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JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF
MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY
ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of
Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27,
1988. the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League),
represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his
personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the
annulment of Frivaldo
In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized
in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself
against President Marcos
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the
respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January
20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for
reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He
then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that
the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a
temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the
COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the respondents.
ISSUE:
WON Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his
election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other
issues raised in this petition are merely secondary to this basic question.
HELD:
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the
Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the
Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section
42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office
must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen
of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under
Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo
described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting
mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however,
that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the
following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District
of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the
Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the
Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the
Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section
42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office
must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the
constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen
of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under
Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo
described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting
mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however,
that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the
following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District
of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the
Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire
Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with
the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD
No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress,
by naturalization, or by repatriation.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends
that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more,
already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the
formal declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship
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previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee
had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner
had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or
judicial proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should
be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents
are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of
governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female
legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or
omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in office
simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten
days from her proclamation? It has been established, and not even denied,
that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight
months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial
governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country.
The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment
only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective
office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.

Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all
fealty and fidelity to any other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen
is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why
it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered
and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of
ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive
mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its
prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an
express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.
Labo vs. COMELEC
Facts:
For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino ctizen, Ramon
Labo, Jr filed his COC for mayor of Baguio City on March 23, 1992 for the
May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner Roberto Ortega on other hand, also filed his
COC for the same office on March 25, 1992.
On March 26, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding
against Labo before the COMELEC on the ground that Labo is not a Filipino
citizen.
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On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution denying
Labo’s COC.
On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads: Acting
on the “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Clarification”, filed by respondent (Labo)
on May 9, 1992, the Commission resolves that the decision promulgated on May 9,
1992 disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory
only after five (5) days from promulgation  pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13,
Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for
City Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this
case in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal
or certiorari.
On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the
proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor
of Baguio.On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for
review with prayer, among others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec; to
render judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent
Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in the event he wins in the
contested elections.
Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion when it refused to implement its May 9, 1992 resolution

notwithstanding the fact that said resolution disqualifying Labo has already
become final and executory.Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court
did not issue a temporary restraining order as regards the May 9, 1992
resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy,
said resolution has already become final and executory. Ortega further posits
the view that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Petition to deny due course or
to cancel a certificate of candidacy —
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days
from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed
by the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1.      WON Petitioner Labo who had the highest number of votes is qualified to
assume as Mayor of Baguio City.
2.      WON disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega)
receiving the next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning
candidate for mayor of Baguio City.
Held:
First Issue:
No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the May 9,
1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo’s) certificate of
candidacy had already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May
ELIGIBILITY AND QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS | KCOLEENB
14, 1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the same
day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no restraining
order was issued by this Court.
The resolution cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that
he is not a Filipino citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains
the SC to rule against his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines. Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks
the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship
is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. The fact that he
was elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment.
Second Issue:
No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle
petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to
proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the
office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the
sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate
for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the
people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make
respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.
Petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He
was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a
disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to
deny due course to petitioner’s (Labo’s) candidacy, the same did not deter the
people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was
allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his
disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus
Election Code).
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.
David Aguila vs Melecio Genato Digest
Law on Public Officers -No Vested Right to a Public Office - Continuing Eligibility
FACTS:
Dominador Borje was an elected member of the Board of Directors of the
Misamis Occidental ElectricCooperative, Inc. (MOELC). While still serving as
a director for MOELC, he ran for an elective position tothe Sangguniang
Bayan of Ozamiz City. Therafter, David Aguila of the National Electrification
Administration issued a memorandum which states that all officials and
employees of electric cooperatives who run for public office, win and assume
office, shall be considered resigned. Borje won in the elections. The other
ELIGIBILITY AND QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS | KCOLEENB
directors of MOELC then sought to enforce the memorandum against Borje.
Borje filed a petition in court questioning said memorandum. Borje claimed
that the memorandum is not applicable to him because when he assumed the
Directorship in MOELC he was already qualified and so he must be allowed
to continue holding office. Judge Genato agreed with Borje and so he issued a
TRO against MOELC from considering Borje as resigned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling is correct.
HELD:
No. The court has no jurisdiction over the said matter. PD 269 which created
NEA provides that electric cooperatives (like MOELC) have the right to
prescribe qualifications of its directors and their manner of election and
removal. MOELC has to comply with the memorandum of NEA, a superior
office under which MOELC is being administered. Further still, Borje has not
shown that he has an explicit right to continue holding the Directorship.
Further, Borje being considered resigned by reason of his election to the
Sanggunian is not merely grounded on the NEA memorandum. It is also
grounded on PD 269 which provides that elective officials are ineligible to
become officers and/or directors of any cooperatives except if such elective
position is no higher than a barangay captain. There is no merit to Borjes
contention that since he was originally qualified he shall be allowed to
 ELIGIBILITY AND QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS | KCOLEENB

continue his unexpired term in MOELC. Eligibility to an office should be the Mayor, Lenlie continued to receive his salary for more than a year. Finally
construed as of a continuing nature and must exist at the commencement of Red was able to secure appointment papers from the Aquino administration
the term and during occupancy of the office. Borje ceased to be qualified and after three years and nine months from the date he received his appointment
paper from President Marcos. Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the
so he must be resigned from MOELC.
Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the Mayor and Lenlie
arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the position of
KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman
Lecaroz vs Sandiganbayan
filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) informations for estafa through
[G.R. No. 130872. March 25, 1999]
falsification of public documents against petitioners, and one (1) information
FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, petitioners, vs.
for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Practices Act, against the Mayor alone. The Sandiganbayan rendered a
DECISION
decision finding the two accused guilty on all counts of estafa. However, with
respect to the charge of violation of RA No. 3019, The Sandiganbayan
BELLOSILLO, J.:
acquitted Mayor Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having denied their motion for
reconsideration, the accused, elevated their case to the Supreme Court.
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz,
Marinduque, while his son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the
Issue:
outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong
Whether or not an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is
Silang, Santa Cruz, and currently a member of its SanguniangBayan (SB)
appointed or chosen or has qualified.
representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985 election of
the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red won the KB Chairman of Barangay
Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by then President Marcos as
Held: YES.
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the
municipality. However, Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit
To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on the terms of
as member of the municipal council until the Governor of Marinduque had
office of KB youth sectoral representatives to the SB and of the KB Federation
cleared his appointment. When Red finally received his appointment papers,
Presidents. Section 7 of BP Blg. 51 and Sec. 1 of the KB Constitution
President Aquino was already in power. But still Red was not allowed to sit
respectively provide -
as sectoral representative in the Sanggunian. Meanwhile with the approval of

Sec. 7. Term of Office. - Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective
officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years,
which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980.
In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association of
barangay councils and the president of the federation of kabataang barangay,
their terms of office shall be coterminous with their tenure is president of
their respective association and federation .
xxxx
Sec 1. All incumbent officers of the Kabataang Barangay shall continue to
hold office until the last Sunday of November 1985 or such time that the
newly elected officers shall have qualified and assumed office in accordance
with this Constitution.
The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral
representative to the SB since he did not present an authenticated copy of his
appointment papers; neither did he take a valid oath of office. Resultantly,
this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue as member of the SB
although in a holdover capacity since his term had already expired. The
Sandiganbayan however rejected this postulate declaring that the holdover
provision under Sec. 1 quoted above pertains only to positions in the KB,
clearly implying that since no similar provision is found in Sec. 7 of B.P. Blg.
51, there can be no holdover with respect to positions in the SB.
The Supreme Court disagree with the Sandiganbayan. The concept of
holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed
term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually
provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall
remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been
ELIGIBILITY AND QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS | KCOLEENB
elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not
become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected
and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his
successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by
law.
In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian
member can continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in
case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say that he is proscribed
from holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory
provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his
successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified.The legislative intent of
not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the
legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the law-
making body favors the same.
Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices,and courts generally
indulge in the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, by
statute, a condition which may result in an executive or administrative office
becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied by one
lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. This is founded on obvious
considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover is specifically
intended to prevent public convenience from suffering because of a vacancy
and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions.