Cases

DEROY vs. CA
Facts: (1st)
-The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private
respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
-Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its
proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. 
-On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court,
-rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to
private respondents.
-On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a
decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, copy of which was received by petitioners on August
25, 1987.
-On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied
by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on September 24, 1987, but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27,
1987.
(2nd)
-This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void the resolutions of the
petitioners motion for extension of time to file motion for consideration since the decision in
said case become final and the resolution denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration for
having been filed out of time.
-Thus, in support of the said denial, CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioners’ motion for extension…
-CA applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japzon that the 15-day period of
appealing or filing of motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on May 30, 1986. Beginning one month after the
promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration. August 30, 1986, the rule shall be enforced. Giving other cases,
one month grace period.
-However, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a
year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986.
-Petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their
failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply
to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette
as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated
Issue:
WN the resolution of the court applied the rule laid down in habaluyas case is affective,
although non-publication.
Ruling:
No, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective.
It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of
the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s)
Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 11, 2010 Of Acting Director Aleu A. Amante, Piab-C,
Office Of The Ombudsman

FACTS:
Subpoena
-In the appropriate case, the Office of the Ombudsman has full authority to issue subpoenas,
including subpoena duces tecum, for compulsory attendance of witnesses and the production of
documents and information relating to matters under its investigation. 2 The grant of this
authority, however, is not unlimited, as the Ombudsman must necessarily observe and abide by
the terms of the Constitution and our laws, the Rules of Court and the applicable jurisprudence
on the issuance, service, validity and efficacy of subpoenas. Under the Rules of Court, the
issuance of subpoenas, including a subpoena duces tecum, operates under the requirements of
reasonableness and relevance.3 For the production of documents to be reasonable and for the
documents themselves to be relevant, the matter under inquiry should, in the first place, be one
that the Ombudsman can legitimately entertain, investigate and rule upon.

-In the present case, the "matter" that gave rise to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum was a
criminal complaint filed by the complainants Lozano for the alleged violation by retired Supreme Court
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez of Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

-A first step in considering whether a criminal complaint (and its attendant compulsory
processes) is within the authority of the Ombudsman to entertain (and to issue), is to consider
the nature of the powers of the Supreme Court.

This Court, the Supreme Court, by constitutional design, is supreme in its task of adjudication;
judicial power is vested solely in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts, not only to settle actual
controversies, but also to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction has been committed in any branch or instrumentality of government. 4

GENERAL RULE, all decisions and determinations in the exercise of judicial power ultimately
go to and stop at the Supreme Court whose judgment is final.

This constitutional scheme cannot be thwarted or subverted through a criminal complaint that,
under the guise of imputing a misdeed to the Court and its Members, seeks to revive and re-
litigate matters that have long been laid to rest by the Court. Effectively, such criminal
complaint is a collateral attack on a judgment of this Court that, by constitutional mandate, is
final and already beyond question.

A simple jurisprudential research would easily reveal that this Court has had the occasion to
rule on the liability of Justices of the Supreme Court for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019—
the very same provision that the complainants Lozano invoke in this case.

Thus, consistent with the nature of the power of this Court under our constitutional scheme,
only this Court – not the Ombudsman – can declare a Supreme Court judgment to be unjust.

Plainly, under these rulings, a criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, based
on the legal correctness of the official acts of Justices of the Supreme Court, cannot prosper and
should not be entertained. This is not to say that Members of the Court are absolutely immune
from suit during their term, for they are not. The Constitution provides that the appropriate
recourse against them is to seek their removal from office if they are guilty of culpable violation
of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust.9 Only after removal can they be criminally proceeded against for their
transgressions. While in office and thereafter, and for their official acts that do not constitute
impeachable offenses, recourses against them and their liabilities therefor are as defined in the
above rulings.

Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6770, in fact, specifically grants the Ombudsman the authority to
investigate impeachable officers, but only when such investigation is warranted:
Section 22. Investigatory Power. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to
investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by
impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.

II. The Ombudsman’s Dismissal of the Criminal Complant

As the Ombudsman’s dismissal of the criminal complaint (Oliver O. Lozano and Evangeline

Lozano-Endriano v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J) clearly implied, no complete
dismissal took place as the matter was simply "referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate
action."
a. Grounds for the Dismissal of the Complaint
The retired Chief Justice and retired Associate Justice allegedly committed the
following unlawful acts:
1) Overturning the findings of fact of the CA;
2) Stating in the Resolution that the "Chin-Mallari property overlaps the UP
property," when the DENR Survey Report stated that the "UP title/property
overlaps the Chin-Mallari property;"
3) Issuing a Resolution, for which three Justices voted, to set aside a Decision for
which five Justices voted.

By these acts, the retired Members of this Court are being held criminally accountable on the
theory that they violated the Constitution and the law in their ruling in the cited cases, thereby
causing "undue injury" to the parties to these cases.

After due consideration, we dismiss the criminal complaint against retired Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez under Section 3(e) of RA
3019. We fully expound on the reasons for this conclusion in the discussions below.

a. Contrary to the complainants’ position, the Supreme Court has the power to
review the lower courts’ findings of fact.
- The Supreme Court is the highest court of the land with the power to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law
or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of the lower
courts. Thus they file immediately to supreme court, causing for its
dismissal, (Hierarchy)
b. Constitutional Provisions were misused.
-The complainants Lozano appear to us to have brazenly misquoted and
misused applicable constitutional provisions to justify their case against the
retired Justices. We refer particularly to their use (or strictly, misuse)
of Article X, Section 2(3) of the 1973 Constitution which they claim to be the
governing rule that the retired Justices should have followed in acting on
Pael. This constitutional provision states:
Cases heard by a division shall be decided with the concurrence of at
least five Members,

They then would have easily learned of the manner cases are heard and decided by
Division before the Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution. Section 4(3), Article
VIII of this Constitution provides:
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without
the concurrence of at least three of such Members.

The elements of the offense charged are not sufficiently alleged in the complain
A public official can violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 14 in two ways: (1) by causing
undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference; 15 in either case, these acts must be committed
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross and inexcusable negligence.

The criminal complaint in this case failed to allege the facts and circumstances showing that the
retired Justices acted with partiality, bad faith or negligence.
SC’s decision cannot be reversed in the absence of facts, alleged and proven, demonstrating a
dishonest purpose, conscious partiality, extrinsic fraud, or any wrongdoing on his or her part.

III. The Complainants’ Potential Liability for Filing the Ombudsman Complaint

In their criminal complaint, the complainants gave a slanted view of the powers of this Court to
suit their purposes; for these same purposes, they wrongly cited and misapplied the provisions
of the Constitution, not just any ordinary statute.
As lawyers, the complainants must be familiar and well acquainted with the fundamental law
of the land, and are charged with the duty to apply the constitutional provisions in light of their
prevailing jurisprudential interpretation.
As law practitioners active in the legal and political circles, the complainants can hardly be
characterized as "unknowing" in their misuse and misapplication of constitutional provisions.
They should, at the very least, know that the 1973 Constitution and its provisions have been
superseded by the 1987 Constitution, and that they cannot assail – invoking the 1973
Constitution – the judicial acts of members of the Supreme Court carried out in 2003 when the
1987 Constitution was in effect. 

In our view, the complainants’ errors do not belong to the genre of plain and simple errors that
lawyers commit in the practice of their profession. Their plain disregard, misuse and
misrepresentation of constitutional provisions constitute serious misconduct that reflects on
their fitness for continued membership in the Philippine Bar. At the very least, their
transgressions are blatant violations of Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides:

Rule 10.02. A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or
assert as a fact that which has not been proved. (Emphasis provided.)

Moreover, lawyers are sworn to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court…"
before they are even admitted to the Bar. All these the complainants appear to have seriously
violated.

La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. et al. v. Ramos et al. 

Facts:
25 July 1987 – EO 279 authorized DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from
foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute
with the foreign proponent. which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the
President may execute with the foreign proponent. In entering into such proposals, the
President shall consider the real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country that will be realized, as well as the development and use of local scientific and
technical resources that will be promoted by the proposed contract or agreement.  Until
Congress shall determine otherwise, large-scale mining, for purpose of this Section, shall mean
those proposals for contracts or agreements for mineral resources exploration, development,
and utilization involving a committed capital investment in a single mining unit project of at
least Fifty Million Dollars in United States Currency (US $50,000,000. 00)

20 December 1996 – DENR Secretary Victor Ramos issued DAO 96-40

 10 January 1997 – counsels for petitioner sent letter to Ramos demanding DENR to stop
implementing RA 7942 and DAO 96-40.

 No response, thus this petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with prayer of TRO and
preliminary injunction (denied) claiming that petitioner Ramos acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing the assailed Constitutionality of RA 7942 [1], of DENR
Administrative Order 96-40 [2], and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
entered into on 30 March 1995 between the Republic of the Philippines and WMC (Philippines) ,
Inc..

 23 January 2001 – Manifestation of respondents that WMCP is  no longer foreign-owned as
WMC has sold 100% of its equity to Filipino company Sagittarius Mines, Inc. which is 60%
owned by Filipinos or Filipino-owned corporations. WMCP is renamed as Tampakan Mineral
Resources Corporation.

 18 December 2001 – DENR approved the transfer and registration of FTAA to Sagittarius from
WMCP.

 Supreme Court said that this manifestation and transfer does not render the issue moot since
the question of validity of the FTAA will affect even that held by Sagittarius.

Issue/s

Preliminary Issue: Standing of Petitioners

 1WON EO 279 is an invalid law having been issued two days before President Aquino’s
legislative powers expired with the convening of Regular Congress and having thus took effect
after which.

 2WON RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional and consequently the FTAA entered
pursuant to above stated laws is invalid

Ratio Decidendi    

Preliminary Issue: Petitioners have standing since they are residents of the land covered by the
FTAA. Since the petition if for mandamus and prohibition and the issue is of constitutionality of
a statute, the Supreme is no longer concerned whether or not petitioners are real parties of
interest to the contract/agreement.

 1 NO. EO 279 is valid and whether or not the law’s effectivity date lies beyond the expiration of
the President’s legislative power is irrelevant since it was still enacted when the president held
such power. It does not run counter to EO 200 requiring laws to have 15 days after publication
requirement before its effectivity since EO 200 also provides “unless it is otherwise provided,”
EO 279 having stated its own effectivity as “shall take effect immediately.” In addition, the 15-
day post-publication requirement was for the information of the public and does not in any way
affect the date of enactment and is not a ground for invalidation. EO 279 nonetheless was
published on the Official Gazette on 3 August 1987.

2 Yes. The 1987 Constitution provides “The President may enter into agreements with foreign-
owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources.”[3]

 The Constitution provides for four modes by which the States may explore, develop, and
Utilize Natural Resources

(1)   State may directly undertake such activities

(2) State may enter into co-production, joint-venture or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens or qualified corporations (60% Filipino owned)

(3) Congress may allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens

(4)   For the large-scale exploration, development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporation for
technical or financial assistance.

 The framers of this Constitution expressly omitted the phrase “service contracts” that was
provided for in the 1973 Constitution which allowed foreign companies to “manage and
operate” mining activities and replaced it with “technical or financial assistance” only.”

 RA 7942, DAO 96-40, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP allows for the
management and operation of the foreign-owned corporation for the large-scale exploration,
development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. Although counsel
for respondents claim that “technical” is a very broad term that may cover the “management
and operation” of such activities, it is still clear from the deliberation of the Constitutional
Commission that they intended to limit the utilization of the natural resources for the sole
enjoyment of the Filipinos