Liucd Bodies I 87
The percciving mind is an incarnated body. I have t¡ied . . . to re-establish the
Lived Bodies
4 Pltenomenology ønd the Flesh
Ê" Ùøn-, fi'Yuet &n'Å')s
Corporeal Phenomenology
M""rrou-oo*r" ¡ecINs with a fundamental presurnption, not of a Cartesian
dualism of mind and body but of their nccess¿rv interrelatedness. He claims that
phenomenology wants to understand the ielations between consciousness and na-
ture and between interiority and exteriority' The body and the modes of sensual
perception which take place through it are not mere physical/physiological phe-
nomena; nor are they simply psychological results of physical causes. Rather, they
affirm the necessary connectedness of c-gnsciousness as it is incarnated; mind, for
him, is always embodied, always basecl on corporcal and sensory.relations.l Un-
'iik. S".tr", for whom consciousncss and reflective self-èonsci'or¡sness (being-for'
itself) assert a priority over and a¡e t¡anscendent of the inertia of the immanent
body (being-in-itself), Merleau-Ponty begins with the negative claim that the
body ii noian oblect. It is the condjtion and context through-which I am able
to have a relation to objects. It is both immanent and transcen?ent' Insofar as I
live the bod¡ it is a phenomenon experienced by me and thus provideg the very
horizon and perspectìvd point which places me in thc world and makes relations
between me, other obiects, and other subjects possible. lt is the body as I live it'
as I experience it, aná as.it shapes my experÈnce that Merleau-Ponty wishes to
elucidæe. Phenoienological reflection on ihe body reveals thât I am nota subiect
separated from the ivorid or from othcrs, a mind somehow cut off from matter
and space. Unlike Sartre, whose idealism grants a prirnacy to mind or.conscious-
ness, ìVfurleau-Ponty claims to revcal a subiect as a "being+o'the-world". lt96zt
uüii, "tuUi."t .ôtmitted to thc world," a subject of percePtion and behavior
*"lt" and reflection. I am not able to stand back from the body
and its expeiience, to rcflect on them; this withdrawal is unable o
", ", "ágnition g,rasp my
body onþ by living it'
¡o¿y-r.-i -il-tl*¿-¡y-me. I have access to knowledç of my
-- -'rü,*J
of of the human subject as a mind housed or encapsulated
"ot..iving
in a (quasi-mechanical) È<rdy, the "captain of the ship"-a postulate
which leads
io i¡.'."1"t"¿ problems of solipsism, ìhe existence of orher minds,.and,the exis-
with. the postu'
tence of an inåepcndent mater-ial rcality-Merlcau-Ponty begins
world through our
i"i" inu, *"
p.t""iu. and receive information of and from the
bodiesr
86
roois of the mind in its body and in ìts world, going against the docrrines
which trcat perception as a simple result of the acion of external tlrings on
our body æ well as against those which insist on tlre auronomy of conscious-
ness. These philosophies commonly forget-in favor òf a pure exteriority or
of a pure interiority-the insertion of the rnind in corporealit¡ the ambiguous
relation with our bod¡ and correlativel¡ with perceived things.... r\nd ic is
equally clear that one does not âccount for the facts by superimposing a purc,
contemplative consciousness on a thinglike bocly.. .. Perceprual behavior
emert€s. ,. from relations to a situation and ro an environment which are not
merely the working of a pure, knowing subject , . . (Merlcau-Ponty ry61t 1-4)
For Merleau-Pont¡ although the body is both object (for others) and a lived
reality (for the subjcct), it is never simply obiect nor simply subject. It is defined
by its relations with objects ând in turn defines rhcsc objecrs as such-it is
"sense-bestowing" and "form-giving," providing a structure, organìzation, and
ground within wlrich objects are to be situated and against which thc body-sub-
ject is positioned. The body is my being+o-the-world and as such is the insuu-
ment by which all information and knowledge is received and meaning is gener-
ated, It is drrough the body that the world of objccts appcars to me; it is hr virtue
of baving/bcing a body that therc are objects for me:
Classical psychology... stated tha¡ my body is disringuisluble from the table
or the lamp in that I can turn away from the lattc¡ whereas rny body is con-
st¿ntly perceived. lt is therefore an object which does not leave mc. But in this
it still an'objectl ... an object is an object only insofar as it can bç
case is
moved away from mc, and ultimately disappear (rom my field of vision. Its
presence is such that it entails a possible absence. Now the Permanence of my
body is enrirely different in kind....lt defies exploration and is always pre-
sented to me from the same angle. Its perrnanence is not the pe¡manence in the
world, but a pe¡manencc from my point of view....lnsofar as-it.sees or
touchás the wórld, my body can thã¡ifore be neither seen nor touched. whai
constituted," is that it
'i¡prevents it ever l¡eing an obiect, ever being "completely nor
ihar by which there are objects. lt is neither rangible visil¡le insofar as it
is that which sees and touches. (Merleau-Ponty ry62. 9o-9zl
The relation between the subject and objects is tlìus not causal but based on
sense or meaning. The relations of mutual definition governing the body and rhe
worlcl of objecrs are "form-giving' insofar as the body actively differentiates and
categorizes the riorld into groupings of sensuous experience, patterns of organi-
zation and meaning.
Merlcau-Pontiætempts to demonstrate this with reference to a se¡ies of neu-
rological disturbances, iniluding the complernentary yct oPPosite symPtoms of
the ihantom limb and agnosia; he also outlines dctails from Goldstein and
Gelb's
re"
f".ãu, study of the brain-damaged aphasic Schneider.¿ Merleau-Ponty
"o.re
fe¡s to Schneide¡ l¡ a number of texts, sta¡ting with the Sttuctu¡e of Behauìor
88 I The Inside Out
and culminating in Tåe Phenomenology of Perception.Schneider's cerebral lesion
entails a series of apparently unreìated disordets in perceptual/visual relations,
memor¡ the perception of tactile spaces, various motor disorders, and the break-
down of language and intellectual skills. He is unable to undertake abstract ac-
tions; ar most he can participate only in ¡he concrete. Schneider is unable to take
on genuinely goal-directed behavior or any actions which rely on abstract func-
tionsr
. . . our patients are unable to imiratc or copy anything that is nor part of their
immediatc concrcre cxperience. . . . they havc the grcatest difficulty in repeât-
ing a sentence which is meaningless for them. . . . To say such things, . . de-
mands.., the ability to livc in rwo spheres, the concrete sphere where "real"
things takc place and the non-concretc, the merely "possible" sphere, for in
saying meaningldss thinç we must shift from one to the orher. This the paricot
is unable to do. He cán livc and act only in dre concrcte sphere. Hc is the¡eforc
always himself. He is unable to þlace himself in the situation of other people
nor is he able to impc¡sonate as an actor does,. ,. [n normal life we are rarely
forced into action by the stimulus siruâtion itself. Usually wc have to place
ourselves... in the appropriarc situation, The outside world merely gives us
the impulse to do this. Thus cven drc initiation of an action demands the at¡-
stract attirude. , . . Wc may say that the paticnt has no world at all outside him-
self and opposed to him in the sense that we do; he is impaired in lris capacity
for separating himself from the world. His inability to achieve pe¡fotmances
which demand a¡ abst¡act attirude mcans not only a shrinkage of his person-
ality but also a shrinkage of the world in which he livæ. (Goldstcin 1963:
53-67]'
Schneider's sclf-identit¡ his absolute self-coincidence, implies that he is un-
able to perform the most everyday and takan-for-granted actions. He lives en-
tirely in the concrete. It is not that læ has lost motor or sensory or even relevant
intellectual abilities, although he does exhibit some impairment' Rather, he lacks
an abstract context in which to make use of these skills. For example, he is able
to take out his handke¡chief from his pocket and blow his nose but is unable to
perform these same actions with his eyes shut, He is unable to perform any action
or respond to any situation which is not currenlly P¡esent. He can only perform
actions by \ryatching his limbs in movement. He is incapable of initiating any
action unless he is called to do so by something external. In other lvoÌds, h€ is
unable to project his wishes, hopes, and plans fo¡ ¡he future onto a present situa'
tion. Consequently, the wo¡ld in its abstractness does not give hirn cues for ac-
tion, as goal-seeking behavior usually requires. He can grasp and touch objccts
but not point to them; he cannot draw by imitation, cannot rcPeat statements.
He ca¡noc follow conversations' âlthough he may respond to concret€ questions.
Hc cannot understand that single words may be joined to form phrases and sen-
tences; he cannot break down words into letters, He is unable to list€n to two
conversâtions at once and cannot tell the difference between a riddle and a prob-
Liued Bodies I 89
lem. He has no capacity to survey or reflect on his past or his future, and he can
only see in the direction in which he is looking: ,,lle neve¡ sings or whistles of
his own accord . . . he never rakes an initiative sexually. He nevã¡ goes out for a
walk but always on an errand" (Merlcau-ponty
ry62t,¡34\, Merlãau_ponty has
argued that a causal explanation, an explanation in teinrs of physìological
or
psychological causes, is not possible.
Thus all of Schneider's t¡oubles a¡e reducible to a unity, but nor the absùacr
unity of the "representative function"; he is ,,tied" to'Jactualirx" he l lacks
liberty," that. concrete.libeny w_hich comprisæ thc g*"r"t pã*i'. oi putti,,g
ooeself in â situation. (Merleau-Ironty 1962: rlj)
SchneidcCs diso¡ders a¡e neither purely bodily nor purcly conccptual but
result
f¡orn the breakdown or disintegration of the passagc or inierconnåcrions berween
these two sphcres.
irreducibility
of psychology to biology and of bìology to psychology can
.be illustrated
..The
wirh the rwo opposite disorders of the phantoä fimb and agnosia.
In the phantom limb, as explained in rhc preceding chaprer, tLe paricnt still suf-
fers a pain in a location whe¡e the limb once ur.Jto b", b.fo." ìt, o-pu,"r,o,l;
agnosia, on the other hand, is thc nonrecognition of a part of thc body as
one,s
own, The phantom limb illustrates an organ or bodilyiart within a átal bocly
r irnage- that, is no longer there; agnosia by cont¡ast is the
nonrecognition of a bocly
part that slrould occupy a position witlrin the body irnagc. In tr:-aditional psycho-
logical and physiologi:al ¡s.¡n,, thc phantorn limb is rreãtcd 6¡"¡¡ory, á ph,
", " and agnosia is
experience reactivated in the present (hence, an hallucination),
seen as a forgetfulnes, a refusal oi iìegative judgment. yet for Merleau-Ironty
both dcmonstrate a funda¡nent¿l ambivalence on tie part of the subject. On one
hand, there is a recognition of the loss or possession oi the real limb; on the other
hand, the actions which the arm, sa¡ would or could have performecl are still
remined as possible actions for the subiect. ft is as if the subjecr refuses to close
off the possibilities of actions of which thc body is capable. The phantom limb
tr is not a memory or an image (of sornething now abseut). It is ,,quasi-present."
It is tlre refusal of an expcriencc to ente¡ inro the past; it illustrates the tcnacity
of a present that remains immutable.
By means of these and other neurological disorders, Merleau-ponty demon-
fr srrates that traditional psychology and physiology presume a fundamentally pas-
sive body, one on which rhe sensuousness or perceptuality of objects irnpinges.
lnstead, he shows rhat it is activ€ insofar as it gives form and sensc ro its own
componcnt parts and to its relations with objecrs in the world. Thc phanrom
limb and agnosia indicate that our experiences are organized not by rcal objects
and relations but by the expectarions and meanings objects have for the body,s
-l'hey
movements and capacities. indicatc a "fictional" or fantasmatic construc-
tion of the body outside of or beyond irs neurological structure, which he ex-
90 I The lnsia" Jut
plains wirh reference to the notion of the body scherna, which is clearly strongly
in{luenced by Schilder's resea¡ches.
The'body is fundamentally linked to representations of sPatiality and tempo-
rality. This relation to space and time is a precondition of the subject's relations
with objects. Merleau-Ponty's point is that we grasP the idea of external space
only through certain ¡elations we hâve to our body or corporcal schema. His
liuggestion is that we acquire motor skills and a sysæm of possible actions or
corporeal proiects spahning the gulf and spectrum of possibilities, which range
from our subiectivity to the extcrnal environment:
Our body is not in space like things; it inhabits o¡ haunts sPác€. It applies itself
to space like a hand to an instrument, and when we wish to move about we
do not move the body as we mol'e an obiecr. rÙ(/e transport it without instru-
menB . . . since it is ou¡s and because, through ir, we have access ro sgace. (Me'
1963:5)
,rleau:Ponty
In other words, we do not grasp sPace dircctly or through our senses but
th¡çrugh our bodily situation. Space is not understood as a se¡ies of relations be-
tween different objectively located Points' points of equai value; for one thing,
this flâttens and neutralizes the positive contribution we ourselvcs make in the
perception of obiecis. Rather, spacc is understood by us as a relation bctween
tlìese points and a central or organizing perspective which regulates perceptions
so that drcy occuPy the same perceptual 6eld. This perspcctive has no other lo-
cation thân that given by the body:
. . . these ¡elations are different ways for exremal stimuli ro test' to solicit, and
to vary ou¡ grasp on the world, our horizontal and vertical anchorage in a
piuce ind in ã h"i"-"nd-now. We find that perceived things, unlike geometrical
àbiects, are not bounded entities whose laws of construcdon we posses'r a
pri
oij, bui th"t th"y are open, inexhauscible systems which we .recognize. through
a certain styleof development, dthough we are nevcr able, tn prrnclple' to ex'
plo." th"* .ntit"l¡ thougtr they never give us more than profiles and pcr'
"ven
spcctival views of themselves' (Merleau-Ponry t9631 5-6J
Schneider can scratch his nose more readily than Point to it; he lives
in a
of ltis practical needs' The space
space narrowly circumsc¡ibed by the spatiality
.i,itl,in *hich î" is able to cffeciively óperate is hcterogeneous' a set of
distinct
lo."tions defined by úis 6odily impulses (tbe place where it itches
"nJ.ignifr""nt distinct
or hur"ts). He does not understand the qualitatirely and quantitatively
of points in which
rp"". oifryti"tt for him, space is a continuum homogeneous
- point has greater value than any other'
-no
Ï it .-frodied sublect tirat the subiect occupies a perspecdve on ob'
i""r.-lrt p"t"íp"oi""."p..""nrc
"t the positìon within space where.it locates itself'
ii- p".rpJ*¡tä jm,* ^th"t
itrrnod." of acccss to obiects are always partial or
but never grasping or possessing them in
;;;;;d interacting with objects
LiuedBodies r 9r
, thcir independent and complete materiality. The object posed before a subject, a
subject engaged with objects, must be a subject situâted in spâce as the (virtual)
poir¡fof central organization of perspective, tl.rc point which organizes a mani-
fold into a 6eld.
Thg
, lodf for Merleau-Ponty is rhc very condicion of our access ro and con-
feptron ot space¡
The "here" applicd to my body docs nor rcfer ro a determinatc posirion in
relation to other positions or to external coordinates, but thc laying down of
the first coordinaes, thc anchoring of the acrive body in an object, the sirua-
tion of the body in the face of its tasks. Bodily spacc can be distinguished from
. extemal space and envelop its parts instead of spr.eading thcm out. . . . the body
. imageis... â vlay of stâting that my body is in theworld.... one's own body
is the third æ¡m . . . in thc figure-background structure and cvery 6gure starirlî
out against the doublc horizon of extcrnal and bodily space.
By considering the body in movemcht, we can see better how it inlrabits
.space (and possibly time) because movement is nor limited to submitring pas-
sively to space and time, it actively assumcs them, it takes thcm up in their
basic significance which is obscured in the commonplace of established situa-
tions. (Merleau-Ponty \96l-l. roo-roz)
lf
my consciousness is not spatially located ancl if external objccts are always
located in space, how is it possible for consciousness n¡ establish a space or dis-
tance between itself and its objects? For Merleau-Pont¡ the mediating ternr nec.
essary to explain.thcir interaction is thc "corporeal schema," or body image. I-{e
asks us to reflect on how we move our bodies and do things: the body "knows"
what its muscular and skeleal actions and posture are in any movemcnt ol ac-
tion, quitc indcpendent of any knowledge of physiology or how the body func-
tions. I am able to pick up a pebble and throw it without reflecting on how I am
to do it. The movements I make are not simply the addition of various st¡ccessive
mechanical movemcnts of a Cartesian or Hobbesian body'machine: thc pebble
and my picking it up and throwing ìt are integrated into a unified relation to my
body as a whole. For example, it is not by means of access to a Cârtesian âbstract
or geometrical space that one knows wherc to scratch in order to satisfy an itch
on one's back. I know exactly where it itches and am able, if I can reach it, to
scratch without having to locâte my hand in relation to the itch' This is true even
if I use an instrument like a stick. From this point, Merlcau-Ponty claims, the
stick is no longer an obiect for me but lras been absorbed or incorporated into
my pe¡ceptual faculties or body parts..Here he afÊrms Schilder's notion of the
plasiicity of the body image, adding to it the philosophical idea of the body im-
ägeh crucial function in establishing the lived space and time of the subject'
- The corporeal or postual schcma of the body is what enables us to devclop
a prâctical r;ladon to óbjects in the world and a psychic attachment to our
bodies
and body parts. B..ause my body is not seen as a mere object by me, I necessarily
92 I The btside Out
have a different relation to it than to any other objects. lt is by means of my body
that I am able to perceive and interrelàte with objects; it is my mode of access
to objects. And unlike my perspectival access to all other objects, my own
liody is not accessible to me in its entirety. I cannot take up a perspective on
my body because it is the vantage point from which I have a perspectiver "as
for my body, I do not observe it i¡self: in order to do that it would be necesiary
to havc the disposal of a second body which itself would not be observable"
(Merleau-Pont¡ 196z ro7),
As Mcrleau-Ponty acklowledges in "Thc Child's lì.elations to Others" (in
Merleau-Ponty 1963) he owes his understanding of the postural scherna of the
body to a number of neurologists and psychoanalysts working in the rgzos aud
r93os on the first year of life-Head, Vallon, Guillaume, Schilder, Stern, Spitz,
l,acan, and others. Merleau-Ponty begins wiih questions already posed by Wallon
and Guillaumc. How do I become awâre of my body and distinguish it from the
bodies and sensations of othcrs? What enables rne to identify my body as my
own? How do I locate my experiences? All maintain that at first there is a phase
of confusion and indistinction, in which thc child doe¡ not recognize the "oth-
e¡ness" of the other-that is, it does not recognize any boundaries sepârating
itself from the world. Mcrleau-Ponty describes this as a phasc of "anonymous
collectivity" or an "undifferentiatcd group" (t963: rr9l. René Spitz, in Tåe
First Yeør of Liþ (1965), suggests that rhere is no distinction between the "psy-
che and soma, between inside and outside, between drive and objcct, between
"1" and "non-l," and not even rcgions of the body" (Spitz r965t 15),
At birth and for the first several days, thc outside world is virtually nonex-
istcnt for the baby. All its perceptual functions are directed to internal, introcep-
tive processes; they conrinu€ to be mediated through introception until seve¡al
months lateÌ, even when che child comes to distinguish itself from its environ-
ment. Only ar the end of the first week of life does it respond to cues with reflex
actions, such as turuing its hcad to the breast whcn hcld in a suckling position.
The child, however, recognizes the nipple only when ìt is put in his or he¡ mouth,
If anything distracts the child, including its own crying, it will not react to the
nipple, wen if it is inserted into the child's mouth. Only after thc first month do
other human beings acquire a special status distinct from othcr obiects; and
within a few weeks of this period, it begins to recognize the human face in par-
ticular, foflowing its movements with close attention.
The mouth, as Freud recognized, is especially privileged in terms of its sen-
sitivity to sensations, It (unctions both introceptively and extroceptively. It is a
primordial link or bridge connecting perceptions from the inside and the outside
of the body. There is a gradual shift fiom such contact PercePtion to more dis-
tance-oriented perception, especially hea¡ing and seeing, but to begin with the
various sens€s arc not all operational, not organized or integrated to form a co-
herent set of synesthetic pe¡ceptions. It must learn to link the sensation of suckihg
Liued Bodies I 9j
at dìe breasr and the visua.l perception of the mother's face, The cohcsiveness of
perceptions needs to be built up not by aggregation but by integration. By three
months, the child will respond to an adult's face with a smile; but even now the
face must be presentcd front on so that the child can see both eyes and other
features; a profile will not elicit the infant's recognitionr ,,At this aç lerel, noth-
ing else, not even the baby's food, prorokes this response. . . .98% of infants
smiled during this period in rasponse to any individual, friend or strânger, re-
gardless of sex or colour" (Spitz r965: 88).
Up to about the third month, dre child doesn't really distinguish between
introception and extroception. The¡e is no clcar evidence that it iecognizes thc
otherness of others. Merleau-Ponty claims that if the child cries whe¡i someone
goes away, it is not that the child recognizes thc other's absence; it is rarhe¡
that
the child has "a sensation of incompletcness,' expericncecl as an internal sensa-
tion (1963: rz4). These write¡s seem.to agree rhat the first active processes of
extroception occur when the child reacts to the voice of others..Ihis may pro,
voke pleasure, delight, surprise, even fright. The child at the same time l¡ecomcs
awarc of its own voice and listêns to the vatious sounds it makes, differentiating
thcm from orhe¡ sounds. The child will experiment wirh monologues of sound,
repeating the labials and linguals in rhythmic variations
Probably the most significant link bemecn the introceptive and extroceptive
perceptual functions is the child's acquisition of organiied visual perception.
This too begins in a fi.agmentary wa¡ and is built up into cohesive perciption
bit by bit (the subclasses of vision it gains ove¡ time include color visùn, spatial
or depth perception, perceptions of movement, variations of luminosity). We
should note that the visual perception of oneself (e,g., in a mirror) is derived frorn
the gradua.l unification of visual capacities. The recognition of its specular image
as an imagc of itself is the most significa¡rt contribution to rhe acquisition of the
corporeal schema. The specular image, while extroceptively perceived, is also still
introceptivcly internalized as a-kind of doul¡le of itselfr
Until thc momenr when the specular image arises, the child's body is a strongly
felt but confused reality. To rccognizc his image in a mirror is for him to lea¡n
tl\at there cdn be a ?ieu)point taken on bim, . .. By means of the im age , . . he
becomes capablc of being a spectator of himsclf. -fhrouglr the acquisition of
the specular image, the child notices that he is zisiåle, for himself and for oth-
ers. (Mcrleau-Ponty ry63: 116)
The Visible and the Invisible
Merleau-Ponty has always seen his work in opposition to and as an attempt
to desøbilize the structure of binary oppositions dominating so much of !íestcrn
thought. Rather thair valo¡ize onc or the other side of a dichotomous pair, rather
than affirm their unity and onencss in some kind of global or local holism (which
94 I The Insia" Jut LiuedBodies I 95

always cntails some kind of rcductionism) or accept the bifurcation and mutually standing of the constructed, synthetic nature of experience, its simultaneously
exclusive and exhaustive status of such pairs, Merlcau-Ponty's work, in ways that active and passive functioning, its ¡ole in both the inscription and subversion of
surprisingly anticipate Der¡ida's supplementary readings of dichotomous polar' sociopolitical values, provides a c¡ucial confirrnarion of many feminists" unspo-
iruiions,. ait mpts to take up and utilize the space in between, the "no'man's ken assumptions regarding women's experiences. Second, in to ìhc
I bracketing off of experience in much of poststructuralìsm and "o,lt."rt
land" or gulf ieparating oppositional terms. This impossible, excluded middle antihumanism,
predat s and makes possible the binary terms insofar as it precedes and exceeds
ihem, insofar as it is uncontainable in eithe¡ term. Perception is, as it were, mid-
t Merleau-Ponty still takes experience seriousl¡ not as somcthing to be explained
away as simply untrustworthy or "ideological" but as somcthing to be explained.
way between mind and body and requires dre functioning of both. Neithe¡ em' * He renders experience of immediate and direct relevance ro philosophy and rhe
piricism nor idealism, neither pure physiology nor pure psychology' have bcen production of knowledge. lt is nor only thc starting point of analysis but also a
äble to produce tcrms to adequareþ account for the complex interactions and å kind of measure agaiust which the vagaries of theory can be assessed. Third,
implications involved in perceptual proceses. 'Iir explain or analyze perception Merleau-Ponty locates experience midway between mind an<i body. Not only
requires an understanding not only of physiological and psychological processes
{ does he link experience to the privileged locus of consciousness; he also demon-
bui ábove all of the wayiin which each is mutually implicated with the other'l r strates that experience is always necèssarily embodied, corporeally constitutecl,
His clefiance of and challenge to binary polarizations places his interess located in and as the subject's inca¡nation. Ilperiencc can only be understood
close to those of many fcminists, especially those who regard logocentrism as
I berwcen mind and body-or across them-in their lived conjunction.
inherently complicit with phalloc.nttß.. His philosophical aims and methodS of Towa¡d the end of his life, particularly in the unfinished text Túe Visible and
,"nd"ring bin"iy polarization problematic accord quite well with the goals of tbe lnvisible (1968), Merleau-Ponry shifted the terms in whjch hc unde¡stood
,n"ny f"Ãini.t --ãnd perhaps most strikingly Luce lrigaray-of making explicit $ perception and the mind/body problem, changing the orientation though not the
the únspokcn âssumptions óf and debt to femininity and mltelnrty that lounds * motivating interests guiding his earlier writings. ln this la.st texr, his object of
philosophy as we knãw it. What Merleau'Ponty seems to offer feminists like lri' * theo¡etical speculation is the concept of "the flesh," a term providing the pre-
but, more Positivelyt elements conditions and the grounds for the distinctions berween mincl and bod¡ subject
laray is nlt simply a common theoredcal struggle
ihrri"y or enrich fcminist theory itself. His-emphasis on lived experi- and object, and self and other.a
.n., "og-*i
p"i..ption, his focus on the body-subicct, has resonances with what tr The notion of the body schcma or postural model of the body ourlined by
*"y "nâ É" ,.j"t.l"d as feminism's maior contribution to the production Merlcau-Ponty ín The Phenomenology of Perception anticipates or provides the
".guåbly
,,ri.tu.. of knãwledges-irs necessary reliance or-lived.experience' on ex- origins of the concept of the flesh in'lhe Visible and the lnvisible, Thc body is
"ná
p"ri"niiA as-a touchstone or criterion of the validity of theoretical able to move, to initiate a¡d undertake actions, because thc body schema is a
"aqurint-ce
Bit it is clear that experience cannot be taken as an unproblematic series, or rather a ficld, of possible actions, plans for action, maps of possible
Ñ;i;*. is of movements the body "knows'how to perform.'Ihe body schema is also the fielcl
liven. a oosirion rhrough which ãne can judge knowlcdges, for experience
and social practices' ¡[ in which the subject's cohesion and idencity as a subject and its intimatc incar-
Ëo*tl iÅpli""r.¿ in ani produced by various knowledges
Ñ"verth.À,
-roi" i *""1d coniend that without some acknowledgment of the forma- nation in and as a particùlar body take place. The concept of the flesh is devel-
,iu" of in the estal¡lishmcnt of knowledges' feminism has no tr oped as al "ultimate notion" (Mcrleau-Ponty r968: r4o), not the union or com-
"*p"ti"nce # pound of two substances, but "thinkable by itself," an elemenrary or
erounds from which to dispute patriarchal norms'
"^"î;;;';f ;-i; r.* .n* o, lo' ton"tpo'n'v theorists committed to the foundational term, which "has no na¡ne in any philosophy" (r19, r 47), an " ex-
a aenttt etnplar sensible." Yhile it does not displacc perception as thc thematic object of
pri.""y J"*p"ri"nce, Merleau-Ponty is in a unique position 1o ¡r-,o¡ii¡,
'"nd
,oohi.ti.æion to feminist attempts m harnesi experience in political evalua- il investigation, it is a more elementary and prior term, the condition of both seeing
irucial insights from which and being seen, of touching and being touched, and of their intermingling and
il. tsíililr"Jtnf oi I*.a .*ptti"nce has three
to an ineffa' $ possible integration, a commonness in which both subjecr and object particþate,
ffi; ffini;;;;H i.*n. ri,tt, it"
"fu*'
to relesate experience
tended to do' Expe- a single "thing" folded back on itself.
ble. unouestionable, g¡ven category, as soms feminists havc
as a sou¡ce of t¡uth' an arbiter of the-
il llhereas in his earlie¡ works Merleau-Ponty stresscs rhc funclamental inter-
ää"ñäil;riouË-,üË"rd""k"n outside implication of thc subject in the object and the object in the subject, in his last
f¡,f,r""f, cle.rlv it must play some role in them)' Experience is not provide text he explores the i¡terrelations of the inside and thc orttside, thc subject and
".1
;:Ji:;1t,""d. il..L"i, J¡,*a fó¡ces a'd in this sense èannot
""ã *rtitrtto thcm' Merleau-Pontv's under- the object, one sense and a¡other in a common llesh-which he describes as the
;ffJ,tË;l"|;'p"i"i'r-t ludgc
96 I The Inside Out
"crisscrossing" of the seer and the visible, of thc toucher and the touched, the
indcte¡minacy of the "boundaries" of each of the senses, their inherent t¡ans-
posability, their refusd to submit to the exigencies of clear.cut sepa¡ation or log-
icaf identity. $Íhat is described as flesh is the shimmering of a difþrance, t\e
(im)proper belongingness of the sublect to the world and the world as the con-
dition of the subject. He attempts a return to p¡cdiscursive experience before the
overlay of reflection, before the imposition of metaexperiential organization and
its codification by reason. A "return" to or reconstitution of such prediscursivc
experiencc, a "wild being," an uncultivated or raw sensibility, is necessary to
produce a nondualist, nonbinarized ontology. In returning to a prereflective sen-
sible, however, he is not seeking a pure datum uninfluenced by the social; instead,
his goal is to 6nd the preconditions within sensibility itself, within the subiect
that makes the subject open up to and be completed by the world. Neither subiect
nor object can be conceived as cores, atoms, or nuggets of bcing, pure pr€sence;
not bounded enriries, rhey "interpenetrate," mingle.
Merleau-Ponry illustrâtes this with reference to the relations between the vis-
ible (sensible) and the invisible (intclligiblc), the seer ancl the seen, although it is
significant that at crucial points in his argument he turns to the relations between
the toucher and the touched.r The visible is a kind of palpitation of being, never
self-identical or absolutely dispersed, a series of fluctuations and differen-
ces. It is
a concretion of visibilir¡ it is not an atom, . . . in general a visiblc is not a
chunk of absolutely hard, indivisible being, offering all naked to a vision which
. could only be total or null, but is rather a sort of straits between exterior ho-
rizons and interio¡ horizons, ever gapíng open, something that comæ to touch
lightly and makes diversc regions of thê colo¡ed or visìble world resound at thc
distances, a certain differentiation, an ephemeral modulation of this world-
less a color o¡ a thing, therefore, ch¡n a diffe¡ence betwcen things and colors,
â momentâry crystallization of color€d being or of visibility. Between the d-
leged colors and visible, wc would find anew the tissue that lines them, sustains
them, no-urishes thcm, and which for its patt is not a thing, but a possibility'
a latenc¡ and a flesh of things. (Merlcau-Ponty ry68t r3z-31\
The relevance of the visual model to tlre other senses nceds to be carefully as-
sessed, given that the¡e are clear characte¡is¡ics which can be attributed only to
the visual and othc¡ sensual features which are relevant to the other selises but
not to vision.6
To understand the radical departure from other phenomenologies which
Merleau-Ponty proposed in his chapter entitled "The lntertwining-the Chiasm"
lin The Yìsible and the Invisible\, it may be worthwhile to describe briefly the
more traditional accounts of PercePtion and visìon' including Merleau'Ponty's
own ea¡lier writhiþ. Througlroùt The Phenomeflolo4y of Perception, Merleav
Ponry describes visiol in terms of an actiYity undertakcn by à subiect in relation
Liued Bodies I 97
to a distinct afrd separaæ object. To this bare presumption-shared equally by
empiricists and idealists-Merleau-Ponty adds two other factors: the claim that
subjects are always and necessarily embodied, incarnate, corporeal beings and
the claim that vision is always composecl not of a given.sense <ìatum but of a set
of relations between 6gure and gtound, horizon ãnd object. In short, vision is
alway_s a_ function of cstablishing a (visual) field. The co¡rditions of having a vi=
sual field, then, involve the constiturion of an ho¡izon and the taking up of a
perspective:
The ho¡izon is what guarantees rhe idcntity of the obiecr th¡oushour the cx_
ploration; it is the conelativc of the impending power which .i g"r" i.trin,
over the obþcts nhich it ùas ju* surveyeci, on-,Iwhi.h it alrcady Ëas owr the
. fresh details which it is able ro discovci. . .. The object-horizon strucrure, or
the perspective, is no obstacle to me when I want o see thc obiect¡ for . . . it
is the means whereby tlrey arc disclosed. (Mcrlcau-ponry
ryeAie7_6g¡
The Senses
Merleau-Ponty's vicw in Pheaomenology made clear the simplicity of tracli_
tional modes of isolation iu accounts of scnse perception and túe reiarions be-
tween the informatiou provided by the senses to the procluctiorl of knowleclges.
Since the earliest days of Greek philosoph¡ vision was considerecl superior to the
othe¡ senses. Knowledge itself was generally dcscribed in mcraphors åerivecl from
visìon and optics. Thus it has tended to function not only as thc model for knowl-
edge but also as reprcsentat¡ve of all the othe¡ senses. [t is incomplete in itsel(
and being the most "developed" sensc, it requires thc rrpport onà funcrioning
of othe¡ senses. Its role is generally regarded as rhat of unifying aud hierarchicalÇ
ordering the other senses, taming or honing them.
Thc epistemological value of sight is based on the clariry and precision of rhe
images of whìch it is composed, An image, traditionall¡ has three characterisrics;
it prcsents a manifold.field or set of evenrs in rerms of simultaneity (it is rhe only
nontemporal or synihionous sensc); it functions at a disrance, serting up a space
o¡ field berween the seer and the seen, the physical and thc psychical; and it does
not iinply oi presume causàlity (becausc the other senses are monrentary and ocl
casioned by events, vision is ongoing and need ¡rot be focused orr or caused by
any object). Thesc characteristics se¡ve ro distinguiih vision lrom rhc olhet senses
and to placc it in a privileged position in terms of the access it yields to what are
believed to be the raì¡,/ eleme¡rts, the data necessary for the production of knowl-
edge.
Sight is par excellencc the scnse of the simultaneous or rhe coordinared, and
thereby of the extensive. À view comprehends many rhings iuxtaposcd, as co-
eiistent parts of one 6eld of vision. It does so in an instant: as in a llash, onc
glance, an openìng of the eyes, discloses a world of co-prcscnt qualities sprcad
98 I The ltsñe Out Liued Botlies I 99

out in space, ranged in depth, continuing into indefinitc disunce, suggesting'
if any direction on their static order, then by their'peÍspective a dlrectron awâY
from the subject rather than toward it. . . (Jonas, in Spicket r97o: 3r1)
sense, dominated by- a 6eld more
Just as sight is usually regarded as a spatial
than an obieä, hearing is usually understood as a temporal qe-¡99" !n which du-
ration is a malãr characteristic. ln this opposition beween sight and hearing, it
-is
believed that sound discloses not an ob¡ect but the region o¡ location of an
object, Rather than producing iconic representations, as does vision, it functions
matæ), ïbxture; like shape, is not given in a single conracr bur is a differential
notion aDd depends on a comparison of different texrures. Fourth, touch yicftls
accesB to thc suifâce-and, in some cases at least, to the depth-of objects, de-
pending on their composition. Fifth, touch provides information (again, differ-
eotially or comparativeþ), It has many sense receptors, including the body's en-
tire surface, but the hand is probably the most refined and sensitive. Touching,
like hearing, is limited in the amount of simultaneous informarion that can bc
processed. Like hcaring and sight, it is a moda.lity of difference:7

ináexically. There must be a Jause' object, or event producing.a sound' although

It appcars-in the embryo before the othcr sensory syst€ms (rowards the end of
sound in no way rcsembles it. As sight holds together and unifies various dispa- the second month of gæratìon), preceding thc rwo other proxirnal systems-
râte obiects, cotemporal sounds are unified into a single sound no longer resern- the olfacory and gustaro¡y-the vestibular appararus, aná dre wo distal sys-
blirrg its components (for example, stronger sounds drown out weaker sounds)' tems (the ¿udito¡y and the visual), obeying the biologica.l law rhar the eariier
Onl-y a few sóunds can be followed simultaneousl¡ and beyond a certain narow a
_system
develops, rhe more likely it is ro bc fundamental. lt has a grcar clensiry
limii; sound rapidly becomes noise. Unlike the activity sight bestows on thc seer' ot r€cepûors (jo per looo square millirnctre). . . . Thc skin can judgc tinre (less
he"ting is entirely conditional on being exposed to a- noise-emitting :Yent' Ad'
well than the ear) and space (less well than the eyc), but it alone combines thc
to iound o¡ choose to ignore it as much spatial and temporal dimensions , , . (Anzieu 1989: 14)
mitteà"þ the subject can actively
"tt"nd
* fr"iUf., but'even so, the subject must wait for something to stimulate the Even in The Phutomenology of Perceptìon Merleau-Ponry argucs that the
hea^ring org"nr. To provide a temporal conrinuit¡ hearing
alone is not.adequate'
js inscribed as an seoses cannot be so readily separated off from each other ir the artempt to un-'
for it äusí teV on memory' ln åther words, whe¡eas vision
de¡stand their specific modalities and properties, for in lived experiencc the
actiuit¡ hea.ing i, characterized as a pæsivity' If,-houwcr, siglt and hearing
are
senses interact, form a union, and yield acccss to a singular world, Sight and
tem-
;;;;;;;i";;PPosites-sight being spatial.and active and hearins beiugnature touch a¡e able to communicate with cach other, to provide ,conñrmations (or
effect or necessity of
p*i""¿i^tlåthis cannãt be unãei'tood
"t "n contradictions) of each other, because they arc thc senses of one and the same
iui tn ï"y, in *hich the senses have been transcribed' incised' and rendered subject operating simultaneousl¡ within one and the same world. The senses not
". ways in which
il.ìi"""I. T'here is no logical necessity-and indeed'-given the only Communicatc with cach other, adding to or enriching each other; they are
define.and are imPlicated in
ty tia spatialityl activity and passivity transposable, within certain limits, onto each other's domains, although thcy re-
".p"t¡
ar"h othaa, therc is no pilysiological
----fouan
reason for these couplings or assoc¡atrons'
main ir¡educible in their differences. Sight, touch, hearing, and smell fuqction
momen-
*"."t *ith Ëeári,,g the sttc""siveness of its impressions' their contemporaneously and combine their cffects, The senses are tra[sposable ouly
."* iÃo".,. l ¡.o "hares wiih vision the presumprion of a sraric oi given obiect
becausc each lays claim to a total world, a wo¡ld in facr dcfining thc subject's
mav weil p'ort to be the most difficult
ii;Ïì;:;;.;ä.h is-iro i.oni"¡' ro""h
inrcr-
sensory state; each world is able to rnesh with, be gridded in terms of, the other
àJcomplex'of all the senses to analyze because.it is composed of so-many "sensory worlds":
;;l"s;;;";ti"t, sensitivit¡ invoívins a numberof diffcrent-lyitÎ:ì:-(Ï:l:
or.rríra. ,a*aura, "f
frequenc¡ pain, and heat)' ln other words' touch' ll¡<e seellrg The senses communicete with each othe¡. Mr¡sic is not in visible space, but it
;äïil;;î'";"ti"i¿ åtà constitutcd thtough transcriptions' retracings' besieges, undermines and displaces that space, Tlre two spaces are distinguish-
writing which both (pro- able only against the background of a common wo¡ld and can compete with
ää* J ãä"tti"tJitv that involve a kind of culiural possibility of their realignmcnts each other only because they both lay claim m otal being.
seParates th; senses and entails the
Thc sight of sounds and che hearing of colo¡s comes about in the same way
"ltiá^¡iyl
-'- retranscriptions into other terms'
and as the unity of the gaze through the wo cycs: in so far as my body is not a
acccss to
fou.h is ågarded as a contact sense' First' it provides contiguous collection of adjacent organs, but a syncrgic system, all dre fuoctions of which
;i;*;d:;;;i. .*f"". of tht 'oucher and the muched must partiallv co- are exercised and linked togeÌher in rlrc general action of being in the world,
"t
iltd;. ;:-i; ,;";h -^v p'od"t" (along with vision) the notion.-of shaÞe or in so {ar as it is thc congealed face of existcnce. . . . Whcn I say that I see a
its simultaneitv- or sYnchronicitY)
thq: sound, I mean that I echo the vibration of the sound wich my whole sensory
ffi;b* öítk;;irio",''hi"rt giY*
notions. of. shapc' Third' being, and particularþ with that sector of mysclf which is susceptible to colors.
touch only yields successive o' àiachronic
(Mcrleau-Ponty r 9 6z: z1 z- 1 4)
"äditiu",
touch grants the subject acccss to ih" tt*io"
of obiects (which vision only inti-
too I Tlre htside Out Liued Bodies I ¡ot
ln short, for Merleau-Ponty, the scnses are able rc be "t¡anslarcd" into each implicated_ in its objects and its objects are at leæt partially
constiturive of the
other, or at least understood in the terms of the other senses, only bccause of the subject, Merleau-Ponr'' wants to argue that such a model is just
as relcvant for
unity provided by thc body image. It is through the mediation of the body image yision.
that'the informaiion provided by the diffcrent bodily senses can be integrated, It is on the bæis of the doublc sensation that Merleau_ponry frames his ar_
unified, coordinated, or even put into comparison or conflict: "My body is the gumeuts regarding the seer and the visibler it is in an
analogy with and iu the
fabric into which all objects are woven' and it is, at least in relation to the per- interlocking of the angible and the visible that he demonsträs
the imflication
ceived world, the general instrument of my 'comprehension' " (235). of the in the visible, the shared participation of the subject ancl obiect
Merleau-Ponty is not the only phenomenologist interested in the question of
_seer-
generalized visibility. Thc exampl. ol tooctr ¡, '.on"r.i"ul in a
in fo.t .o..
the integration and transposition of the senses, Levinas too addresses this ques- gult berween subi€ct and object is never so distant as
ø, ,f,*
in vision, where thJcrossing
tion of establishing a kind of "kinesthctic intettranslation" between one pcrcep- of the subject ìnto the obicct is more easily rccogniz"Ut*
t .."u.":"""o, ,u ¡",
tual system and another or at least a transposition of the senses' Tbe visual rcso- the inside o¡ thc outside is simply a matter of "l
shiftìng lo*" ,"rt il.,"n Ilr"rAty
nates with the sayablc; the light is capable of eliciting a tactile, textured response; "i
hcaring can be visualized. il]]¡c1iq
n"sig'o'1. uirleau-ponty wishes to
"ppty
,h;.;;;;;;ìpr"-,li t rai,s
back or lnvagination tlrat mark his discussion of the double sensaìion. {hþ it
is clear that in the case of touch, thc touche¡ is
tuu.hrJ, iq_¡¡arfiliund
The Reversibility of the Flesh undershnding,s of vision, the seer sees at a distance"trr"y,
and is unimpiic;ãin w-hat
for Merleau-ponty rhc seer's visibility .."¿1,ø", i*fi, ir,f,.
F/eså is the term Merleau-Ponty uses to designate being, not as a plenitude, r is ¡een, lut
ground rhe seer shaics with the visible, the condition of
any"iìi.rr
relation between
self-identity, o¡ substance but as divergence or noncoincidence' Flesh is no longer fi them.
associated with a privileged animate catcgory of being but is being's most ele- b :*:.th.n,j: also, by implication, ro be seer. Seeing entails having a body
mentary level. Flesh is being's rcversibilit¡ its capaciry to fold in on itself, a dual , is irself
that capable of beirrg secn, that is visil¡|e., This ii the very .onãition
of
o¡ientation inward and outward, which Merleau-Ponty has described-not un- seeing, the condition of embodiment:
problcmatically-as "invagination,"s The flesh is reflexivity, that fundamcnøl r
gap or dehiscence of being that Merleau-Ponty illustratcs with a favorite example, . , , he who looks must not himself bc foreign to thc world
that he looks at. As
soon as.I see, it is-necessary that the vision. . , l¡e doubled
the "doublc sensation," an example that clearly illustrates the varioirs gradations wirh .urnot"^eIr_
tary vision o¡ with another visjon: myself seen f.o- *lth.rut, "
between subjectivity and objectuality' Between fceling (the dimension of subiec- ,*h
would see me, installed in the midst ôf the ui";bf., à"."fi"li'n- ."nîai",ng
o"-ãnutll"r
tiviry) and being felt (the dimension of obiectuality) is a gulf spanned by the i,
from ã.ce¡tåin spot_. . , he who sees canoot possess the uisible rrnto.i"
i, po"_
indete¡minate and reversible phenomenon of the being touchcd of the touching, sessed by it, unless åc is of ir, unless . . . he is one of ,f,r"
iry
the crossing over of what is touching ro what is touchcd, the ambig¡¡ity which singular reversal, of æeing thcm-h who is one of them,"lri¡l*,-"lp"U[
trgei, ,ll_U,¡ "
entails that each hand is in the (potentially reversible) position of both subiect
and object, the position of botlr phenomenal and oblectual body'
Merleau-Ponty h making a stronger claim tùan that every person who sees is
capable seenby other subiccts, I{is point is ontotgical and not inter_
Between touching and being touched, between seeing and being seen, there -of.bcing
personal: the painter sees trees; but the trces also, irr some
is a fundamental revcrsibility. In thc case of touch, for example, Merleau-Ponty sÃse, sce the painter
points out thar there are three modalities or manifestions of touchr touching of
$ (lris example, ry68: t67J. This at¡ibution of visibility as
wcll as visìon to rhs
.ri see¡ is not the result of a problcmatic anthropomorphism on Mcrlcau-ponty's
an object, touching of the Properties or qualities of an obiect, and touching of
$ part; rather, it is a claim regarding the seer's mode oi material existence. While
the touch, or whatì n The Pheiomenology of PerceptíonTrc rcfe¡s to as the "dou-
ble sensaiion." In the double seusâtion my right hand is capable of touching my
# it is clear in the case of touch that the toucher. is always touched, on the classical
conception of vision, the seer, in seeing at a distance, is unirnplicated in what is
lefc hand as if the latter were an object. But in this casc, unlike an obiect, my
scen, But on his account, the seer's visibility conditions visi<¡n irself. lnstead of
left hand fcels the right hand ouching it. My left hand has the doublesensation
any anthropomorphism or animisrn, Merlcau-ponly is claiming uot an actual but
of bcing both the obiect and the subiect of the touch' lt is not the case that I have
only an in-principle reversibility of sccr and seen o¡ toucher and touched:
two coitrary sensatíons at the sâme time (âs one might feel two ob,ecß at thé
same time); râther each hand is in the ambiguous position of being capable
of To begin
I( the double scnsa- _with, we spoke summarily of a reversibility of the secing and the
taking up iire positions of either the toucher or the touched' visible,. of ùe- rouching and the touched. lt is ti¡ne tå crnphasize tËar it is a
t¡on irakes it clear that ar least in rhe case of tactile perception, the subject
is reversibiliry alwal,s immønett ard never realized in fdd, M; letthand is always
roz I T'he Inside Out Liued Bodies I toj
nwcr rcach co- tary, precommunicative domain out of which both subject and objcct, in their
on lhe verec of touching my right hand touching things'-but.l
ï:,äi;:"i'Jä;iå;".;i.iü;"' at the momeit of realiz¡tion ' ' ' likewise I murual int€rections, develop. The subject can no longei be con.civecl as au en_
i::ï'å:ä;;;iäi iLiåii.", tr'" sonorous existence of mv voice h ror closerl nucleus of identity or æ an empty receptivity rãady to take irì the contcnrs
ä';:'tffi;'ä;lt li""" rather an echo of irs articulared exis- provided by objects. And objects can no longir bc viewecl as a pure positivity
or
i"n..- it "ìTìËì.Jf
th-ugh my head rathcr ¡han outside' I am always on the same
(re68: si.m¡ff a.s an aggregate of sensations. Subject and object, mind anà bod¡-tl.,"
;iilil;i;;ly,
"ibrateì il;tä"ni! imelf to me in one inva¡iable peßPective'
ü vhible and the invisible, are intercalarcd; rhe ,,rays,', rie lines of force, injelibly
r47-48J j etch the one into the other. The flesh is composecl of the ,,lcavcs,, of the bocli
based on
. Although all perception, all sensible existence, entails a reversibility interspersed with the "leaves" of the worìd¡ iiis the chiasm linking and
separai_
this
,h" i.ion"ii*n.r, of the -"terial subiect to its material world' 1e*"+ttlE- ing the one from the other, the .,pure difference" whose play g"n"-r",., p"r.onr,
i, lt is in this sense that the trees can be said to "see" the Pârnter: things, and their separations and unions.
"ry.-ãtriã"|.
," uíriUl., ,r".. and the painter are of the same "matter"' flesh'
The trees are a The subjeçt arid the oblect are inherently open ro each othcr, for thcy alc
minor of mv visibiliry, as is anything I see'ro constituted in th€ orc srroke dividing the flcsh into its various modalities. i.hey
"""iË'ü #;l"rçp"g. i" tË a"uble sensation because one's two hands are interlaccd one with the othe¡, not externally but through thcir rcversibility
o"ri ãf,¡. (thc.leÍt hand
,rrn" ¡o¿v.'[hey remain irreducible to each othcr I and exchangeability, their similarity-in=diffe¡cnce and diffcrencc-in-sirnilarity.
"." same as the right hand feeling the left)'
split
ä'Ëil;i"il ;;;';";;í" Thiugs solicit the flesh just as the flesh beckons to and as an objcct ro things.
;ä;t#;.il;i -arn
i.¡"ã-t"""¡"¿' in spite oftheir potential interchan€cab l-
posttlon tnto
f
Ìt,
Perception is the fìesh's reversibilit¡ the flesh touching, sering, perceivìng itseif,
i.". iÀ" auUlaa, at besi experience the transformation of one |x
one fold (provisionally) catching the orhe¡ in its own ielf-e¡nb¡ace.
world the capacitv to
;i;Jì";, il;;;"it ia.n,itv' rm tuulect brings to the
introducing that
s
äìî'ili ,*rl¿ u*L on irself, to fold it over ¡tself and the world, * Feminist Phenomenology ?

i.iJ r" *ii.rt,tt" subject is positioned as a pcrceiving' Perspectival t*tl1Y-:I *

Merleau-Ponty experiments wrth â scrres Many feminists have found support for thei¡ various projecs in Merleau"
it it selÊcoincidence
"J"i"
:?ï;;;ü;h --p,oticie sraduallv modifres' This relation' he.cìaims' shows the Ponty's particular brand of phenomenolog¡ but it is significant thar of all the
one of which is an obiect in a world
of #
;l#'ffiJi:i.inJJ *",t."n;;;
these obiects' It is doubled back ff
feminist writings on his works with which I am familiar, even thosc feminists
är *¡i"t' i'
.îi.t äu¡.*,lit t ¡., "
oått;iver of strongly influenced by him rernain, if not openly crirical, then at least suspicious
.-+of his âvoid3!9g-9t{g!es!on of sexl4lCjlierence and specificity, wary of his.
."t"pr,o, *',t is point is to reassert simply another form
ä"ä*ji,'äil m. ,t
of dualism, a union
"
of incompatible properties:

If onc wants metaphors, and it would be better m say that the boll:tTd -d
apparent generalizations regarding subjectivity which in fact tcnd to take men,s
experiences for human ones. It is significanr too thar gencrally, with the excep-
,.tion of lrigara¡ most fe¡ninists fiave little to say about his Iast works and about JSr'"
\.fu
,)
[ ,rr" 'r.,rffitncr n$ anccrstanolng oI scx-
\ uality (as in Judith Butler's critical reading Ir99o]) or his notions of cmbodimenr d{\
# (as Iris Young does in her demonstration of phcnomenology's incapacity to ade-
quately account fo¡ fcmale corporeality and prcgnancy [r99ol). I will ¡eturn rö ,o3
sensible and with the samc mo
itself." (Merleau-Ponty 1968r r38) these critical readinç shortly but for the moment wor¡ld like to concentrate on
selÊenfold- ffi lqøq
Merleau-Ponty according to the
Lânguage too is understood bv what gives voice Etbique de la différerce sexuelle þ984J.
on any uoice but is
inq of the flesh. I'anguage i' not alplnã"nt since it'is the voice of tr Merleau-Ponty aoe@¡pþ{y address the question of sexual difference
toihe *orld itself. He writes th*;í;tc";;
is evérything
ãnd the.forests" (r 5 5)' in The Visible and the Invisible, but if lrigaray's reading is appropriate, it is clear
no one. since it is the very voice .f ;l;"dr;gr,
the waves

[il*inl'i:lå'[:,'f :m*Ïil; that his wo¡k de¡ives much from an implicit sexualization of ontology, the utili-
zation of a whole series of metaphors embedded in and derived f¡om relations lt-l 4*
*s.r mr,''".¡;rlIlr
'wild being'"
tr between the sexes. These metaphors underlie and make possible his notion of the
(rl3)' another nor flesh and of reversibility. In this sense, the feminine may be unclerstood as the
' tt'i"n th" '"lf-tontained object at a distance
Perceotion involves ncither kee unspoken, disembodied underside of tbe flesh: the flesh, Irigaray argucs, ha.s a
,'.;:ff i::::;","";ì;.ili:::Ïå j1ff Xlï:im'"tiï'i:[ï:i1 point-for-point cong¡uence with the attributes of both femininity and maternity.
for the cx$tence
in and necæsarY

ffi ¡F'>-" \"

'r*,*" ),wnn' '
ro4 I The Inside Out
Liued llodies I to5
1b rather drastically oversimplify her elliptical style' her obiections to Mer- wlich I have ¡eceivcd tife, havc been envcloped
in my prenatarl soiourn,
leau-Ponty's reworking of being in terms of thc flesh revolve around three maior
havc

claims: fì,s1, that the privileged, indeed dominant, position of vision in his wriç
ings, in overpowering and à'cting as a model for all othcr pe¡ccPtual r€lations,.

"uî-it.
th"* ,o pñ"lli. econoÃy in which thc feminine figurei as a lack o¡ a
"
I
i
å'*#di{i:+n*j#$f t;ilq¿itç;gf
Perhaps more important is he¡ claim
;ffi r:il
that the visible and the tactile do
blind spot; seconcl, that the conccPt of the flesh is implicitþ codtd in terms of as Merleau-ponty aserts, have a reta¡is¡ not,
the attiibutes of femininity; and third, a rclated point, that Merleau-Þonty dis-
T
As I noted earlier, Merleau-pontv
6f rec¡p;;ì;; ;ñ;;rl dää**.
# rDrns to the tactile to
avows the debt that the flesh owes m matcrnity. I will tu¡n briefly to çach of rwersibility even though be has tirus illustrate the thesrs of
tar ¡estrictel his claims to thc
these issues. rev¡Gsiôn î^ rh. r.-':r-:^_21 : , visual. This
lrigaray claims that Merleau'Ponty privileges vision in terms of metaphors ronty
Ponty needs to jnvoke
invoke the tactile ai Merleau-
of fluidity and absorption; for example, he compares the intimacy of the relations generalizãble fo¡ all the selses-vision ia.ìcrìitics
between the see¡ and the visible to the indeterminacy of the relations berween
IL serses_vic opcrates differently "rc@ I

"the sea and the strand" (1968: r3r). For lrigaray this metaphorics of fluids, I -'r¡ 'ìv rxË¡'r¡v traflsto¡ms hts exâmPìe. It
will *:TX;:";:l:,'::111,;9ö"#.-:ìì,i,,;1i,I;,*,hisexampre.r,
be recalled tlr"t ¡l,rctle"u-pitniJ.
I

emblematic of femininity i¡ This Sex Which Is Not O¿¿ (rg85b) and Ma ne

It
nu*",
---- the
"'! phcnomenon I

* sation, the .a.ê

sarion- rIìê case of ^-- L__r.¡
^t one ,, another-which
hand feeliná
r'r'!¡ru¡r¡cr¡urr ot
of urc
dre oouhlc
doublc seri-
scn_
Lovet þ9gr), signifies not only thc "formlessness" of feminine iouissance but tashionino ,hÆÁ Ê- L-_r_ , .
_ is itself fceling an obiccr. Re_ i

more particula¡ly the amniotic element that houses the child in the mother's body ffi l,-*:";::*:: :'.lïd:r lrtcJ;;Ë! :;:ilì'JåÏi:?
i.i:/ffi il ?lii;Lï;
å:*il:
i
and continues to be a "watermark" etclred on the child's body. ln this sense the
fr H.Í,}:l:*r;:ïl1tc.,iÍ.";::::.ff
two hands rather than the k¡i¿ or .uctural
st,
i:l,fi
u¡ svmmctrv berween the
l
dornination or hierarchy that
womb and the earliest relations berwecn mother and child, those relations be' ,t¡ ,
^.,-_j_- ì,oiã'
leau-pont, ¿Þc-,ik-. i_ gruineon.
;:äiÏ:ffil i:Ï:'J;'il i:; Mer-
tween the operationò of a fully constituted vision, must remain in darkness, a
kind of nociurnal state that Pr€cludes but Preconditions vision, an invisible that $
Lï'"t",:Ïiîî::ïrn
scnsationi they llr"
*::,::l.l;j, remairr "ir,"i
i.;ii'",'ËiJ
irrcducible to
-- ;"ä: iï#:i
-.'q'r s ùuPPdHE IIr rne
ï"',j",jil,:
oouòlc 3
i
i

Merìeau-Ponty can never acknowledge: ,ìf/ $ encc rhe r¡ansfo¡mar;""

^r ^-. ^^-,.,^ll:l-":l*
+t
best the subject can experi- i
x/ iil:,jå::"ffjîTi:::ijÍ":,'",1"".,",j:,,-r",.,,¡..ii""i"ii".:i,'i:i:,ü,,äi; I
If itwas not the visible that is in question herc, it would be possible to belicve & J*":5.*i:ïr"¡c.ú;ö;ä:t;:ffi ;:iï:"1ïi;iJiffi,J;
or onc or the other hand, for
rii" á
t
that Merlcau-Ponty alludes here tò inträuærine life. After all, he employs the
4.

"images' of the sea and the strand. Of the immersion and the emergence? And
course, not unlike the_touching
of thc "'ii""il,'ï';ä.ä"ä,iililå:iÏ.*'T
"r*" t¡pr;;;lj;;i;;ä;i;i,";.r,
slstenr descriprion of fcmalc sexualiry.
he spËaks of the risk of disappearance of the scer/seeing and rhe visible' What """_
$

douÈly conesponds to .*irt"n." in the intr{uterine nesting: who is still in ü

. "n remains without anf visible.
this night doe, not see and
mcmoä of that first event whcrc
. Especialþ without
ffi ;ät¿?tff"HìÍ"å'# *^ *"lv visrure is cut our in rhc.rânsi-
lre is enveloped-touched
-'-.
by a tangible invisible
ffi
ll:l
encroachment,,'r,,öñ, il,åli"ü;Ëff;#lir,;ir,;,:ï,l;í:,,,;
.J

ít
out of ihich evcn his cles arc formed but which he will never see: without but also berween theãnsible
seeing, neither visiblc not visibility in this placc. (lrigaray r984t 144-451
en.l rhe.visible, which is enc¡usred i¡
verscl¡ the tangibrc ircelf-is not a nothing"*J.i in it, as con_ .I
existence. . , . Ele¡y vision takcs olace ìlîïî'''ir'r,"i,i
This darkness or ìnvisibility of thc matemal soiourn conditions and makes somcwhere"ìriliiir¡ "^*ris
in the tactile space, ,l.here ì
ffi a double and c¡ossed situatins of'the visibb
il;ì;';ä¡ìä: I
vision possible. lt cannot be unilerstood simply as an absence of vision, alack oÍ rg¡'¡ the visible; the rwo maos arã..,, ìilî*,¡,. , ,li
light, ior it is a positivity' This tactility is not entirely obscured ty Merleau-|Ðqe
yet drey do not mcrgc irío one'
The two pa¡rs a.e romi p"rr. drrcl yet ri
are not strperposable. (Merlcau-Ponry
Pä,y', of uirioni fo, it infiltrates his very firsr example, that of seeing .¡t/ rgø8r r¡i) ".:P.Ît-":"d .¡
"..oun,
colors. ln confronting a color, the subiect is not confronted with a 'pellide" o9l'
In opposition to Merleau-pontv, lrigaray ;1

atom of being but with a field of differences-differences betwecn colors, shapes' claims rhar rhe mîp provided by rii
the actile is not consruous with ,r,âi
and textures"and differences beween colors and that which is colored' As
I¡- p,ä¡¿J¿ iy ü. ìi".uj.ï'# í;"å"_0" I
of ing, the visual and the tactite function ì!
igaray notes, color here must function as a fluidity; ic Presumes â metâPhorics ac*rairg L ãiff";;,i"ckî,"jür,r,rnr,
although it is clcar that there is some
the tactilc and the feminine: interchaige U"ù.", ülrn. îìr"r" tr, o*
claims, a su'eptitious reclamation *".ã;;i"rg;i;;"^,"",ìi"'rrr'lii j
' ' ' ìmposes itself
escapes itself which subordinaæs all the othe¡ scnses."r,lto. its exigencies """",
[Color] pours itseìf out-stretchc¡ itself out, and fornrs. Irigaray de_
i,öïJ;; t"."lt ot *tt", is most archaic in me' the fluid' That through nies that the visibte can be situated *ittin
tt" täfiùLï,^¡î,'r"r,.'ö,0* * I

I
rl

.I
ro6 I The lnside Out Liued Bodies I r c>7

for the tangible More primordial than vision, the tangible is also thc nccessary
situated thfough the visual: theirs is not a relation of reciprocity, accompani_
of the-visible' In brief' her claim is ment of. the earliest sensations, those in the blackness
pì."rJ" ,ft" pi**¿itions and the grounds of the wumú, thosc ro do
is perfecdy ca¡able of an with hearing,.which, for lrigara¡ is necessarily bound up with ihc-mate¡nal
irrat the vis¡bie requires the tangible but the tangible
in roice. Chronologically between the touch and seeing,
ió- .t.ii.ist" case
(a that is perhaps best illustrated hearing, whilc relying on
"-#;.;;;;;;;t
the existence of blindness-one cannot conceive of a case of a tangible equivalent tactilit¡ cannot hide its earliest feminine/mater nj originsi the music
of the
remain op- womb, tlre precondition of both sound and meaning. Tf,e
m blindness, where touch no longer functions while tlre other senses tactile is related by
is in a state of unconscious- Irigaray to the concept of the mucus, which always
.Lri""; if an. o"giUle docs not finction, the subiect mà'rks th" p"rr"g" f.o,o iroid"
to outside, which accompanies and lubricates the
n*). in tt., un¿ãrrtanding, the tangible is the unacknowledged base or founda- -utuJ
parts ând regions. The mucus is neither the subjectivc
,r"åfri,rgiiif," ur¿yt
iãn, ,n" rour." of the vislbh that ånders any comparison between them false: touchirrg"of the toucher
ih;;;;;;;."-p"rable, for thev occupv differcnt logical positions-one is the nor the objectivity of the touched but the indete¡Áinacy
of ,l"irün"" b"t*""n
"ny
them. It escapes.control, not being subject ro rhc trnj of uotu,lorf
ioona".ion oiigin of the other. Thc iangible is the invisible' unseeable milieu ,t¡p"ge Uy
"na,1. Jource of visibility; it precedes the distinction. besræen active which the touching hand becomes the touched. She suggcts that the
*i¡1", ;i
ru"u" _"y
"lìlr.
;il;;;;;J;"bl.t ob¡".t' se" onlv tlooush the touchins of the lisht" reprcsent the toucher/touched indetermin"cy more prràÃ"ly
than one hand grab_
"nd bing the other.
(lrigaray 1984: r55).
' 'vÁt her,reading of the Her argumcnt is that Merleau-ponry's theoretical paracligm owes a clebt_
i"tii"uí"ti¡ Irigaray suggests, along lines similar tothat the visual is the indeed, its conceptual foundations--to iemininiry j.Àt *hor*
pry.-ftt*iy,i. pti"iláiing'"t uitionin tt'e story of ocdipus'-
ist be bcated; it is tie o¡der of plenitude' gesult' and
"nd^m"t"riity,
symptoms ¡eside in the kind of language of pregnancy "
ão-"in in ïni.h lacÈ he continïally invokes ro
a¡ticulate the emergence of that torsion within the flesh that constitutes
which is
,tt" o.¿.. *ltich designates female genitals as mirsing' an order and
"ir"n.., tactile unites the seer and the visible. The wo¡ld remains isomorphic with tlre
ur""rnpr,itú *f,n the plenitritle, enfolding ãnd infrnite complexity,of,the pre- subject,
existing in.a complementary relation of reversibility, Tic perceiving, seeing,
vloi,"rn"in, i"ui'iblc within phallocentrism is both the
i".giUf". touching subject remains a subjcct with a proprietoriai relation to the
".ã,ä"1""ã-'i- .f .orporeal existence, the child's inability to scc the mother as visiblc, thc
""åi of the other sex' a sex-different tactile: he sta¡rds o!€r and above wlrile remainilg also within his worlcl, recog-
source or origin of its existence' and the existence
;;;;;-i":"t-.nsurable with the subiecr: '[f I cannot see the other in its nizing the object and the (sexed) other as versions o¡ inve¡sions of himself, rcverse
three-dimensional "mirrors," posing all the darrgers of mirror identifications: 12
;;;;il;Jiil;-;ìh* m", mv bodv no longer sees anvthing in the
'""
ãifi.äo
-"*'-"-ìr+ i ¡."o.. blind as soon as it is about â ttody that is sexed differentlv"
"n,,no,
one's eyes
If there islo cutting of the cord a¡d of osmotic exchanges with thc maternal
tlt). It is not, for lrigara¡ simply.a.matter of opening
for self-same
world and_ its substitutes, how could sublimation of rhã flesh take place? It
tex the
;;àï;;iJ" ;".á láok. The kind of inviiiLititv of the "ttt"t that
continues becoming in closed circuir, withjn sorts of nourishing relaiionships
l'Ï"iiåÏuit"Jntät*l'ìu"ì -"ir' Her claim beems to woman be more.ontological
for man' man for
to thc othe¡, Doæ it sublimate itself h o¡der to accede ro the alü1ncc wirh tÀe
other? It does not seem so. It perpetuates a stâte, ente¡tains it in its perma-
îi.î *î..näï.-,rt'" otherness of tlrc other (whcther othernes' il(/e
nence, absorbing is cuttings and shocks? What is called reversibiliry herr is
t"ú*i it "t"essarlþ unable to see that
ffi;l,;ääh;,,it'r" grasped' madc perhaps also that by which thc subjcct producing. somc mucus at rhe exrerior
ä;;î;;î ,," diff.,"n"" útt"o'"-àirr"ttntt itself cannot bc re-envelops itself in it, Some elabo¡atio¡r of the carnal rakes place there. Bur
to-i" "*alv unabte to hear or {eel-a bodv tlut
;;#;'ili;;i;-;ì;-¡i¡"4 always in its solþsistic relationships to the matcrnal. 'Iherc is ràt a single tløc¿
of a camøl idea of tbe otbetwoman nor of d sublitøatiox of the ftish with
is '-iãi differendY'
'" sexed is significant that Merleau'Pont¡ perhaps
witlrout being ' the othe¡, At most an alchemy of subsritut¡on of a placcntary nourishmcnt.
i.itit"y"r, the reversal of
aware of what he com-its himself ìo-L-,hi, -"'qun"t, åescribes (Irigaray 1984: 168; emphasis in original)

the see¡ and the visible in t"rrn, of ,L t*o lipl9these rwo.lips are not those
*-tn although his metaphor mav be an at'
il;;i;;;;il"J uv as such'
of female corporealiryr his lips rematn
Sexuality and the Lived ßody
ä"pt.ääötñ tÁi'
""rlq!-i'''i"tu '
.åf"H,,ffi Jit5.i: If Merleau-Ponty does not address the question of sexuality or the sex of rhc
:ff \T$Ir:'ffiïä*1ffi;,"lì:.ü,lit,îif
neither is able to disolve its body in Tbe Vsible and the Inuisible, he does de.vore chaprer 6ve of The Phe-
ü'làîöËi#' ,"ìi"'i"ià¡'c "i"pt'o'-fo' -
romenology of Perception to the qucstion of the body in irs sexual being. Al-
[ãun¿"tio ihroueh it. intimacy with the other'
ro8 | The Inside Out I Liued Bodies I rc9
though ther.e is much of value in his discussion-Judith Butler fr99o), for exam' beließ that sexuality is an instinct modeled
on the reflex, in which sexual organs
plc, slrongly praiscs some facerc of his notion of sexuâlity for his commitment i
{l
respond to ap¡ropriâÞ stimuli, âs ir
were, automatically, If this were the case
thcn
io s""ing ìo,rality not as a drive or a câuse of behavior but as a modality of a cerebral injury of the kind Schneider'sustaineJ-.*fä
t"".'i.
existencã, inf,rsing all aspects of the ways we face and act in tlìe world, Part of
.$
subjeccs_sexual responsivcness (as indeed * ,r"
"ii"* oro..
¡
,¡, *r"
*¡ri.r r,""Ë.ri.'io,
our situation in the world-at the same time, and particularly in his analysis of without schneider's injuries, the iexual
obþ., ñË;ill'i,t"-iï,
Schneide¡'s sexualit¡ he is clearly representing sexuality on the model of male
* ceptual object' The descxualized årn* o*_
.r"* u'...'r,*'"ì iì,ii.',r"
sexual expcriences while ignoring female sexuality.rl fl with its secret recesses âs does the"¡i." ""i lnau.irg;rì"i"r'ïnrirn".y.
sexual .U¡.r, ",rri..,
Iris Young, although developing a quite different account of embodiment Schneider tacks sexuat desi¡e bccause.he
has ; ;ilxä;'[
i

i""ffi,.
", o._
than that represented by Butler's discussion of Merleau-Ponty's work, secms to + ducing a conrext, a. set oJ future posibilitics,
comç to a similia¡ broad conclusion: that while Merleau-Ponty provides a num' r n$ e¡ottc
iorääää;:t'-, I

T and eroticizine ncrcsp¡ig¡, in which i

thc subicct is open to and
be¡ of crucial insights about the forms and structurc of human embodiment, he partially productive of the jnri-mate
cxploration of and atmchment à a
sexual I
nevertheless excludes o¡ cannot explain those specific corporeal experiences un- object, is a projecrion of possible frrru¡es
dergonc by women. Young elaborates in considerable detail the speci6cities of
r
tìi This eroticized perception is neither
onto ,lr. *.u.,u." oiìiï'iiuä
o.*r.n,.
I

ilr objective (in the sense of sharecl or inrersub_

female embodiment and lived experience in her explorations of women's corpo- jective) nor purely concentual. t
-u u*J;; ä,;J;
inrclectuat,
ìi iv"¿."u_
real comportment and ways of compartmentalizing their bodily unity to under-
take physical tæks. In the experience of b¡easted existence in a sexist societ¡ for
Ponty states, desire "undlersuncls btindty
a;;jy;;ilö. j r.
in binding ru
il
j
å ceive
.the desirabte'.."";-:;;;;; ,i"" jr"nï* ,"*r",
othe¡'s body as 'l

example, breasts a¡e an inherent bodily attribute subjectively lived and at thc
1
"physiogn.my" inm.a. set of sisns acldrcsed
s to ii;ìt;:"r,'..#;iiÌ¡i rnou.- !f
same time function as objects, both for men and for women. And in the ambigu' # meots, acriviries, and behaviors with othc¡ r:

¡$
rigni6.o*..:;;rd";;;';"*.nou, I
ous and unbounded experiences of pregnanc¡ wc can no longer definitively spec- .u:l
zones so. rhar thcy are privireged not
only in tlre body of thc othcr but abovc
i¡

ify whether it is one subject/body or two thal is in question. Thc rclations be- in the subject's body (through the intercommunication a
of body images). .fhe sub_
i
twecn immanence and transcendence, between owning and bcing a body, ¡ect perceives rhe oute¡ surfacc and behauio. í
* of tl," ottr.. in ,.ì'rn.'.är'rr"" ,""* fi
between subject and object or one subject and another, are not the same for wo- animations, its vibrant sensirivity.la
11

men as for men, in ways that Merleau-Pontt' seems unaware bf. # It is only the sensor¡ perceivine subject, the
corporcal subjccr, who is capa_ i¿
Significantl¡ Merleau-Ponty opens his discussion of the sexuality of the lived ble of initiating (sexual) desire, ,"rpon¿lne
. p;l,f*",-a, ì*i.".'ií* ,,u,¿" ijN

body with refcrence to the breakdown of sexual interest and activity in the case iÀ;il,;;;;fiäåïr';?i"iäi',å,1***,
is.not.an_effect of in,tin.ts, biologi.a "n¿ ;il
il1l

of Schneider. Schneider has little if any interest in sexual activities. Indeed, sexual stimuli, It.emanates from the stiucture'oi
,"nriu;tiry, u fä",u l"ä'if"* ,f
desires, activities, and relations seem to have lo$ all meaning for him. For other intenrionality, of the intes¡ated union of
affectiviry, ;;;;;;';;.prr". 1r
persons in sexual situations-a câress, a kiss-contact with the erotogenic zones Sexuality is not a reftex but "i"*,¡;;J';;1f ii'",'äåi* ääi ._"a 1!
induces (and lesults from) sexual desire, a desire to continue and prolong itself
"-r.
by the body as acting perceiru. "n
i{
through ìntirnate contact with another. But for Schneider, all sexual contact with Merleau-ponty's integration of the mind/bocly
dualiry and his arternots to :ll
others is momentary and localized, lasting only as long as the contact:
ï::lt'::ry:ll prirnacy in psychical *a ri.rãgi"JiiË
ctat set ot sffategic terms which feminists can
h",ì;ä'"Tä\
use as they wi ni their \
[Schneider] no longer seeks sexual inrcrcourse of his own
accord' Obscene pic-
iuiÀ, .ãnn".t^,i"ti on sexual topics, the sight of.a body, do no¡ arouse dæire
to think a ¡adical notion of sexual difference. ¡f.t.ìeir,
ory.Merleau-Ponty,s work provides a set of powerful'insighrc
"r,"_o,,
ik; pryîLli*lrrì. .il: \, 1ä¡l

in hiín. The patient hardly evcr'kisses, aná the kiss for him. has no value as ffi odological framework in which to retrrink the
oíd u bro"'d ,r,.th_ \\ f,l
.t
sexual stimuËtion. Reactiom are strictly local and do not begin to occur with-
body .r,*iã. ãiå""rirrn,
remains inadequaæ for understanding the diffcrences
ä *-r. \li
ou, .on,"*. . . ' At every stage it is as if the subject did not know what is to
¡.**i
tt'' r.ccrvâttons ofÁlphonso Lingis are to be taken seriously
,i. ,",.1r.',t"¿ ,t r ll4

be done. Therc are no aitiue mo"ements, save a few seconds before

the orgasm regarding Merleau_ I ì-4

which is extremcly brief' (Merleau-Ponry ry62: ry4)

ffi
ru¡ :.s understanctlng ol scxuality in particular, it remains inadequate
dunkmg-ma¡e, Iet alone female, sexualit¡ for it
is incapable of accounting for or
for re_ f4' .f
1iü
adequately conceiving voluptuous passron, ì1}
Exactly how and why a man who has no interest in sex hâs a; orgasm' how- 9u
But leaving Lingis claims that in spite of Merlcau-ponty,s atrempts to :t
ever brief, neither Goldsiein and Gelb nor Merlcau'Ponty explain' reucler sexuality lql
to arguc against the as part of the meauingful and meaning-proclu.ing in,."t@[g4agÞjq,r, l
ifrti Merleau'Ponty uses Schneicler's case Prevailing l,i r¡l
"ti¿",
r¡!
lflj
rT
r ro I 'f he Insde Out I-ivecl tsodies I ¡rt
¡educes dcsi¡e too rcadily to significance and conscquently leavæ out of account lolidificatio-n or coagulation of these potentially volatile ancl unstable differences.
its force, or árive. úhere Freud perhaps too strongly emphasizes de' Y. ïn,"f6trn
this inærval by which we are incessantly re-"de onlf ii*"
"ff..tiuit¡
sire (enab[nj it to be readily equated with instincts), Merleau-Ponty does
not knowledge the unrecognizable difference of the other
sex.rr Feminists necd"c_ro
prouìd" i, *iih iole, with a disturbing, disquieting, and disrup- seriousþ question whether phenomenological descriptions arc appropriate
for
"."ntr"l "nough
tive role, in perccptual life: womer's expcrience and, if they are not, whether it ii desirable thi rhey should
be or whether, instead, altogether new and different thcoretical
terms a¡e ncces-
Does not the orgasmic body 6gure as a body decomposed, dismem'bered, dis' sary-and how such terms may be developed.
*lut , *h".. poirut"t and ãynãmic axes form and defo¡m in ùe limp indeci-
,i"*á" of.hJ".oti. troubleils it not a breaking down irto a mass of exposed
ãtg"ir, t**iiã*, .ut.l"s, tytt ts tur-ning ino pulp and susceptibil'
i lil 'äi" ¡"dv h . . . the úody drifting toward a state on the far side
"ü"rcd
"re;i.
oÍ o.g"nir.iion and sËnse, a state whete action loses its seriousness and
be-
comcs play... (Lingis r985a: 55-56)

If we can for the moment ignore the sexual specificity of Lingis's remarks-
of the
he seems to have no awarenes that what he provides is not a description
disolution of thc male body after
ãi*f*¡on ql ,ft" o¡gasmic body but only thJ
the man's orgasm-u/E may agree that sexuality mây be thal arena in which
intentionalityireak, do*n, no iong", functions adequatel¡ but where its
break-
down is positively'sought and relished wíth pleasure'
ftrhàp, torå seriãus than Lingis's obicctions is thc claim that in discussing
,trt qt*,iåt áf and the bo-dy image, Merleau-Ponty leaves out-ifldeed'
*."Aity
is u¡åble to add¡ess-túe question of ãuaì diff"t"nct,
tht quotion of what kind
of horn"n body he is discussing, what kind of perceptual functions and what
of the
f.irãi,""'ã*ire ¡esult frori'the sexual morphology and partic'ularity
suggestion that his formu-
subiect. Never once in his writings does he make any
and analvsis of the experi-
ñon',';;;-ñ;..n ã.ti".¿ fåm the valorization
ti .." lindof subiect' The question of what other types of human
"ìiä
*p".¡.tà "íryih" othe¡ modalities of perception, what other, relations' subiects
tîy ftã". íi* objects is not, cannot ùet raised in the ::tit and h"i:9Îï:-{Î"7
*i î ii"gi. and oihers, he seems unaware of the masculinity tl,r1f111hat
Pharoc€nu$m
these
analvses of the lived
"iìiJ'i.r*t Oienomenological) fdr'
il;;"bñü ã.rll,.d i'i"'t' quitt.other than and Po,s:tlf]t11.:::T:i
as. if.it were rhe
àra,n. E".tt prescnts a discussion of sexuality : T:-ltn"tt"t
features' for any
il,;ü itt. o-" pry.t otogical strucrures and physiological
sexed subject'
:-^"it l, Tãiìi-pry. a matter of providilB wo19r..*n1 "gemine
" -,recogr.tition"
unmediated
* *ïr, t*"J'öii6"it¡ as if there i' thl posibiliry of a di¡ect and
relationbetwcenthetu¡osexes,o,b"t*"enanytwoindividuals.Ilþaayseems

#*ïiiu1tt;;ïäf l'Ë#"1';1'f ffi1Í:'#'iiÆ'*

specificiry is posible,onlv if there is
al-
iîä'¡it*e;"s!;ì;g¿, ,62)' s"*ì;l t*¡:Y:1t::Iþ
ready an unrecogni""ll" "'::fl
ung';f,"bË scxual'diffetence'
"na
' I No¡es to pales 69-8o No*s to pages 8o*.87 I zr9

iälW:îf
*':utat¡ons). Surprisinsty,
:l1l'.Î:t:l* '.1
:rr rctatrons to other body pam.
these patients do not show any

8. Âs Schilder stâtes,
ä"*ril'f fåH;',fi *ïi
Sühcn such â påtieflr ùics to light a match, conviction that the body is sunounãÁilffiTurc of particular srnsìtiveness, fhis is tn¡e
hc may take rhe matchbox in his finEcrc and
evm in tlrc physiological scnsc, sincc the snrell of the body gocs úutLer rhan the body irsclf.
them with bis thumb and indcx finpr in spitc
object. Ewn if helpeJ by having thc'matchbox opened
.i
,h. f;;üìi;ilililffiü:dä, (Qrroæd in Gorman r969' iz-si)
br him, he w¡ll rr", *ãnl'Ë"î¡
,l*
now touches rh€ w¡ong side of thc box. trØhen hc
c""Iy *..."j"
i" ."iìr;;'mit.h, 16, Tle child only gadually comes to acquire thc adult's notion of spatiality. lt has lot
brins i! to ¡hc hroad side of the box, putting ir
h€ cannot bring it ncar a c¡ndlestick.
n"ú; il';ï; \irË';ilïJ',ä " yet learnod to distinguish virtual or specular space from real space. lt does not undersrand
¡
Givm-an urúr,,"¿¡¡"*, ."yi;;;i_.b, t. "
r," pcrspectives or the ¡elations between figure and gromd, which require oppositions that the
spire of rhc hctth.ár trc knows
{s"hild; ;;;;-l ;ä ""'
the match is rxn-tir. ''.
'"
child hæ not yct acquired. For the infant, space is not yet conceìved æ a regular grid into which
I,an!'-marÌing of o,r inærlerdorr inm rhe body is psychically as obiects are placed or from which thcy can be rcmcned. ln otbe¡ wo¡ds, space is ncver "empty,"
well ar
,;"1"".,::T9,
ry1,.r
*" "pr"""u.,; or
transformation ãf the *.r*i
iü;;#i;:iffiilr;
rr" ¡o¿y.'i;äå,i; .,;""#lti ü:
Sch¡lder
subsisting simply without objects. This rcquires a¡ abstracrio¡r fmm its expcrienccs and an
abiliry to posirion r'rsøfas an objec available f<r inspccrion by others. lnsteact, tlre chikl per-
region in"rractite and scnsory ini it ceives within a pre-Oedþl space which is orally or kilcsthetically rather than visualþ consti-
:.t_:ìf;'t:,:ï
nt T:lTd
bodily sirc, eroticizingih" ,"gi--
te.,n , m"rt :
n¡ted- The child perceives a 'space of adhc¡¿rcc" (Merleau-Porty), a epace rhar clings ro
¡o. Mcllor noæs thar objects and images without beirrg able to distinguish thcm.
r7. Indeed, this may explain the superstitious and religious rituals nrroundiog variorrs
rlthough de¡rcrsonalization h¡d beco
dcscribed by earlier writers, h wes Schildcr wto body parts in some cultu¡es. Th¡t thæe bo<þ msidues still contain mctonymic connecrions to
úly Frcvided â compr€hensirc descripdon, b't
trr".åi*"ì"iJr
set it in rhc conæxt of tbe subject is the condition of thcir ability to substituæ fur thc subiccr in various incanrarions
'f body-ìmage... . . dçersonatization appÉao ro t;ectoo-to-iiü#;"*'#;:il: artd magic rites. Roman Jakobzun discusser rvlút he calls homeopatlric magic in terms of ¡re-
pTbkl phy,t.d;;J*i;;;Jî,iå*oil r,*,
i,1-,Hy llc rctationship bctween tonymy in Jakobsoa and l-lallc 1956.
'Ì 6clf-perceprion. (Mejlo¡ r98B: rg) 18. lrigaray characterizrs female sexualhy ¡s nrcontainable within the tcrarr of idenrity
¡.
.
'l
have-obsc¡vcd a sioger who showed depcrsonalizatior
concerning smech :
gore.rning male sexuality; it is ireducible ro a single organ, a single sexual zonc, or a single
orgasm and cannot be regarded simply as the a<lditiol of a number of siogular proccsses. It is
g the mourh, an organ m which
lø r978: t19ir.
shc paid speci"l ;-ñ;;;; l*;;"il;iji".l; incapable of the kind of hierarclrical rcgulation ro which the Oedipus cornplex subjects the
not
suggæting ¡har thcre is a de¡erminism at work in boy's sexual impulses. Scc lrigaray r985a and r985b.
r:;-^Ï:,T-t_A
bodily zones_ over otlrers oithat thcrc may b"
the pr r9. Sec \üoodward, r988-89 ân(l r99r.
(Jn t¡re cornrary, dÉrerminism
,;;; b*;.;;;;;,ä ,T;;"j
ï_-:l:"1r.*. and predictability arc not p..rui"ã i
rryur urcory-¿¡nq nerther docs 4. Lived Bodies: Phenomenology and thc Flcsh
ll::^i:l^_ To ":ither does neurophysiology claim this s¡atus la(alìhough no
tr rÌs practtrmners aspirc to such theoretical qualities).
r. "Merleau-Ponty inherited the sor¡l as Being and ar Nothingnesr and set out alone ro
:Tt
;e :an
J*Ji;;;;ilä;ffi;iJ'i
t (or prst) starc of affairs.
Rather, i¡ is only
,ffi;,i iï'"äi [:
lo âccltunt do what none before him-or since him-could think to do; first, he rnade tllc soul a thing,
a bod¡ and then, hc inca¡rated âll thiogs into rhe Flesh. I-lis succcscors lÌele yer ro appear.
t-. Dora's hysrericâl coughing, which signals an idcntificarioo with rhc eenitel "I'lrose who follow him in ¡ime are still resisting incãrnâtion; rhey arc
ûrill trying to makc rhe
.u&[ nû
,hrch
¡hich her rnorner
mother wâs
was inficreã.by
wãs rntefied
infecred by he¡
her fâther's
farher's syphilis,
svohilis- utilizes f., its
utilìzec for *; ^,,,"
h. or¡vn Flcch become word; rhey are still sccking to obtain release from thc worlcl by fransformilg ít
; conncctions l¡etween oral and gcniral rracts. and themselvcs into a text" (M. C. Dillon, Metleau-Ponty's O*tology r98B:- roo), While I
q. "There are. . . many organicäiæases in lvhich the psychogenic facmr can l¡clieve that Dillon h¿s misunderstood the forcc of the inscriptivc model, the modcl of purc
Sreater Þârr.. - . We often wo,¡rde¡ why organic diseasec oJ* ,i.". *há dif{e¡cnce or the trace as the co{ìdirion of corporealìty, nouedreless I believe that he has singled
ot the indiv¡duâl
individuâl has come to aâ crisis,
crisis and
¡n¡t why tþ
uh- çh-, .^
so often ", ,.,L--
^^-,. the :-
whcn .L- o¡¡l Merleau-Ponty's uniquc contributior¡ to contemporaty philosophy and feminist thecry, his
'n neeo ^f¡.- occur
to need mem
them our
out ot
of h¡6 inncrllhcr st¡iv¡ngs"
hi6 innerinost dr'¡v¡ñæ. (Schilder ,^-a, rEg).
/s¡hit.t.. t97gr , coì focus on corporeality. I do nog however, shaÌehis lament for the loss of immediacy implied by
i.;'ùcntldc¡
Schilder descr¡b€s
describes rhe bctweel rh..rh¡p¡t.nã
i¡rtc¡chanee bctìr¡rn
tlre intc¡change bctweo the subjm andand .h",
the wo¡ld in ¡ire the inrcrvention of represcntation.
rhe ooqy
rrrc body rmâge
image shrmks
shrinks or expaods, incorporates objects into iteelf, or expels z. Goldstein cxplains thc variou$ âphrsic disorders in terms of ¡he patient's inabilþ to
¡ithin. He $ayo of his own reactions to ân automobile undenake abstr-¿ct behavior. The ¡ntient is stuck in the concrete, unable to gain any distance
¿ccident:
fton or perspective on it. Reflecrioo, imagination, judgment-altematives which involve the
. the body is certainly not only wherc rhe borderline of the body ancl its clother årc. ¡bst¡âct âtti¡ùde-ele impossible. 1'he patient may be able to use an implement, even dectibc
In âr
tonobih accidenr I susaâined a rafher scrr:re iniury to my haná (rhar resulted in a dcfor- whât it can bc used for, but is unable to name it, Oo being shown a pen, ColdsteiÍì's patie t
ity) which was for sorne ti¡nc connccred ü/¡th painful sensations. ln the e¿rly days after tlÉl could sat, "rhis is fot wr¡tir¡g" (Coldstcin 1963; 7o). The aphasic seerns to live in the immediacy
ciden¡, cvery appmaching car seenrcd to involvc a partiorlar dangerous eloieni which
eá: of ânimál exi$cnce. That seerns to be wh¡ dcspite the often overwhclrnirrg and debilitaring sets
>ached ioto the sphere of the bod¡ even wlren it was still a conside¡al¡tc disrance auay.
l¡ì of diso¡derc from which aphasics suffer, they rarely if cvcr commit suicicie: 'Suicide is a phc-
ro I Not¿s to-þ-ges g4-roo Notes to Pages .ror-'ro8 I 22r
mcnon we observe o¡ly in man. No animal commits
suicide.,. . Suicicle is a voh r t<r Lacan's
I wttn that, a phenorneDon belonsinE ro alrstract behavir¡¡ 9. Metleeu-Ponty's notion of the rwersilrility of vision is str ikingþ ,simila
and thus cha¡acteristic .cloubíe diherlral of vision" (sec Lacan r977lr: \o6-8\.1¿csn refers to Tbe l>henomenokryy
:ure alone" (¡ r6-¡7).
and ¡o Gclb and Goldstein's strrdy of Schneider in his discussì<¡n' l'ike Merleau-
l, Clearly perception is not the only such term howring
berwren mind and ^i nrceotio¡ (he calls it "rhe screcn") which
appaæntly mutually e*"lus'iue term" fo, i,, äinry, he.lai.. that *hat is missing for Schneider is thc frame
!Ì:.1!.b"rh
nifcant term is, as I hrive
Ano,iJ gi;;;"ning to *h", is seen. Hc agrecs with Merleâu-Ponty thet to sce entails the pcrstibility
argueá in the previous chaprcr, ""it"n"rioi.
th'e;;;;;;;;il;: ef being seen:
l^ll5il:-ll,
tlogrcal and
rlogical
y":leau-ponty\ wìhings i, ,r,¡,
and lpistemoìogical4 srrarc$es
r* ¿",ì.ip* ,"iyü
straregies ¡rer¡tqa
De¡rida usc$
uscs lri h¡."*,
in hls doonsn,i.t¡on Of
deconstruction . . . in thc scopic ñeld, the gazc is outsidc. I am looked at, that is to sa¡ I am a picture' This
tosltlotrs aod key terms. I am unawa¡e.of rñv (f^ñ¡âñ,
ùnen/âft ôf any t;¡-.--.- linking
¡j_r-j_- Dc visible' What
secondary liærarurt is the function ¡h¿t is fou¡ã at the hcart of thc in¡titrìtion of rhe sub,ect in the
r.Ponty. ....-."-É
|,.oflmÞüons
:---,-
å.lthough.thc,"
,.q¡urç ¿,c un,toub*dÇ
uxorruDrcqty i;ñ;i ffiiï'";ilili"i:i
mâny wåys rn which rheir ùeor(
",.it is clcar that tßey determines me, åt thê most ptofound level, in the visible, is th4 gâzc thát is oursirle' It is
it
âre d¡llc¡enr, sha¡c ¡ nr¡mber of theo¡edcal rhrough thc gazr that I €hter lig¡t âr¡d it is from thc Ba?.c lhat I re(¡ive. iqc.effects Hcncc
Spinoza,aa, Heidegger, Freud, and Saussu¡e. .om"iabout-that th" gazc is tlie instru¡nent through rvhich light is cmbodicd and drrough

, i. fhc probhmis-not
Tlre problcm is not vision oe¡ per s¿
tu¡, r¡aÍ¡eurorks to deñne the notion of lack_â
se hu
but the ways in which vision has becn u which . . . I âm proto-gÍaphed- llacøn 477b: t'o6)
r¡otjon thatj ir¡cidentall% mak€s
Houever, I-acan disagrces with Mcrleâu-Fonty insofar as he introduccs a rift into th€ sult-
:li.::-:,,h:*rit.: I hrve no objection m the p"r..p"¡ pîiì+ icc¡ of ¿he sazc which do-es not exist for thc subiect of vision. l'le distinguislrcs betwec¡r
tlre
fu visual, except that vision, like rhe phaltur,Ç;ä;;i;;.ä;;ä;iål
",j¿'r.ìipiìi'. 'enre
,t woik in th" picn re and thc functioning of vision in percçtion, a distinction that Mer-
nq teTr, a- telT or process which ùicrarchícally subordinates
es) under irs di¡c<tion and control. \ühile it
the othe¡ se¡scs äri-lonty igno."" i" accounting for lhe Painte¡'s vision in rhe same tcrms as cvcryday per-
is not clear dr"; ti;; i, d";;;
ly's use, it do€s neve¡th€lcss indicate a possible problem, one ception:
t¡"t ,nu"¡ L"
I in feminist te¡ms. is not
lndccd, there is somcthrng whose abscnce can alwzys lrt olxcrvcd in a picture-which
6.
o. Fronr thctime
thc time of the Greeks, visual metaphors, metaphors utilizine rhe cÀse h perc€ption. This is the cent¡al field, where the separaring Fo$rr ot the eyc ß ex-
.from rhe
but tìe âbs€nt'
ge, wn€re thc ob,ect is construed
æ exhibiticmistic and the knowing
knowinp subject
snh-ìc¡r : ercised m tie i¡uximum in vision. ln cvery picture, this cent¡al field cannot

11",,^"::d";iil"Jffi ñ;.;i#;ìï;,'ä;ff ':ï:å::i"åi; andreplaccd by a holc-a rcflcction, io slìori, oi the pupil behind which i5 sinratcd
the ßâze'
che placc of a
*¿ inio to dcsirc'
"depicted" revelation, .---, i"
)lc coincidcs rvith the intelligible. h s.têñi.rÂ,r'
l(nr¡pte.t* is
intellipible_ Knowledç C".*ä"*dy, âs r$rch ¿s the Pictr¡re n telation
r,4.rre prrrposrrron tsis
".
as -.-r-:-- "ntt"
¡. ¡*ry. markd wüicÉ is preciscly that by which in fnrnt of thc picture I
am
heiS:
¡þ ruo¡r¡ion pictorial. This
prcrofml. I hts st¡steincd ,".¡", of
sr,stailn"¿ series ..tpt or. confirms ,he
ol mctâphors "*i.¡'r**í
sclt-identity of both subject and objcct. Thes. merapho.s p.äide a"oni.,n. elided ar subicct of thc geomctral plane. {lactn r977b: toE)
seriqç of us
ncd presumptions goveming the ways in which tnåwhdje is
licatetl in the hisrory of çisrcmology.
;"";;; ;;; ro. M. C. Dillon stat€6,
^s ãn ontologicâl
. 7- Morris Bendcr performed a æries of experimenrs to demonstrate that i{ hÁ,q Ther€ rs no reasot¡ to ettribum sccing to mountaius and trecs or to introduce
flesh whiclr
body aÌe $imulÞneously touchcd, only one stimuh¡s will be perceivcd.
The parr iif",Lì¡in J*in ,¡" lloh .,f th. vo,tà. Th"¡c is flesh wlrich is se¡sitive to light'an¡ñals'
e sensitivc ro stimùlation he dcsc¡ibed ¿s dominant. Of all ttre body partr, ;;;;;J d.il; ;¡ *tsitivitv lìrking rhe ertremes we need not m¡rtrr the ves-

$':s the mosr dominant, in the se¡sc rhat when it

he
*órl¿ to iu-"n¡tv to owrcome oltological,dualism- Trces ¡nd
uny ntlæ."p"n of th. 'flìe
lac:
hed, thc stimulation to rhe face is mosr easily perceived; "n,lthe hand is the ","ñ"1,
*"*å¡rl" iái.*t "i*"
""itit""¡. ,hey are blin<l witnesses to my own v¡siltility ' ' huma¡ bodv is
on itsclf ¡nd
6 the rcgion lcast lìkely to provide a conscious rigisrarion of the s¡imulus. Bcnd¿r
least
tlla¡ D¡rticulár kiîd of n*¡ ¡r, ¡l-i'. i-i" il"J oítht *otld to double back

:¡archical chain of body parts from the mosr to rhc leasr dominanr facn ;: :#:iffi;ì;;Ïii;ïh*;;J n* b. human visio¡ without humán bodies (Dil-
buttocks-brcast-back-rhigb-abdomen-hand. (See Go¡man lon r988r 168-ól)
rye9, 7 j-7 4j
8. blwg¡ndtion of hcr claìms rcgarding
,arioz rs
is â
a nororiously
notoriously ambiguous ând and slippery term
rerm in thc hands
hâDds of r¡. Âs chancc voulcl hâle it, l¡igaray 6nds suiking confitmation
eirnr which has Mcrleau-Ponty's trans-
s, âlthough itir has relativcly precise
precise anatomical
anatomkal and ând physiological
ohysiological referencer, It a
reference¡, lts b* *nrn* invisible in
r"nd"red a rvpogtaphit"l
(Merlea''Pontv
s whcn the philosopher plays with the undecidabiíity bctween the limal and the j;; ;i;i;; "a" LÇ., .ni,t."n.l"tin s í;-Z; ;' "lâPs" rathcr than "lips"
ic, betwccn the anaromical vagina an{ its formation, and a kind of philosophical (ry68) uó\.
¡ical self.enfolding. The problcm is not that rhe¡e is not and cannot be a \-,/r z. Fmm her orher writings, moct notably Thk Sex whicb Is N¡¡t ote' lrigâray' makcs
of thc s'biect-
ration between the literal and ¡he metaphoric; the problem is what is et stake in c .ñ. iá;i'"iü'"i" ¿:ö';;;;til'"blv ;l*;tl; mír'or o"'lv r"u'"l' a picturc
of the subject's
ite¡al i¡ the metapho¡ic. Anzieu sigrials ât leaçt some of the anatomical ¡esonances the or$er ¡crnai's at l¡ot i-p"rf""t dJub!", ,ttáy. ¿"nn"i ¡y ,tt" paràmeters
"o
;;ì;;ilä;;. Til;i..* øà*ri-tl""t i"u" ttt"in ¡i¡"¿ tthe Plãne,tlìât constirutes
'rto co¡ception' which con-
"lnvagination," ¡he te¡m used ín anatomy and physiology.,. is a uscful re.minder ¡hat the mirror-a kind o{ "intisiblc," qoite áiifcät fìot U*¡""u-punty's
vâgina ,-s not ân organ of particular contcxture but fold of rhe skin, iust like the lþ, ditions rhe visible, in this case, dre speculat'
againsr r¡c a'Parcnt scxuâl Íeurrality
anus, thc nose or the eyelid¡. It has no hardened laycr or cornea ro act as e p¡otectile shi r ¡. Butler seems to d.uelop , -ort .üuincirrg casc
r".'*,¡nol', ¡t ¡s d¡r6cult.to understand
its mucous oembr¿ncc is €xposed, its sensitiviry âr¡d e¡ogcnciry rigfiron the sr¡rf¿ce . . t::#:;;;:;;i*.- "i"'eìTil'"';i"¿*¿ ¡t' "thc bodv" hc means thc
zieu rgEt: ro) iiniffiffiäil'ì;;;k*
"É 8¡'""-i 'ùi-' 'uãui¡'ài"'' "nr"'"
22 I Notes 10 pages rog-24 Notes to pdges rz7-42 I zzj
rale body, irrst as... the,.normal subject" tumed out to bc male.. .. lf tlre
4. Sce Lingis (r985b: 4e-43)'
otcs an essence, while bodies in general denote existenc+, then it
rust tre mdfe" (t99ot 9$.
appears that j. LinEis statcs:

14. According to Lingis, rh, ..r¡rr Vhat is powerful in rhc anist is th¡: comPulstort
is rhe first fisure of powetful life.
'fhe noble is the second figure of powerÉul
the comluleion to orgiastk sÞte
To see somconc sp¡awled or¡ the bed as seducrirr -'¿r"ä "^¿
,ùiflâ,i ii rhe noble ii thc power to forget. The rhird figure ol powerfrrl htu is
is,to feel, forming within onesr
mmrs of taking him o¡ her. The other is st¡uctuæd perceptibly ììi" *r"*rl
kisses and embraces, the cxterior r€tief of one,"
irle surface *" r**.t* l"¿¡¡¿*1. Whât is pô\À¡crful in the sorereign individ¡Ial is thc memory of his
inw""ã tinÅ of L*t;ng. . . . in o Ì'ord {Lin8ìs t985b: sB)
mce, what cxposes itself outsidc of onesclf affli"," will, his powcr m keep his
*p,irr;;;;"d, ;;;
ole *comes, rhe ""d
Scli-ve
hold and palpations of the'norÉ
o¡¡e bccomes surlace
other. (Lingis r9r5r
-d :-hi;";;il;t d" 6. See "tilhat Ic a Minor Literatrrre?" in Dclcuze (r986)'
5r)

:T¡1lllChltul U"gis ie
.regarding
his critical reading of Merleau-poaty, his ó. The BodY as lnscriptive Swface
most,t¡enspârendy- mrsculini$t, It is not ar
e-bedas seductivd (although this is a iæreotypical
all clear thãt r,rcmen "; #;;. ¡. See Homi Bhabha (r99o) and Vicki Kirby (rp8z)'
description of male æxual
z. Leni Riefenstahl, TDe People of Kau þ976)'
is certainty not crear th"tJo."n se. ¡iæãilñääilr*d;.^åäiJj Mahing and UtNflaþing of the world
's"""t b*k The Boì:'v ¡n ta¡i, T'e psychologv
;. l"'t";;;tt
11, I îs:*f{
tt particularþ for his insistmce ""*..;;i the;i;;;;
p Itreng Chcatr for his insish,f"ì
oD rhe irrcducibäity of orfr".".*.
,
' "t
, iì:irì"" oioÃit " gtoptti" u.-unt of thc
r'ü pain of roituìe and interroSâtion, â wordìv
and practicc o{ the subiec-
companio' picce to Nictz'
,;.::j,::1_*. .**"ry "¡a,i", ;,;^¿i;;Ñ;;
lf and orher.
gap or intewal always
-á i"-li*¡""¡ty ii"¡jöf*îi" ;i;;';;il;;t-iihment and Foucault's anaþsis of the prison' scarrv a'alvzcs the wavs
;'ilü;õ;i;ii itt"it i, ."niput"t"a and controtled d'ring the sarctione¡l and unclcr-
cleârly
Nietzsche and thc Choreography of Kbowledge pround forms o{ torture still Perpetrated in much of the world today' This torturc is
:;: oith;,nå,ã;;-a-nã, ol t-'i6t"tion and inscripticn .f thel¡odv (alrhoush these
'r,åã.^t when compared
, .r. k is.significant
rhæ the history of the conccpt of desirc is jtself a
chart of
;;';;;;" toå weak to conuey thc rclative innnsiry of toiture procedures
i¿e lotture
:-vlclssltudT,
unde¡g9De -úáä;il;
þ
notions of corporcality. Although the correlarion is iiiit .i"ä*" i""igt ørms of soiial inscription) For scarrv' thrce featutes chârãctcr
:rc ate, b,oadry sp.affi
undc¡sta¡¡dings
ii¿*'ii_i:äiffi;ii]:å':r arrd serve to distinltrish i¡ from othet forms of pain or interrogation:
il_Y P-,"d of the body. The negative rotion oid""ir", lik" ti the pain' continually
*tt to mind, can L .traced to plato. t¡'-the Sy"O^¡"^,-i* Fi¡st, pain is inflictcd on a pelson in evel-intcnsifying ways Second'
it is objcctificd' m¿dc
!_1] :O
ìms, ..::a ."*..,
...1"' in ¡o, ,,on"
e ,r6arnon, uur
speech to,tgathon, -.one destres
¿"rii.. what ;;'úír.r"ï;ri
*i'uì onc lacks" (r99e). HeÊel. ;;itffi';;i;ñ;Ë*', ¡o¿v' i'
'lto "plified
iã thc sense that
in a wry thâl
ruo a¡cl Laqrn, continue ùis long taadit¡on insofar visible to rhose outside dæ pcrsont bo<ly (thus rcndcring pain conmr'¡nicable
æ each sees deçire as a v.a-.rri ai pain an't rcad a: po"ver' a transla-
is hishlv awDicâl). Tbira, ,fc ou¡".oiJ piin is denied
iTq""ible.
Desitõ is posited in an economr.olr.*ll;;;;
1j!-"F*1,9t
s$ng something
ssing somelhinß (the objec
obiect anainm-r would
whose anainment rhnt¿ yieú . ññt-ri-r
viÞt¿ completi.iri, ^-,r I
t-ï"¿" postiUt" Uy thc ob'sessivc rnediation of agency (zB)

for mutual recognition) and annihilation (wùich thè objcciof""¿linf"¿

e struggle ¡or in uhiclr urban geography
rlesire 4. See Gmsz (1992), wherc I t¡y to outlìne some of the ways
opposition to this broad, Plâto¡tic tradition
Eâdition is a second,
second- less nerv¡+iw and ."¡.iL
pervasirc ¡.,t inscribqs the body.
desirc, which may be located in Spinoza, ¡".'"lr¡"t i.rir" i.
ln:s,wli:h pÞducej, transforms, and engagæ directþ with *¡lty. l"'"*J ñ,'öA
i""n;; ;
jfi."ini 5. Nietzschewrircs:
(and not
speaking of US EuroPeans
r^lacÌ, Spinoza sees,it as a form of prodrri-tiàn, ;nauding slf-p.JLJ;;;;;d;; A naked human bcing is gencrally a shameful sight l am
t"lit""'t
taice'-tlrc most cheerful
t
or bc,corning þee the Ethi6, ,i;), a, p"" ,f,i, ..i""J ,'..1ì*;, ñl.ti.¡.t, even of female European.ll. soppo'"ïiäänJä
to,n"
thar not onlv their
compány at tabte suddenly t"*
"f
I particuhr ly Deleuze and.cr.¡attari are contcmpo,"ry ;üã,i"" p.ãà""1, undt"ts"tli lbelieve
t is ¡eal. If dcsi¡e is producrive, ir can oaly be so ln"*.rnpt*.,
¡,, '"ili:;;J;;
chec¡fulncss wr¡uld vanish ,na ,hr.'it. "*ng*., appetitc
would be J;scoufâgcd--it scems
.e"liiy and of realiiy" (Deleuze which onc calls ck¡thcs'
ettâri r9ðJ:
auan rgEr: ¡.ó,1.
a6). ìú¡here
whe¡e d€sire
desire is constru€d
construed ¿s negative, a lack or inc<¡moletion. it is a
as neÊãrive, that wE EuroPeãìs simplv cannot di,};;';"tth;ü
masquerade

¡ and cffect of the mind, psyche, or idea: irs pheno-menj form dicrare, its key charactcr I\97+ a95\
rere desi¡e is undersrood æ positive produciion, it is vier¡æd
"beluviorall¡i' in terms of 6. Nietzsche has this ro say abour gait:
nifcst connections and allegiancec, its arti6ce, its bodily impous, The psychoanalytic
rnob or
nomenological accounts of the body thus presume and emeil the notion åf doir. ¡nd betray thar thcy c<¡me from tlrc
ßv certain manners of the spirir even great spirits bet'âF themi thcv cannot
clogy of lack, while the Spinozisr, productivisr notion entails an exrernalized perspcçtivè tho"lhts tt'at
kind I explore in this chapter.
i':ïJ;il;il;;r'ii'"'e"i' ** -ä 'i"iã'r'ihei' * *;'I-l'f " *ll1-ì^l*-
wârk. rbus Nâpoteon, ,""'
l'*il-r."rJ lì'"*,tiltis when thar is 'ä'ì';;i;;;ä"s;''
z. See Scotr Lash (1984: 3-5), who makes this claim even more strongly. '""iù' rcquired' suclì as srcât coronâtion Droc'jeons'
.Consciousness is p¡esent only to the extent that consciousncss is useft¡l, lt cannot be "Ji.,l','i.í*,"r,'" i""i*"''ttv euhe semc time'
;i ;-:;"*n--p'"'d i"d h¿sry aurhors
''lv who eniov
üi *"î.ri'"¡""t ""t'
3
'h"
tÉi'.'ft'"* i' r"ìþbt ost't ot
brcd that all sense pq: 'ions are perneared with value jridgcmcnts. (Nierzrctæ, r96i: 274): "îÀ"tr'i'f "Lou' 't'"
"t