1 8 8 D e l e u zo

en d S p o c e Chopter1 1
-5. In Deleuze'sorvn philosophl',rve nriglrtsar',spacedoesfind neu'determinattons, TheSpoceof Mon: On the Specificity
of
not only in the particulal aestheticrnedia that he considers(parnting,theatre,
cinemai but alsoin the generalconsiderationof rnor,'ement that char;rcterises
perspec-
his Affecfin Deleuzeond Guottori
work. vhereas representation ahvals demands the return to a unlque
'implies a plu-
tive, Deleuzearguis in Differenceand Repetitio, that movement,
rality of ..nt.rr, a superimpositionof perspecrives, a tangle of pornts of yierv,a
c1.1existence of rnomentswhich essentialh'distort reprcsentation'(DeleuzeI997:
. 5 6) .
6. As Deleuzewrites, in a relatedcontext,'The negativeis the image of difference,
br.rta flatter-red and inverted image,like the candle in the eye of an ox - the el'e
of the dialecticiandre:rrling of a futile combirt' (Deleuze1997 51). Cloire Colebrook
7. Far frorn being another dintensionof ertensit,v,then, depth indicatesthe inren-
sive field (plan) front u,hich extensit.vissues:'Depthas the (ultimate rnd origi-
nal) heterogeneousdinlension is the matrix of all extensin',including its third
drmensioncor-rsidered to be hornoger-reous rvith the gther tr,vo'(Deleuze 1997r
229\. The relationbenveenmathenratics and nran mav thus be conceivedin a new
8. The diverseor n.ranifoldis produced bv difference,b,vthe irreducibleinequalin'
wa\': the questionis not that of quantifyingor measuringhuman properties,
and disparit,vthat haupts God's perfection like a remainder.Thus, as Deleuze
'principle of sufficient but rather,on the one hand,that of problematisinghumanevents,and, on the
says,it is nor c;od's perfecr calcularionswhich form the
reason' for the world but, rather, the imperfection of those equations - the a problem.
other,that of dei'elopingas varioushumaneventsthe conditions<-rf
al',vavspresent,:rlr'"'21'5 unrecoverabledifference- that makes the rvorld behind (Deleuze,The Logic of Sense\
God's back, as it u'ere.
9 . W h a r i s D e l e u z ei t r g u i n g w i t h r e s p e c tt o s p a c e ?I n a s e n s e .K a n t : r n t i c i p r t e s
Deleuze'sown trauscendentalempiricissrin his elucidation of spaceand time
when he considerspossibleobiectionsto his own erposition. Those u'ho: The Senseof Space
regard spaceand time as relationsof appearances, alongsicleor in succcssioti
How do thespatialmetaphors by Deleuze
adopted andFoucrultin their
to one another - relatior-rs abstractedfrom experience,and in this isolatiorr
confusedlyrepresented. . . are obligedto den_v that a priori mathematicaldoc- earl,v work relate to a theory of actual space? When Foucault, in The
trines have any validitl' in respectof real things (for instance,itr sp:rce)or at Order of Things (1970), detailed a series of historical a priori, he set
leastto denv their apodeicticcertatntv. himself the task of uncovering the 'table' across r,vhich the terms of
'mathematicaldoctrines',and it-tstlfaras the
Insofar as Kant meansgeometrvb,v thought were distributed. He also referred to spacesof knowledge, and
Euclideannorion of spaceancl the Nervtonian notiorl of space-timeon nhich concluded with reflectionson the history of rhought as defined by various
Kant basesso much of his erposition have been largelv dismantled,rve have no 'foldings'
real trouble with this objection.What should interestus. however,is rhe conclu- producing an interiority and exteriority.rOne of the many texts
sion that Kant drar,vsabout this transcendentalempiricisn'r: to rvhich Foucault's work was responding was Edmund Husserl's Crisls
on this vieu', indeecl,the a priori conceptsof spaceand tinle are merelv crea- of' tbe European Sciences(1970\ which, as Derrida noted, r"rnwittingly
tures of the imagination, u''hosesource must reallv be sought in erperience, exposed the rvay'sin which a humanised and architectonic concepfion
the imaginationfrarningout of the relationsabstrirctedfronr e-xperience some-
of space underpinned the transcendental project (Derrida 1989). A
thing that does indeed contain u'hat is generirlin these relations. but r,"'hiclr
cannot exist u'ithout the restrictionsthat nature lias attachedto theln. (Kant common, objectir.e,presentableand scientifically rneaningful world was
1965:81) the implicit telos, not only of all acts of me:rning but also of the very idea
o f m e a n i n g a s s u c h . I n o r d e r f o r p h e n o m e n o l o g yt o e s t a b l i s hc o n s c i o u s -
ness as the temporal synthesis that constitutes a world, and that posirs
that rvorld as objectively present for others both now and in the future.
o n e m u s t p r e s u p p o s ea s p a c eo f m a n : a w o r l d w h o s e s e n s e t, r u t h , o r d e r
and geometrv must always be presentable (even if not present) for any
sublect whatever. Any cultural, historical or ethnographical relativism
r e l i e su p o n a g e n e r a lh o r i z o n , c o m m o n w o r l d o r p r e - c u l t u r a l' w e ' w i t h i n
lvhich relativit)' takes place.
 190 Deleuzeond Spoce
On the Specificity
of Affecr I 9l
whereasDerridaarguesthat this architectonicassumptionof
a human emergence ranc.. Phenomenology
spacein generalunderpinsphilosophyassuch,which necessarily ?{ had arguedthar all perceptronand
presup_ communicablemeaningpresupposed
posesthat all sense ultimatery be brought a horizon, a world of possibilities
.can to presence, Foucault
(1970) arguesthat this which would then be givenrepeatableform and idealityin the structures
transcendentalconcernis historicallyspecific.
Prior to modernity spacewas heterogeneous: of sense'The laws of geometrymay, therefore,have teen inscribed
selveswere fo.rstituted by
morally, definedaccordingto their territory and its Euclid but their sensetranscends any specificsubjectand concernsany
norms (Foucault
1970: 328); but it is with rhe rranscendentalproject subjectwhatever.senseemergesfrom a local time and spacebut then
that any local allows for the thought and beingof what is true fo, ,p"c. and time in
appearance of man is seenasan empiricalrealisatitnof a generalhuman-
ity. An entirelynew spatialmetaphoricsexplainsthe e"istence general.For Derrida_thishorizon of 'any subjectwhatever'presupposes
of actual a normativeimageof humanity,a subjectorientedtowardsthe disclosure
spaces:therecan only be this localisedworld here because
humanrtyis of an objectiveand scientificallymanipulabreworld. For Foucault,this
just that transcendental movementthat will unfold itselfthrough time in
all these concreredimensions..No*, in his later work horizon fails to confront the 'outside', the untbought eventsthat orient
on iou.uult, the horizonsof senseor milieuswithin which -. Lou. and think. The
Deleuzesuggests that we can move beyondFoucault,schartingof those
human or acrual spacesthat unfold from a transcendental problemof sense'then, is the problemof the way in which ortrot spaces
pr-incipleof - the milieu in which we orienr ourselves
spacein general- the phenomenological idea of .o.rr.io.rrn.ss as the and live - are doubled by a
genesisof space- towards a 'superfold'.The argumentgoes spaceof sensera 'distance'or distributionfrom which we can think
something or
like this (Deleuze1988: 131).,First,thereis the era of live loczilisi:d-tim.,and spaces.It would be far too simple,then,
the unfold:anv to say
actual appearanceof life is seento be a finite expression that phenomenology^uses the conceptof ,horizon' metaphorically,or
of an infinity. that the 'terrirory'
Human beingsare fragmentsof the cosmos.6ectnd,in is figural in A Tbousandplateaus(19gi). Rather,the
the nineteenth very differencebetween-literaland figural - the very possibility
century,with the emphasison 'man', we encounterthe
fold: .man, is thought - emergesfrom botb the movementsof bodiesaid the
of
finite, but his subjectionro the world is preciselywhat produces rmages
his his- thosebodiesproduceof eachother.
torical, linguisticand political development.A senseofii-.,
space,ran- As early as L9G9, in The Logic of Sense,Deleuzecontrasred
guageand life in generalis brought into beingonly two
becaus.d.rit. -u' geneses of sense:the first is Husserlianand is static.Senseis releasedby
can turn backand cometo recognisethe waysin which he
is enfoldedby an eventthat passesfrom a 'noematicattribute' - seeingsomething
life; he is that borderwherelocal determinationunderstands as
itselfasloc_ something- but then releases
alised.In thesefirst two.erasof knowledgethe very style the perceivedfor all time;"oneseesin the
of our thought hereand now (theactual)a potentiarthat could be perceived
is orientedby spatialrelarions,the way in which *e i-"gi.r. for all time
what it is (the eternaland pure singularity,singular
to think. The very idea that thought alters historically, becausenot entwinedwith a
ihat it has an rvorld of relations).The noematicattributeof sense
orientationor spatialimaginaryis what opensup the 'superford,. is the event,for we
By con- seenot just what actuallyrs,but alsothe seenas it might
fronting all thoseeventsfrom which thought.-.rg"r, be remembered,
fy thinking how imagined, recalled, repeated, hallucinated. Any perceived
therecan be perceptionsof spaces,*. rolong., pi.ruppose redness
to be represented;
an infinity becomesa 'to red'. It is in this sensethat the ,uifr..
nor a finite beingwho constitutes,his, human world 'quasi-causal', of senseis only
sterileand incorporeal;it is the imageof bodiesproduced
(asin phenomenology) but an 'unlimitedfinity'. Eachlocatedobserverrs
from an encounter,but is also no longerbound ,rpi"irr,
the opening of a fold, a worrd forded around its u"ai.r'""a -ir,-
contemplationsand tures.senseis the eventthat emergesfrom an encounter,
rhythms.Thereare as many spacesor folds as there a senseof red,
are stylesof percep_ a potentialor power 'to red . . .'. Deleuze's
tion' If a fold is the way perceptions'curve around' staticgenesis is thereforeclose
or are oriented to phenomenologyin arguing that the condition
accordingto an actingbodS then thethoughtof these for any perceivedor
curvesproducesa actual world is a virtual distance.But whereasHusserl
life that can think not just its own human world - saw senseas a
the spaceof -ar, - brrt predicate- judgingthe world to be thus - Deleuze
the senseof spaceas such. seessenseas rhe verb,
's7hat releasingfrom this world of effectedrelations- this territory,
united Husserlin the 'origin of Geometry',and Derrida assemblage
with or mixture - the potentialfor other relations,other *orlds.
Foucaultin their criticism of phenlmenology In addition
was the problem of the to the surfaceof production, or the spacethat is produced
from the
 192 Deleuzeond Spoce
encountersof singular powers,there is also the metaphy5i6slsurface.
which is rheimageof rhosepowersnor as rher areactualiicdbur asthey
'we
rnight be. could say,for exanrple,that eve' the minimal laws of geog-
raphy form a metaphysicalsurface,extracting from relertionscertarn
powers to relate.But once we thougbt this genesisof a metaphysical
surface,this doubling of the a*ual world with its sense,then we would
be obliged to consider the potential of other worlds or a counrer-
actualisation.
The secondgenesisis dynamic:how is it that this expressingor sense-
constituringperceprion emerges? How is the eyecapableof survel-ing a rvhich do effect a possibility for thinking territoriality as such, or an
world, not just as its own but as it would be,or could be, for any subject
whatever,for all time? Here, Deleuzedraws upon a psychoanalysis of
partial objects;bodiesbegin as flows of forcesand desire,mouth and
breast,mouth and finger,excremenrand anus.This is a schrzoidposition
of forces,and is made up of parts and fragments.But in the subsequent
depressive positionthe surfaceis overtakenby a height,the heightof rhe
good objectthar presentsthe forceswith an irnageof wholenessand inte-
gration, a proper point from which the surtaceis surveyed.If rhereis a
surfaceof sensethat we can describestatically(asthe differenceberween
actual imagesand the imageas it would be for othersbeyondthis here
and now), this is only possiblebecauseof the dynamic relationsof
bodies.The mouth becomesan organ of speaking,producinga subject
whose world is now no longer that which it seesfor itself, but is that
world as it is surveyed.If we have a horizo', lived world, context or
actual space,this is becausean eventhas occurredin the peculiarmir-
turesof human bodies.The Body withor-rtorgans is
first jLrsrthat depth
producedby the forcesthat take in and spit out partial objects;but with
the elevationof the 'good object'the body without organsbecomesa ,full
depth'.
If we nroveforward to the politicisationof thisgenesis in Anti-oedipus
we aregivena further distinction:legitimotely,the Body rvithout organs
is eff'ectedfrcjmthe productionof forces.(So,to draw upon a ,fieldmeta-
physic'that goesback at leastas far as Spinoza:life is ?orce,the play of
and the interplayof theseforcesproducezonesor sitesof qual-
forces,
ities,i'tensities.Ir is not that thereis a spacethat is then qualified;raiher.
forcesproduceqr-ralities and qualiciesprodr.rcefieldsor spaces,.blocsof
becoming').The Body u,irhout Organsis produced,alongside;the con_
nectionsof desiringflows.The zonesadd up ro a seriesof spaces;but this
whole is nevergiven,for thereis ahvaysthe potentialfor furtherconnec-
tio' and prodr-rction.Legitirnately,the Body wirhout organs is this
effecteddepth.Illegitimately,however,one can cometo believethat the
.|93
On the Specificityof Affect
Body withor.rtOrganswas the original subiector ground, from which
fir-riteterritories or zones were formed. In psychoanalyticterms, the
desiresof bodiescreatepartial obiectsor attachments,which are then
srructuredby Oedipus:the breastis the breastof the mother,the penisis
the phallusof the father,and all this is necessary becauseif we are not
submittedto structurewe will fail back into the abyssof pre-Oedipal
ir-rdifference. The Body without Organsis irssumedto be that ground or
life againstwhich human structuredefinesitself.Politically,this error is
that of presupposingth:rt from all the territoriesand regimesof signs
rrbsolutedeterritorialisation, we imaginethat thereis in existence an ulti-
mare territory, a unir-vrvithin which and from which local spacesare
lived.
Absoluteterritorialisationis, then,the potentialof sense,the potential
of the brain to think the genesisof spatialityfrom within a local space;
not just this image as it is here for me, folded around my body, but
irnagingas such.Humanity is not, as in phenomenology, the finite point
in the rvorld from which the world is unfolded.But human life, in the
form of the thinking brain ls the sitewherethe potentialfor space- the
intuition of inhuman foldingsof space- can be actualisedand counter-
actualised. For Deieuze.then,the humanor the potentialof the brain is
ahvaysmore than a constitutedimagewithin sense;it is also that image
that allows us to think the potentialof imagingas such (Deleuze1995:
42). Just as Foucault'sgenealogyof man was accompaniedby an affir-
rnationof the selfas that rvhich can turn back upon itself,problematise
itself and thereby open new ways of thought, so Deleuzewill affirm
Foucault's'superman' no longerturns back upon himselfbut opens
"vho
out to forcesthat will 'free life' from'witbin hintself' (Deleuze1988:
132).-Indeed, asDeleuzenotesin hiswork on Foucault,totbink requires
movingbeyondformationsof knowledgeand dispersedvisibilitiesto the
'non-place'
from which 'what we see'and 'what we say'emerge(Deleuze
1988: 38).'This 'outside'is not spatiallyseparatedfrom the world we
live; ratheq the 'outside' is nothing more than the relationsof forces
throughwhich rvelive,see,and say(Deleuze1988:84).Thereis space,
the experience of space,only because of a non-spatial'outside'that is
nothingmore than a play of forces(Deleuze1988:B5).
The Ethics of Space
Thereis a perceptior-r
rvecould havein readingDeleuzeand Guatari that
the molecularis good,while the molar is bad,that affectis liberatingand
 194 Deleuzeond Spoce
mobilising while meaning or conceptuality is rigidifying. Such a moral-
ising reading would be enabled by placing Deleuze and Guattari in the
tradition of post-1968 difference thinkers who resist the lure of identiry
and who, supposedly,grant an essentialradicalism to the non-semanric
per se. On such an understanding, conceptuality, ideality and form are
ways of retarding and normalising the flow and force of life, while the
random, singular or unthought release life into its open and infinite
potentiality. The relation between time and space would, accordir-rgly',
also be historicised and politicised. Philosophy has privileged a uniform
space of points, a space that may be measured or striated precisely
becauseany point in spaceis equivalenr to and interchangeablewith any
other. These points are achievedeither by the division of uniform matter,
or by the loc:rtion of bodies across the plane of matter. Time is then
regarded as the measure of movement or points within this uniform field.
'Western
metaphysics has always privileged a 6xed world of forms, a
spatial unity and a pre-given order over the processesand events that
produce that order. When we read Deleuze and Guattari's seeming cele-
bration of smooth over striated space (Deleuze and Guattari 1987 353\,
of multiple plateaus rather than a line of history (Deleuze and Guattari
1987: 393), of artisans rather than architects (Deleuze and Guattari
1987 402), and of nomadology rather than sedentar,vphenomenology
( D e l e u z ea n d G u a t t a r i 1 9 8 7 : 3 8 0 ) , t h i s w o u l d s e e m r o , u g g . r , t h a t w e
move from a dualism that privileges a founding term - spatial coordi-
nates, measuring time, order - to an affirmation of the singularities from
which all dualisms and orders emerge. As in Derridean deconsrrucrion,
we would recognise any moral or binary opposition as effected from a
differential field not governed by rrny dominant term. In terms of space
this would seemto suggesrrhat space,far from being a field within which
points are mapped, is better conceived as a plane of singular affects and
events that is, in'Western thought, reactively coded as one general terri-
tory.
However, the emphasis in post-Deleuzian theory on affecr, singular-
ities and nomadology misses the affirmative understanding of sense,
mind and philosophy that sits alongside Deleuze's critical project.
r"Throughor.rthis work Deleuze is at pains to point out that he is not advo-
're[Llrn'to
cating a primitivism, and this has been acceptedwell enough.
',Flowever,the celebration of the minor term in Deleuze and Guattari's
non-dualist binaries does seem to suggesta preferencefor the affective,
singular, haptic and embodied over sense, conceptuality and idealitv.
Alongside the critique of the normalisarion of space in the 69r.rreof a
unified humanity, there is another problem in the post-1968 affirmation
of Affect 195
On the Specificity
of difference: the problem or positive possibility of the whole, the power
of a singular thought to imagine space in general. Certainly, post-struc-
turalism concerned itself with the disruptive qLrestionof genesis:how is
any field, system of differences or plane of knowable terms generated,
and how does one term explain, and thereby occlude, the genesisof any
srructure? But there is also an affirmation of the structural possibility of
this genesis:how does any field or set of relations produce a point or
image of that which exceedsthe set?For Deleuze and Guattari, it is time
to approach the problem of genesisatrd structure differently (Deleuze
and Guattari 1987:242): a strtlcture is a set of external relations, the way
in which life is viewed or generated from some point. A structure is one
side of a stratification; the other side is that wbicb is structured, but this
determinable content is not undifferentiated or formless. And so for
Deleuzeand Guattari we need to move beyond structureson one side and
structured on the other to the abstract machine from which both are
unfolded. This would mean taking account of the processof differentia-
tion - the dynamic unfolding of difference - that subtends differencia-
rion, or the actual and realiseddistinctions between terms (Deleuze 1994:
206-7).It should be possible to think immanent tendencies,the way in
which different expressions of life unfold different spaces, relations,
'the immanent power of corporeality in all matter'
6elds or trajectories,
( D e i e u z ea n d ( i u a t t a r i 1 9 8 7 : 4 L 1 ) .
Genesisand Structure
Structuralism
presented epochof meta-
itselfasa breakwith the'Western
phvsics that had grounded beings and identities upon some prior plane
from which they emerge; differences were no longer differences within
space.Rather than accepting that differenceswere grounded on a prior
order and distributed across a field, structuralism described the emer-
genceof any field from the differentiation of points or terms. The idea of
difference wirhout positive terms allows us to imagine a differentiating
field that produces points only in relation to each other and that have no
intrinsic orientation.JSpacewould, then, be the effect of a synthesis,of
points, not a container or ground. Space is the effect of relations.vfhis
would apply both ro ,p"..in a meiaftroiicalienie, such as the space or
field of a grammar or social structure, and literal space.Geometry is not
a pre-given and ideal order of a spacethat bears its own lawsl rather, our
spaceis constituted through the sensewe make of it, the mapping of our
field of orientation. Structure therefore privileges external relations or
movements over points. There is nothing in any point or being itself (no
 196 Deleuzeond Spoce
intrinsic relati.n) that would determinehow it behavesor consrir.lres
itself in relationto other points.^However, as long as structureis seenin
terms of a differentiatingsystemof pure relationsit fails to account
the genesisor internal differenceof those relations.
..whileDeleuzealsoinsistson the exrernaliryof
relations- thar 'orhing
fully determineshow any potential will be actualised- he refuses
reducerelationsto a singlesrructure.Rather,life is a planeof potential_
ities or tendenciesthat may be actualisedin certain relationsbut that
could alsoproduceother relations,orher rvorlds.we can make this con-
crete by way of a very crude example.The power to be perceived
locatedin geometricalspace- to be actualisedin a systemof relations
betweenpoints - is certainlyone wav in which a body or marrermight
be actualised.So, a line that makesup a grid on a plan or diagramls
line by virtue of this realisedset of relations.Bur sucha line might also
be drawn on a canvas,overlaidwith other linesor set besideblocksof
colour,no longer bei.g a line b't becomingother than itself- a shading
or border.This meansthat thereis a potentialfor sense(within. say.lin-
e a r i t y )t h a rc a n n o rb e e x h a u s t ebdy a n y s i n g r er e l a t i o nI.n c o n r r a s i w i t h
the idea that spaceor the world is constructedfrom sense- sociall."''
culturallyconstituted- sparialityopenssense,for any location bearsthe
potentialto open up new planes,nerv orientarions.'Rather
spaceas effectedfrom sense,as realisedfrom a systemof orientationor
intending,Deleuzeseesspatialiryas an openingof'sense,as the potential
to createnew problems.Deleuzeis critical of the subjectof philosophy
for whom spaceis a form imposedo. the world, bur he is arsoresisrant
to reducingspacero actuallyconstitutedspatialplanes.vhat 'eeds to
be thought is not this or that plane, nor this or thar realisedsystemof
relations,but the potentialto produceplanes.the .pla'om ,ron,, ard
capacityto think or encouncerthat potential.
A singularityis the porentialto pio.luce relarions,but theserelations
cannotbe d.etermined from the singularityalone,for it is alwayspossible
rhat new encounterswill open up new relations.consequently;there
be no point from which spacesare drawn, because oolr,, only takeson
its determinationwith the unfoldingof a certai.r,p"..
could alwaysbe redrawn).A singularityis, however,a tendencyor poren-
tial and for this reasona spaceor field is alwaysmore than iti relations;
there_are alwayssingularitiesor potentialthat could open further spaces
or allow for the thought of any spacewhatever,spaceas such,or the
senseof space.In What is Pbilosopbyi Deleuzeand Guattari argue for
the prirnacyof architecturein relation to the arts and this is becauseart
works with the planeof composition,all thoseaffectsand perceotsrhat
On the Specificityof Affect 197
fill out any space.The plirne of composition in art is more than a spatial
rletaphor, for an,vrvork of art is a strugglewith those perceptions,affects
'lived'.'.Art does not expressthe 'lived' but
for end sensedencountersthirt are
releasesfrom the lived the impersonal power frorn which any oriented
rnd located life emerges.The plane of cornposition comprises the poten-
ro ti,lls of sensibility that an artist must somehow locate in a material (in
this time and in this space),rvhile producing a monurtent, such that this
s e n s a t i o na s i t w o u l d b e f e l t c o m e s t o s t a n d a l o n e , f o r a l l t i m e .
\{'e might contrast this productive, composing and architectonic model
as of art - art as the creation of relations that allow for the preservation of
'lived'
body - rvith ar received under-
sensation witirout reference to a
of deconstruction. For Derrida deconstruction is not itself a
stancling
a n-rerhodso much as an inhabitation and solicitation of all those texts that
preserlttheir strucrures,differences,borders or relations, rvhile repressing
that rvhich generatesstructure. There will always be, within any field or
sp;lce,a closed set of terms dnd an unthinkable supplementary term that
l.,ordersor closesthe set.'trfwe imagine how this might provoke the prac-
tice of spatial arts, such as architecture,then we can follow Mark Wigley
or bv suggestingthat anv experiencedor actual spacemust repress,forget or
disirvorv that spatialising tracing which marks out the border between
tha' seeing insideand outside, rvhich generatesthe field but cannot be located within
the field [Wigley 1993 191). More concretelyone could strive, as Bernard
Tschumi has done, to bring this thought of quasi-transcendentaldiffer-
enceinto practicei'Le Parc de la Villette (1987) aims to decentrespaceby
pr:oducing a distribution of poincs withor,rt hierarchy. According to
Tschumi, the various points that create the grid s.ystemof the park pre-
cltrde the thought of a centre or realised intention. \X/ithout hierarchy or
centre the various points will then enter into a seriesof multiple relations,
ou,
such that the character of the spaceproduced is not determined or organ-
ised beforehand.Fr-rrther, by overlay'ingother distributions such as ir series
of surfacesand then a seriesof lines, no systemof distributions is elevated
above any other; unity is avoided. The points therefore work against a
can
dominating ratio that would present space as an expression of design -
" (an
unfoldingthat certainl,vnot an expression of a subject. Ii the points were in some ways
pure form or pure difference,this would be a set of relations without pos-
itive terms, withouc overarching form, allowing orher systemsof relations
- including acrions and the participation of other designers- to produce
nerv relations. Most significantly,Tschumi insists that the, 'project aims
to unsettle both memory and contexr,' and is therefore exemplary of a
resistanceto the idealisation of space,the use or experienceof space in
terms of an ideal sensethat rvould precedeits punctual event:
198 Deleuzeond Spoce
Not a plenitude,but instead'empry' form; /es cdsessont uide La Villette,
then aims at an architecturerhat nTeansnothing, an architectureof the sig-
nifier rather than the signified- one thar is pure rrace or the play of lan-
guage. . . a dispersedand differentiatedreality that marks an end to the
utopia of unity. (Tschumi 1987: viii)
In contrast to this pure distribution and relation of points - 'differ-
entiated reality' * Deleuze puts forward the idea of external relations
that cannot be confused with the singular powers from which those
relations are effected. Relations are not the effect of a process of diffe-
rentiation or distribution. Rather, the power to differ expressesitself
differently in each of its produced relations, with each effected point or
term bearing a power to exceed itself, and to establish a new relation
that would then create a new space. Put more concretely, we might
imagine a certain power to differ - light - producing a spectrum of
colours, such that these differences are effects of this intensiry of differ-
ence; but we then might imagine colours entering into relation with the
eye, thereby producing a visibility that can create new rerms and new
relations. Any space or plane, then, is the unfolding of marter, with rela-
tions being effected by specific expressions,which are events of specific
powers to relate:
[Tlhere is an extraordinarily fine topology thar relies not on poinrs or
objectsbut rather on haecceities, on setsof relations(winds,undulationsof
snow or sand,the songof the sandor the creakingof the ice,the tactilequal-
ities of both). It is a tactilespace,or rather 'haptic', a sonorousmuch more
than a visual space.The variability, the polyvocality of directions,rs an
essentialfeatureof smooth spacesof the rhizome rype, and its alrerstheir
cartography.(Deleuzeand Guattari 1987: 382)
This is what Deleuze draws from Spinoza: if life is desire or striving,
and has no static being outside this striving, then encounrersor relations
need to be referred back to desires or intrinsic powers to differ.lThere
are not points or positive terms thar are differentiated or distributed in a
uniform space; nor is there spatiality or punctualisation as such which
can only be thought after the event. Rather, each relation is expressiveof
a power that bears a potential to enter into further relations, such that a
6eld is not a distribution of points so much as the striving of powers to
become and that become as this or that qualitl, depending upon, but
never exhausted by, their encounters.
Even so, while this yields an affirmation of the affective or material
over the formal, the production of space rather than its orienting sense,
there is also an affirmation in Deleuze'swork of the thought, philosophy
On the Specificityof Affect 199
and senseof affect. lndeed, Deleuze'shistorical work with Guattari offers
a genealogy of globalism: how certain affects such as the white face,
viewing, subjectiveeyes,and labouring and subiectedbody constitute the
' m a n ' o f m o d e r n i t , va n d s i n g l e t e r r i t o r y o f c a p i t a l i s m ' T h e r e i s n o t h i n g
radical per se about affect, but the thought of affect - the power of phi-
losophy or tme thinking to passbeyond affects and imagesto the thought
of differential imaging, the thought of life in its power to differ - is desire,
dnd is alwal's and necessarilyradical.2 The power of art is ethical: the
power not just to present this or that affect, but to bnng us to an expe-
'affectuality' -
rience of or of tbe fact that there is affect. Art is not a
judgement on life but an affirmation of life.
Space in General
Delerrze's conceptsof the molecular,affect,haecceityand multiplicity,far
from strivingto think a spatialitythat liesoutsidethe 6eld it determines,
allorvthe thought of a self-distributing plane,a spacethat unfoldsitself,
and that doesnot requireand expela supplementary absentand spatial-
isingforce.Deleuze's differenceis not radicallyanteriorand unthinkilble;
it is the immanentpulsationof life that expresses itselfinfinitelyand that
can be affirmed in the thought of lfe.
The idea of spaceas the effectof a radicallyabsentforce of spatialisa-
tion that liesoutsidethe field it spaces- evenwhile this outsidecan only
bethoughtas outsideoncetermsarespatialised - is itselfa peculiarevent,
affectand multiplicity.Whv is it that today we seeourselvesas subjected
to the signifier,as inhabitinga law or systemof relationsimposedby an
Other who doesnot exist?Thereis, if you like, a spaceof white Oedipal
man, a spacethat hasexpressed itselfin a pure geometry,a geometryori-
entedby the senseof a spacethat would be the law for any body what-
ever, a space that is nothing more than a capacity for axiomatic
repetition.In responseto this spaceof man and pure geometryDeleuze
suggeststhat far from returningto a primitive geometry,and far from
adding one more dimensionto the plane that might allow us to think
spacein general,rve ought to multiply the dimensionsof spacein order
to maximiseits power.From that critical endeavourwe can then go on
to ask,asDeleuzeand Guattarido, what a planeis, suchthat it can think
its orvn folds and dimensions.Philosophycreatesthe plane of thought
which, in its Deleuzianform, strivesto think the emergence of all planes,
and this is rvhy A TbousandPlateauscan describelife through planesof
science,geometry,geology,literature,politics, metallurgy,history and
linguistics:all the waysin which life folds upon itselfin orderto imagine
 2OO Deleuzeond Sooce
a'd give form to itself, all the differenr matters of form. all the wzlys in
which matrer manners or articulates itself.
Univocity and Equivocity
'Both Foucault's The order of Things and Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-
oedipus historicise the emergenceof man, pointing out that man is nor
just one being in the world among others, even if the human knower
has
always been somehow privileged. NIan is defined through whar Deleuze
refers to as an equivocal ontology, or what Foucirult describes as an
'ontology
withour metaphysics' (Foticault 1970: 340). Thar is, rhere is
'o longer a world of inherent or incrinsic differences which hr-rman
knowledge may either come to knorv and map (as in the classicaieral, or
which can be recognised and reflected in the self's relation to a cosmos.
For Foucault, prior to rnodernity, spilce is the surfaceupon which knowl-
edge and difference are placed, and time allows rhose dispersed spaces,
rlot to be constituted and synthesised,but to be recognised.In modernity,
however, this world of disperseddifferencesis norv rorn aparr by a point
of opacity and radical difference. Being does not bear its own trurh or
metaphysics;there is a point outside being - life - that is other than the
world but which gi'es the world its truth, order or differentiation
(Foucault 1970 265). Difference and unfolding are located rvirhin man.
To go back to Husserl's argumenr for transcendenralconsciousness:we
can no longer naively use the truths of geometry as though they simply
representedthe truth of space. we have to recognise the temporal con-
stitution of these truths by consciousness.consciousnessjust is a capalc-
ity for spatialisation through time that can be recognised as having no
proper space, and that must ar once be located in ir specific culture and
epoch, but also differentiated in its potential from any concrere locale.
Here, the difference, space and surface of the world are unfolded from
one point within the world - life - a point that can never have its space
within the horizon it unfolds:
It is alwayszrgainsta backgror.rnd of the alreadr'-begr-rn
reflectin what n.rayservefor hirn :rs origin. For nl:1n,then, origin is by no
rneansthe beginning- a sort of darvn of historv from rvhich his ulrerior
acquisitionswould have accumulated.origin, for man, is much more the
wav in which man in general,any man, articulateshimselfupon the alreac-lr.-
h e g u no f l a b o u r .l i f e a n d l a n g u a g eilr r r r r s rh e s o u g h rf o r i n r h a t f o l d w h e r e
man in aii simplicityapplieshis labour to a world th:rt has beenu,orkedfor
thousandsof years,livesin the lreshnessof his unique, recentand precari-
ous existencea life that has its roots in the first orsanic formations.and
On the Specificityof Affect 201
composes into sentenceswhich have never before been spoken (even though
generation after generation has repeated them) rvords that are older than all
memory . . . Far from leading back, or even merely pointing, towards a peak
- r,r'hetherreal or virtual - of identity', far from inclicating the moment of the
Same at rvhich the dispersion of the Other has not yet come into pla,v,the
origir.r:rlin man is that w'hich articulates him fronr the olltser Lrpon some-
thrng other than himself . . . (Foucault 1970: -331)
It is in equivocal ontologies, according to Deleuze, that man as a sig-
nifving animal is the point frorn which system, difference and structure
rrre given. Man everywhere is sut'riectedto the same formal strr.rctureof
differences, lau.',erchange and signification - rvith the world and real
being nothing more than the plane upon lvhich system takes hold. In
rnodernity, one moves from expression to signification: from a world
u,here differencesare real and distinct and give birth to signs,to a world
rvhere each event has its ground and origin in one organising system.
From real and distinct differencesone moves to formal difference,and to
rrn idea of humanicy that is nothing more than a formal function."Man is
not a being rvithin the world so much as a c:rpacity to signify, exchange
and communicate.
It is not surprising that Deleuze,like Foucault, makes much of the pre-
Kantian experienceof multiple folds and spaces..Inhis book on Leibniz
rrnd the fold Deleuze draws attention to the ways in which the Baroque
plavs upon the intrinsic differences of possible perceptions. Each point
in the world is a monad, a perception that unfolds the world from itself
u.ithout the requirement of a shared and anticipated spacethat is synthe-
sisedinto the future. To say that 'monads have no windows' is to say that
rr rvorld is perceived and unfolded without the assumption or presuppo-
s i t i o n o f p e r c e p t i o ni n g e n e r a l .O n e h a s n o t ) , e tt r o u b l e d o n e s e l fo r g i v e n
rnan the responsibility for the genesisof space from his own time; one
has not yet seen each perceiver as the effect or sign of a perception in
general. Perception is not the condition, genesisor origin of the spatial
irnd temporal rvorld; there are spatialities and remporalities of each
rronad. At one end, God is the full and clear perception of all sptrce;at
that man is zrbleto
the other, are the singular perceptions of infinity, each monad's percep-
tuaI grasp of the infinite that transcends it. By contrast, modern 'man'
stands, not for one perceiver among others, but for a purely formal
power to perceive that also bears the imperative ro perceive as any
subject whatever. The deterritorialisation that frees the perception of
space from its own locale is reterritorialised onto consciousnessin
general, the subject for whom space is everywhere subjecr ro the same
formal and geometric logic. Ntan speaksas one who is already subjected
2O2 Deleuzeond Spoce
to a systemthat giveshim being,and who must in essence
alreadybe tied
to any other possiblespeaker:
The classicalimageof thought,and the striatingof mentalspaceit effects,
aspiresto universality. with two 'universals,'
It in effectoperates
the whole
asthefinalgroundof beingor all-encompassing horizon,andtheSubjectas
the principlethat convertsbeinginto being-for-us.(Deleuzeand Guattari
7987:379)
From univocity,where spaceand perceptionare spreadacrossa time
and surfacethat transcendsthe human knower,equivocityestablishes a the averageEuropean, the subject of enunciation' (Deleuzeand Guattari
singleand formalisablecondition of spatiality- the logic of the subject
- which is both inescapableand unmasterable.Both Foucault and
Deleuzenote that this historicalshift doesnor just have political impli-
cations but needs to be seen as rhe very negarion of the political.
Although they both have a common target - the equivocalontology
wherebyconsciousness is the substancefrom which the world's spaces
are constituted- Foucaultand Deleuzediffer as ro rhe possibilityof the
repoliticisationof space.
Husserlhad alreadyarguedthat the formalisingor idealisingpower of
geometryallows one to repeatthe truths of spaceto infinity. One estab-
lishesa sciencethrough an orientationor problem which goesbeyond
the given to its future and repeatablepotential.Sense,for both Husserl
and Deleuze,is this radical incorporealpower to releasewhat rs essen-
tial in an eventfrom its materiallocale.The constitutionof formal geo-
metricalspacethereforeemerges from a certainsense)strivingor project.
For Husserlthis is the senseof one humanity,occupyinga singleterritory
'Whereas
and history of truth and knowledge. Foucaultand Derrida are
criticalof this one consciouslife,this presupposed 'we' or ground
of con-
sciousness, Deleuzeaffirms the power of thought and philosophy to
intuit life as the sourceof difference,folds, relationsand spaces.Sense,
philosophy intuition, thinking and conceptsall name the power ro
unleashother territoriesby imaginingthe givenas an expressionof a life
that exceedsany of its fixed terms,and imaginingrhe potentialthat can
be unfoldedfrom thar expressive power.
'Man', or the modern
subjectof psychoanalysis or linguistics,closes
down thinking if he is seenas the point from which differencesand rela-
tions unfold. Accordingly,space,seenas the field occupied,measured
and constitutedby this man of consciousness, is a field of interiority- a
spacewithin which we think, a spacereducibleto perceprions of this spe-
cific organism.Sucha spaceoperatesfrom a combinationof senseand
affect.There are the affectsof Westernman, the imagesthat organisea
On the Specificityof Affect 2O3
olateau or constitute the social unit: the white face of the viewing subject,
the bla.k holes of eyes expressing an interior, a body dominated by
speech and identified through its familial position as either mother or
percep-
father (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 96-7). That is, the investing
- face
tion of a certain body part the apprehension of the power of the
- unfolds a sense of space, a way of orienting a field
as organising centre
'The faciality function showed us the form
crucial to the territory of man:
Lrnderwhich man constitutes the majoritS or rather the standard upon
u,hich the maiority is based:white, male' adult, "rational", etc., in short,
1987:292).
From the specificaffect of speaking man as subiect and centre, Deleuze
and Guattari then describe the expansion or extrapolation of this affect
to form a senseof space and time in general. The central point enables
equivocity, where one privileged term is the organising ground of the
other; man becomesthe substanceupon which other terms depend and
he also enables a single temporal plane:
Following the law of arborescence, it is this centralPoint that movesacross
all of spaceor the entire screen,and at every turn nourishesa certain dis-
tinctive opposition, dependingon which faciality trait is retained:male-
(female),adult-(child),white-(black,yellow,or red); rational-(animal).The
central point, or third eye,thus has the property of organizingbinary dis-
tributions within the dualism machines,and of reproducingitself in the
principal term of the opposition;the entire oppositionat the sametime res-
'maiority' as redundancy.
onatesin the centralpoint. The constitutionof a
Man constituteshimself as a giganticmemory' through the position of the
centralpoint . . . (Deleuzeand Guattari 1,987:292-3)
And all this is achievedat the expenseof the line: movement' desiresand
trajectories are subordinated to the terms or points they produce. The
effectsof relations and desires- points - are taken as original, and in the
constitution of an ongin Memory supplants memories:
Vhat constitutesarborescence is the submissionof the line to the point. Of
course.the child, the woman, the black have memories;but the Memory
that collectsthose memories is still a virile maioritarian agencytreating
them as 'childhood memories',as conjugal,or colonial memories.(Deleuze
a n d G u a t t a r i1 9 8 7 : 2 9 3 \
Deleuze's prolect is the expansion of sensebeyond its localisation in
man, the expansion of the potential of geometry beyond its purposive or
architectonic sense.The transcendentalproiect, the striving to think the
senseof space,has yet to be carried out beyond its dependenceon man.
2O4 Deleuzeond Sooce
The spaceof humanity has beenconstitutedfrom the perceptionof an
uprightman of reasonwho regardsall orhersaspotentiallyor ideallyf ust
like himself.A radicalstrivingtowardssensemust be transcendental and
empirical:transcendental in its refusalof any imageof thought or con-
sciousness, and empiricalin its observationof the differentperceptions
opened from different affectiveencounters.Senseis the porential to
imagineother perceptionsof the infinite,and the strivingto think space
positively;not the link betweentwo points, but the power of life in its
strivingto createtrajectoriesthat open seriesor plateaus.
One might think here,positivell',of sacredland. Claimsfor the sacred-
nessof land by indigenouspeoplesare not just examplesor instancesof
the variousways in which 'we' (humanity)grant spacesignificance. For
the key differenceis that spacehere is not 'significant'- not seenas a
marker,symbol or imageof cultural memory.WhereasWesternunder-
standingsof monumentusespaceto mark an event,and do so in order
to call future humanity to recogniseand retain its past, sacredland is
both infinire--demandingrecognitionfrom others- and inherenti,vaffec-
tive. The infinite it opensis deemedto be real, and not simply a relative
culturalconstruction;but at the sametirnethis infinitecannotbe knorvn
or appropriatedby just any other. IndigenousAustralianclaimsto the
sacredness of land locatememoryor spirit in the land itself,u'hich is not
a signifierof the past, so much as the affirmationof the ways in which
bodiesand land arecreatedthroughtheir affectiveconnections. A people
is a peoplebecauseof this land, and this land bearsits affect,resonance
and spirit becauseof the dreamingof tbis people.At the sametime, in
accordwith the positiverealityof sense,the dreaming,spirit or geniusof
spacetranscends presentindividualsand opensup into the future,requir-
ing further creationand demonstration.There is not 4 time or 4 space,
which is perceivedherein one sense,therein another.There are distinct
modesof sense,differentways in which perceprionsimagine,intuit and
constitu.tean infinite.
Conclusion
Deleuze'sproject is both critical and affirmative.Like Foucault and
Derrida he is critical of the assumedcentreof a constitutingconscious-
nessor singlebody from rvhichrelationsemerge.EutDeleuzealsowants
to arguethat the transcendental project- the strivingto think spaceor
- Deleuze.G. (1990), The Logic of Sense,trans. M. Lesterwith C. Stivale,ed. C. V.
life in general needsto be carriedbevondits human territory.
The subjectas universalhumanity who operateson rhe singlespatial
and temporalplaneof capitalismrepresents a distinctpassagefrom affect
of Affect 2O5
On the Specificity
to formal function. The white man of reason has no race' no body, no
beliefs;he is nothing more than a power to relate to and recogniseothers.
C:rpitalism is cynical and axiomatic; no body, image or desire governs its
domain. N{an is the communicating, rationalising and labouring poten-
tial in us all. There is an abstraction from all tribalism and affective rela-
ti<tns:territories are no longer constituted through investment in certain
bocliesor irnages.But this is possible only becauseone affective body -
rhe image of Oedipal man who is nothing more than a power to abstract
ironr his body and speak - norv allows the axiom of one global human-
in'. The production of one who is other than his bodily desire - the
gender-rreutral,disembodied subject of rnodernity - is the white,'Western
man of reason.
The body of signifying, capitalist man is the body of reason, speech,
communication and submission to a law that one recognises as one's
orvn, and therefore as the lalv of all others. One's true being is that of
'anv subiect wha1e19{, an affective investment in a body whose desires
are now pure functions, who can recognisein all others the same human
life, the samepotential to liberate oneselffrom mere life and become fully
human. N{an is that bod,v or point of life liberated from life, a desire not
for rhis or that image or affect, but a desire to be other than affect. On
the one hand, then, this subject of formal geometry and the space of
humanity is reactive: a desire that wills itself not to will and in so doing
subnits itself to the negation of desire. One constitutes oneself as a point
in humanity across one universal space and time. In so doing, howeveq
desire is deprived of its ou'n po\\'er, reterritorialised or subordinated to
one of its affects.The power to intuit or senseperceptions bevond one's
or'vnpurvieu, is halted by the inclusion of all other perceiversas already
rvithin one's own space and time. Deleuze's own proiect is neither the
inhabitation of a specifictext or event of space- determining the points
from rvhich a spaceis drawn or delimited - nor the assertion of an abso-
lute deterritorialisation. Rather, from the thought of the constitution of
this or that space from this or that desire, or from the thought of the
potential of sense,one can think space as such in its infinite divergence:
a thousandplateaus.
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Deleuze,G. (1992), Expressionismin Philosophy:Spirtoza,trans. M. Joughin, New
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Deleuze,G. (1993), The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. T. Conley, London:
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J. P. LeaveyJr, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Foucault,M. (19701.The Order of Things, London: TavisrockPress. scrolled tightly into a coil, and then pushed down the neck of a bottle he
Foucault,M. (2001), 'Space,Knowledge and Power,'in J. D. Faubion (ed.),power: corked and tossed into the ocean. But unlike the marooned soul on the
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beachliving in the hope that a crew aboard a passing ship might find the
Penguin,pp.449-64.
Husserl, E. (1970), Tbe crisis of the European sciences and Transcendental bottle bobbing in the waves, read the words and look at the map in order
Pbenomenology,trans. D. Carr, Evanston:Northwestern Universitv press. to change the course of their voyage, retrieve the forlorn author and
Heidegger,M. (1967), What is a Thing?, rrans. W. B. Barron Jr and V. Deutsch, bring him back to the haven of a mainland, the isolated man encrypts his
Lanharn: University Pressof America. .,vordsin a glasscontainer and sendsthem seaward. He throws the bottle
Tschumi, B. (1987), cinigramme Folie: Le Parc de la \tillette, Princeron: princeron
Architectural Press. into the sea to let it follow a course and reach a destination of its own.
'The
Wigley, M. (1993), Tbe Architectureof Deconstruction,Carnbridge:MIT press. Desert Island' (in French as 'Causes et raisons des iles d6sertes'
'Causes
Iliterally, and Reasons of Desert Islands'] now in English trans-
Notes lation as "The Desert Island") was penned in the 1950s. Purportedly
1 . Accordinglli there is a quanrirari'e distinction among beings thar allo*'s for n,ritten for a special issue of l,louueau Fdmina on the theme of desert
intrinsic difference.All thesenumericallydifferent insrancesof white are still o/ islands, the manuscript copy of 'The Desert Island' never reached the
whiteness,a polr'er to differ that is essentialand can be seenas really distinct onlv addresswhich, it was supposed, was written on its containing envelope.
becauseit expressesitself over and over again. space as extension allows foi
'extrinsic
individuation'or rhe differenceofihts frin that; but intensivespaceas
Vhen David Lapoujade and his team of editors retrieved the pages and
intensiveis just the power of essentialdifferencesto expressthemselves, to t.p"at used them to inaugurate an assemblage of the philosopher's essays
themselvgsin all their differenceand therebyestablishone expressiveplane:' n.ritten in France and elsewhere between 1953 and 1974,Delettzehad
only a quanrirarive distinction of beings is consistenrwirh rhe oualitatrve been dead for sevenyears. The ms. in a bottle was recovered,and a text
i d e n t i t yo f r h c a b s o l u r e A
. nd rhisquantrrarive
d i s r i r r c t i o ni s n o m e r e a p p e a r - that until the turn of the twenty-first century had been private finally
ance, but an internal difference, a difference of intensiry. So that each hnite
being must be said to expressthe absolute, according, that rs, to the degreeof became public. The piece has since become an event and, as an event) a
its power. Individuation is, in Spinoza,neither qualitative nor extrinsic, bur marvellous reflection on the vitality and force of the spaces Deleuze
quantitativeand intrinsic, intensive.(Deleuze1992: 1971 rnvents in all of his philosophical and critical writings.
2. ln Anti-oedipas (1983), Deleuzeand G'attari arguethat desireis alwavs revo- The unpublished essayon desert islands has appeared almost literally
I u t i o n a r y .D e s i r ei s n o r r h e d e s i r ef o r r h i s o r t h a r l l s r o h i e c t .o r r h i s o r r h . r r u o -
out of the blue. The decision to title the collection of thirty-nine essays
posedlynatural need.Desireis the power for life to act, where action, movement
and striving are not determinedin advanceby any proper end or intrinsic rela- L'Ile ddserte et autres textes: Textes et entretiens 1953-1974 [The Desert
tion (Deleuzeand Guatari 1983 377). Island and Other Writings: Texts and Discussions 1,953-19741atteststo