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Archive for December 15th, 2010

BANGKOK 002977 AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES WITH
FORMER PM SAMA
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Source: Guardian http://goo.gl/rHWa5 14/12/2010

Wednesday, 01 October 2008, 10:48

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002977
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/01/2018
TAGS PGOV, KDEM, KJUS, PINR, TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES WITH FORMER PM SAMAK HIS
DOWNFALL,
REF: BANGKOK 2778 (SAMAK UNDERCUT)
BANGKOK 00002977 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b, d)

1. (C) Summary: Former Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej resigned from his position as Party Leader

of the People’s Power Party (PPP) September 30. He remains free on bail as he continues to appeal a

years-old defamation conviction. Samak told the Ambassador September 26 that he believed Queen

Sirikit, working through Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda, supported the People’s Alliance

for Democracy (PAD) protest movement. Samak viewed himself as loyal to the King, but implied that

the Queen’s political agenda differened from her husband’s. Separately, XXXXXXXXXXXX
confirmed

to the Ambassador October 1 that he had begun direct negotiations with the PAD and suggested that

he and the current Somchai administration had 90 days to produce results.

2. (C) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX’s expectation that his term in office may be short-lived tracks
with

a widespread view among Thais that the PPP will be fighting against the odds for its survival in

upcoming party dissolution proceedings. Although XXXXXXXXXXXX provides proof that senior

Thai politicians can often revive careers, we believe Samak has lost virtually all of his influence and

has little prospect of staging a political comeback. PM Somchai Wongsawat appears likely to succeed

Samak as PPP Party Leader. End Summary and Comment.

SAMAK QUITS PPP POST, HEADS TO DISNEY WORLD

3. (C) On September 30, a PPP official told the media that former PM Samak Sundaravej had formally

resigned from his position of PPP Party Leader. This resignation followed an Appeals Court’s

September 25 ruling upholding a previous conviction of Samak on defamation charges, and affirming

the two-year prison sentence for Samak. In a September 26 lunch with the Ambassador, Samak

explained that he expected to remain free on bail while continuing to appeal this case through other

channels; he predicted his legal battle could continue for approximately two years before he might

have to face incarceration. Samak planned to join unnamed associates for an extended North

American vacation starting with Disney World, criss-crossing the United States and parts of Canada by
car.

4. (C) Note: Once Samak lost face after PPP legislators signaled their unwillingness to support his

reelection as Prime Minister (reftel), it would have been awkward for Samak to retain the position of

Party Leader. PPP immediately named PM Somchai as acting party leader. Political parties typically

nominate their Party Leaders for the position of Prime Minister; it would be logical to assume that

Somchai will formally take the top job in PPP. Samak’s resignation will not protect Samak from a

five-year loss of political rights in the event that PPP is dissolved. Party dissolution by the Constitutional

Court entails sanctions against the executive board that was in place at the time of the dissolution-

warranting offense.

SAMAK DISCUSSES HIS DOWNFALL, CRITICIZES THE QUEEN

5. (C) Samak described to Ambassador the political pressure against him during his seven months

in office. He showed disdain for Queen Sirikit, claiming that she had been responsible for the 2006

coup d’etat as well as the ongoing turmoil generated by PAD protests. He alleged the Queen operated

through Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda who, along with others presenting themselves

as royalists, worked with the PAD and other agitators. Citing his own regular meetings with King

Bhumibol, Samak claimed he — rather than his opponents — was sincerely loyal to the King and

enjoyed the King’s support. In his discussion of the

BANGKOK 00002977 002.2 OF 002

monarchy, Samak made no mention of the Crown Prince.

6. (C) Samak, a former journalist, lamented his opponents’ success in manipulating media coverage of
his

administration. Samak noted that jockeying for control over the media had often caused rifts within

Thai Rak Thai and, subsequently, the People’s Power Party.

7. (C) Samak’s eyes became misty as he recalled that, when he was contemplating returning to the

premiership after eviction from office by the Constitutional Court, his wife and one of his daughters

had pressed him to abandon this quest. “I told them to get out,” he related. “I didn’t need to be betrayed

by them.”

Out with the Old, Out with the New?

8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX indicated to Ambassador October 1 that he expected the Somchai

administration

to be short-lived, though he hoped it could be extended if it proved successful in addressing the serious

challenges facing the country. XXXXXXXXXXXX If Somchai’s administration were to prove

effective,

he hoped the Constitutional Court might delay dissolution proceedings against various coalition parties

to allow the government more time in office (note: the Attorney General announced later on October 1

that he had referred the first case, against Chat Thai, to the Constitution Court for review).

9. (C) On the ongoing PAD occupation of Government House, XXXXXXXXXXXX said he had
twice

spoken with PAD XXXXXXXXXXXX, most recently on the night of September 30.
XXXXXXXXXXXX

described his approach toward the PAD as similar to that which he had taken toward communist

insurgents in the 1970s and 80s: he would initially stress commonalities while deemphasizing

differences, which would be sorted out later. (Septel will report XXXXXXXXXXXX’s views on
mediating

the southern insurgency.) JOHN

Written by thaicables

December 15, 2010 at 3:33 am

Posted in Confidential, PAD, Royal Family, Samak Sundaravej

BANGKOK 003317 PALACE INSIDER

TELLS AMBASSADOR
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Source: The Guardian

http://goo.gl/2KcO8 14/12/2010

Thursday, 06 November 2008, 07:30

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003317
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR WILDER AND PHU
EO 12958 DECL: 11/06/2018
TAGS PGOV, KDEM, MOPS, ASEC, TH
SUBJECT: PALACE INSIDER TELLS AMBASSADOR OF THE KING’S
OPPOSITION TO A COUP AND TO PAD PROTESTS
REF: A. BANGKOK 3289 (POLARIZATION TO PERSIST) B. BANGKOK 3280

(THAKSIN ADDRESSES UDD) C. BANGKOK 3226 (HOPES FOR MEDIATION)

D. BANGKOK 3080 (QUEEN SHOWS SUPPORT)

BANGKOK 00003317 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b and d)

SUMMARY AND COMMENT

——————-

1. (C) King Bhumibol explicitly told Army Commander Anupong Paojinda not to launch a coup,

XXXXXXXXXXXX, an advisor to Queen Sirikit, told Ambassador November 4.

XXXXXXXXXXXX

also claimed that the Queen had not meant to signal support for the People’s Alliance for

Democracy (PAD) anti-government agenda when she presided over funeral ceremonies on

October 13. XXXXXXXXXXXX said PAD’s activities had irritated the King, who reportedly wants

PAD protestors to leave Government House. XXXXXXXXXXXX spoke well of Prime Minister

Somchai Wongsawat, saying Somchai was open to compromising with the PAD, although

XXXXXXXXXXXX guessed Somchai would be forced from office by the end of the year.

Separately, a politically active businessman with strong connections to the palace told us that

the Queen’s funeral appearance had hurt the monarchy’s image, thereby serving the agenda

of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. This contact also discussed a possible assassination
plot against Thaksin and PAD plans for violence. Both contacts claimed the King suffered from back

pain and his condition was frail.

2. (S/NF) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX’s claim that the King instructed Anupong not to conduct a

coup is the strongest account we have heard to date about the King’s opposition to a coup and his

communicating this to Anupong; it would explain why Privy Counselors Prem and Siddhi, both

seen as opponents of the current government, gave recent assurances to the Ambassador that there

would not be a coup. While XXXXXXXXXXXX did not specify how he heard of this exchange, the

purported instruction does appear consistent with Anupong’s actions, other high-level military

assurances to the Ambassador, and reporting in other channels. We agree that the Queen’s funeral

appearance was a significant blunder, jeopardizing the public’s perception of the palace’s neutrality.

PAD appears increasingly divided; this divide, as well as the intense and dynamic condition of

Thai politics, may make it appear realistic to hope for a PAD-government compromise. Possible

further violence, however, remains a concern. End Summary and Comment.

PALACE-PAD RELATIONS

——————–

3. (C) Ambassador met privately at the Residence on November 4 with XXXXXXXXXXXX, a close
advisor to

Queen Sirikit who in the past has also served as a confidant of the King.XXXXXXXXXXXX
remarked that he

regretted the Queen’s October 13 appearance at the funeral of a PAD supporter (ref D). He claimed the
Queen

had been emotionally affected when she learned that one victim of the October 7 violence was a young
lady

about to be married, and that she had told her father she was going to the protest to defend the
monarchy.

Initially, the Queen had wanted to send Princess Chulabhorn to the funeral. It was only at the request of

Chulabhorn and Chulabhorn’s companion, Chaichon Locharernkul, that the Queen decided to go
herself.

XXXXXXXXXXXX said there was no intention for the Queen to involve either herself or the
monarchy in

political matters, but, unfortunately, some members of the public could interpret the funeral appearance

differently. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the Queen later reached out to seriously injured police officers in
an

attempt to show her neutrality, but this signal went largely unnoticed.

4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX remarked that King Bhumibol was highly irritated by PAD’s occupation
of

Government House and other disruptions caused by the anti-government group, but the King was
unsure

how best to ensure PAD would vacate the compound. XXXXXXXXXXXX said the King had
instructed

two of his loyalists to convey his desire that PAD leave Government House. (One of these messengers

was well-known associate of the King Disathorn

BANGKOK 00003317 002.2 OF 003

Watcharothai, who said publicly on October 29 that Thais who love the King should “go home”; see ref
A.)

XXXXXXXXXXXX considered XXXXXXXXXXXX to be obstinate, however, saying Sondhi had

become

obsessed with his own sense of mission. By contrast, XXXXXXXXXXXX thought that
XXXXXXXXXXXX

was reasonable and willing to compromise.

POSITIVE VIEW OF SOMCHAI

5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed to have spoken to Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat about the
current

standoff. XXXXXXXXXXXX told the Ambassador that Somchai had agreed that the government
could

meet with the PAD and reach a compromise, but the time was not yet ripe. In his conversation with the

Ambassador, XXXXXXXXXXXX spoke highly of Somchai, saying he was “very good” and had
many

qualities that made him suitable to be Prime Minister, including a sense of fairness and a moderate
temperament. Nevertheless, XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that Somchai could not remain long in
office

because he would likely be forced out by an adverse Constitutional Court ruling in the People’s Power

Party (PPP) dissolution case (ref A), which XXXXXXXXXXXX believed the Court might issue before

the King’s birthday (December 5). XXXXXXXXXXXX guessed Somchai would dissolve the
parliament

before being forced from office.

KING TO ANUPONG: NO COUP

6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that the current turmoil would not result in a military coup. He said

that the King, speaking with Army Commander Anupong Paojinda, had referred to the 2006 coup and

made a statement to the effect that there should be no further coups.

POLITICIZATION OF THE MONARCHY

7. (C) We also met on November 5 with XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect), the well-connected
scion of a

wealthy family with close palace ties. XXXXXXXXXXXX had a leading role in the
XXXXXXXXXXXX;

his wife, XXXXXXXXXXXX, has the royal title of “XXXXXXXXXXXX” and works closely with
the Queen.

XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed that the Queen’s appearance at the October 13 funeral had highly
negative

ramifications, saying that even politically neutral Thais felt she had inappropriately brought the
monarchy

into politics. He also acknowledged increasing semi-public criticism of the monarchy, focused on the

Queen (septel). XXXXXXXXXXXX stated with confidence that the King had sought to deter the
Queen

from attending the funeral by questioning the wisdom of that plan, but had stopped short of forbidding
her

to do so.
8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX discussed former Prime Minister Thaksin’s statement in his November 1
address

to supporters (ref B) that either “royal mercy or the people’s power” could allow his return to Thailand.

XXXXXXXXXXXX said this juxtaposition, which he viewed as highly strategic, had the predictable
effect

of energizing Thaksin’s opponents in the royalist camp. This reaction allowed Thaksin to demonstrate

publicly that many palace figures were aligned against him, thereby eroding the prestige that the palace

derived from its status as an institution above politics. (Separately, after Thaksin’s remarks, a member

of Thaksin’s legal team told us that the sentence in question was part of a “very refined product” and
that

she had heard this sentence “four or five times” in Thaksin’s rehearsal of the speech.)

THAKSIN’S ENEMIES’ PLANS FOR VIOLENCE

9. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX believed PAD continued to aim for a violent clash that would spark a
coup.

He asserted that he had dined on October 6 with a leading PAD figure (NFI), who explained that PAD

would provoke violence during its October 7 protest at the parliament. The unnamed PAD figure
predicted

(wrongly) that the Army would intervene against the

BANGKOK 00003317 003.2 OF 003

government by the evening of October 7. XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted to us that PAD remained

intent on

a conflict that would generate at least two dozen deaths and make military intervention appear necessary

and justified.

10. (C) We mentioned to XXXXXXXXXXXX the claim by Thaksin associate XXXXXXXXXXXX

that

Thaksin had been the target of an assassination plot (ref C). (Note: Subsequent to the Ambassador’s
meeting

with XXXXXXXXXXXX, another Thaksin ally related the same claim, and said Thaksin himself had
spoken

of this plot. End Note.) XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested XXXXXXXXXXXX’s list of conspirators —

including

two prominent judges — was not credible, but XXXXXXXXXXXX said he could confirm
(presumably because

of first-hand discussion with an organizing figure) that certain enemies of Thaksin (NFI) had sought to

kill him. XXXXXXXXXXXX said he had been surprised to learn that the contract on Thaksin’s life
entailed

a relatively low payment of only several hundred thousand Baht (in the range of 10,000 USD), although
it

also entailed resettlement abroad for the person(s) directly involved.

REMARKS ON THE KING’S HEALTH

11. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX (late August/early September). At that time, he said, the King’s
complexion

appeared healthy, but overall the King appeared frail. He added that the King was upset with the Thai

doctor who had organized the team that performed back surgery on the King two years ago, as the
operation

had not worked as well as the King had been led to expect. XXXXXXXXXXXX, in his meeting with
the

Ambassador, also said the King was suffering from back pain, and his activities were more limited than

in recent years. JOHN

Written by thaicables

December 15, 2010 at 3:03 am

Posted in Uncategorized

BANGKOK 005811 MY MEETING WITH

GENERAL SONTHI
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Source: The Guardian http://goo.gl/rHWa5 14/12/2010

Wednesday, 20 September 2006, 12:29

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 005811
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
TREASURY PASS TO FRB SAN FRANCISCO/TERESA CURRAN
EO 12958 DECL: 09/19/2016
TAGS PGOV, PHUM, TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: MY MEETING WITH GENERAL SONTHI
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b)(d)

1. (C) I met with General Sonthi privately directly after he addressed the diplomatic corps this afternoon.

He thought the session had gone well (see septel for details; I doubt most of the Western diplomats, at

least, will share his assessment).

2. (C) I began by asking Sonthi about the audience with the King last night. Who had attended? He said

Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda had brought him, Supreme Commander Ruangroj and
Navy

Commander Sathiraphan in to meet the King. Sonthi stressed that they had been summoned to the
palace;

he had not sought the audience. He said the King was relaxed and happy, smiling throughout. He
provided

no further details.

3. (C) Turning to the US reaction, I reminded him of our conversation, August 31, when I told him any

military action would result in immediate suspension of assistance programs such as IMET, FMF and

numerous others. I told him he could expect us to announce such a measure shortly. He understood. I
added

that the restoration of such assistance could only come after a democratically elected government took
office.

In the meantime, I stressed that the coup group needed to make every effort to demonstrate a sincere
intention

to return to civilian rule as soon as possible. His announcement today that an interim constitution and

civilian government would be installed within two weeks was a good example. I reiterated these points
several times.

4. (C) Sonthi responded by saying the military had truly acted in order to improve Thai democracy, not
destroy it.

The prevailing situation had become untenable. Had Thaksin only been willing to announce publicly
that he

would not return as Prime Minister, this action could have been avoided. But his unwillingness to do
publicly

what he had repeatedly told many privately had led people to fear that his true intention was to seek a
renewed
mandate and return to power. Thus the military had acted. But they did not seek sustained political
power and

would return to barracks as soon as possible. The sooner the better, I repeated. I told him to expect fairly
broad

international criticism, as military coups were generally seen as a thing of the past.

5. (C) Was he going to seize Thaksin,s assets? No, he stated flatly. Would Thaksin and his family and
colleagues

be allowed to return to Thailand? Yes, unconditionally. What is the officially approved English rendition
o

f the coup group,s title? &Council for Democratic Reform Under Constitutional Monarchy,8 or CDRM.

6. (C) Why had the military chosen to act at this particular point in time? Smiling slightly, he leaned
forward.

Thaksin was at his weakest and we were at our strongest.

7. (C) Comment ) Sonthi was relaxed and calm. Clearly the royal audience was the turning point last
night.

(Septel reports Thaksin,s defiant attitude dissolving completely when he learned of the audience.) For
now at least,

the CDRM appears to be taking the high road as far as how they will treat Thaksin. We have ready
access to this

group and will press them to implement their announced intention to return to civilian rule as soon as
possible.

Meanwhile, a coup is a coup is a coup and we believe a strong U.S. statement announcing the
suspension of

assistance and a call for an early return to civilian rule and eventually elections is entirely warranted and
will

submit suggested text via septel.

BOYCE BOYCE

Written by thaicables

December 15, 2010 at 2:44 am

Posted in Confidential, Coup 2006, Royal Family

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