Maria David

Sociology 436
Professor Liebman
1/26/2010

1a)
Asymmetry in the case of the Strategy of Social Protest is
essentially the imbalance of organizational patterns of a challenging
group and that of an established group. The issue of asymmetry makes
sense for challenging groups who have yet to establish themselves and
their credibility. To help overcome problems of asymmetry challenging
groups must solve “two separate functional problems” (The Strategy of
Social Protest, 90). These two problems are the ability to maintain a
“series of commitments from members that can be activated when
necessary – essentially a problem of pattern maintenance” and “the
ability to solve problems of internal conflict so that power struggles
within the group do not paralyze its ability to act” (SSP, 90). Groups
that have been established have already solved these issues and have
ways to overcome situations and prevent fleeting members and to
resolve and/or prevent internal conflict. Time is the prevailing factor
within the issue of asymmetry and simply experimentation with solving
issues and overcoming situations comes with experience and the
longevity of an established group. Time allows groups to overcome
issues simply because of an established way of dealing with internal
conflict or even a more established hierarchal structure that is
knowledgeable in overcoming a particular situation of conflict.
Bureaucratic organization helps with the issue of pattern
maintenance because this way there is a structure of roles and
expectations for the members so that members cannot carry their
membership in “latent form” (SSP, 90). Bureaucratic organizations also
are more highly accepted and receive more amounts of new
advantages more so than non-bureaucratic. This is because non-
bureaucratic groups are less ready when needed to act and the
bureaucratic is in a state of readiness. According to the Strategy of
Social Protest there are three characteristics to define a bureaucratic
group: “(1) The group possess a written document, a constitution or
charter, that states both the purposes of the organization and its
provisions of operation. A written document stating only purposes – for
example, a manifesto – is insufficient if it contains provisions for how
the group will conduct its business, (2) The group maintains a formal
list of members, thus distinguishing members from mere supporters
and sympathizers, (3) The group possesses three or more levels or
internal divisions” (91).
Bureaucratic organization cannot be the sole reason for success
in achieving acceptance and new advantages, because there are nine
out of twenty-four groups that did not receive new advantages
although were considered bureaucratic groups under the criteria set
out in the Strategy of Social Protest (92). “Bureaucratic organizations
helps solve the problem of pattern maintenance, it cannot alone solve
the problem of internal control or conflict” (Liebman lecture #3).
Having a centralized power entails having a single center of power
within the organization, whether or not this is formally sanctioned. The
single centralized power can designate and delegate tasks and thus
creating a more cohesive and orderly organization. This relationship
between the centralization of power is stronger for gaining new
advantages than it is for acceptance, unlike bureaucracy (SSP, 93). A
centralized power that dictates can theoretically solve conflict and set
out rules and regulations that will help keep internal conflict to a
minimum.
Bureaucracy and centralization of power differ in delivering types
of success because both appeal to different problems; one of problem
maintenance and the ability to solve internal conflict respectively.
Although there is moderate success of each alone there is a noticeable
increase of success when both bureaucracy and centralization of power
is combined (Liebman lecture #3). Likewise, when both bureaucracy
and centralization of power are absent there is a very low chance of
the challenging group to receive new advantages and to win
acceptance (Figure 7-1,2,3,4, SSP, 92-95). The lack of state of
readiness in a non-bureaucratic group combined with the lack of
having a single central power is an obvious combination that will not
succeed; it is essentially unorganized and unstructured to the point
where getting the necessary tasks done would be close to impossible.
On the other hand there are deviant cases where groups were both
bureaucratic and centralized but did not achieve new advantages or
acceptance. But once again, these are anomalies cases and according
to the text are not that likely to occur.

1b)
The problem of the free-rider is when a person or group of people
benefit from a group’s actions and advantages without actually paying
into the group and lacking the membership that the group requires.
According to chapter five the best way to overcome the free-rider
problem is to use selective-incentives. Olson in chapter five can see
“readily enough how a group can induce members to join by means of
selective, private rewards given only to those who participate” (SSP,
58). Large groups in this case are prone to free-riding because of
anonymity factor where people can be unseen in the group and also
because of an issue of unimportance; free-riders feel unimportant and
that their contributions to the group does not matter and does not
count (Liebman lecture #2). The second theory on why the problem of
free-riding is more prevalent in large groups as opposed to small
groups is that it is important mainly when it threatens “commitment,
undermining the solidarity and morale of the challenger and raising
questions for the active participants about the personal costs they are
bearing” (SSP, 152).
In this second theory, the effect of free-riders is
more dependent on specific variables which include: the nature of
collective action, scarcity of supply, degree of participant sacrifice,
relationship to a past commitments (SSP, 152-153). Unlike Olsen in
chapter five, the second theory does not believe that the free-rider
problem is a universal problem for challenging groups but simply under
the special circumstances outline above. Groups that might be immune
to the free-rider problem are those that find personal gratification
through their activity and do not necessarily care about the selective
incentives Olsen offers or the variables offered in chapter ten.

2a)
Being a group that is already established prior to the country
being involved in a major war “show a greater rate of success than
those which were entirely in peacetime: (acceptance – 77% v 26%,
advantages – 64% v 39%)” (Liebman lecture #3). These groups that
are established prior to the major war are less likely to be deemed
“unpatriotic” because they were challenging the institution prior to the
war, but when the challenging group is established during the war they
are deemed “unpatriotic.” Along with the group’s establishment timing
it is also important to consider the length of challenge; long-term
challengers need to avoid displacement because there are always
people who are outsiders/losers (essentially groups that lack power in
conventional means). Groups that are less likely to displace their
opponents have more focus on their group itself and not on trying to
work to displace the antagonist. Wartime challengers are, “in many
cases, long-time challengers. They manage to stay alive and active in
spite of not having stabilized their relationship with their antagonists,
and when a war or other system-wide crisis finally comes along, they
are able to cash in” (SSP 121). Long-term challengers also tend to be
more bureaucratic which coincides with a more successful
combination.

2b)

War is a better moment for success because war-time

challengers “tend to be long-term challengers. Among the 16 groups
which lasted more than 20 years, all but three were eventually
successful; they tended to be more bureaucratic than other groups,
but less centralized (F8.7); they also were less likely to try to displace
their opponents” (Liebman lecture #3). Also in non-crisis times third
parties do not become “involved in someone else’s quarrel, but in
times of crisis, it is everyone’s quarrel and they are less tolerant”
(Liebman lecture #3). People in war-time do not want to be seen as
unpatriotic so they support challenging groups. In times of peace it is
harder to get people to support the challenging groups.

2c)

All potential groups cannot follow SSP’s formula for success. Poor
people for example only have the ability to be a pain in someone’s
behind but do not have the monetary ability to finance a social
movement and because the rich have the ability to control what the
poor need to live; they control their pay, rent and other necessities.
The disadvantaged do not have the flexibility to spend their time
organizing but instead have to work for their wages and make a living.
This leaves the poor disadvantaged and unable to strive for the
success of a challenging group.