The effect of darfur conflict on

the

international community
 Introduction

i
t is now nearly six years since the current crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan
broke in early 2003. Few if any humanitarian crises have achieved
greater notoriety in the interim. The calls to 'do something' about Darfur have been
persistent and pervasive; the amount of time and energy expended on the issue in
diplomatic forums impressive, at least compared to other African conflicts.

International attention to the Darfur conflict largely began with reports by the
advocacy organizations Amnesty International in July 2003 and the International
Crisis Group in December 2003. However, widespread media coverage did not start
until the outgoing United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for
Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, called Darfur the "world's greatest humanitarian crisis" in
March 2004.[3] A movement advocating for humanitarian intervention has emerged in
several countries since then.

The bloodshed in Darfur has by now received a great deal of attention., however, has
focused not on how to stop the crisis, but on whether or not it should be called a
"genocide" under the terms of the Genocide Convention. Such a designation, it was
long thought, would inevitably trigger an international response.

In July 2004, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution labeling Darfur a genocide. Then,
in early September, after reviewing the results of an innovative government-
sponsored investigation, Secretary of the united state of America Colin Powell also
used the term and the American ex President George W. Bush followed suit in a
speech to the United Nations several weeks later--the first times such senior U.S.
government officials had ever conclusively applied the term to a current crisis and
invoked the convention. Darfur, therefore, provides a good test of whether the 56-
year-old Genocide Convention , can make good on its promise to "never again" allow
the targeted destruction of a particular ethnic, racial, or religious group.

We begin by laying out the key premises of the 'international community approach',
or what has come to be known as the English School of International Relations. In
short, who and what is international community, and how should its members be
expected to respond to major humanitarian crises?

The international community is a vague term used in international relations to refer to

all the governments of the world or to a group of them. The term is used to imply the
existence of common duties and obligations between them, frequently in the context
of calls for the respect of human rights and for action to be taken against repressive
regimes.

The research is divided into two sections. Chapter 1 concerns the first international
responses about the crisis in the darfur , with chapters variously considering matters
of humanitarian issues in darfur as well as media coverage and
leadres‘statements,and chapter 2 concerns in particular the effect of darfur on the
international community through the huge international community .

And this research is about the effect of the Darfur conflict wich occurred in sudan on
the international community, so it will answer these following questions: what is the
effect of this conflict? What was the main international responses to the conflict in
darfur? And how did the international community responded to the crisis in darfur ?
 The plan

 Introduction
 Chapter one: the first international reactions
 Part one: the humanitarian aid
 Part two: the media coverage
 Part three: statements from world leaders
 Part four: the declaration of genocide

 Chapter two: the international responses

 Part one: United Nations & the African union
response
 Part two: the united sates of America response
 Part three: the European Union response
 Part four: the Arab countries response
 Part five: the international crime court response
(ICC)
 Conclusion
 Bibiliography
Chapter one : the first international reactions
Part one: the humanitarian aid

The ongoing crisis in Darfur in western Sudan has led to a major humanitarian
disaster, with an estimated 1.5 million people displaced and more than 200,000
refugees forced into neighboring Chad. While there are no reliable estimates of the
number of people killed as a result of the conflict, some observers estimate that up to
70,000 people have been killed from 2003 to the present.

According to United Nations and U.S. officials, the situation in Darfur is considered
to be one of the worst current humanitarian and human rights crises in the world.

International attention to the Darfur conflict largely began with reports by the
advocacy organizations Amnesty International in July 2003 and theInternational
Crisis Group in December 2003. However, widespread media coverage did not start
until the outgoing United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for
Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, called Darfur the "world's greatest humanitarian crisis" in
March 2004.

Organizations such asSTAND: A Student Anti-Genocide Coalition, later under the

umbrella of Genocide Intervention Network, and the Save Darfur Coalition emerged
and became particularly active in the areas of engaging the United States Congress
and President on the issue and pushing for divestment nationwide, initially launched
by Adam Sterling under the auspice of the Sudan Divestment Task Force. Particularly
strong advocates have additionally included:New York Times columnist Nicholas
Kristof, Sudan scholar Eric Reeves, Enough Project founder John
Prendergast, Pulitzer Prize-winning authorSamantha Power, photographers Ryan
Spencer Reed, former Marine Brian Steidle, actress Mia Farrow and her son Ronan
Farrow, Olympian Joey Cheek, actress Angelina Jolie, actor George Clooney,
actor Jonah Hill, actress Salma Hayek, Save Darfur Coalition's David
Rubenstein, Slovenian humanitarian Tomo Kriznar, and all of those involved with
the Genocide Intervention Network. A movement advocating for humanitarian
intervention has emerged in several countries.¹

__________________

1.Wikipedia, 2010[consulted on 30 April 2010], available on:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Darfur

The main humanitarian organizations are :

1.OXFAM

2.INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

3.MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES

4.THE REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL

5.THE OCHA:united nations office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs

6.CARE

these organizations were slow to raise the alarm, at least in their public statements.
The conflict was at its most intense in 2003 and early 2004, with villages razed to the
ground and hundreds of thousands of people killed or displaced. During this period,
most international organisations were either unable to gain access to Darfur or were
publicly silent. With a few exceptions, most notably the Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and MSF, public advocacy on Darfur commenced
in 2004. Many attribute the raising of the alarm to the outgoing UN Resident and
Humanitarian Coordinator to Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, who in March 2004 compared
the situation to Rwanda in 1994. Earlier, the then Under-Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egleland, had called Darfur the world‘s worst humanitarian
disaster (IRIN, 22 March 2004). From that point on, the crisis attracted significantly
increased attention.

As aid agencies began to advocate on sensitive civilian protection issues, the risks
associated with advocacy appeared This increase in the harassment and intimidation
of aid actors also corresponded with rising insecurity. According to OCHA, reported
security incidents involving aid workers (including theft, detention, physical/sexual
assault and death) increased by 59% between 2005 and 2006, and by a further 53% in
the first half of 2007. While the effects of insecurity are felt across the humanitarian
sector, operational NGOs and other non-UN agencies have borne the brunt, with a
69% rise in the number of security incidents between 2005 and 2006, compared to a
28% increase for UN agencies. Over this period, and particularly during 2007, field
workers also indicated an increase in the number of expulsions and greater difficulties
in renewing working papers, particularly for agencies engaged in policy or protection
activities.

As with aid organizations, Darfur is a priority for many human rights groups and
policy think-tanks. In 2003, Amnesty International issued a number of alerts on
Darfur; it has since been joined by Human Rights Watch and other human rights
organizations. The International Crisis Group has also been a consistent voice on
Darfur. Focusing on questions of peace, security and justice and unrestricted by
incountry presence, these organizations have publicly called for strong international
action on Darfur including recommending measures such as UN peacekeeping, no-fly
zones and sanctions. While some aid organizations guard their independence fiercely
and remain cautious about sharing platforms with these groups, others are less
reticent. In addition to the informal channels of communication that have always
existed, new coordination groups, such as Crisis Action in the UK, reflect a trend
towards collective action based on shared analysis.

The apparent success of these campaign groups in increasing the profile of the Darfur
crisis has led some humanitarian organizations to join forces with these coalitions.
Others have received support from campaigning groups, either directly in the form of
financial assistance, or indirectly, to the extent that these organizations highlight
humanitarian needs. Many have also shared campaigning tactics with these groups,
participating directly in the international rallies, such as the Day for Darfur, or
employing similar techniques. UNICEF and the International Rescue Committee, for
instance, have each hosted high-profile visits to Sudan by actors Mia Farrow and
George Clooney, prominent figures in the US Save Darfur campaign ².

In the other hand, the humanitarian response has also been hampered by logistical
challenges. The fundamental challenge has been the remoteness of Darfur and its poor
transport links. There are few tarmac roads, and the one rail link — to Nyala — is
unreliable and insecure. This poses major problems for the timely delivery of
adequate humanitarian supplies. For instance it can take three weeks to deliver food
by truck from Port Sudan to El Geneina. In the rainy season, most roads are
impassable. Faced by bureaucratic obstructions and insecurity, the World Food
Program (WFP) had a slow start in Darfur in 2004, and spent much of the year
playing catch-up. Once a reasonable operating capacity had been reached, WFP faced
additional problems of airport apron capacity, aviation fuel shortages, and
insecurity.77 As we heard from NGOs in Khartoum, and data for early 2005
confirm78, there are still concerns about the ability of WFP to deliver sufficient food
to Darfur, especially if insecurity continues. All organizations tasked with the delivery
of humanitarian supplies, including the WFP, must be well-supported by the donors at
an early stage. If they are to deliver adequate supplies at the right time, then this is
essential. In return for donor support, the organizations must deliver. The WFP must
do all it can to ensure that adequate food supplies are in place before demand peaks in
August this year.

__________________

2. Humanitarian advocacyin Darfur: the challenge of neutrality, HPG Policy Brief

Humanitarian Policy Group,p.p2-5,[consulted on 01may2010]available on:
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/341.pdf

The humanitarian crisis in Darfur is far from over. The relief effort made steady
progress with providing assistance to an increasing number of people over the course
of 2004, but big gaps remain. Thirty-eight percent of those in need of food are not
provided for, twenty-seven percent of those in need of shelter, and fifty-one percent of
those in need of clean water. Ninety-six percent of those in need of agricultural inputs
seeds and tools have not been provided for.139 Millions of people remain displaced
and affected by conflict. The effects of the crisis will be felt across Darfur for many
years to come, by the mainly Arab nomadic herders as well as the mainly ―African‖
sedentary farmers, many of whom are currently housed in camps.

Such concerns were put to us particularly forcefully in El Fasher, by representatives

of the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO). If, as seems certain, the IDPs are unable to return home this spring in time to
plant crops, continuing food aid will still be needed this year to feed 3 or perhaps 4
million people, nomadic Arabs as well as African sedentary farmers. There is an
extremely serious risk of famine. Having arrived late in the day, the humanitarian
community must not now turn its back on Darfur³.

_______________

3. Darfur, Sudan: The responsibility to protect, 2005, authority of the House of

Commons,p.p:25-29.
Chapter two: the media coverage

The need for information during any time of conflict or crisis is crucial not only for
those directly affected but also for those involved and engaged from outside the
affected area. The need for information of the Darfur conflict is no exception. Indeed,
Darfur is often cited as one of the world‘s worst humanitarian disasters but it is also
one of the most complex. Considering, that mass media often is a main source of
information in relation to a given conflict and its development it will be useful to
examine what type of media coverage has been afforded the conflict by the media.

Amnesty International, the International Crisis Group, Justice Africa and Médecins

Sans Frontières began warning the world about the emerging crisis in Darfur from the
very start of 2003.38 Their warnings were not taken seriously. Some NGOs were told
that it was not the right time to highlight Darfur for fear of jeopardising the North-
South peace process,In September 2003 the UN launched an appeal the Greater
Darfur Special Initiative — for $23 million.40 In November 2003, the UN Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) warned that Darfur was set to
become the world‘s ―worst humanitarian crisis‖. Darfur still received little public
attention.

First of all, we present the media coverage in Sudanese and non-Sudanese (Arab)
media from the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the media content.

And for instance: The Sudanese and Arab media differ in terms of the volume of
coverage concerning the issue of Darfur. While the situation occupies a larger space
in the local Sudanese media for obvious reasons, in the Arab media the situation is
represented in almost equal proportions to other issues of social concern.

This allocation of coverage is also reflected in the number of journalists dedicated to

Darfur in comparison with other issues. The editor of Al-Aosboa, Mustafa Bakri, says
that he has a team of three persons specialized in Sudanese affairs who are in charge
of the Al-Aosboa‘s special edition which is printed in Sudan and related to its affairs.

At Al-Arabiya TV, the Darfur issue falls within the framework of African affairs in
general. However, according to Nabil Al-Khatib, Darfur is regarded as an essential
feature of the channel‘s African coverage because it is considered an Arab issue
―making it a priority in coverage‖.

For Al-Jazeera, there is no fixed percentage of coverage on Darfur ―but it depends on

the importance of the event and the focus now is on the issue of Rafah border and
check point,‖ according to Ahmed Al-Sheikh.

Conversely, the pan-Arab news channel Al-Jazeera reported the attack on Golo (26
February 2003) immediately, causing the then-Governor of North Darfur Lt-Gen
Ibrahim Sulayman to refute on Sudanese TV the next day Al-Jazeera's claims that a
rebel movement had occupied Golo.

The lack of resources plays a role in determining the volume of coverage of the
Darfur issue for the newspaper Al-Nahar which generally covers less of the Darfur
issue than it likely deserves considering the magnitude of the crisis in relation to other
issues.

Attiya Ayadi of Al-Ahram acknowledges that the volume of coverage of the issue of
Darfur in his newspaper is ―not sufficient‖ and is perhaps due to lack of resources.

Marwan Metni of LBC channel says that this issue occupies a volume equal to the
coverage of other issues in the region. He also indicates that the channel does not have
a department for African Affairs but rather a specialized department called ―hot
spots‖.

All in all it would appear that for the most part, the Darfur conflict does not garner
any particular volume of coverage for several reasons including financial. Rather the
conflict is covered as any other conflict in the region or in the

African continent and will get the attention of editors when there is a spike or
significant event.

In general, the interviewed media representatives expressed dissatisfaction with the

size and nature of coverage concerning the Darfur issue in the Arab media especially
among those in charge of covering the issue.

Abdel Azim Awad of Um Durman Radio says the Arab media ―fall short in its
reporting on Darfur since they participate in the coverage upon invitations rather than
self-initiatives,‖ while ―foreign media are subject to the interests of some non-
governmental organizations.‖

Clearly, despite the will and possibilities to cover the conflict, most journalists and
editors have expressed disappointment in both the quantity and quality of the
coverage of Darfur and lay blame largely on the lack of knowledge of the conflict.
However, if this is to change then it will likely need, as expressed earlier, some
specialized training not just of Darfur but conflict in general¹.

The Arab media has been criticised in the past for its scant regard for Darfur, but it
did cover the region in 2003. For example, a report on Al-Jazeera prompted then-
Governor of North Darfur Lt-Gen Ibrahim Sulayman to refute on Sudanese TV on 27
February 2003 its claims that a rebel movement had occupied Golo. A further exempli
gratia: the attack on Al-Fasher airport was reported by a number of Sudanese outlets
(print and broadcast), and regional news agencies and newspapers, including Egypt
(MENA), the Gulf (Al-Watan, Qatar), Jordan (Al-Bawaba), the Saudi Press Agency,
and the London-based Arabic-language newspapers Al-Hayat and Asharq Al-Awsat.

However, one caveat to mention is that the freedom given to these agencies and their
staff to report is another matter, as is the appetite they themselves had to report in any
depth; Darfur has never been an ideal reporting environment for a wide range of
reasons, not just government obstruction².

_______________

1. A quantitative and qualitative analysis: Media coverage of the Darfur conflict in

Sudanese and non-Sudanese media,report, June 2009,available on:
www.cihrs.org/Images/ArticleFiles/Original/475.pdf

2. The Absence of the Western Media from Darfur in 2003,Guy Gabriel,available on:
http://blog.albanyassociates.com/?p=204
Meanwhile, in the western media, 2003 was a very quiet year for Western media and
advocacy, which were very slow in cottoning on to the unfolding tragedy. Why is this? Where
were they? Debates rage about the efficacy of organisations such as Save Darfur, which was
not established until July 2004, but questions also need to be asked about the role of the
media in Darfur, especially in the early stages of the conflict.

During the calendar year following 26 February 2003 (for arguments sake, the attack
on Golo is taken to be the start of the conflict), five articles about Darfur appeared in
the British mainstream media, three of which were news-in-brief in the Independent
(culled from newswires) – a combined total of 165 words. The other two were in the
Guardian (both in early 2004). By this stage, the frequency of attacks had peaked,
according to statistics used by the Prosecution in preparing their case at
the International Criminal Court.

This virtual silence seems counter-intuitive from today‘s perspective, as this period of
high-intensity conflict set the tone for much of the future media coverage and
advocacy as characterised by Save Darfur. Nevertheless, the very low exposure of
Darfur in the British media in 2003 is a matter of record, and is a state of affairs
replicated among major publications in the US.

If a particular subject is missing from a newspaper, the explanation is that there is no

editorial appetite for it. Undoubtedly, Khartoum opposed reporting from Darfur. In fact, then-
minister of information and communication, Al-Zahawi Ibrahim Malik, in March 2003 was
already complaining that the media ―had magnified events and portrayed untrue facts‖ (13
March 2003, Al-Khartoum).

Amnesty International in July 2003 drew attention to the case of Yusuf Al-Beshir Musa, a
correspondent of Al-Sahafa in Nyala, South Darfur, who was arrested and beaten by the
security forces ―apparently because he wrote about the destruction of Sudan air force planes
and helicopters in El Fashir airport by the Sudan Liberation Army.‖ Having said that, Sudan
normally fares better than many other countries in the neighbourhood (such as Ethiopia,
Egypt, Eritrea, and Libya among others) in the Reporters Without Borders Annual Press
Freedom Index, having kept a cushion of 24-38 other countries in between them and least free
country press-wise in the world since these records began (2002). However, its lowest ever
ranking was 2003.

Nonetheless, a wide range of sources were available to journalists potentially covering

Darfur, which was most certainly on the radar of newswires in early 2003 (among
others, Agence France Presse, the Associated Press, Reuters, the Pan African News
Agency, United Press International and Integrated Regional Information
Networks were reporting Darfur then).

The one British newspaper to report the attack on Al-Fashir airport, the Independent
on Sunday (27 April 2003), then reported nothing further until nine months later (24
December 2003) because nothing in its opinion happened there that was newsworthy,
though this was not the opinion of the various outlets mentioned above.
In fact, it was NGOs that began drawing attention to Darfur – this much is confirmed
in one of the early broadsides to a dormant public about Darfur. After several attempts
and what amounts to sanitizing for public consumption, the Washington
Post published a commentary by Eric Reeves (Unnoticed Genocide, 25 February
2004) in which the opening paragraphs quote both Doctors Without Borders and
Amnesty International, an organisation that the author writes ―has led the way in
reporting on Darfur.‖

This was an accurate observation. For example, Amnesty noted the ―deteriorating
situation‖ in Darfur in February 2003. The International Crisis Group likewise pre-
dated mainstream media interest with Sudan‘s Other Wars (25 June 2003), as did
Sudan: Empty promises? Human rights violations in government-controlled areas (15
July 2003), again from Amnesty. A 3 February 2004 report, Darfur: ―Too many
people killed for no reason‖, yet again from Amnesty, coincided with the start of
much greater media interest in Darfur.

However, the reports produced by NGOs are not categorised in the same way as
articles produced by journalism. While newspaper reporters are by definition
(textbook, at least) ‗objective‘ and required to provide ‗both sides of the story‘ (in
news articles, as opposed to opinion pieces), NGOs have no similar, developed branch
of ethics requiring them to do so. In fact, they profess to lobby for a particular
outcome: Amnesty campaigns for ―human rights for all,‖ while the ICG says it
provides, among other things, ―sharp-edged policy prescription and high-level
advocacy.‖ No newspaper or news agency would claim the same.

Undoubtedly, this is a vital role to fulfil in civil society, especially in areas, such as
Darfur, where the media simply cannot cover everything, if at all, to the tastes of a
wide range of consumers. Darfur in 2003 was at best an esoteric subject, at worst
almost completely ignored by the mainstream. However, it also needs to be said that it
is entirely legitimate for journalism to draw upon secondary post-event accounts as
source material, such as interviews, recollections, contemporary photos etc – but this
is not the same as being eyewitness to something.
The question we are left with is what quality does NGO-led news agenda-setting bequeath the
journalism on Darfur once they have caught up? Inevitably, subsequent (Western) journalism
is qualified by its absence in the early period, as it was obliged to build on foundations
provided by others that operate in a different way to it.

In contrast to Darfur, the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq in the same year
received global blanket coverage that pushed the boundaries of journalism and of
credulity at times. This comparison merely makes the point that if there is an editorial
appetite – such as the US-led coalition removing one of the West‘s great bogeymen –
the media consumer can be made to feel that there is nothing he or she does not know
about a subject. This in Darfur came much later³.

______________

3. . The Absence of the Western Media from Darfur in 2003,Guy Gabriel,available

on: http://blog.albanyassociates.com/?p=204
Part three : statements from world leaders
US President George W. Bush:

in 9 September 2004,Restated declaration of genocide in June 2005

On 18 February 2006 US President George W. Bush called for the number of

international troops in Darfur to be doubled.

In may 2007,us president Bush said:‖ Darfurians deserve the help‖

He said during a White House briefing that the U.S. will continue to push for full
implementation of a peace agreement.

"I promise this to the people of Darfur: The United States will not avert our eyes from
a crisis that challenges the conscience of the world, »¹.

Colin Powell: (exUnited States Secretary of State)

He cited a "consistent and widespread" pattern of atrocities -- including killings, rapes and
burning of villages. "This was a coordinated effort, not just random violence," he said.

"The government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility," Powell said.

He made his comments as the U.N. Security Council prepared to meet on the matter and study
a new draft resolution being circulated by the United States².

Powell said for the first time in:09 of september 2004, that genocide has taken place in Sudan
and that the government in Khartoum and government-sponsored Arab militias known as
Janjaweed "bear responsibility" for rapes, killings and other abuses that have left 1.2 million
black Africans homeless.³

__________________

1. Bush Pressures Sudan Over Darfur Genocide, available on:

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10518746

2. Powell calls Sudan killings genocide, available on:

http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/09/09/sudan.powell/

3. U.S. Calls Killings In Sudan Genocide, available on: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/articles/A8364-2004Sep9.html
Tony blair: (ex British prime minister)

On 17 September 2006, British Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote an open letter to the
members of the European Union calling for a unified response to the crisis.

"In the coming weeks I will talk to other leaders to agree on an initiative that sets out
the help Sudan can expect if the government lives up to its obligations and what will
happen if they don't," Blair said in a statement.

"The government of Sudan must agree to the continuation of the (African Union)
force and transition to the U.N.," he said.

Blair's comments come a day after U.S. Oscar-winning actor George Clooney told the
United Nations time was running out in Darfur and the world would be blamed for a
genocide akin to Rwanda if atrocities were not halted4.

Gorden Brown: (British prime minister)

In supporting the United Nations Security Council resolution in 2007 to authorize the
deployment of up to 26,000 peacekeepers to try to stop the violence in Darfur, British
Prime Minister Gordon Brown said in a speech before the General Assembly of the
United Nations, the war "the greatest humanitarian disaster the world faces today"5.

_______________

4. U.K.'s Tony Blair: Darfur Situation is 'Unacceptable',available on :

http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/9/15/105025.shtml

5. International response to the War in Darfur,available on:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_response_to_the_War_in_Darfur
Mukesh Kapila : (un president & humanitarian coordinator)

His statement was: "I see no reason why the international community should not
consider some sort of international court or mechanism to bring to trial the individuals
who are masterminding and committing the war crimes [in Darfur]." (Reuters, March
26, 2004)

―[Kapila] said the violence, which he described as 'ethnic cleansing', was mostly
carried out by Arab militias known as Janjaweed who were supported by government
forces. ‗Under those circumstances one can only conclude that it is state-sanctioned.‘‖
(Reuters [Khartoum], March 26, 2004)

"‗The only difference between Rwanda and Darfur now is the numbers involved‘
[said Kapila]. ‗[The slaughter in Darfur] is more than just a conflict, it is an organised
attempt to do away with a group of people.‘‖ (UN Integrated Regional Information
Networks, March 22, 2004)

The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, added his voice in December 2003.Mukesh
Kapila, the UN‘s then-Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan 6.

______________

6. (Mukesh Kapila, UN humanitarian coordinator for Sudan), March 29,

2004,available on : http://www.sudanreeves.org/Sections-req-viewarticle-artid-161-
allpages-1-theme-Printer.html
Part four: the declaration of genocide
The following notable individuals and institutions have declared the conflict in Darfur
a genocide (organized chronologically by first statement):

 International Association of Genocide Scholars, 19 February 2004

 Committee on Conscience of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, 6 June

2004

 The United States Congress (House Concurrent Resolution 467), 22 June

2004, passed 422-0 in the House and by unanimous voice vote in the Senate,
declaring state-sponsored genocide by the proxy militias known as Janjaweed.
Therefore each member of the 108th United States Congress has technically
declared that the situation in Darfur is a genocide. All but three members of
the 109th United States Congress voted in favor of the Darfur Peace and
Accountability Act, a law signed by President Bush in October 2006 that
restated the findings of genocide. Additional individual statements by
members of the US Congress are noted below.

 US Sen. Russell Feingold, 22 July 2004

 US Secretary of State Colin Powell, 9 September 2004

 US President George W. Bush, 9 September 2004 ,Restated declaration in

June 2005, and in a meeting with activists from the Save Darfur Coalition, 28
April 2006

 Jewish World Watch, 16 September 2004, in a sermon by Rabbi Harold M.

Schulweis.

 US Sen. John Kerry, prior to 16 September 2004

 Anti-Defamation League

 US Sen. Joseph Lieberman, 2 March 2005

 Armenian Assembly of America, 2 March 2005

 US Sen. and Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, 15 April 2005

 American Jewish Committee, 6 May 2005

 Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, July 2005

 US Sen. Barack Obama, 22 July 2005

 Genocide Intervention Network, 21 November 2005

 Israeli ambassador to the U.N., Itzhak Levanon, 27 January 2006

  US Sen. Hillary Clinton, 16 March 2006

 French foreign minister Philippe Douste-Blazy, 6 September 2006

 The Assembly of the Republic of Portugal, 4 May 2007

 Physicians for Human Rights (date unknown)

 U.S. Committee for Refugees (date unknown)

 Africa Action (date unknown)

 Justice Africa (date unknown)

 Africa Confidential (date unknown)

 Yad Vashem (date unknown)

 Genocide Watch (date unknown)

 American Israel Public Affairs Committee

The following institutions have not declared the conflict in Darfur a genocide (related
statements included):

 United Nations: Stated that mass murders of civilians have been committed by
the Janjaweed, but not genocide

 African Union: In the 2004 the Chair of the AU's PSC said that "abuses are
taking place. There is mass suffering, but it is not genocide."

 Amnesty International: "The grave human rights abuses ... cannot be ignored
any longer, nor justified or excused by a context of armed conflict."

 Médecins sans Frontières: Director Jean-Hervé Bradol called the term

genocide "inappropriate" and deputy emergency director Dr. Mercedes
Taty said "I don't think that we should be using the word 'genocide' to describe
this conflict. Not at all. This can be a semantic discussion, but nevertheless,
there is no systematic target – targeting one ethnic group or another one. It
doesn't mean either that the situation in Sudan isn't extremely serious by
itself."¹

_____________

1. International response to the War in Darfur, available on:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_response_to_the_War_in_Darfur
In September 2004, the Security Council adopted resolution 1564 which among other
things requested that the Secretary General ―rapidly establish an international
commission of inquiry in order to investigate reports of violations of international
humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also
whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such
violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable‖. The
resulting International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (COI) reported to the
Council on January 25, 2005. The report generated controversy which obscured its
other important conclusions by finding that the Government of Sudan has not pursued
a policy of genocide, but has committed crimes against humanity.

The COI has given the United Nations Secretary-General a sealed list of 51 persons it
considers guilty of these crimes. The Secretary-General will forward this list to the
international prosecutor who may be entrusted with the case of Darfur. This
prosecutor will be free to make his or her own determination on genocide there. The
COI report recommended that the Security Council refer Darfur to the International
Crime (ICC).

I. Did acts of genocide occur?

The definition of genocide under the Genocide Convention of 1948 as well as in the
Rome Statute for the ICC and other customary international rules is as follows:

Genocide is any of the following acts, committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its

Physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

A crime always constitutes of two elements, an objective and subjective one. The
objective element is the actual acts required by the definition of the crime and the
subjective part requires the will to commit these acts. In the case of genocide both the
objective and subjective element have two dimension.

In the Darfur case the commission found it hard to just rely on the objective criteria in
determining whether the Arab militia and the African tribes make up groups that are
distinct in an objective way. Both tribes are Muslim and speak Arabic. The groups
have also mixed through marriage and settlement to a point where it is hard for an
outsider to make a distinction.
 While there are slight differences between the two it is arguable whether these
constitute an objective difference.

In the subjective perspective, the report names examples of attacks where the Arab
militia used terms such as ―slaves‖ or ―blacks‖. The witnesses always described the
attackers as ―Janjaweed‖, which in this context was used to describe ―militias of Arab
tribes on horseback or on camelback‖. This led the commission to conclude that the
victims saw their attackers as belonging to a hostile group that is different from
themselves. This fulfilled the requirement of a distinct group.

Another reason the Commission gives why it cannot see a genocidal intent behind the
Government‘s actions is that it collects fugitives from the destroyed villages into
camps for internally displaced persons. According to the report this means the
Government does not want to destroy these people but wants to have them live in a
government controlled area².

The U.N. commission's report said a court could still determine that government
officials or militia leaders did commit acts "with genocidal intent." But the panel
found that "the crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing" from policy
pursued by the government. "Generally speaking," it said, "the policy of attacking,
killing and forcibly displacing members of some tribes does not evince a specific
intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group distinguished on racial, ethnic,
national or religious grounds."

That, however, should not "detract from the gravity of the crimes perpetrated" in
Darfur, the report said, adding that they may be "no less serious and heinous than
genocide.³ "

_______________

2. Darfur, Genocide, the Security Council and the International Criminal

Court,available on: www.amicc.org/docs/Sudan%20Referral%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf

3.the Washington post, U.N. Panel Finds No Genocide in Darfur but Urges Tribunals,
Colum Lynch, Tuesday, February 1, 2005; Page A01,available on:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52442-2005Jan31.html
 Chapter two: the international response
Part one: united nations & the African union response

1.united nations:
In Sudan, as elsewhere, Member States determine the role of the UN, ultimately by
the decisions that they make, in accordance with the UN Charter, on the UN Security
Council.

From mid-2004, Darfur received more attention: Kofi Annan, US Secretary of State
Colin Powell, Jack Straw and Hilary Benn visited the region

. The UN Security Council sprang into action, of a sort, adopting four Resolutions
about Sudan in the latter half of 2004.

. The UN Security Council adopted its first Resolution on Darfur (1556) in July 2004,
with a second (1564) following in September. Both of these Resolutions were adopted
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, implying that the crisis in Darfur represents a
threat to international peace and security. As such, the UN Security Council could
legitimately and legally adopt mandatory punitive measures against the Sudanese
government in the event of non-compliance, including economic sanctions, and, if
necessary, military action.

The Resolutions called on all parties to allow humanitarian access, to cooperate with
AU mediation efforts, and to respect their ceasefire and other commitments.
Resolution 1556 demanded that the GoS fulfil its commitments to disarm the
Janjaweed and bring their leaders to justice, requesting a report on compliance in
thirty days time, to be followed by monthly reports. The Security Council also
expressed its intention to consider further unspecified economic and diplomatic
sanctions in the event of non-compliance, and decided to implement an arms embargo
covering all non-governmental entities.

Resolution 1564 expressed grave concern at the lack of progress with regard to
security and the protection of civilians, and the disarmament of the Janjaweed,
demanded that the GoS provide the Security Council with the names of Janjaweed
leaders, and requested the establishment of an International Commission of Inquiry.
The Security Council noted that China and Pakistan had abstained on the first
Resolution, while Russia and Algeria ultimately supported it but felt that the Sudanese
government should be given more time.

China, Russia, Algeria and Pakistan abstained on the second Resolution. They all felt
that sanctions were inappropriate, and that the GoS deserved more credit for the steps
it had taken to comply.
A stronger Resolution would likely have been vetoed by China, and possibly Russia.
The UN Security Council met in Nairobi from 18–19 November, to emphasise the
importance which the international community attached to peace in Sudan. The
Nairobi Resolution (1574) urged the GoS and the SPLM to conclude the CPA, and
emphasized that progress towards resolving the crisis in Darfur would create
conditions conducive for the delivery of assistance for the implementation of the
CPA. It made no mention of the Government of the Sudan‘s obligations under
previous Resolutions, and backtracked on prior threats of sanctions.256 It was passed
unanimously.

The Resolutions of the UN Security Council succeeded in focusing attention on

Darfur, within the context of Sudan, but made few demands of the Sudanese
government, or the rebels, and failed to specify what consequences would flow from
non-compliance. The one clear demand that the Resolutions did make was that the
GoS must disarm the Janjaweed and bring their leaders to justice. Eight months later,
despite repeated commitments and promises, there is no evidence that the GoS has
made any serious effort to comply with this resolution; the Janjaweed remain at large,
supplied with arms and operating in a climate of impunity¹.

On 24 March 2005, the Security Council by its resolution 1590 (2005) established the
United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). The Council decided that the tasks of
UNMIS, among others, would be: to support implementation of
the CPA(;Comprehensive Peace Agreement) to facilitate and coordinate, within its
capabilities and in its areas of deployment, the voluntary return of refugees and
internally displaced persons and humanitarian assistance; to assist the parties in the
mine action sector; to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote
human rights in the Sudan. See the UNMIS Mandate, for further information².

On 31 August 2006, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution

1706 which called for a new 26,000-troop UN peacekeeping force called UNAMID to
supplant or supplement a poorly funded and ill-equipped 7,000-troop African
Union Mission in Sudan peacekeeping force. Sudan strongly objected to the
resolution and said that it would see the UN forces in the region as foreign invaders.
The following day, the Sudanese military launched a major offensive in the region.
In March 2007 the UN mission accused Sudan's government of orchestrating and
taking part in "gross violations" in Darfur and called for urgent international action to
protect civilians there.

In February 2009, Darfur's UNAMID tried to persuade the rebel group Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese government to sign a peace agreement³.

____________

1. Darfur, Sudan: The responsibility to protect, 2005, authority of the House of

Commons,p.p:57-58.

2. United Nations Mission in the Sudan, available

on:http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml

3. War in Darfur, available on : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Darfur

2.African union:
The African Union has taken centre-stage in the international community‘s response
to the crisis in Darfur, with the UN Security Council providing post-facto
endorsement.

The AU‘s involvement in Darfur was supported by the international community for
two reasons:

First, the AU‘s involvement signals a new commitment by African countries to take
responsibility for dealing with the problems of their neighbors, a commitment which
will in time do much to enhance the world‘s ability to deal with crises and conflict.

Second, and more importantly, the AU was and remains the only entity willing to
involve itself so fully in trying to tackle the crisis and protect the people of Darfur.

Indeed, as authorization from the UN Security Council for military intervention by

other organizations has never looked likely, the AU has been the only realistic option.
The Sudanese government perhaps mistakenly imagining that the AU would be a
―soft touch‖ has been prepared to accept the involvement of the AU in what it regards
as an internal matter.

The AU, it should be noted, is only in Sudan with the consent of the host
government. The Sudanese government has repeatedly ruled out military intervention
by non-African organisations, and is backed up by Chad, Egypt, Liberia and Nigeria
in its promotion of ―African solutions for African problems‖.

The AU however, has a mandate for intervention in cases of genocide, gross human
rights violations, military coups and rigged elections which threaten peace and
security in its Member States. The thresholds for triggering intervention remain
unclear, and would be determined by the AU‘s Peace and Security Council.

The AU-hosted talks in Abuja:

Nigeria,was the current Chair of the AU, has been hosting and mediating talks in
Abuja between the GoS and the rebel groups ,the SLA/M and the JEM , aimed at
finding a political solution to the crisis in Darfur. There have been three rounds of
negotiations. The first round began on 23 August 2004 and broke up in mid-
September, after inconclusive talks on a humanitarian protocol. The second round led
to the signing of two protocols , on humanitarian issues and on security , on 9
November 2004. The Humanitarian Protocol includes commitments on free
movement and access for humanitarian agencies;the protection of civilians; the role of
the international community; and an implementation mechanism
the Joint Humanitarian Facilitation and Monitoring Unit. The Security

Protocol recommits the parties to the N‘Djamena Ceasefire of April 2004, reiterates
theSudanese government‘s responsibility for disarming the Arab militias (Janjaweed),
and specifies a reporting mechanism for the AU ceasefire monitors.

A third round of talks in December 2004 was intended to lead to the signing of a
―Political protocol‖, but the talks were abandoned because of escalating violence in
Darfur, caused in large part by the Sudanese government‘s aggressive ―road-clearing‖

The initial AU mandate for Darfur was ceasefire monitoring. The revised mandate,
from October 2004, was extended to include some civilian protection. It does not
extend to peace enforcement or disarmament. There has been confusion about the
interpretation of the civilian protection mandate. The mandate gives the AU Mission
the task of ―protecting civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the
immediate vicinity, within its resources and capability, it being understood that the
protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the GoS3.‖

African Union efforts to seek a solution to the crisis in Darfur culminated in the
signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on 5 May 2006. The Secretary-General
said that the DPA, signed after more than three years of conflict, had given hope that
the parties might be prepared to lay down their weapons. At the same time, he noted
that the Agreement still faced formidable challenges. Following the signing of the
Agreement, there was an escalation of clashes between those who supported it and
those who did not4.

____________

3. Darfur, Sudan: The responsibility to protect, 2005, authority of the House of

Commons,p.p:43-47.

4. UNMIS United Nations Mission in the Sudan,available on:

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml
 Part two: the united states of America
response
As we have mentioned already in the last chapter ,the unite states of America was the
first in declaring genocide by both of the American president & the secretary of
State ―Colin Powell‖ & by asking for peacekeeping forces intervention in Darfur

And this timeline makes the responses clear :

The United States (US) Response:

June 2004: US Congress described Darfur as ‗genocide‘.

September 2004: On the basis of a report conducted jointly by the US State

Department, the Coalition of International Justice and USAID, the US Secretary of
State Colin Powell announces that ―Genocide has been committed in Darfur, and the
government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility …no new action is
dictated by this determination.‖

21 April 2005: US Senate unanimously passed Darfur Accountability Act,

spearheaded by Senator Jon Corzine. The Act condemned genocide, called for
sanctions and the appointment of a presidential envoy to Darfur.

21 April 2005: The Sudanese head of intelligence, (thought to be accused of war

crimes by the UN inquiry), was brought to Washington to brief the CIA on terrorism.

November 2005: US Senate cut $50m from aid to the African Union mission to
Darfur.

September 2006 : At a UN General Assembly Meeting in New York, George W. Bush

declared that "if the Sudanese government does not approve this peacekeeping force
quickly, the United Nations must act".

17 September 2006: At the occasion of the Global Day for Darfur, President Bush
joined calls for the UN to stop Darfur slaughter. In the Sunday Times, he claimed ―I
can understand the desperation people feel for women pulled out of these refugee
centres and raped. And now is the time to act‖.

May 2007: President Bush announced further economic sanctions as well as support
for the UNAMID peacekeeping force.
Bush also ordered the US Department of Treasury to block the assets of three
influential Sudanese individuals accused of taking part in Sudan‘s genocidal
campaign, including sanctioning 31 companies owned or controlled by the GoS.
September 2007: The US pledged support for peacekeeping and humanitarian
assistance in Darfur: $4 billion towards operations for peacekeeping, humanitarian
assistance and development, providing 25% of funding for the UN-AU hybrid force,
construction and maintenance for 34 bases in Darfur for the AU peacekeepers, 40,000
tons of aid food (monthly).

February 2008: Steven Spielberg resigns as artistic director to the 2008 Beijing
Olympic Games, stating : ―I have made repeated efforts to encourage the Chinese
government to use its unique influence to bring safety and stability to the Darfur
region of Sudan. Although some progress has been made along the way, most notably,
the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769, the situation in
Darfur continues to worsen and the violence continues to accelerate. With this in
mind, I find that my conscience will not allow me to continue with business as usual.
At this point, my time and energy must be spent not on Olympic ceremonies, but on
doing all I can to help bring an end to the unspeakable crimes against humanity that
continue to be committed in Darfur.‖ A great deal of media attention on Darfur is
generated as a result¹.

___________

1.Darfur Timeline,available on :
http://www.article1.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=185&Item
id=48
Part three : the European union response
EU ENGAGEMENT WITH ARAB ACTORS

Although the EU‘s external relations aim to have a global reach, some commentators
point to a lack of EU engagementwith Arab states when it comes to conflict
resolution. This is important background information to takeinto consideration when
considering this analysis; EU member states tend to act bilaterally with Arab
statesmore than through EU mechanisms, a legacy in part of the EU lacking a clear
structure for foreign policy.

The difficulties in coordinating 27 EU member states means that the EU is more

often than not caught in no-man‘s land between the dialogue of the US and Arab
states.

What the EU lacks in political push, it makes up for in vast financial development and
humanitarian aid. EU member states donated over 17 trillion US dollars in DAC aid
in 2007 to 20 Arab states,3 and EU financial payouts through contracts and
commitments amounted to some €1.2 billion in 2007.4 However, the EU‘s partnership
focus in this area is largely based on African, Caribbean and Pacific states as well as
Overseas Countries & Territories (OCT‘s),5 rather than Arab states. As such, the
Commission has provided Sudan with over €500 million in development assistance
since 2005, as well as approximately €640 million in humanitarian aid, including
close to €110 million for 2009 only.6 EU engagement with Arab states as a group
tends to be more targeted at trade and environmental concerns. This is particularly so
since the onset of the 2008 development of the Union for the Mediterranean or
‗Euromd‘, evolved from the 1995 Barcelona Process; the first of its three key
principles {Political and Security Dialogue, Economic and Financial Partnership,
Social, Cultural and Human Partnership}, was to enable dialogue related to the fight
against terrorism and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), involving
issues such as civil protection, good governance, and parliamentary cooperation. But
the principal focus has now turned to infrastructure, environment and business.7 Even
though the Commission claims that it will also provide a forum for regional dialogue
for the Middle East Peace Process, and that it ‗remains the only multilateral context
outside the United Nations where all parties to the conflict can meet and work
together on a range of issues‘, the suitability of this platform to address Arab issues
beyond the Mediterranean is yet to be seen ¹‖

____________

1. THE EU‘S ROLE IN THE DARFUR CRISIS FROM 2003 UNTIL TODAY, Giji
Gya,March 2010,p.p 7-8, available on: http://www.isis-
europe.org/pdf/2010_artrel_461_10-03gya-fride-eu-role-darfur.pdf
A timeline to the EU response:

The European Union (EU) Response:

September 2004: The European Parliament declared that the actions of the Sudanese
Government in Darfur were ‗tantamount to genocide‘. By including the qualifier that
Khartoum‘s actions were virtually genocide, the EU puts itself on the record as
deploring the crimes, yet avoided the contractual obligation under the UN Genocide
Convention to act.

16-17 October 2006: At the EU External Relations Council Meeting, foreign

ministers emphasized that “a UN operation is the only realistic option for a
sustainable, long-term peacekeeping operation in Darfur”. Despite Sudan‘s defiant
resistance to UN deployment in Darfur, the Council reaffirmed its decision not to
impose sanctions on Khartoum.

March 2007: An EU resolution which aimed to facilitate compensation for victims;

urge the UN General Assembly to convince companies affiliated with the Sudanese
regime to withdraw their businesses from Sudan; and address issues regarding the
Sudanese government‘s failed ability to protect its civilians, failed to make much
progress.
The EU claims to be at the forefront of funding the AU and support for
implementation of the DPA and CPA, human rights inquiries, and for UN Special
Envoys to ensure compliance with Security Council Resolutions (totalling €1 billion
euros).

March 2008: To date, the EU has deployed 100 EU personnel to Sudan as military
support for AMIS. The EU has coordinated airlifts for over 2,000 AU personnel. It
has also heavily contributed to AMIS funding (totalling €435 million). These funds
are also earmarked to fund UNAMID transition costs.

February 2008: European security force in Chad (EUFOR) deployed a force of 3,700
troops to Chad in to protect N‘djamena and Chadian President Deby from an
attempted rebel coup.

March 2008: A EUFOR soldier was shot and killed in an exchange of fire with the
Sudanese military when his truck accidentally crossed the border of Chad into Sudan.
French President Sarkozy condemned the killing, declaring the exchange of fire with
the Sudanese military as “deliberate and disproportionate”.
EU divests shares from the Chinese Oil firm PetroChina/CNPC due to its affiliation
with and bankrolling of the GoS and the genocide in Darfur after pressure from
humanitarian activists and MEPs.
The United Kingdom (UK) Response:

March 2005: The House of Commons International Development Select Committee

took the unusual step of reprimanding DFID Secretary of State Hilary Benn for
downplaying the scale of the disaster in Darfur.

June 2005: The Africa minister Lord Triesman reiterated earlier parliamentary
answers when he said the UK remained“concerned” about the situation in
Darfur; “We continue to make it clear to the government of Sudan that perpetrators
must be brought to justice,” and “we regularly press the government of Sudan [to
uphold its obligations].” When asked about friendly relations between London and
Khartoum, his predecessor, Chris Mullin, said, “I’m afraid that, in diplomacy, it is
sometimes necessary to meet governments with whom we do not see eye to eye on all
matters.”

March and August 2006: The head of Sudanese Intelligence, Salah Abdallah Gosh
was granted a visa to the UK for “urgent medical reasons treatment”, according to
the FCO. The US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs was in London
during both visits.

8 December 2006: In a statement on the second Day for Darfur on 11 January, Hilary
Benn reiterated the FCO and DFID position that all parties to the conflict held equal
responsibility for the crisis in Darfur: “the Government of Sudan and the rebel groups
must end the fighting and commit to finding a political solution (…). The continued
fighting by the Government of Sudan and the rebel groups, particularly the National
Redemption Front, is putting this work in jeopardy and is threatening yet more lives”.

13 December 2006: In the Financial Times, Tony Blair declared his support for a no-
fly zone in Darfur and called for “tougher action”. He warned that “If rapid progress
is not made, we will need to consider alternative approaches, with international
partners”.

16 January 2007: At Commons question time, William Hague urged Foreign

Secretary Margaret Beckett to spell out what actions the British government intended
to take in view of the worsening situation on the ground in Darfur. Beckett
answered:“There is, I think, quite a short window of opportunity for the government
of Sudan to show that this time they are sincere in being willing to move forward with
the UN and the African Union". She added "If they are not able to do so, then I think
consideration of what action the international community can take - whether through
sanctions of whatever -will have to come to the fore again, which is not what
anybody wants.”

July 2007: Gordon Brown states that France and Britain will work together to help
resolve the “great humanitarian disaster of our generation” as both countries pledge
to work with the UN in producing a quick deployment of an AU-UN force.
In addition to leading international efforts to help gain UN consensus in supporting
AMIS ahead of the AU-UN joint mission, the UK claims to continually lobby
international counterparts (AU, Russia and China) in pressuring the GoS to uphold all
aspects of the Addis Ababa agreements brokered by Kofi Annan in November 2006.

March 2008: Gordon Brown called for a faster deployment of UN peacekeepers to

Darfur and stronger sanctions against GoS.
He also urged the GoS to enter cooperative peace talks with rebel militias to end the
atrocious human suffering in Darfur, declaring the state of the situation
as “humanitarian tragedy of colossal proportions where the world must act…We must
strengthen our sanctions against the Sudanese government. We should have military
sanctions for the whole of Sudan.” Yet Brown did not support the imposition of a no-
fly zone over Darfur, citing it would be "impractical."

Brown‘s position was supported by opposition MPs and by French President Nicholas
Sarkozy vowing to redouble their efforts to stabilise the Darfur region.

13 April 2008: On the Global Day for Darfur PM Brown announced that Britain
would be willing to hold peace talks in order to end the conflict in Darfur. "Britain is
willing to invite all parties to London for talks to see if there is a way to make some
progress." Brown stated that he was frustrated at the "appalling situation and the slow
progress" in brokering peace talks. He promised to raise the issues of of deploying
peacekeepers in Darfur during talks with US President Bush and UN Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon during his visit to America in mid-April.²

________________

2. .Darfur Timeline,available on :
http://www.article1.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=185&Item
id=48
Part four: the Arab countries response

In 9 August, 2004, Arab foreign ministers at an emergency session in Cairo backed

Khartoum's measures to disarm Arab militias and punish human rights violators.

They called on the UN to give Sudan more time to resolve the conflict.

And Sudanese Vice-President Ali Osman Taha said he thought the UN's end of
August deadline was impractical.

He told the BBC's Hard Talk programme that Khartoum was committed to disarming
all militia forces in Darfur. He said 6,000 Sudanese police and government troops
were currently in Darfur, and there were plans to expand the force to 12,000.

"We are really committed to disarm whoever is acting outside the law," he said,
adding that comprehensive stability was only possible if both the Arab Janjaweed
militia and rebel groups disarmed.

But he added that logistical problems were hampering deployment, which meant that
fully disarming the Arab Janjaweed militia, and other forces, by the end of August
would not be possible.

"We cannot have comprehensive stability without disarming both sides."

On 30 July, a UN resolution gave Sudan 30 days to bring Arab militia under control
or face international action.

Foreign ministers from the 22-member Arab League attended the meeting, which was
chaired by the group's Secretary General Amr Moussa.

Mr Moussa said before the talks that the group was inclined towards helping Sudan
avoid sanctions.

The BBC's Magdi Abdelhadi in Cairo said there were no surprises in the Arab League
statement and Khartoum got what it wanted.

The statement welcomed measures already taken by the Sudanese government to

disarm the Janjaweed and bring those responsible for human rights violations in
Darfur to justice.

The Arab foreign ministers also pledged to assist Sudan and the international
community in resolving the conflict peacefully.

In The Arab League has rejected any sanctions or international military intervention
as a response to the crisis in Sudan's Darfur region.
Its Africa division chief Peter Takirambudde accused Sudan of "trying to manipulate
opinion in the Arab world to hide the massive crimes it has committed against
Sudanese citizens".

In fact , in 31 October 2007,Arab States have made on financial and moral support to
the Sudanese government, through a conference organized by the Arab League, the
Sudanese capital Khartoum, the collection of some 250 million dollars in
contributions for the reconstruction of the territory of war-ravaged Darfur1

______________

1. Arab League backs Sudan on Darfur,available on:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3545818.stm
Part five: the international crime court response
The UN Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the ICC
in Resolution 1593 (2005)on 31 March 2005. The resolution requires Sudan and all
other parties to the conflict in Darfur to cooperate with the Court. It also invites the
Court and the African Union to discuss practical arrangements that will facilitate the
work of the Prosecutor and of the Court, including the possibility of conducting
proceedings in the region.

The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur was established by UN Secretary-

General Kofi Annan in October 2004. The Commission reported to the UN in January
2005 that there was reason to believe that crimes against humanity and war crimes
had been committed in Darfur and recommended that the situation be referred to the
ICC.

The Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, has decided to open an investigation into the situation in Darfur, Sudan.

Following the referral from the United Nations Security Council on 31 March 2005,
the Prosecutor received the document archive of the International Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur. In addition, the Office of the Prosecutor requested information
from a variety of sources, leading to the collection of thousands of documents. The
Office also interviewed over 50 independent experts. After thorough analysis the
Prosecutor concluded that the statutory requirements for initiating an investigation
were satisfied.

Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo said:

―The investigation will require sustained cooperation from national and international
authorities. It will form part of a collective effort, complementing African Union and
other initiatives to end the violence in Darfur and to promote justice. Traditional
African mechanisms can be an important tool to complement these efforts and achieve
local reconciliation.”¹

____________

1. Source: Office of the Prosecutor, available on:http://www.icc-

cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2005/the%20prosecutor
%20of%20the%20icc%20opens%20investigation%20in%20darfur?lan=en-GB
On 4 March 2009, the International Criminal Court's (ICC) Pre-Trial Chamber I,
decided to issue a warrant of arrest for the President of the Republic of Sudan, Omar
al-Bashir for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The decision follows the
request made by the ICC Prosecutor, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, on 14 July 2008.

On 6 June 2005, Mr. Moreno-Ocampo announced the opening of an investigation.

On 27 April 2007, the ICC issued two arrest warrants against Ahmed Harun (former
Minister for the Interior and current Minister for Humanitarian Affairs) and Ali
Kushayb (Janjaweed militia leader). Both men are charged with crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed between August 2003 and March 2004

The ICC Prosecutor is accusing Bashir of having planned and ordered genocide
(killing of the members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups; causing
serious mental harm to members of these groups; deliberately inflicting on these
groups conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical destruction in part),
crimes against humanity (including acts of murder, extermination, forced transfer of
population, torture and rape), and war crimes (atacks intentionally directed against the
civilian population and pillaging).²

___________

2. The International Criminal Court and Darfur Questions and Answers, available on:
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/Q_ADarfurENG_cleanFINAL.pdf
 Conclusion:

T He effect of the Darfur conflict was huge on the international community to

the point of condemning the Sudanese president ―Omar El Bashir‖.

After what we have seen in this research, we can say that the international community
has failed in dealing with the darfur crisis, & that is what the amnesty international
has claimed in a report in february 2009,concerning the international community
obligations & Promises made to the people of Darfur to provide protection to them
through the deployment of a peacekeeping as" UNAMID " It has been said in the
report that ―UNAMID‖ is still lacking in chronic funding, while continuing attacks
against civilians, including acts of murder.
"Women are still subjected to rape and other forms of sexual violence. While
spreading a climate of insecurity and the perpetrators go unpunished without
question."

Meanwhile, the early announcement of the genocide in darfur before the report of the
international commission adopted by the security council,the commission has clamed
that‖ genocidal intent appears to be missing‖,the ICC condemnation of the Sudanese
president as well, which led to a various international reactions, but this remains an
open question: Was it an early indictment of Sudanese President? Do we still need for
further investigation before condemning the sudanese government? Do we need more
facts about the darfur crisis taking into account the volume of media coverage?
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