Report of Apollo 201 Review Board

REPORTOF
APOLLO
204
REVIEW
BOARD
TO
THE ADMINISTRATOR
NATIONALAERONAUTICS
AND SPACEADMINISTRATION
(NASA-T#I-84105) REPORT O..P A]_C/,£O 204 REVIEW _q82-72199
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D.C. 20546 STOP 85
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APOLLO SPACECRAFT
The spacecraft (S/C) consists of a launch escape system (LES) assem-

bly. command module (C/M), service module (S/M). and the spacecraft/
lunar module adapter (SLA). The LES assembly provides the means for
rapidly separating the C/M from the S/M during pad or suborbital aborts.
The C/M forms the spacecraft control center, contains necessary auto-
matic and manual equipment to control and monitor the spacecraft
systems, and contains the required equipment for safety and comfort of
the crew. The S/M is a cylindrical structure located between the C/M
and the SLA. It contains the propulsion systems for attitude and veloc-
ity chan_e maneuvers. Most of the consumables used in the mission are
stored in the S/M. The SLA is a truncated cone which connects the
S,'M to the launch vehicle. It also provides the space wherein the lunar
module (L/M) is carried on lunar missions.
TEST IN PROGRESS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
Spacecraft 012 was undergoing a "Plugs Out Integrated Test" at the

time of the accident on January 27, 1967. Operational Checkout Proce-
dure, designated OCP l:O-K-0021-1 applied to this test. Within this
report this procedure is often referred to as OCP-0021.
TESTS AND ANALYSES
Results of tests and analyses not complete at the time of publication

of this report will be contained in Appendix G, Addenda and Corrigenda.
CONVERSION OF TIME
Throughout this report, time is stated in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).

To convert GMT to Eastern Standard Time (EST), subtract 17 hours.
For example, 23:31 GMT converted is 6:31 p.m. EST.
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402- Price $1.25
i NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
APOLLO 204
AND SPACE
REVIEW
April
BOARD
ADMINISTRATION
5, 1967
IN RFPt Y REFER TO
The Honorable James E. Webb

Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D. C. 20546
Dear Mr. Webb:
Pursuant to your directive as implemented by the memorandum of

February 3, 1967, signed by the Deputy Administrator, Dr. Robert C.
Seamans, Jr., the Apollo 204 Review Board herewith transmits its
final, formal report, each member concurring in each of the findings,
determinations, and recommendations.
Sincerely,
_ .-x <,/, "

,-f_/ t/,_?_. /
Dr: Fr_a IL.,l"h'or_pso/(

Chairman t
_/::,,,,,,.,+ D' , ,
Frank Borman, Col., USAF Dr. Robert W. Van Dolah
/Dr' M&xime A'. Faget -ZGeorg_'C. Wh ire, Jr. '
E. Barton Geer (JJ'ohn J ?'Williams
_ .i'::' f " '.....
Charles F. Strang, Coi.,-US._jtF"

This page left blank intentionally.
REPORT
OF
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
PREFACE
The Nation's space program requires that man and machine achieve the highest capability to pursue the
exploration of space. Three gallant men lost their lives in line of duty during the development of that
capability.
The Apollo 204 Review Board was charged with the responsibility of reviewing the circumstances sur-
rounding the accident, reporting its findings relating to the cause of the accident, and formulating recom-
mendations so that inherent hazards are reduced to a minimum.
Throughout its proceedings, the Board recognized the need for an impartial and totally objective review in
order to arrive at its findings. The Board believes that this was accomplished.
The Board is very concerned that its description of the defects in the Apollo Program that led to the
condition existing at the time of the Apollo 204 accident will be interpreted as an indictment of the entire
manned space flight program and a castigation of the many people associated with that program. Nothing
is further from the Board's intent. The function of the Board has been to search for error in the largest
and most complex research and development program ever undertaken. This report, rather than presenting
a total picture of that program, is concerned with the deficiencies uncovered.
The Board has been greatly impressed by the integrity, candor and dedication of those people upon whom
the Board relied in conducting this investigation. All have felt a personal loss in this accident, and all
are determined that a comparable tragedy shall not occur.
This report represents the dedicated effort of many hundreds of individuals in government, industry and
educational institutions. In addition, useful advice was received from many private individuals in this
country and abroad. The Board acknowledges with appreciation these contributions.
.°°
III
iv
APOLLO 204REVIEW BOARD
FINAL REPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
PREFACE iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS V
PART I AUTHORITY
NARRATIVE OF BOARD HISTORY 1-1
NASA MANAGEMENT INSTRUCTION 8621.1 APRIL 14, 1966 1-3
MEMORANDUM, JANUARY 28, 1967, FROM DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
NASA, TO APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 1-5
MEMORANDUM, FEBRUARY 3, 1967, FROM DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
NASA, TO APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 1-9
MEMORANDA, FEBRUARY 3, 1967, FROM DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
NASA, TO APOLLO REVIEW BOARD

BOARD COMPOSITION DR. FRANK A. LONG 1-11
DR. ROBERT W. VAN DOLAH 1-12
MR. GEORGE JEFFS 1.13
PART II BIOGRAPHIES
DR. FLOYD L. THOMPSON CHAI RMAN . 2-1

2.3
CHARLES F. STRANG, COLONEL, USAF BOARD MEMBER
BOARD MEMBER 2-5
MR. E. BARTON GEER
FRANK BORMAN, COLONEL, USAF BOARD MEMBER 2.7
MR. GEORGE C. WHITE, JR. BOARD MEMBER 2-9
DR. ROBERT W. VAN DOLAH BOARD MEMBER 2.11
MR. JOHN J. WILLIAMS BOARD MEMBER 2-13
BOARD MEMBER 2-15

DR. MAXIME A. FAGET
COUNS EL 2-17
MR. GEORGE T. MALLEY
PART III BOARD
MEMORANDUM, FEBRUARY 4, 1967, FROM CHAIRMAN APOLLO 204 REVIEW
BOARD, SUBJECT. ESTABLISHMENT OF APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
ADVISORY GROUP 3-1
MEMORANDUM, FEBRUARY 7, 1967, FROM CHAIRMAN, APOLLO 204 REVIEW
BOARD, SUBJECT: ESTABLISHMENT OF APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD PANELS 3-5

BOARD STRUCTURE 3-7
BOARD PROCEDURES 3-9
BOARD PROCEEDINGS 3-11
SPACECRAFT AND RECORDS CUSTODIAL RESPONSIBILITIES 3-35

INTERIM REPORTS
DR. ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR.

TO THE ADMINISTRATOR,NASA, FEBRUARY 3, 1967 3-47
TO THE ADMINISTRATOR, NASA, FEBRUARY 14, 1967 3-51
TO THE ADMINISTRATOR, NASA, FEBRUARY 25, 1967 3-55
STATEMENT BY JAMES E. WEBB,
ADMINISTRATOR, NASA, FEBRUARY 25, 1967 3-61
PART IV HISTORY OF THE ACCIDENT
DESCRIPTION OF TEST SEQUENCE AND OBJECTIVES 4-1
CHRONOLOGY FROM T- 10 MINUTES THROUGH MEDICAL
DETERMINATION OF DEATH 4-4
PART V INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS 5-1
PART Vl FINDINGS, DETERMINATIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS 6-1
APPENDICES
vi
PART I
AUTHORITY
c_
c_
v_
_D
c_
NARRATIVE OF BOARD HISTORY
By authority of the Administrator, National Aeronautics :and Space Administration, the Apollo 204 Review
Board was established January 27, 1967. This action was:initiated through oral instructions issuedby '
the Deputy Administrator, followed by written confirmation February 3, 1967, setting forth, in detail, the
broad powers and responsibilities of the Board.
The Review Board convened at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida, on January 28, 1967, underthe _,
Chairmanship of Dr. Floyd L. Thompson, Director of the Langley Research Center. The sessions :and or-
ganized activities of the Board continued at KSC until the Board submitted its :Report.
During this period an intensive review was carried out in accordance with the responsibilities placed on
the Board by the Administrator. A principal element of this:Review was the creation of 21Task Panels
manned by experts :in their respective fields. The report of these Task Panels provided the main source of
information from which the Board has formulated its findings and recommendations: Periodic interim re-
ports were provided the Administrator.
With completion of this report, the Board has been recessed subject to being reconvened at the call of the
Chairman.
1-1
1-2
8621,1
April 14, 1966

Effective dole
Manaoement
Instruction
SUBJECT: MISSION FAILURE INVESTIGATION POLICY AND PROCEDURES
1. P URP OS E
This Instruction establishes the policy and procedures for investigating

and documenting the causes of all major mission failures which occur in the
conduct of NASA space and aeronautical activities.
2. APPLICABILITY
This Instruction is applicable to NASA Headquarters and field installations.
3. DEF INITION
For the purpose of this Instruction, the following term shall apply:
In general, a failure is defined as not achieving a major mission

objective.
4. POLICY
a° It is NASA policy to investigate and document the causes of all major

mission failures which occur in the conduct of its space and aeronau-
tical activities and to take appropriate corrective actions as a
result of the findings and recommendations.
i). The Deputy Administrator may conduct independent investigations

of major failures in addition to those investigations required of
the Officlals-ln-Charge of Headquarters Program Offices as set
forth in paragraph 5a.
5. PROCEDURES
a. Officials-in-Charge of Headquarters Program Offices are responsible,

within their assigned areas, for:
(z) Informing promptly the Deputy Administrator of each major

failure and apprising him of the nature of the failure, status
of investigations, and corrective or other actions which are
or will be taken.
1-3
NM_ 862 i. 1 April 14, 1966
(2) Determining the causes or probable causes of all failures,

taking corrective or other actions, and submitting written
reports of such determinations and actions to the Deputy
Administrator.
b, When the Deputy Administrator decides to conduct an independent

investigation, he will:
(i) Establish a (name of project) Review Board, comprised of appro-

priate NASA officials;
(2) Define the specific responsibilities of each Board, encompassing

such tasks as:
(a) Reviewing the findings, determinations and corrective or

other actions which have been developed by contractors,
field installations and the Official-in-Charge of cognizant
Headquarters Program Office and presenting the Board's
conclusions as to their adequacy to the Deputy Administrator.
(b) Reviewing the findings during the course of investigations

with cognizant field installation and Headquarters officials.
(c) Recommending such additional steps (for example additional

tests) as are considered desirable, to determine the techni-
cal and operational causes or probable causes of failure,
and to obtain evidence of nontechnical contributing factors.
(d) Developing recommendations for corrective and other actions,

based on all information available to the Board.
(e) Documenting findings, determinations and recommendations

for corrective or other actions and submitting such documen-
tation to the Deputy Administrator.
Ce Procedures for implementing the Board's recommendations shall be

determined by the Deputy Administrator.
6. CANCELLATION
NASA Management Manual Instruction 4-i-7 (T.S. 760), March 24_ 1964.
Deputy Administrator
DISTRIBUTION:
SDL'I
]-4
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR January 28, 1967
MEMORANDUM For the Apollo 204 Review Board
i. The Apollo 204 Review Board is hereby established in accordance with

NASA Management Instruction 8621.1, dated April 14, 1966, to investigate
the Apollo 204 accident which resulted in the deaths of Lt. Col. Virgil I.
Grissom, Lt. Col. Edward H. White and Lt. Cmdr. Roger B. Chaffee on Launch
Complex 34, on January 27, 1967.
2. The Board will report to the Administrator of the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration.
3. The following are hereby appointed to the Board:
Dr. Floyd L. Thompson, Director, Langley Research Center,

NASA, Chairman
Lt. Col. Frank Borman, Astronaut, Manned Spacecraft Center, NASA
Maxime Faget, Director, Engineering & Development,

Manned Spacecraft Center_ NASA
E. Barton Geer, Associate Chief, Flight Vehicles & Systems Division,

Langley Research Center, NASA
George Jeffs, Chief Engineer, Apollo, North American Aviation, Inc.
Dr. Frank A. Long, PSAC Member, Vice President for Research and
Advanced Studies, Cornell University
Col. Charles F. Strang, Chief of Missiles & Space Safety Division

Air Force Inspector General
Norton Air Force Base, California
George C. White, Jr., Director, Reliability & Quality, Apollo Program

Office, Headquarters, NASA
John Williams, Director, Spacecraft Operations, Kennedy Space Center,

NASA
I-5
261-101 O - 87 - 2
4. George Malley, Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center, will serve as
counsel to the Board°
5. The Board will:
a° Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to establish

the probable cause or causes of the accident, including review
of the findings, corrective action, and recommendations being
dev_loped by the Program Offices, Field Centers, and contractors
involved.
b. Direct such further specific investigations as may be necessary.
C. Report its findings relating to the cause of the accident to the

Administrator as expeditiously as possible and release such infor-
mation through the Office of Public Affairs.
d. Consider the impact of the accident on all Apollo activities

involving equipment preparation, testing, and flight operations.
e. Consider all other factors relating to the accident, including

design, procedures, organization, and management.
f. Develop recommendations for corrective or other action based upon

its findings and determinations.
g. Document its findings, determinations, and recommendations and

submit a final report to the Administrator which will not be
released without his approval.
6. The Board may call upon any element of NASA for support, assistance,
and information.
Robert C. Seamans, Jr.

16
WASHINGTON,D.C. 20546
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR February 3, 1967
MEMORANDUM for the Apollo 204 Review Board
I. The Apollo 204 Review Board was established on January 28, 1967,
in accordance with NASA Management Instruction 8621.1, dated April 14, 1966,
to investigate the Apollo accident which resulted in the deaths of Lt. Col.
Virgil I. Grissom, Lt. Col. Edward H. White, and Lt. Cmdr. Roger B. Chaffee
on Launch Complex 34, on January 27, 1967. In order to reflect the current
Board membership and to provide further guidance to the Chairman in the •
conduct of his duties, this memorandum supersedes that of January 28, 1967.
2. The Board will report to the Administrator of the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration.
3. The following are hereby appointed to the Board:
Dr. Floyd L. Thompson, Director, Langley Research Center, NASA, Chairman
Col. Frank Borman, Astronaut, Manned Spacecraft Center, NASA
Max,me Faget, Director, Engineering & Development, Manned Spacecraft Ctr.,

NASA
E. Barton Geer, Associate Chief, Flight Vehicles & Systems Division,

Langley Research Center, NASA
Col. Charles F. Strang, Chief of Missiles & Space Safety Division,

Air Force Inspector General, Norton Air Force Base, California
George C. White, Jr., Director, Reliability & Quality, Apollo Program

Office, Headquarters, NASA
John Williams, Director, Spacecraft Operations, Kennedy Space Center, NASA
Dr. Robert W. Van Dolah, Research Director for the Explosive Research
Center, Bureau of Mines, Department of Interior
. George Malley, Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center, will serve as

counsel to the Board.
5. The Board will:
a. Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to establish

the probable cause or causes of the accident, including review
of the findings, corrective action, and recommendations being
developed by the Program Offices, Field Centers, and contractors involved.
] -7'
5.
b. Direct such further specific investigations as may be necessary.
C. Report its findings relating to the cause of the accident to the

Administrator as expeditiously as possible and release such
information through the Office of Public Affairs.
d. Consider the impact of the accident on all Apollo activities

involving equipment preparation, testing, and flight operations.
e. Consider all other factors relating to the accident, including

design, procedures, organization, and management.
f. Develop recommendations for corrective or other action based upon

its findings and determinations.
g- Document its findings, determinations, and recommendations and

submit a final report to the Administrator which will not be
released without his approval.
6. The following amplifies and documents the verbal instructions given

to the Chairman, January 28, 1967:
a. The Chairman shall establish such procedures for the organization

and operation of the Board as he finds most effective; such
procedures shall be part of the Board's records.
b. Board members shall be appointed or removed by the Deputy

Administrator after consultation with the Chairman as necessary
for the Board's effective action.
c. The Chairman may establish procedures to assure the execution

of the Chairman's responsibility in his absence.
do The Chairman shall appoint or designate such representatives,

consultants, experts, liaison officers, observers, or other
officials as required to support the activities of the Board.
The Chairman shall define their duties and responsibilities as
part of the Board's records.
e. The Chairman shall keep the Deputy Administrator advised periodically

concerning the organization, procedures, and operations of the
Board and its associated officials.
f. The Chairman shall assure that the counsel to the Board develops
and maintains memoranda records covering areas of possible litigation.
1-8
7. The Board may call upon any element of NASA for support, assistance,
and information.

I-9
1 -10
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20546
MEMORANDUM for the Apollo 204 Reyiew Board
After consultation with the Chairman, Dr. Frank A. Long,

PSAC Member, Vice President for Research and Advanced Studies,
Cornell University, is no longer a member of the Apollo 204
Review Board, effective February I, 1967.
c.
1-11
Dr. Robert W. Van Dolah, Research Director for the Explosive

Research Center, Bureau of Mmes, Department of Interior,
is hereby appointed to the Apollo 204 Review Board effective
February i, 1967.
Robert C_ Seaman_ Jr.

1 -12
February 3, 1967
After consultation with the Chairman, Mr. George Jeffs, ChEef

Engineer, Apollo, North American Aviation, Inc., is no longer a
member of the Apollo 204 Review Board, effective February 2, 1967.
c.
1 -13
1-14
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
DR. FLOYD LAVERNE THOMPSON
Dr. Floyd LaVerne Thompson is Director, Langley Research Center, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Hampton, Virginia. He plans and directs research designed to provide the science and
technology for a variety of important aeronautical and space programs, including the national effort to
land a man on the moon and safely return him to earth. He guided research leading to a number of pro-
grams of world importance including Project Mercury, the concept of erectable space vehicles which led
to the development of the world's first passive communications satellite, and the first solid fueledladnch
vehicle to propel a satellite into orbit.
Dr. Thompson was born in Salem, Michigan, November 25, 1898; graduated from high school in Salem in
1917 and served the following four years in the United States Navy. After his war service, he entered
University of Michigan and was awarded a B. S. Degree in Aeronautical Engineering in June 1926.
He began his science career July 8, 1926, as a member of the staff of the Langley Research Center of
the former National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, nucleus of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. Starting as an aeronautical engineer in the Flight Research Division, he progressed
through various assignments to Chief of Research in 1945. He was appointed Associate Director in
charge of all research September 14, 1952, and in May 1960, became Director of the Center. In addi-
to his duties as Langley Director, Dr. Thompson completed a two-year period of service as Chairman of
the Policy Planning Board at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D. C.
He is the author or co- author of 20 technical reports based on research he conducted. He haslectured
and participated in a number of technical conferences conducted by NASA, the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, the Society of Automotive Engineers and many other professional organi-
zations. Dr. Thompson was elected in 1949 as a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics. He is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Dr. 'Thompson was cited by the University of Michigan in 1953 as a distinguished alumnus in recognition of
his outstanding career in the flight sciences and honored him again in June 1963 by awarding him the
honorary degree of Doctor of Science. The College of William and Mary awarded him the honorary degree
of Doctor of Science in June 1963.
In May 1963, the President of the United States presented the NASA Medal for Outstanding Leadership
to Dr. Thompson at ceremonies at the White House.. He was honored by the NASA "for his outstanding
leadership of the scientists and engineers who were responsible for the original technical concepts and
who comprised the nucleus of the development team for the space flight missions of the United States in
Project Mercury."
Active in civic affairs in Hampton, Virginia, and surrounding communities, Dr. Thompson is a member of
the Hampton Rotary Club and the Board of Trustees of the Dixie Hospital. He is an honorary member
of the Board of Directors of the Virginia Peninsula Chamber of Commerce, a trustee of The War Memorial
Museum of Virginia, and an honorary life member of the Engineers' Club of the Virginia Peninsula.
Dr. Thompson lives at 94 Alleghany Road, Hampton, with his wife - the former Jean Geggie of Hampton.
They have three daughters.
2-1
2-2
PART II
BIOGRAPHIES
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
CHARLES F. STRANG
COLONEL, USAF
Colonel Charles F. Strang is Chief, Missile and Space Safety Division, Directorate of Aerospace Safety,
Deputy Inspector General for Inspection and Safety, Headquarters, United States Air Force. In this and
prior assignments, Colonel Strang has obtained extensive experience in aircraft and missile accident in-
vestigation. He was alternate President of the Air Force Board which investigated the Titan II Missile
Accident of August 1965 at Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas. *
Colonel Strang entered the United States Air Force in January 1940. He was commissioned a Second
Lieutenant in March 1943 after graduation from Officer Candidate School, Miami Beach, Florida. He has
served in various staff and management positions in the fields of aircraft and missile maintenance engi-
neering and materiel. These assignments included: Chief of Maintenance, 7th Bombardment Wing, Cars-
well Air Force Base, Texas; Director of Materiel, 72d Bombardment Wing, Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto
Rico; Deputy Director of Weapon Systems, Headquarters, 13th Strategic Missile Division, Francis E.
Warren Air Force Base, Cheyenne, Wyoming; and Chief of Weapons Maintenance Management, Directorate
of Materiel, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, Omaha, Nebraska.
Colonel Strang has been awarded the Legion of Merit, the Air Force Commendation Medal with Oakleaf
Cluster, the Army Commendation Medal and other Service Medals. He has served in South America, Puerto
Rico and Europe.
Colonel Strang was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in 1918. He completed high school at Havertown,
Pennsylvania and attended Texas Christian and Florida State Universities. In 1956, he graduated from
the Air Force Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air ForCe Base, Alabama. He is a 1965 graduate
of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D. C.
Colonel Strang is married to the former Mildred Irene Wells of Benton, Illinois. They have two daughters
and a son. Daughter Charlene is married to Mr. R. James Mitchell of Lincoln, Nebraska. Their son,
Charles II, who attends San Bernardino College,anddaughter, Karen Sue, reside with the Colonel and Mrs.
Strang in Redlaads, California.
2-3
2-4
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
E. BARTON GEER
Mr. E. Barton Geer has been Associate Chief of the Flight Vehicle and Systems Division, Langley Re-
search Center, Hampton, Virginia, since 1961. He is responsible for directing and reviewing the design
and development work of the three Branches of this Division covering mechanical, structural, dynamic
analysis, reliability, qualification testing of spacecraft systems and subsystems. Included are con-
siderations of thermal balance, life support, cryogenics, hypergolic, hydrogen peroxide and cold gas
control systems, deployment devices, structures, dynamic vehicles and reentry and orbiting payloads. "
Mr. Geer was born April 28, 1919, in Rockwell, Iowa. He attended Iowa public schools and received his
Bachelor of Science Degree in Mechanical Engineering from Iowa State College in 1942, at which time he
joined the Langley Research Center. From 1942 to 1950, Mr. Geer designed and developed vacuum sys-
tems, high pressure air systems, air dryers, refrigeration systems and heat exchangers. In 1950, Mr.
Geer became Group Leader of the Mechanical Engineering Group and he held this position for six years.
In 1956, Mr. Geer was made Headof the Systems Engineering Section, supervising twenty-five specialists
and engineers in the field of thermodynamic, pressure and fluid systems. In addition, he directed the de-
tail design of the 9 foot x 6 foot Thermal Structures air storage and supervised investigation of materials
and design methods for obtaining air temperatures up to 5,000 ° F.
In 1960, Mr. Geer was made Branch Head of Systems Engineering Branch, consisting of 60 specialists and
engineers working on systems and controls. In January 1964, Mr. Geer was named Chairman of the Scout
Vehicle Design Environmental and Quality Control Committee which consisted of ten members to review
the relationship among design, environment, quality control, testing and operations on the reliability of
the total Scout Vehicle System. In September 1964, he was appointed Chairman of the structural, mechani-
cal, electrical and pyrotechnic committee to review the related systems of the Pegasus Project. In
1965, Mr. Geer was appointed Chairman of a committee to review the systems, reliability and operational
status of the Explorer Injun IV spacecraft. On Project Fire, he participated in the design and flight
reviews of the spacecraft and directed the design and review of the tracking telespectrograph. On the
Lunar Orbiter Spacecraft, Mr. Geer participated in all the Preliminary and Critical Design reviews.
He is married to the former Iris J. Carr of Fertile, Iowa, and they live at 3203 Matoaka Road, Hampton,
Virginia. They have two daughters, Diane and Cheryl.
Mr. Geer is active in Civic and Church work. He is a registered professional engineer in the State of
Virginia and is a member of the Engineers' Club of the Virginia Peninsula.
2_1-101o ,7-3 2-5

2-6
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
FRANK BORMAN
COLONEL, USAF
NASA ASTRONAUT
f
Colonel Frank Borman was assigned as Commander of the third manned Apollo flight. He was Comman-
der on the fourteen-day Gemini VII mission.
Colonel Borman entered the Air Force in June 1950 after graduation from West Point. He receive_ his
pilots' wings in 1951. From 1951 to 1956 he was assigned to various fighter squadrons in the United States
and the Philippine Islands.
Colonel Borman became an assistant professor of thermodynamics and fluid mechanics at the United States
Military Academy in 1957. In 1960 he graduated from the USAF Aerospace Research Pilots School. He
remained there as an instructor until 1962 when he was selected by NASA as an astronaut. Colonel Borman
served as back-up command pilot for the Gemini IV mission prior to flying on Gemini VII. He has accumu-
lated over 5200 hours flying time, including 4300 hours in jet aircraft.
Colonel Borman has been awarded the NASA Exceptional Service Medal and the Air Force Command Astro-
naut Wings. He also received the 1966 American Astronautical Flight Achievement Award and the 1966
Air Force Association David C. Shilling Flight Trophy. He was corecipient of the 1966 Harman Interna-
tional Aviation Trophy.
Colonel Borman was born in Gary, Indiana on March 14, 1928, and was raised in Tucson, Arizona. He
graduated from Tucson High School in 1946, the United States Military Academy in 1950 and received a
Master of Science Degree (Aeronautical Engineer) from the California Institute of Technology in 1957.
Colonel Borman is married to the former Susan Bugbee of Tucson, Arizona. The Borman's have two sons,
Fredrich, age 15 and Edwin, age 13.
2-7
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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
GEORGE C. WHITE, JR.
George C. White, Jr., is Director, Apollo Reliability and Quality in the Apollo Program Office, NASA Head-
quarters. Prior to his appointment to this position in November 1966, he was Chief, Spacecraft and Launch
Vehicle Test Performance in the Apollo Test Division since December 1963. He had joined NASA in Feb-
ruary 1963 as Chief, Command and Service Module Development.
During the period from October 1953 to February 1963, Mr. White had been with Fairchild Aircraft (now
Fairchild-Hiller) in Advanced Design, Engineering Management and Program Management on the WS-123A
Goose Missile and the SD-5 Surveillance Drone.
Six years, beginning in October 1947, were spent with NACA, Langley Research Center, in mechanical and
structural design of rocket powered research models and special projects in the helicopter and airplane
fields.
Mr. White had resigned from the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Buffalo, New York in December 1945 to orga-
nize and manage the Dansaire Corporation where he was responsible for design, manufacture and flight
test of a three place personal aircraft. He had, previous to this, been in structures engineering at Curtiss-
Wright for six years, and in manufacturing at Curtiss-Wright and Piper Aircraft for a total of four years,
having started at Piper in 1935.
Mr. White was born in West Grove, Pennsylvania in 1914. He received a B.S. Degree in Aeronautical Engi-
neering from TriSState College, Angola, Indiana, in 1937. He is married to the former Marcia C. McOmber of
Bradford, Pennsylvania and they have two daughters now in college. They reside in RockviUe, Maryland,
where they are both active in the Rockville Presbyterian Church. Mr. White is a Registered Professional
Engineer and an Associate Fellow in the AIAA and he holds a Commercial Pilot's License.
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2-10
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
DR. ROBERT WAYNE VAN DOLAH
Dr. Robert Wayne Van Dolah is Research Director, Explosive Research Center, Bureau of Mines, U.S. De-
partment of Interior, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In this position which he has occupied over twelve years,
he plans and directs research in the fields of combustion, explosions and explosives. In addition to the
programs supported by direct appropriation, he directs investigations related to a variety of space, mili-
tary and private industry problems in the field of combustion and explosions. He has provided consultative
service to military agencies on a number of occasions. He has participated in several accident
investigations involving fire and explosions.
Prior to joining the Bureau of Mines in 1954, Dr. Van Dolah was head of the Organic Chemistry Branch
and then head of the Chemistry Division at the U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station beginning in 1946. In those
positions he planned and directed research on the chemistry of propellants and fuels and their combus-
tion characteristics. Before that he served first as assistant to the Scientific Director and later as re-
search Chemist and Group Leader of the William S. Merrell Company, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Dr. Van DOlah was born in Cheyenne, Wyoming, February 1, 1919. He received a Bachelor of Arts Degree
in Chemistry from Whitman College, Walla Walla, Washington, in1940and aPh.D, in Organic Chemistry
from the Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, in 1943. He is a member of the honorary societies: Phi
Beta Kappa, Phi Lambda Upsilon and Sigma Xi; and of the professional societies: American Chemical
Society, American Association for the Advancement of Science (Fellow), Combustion Institute, American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (Senior Member). He is on the Board of Directors of the National
Fire Protection Association.
Dr. Van Dolah is author or co-author of 97 publications and three patents. He is very active in committee
work in areas relating to fire and explosions including being Chairman of National Fire Protection Asso-
ciation Committee on Chemicals and Explosives, the Working Group on Hazards, Committee on Safety
Criteria of the Interagency Chemical Rocket Propulsion Group. He is a member of American Chemical
Society Committee on Chemical Safety and of numerous other committees. In July 1965, he received the
Department of Interior Distinguished Service Award.
Dr. Van Dolah lives at 202 Cherokee Road, Upper St. Clair Township (Pittsburgh), Pennsylvania, with
his wife, the former Elizabeth M. Becker of Portland, Oregon. They have one daughter in college and
two sons in high school.
2-11
2-12
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
JOHN J. WILLIAMS
John J. Williams, Director, Spacecraft Operations, John F. Kennedy Space Center, is responsible to the
Director of Launch Operations for the management and technical integration of KSC operations related
to preparation, checkout and flight readiness of manned spacecraft.
Since joining the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1959, Mr. Williams was the Head of
Capsule Systems Branch during the Mercury Program and was the Assistant Manager for Gemini, MSC-
Florida Operations until he was moved to his current position in December 1964.
From 1954 to 1959 he was employed by the U.S. Air Force as an electronic engineer in the Directorate
of Test Engineering, Air Force Missile Test Center, Florida. He was responsible for the evaluation of
various missile prelaunch and flight tests.
From 1951 to 1954 Mr. Williams was employed as an electronic engineer in the Technical Systems Labora-
tory, Air Force Missile Test Center, Fla., where he was engaged in ground instrumentation and antenna
fabrication and testing.
Mr. Williams was employed as an electronic engineer by the U.S. Air Force at Wright Patterson Air Force
Base, Dayton, Ohio. He engaged in the development of a cooling system for electronic devices at ex-
tremely high altitudes and in the miniaturization of airborne power supplies.
Mr. Williams, a native of New Orleans, Louisiana, graduated from high school in 1944. He served in the
U.S. Navy during World War II as an electronic technician and upon his discharge from service entered
Louisiana State University. He graduated in 1949, receiving a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical
Engineering.
Mr. Williams and his organization won many honors, receiving the Group Achievement Award in 1966 for
contribution to the success of the Gemini VII/VI Launch Operations and to the success of Project Gemini.
In 1966 Dr. Seamans presented him the Outstanding Leadership medal for his work in Manned Space Programs.
He nowlives in Eau Gallie, Florida, with his wife, Peggy; daughters, Barbara and Jo Ann; and son Michael.
2 - 13
2-14
BIOGRAPHICAl- DATA
DR. /vlAXl/vlE A. FAGET
Dr. Maxime A. Faget has been the Director of Engineering and Development, Manned Spacecraft Center,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Houston, Texas, since February 1962. He is responsible
for technical support of the Gemini and Apollo manned space flight programs and advanced studies into
space systems. As a NASA member of the Polaris Missile Steering Task Group, he contributed to the
design of that Navy missile. Dr.Faget served on the Steering Committee which helped the NASA Admini -
strator make Project Mercury policy decisions.
Dr. Faget was born at Stann Creek, British Honduras, August 26, 1921. He attended San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, Junior College and received a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from Louisi-
ana State University. He served three years as a naval officer during World War II.
Dr. Faget joined the staff of Langley Research Center, NASA, in 1946 as a research scientist. He worked
in the Pilotless Aircraft Research Division; later was named head of the Performance Aerodynamics
Branch. He conceived and proposed the development of a one-man spacecraft, later used in Project
Mercury. Dr. Faget was one of the original group of 35, assigned as a nucleus of the Space Task Group
to carry out the Mercury project.
Dr. Faget has authored and co- authored numerous technical papers on aerodynamics, rocketry, high-speed
bomb ejection, reentry theory, heat transfer, and aircraft performance. He is co-author of a textbook,
"Engineering Design and Operation of Spacecraft," and is author of a book entitled, "Manned Space
Flight." Dr. Faget holds joint patents on the "Aerial Capsule Emergency Separation Device" (escape
tower), the "Survival Couch," the ''Mercury Capsule," and a "Mach Number Indicator."
Dr. Faget is a member of the following: Tau Beta Pi, National Engineering Honor Society; Omicron Delta
Kappa, National Leadership Honor Society; International Academy of Astronautics of the International
Astronautical Federation. He is an Associate Fellow, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.
Dr. Faget was presented the Arthur S. Fleming Award in 1960. He was presented the Golden Plate Award
in 1961 by the Academy of Achievement. In 1963 he was awarded the NASA Medal for Outstanding
Leadership and in 1965 he was presented the Award of Loyola. Dr. Faget was honored by the Uni-
versity of Pittsburg, March 1966 by awarding him the Honorary Degree of Doctor of Engineering. Dr.
Eaget served as visiting Professor teaching graduate level courses at the Louisiana State University,
Rice University and the University of Houston.
Dr. Faget is married to the former Nancy Carastro of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. They reside with their
3 daughters - Ann Lee, Carol Lee and Nanette, and son, Guy, at Dickinson, Texas.
2-15
2-16
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
GEORGE T. MALLEY
Counsel to the Board
Born April 24, 1913, Rochester, New York. Attended public and parochial schools in Rochester and
received A.B. Degree from the University of Rochester, and L.L.B. Degree from Cornell University,
Ithaca, New York.
Member of the New York Bar.
Attorney, Office of General Counsel, Department of the Navy - 1950 to 1959.
Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1959 to present.
Retired Naval Reserve Officer - Active duty World War II - 1939 to 1946, chiefly in South Pacific serving
on various types of ships.
Married to Sally E. Wren, 2 step-sons, resident of Newport News, Virginia.
2-17
2-18
PART III
BOARD
NATIONAL. AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
IN REPLY REFER TO February 4, 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT : Establishment of Apollo 204 Review Board Advisory Group
REFERENCE: Memorandum for the Apollo 204 Review Board from Dr.
Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Deputy Administrator, NASA,
dated February 3, 1967
i. An Advisory Group is hereby established to support the Apqllo

204 Review Board in its investigation. This Group consists of
Representatives, Consultants, Liaison Officers, Observers, and
Secretariat.
2. The Advisory Group will report to the Chairman, Apollo 204

Review Board.
3. The Advisory Group will consist of:
a. Representative: Represent a major element of NASA or

other Government agency having programs and activities associated
with the Apollo Program.
b. Consultant: Serve as an advisor to Apollo 204 Review

Board by providing views, opinions, information, and recommenda-
tions, as appropriate, based on his field of competence.
c. Liaison Officer: Represent an activity having an interest

in the Apollo 204 review and provide liaison with that activity
by the acquisition of information.
d. Observer: Acquire information relative to his area of

expertise and normal responsibility.
e. Secretariat: Provide administrative, secretarial, cleri-

cal, and other supporting services to the Review Board.
261-101 O- 6?- 4 3-I

,
4. The following are hereby designated the Advisory Group:
Representatives
Gen. C. H. Bolender OMSF, represents Apollo Program Director
Mr. C. Mathews OMSF, Director, Apollo Applications Program
Mr. R. A. Petrone KSC, Director, Launch Operations
Dr. J. Shea MSC, Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program

Office
Lt. Col. W. Baxter USAF, Chief, Range Safety Office, Air

Force Eastern Test Range
Dr. G. F. Kelly Flight Medicine Branch, Center Medical

Office, MSC
Consultants
Dr. Frank A. Long VicePresident for Research and Advanced

Studies, Cornell University
Mr. J. Yardley Technical Director, Astronautics Company,

Division of McDonnell Company
Mr. G. W. Jeffs Chief Engineer, Apollo Program, North

American Aviation, Inc.
Alternate:
Mr. R. L. Benner Assistant Chief, Engineer, Apollo Program,
North American Aviation, Inc.
Mr. Irving Pinkel Chief, Fluid Systems Research Division,

Lewis Research Center
Mr. Thomas G. Horeff Propulsion Program Manager, Engineering

and Safety Division, Aircraft Development
Service, Federal Aviation Agency
Dr. H. Carhart Chief, Fuels Branch, Chemistry Division,

Naval Research Laboratory
Mr. John S. Leak Chief, Technical Services Section, Engineer-

ing Division, Bureau of Safety, Civil
Aeronautics Board
3-2
Liaison
Mr. Duncan Collins Special Advisor, Secretary of the Air

Force, SL Program
Observers
All Astronauts, MSC
MaJ. P. A. Butler, USAF
Dr. Kurt H. Debus, KSC
Mr. P. C. Donnelly, KSC
Lt. Col. W. Dugan, USAF
Mr. John Hodge, MSC
Mr. J. King, KSC
Mr. H. E. McCoy, KSC
Mr. R. E. Moser, KSC
Dr. George Mueller, OMSF
Mr. W. P. Murphy, KSC
Gen. S. C. Phillips, OMSF
Mr. G. M. Preston, KSC
Gen. J. G. Shinkle, KSC
Mr. A. F. Siepert, KSC
Mr. W. Willlmms, KSC
Secretariat
Mr. Ernest Swleda Executive Secretary
3-3
3-4
February 7, 1967
IN REPLY REFER TO
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT : Establishment of Apollo 204 Review Board Panels
REFERENCE: Memorandum for the Apollo 204 Review Board from

the Deputy Administrator, NASA, dated February 3, 1967
I. Task Panels are hereby established to support the Apollo 204

Review Board in its investigation. A Board member, appointed by
the Chairman, will serve as,Monitor for each Panel.
2. The Task Panels will report to the Chairman, Apollo 204 Review
Board.
3. The Panels, under the direction of their Chairmen appointed by

the Board Chairman will:
a. Perform all functions within their respective statements of

work as approved by the appropriate Board Monitors.
b. Submit work plans through the Panel Coordination Committee

to the Review Board for approval.
c. Provide reports to the Review Board, when required, on the

progress of work.
d. Work with each other under the cognizance and guidance of the
Panel Coordination Committee.
4. The following Panels are hereby designated, together with respective

appointed Panel Chairmen and Board Monitors:
PANE L
PANEL TITLE PANEL CHAIIVIAN 3OARD MONITOR
NO,
I S/C and GSE Configuration J. Goree, MSC J. Williams, KSC
2 Test Environments W. Hoyler, MSC G. White, NASA Hqs
3 Sequence of Events D. Arabian, MSC Dr. M. Faget, MSC
4 Disassembly Activities S. Simpkinson, MSC Col. F. Borman, MSC
3-5
PANEL
NO, PANEL TITLE PANEL CHAIRMAN BOARD _0NITOR
5 Origin & Propagation of Fire F. Bailey, MSC Dr. Van Dolah
6 Historical Data J. T. Adams, MSC G. White, NASA Hq_
7 Test Procedures Review D. Nichols, KSC J. Williams, KSC
8 Materials Review W. Bland, MSC Dr. M. Faget, MSC
9 Design Reviews R. Williams, MSC G. White., NASA Hqs
IO Analysis of Fracture Areas P. Glynn, MSC B. Geer, NASA LaRC
II Medical Analysis G. Kelly, MSC Dr. F. Thompson, NASA

LaRC
G. Malley, Counsel
12 Witness Statement N. Vaughn, MSC Col. C. Strang, USAF

G. Malley, Counsel
13 Ground Emergency Provisions G. Page, KSC Col. F. Borman, MSC

Review
14 Security of Operations C. Buckley, KSC Col. C. Strang, USAF
15 Board Administrative A. Griffin, KSC B. Geer, LaRC

Procedures
16 Special Tests G. Stoops, MSC Dr. M. Faget, MSC
17 Final Board Report Lt. Col. K. H. Col. C. Strang, USAF

Hinchman, USAF
18 Integration Analysis A. Mardel, MSC Dr. M. Faget, MSC
19 Safety of Investigation J. Atkins, KSC B. Geer, NASA LaRC

Operations
2O In Flight Fire Emergency Capt. J. Lovell Col. Borman, MSC

Provisions Review MSC
21 Service Module Disposition W. W. Petynia, MSC J. Williams, KSC
3-6
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD AUTHORITY
ADMIIIS"IP,
AT_
DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR
I
CHAiRMAH L.[GALCOIJNS(L
MII. G. 16i2_
DR.FLOYD
L. THOMPSON
LaRC
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HEHIHER
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PANEL# 5 PAJEL# 10 PANEL
# 17 PPJ([L# 11
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OIgGIH
AHDPROPAGA110N ANALYgSOFFRAC1URE FINAL
BOARO
REPORT MEDICAL
ANALYSIS
1T.ST_ $[OUEIlCI[
OFEVENTS DISASSEMBLY
ACTWITIES
OFF'IRE AREAS K. IINCHHAH OR.KW.Y.
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W. HO?LER D. AHASIAI4 S. SIIPI_otsgN P. 6L_04
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# 13 PANEL
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PANEL# 6
DIIHGB4CY BOARD
ADMHS1RATWE SECURITY
OFOPERAllOk_
T[STPIlOI2OUR[S
REVIEW HISTOIUCAL
DATA lUTEmALSRL'VtEW
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IHFt.IGHT
FIREOdERGF.HCY SAFETY
OFIHVTSTIGA'HOH WITNESS
STATEMENTS
_qL'Vl(_UOOtlt.E OEgGHREVIEWS SPECIAL
_$'TS
PROWSION$ RL'WEW OPEIIA11OHS
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t PAHEL# 21 t PANEL # 16 KSC HSC
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INTEGIAT]OR
ANALYSIS
A. MARDEL
PANEL# 18
ldSC
3-8
BOARD PROCEDURES
The Apollo 204 Review Board was established by the Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, under the authority of NASA Management Instruction 8621.1, dated April 14, 1966.
Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., Deputy Administrator, NASA, in Memoranda dated January 28, 1967, and
February 3, 1967, appointed Board Members, defined Board responsibilities and amplified oral instruc-
tions to the Board Chairman, Dr. Floyd L. Thompson.
#
The Board was composed of eight members, including the Chairman. Six members were NASA
personnel; one member was an officer from the Aerospace Safety Directorate of the Air Force Inspector
General and one member was from the Bureau of Mines, Department of Interior. A Counsel was assigned
to provide legal advice.
Twenty-one Task Panels were formed, each reporting to a Monitor who was a Board Member.
Task Panels were assigned the responsibility of providing administrative assistance and technical
investigation for the Board. Each Panel, with the exception of the Final Board Report Panel, was chaired
by NASA personnel experienced in the area of interest of that particular Panel. The Final Board Report
Panel was chaired by an Air Force Officer. Each Panel was manned by NASA personnel assisted by
contractor personnel in defined technical areas.
In addition, Representatives, Consultants and Observers participated in General Board Meetings

and Panel activities. These individuals assisted the Panels and Board Members in their a_ea of expertise
and responsibilities.
The established procedure for the Board was to convene a General Session Daily at 10:30 a.m.
for approximately one hour. During these meetings, plans and schedules were reviewed. Reports on
proposed actions were presented for approval of plans and schedules and the determination of require-
ments for testing and analyses.
An Executive Session was held each afternoon at 4:00 p.m. This Meeting was restricted to Board
Members; however, additional personnel were requested to attend when necessary.
Basic direction to all Board activities was developed and consummated during Executive Sessions.
The Executive Sessions provided the Board the opportunity to freely discuss sensitive matters. Plans,
schedules and other investigating actions were formally approved by the Board in these Sessions.
Operational procedures for the activities of the Board, the Advisory Group and supporting person-
nel were delineated in a series of Administrative Procedures authorized by the Chairman of the Board.
The investigation techniques employed by the Board required the coordinated effort of numorous
agencies. An overall Master Plan was developed to insure that the investigation was accomplished sys-
tematically without disturbing or destroying evidence. This plan required disassembly if the Spacecraft on
a component or system basis with continual observation by appropriate Panel personnel and photography
before, during and after the removal of each component. The technique of disassembly was validated in
Spacecraft 014 Command Module prior to the actual component removal from Spacecraft 012 Command
Module involved in the accident. During the disassembly, extreme caution was exercised to prevent dis-
ruption of adjacent areas. As components were removed they were identified and placed in a bonded area
and made available for inspection as authorized by the Board.
Simultaneously with Spacecraft disassembly, extensive testing and numerous analyses were ac-
complished. These tests and analyses were accomplished by many agencies: i.e., Kennedy Space Cen-
ter, Manned Spacecraft Center, United States Air Force, Bell Laboratories, contractors, sub-contractors
3-9
BOAR D PROCEDURES
and vendors. All Telemetry data, Spacecraft Records, and Design Documents were reviewed in detail. When
anomalies were discovered, they were analyzed completely to determine their relationship to the accident.
The investigation technique also provided rigid control for all material associated with the re-
view. Immediately after the accident, all possible relevant material was impounded. This material was
analyzed in detail and released only after determination that it did not contribute to the acciden, t or was
no longer required by the Apollo 204 Review Board
The Final Report of the Apollo 204 Review Board was designated to document the findings,
determinations and recommendations for submission to the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration.
A General File of the materials of the Apollo 204 Review Board investigation has been estab-
lished. The Director, Langley Research Center, NASA_Virginia, has been designated the custodian of the file.
The General File containing Telemetry Data, Spacecraft Design Records, Data from special tests and
analyses conducted, and other documents relating to the investigation will be physically located at
Langley Research Center. The Spacecraft, related hardware and drawings, residue from the fire and
Astronaut's equipment will be stored at Kennedy Space Center with the Manager, Apollo Spacecraft
Program Office, Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas, acting as custodial agent for the Langley
Research Center. Medical records specifically associated with the investigation will be stored at Manned
Spacecraft Center, in custody of the Director of Medical Research and Operations, who is Custodial
Agent for Langley Research Center. All materials in the General File will be securely stored at the
designated locations for a period of ten years, unless sooner releasedby proper authority.
3-10
February 8, 1967
IN REPLY REFER TO Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board
TO" DISTRIBUTION
SUBJECT: Transcripts of Review Board Sessions
I. During the first days of the sessions of the Apollo

204 Review Board, the Board heard discussion, suggestions,
extemporaneous remarks by Board members, Advisory Group
members and technical experts engaged in studies relevant
to the review, and accounts, to be verified, from two on-
the-scene witnesses and one individual who was observing
the monitors in the blockhouse.
2. In the free and open discussion, in many cases the

identity of the speakers was not established and the re-
marks were not clearly related to the subject under dis-
cussion. The result is that the transcript of the
proceedings of the first days (other than eye witness
accounts) is valuable primarily as background material
that provides a useful source for identifying potential
review action.
3- In view of the foregoing, the minutes of the Review

Board meetings on January 28, 29, and 30 will be utilized
only as reference material with limited distribution, with
the exception of identifiable eye witness accounts which
will be
nopor
ted Dr. in__ the final/_/_reBgrt.
3-11
3-12
Note: The Board Proceedings are the highlights of Board activities. Complete
transcripts of General Sessions of the Apollo 204 Review Board are contained in
Appendix Pu
January 28, 1967
(1) The Chairman and several Members of the Board assembled at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) at
midday, January 28 and met with the Deputy Administrator, Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr.; the Apollo Pro-
gram Director, Major General Samuel C. Phillips; and other officials from NASA Headquarters, the Manned
Spacecraft Center (MSC) and Kennedy Space Center. These NASA officials provided a quick appraisal of
t
the circumstances surrounding the accident and actions already taken at KSC. This meeting was followed
by an initial general session of the Board in the Mission Briefing Room, a secure area used to conduct
Board business.
(2) After a general discussion, the meeting was adjourned to permit the Board to visit the scene of
the accident at Launch Complex (LC) 34. Upon completion of this inspection, the Board reconvened in
general session and initiated detailed procedural planning for conduct of the Review.
January 29, 1967

(1) Colonel Frank Borman briefed the Board on his inspection of the Spacecraft (Command and Ser-
vice Modules). The purpose of this inspection was to verify the position of circuit breakers, switches,
etc. Immediately following the inspection, many photographs were taken of the exterior and interior of
the Command Module (C/M) with emphasison switches and circuit breaker panels.
(2) The Board interviewed Mr. Donald O. Babbitt for approximately 45 minutes and Mr. James D.
Gleaves for approximately 30 minutes. Both are employees of North American Aviation, Inc. (NAA) and
were on level A-8 of L C 34 at the time of the Apollo 204 accident.
(3) The Pyrotechnic Installation Building (PIB) was assigned to the Board to display the debris and
Spacecraft (S/C) components after removal from the Launch Complex.
(4) Dr. Thompson, Board Chairman, asked Dr. George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight (who was at KSC), for assistance in obtaining flame propagation experts to assist the Apollo
204 Review Board. Dr. Thompson suggested these experts might be obtained from the following organi-
zations:
a. Lewis Research Laboratory, NASA

b. Bureau of Mines
c. Federal Aviation Agency
(5) Dr. Thompson authorized selected personnel from the local press pool to photograph and observe
the C/M. Dr. Thompson authorized one still and one motion picture photographer with one writer repre-
sentative to visit LC 34. They were escorted by Mr. Charles L. Buckley, Jr., Chief, Security Office,
KSC and Mr. John W. King, Chief, Public Information Office, KSC. Dr. Thompson instructed Mr. Buckley
and Mr. King to restrict the press personnel to photography and observation and not allow any questions
pertaining to the accident.
(6) Dr. Thompson established an ad hoc committee composed of Mr. John J. Williams, Mr. E. Barton
Geer, Mr. Charles Mathews, Mr. John F. Yardley, Mr. George Jeffs and Colonel Charles F. Strang. They
were to organize Task Panels to accomplish the accident investigation in a systematic manner.
3-13
January 30, 1967
(1) Dr. Robert W. :Van Dolah, Bureau of Mines, Mr. I. ilrving Pinkel, Lewis Research Center, Mr. T.
Horeff, Federal Aviation Agency, joined the Apollo 204 Review Board as Consultants.
(2) Membership on the special ad hoc committee that was established on January 29, 1967 to make
recommendations on the types of special Panels was changed to: Colonel Borman, Mr. Jeffs, Mr. Yardley,
Mr. Mathews, Dr. Maxime A. Faget and Mr. Williams, Chairman. Dr. Thompson directed that the assign-
ment of tasks will be supported by a statement of work, i.e., "guidelines and basis for understanding."
Mr. Mathews presented an oral outline of the 19 recommended Panels and the work objectives of each;
A Board Member was assigned to monitor each Panel and to serve as the focal point through which the
Panels would report to the Board.
(3) Dr. Thompson designated Colonel Strang to assume the responsibility of managing the assemblly
of all information and data that will be embodied in the Final Report. Colonel Strangwas also assigned to
to plan the format of the Report. i
(4) Lt. :Colonel James W. Rawers, Range Safety Division, Analysis Section, presented on oral report
on what the Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR) personnel saw at the time of the accident.
(5) Dr. Thompson announced that Mr. :George T. Malley, Chief Counsel at Langley Research Center,
will serve as Counsel for the Board.
(6) Dr. Faget introduced Mr. Alfred D. Mardel, who presented a briefing on data and sequence of
events.
January 31, 1967
(1) Dr. :Thompson received from Dr. Seamans a "Memorandum for the .Apollo 204 Review Board"
dated January 28, 1967, which established the Review Board. Dr. Thompson discussed the memorandum
at length and made distribution of copies to all Board Members.
(2) The Board was advised by Colonel Strang that the accident which occurred in an altitude chamber
at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas on January 31, 1967, might be of particular interest to the Board. He
presented a short briefing of the circumstances. The Chairman requested Colonel Strang to provide
follow-up for the Board.
(3) Lt. Colonel William D. Baxter (AFETR Representative to the Board), advised of existing hazards
associated with the spacecraft. These included: high pressure oxygen bottles which may be pressurized
to 485 pounds per square inch (psi) and subject to embrittlement; pyrotechnics on the Service Module; and
the Launch Escape System (LES), which has a 9000 pound thrust rocket motor. An engineering review
was made of thi se potential hazards and it was agreed that before any work could proceed, these specific
items must be removed.
(4) A technical briefing on telemetry data, recorded prior to and during the accident was presented
to the Board. These data indicate discrepancies in certain channels. Therefore, without further evalua -
tion, the telemetry data are inconclusive.
(5) In lieu of classifying Review Board records as confidential, a special cover sheet will be used
to comply with the Chairman's instruction that all Apollo 204 Review Board records and material be
treated as "Confidential." A supply of these cover sheets was provided.
(6) The Chairman of Panel 4, Disassembly Activities, presented a briefing on the Spacecraft De-
bris Removal Plan. The Board approved the plan to the point of removing the astronauts' couches.
3-14
(7) Panel 19, Safety of Investigation Operations, was formed.
February 1, 1967
(1) The task of removal of the Launch Escape System was delayed until retro rockets and other
ordnance devices could be removed from the Saturn Launch Vehicle (SLV)and Spacecraft.
(2) Dr. Van Dolah, Bureau of Mines, replaced Dr. Frank A. Long, Vice President for Research
and Advanced Studies, Cornell University, as a Member of the Board. Dr. Long, whose other respbnsi-
bilities precluded full time service with the Board, will continue to serve as a Consultant. (Dr. Van
Dolah was assigned the responsibility of Panel Monitor for the Panel on Origin and Propagation of Fire.)i
(3) Dr. :Thompson appointed a committee, composed of two Board Members and three Consultants,
to coordinate Panel activities and bring to the attention of the Board those actions requiring specific
approval, i This group will be known as the Panel Coordinating Committee and be required to present
daily activity reports to the Board. This committee supplanted the ad hoe committee that had planned
the organization of the Panels. A procedure was established for orderly, controlled (numerically se-
quenced from 0001) presentation of proposed "Action Items" to the Board for approval prior to imple-
mentation of hardware removal, special tests and other Review Board activities.
(4) Proposed Action Items 0001-0007 were presented for consideration by the Board. 0001-0006
were approved, 0007 was deferred.
(5) The Board reviewed the methods used in releasing public statements. Dr. Thompson advised
that no public statements will be made until approved by him.
(6) Colonel Strang briefed the Board on a proposed Final Report format. It was necessary that a Re-
port format be approved at an early date in order that an orderly flow of data from the Panels could be
maintained. The proposed Final Report format was a modified version of the one used by the Air Force
for accident investigations, i The proposal was tentatively accepted, i
(7) Colonel Strang requested copies of all witness statements be provided each BoardMember asthey
are developed. This wil_permit aprompt review so that additional interviews can be arranged if necessary.
(8) Dr. Thompson announced an Executive Session (Board Members) will be held daily at 4:00 p.m.
(9) Dr. Faget presented a status report on work in progress. He outlined the daily reports as fol-
lows:
a. Activities accomplished on the Launch Complex and in other related areas,
b. Items needing Board approval for future activities,
c. Progress analysis and anticipated work.
February 2, 1967
(1) Dr. Seamans attended the General Board Session. He reiterated and emphasized that all news
releases would be made through the Board Chairman.
(9) Dr. Thompson announced that Mr. Jeffs had been appointed a Consultant in lieu of Board mem-
bership.
(3) Command Module 014 arrived from Downey, California and is in place at the Pyrotechnic In-
3-15
stallation Building (PIB), KSC. This Module will be used for training of technicians who will dis-
disassemble C/M 012; i.e., prior to the removal of any component from 012, the technicians will perform
similar tasks on 014. In this way, they will become familiar with all actions required to remove any
single component. Consequently, little or no damage or disruption will take place during the removal
of items from 012 as it is disassembled. As a component is removed, it will be transported from the
L C and placed in the PIB. It was agreed that all equipment associated with the accident will also be '
located in the PIB. This includes Command Module hardware and support equipment. Spacesuits and
other associated flight equipment will be placed in a special room within the PIB where strictaccess
control will be maintained.
(4) The most significant event to date was the removal of the Launch Escape System from the Com-
mand Module, thereby removing the greatest potential hazard to disassembly operations. With this task
completed, it is estimated that members of the Fire Propagation Panel will enter the Command Module on
February 3, 1967. Completion of the Launch Escape System removal will also permit extensive photo r
graphic coverage of the inside of the Command Module.
(5) Colonel Strang distributed copies of a status report on the recent accident at Brooks Air Force
Base for the Board's information. He stated that authority had been received from the Chief of Staff,
USAF, for him to maintain direct contact with the Accident Investigation Board at Brooks AFB.
(6) Mr. Malley, Counsel for the Board, was requested to prepare a statement to be read to each
witness prior to making a statement. It will inform the witness of the Board's precise intention with re-
spect to use of the statement.
(7) Proposed Action Items 0008 - 0024 were presented for consideration and approved by the Board.
(8) The matter of samples for analysis was again brought up and it was decided as a general direc-
tive that samples be reservedto provide for testing by two outside or independent agencies. If certain
conditions make this impossible, appropriate action should be brought back to the Board for approval.
February 3, 1967
(1) The Chairman announced he had received a telephonic draft of the revised authority from NASA
under which the Board is to be conducted. He also explained to the Board that this new authorization
grants him, as Chairman, the authority to change the composition of the Board advisory group, to appoint
an Acting Chairman and appoint any other positions of the advisory group he deems necessary. Dr. Thomp-
son appointed Colonel Strang to serve as Acting Chairman in the absence of the Chairman.
(2) The Board reviewed the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation film entitled, "Investigation Report, Air-
craft Wire Harness Fires, Revision 2." Through telephone conversations with Colonel Strang and Mr.
Malley, Mr. Gilley, Lockheed Georgia Company of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, granted permission
for the Board to reproduce the film and copies of the report thereto. Three Panels requested copies of
the reports, which were made available.
(3) Dr. Thompson requested a document be written establishing procedures for entry to Command
Module 012. Coordination of requirements and priorities will be controlled by the Panel Coordinating
Committee. Entry to the C/M will be controlled by Colonel Borman or his delegated representative.
(4) A sequence of events display (immediately preceding and following the accident) was prepared
from telemetry data and positioned in the Mission Briefing Room. The time span of the display is from
23:30 to 23:33 hours, Greenwich Mean Time (6:30 to 6:33 p.m. EST) on January 27, 1967. Significant
information on several spacecraft systems such as communications, instrumentation, electrical power,
environmental control, guidance and navigation and stabilization and control is included on the display.
3-16
It will be updated as additional data are analyzed and will beavailable for easy reference by Board Mem-
bers.
(5) Dr. Thompson requested that Board Members have their Panel Chairmen submit work require-
ments and priorities in writing to the Panel Coordination Committee so a schedule can be developed.
(6) Colonel Borman reported that the Debris Removal Plan, as approved by the Board, had progressed
satisfactorily. The next phase will involve the use of protective covers (plywood) for the couches so
detailed examinations of the C/M interior can be accomplished.
(7) Proposed Action Items 0025 - 0027 were presented and approved by the Board.
(8) Procedures to further control entry to the Command Module, Launch Complex 34 and the Pyro-
technic Installation Building were approved by the Board.
(9) Dr. Homer Carhart, Chief of Fuels Research, Chemistry Division, Naval Research Laboratory,
Washington, D. C., was assigned to the Fire Propagation Panel.
(10) Dr. Thompson appointed the following as Representatives to the Board: Brig. General C. H.
Bolender, USAF and Mr. Charles Mathews, NASA, Washington, D.C.; Dr. Joseph F. Shea and Dr. G.
Fred Kelly (M.D.), MSC; Mr. Rocco Petrone, KSC; Lt. Colonel William D. Baxter, Air Force Eastern
Test Range.
February 4, 1967
(1) Dr. Thompson asked the Board Members to support the Public Information Office (PIO) in ob-
taining photographs to keep the public informed of activities and progress.
(2) A system was established to ensure that all recommendations and offers of assistance received
by NASA, regardless of source, be referred to the Review Board for appropriate action and acknowledg -
ment.
(3) A draft report of the use of internal/external power on the C/M was distributed by Dr. Faget
for the Board's information.
(4) Dr. Thompson stated that the list of advisory groups (Representatives, Observers, Liaison,
Consultants) is being prepared. The individuals assigned to these advisory groups Will be identified
within their respective organizations and by position held in that organization.
(5) Dr. Thompson directed Mr. Williams to develop an overall master plan including important
milestones and estimated time frames. He called a meeting following today's General Board Session to
discuss this with Mr. Williams and some of his committee members.
(6) Mr. Scott Simpkinson, Panel 4 Chairman, presented and distributed the disassembly schedule.
He estimated removal of the couches from C/M 012 by 5:00 a.m., and installation of the false floorby
12:00, February 5. This false floor was installed in C/M 014 last night as an exercise prior to having
it installed in C/M 012.
(7) Colonel Borman asked for and was permitted release of the impounded flight suits of the backup
crew for use in an egress test. The Board will view this test in the Simulator Building, Sunday, February
5, at 10:00 a.m.
261-I01 O- 67- 5 3 - ] 7
February 5, 1967
(1) Members, Consultants and Observers of the Board visited the Spacecraft Simulator. The simu-
lator performs many functions including navigation, earth observation and inflight procedures. At the time
of the visit three astronauts were practicing inflight emergency procedures. One of the procedures was
donning the space suits. This was carefully timed and required a total of 12 minutes to perform the task.
Two astronauts gave a detailed briefing on the composition, function and operating procedures for all
components of the space suit. The Board Members also inspected the inside of the simulator which is
configured to duplicate Spacecraft 012 in most areas.
0
(2) Dr. Thompson, Mr. Geer and Mr. Malley departed for Langley Research Center, Virginia. They
are scheduled to return in the late afternoon on February 6, 1967. In accordance with Dr. Thompson's
previous instructions, Colonel Strang served as Acting Chairman of the Board.
(3) Representatives of the Board visited Launch Complex 34 and made a very detailed inspection
of movable platforms A-7 and A-8 which surrounded the Apollo Spacecraft. During this inspection,
the installation of the false floor in the Command Module was observed. Since removal of the astronauts'
couches a false floor was constructed and suspended from the Command Module ceiling and entrance
hatch. This will facilitate inspection of the floor of the module without disturbing any evidence of the
fire damage.
February 6, 1967
(1) Colonel Strang, acting for Dr. Thompson, conducted the General Session.
(2) The Master Plan Milestone Display was distributed and explained by Mr. Williams. The Systems
Integration Panel will prepare a Phase "A" plan today and submit same for Board approval. The Board
Members were asked to review this Master Plan with their Panel Chairmen and provide comments to Dr.
Thompson.
(B) Lt. Colonel Baxter reported the status of the Witness Statements as of 10:g0 a.m., February 6.
There were 90 statements; the original package distributed on February 2, the first addition on February
3 and the third and fourth addition on February 4 and 6 respectively. The distribution list is amended
to include copies for Panels 6, 14, 17 and 18.
(4) Mr. Jeffs announced that a team made up of representatives of AiResearch and North American
Aviation, Inc., arrived at KSC on February 6 to inspect the Command Module and to propose further action
relative to the Environmental Control Unit (ECU) and Environmental Control System (ECS).
(5) Reconsideration was requested of Action Item 0007, Medical Data Acquisition System Removal,
that was presented to the Board on February 1 and deferred at that time. Technicians are now prepared
to remove the tape recorder from the C/M and remove the tapes for analysis. Action Item 0028 was di's-
tributed to the Board. Approval was granted for work to proceed on both Items 0007 and 0028, providing
that appropriate members of Panels 4 and 5 are present.
(6) Colonel Strang stated that Dr. Thompson had requested that the "Life Sciences" part of the
Final Report include an analysis of the escape system and appropriate re-design recommendations.
This system falls within the purview of the Ground Emergency Procedures Review Panel 13, the In-flight
Fire Emergency Provisions Review Panel 20 and the Design Review Panel 9 in addition to the Medical
Analysis Panel 11. Dr. G. Fred Kelly, Chairman of Panel 11, was requested to coordinate and interface
the findings of the above Panels.
3-18
February 7, 1967
(1) The Board received a detailed preliminary report from Mr. Pinkel, a Member of the Fire Propaga-
gation Panel. This report described the areas of the Command Module (C/M)which received the greatest
fire damage, the most probable fire paths and a description of combustible material in the C/M. He
stated the oxygen available in the C/M would permit burning of only 12- 15 lbs. of combustible material.
Solid combustible materials used in the C/M includes plastics in the nylon, polyurethane and silicone
rubber class. The liquid coolant ethylene glycol could also become a fuel if it escaped from the closed
coolant system. Additional inspections and investigations are required by this Panel to develop con-
clusive findings.
(2) Request for approval of Action Items 0029 through 0052, approved by the Board at the Executive
Sessions held February 6 and 7 were read for the record by Mr. Williams.
(3) A technical team from AiResearch Company and North American Aviation, Inc., under NASA
supervision, completed an inspection of the Environment Control Unit in C/M 012, preparatory to develop-
ing a removal plan. The plan will be coordinated with the appropriate Panels.
(4) The Board approved the Master Planning Schedule of the Board's activities as submitted by Mr.
Williams on February 6, 1967.
(5) The Board approved the procedures for material testing and analysis. These procedures estab-
lish specific channels for all agencies involved in testing and analysis. Included in the channel were
several check points to ensure the establishment of adequate control.
(6) A new Panel 21, Service Module Disposition, has been formed. This Panel will plan and
execute the necessary Service Module activities. The Panel will obtain Board approval for the demating
of the Command and Service Modules.
February 8, 1967
(1) The Chairman reviewed and re-emphasized the Board's charter as amplified in a memorandum
from Dr. Seamans dated February 3, 1967. In consonance with guidance contained therein, he also de-
fined the relationship of the personnel supporting the Board, i.e., Representatives, Consultants, Liaison,
Observers, the Secretariat and Panel Chairmen.
(2) The batteries used for reentry power were removed from the C/M after approval by the Board.
There was no indication that these batteries contributed to the mishap.
(3) It was agreed that each system in the C/M would be removed individually, inspected and eval-
uated. However, each system will be removed only after it is conclusively determined it did not con -
tribute to the source of ignition and is no longer required to evaluate interface with other systems and
the Service Module.
(4) As a result of the interest shown by the Apollo 204 Review Board in the film, "Aircraft Wire
Harness Fires," Manned Spacecraft _Center (MSC) has been requested to conduct research on the pheno-
mena shown in the film. The research will attempt to determine the validity of the wet wire phenomena
as related to the type of wires used in the C/M when exposed to wide range of checkout and mission
environments, including 100 per cent oxygen.
(5) Proposed Action Items 0053 through 0063 were presented and approved by the Board.
3-19
(6) It was brought up by Mr. C. Mathews that fairly heavy activity might take place in the area of
testing systems and components as they are moved from the C/M to the plants of prime contractor and
vendors. Discussion followed resulting in a requirement for the Board to determine who should accompany
this material, i.e., representatives from NASA, NAA, subcontractors and/or an independent representative.
An ad hoc committee was called to meet with Mr. Malley at 1:00 p.m. today to prepare a recommendation
for the Board on this matter.
February 9, 1967
(1) A standardized diagram of various Apollo Command Module views was distributed for use b_,
Panel members and for reference in the Final Report.
(2) A method for controlled handling of accident material for testing, analysis, etc., was approv?d
by _he Board. This applies to tests at both Kennedy Space Center and material sent off- site.
(3) The Chairman of each Panel presented a briefing to the Board on Panel accomplishments, future
plans and, in a few cases, specific findings.
(4) A detailed report on the initial assessment of structural damage of the Command Module was
presented to the Review Board. This report was based upon a visual inspection only. A more complete
assessment of structural damage is to be accomplished in conjunction with the removal of each system.
(5) Proposed Action Items 0064 through 0080 were presented and approved by the Board subject
to certain clarifications.
February 10, 1967
(1) Dr. Seamans and staff members attended the meetings at KSC this date. Short presentations
were made to them on plans for the Final Report, fire propagation, photographic control, data integration
and medical analysis. These officials also visited the Pyrotechnic Installation Building (PIB) and other
areas under the Review Board's jurisdiction.
(2) The Chairman advised that Panel reports will be signed by Panel Chairmen only. Board Monitors
of Panels were requested to assume the responsibility for assuring minority views are given proper con-
sideration. If serious differences are not resolved they are to be includedin Panel reports for the Board's
consideration.
(3) The Chairman emphasized to the Board Members who are Panel Monitors that copiesof all Panel
reports should be forwarded to the, Panel 18 Integration Analysis for coordination and integration.
(4) A report on the assessment of manning requirements to assure proper implementation of tasks and
to meet present schedules was requested of Board Monitors for each Panel. This assessment is due
Tuesday morning, February 14.
(5) Following the adjournment of the Board meeting, a film was shown of approximately 10 minutes
duration depicting Flammability of Paraffin at zero g in 100% Oxygen.
(6) Proposed Action Items 0081 and 0084 through 0107 were considered by the Board and approved.
Note: Numbers 0082 and 0083 were not used.
February 11 and 12, 1967
(1) No formal meetings of the Board were conducted. Investigation continued on C/M and on debris
and components that had been removed to the PIB._
3 -20
(2) Reviews of work progress were conducted individually by Board Members.
February 13, 1967
(1) A nine-minute film, recently completed at MSC on C/M 008, was shown. This film was the re-
sult of a photographic study of what could be seen through the hatch window by a TV monitor, with vary-
ing degrees of external and internal lighting. This film will be available for correlation with eye witness
accounts.
(2) Dr. Thompson advised that a meeting of the Board and Deputy Administrator, NASA, has been
scheduled for February 22, 1967. The meeting will be primarily concerned with interim reports of the
Panels.
(3) Dr. Thompson requested the Office of Manned Space Flight, Marshall Space Flight Center, Ken-
nedy Space Center and Manned Spacecraft Center to provide the Board a detailed description of their
responsibilities and organizational relationships and alignment in the Apollo program. This information
will be used to perform a review of the Apollo Program organization.
(4) Proposed Action Items 0108 through 0112 were considered and approved by the Board.
(5) Dr. Van Dolah was requested to prepare a report by February 15, 1967, on flame propagation, for
submission to Dr. Seamans.
(6) A group of specially built tables have been placed in the main bay of the Pyrotechnic Instal-
lation Building. Items removed from C/M 012 are displayed on these tables to permit required inspections
without handling.
(7) It was decided by the Board to have special studies of the space suits conducted by the manu-
facturer and Manned Spacecraft Center's Crew Systems Division. This would enable the Board to obtain
expert opinions regarding possible contributing factors to the accident and to gain information regarding
future space suit design.
(8) Dr. Thompson reported that seven people from Marshall Space Flight Center and one person from
Langley Research Center had arrived to support various Panels.
February 14, 1967
(1) The Chairman read excerpts from the report of the "Apollo Accident Hearing Before the Commit-
tee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, February 7, 1967."
He emphasized the importance being given this review by that Committee and the responsibility of the
Board to respond promptly and completely to the Administrator.
(2) Selected Board Members and Panel Chairmen were instructed to prepare an interim report on
actions to date with significant information and tentative findings. The Board will conduct a critique of
the material to be presented on February 19, 1967. On February 22, 1967, the interim report will be pre-
sented to Dr. Seamans. The content and order of this briefing will be: (a) Board Organization and In-
vestigation Techniques, Colonel Strang; (b) Description and Course of Fire, Mr. Pinkel; (c) Background,
Mr. White; (d) Analysis and Tests in Pursuit of Cause, Dr. Faget; (e) Tentative Findings and Prelimi-
nary Recommendations, Colonel Borman.
(3) Dr. Van Dolah presented a report on the propagation of fire and tentative findings of Panel 5 for
submission to Dr.. Seamans.
(4) The removal of systems from the C/M has progressed satisfactorily. As a result, the C/M is
scheduled to be removed from the Launch Vehicle on Friday, February 17, 1967. This action coincides
3 -21
with the Master Planning Schedule developed by the Review Board on February 7, 1967.
February 15, 1967
(1) Dr. Thompson received a letter dated February 10, 1967 from Dr. Seamans. The letter empha-
sized the importance of the investigation and transmitted copies of four letters from Senator Anderson
to the Administrator, NASA, concerning the investigation. In essence, these letters state that _he Senate
Committee expects to be advised on a recurring basis as to the findings of Apollo Review Board.
(2) The Board received a detailed briefing on the recorded anomalies prior to and during the accident,
These anomalies were transmitted by the C/M telemetry system to several recording stations. The pria-
ciple anomalies were: _.
a. Communication difficulties
b. High flow rate in oxygen system
c. Disruption of alternating current
d. Telemetry readings from a disconnected gas chromatograph connector
e. Change in gimbal angle of the inertial measurement unit which may indicate movement in
the C/M
At the conclusion of this briefing, direction was given to conduct further analysesand testingin
an effort to obtain specific conclusions.
(3) A briefing and written report on Astro-Communication Circuits was presented to the Board.
February 16, 1967
(1) The task of removing the Command Module from the Space Vehicle was approved by the Board.
Extensive photograph (motion and still) of this task was accomplished for review by the Board and pos-
sible release to the Press.
(2) Colonel Borman suggested the work schedule be reduced to a 2-shift, 6-day week, rather than
the 3-shift, 7-day week, which has been in effect since the accident on January 27, 1967. This sug-
gestion was approved and will be implemented after the C/M is positioned in the bonded area of the
Pyrotechnic Installation Building (PIB) on February 17, 1967.
February 17, 1967
(2) The Board met with the Panel Chairmen to review the Panel preliminary reports. These reports
will be used as a basis for preparation of the briefing for Dr. Seamans, February 22, 1967.
(3) Material Release Record Items 0001 through 0056 have been considered and approved by the
Board. This system provides a formal and controlled means of releasing for normal program use various
hardware, software, spares, tools and expendable supplies that were impounded at the time of the accident
3 --22
and have been determined not to be related to the accident.
(4) The Command Module was separated from the Service Module and moved to the PIB where dis-
assembly and investigation will continue.
February .18, 1967
(1) To clarify the content of the interim report briefing for Dr. Seamans, Colonel Strang presented
an outline to the Board for approval. The outline was approved.
(2) In addition to the briefing for Dr. Seamans on February 22, 1967, the interim report briefing will
be presented on February 21, 1967 to Dr. Mueller and his staff. Both briefings will be given at Kennedy
Space Center.
(3) Panel summary reports were distributed to Board Members and Panel Chairmen. Dr. Thompson
cautioned on the distribution control of these reports.
(4) Proposed Action Items 0148 and 0149 were considered and approved by the Board.
February 19, 1967
(1) The Board met to further develop the briefing for Dr. Seamans. Each speaker made an initial
presentation using visual aids. Additions and corrections were discussed.
February 20, 1967
(1) The Board approved a plan for removing the Service Module from the Launch Vehicle. The actual
removal was scheduled for February 21, 1967, whereupon the Service Module will be transported to the
Manned Spacecraft Operations Building at KSC for detailed examination and testing.
(2) Dr. Thompson directed that a plan be developed to release Launch Complex 34 to Kennedy Space
Center for normal use, following removal of the Service Module.
(3) Proposed Action Items 0150 and 0151 were considered and approved by the Board.
(4) Preparations are being made to remove the heat shield from the Command Module so that the
floor of the Command Module can be inspected from the lower side.
February 91, 1967
(1) A briefing on the significant information, tentative findings and preliminary recommendations as
developed',by the Apollo 204 Review Board, was presented to Apollo Program officials by Board Members.
The officials attending this briefing included: Dr. George E. Mueller, NASA, Washington, D. C., Dr. Kurt
H. Debus, KSC, Dr. Robert R. Gilruth, MSC, Dr. Wernher Von Braun, MSFC, Major General Samuel C.
Phillips, USAF, NASA, Washington, D. C., Brig. General C. H. Bolender, USAF, NASA, Washington, D.C,
Lt. General Frank A. Bogart, USAF (Ret.), NASA, Washington, D.C., Major General Julian B. Bowman,
USAF (Ret.), NASA, Washington, D. C., Mr. Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., MSC, Mr. George A. Low, MSC.
These officials were accompanied by key staff personnel. In addition to the Board, Panel Chairmen and
Representatives to the Board were in attendance. The briefing was a preview of that to begiven to Dr.
Seamans on February 22, 1967. The Apollo Program officials and their staffs were expressly invited by
Dr. Thompson.
3 -23
(2) Proposed Action Item 0152 was considered and approved by the Board.
(3) Material Release Record Items 0057 through 0072 were considered and approved by the Board,
(4) Mr. Ashmun Brown, Office of Chief Counsel, KSC, was assigned to assist the Counsel to the
Board.
February22, 1967
(1) The formal briefing on the progress of the Apollo 204 Review Board was presented to Dr.,Seamans.
This briefing was generally similar to the one given on February 21, 1967 to Apollo Program officials,,
who were also in attendance on February 22, 1967. Additionally, Dr. Charles A. Berry (M. D.), Dr.
Joseph F. Shea, Mr. Donald K. Slayton and Captain Walter H. Schirra, Jr., USN, of MSC; and Mr. David
Williamson of Dr. Seamans' staff, attended the briefing.
(2) Dr. Thompson announced to the Board in general session that a survey showed some 1500 people
were directly supporting the investigation. This number, which is considered quite conservative, in-
cluded 600 personnel from the NASA, Air Force, Navy, Department of the Interior and other Government
agencies; and 900 personnel from industry and universities.
(4) Material Release Record Items 0073 through 0103 were considered and approved by the Board.
February 23, 1967
(1) The Apollo Program officials, under the chairmanship of Dr. Mueller, briefed Dr. Seamans and
the Apollo 204 Review Board. In attendance were those who received the Review Board briefing on Feb-
ruary 22, 1967. The briefings included a status report of the Apollo Program, special tests being con-
ducted or planned as a result of the accident and proposed actions relative to the tentative findings of
the Review Board.
(2) Dr. Thompson, Colonel Borman and Dr. Van Dolah accompanied Dr. Seamans to Washington,
D. C., to brief the Honorable James E. Webb, Administrator, NASA on the tentative findings and pre-
liminary recommendations of the Board.
(3) Upon the departure of Dr. Thompson, Colonel Strang assumed the responsibilities of Acting
Chairman. A plan was approved to consolidate three Panels into a single Panel. This consolidation of
Panels 3, 16 and 18 will permit better utilizationof personnel.
(4) The Spacecraft/Lunar Module Adapter (SLA) was removed from the Saturn Launch Vehicle and
transported to the Manned Spacecraft Operations Building for investigation.
February 24, 1967
(1) Colonel Strang conducted a special meeting of the Board and Panel Chairmen to ascertain the
status of each Panel's final report. He emphasized that the reports should be sufficiently detailed to
enable the Board to arrive at sound, appropriate recommendations. He also stressed that findings
should apply not only to proximate causes of accident, but to any deficiency that could adversely af-
fect the Apollo Program.
3 -24
(2) The Board approved the release of Launch Complex 34 through Level 4 to KSC for operations.
The Board will continue to control access to Levels 5 through 8, (Material Release Record (MRR)Item
0123). MRR Items 0104 through 0122 were also approved.
(3) Dr. Thompson, Colonel Borman and Dr. Van Dolah met at NASA Headquarters with the Honorable
James E. Webb, Administrator, and Dr. Seamans, to present the Apollo 204 Review Board interim findings.
February 25, 1967
1. Members of the Board visited the PIB to view the Environmental Control Unit removed from C/M
012.
2. Panel work plans and schedules for accomplishment of tasks and submission of final reports were
reviewed by the Board. Dr. Thompson emphasized that Panel Chairmen will not be released from
their responsibilities until the Board has formally accepted their respective reports. A memorandum to
this effect will be sent all Panel Chairmen. Specific comment will be included requesting submission of
final reports as soon as possible.
3. Following the Executive Session, Dr. Thompson, Colonel Borman, Dr. Faget, Dr. Van Dolah, Mr.
Geer and Mr. White departed for their respective parent organizations. They are scheduled to return
to KSC on February 28, 1967. During their absence, the Panels will continue to perform their investi-
gation functions and Colonel Strang will be Acting Chairman of the Board as previously designated.
February 26, 27, 28, 1967
1. In the absence of Dr. Thompson and other Members of the Board, no formal meetings were con-
ducted.
2. Panels continued to conduct their portions of the investigation. The disassembly of the Command
Module and detailed analysis of components was accomplished as scheduled in the master plan. Several
Panels initiated preparation of their final reports.
3. Proposed Action Item 0163, Service Module Investigation Plan, was approved by Col. Strang, due
to its urgency, on February 27.
4. All Members of the Board, with the exception of Dr. Van Dolah, returned to KSC at approxi-
mately 6:30 p.m., February 28, 1967.
5. Initial visual inspection and X-ray analysis of the Environmental Control Unit was completed on
February 28, 1967. The unit was moved from the PIB to the Life Support Building for disassembly
and detailed analysis.
March 1, 1967
1. Dr. Thompson announced to the Board that a memorandum from Dr. Seamans, dated February
27, 1967, had been received designating the Director, Langley Research Center, the Custodian of
Apollo 204 Review Board Material.
2. A general discussion was held (in Executive Session) regarding the future activities of the Panels
and other Board activities, with the objective of developing assurance that the Board's Final Report
will be completed by the end of March. An additional objective was to establish a mode of operation
whereby the Board will be able to effect an orderly reduction of its activities at KSC, eventually re-
3 -25
cess, and finally recommend to the Administrator that the Board be disbanded. Dr. Thompson re-
marked that certain tests and analyses which were stimulated by the Board's activities may more ap-
propriately be of prime interest and concern to the Apollo Program Office. Such tests and analyses
would not be followed in detail by the Board, however, the Board will require reports from the Pro-
gram Office on the results so that the Final Report Appendix E, may include a statement of the re-
suits.
3. Dr. Faget presented a plan for the screening of removed equipment that is intended to reduce the
amount of effort and time required to investigate and analyze equipment from Spacecraft 012. This
plan was discussed by the Board and it was agreed that the Panel Coordination Committee establish
an ad hoc group to perform the screening as proposed in the plan. The Panel Coordincatidn Com-
mittee will report back to the Board on this activity.
4. Dr. Thompson announced that General Sessions would henceforth be held on Monday, Wednesday,
and Friday of each week. Executive Sessions will continue on a daily schedule.
5. Proposed Action Items 0158 through 0162 and 0164 through 0167 were considered and approved by
the Board. Item 0163 had previously been approved by Col. Strang.
6. Material Release Record Items 0127 through 0137 were considered and approved by the Board. Items
0124 through 0126 had previously been approved for release.
7. Following the Geners 1 Session, the Board viewed a film on fire propagation tests conducted at MSC
in a boilerplate mock-up of the Command Module.
March 2, 1967
1. Proposed Action Items 0168 and 0169 were considered and approved by the Board.
2. Material Release Record Items 0138 through 0141 were considered and approved by the Board.
March 3, 1967
1. All material from the Command Module will be retained by the Board and will be designated Cate-
gory A or B. Items in Category A are those that are damaged, or identified as suspect and/or assoc-
iated with anomalies. Category B Items are those that appear to be absolved of association with the
incident. They (Category B) will be eligible for use by the Apollo Program Office for nondestructive
testing; however, the Board will require copies of all test reports. An Administrative Procedure will be
released on this matter.
2. Col. Borman reported that the disassembly of the Command Module was expected to be complete
by March 10, 1967. An around-the-clock work schedule was approved for the removal of the heat-
shield.
3. The Board met with the Panel Chairmen to discuss final Panel report content and submission sched-
ule. Tests that are not complete, when the Panel reports are submitted, will subsequently be integrated
into the Final Board Report.
March 4, 5, 1967
1. Material Release Record Items 0142 through 0144, and 0146, were considered and approved by the
Board. Item 0145 was held in abeyance pending further action.
2. Board Members reviewed transcripts and other material for inclusion in the Final Report.
3 - 26
March 6, 1967
1. Mr. Mardel, Chairman, Panel 18, reported on an arc indication that was found on the Lower
Equipment Bay junction box cover plate. A metallurgical analysis on the cover plate will be accom-
plished. Investigation will continue in an effort to identify and remove the wire that appears to have
caused the arc.
2. Mr. Simpkinson, Chairman, Panel 4, presented a status report on the disassembly plan. Approval
was granted by the Board to start removal of the heat-shield.
3. Proposed Action Items 0170 through 0177 were considered and approved by the Board.
4. Material Release Record Item 0147 was considered and approved by the Board.
March 7, 1967
1. The aft heat shield was removed from C/M 012 in accordance with the master plan for disassembly.
Close inspection of the C/M disclosed that the rupture in the floor extended approximately 2/3 around
its circumference. This is much greater than originally estimated.
3. The Board viewed a 30 minute film entitled "Apollo Mock-up Flame Propagation, Test No. 2".
The Test was conducted in a biolerplate Apollo mock-up at MSC on March 4, 1967. The Board
concluded that this was a valid test procedure for assessment of flame propagation, and to qualify
materials for use in the spacecraft.
4. A general discussion was held on the subject of subsystem and component design as relatedto the
ability to ensure that such hardware may be installed and subsequently maintained in a manner consistent
with established quality control procedures.
March 8, 1967
1. Dr. Faget gave a follow-up report on analysis of the arc indication on the Lower Equipment Bay
junction box cover plate. The plate has been delivered to KSC Material Analysis Laboratory. In
addition to the analysis of the arc indication, analysis will also be made of molten material found on
the bottom of the plate.
2. Col. 'Strang briefed the Board on a proposed procedure for screening and processing final Panel
Reports. Initial review and editing will be accomplished by Final Board Report Panel 17. After pre-
liminary editing, the reports will be amended as necessary and distributed to each Board Member and
Counsel for review. Panel Chairmen will then meet with the Board for oral erview, critique and accept-
ance of the report, or additional actions as necessary. The procedure was accepted by the Board.
3. A progress report on status of test analysis was presented to the Board. A total of 104 tests have been
identified of which 45 have been closed and 59 remain in the open category.
4. Proposed Action Item 0178 was considered by the Board and approved.
March 9, 1967
1. It was announced that the Crew Heat Shield had been removed from the Command Module, and that a
total of 891 items have been removed to date.
3 -27
2. Proposed Action Item 0179 was considered and approved by the Board.
4. Dr. Faget suggested construction of a simple fixture, in the configuration of the Command Module,
upon which the wire harnesses and bundles removed from C/M 012 can be placed for subsequent
inspection. The study of this or other approaches to implement a detailed inspection of the harnesses
was recommended by Dr. Faget. The Board approved this recommendation.
5. The Board appointed Mr. Robert Bruce, Langley Research Center, as an alternate Board d_ignated
agent for the Environmental Control System (ECS) investigation.
March 10, 1967
1. A report from the Screening Committee was made by Mr. Sasseen. An assessment of activity of the
Committee and a written report were requested for the General Session on March 15, 1967. The crev)
compartment and the aft heat shields have been removed from the C/M and reclassified to Category
B in order to remove the requirement for a special 24-hour guard.
2. Colonel Borman presented the Disassembly report. Command Module (C/M) disassembly activities
are now scheduled to be completed by March 18.
3. A film on Fire Propagation Test 3 conducted in the boilerplate mock-up at Manned Spacecraft
Center (MSC) was shown. The C/M was simulated in Flight Configuration.
4. The Board met with Mr. L. Barnett of Panel 13 to conduct a critical review of that Panel's draft
final report. The Board's comment were noted by Mr. Barnett and corrective and/or amplifying state-
ments will be incorporated in the report.
5. Proposed Material Release Record Items 0155 and 0156 were presented for the Board's consideration
and approved.
March 11, 12, 1967
1. Colonel Strang reported that Panels, 2, 12, 13, 16, 19 and 20 have submitted Final Reports. These
six reports have been distributed to the Board Members for review.
2. Formal Board sessions were not held on March 11 and 12, 1967. The Board Members devoted their
time to study of the final reports from six Panels. Disassembly and analysis continued as scheduled.
March 13, 1967
1. Board Members and Panel Members who received copies of witness statements in connection with
their responsibilities were requested to return all copies to Panel 12 when this material is no longer
needed.
2. A progress report on dismantling the Environmental Control Unit (ECU) was made to the Board
by Mr. Williams. He also presented a proposed modification to Action Item 0153, Command Module
Equipment Removal Plan. Following discussion by the Board, this modification was approved.
3. Mr. Robert Allnutt of NASA Headquarters was introduced by Mr. Malley. Mr. Allnutt, with Mr.
Ashmun Brown, KSC Legal Staff, will assist Mr. Malley in the legal review of the Panel Reports and
the Final Board Report.
3-28
4. The Board met with the following Panel Chairmen to conduct a critical review of their draft final
report: Capt. J. Lovell, Panel 20; N. Vaughn, Panel 12; J. Atkins, Panel 19; G. Stoops, Panel 16.
Each of the reports was accepted subject to editorial corrections.
5. The Board discussed reviews of Panel draft reports not yet received. Colonel Strang reported Panel
15, Final Report, will be available for review on March 13. The Board scheduled a meeting with Panel
5 on March 14. Further scheduling of meetings with Panels will be accomplished as reports are available.
March 14, 1967
1. Dr. Thompson advised that Dr. Gilruth and certain members of his staff will be at KSC on M_rch
20 for the purpose of making a presentation to the Board on the subject of solder joints.
2. Colonel Borman presented the modified Panel 13 report for acceptance. The Board agreed with the
report as modified and requested distribution to the Board Members for a final review.
3. Material Release Record Item 0161 was presented for the Board's consideration and approved. Items
0157, 0158, 0159 and 0160 were approved by Mr. Geer on March 13.
4. The Board met with Panel 21, Service Module Disposition, to review the final Panel Report. The
Report was accepted subject to correction.
March 15, 1967
1. Disassembly of the ECU was completed this date.
2. The Board met with the Chairmen of Panels 5 and 6 for a preliminary review of their final re-
ports.
3. Mr. Eldon E. Mathauser and Mr. Andrew G. Swanson, Langley Research Center, and Mr. Richard
B. Ferguson, Manned Spacecraft Center, were appointed by Dr. Thompson to support the Board in
the capacity of technically reviewing Final Panel Reports.
March 16, 1967
1. The Final Report from Panel 15, Administrative Procedures, was submitted to the Apollo 204 Re-
view Board for individual study by Board members. In a special session the Board accepted the Final
Report of Panel 15, subject to editorial corrections.
2. The Board met with Dr. Charles A. Berry (Chief, Division of Medical Research and Operations, MSC),
Dr. Kelly, and Dr. Hatter for a:briefing on the life sciences portion of the Apollo 204 Review including
the proposed final report of Panel 11, Medical Analysis. In addition to the Board Members, Mr. Malley,
Counsel to the Board and Mr. Robert F. Allnutt, Assistant to the Counsel, were in attendance.
March 17, 1967
1. During the General Session, discussion was conducted by Dr. Thompson with the Panel Chairmen
on preparation of their Final Reports and responsibilities of the Apollo 204 Review Board.
2. Mr. Simpkinson, Chairman of Panel 4, Disassembly Activities, reported on the status of C/M Dis,
assembly. It is now scheduled for completion by March 22, 1967.
3 - 29
3. Colonel Borman presented MRR Items 0162 - 0166 which were approved.
4. Mr. Sasseen gave an interim report for the Screening Committee. Their report is expected to be
completed by March 24, 1967.
5. Mr. Williams presented proposed Action Item 0180, whih was considered and approved.
6. The Board met with the Chairman of Panel 8, Materials Review, to review the Final Panel Report.
It was suggested that one additional test be accomplished, and reviewed by the Board prior to accept-
ance by the Board.
7. Colonel Strang discussed the selection of photographs for inclusion in the Panel reports and the Final
Board Report. The photographs selected thus far were made available for review by the Board.
8. Mr. Simpkinson was appointed Special Assistant to the Board for technical matters pertaining to
preparation of the Final Report.
March 18, 19, 1967
1. The Board met with the Chairmen of Panel 1, S/C and GSE Configuration; Panel 5, Origin and
Propagation of Fire; Panel 10, Analysis of Fracture Areas; and Panel 14, Security of Operations, to
review their Final Panel Reports. The reports were accepted subject to correction.
2. Material Release Record Items 0167 - 0192 were approved by the Board.
March 20, 1967
1. Col. Strang presented a progress report on the Final Panel Reports. As of March 19, 1967, Reports
from the following Panels have been received and accepted by the Board, subject to editorial correct-
ions: Panels 1, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21. The Board accepted, subject to editorial
correction, the findings and determinations of Panel 5.
2. The Deputy Administrator, NASA, designated Langley Research Center as the custodian of all mat-
erials dealing with the investigation and review of the Apollo 204 Accident. The Chairman of the Board,
who has the responsibility of determining the materials that are to be included in the final repository,
has determined that the following categories of materials are to be preserved:
1. Reports, files, and working materials.
2. Medical reports.
3. Spacecraft 012 Command Module, its systems, components, and related drawings.
Category 1 will be stored at Langley Research Center, Category 2 at Manned Spacecraft Center and
Category 3 at Kennedy Space Center.
As long as the materials are under the jurisdiction of the Board, access to materials shall be in accord-
ance with the Board's policy. When the Langley Research Center assumes custody of the materials,
access will be in accordance with the policy established by the Director, Langley Research Center.
3. Dr. Van Dolah reported on a test being made in C/M 014 to attempt to determine the amount of
static electricity that may be generated by a suited crewman.
4. Mr. Williams presented proposed Action Items 0181 and 0182. Explanatory comments were made
by Dr. Van Dolah on Item 0181. Mr. Sasseen made distribution of a memorandum, subject: "Plan
of Action for AC Inverter 2" relative to Action Item 0182. Both of these Action Items were approved
by the Board.
3 - 30
5. Colonel Borman presented MRR Item #0193 for consideration. This item was approved by the Board.
6. Prior to the Executive Session, the Board met with Dr. Robert R. Gilruth, Director, MSC, and
members of his staff, plus management and engineering personnel from North American Aviation, Inc.
for a presentation on the subject of solder joints in the Command Module.
March 21, 1967
1. The Board reviewed and accepted, subjected to editorial correction, the Panel 4 Final Report. The
Final Reports from Panels 7 and 11 were submitted to the Board for review.
2. The Board Chairman appointed Mr. F. E. Eastman (MSC) as the Board's agent to witness activities
associated with removal, transportation, disassembly, and testing of the Static Inverter 2, S/N 09240
ML 0088, in accordance with Apollo Spacecraft Hardware Utilization Request 012503 dated March
21, 1967.
3. MRR Items 0194-0199 were presented for consideration and approved by the Board.
March 22, 1967
1. The Apollo 204 Review Board witnessed a demonstration on the removal of C/M crew hatches.
The demonstration was conducted in the PIB using a mock-up C/M. The purpose of the demonstra-
tion was to provide the Review Board a thorough understanding of hatch removal both from the inside
and outside of the C/M. Following this demonstration the Board went to the ACE Control Room
(MSOB) to get first-hand knowledge of the operations that are carried out there.
2. Major Butler, in Colonel Strang's absence, presented a progress report on the Final Panel Reports.
As of March 21, 1967, the Board has reviewed and accepted, subject to editorial corrections, the Final
Reports of Panels 4, 5, and 11. The Final Reports from Panels 15, 16, 17, 19 and 21 have been sub-
mitted for printers copies. The Final Reports from Panels 10, 13, 14 and 20, presently being edited,
are scheduled for submittal to the printers by early March 23.
3. Dr. Faget distributed a report on the updated status of the analysis of items under investigation by
Panel 18. To date there are 105 items; 27 remain open and 78 are closed. None of the closed items
fall into the category, "May have caused the accident."
March 23, 1967
1. The Board met with the Chairman and Members of Panel 7 to review the Panel's Final Report.
The Report was returned for further action prior to acceptance.
March 24, 1967
1. The Board met with Panels 9 and 6 to review their Final Reports. These meetings required the full
day, therefore, the General Session which had been scheduled for 10:30 a.m. was postponed.
2. MRR Item" 0200 was considered by the Board and approved.
3. The Board will recess at 1:30 p.m., March 25 until 8:00 a.m., March 28. Regular activity of the
Board will be discontinued during that period; however, Panel Report preparation and detailed testing
and analysis will continue.
3-31
March 25, 1967
1. The Board met with the Chairman and Members of Panel 18 for a brief preliminary review of their
Report. The Board also met with the Chairman and Members of Panel 2 to review that Panel's Final
Report. The Report was accepted, subjected to incorporation of corrections and amplifying statements.
2. The Board reported that all Panel Reports have been reviewed. A second review of the Reports from
Panels 5, 9 and 18 will be accomplished next week.
3. The Board recessed until 8:00 a.m., March 28.
March 28, 1967
1. The Board was in recess from March 25 at 1:00 p.m. until March 28 at 8:00 a.m., however, work
continued in the preparation of Panel Reports.
2. Colonel Strang made the following report on the progress and preparation of the Final Reports:
A follow-on review by the Board of Final Reports from Panels 3, 5, 7, 9, 12 and 18 is required.
The Panel 18 Report will be available for Board review at 8:00 a.m., March 29. The Board sched-
uled a meeting with Panel 18 for 1:00 p.m., March 29 to conduct a critical review of their Report.
It is tentatively planned that the Board will review Final Reports with Panels 7 and 9 on March 30.
Reviews with Panels 3, 5 and 12 will also be scheduled.
Eleven Panel Reports have been submitted for varityping. Final Reports from Panels 4, 10, 14,
16, 17, 19 and 21 plus Parts I and II of the Final Report and General Session Minutes were distrib-
uted by Col. Strang. This material is to be reviewed by the Board Members and Counsel prior to
printing of the Final Report.
Specific assignments have been made regarding preparation of a narrative describing the Spacecraft
012 test sequences and their objectives, the time line of events from start of the T-10 hold through
medical determination of death and the investigation and analysis activities of the Board.
3. Mr. Malley discussed preparation of findings, determinations and recommendations. He also stated
that if corrections are made after varityping, they can be included in the Final Report as Addenda
and Corrigenda.
4. Dr. Thompson asked for a report on PIB activity. Colonel Borman introduced MRR Items 0201,
0202 and 0203 which were considered by the Board and approved. Disassembly of the Spacecraft was
completed on March 27 during the first shift. 1241 items are logged in as having gone through the
Bond Room for display to Review Board and Panel personnel. Of these, approximately 1000 came from
the C/M.
5. The Final Report of the Screening Committee was distributed by Mr. Sasseen to the Board Mem-
bers for their review. Mr. Sasseen stated that the following eight items will be retained in Category
A:
Lower Equipment Bay Junction Box Cover Plate
Command Pilot's Torso Harness
Velcro and Raschel Netting
Static Inverter 2
Main Display Control Panel 8
Instrumentation Data Distribution Panel J800/J850
Octopus Cable
6. Dr. Faget advised that LiOH cartridge has been sent to MSC for analysis. Mr. Callahan of OMSF
was appointed courier to handcarry this Item to MSC. Mr. R. S. Johnston has been designated the
Board's witness for the analysis. MSC's Crew Systems Laboratory will perform the analysis and provide
3 - 32
the Board with a report. Objective of the analysis will be to identify contaminants in the LiOH and
to determine the quantity of CO 2 in the LiOH.
7. Members of the Board and other interested personnel viewed a demonstration in the Spacecraft
Mock-up at the PIB of hatch removal conducted by NAA personnel who performed this function at
the time of the accident.
8. Mr. William D. Mangan, LaRC, Office of the Chief Counsel, joined the Legal Staff supporting the
Board.
March 29, 1967
1. The Board Members met with Panel 18 to conduct a critical review of the Panel 18 Report.
2. Colonel Strang reviewed the status of Final Report preparation. The Board scheduled a review
meeting with Panel 9 for March 20 at 9:00 a.m., to be followed by meetings with Panels 7, 6 and 3,
as time permits. The reports from Panels 11 and 12 are being clarified in certain places prior to vari-
typing.
March 30, 1967
1. The Board met with the Chairmen and Members of Panels 9, 7 and 3, to complete acceptance of
their Final Panel Reports.
March 31, 1967
1. Col. Strang made the following report on the status of Final Panel Reports:
Reports from the following Panels have had printer's copies prepared and distributed to the Board
for final review: 4, 10, 14, 16, 17 and 21. Most of these reports have been returned by Board Mem-
bers for final editing and printing.
The following Panel Reports are being processed today for preparation of printer's copies: 3, 5,
7, 11 and 6.
Printer's copies of Panel Reports 1, 13, 15 and 20 are to be distributed to the Board today for
final review.
Final draft copies of Panel Reports 2, 8, 7 and 12 are being reviewed by Board Members. After return
of these reports to Panel 17, they will be processed for preparation of printer's copies and subsequently
distributed to the Board for final review.
The Final Report from Panel 18 is still undergoing rewrite by the Panel.
2. Col. Borman introduced MRR 0204 to release the complete Launch Escape System from Category
A to C. He requested approval for a general MRR to release from Category A to C all parts and
equipment that were not attached to the Spacecraft at the time of the accident. Approval was granted
on both of these items.
4. The Final Report of the Screening Committee was distributed by Mr. Sasseen at the General Sess-
ion for Board review. The Board approved the categorizing of the parts, components and assemblies
of the Spacecraft. Dr. Thompson stated that the Board accepts the report as the basis on which the
handling of these parts, components and assemblies will be followed regarding custody and access to
them.
5. Mr. William E. Guilian, Chief Counsel, Marshall Space Flight Center, has joined the Legal Staff
supporting the Board.
26_-_0_o- 6_- _ 3- 33
6. Dr. Thompson announced that in view of the imminent completion of the Investigation and Final
Report, the March 31 General Session would be the last scheduled meeting of the Board. Any subse-
quent meetings which may be required prior to the time the Board is recessed at the completion of
the Final Report will be called by the Chairman.
3 - 34
February 27, 1967
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR
MEMORANDUM
To: Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board
From: Robert C. Seamans, Jr.

Subject: Custody of Apollo 204 Review Board materials
The Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia, is designated

as the custodian of all pertinent physical evidence, reports, files,
and working materials dealing with the investigations and review of
the Apollo 204 accident.
The Director, Langley Research Center, shall assure that

adequate secure storage and warehousing is made available at
appropriate locations for this purpose. These materials will
be in the final custody of the Director, and access thereto
shall be determined by him or by the general counsel at the
Center as his designee.
The Chairman of the Board shall determine the materials that

are to be included in the final repository and shall arrange for
the most useful disposition of the remaining materials not selected
for final retention.
3-35
3-36
IN REPLY REFER TO
TO : Director, Langley Research Center
FROM : Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board
SUBJECT: Custody of Apollo 204 Review Board Materials
By memorandum dated February 27, 1967, Enclosure 1, the Deputy

Administrator designated Langley Research Center as the custodian of
all materials dealing with the investigations and review of the Apollo
204 accident. The materials are divided into three categories:
. Reports, files and working materials

2. Medical reports
3. Spacecraft 012, its systems and components
Category 1 will be stored at Langley Research Center; Category 2 at

Manned Spacecraft Center; and Category 3 at Kennedy Space Center.
Custodial agents have been designated at the three Centers, Enclosures
2, 3 and 4. Administrative Procedure 23A, Enclosure 5, sets out the
procedure for custodial agents to follow.
It will be the responsibility of the Director, Langley Research Center to

provide suitable secure storage space for the materials, to insure that an
index file is established for location of materials, and, at the appropriate
time, to transfer custody and storage of the materials in accordance with
regulations of the Administrator, General Services Administration.
The provisions of Title 44 U. S. C. § 396 and NMI 1440.1 are applicable.
Dr. FIo_d-C. Thomp_n

i
Enclosures
As Stated
3-37
This page felt blank intentionally.
3-38
IN REPLY REFER TO March 1, 1967
TO: Assistant Chief, Administrative Services Division

Langley Research Center
FROM: Chairman, Apollo 204 Review Board
SUBJECT: Designation of Custodial Agent

204 accident. The Chairman of the Board, having the responsibility
of determining the materials that are to be included in the final repository,
has determined that the following categories of materials are to be pre-
served:
1. Reports, files and working materials
2. Medical reports
. Spacecraft 012 Command Module, its systems,

components and related drawings
Category 1 will be stored at Langley Research Center; Category 2 at Manned

Spacecraft Center; and Category .3 at Kennedy Space Center.
You are designated Custodial Agent of Category 2. The policy and proce-
dures set forth in Apollo 204 Review Board Procedures 5, 21 and 23A,
appended as Enclosures 2, 3 and 4, are applicable.
Dr.,Pf_yd k. Thompson _//

/
Enclosures
as stated
3-39
3-40
TO: Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program Office

Manned Spacecraft Center

served:
2. Medical reports

Category 1 will be stored at Langley Research Center; Category 2 at

Manned Spacecraft Center; and Category 3 at Kennedy Space Center.
dures set forth in Apollo 204 Review Board Procedures 5, 11 and 23A,
appended as Enclosures 2, 3 and 4, are applicable.
This delegation of authority is made with the power of redelegation to a

member of the Spacecraft Program Office.
r ;"F-qo_yd L. T_omps_j("
/
Enclosures
as stated
3-41
3-42
IN REPLY REFER TO
TO: Director, Kennedy Space Center MAR 2 0 1967
SUBJECT: Custody of Apollo 204 Review Board Materials
By memorandum dated February 27, 1967, Enclosure 1, the Deputy Adminis-

trator designated Langley Research Center as the custodian of all materials
dealing with the investigations and review of the Apollo 204 accident. The
materials are divided into three categories:
1. Reports, files, and working materials

2. Medical reports
3. Spacecraft 012 Command Module, its systems, components, and related
drawings.

Spacecraft Center; and Category 3 at Kennedy Space Center. Custodial agents
have been designated for each category, Enclosures 2, 3, and 4. Adminis-
trative Procedure 23A, Enclosure 5, sets out the procedure for custodial agents
to follow.
The Director, KSC, is requested to provide suitable secure storage space for the
Spacecraft 012 Command Module, its systems, components, and related
drawings.
I would appreciate being advised of the nature and location of the proposed
storage area at your earliest convenience.
D.r_(d_e#'L .IThom pson

I/
Enclosure: a/s
3-43
3-44
TO: Director of Medical Research and Operations

Manned Spacecraft Center

served:
2. Medical reports


Spacecraft Center; and Category 3 at Kennedy Space Center.
dures,set forth in Apollo 204 Review Board Procedures 5, 11 and 23A,
appended at Enclosures 2, 3 and 4, are applicable.
This delegation of authority is made with the power of redelegation to a

member of your staff.
k'
Enclosures
as stated
3-45
3-46
February 3, 1967
MEMORANDUM
To : Mr. James E. Webb

Administrator

Subject: Report on Apollo 204 Review Board Discussions
I spent yesterday at the Kennedy Space Center with the Apollo Review
Board and other key personnel involved in the current investigation of
the causes and circumstances of the Apollo 204 accident.
First, there has been no determination of the specific cause of the fire
that resulted in the deaths of Lt. Colonel Grissom, Lt. Colonel White,
and Lt. Commander Chaffee. The retracing of possible, and then of
probable, chains of events in such an accident is a complex task that
is demanding the complete attention of the Review Board headed by Dr.
Floyd Thompson, of the assistants and consultants to the Board, and
of many of the elements of government, industry, and universities
involved in the Apollo program.
The Board is taking full advantage of the extensive taped data available
as well as records made prior to the accident, the present condition of
the spacecraft, and the reports of those involved in the test. All the
physical evidence and data concerned with the test were impounded
immediately following the accident. This was to assure that no perti-
nent information would be lost and that no actions would be taken except
in the full context of all the data available.
As I have stated, the preliminary review of this information has not

provided any direct indication of the origin of the fire; the prelimi-
nary analyses point to the conclusion that a clear identification of the
source of ignition or of its possible source will depend upon detailed
step-by-step examination of the entire spacecraft and its related test
support equipment.
3-47
At present, the spacecraft is still mated to the unfueled launch
vehicle at the pad. However, it is being prepared for removal to
our industrial area where it will be disassembled and where experts
in many technical and scientific areas can work with the physical evidence.
Prior tO disassembly of the damaged spacecraft, an undamaged and nearly
identical (#014) spacecraft will be used to establish the conditions
existing prior to the accident. The 014 spacecraft was flown from
the North American plant in California to Cape Kennedy on February I.
The current plans are to go through a parallel, step-by-step disassembly

process, first working on the undamaged vehicle and then repeating as
closely as possible the procedure on the damaged vehicle.
In addition to analyses of recorded and physical data and equipment,

the Board is defining a series of investigative tasks and is assigning
these to teams for execution. For example, a team is charged with
the chemical and spectrographic analysis of damaged elements aimed at
identifying the propagative history of the fire. Another is working
on relating the propagation history to the flammability characteristics
of the spacecraft materials. Another is dealing with design analyses
and experimental tests to help establish possible ignition sources.
As work progresses and a pattern of information emerges, additional
tasks, analyses, and reviews will undoubtedly be instituted by the
Board.
From information now available to the Board, I had an opportunity to

learn more about certain specific aspects of the simulated mission
and the test sequence itself than we had previously had before us in
a clearly related pattern.
At 6:31:03 pm EST the fire was first detected. The mission

was holding at T-10 minutes. Up to this time there had been
only minor difficulties with the equipment. The purpose of
the hold was to provide an opportunity to improve the communi-
cations between the spacecraft and the ground crew.
Up to this time the cabin pressure, the cabin temperature, and

the oxygen suit supply temperature were nominal. The oxygen rate
of flow into the suits had shown an increase 4 seconds prior to this
time but we have not been able to relate this to the accident.
Lt. Col. White was the only astronaut instrumented for heart rate
and respiration. His heart rate had shown an increase 40 seconds
prior to this time, but at 6:31:03 his heart was at the normal
level for him when in a relaxed prone position.
3-48
The spacecraft was operating on external power. Earlier in
the day, at 9:30 a.m. EST, the system for transfer from external
(ground) power to simulated internal (spacecraft) power had been
tested, and operated normally. The fuel cells in the service
module were not in use, and the so-called internal power was
being supplied by batteries having the same characteristics as
the fuel cells but located external to the spacecraft. If the
accident had not occurred, the transfer from external to simu-
lated internal power would have taken place on resumption of the
count.
At the press conference on Saturday morning, Apollo

Program Director S. C. Phillips was asked whether the
spacecraft was on internal or external power when the
fire occurred. At that time he did not realize that
the spacecraft was still on external power since he had
in mind primarily the eyewitness reports. Subsequent
examination of the data has established the above power
supply sequences. There is no evidence up to this time
that the source of power whether simulated internal or
external was related to the accident.
Lt. Colonel Grissom was the command pilot, sitting in the left
seat; Lt. Colonel White, the senior pilot, sitting in the middle
seat; and Lt. Commander Chaffee, the pilot, was in the right seat.
In the event of emergency, the procedure is for the senior pilot
(White) to reach high over his left shoulder to actuate the inner
hatch release handle, The command pilot (Grissom), after lowering
the center headrest, aids the senior pilot in lifting the inner
hatch and removing it to the floor of the spacecraft. The main
duty of the pilot (Chaffee) during this procedure is to maintain
communication and assist in the removal of the inner hatch if
needed. From the following data, you will note that the crew
appeared to follow the correct procedure.
At 6:31:033 Pilot Chaffee reported that a fire existed in the

spacecraft. At about this time Senior Pilot White's heart rate
started to increase. At 6:31:04 the inertial platform in the
capsule gave an indication of a small amount of motion which may
have been caused by movement of the crew. At 6:31:05 the cabin
temperature began to rise. At 6:31:09 Senior Pilot White repeated
the previous report saying that there was a fire in the cockpit.
At the same time the cabin pressur_ commenced to rise and a larger
amount of motion was indicated by the inertial platform. This
means that the crew were commencing their emergency egress proce-
dure.
261-ioi o- 67- 7 3-_

At 6:31:12, or nine seconds after the first indication of fire,
the cabin temperature started to increase rapidly and pilot
Chaffee reported that a bad fire existed in the cabin. Also
at this time pilot Chaffee increased the illumination of the
cabin lights and actuated the entry (internal) batteries. No
other intelligible communications were received although some
listeners believe there was one sharp cry of pain. Loss of
radio signal occurred a few seconds later.
The oxygen supply to the astronaut suits, which had been holding
nearly constant, pressure and temperature started to fluctuate
at the time of signal loss. At 6:31:17 or fourteen seconds
after the fire was first detected, the cabin pressure reached
a level of approximately 29 psi and the cabin ruptured.
One and one-half minutes after the start of the fire, the ground
power was switched off. Various command module systems con-
tinued to operate on the entry (internal) battery power until
about 12:30 am EST on Saturday when the batteries ran down.
The official death certificates for all three crew members llst the
cause of death as asphyxiation due to smoke inhalation due to the fke.
I would like to emphasize that this report is based on preliminary

information. This information has not as yet been extensively analyzed
by the Apollo Review Board under Dr. Thompson. Since the data were
recorded at a number of different stations, the time sequences may not
be perfectly synchroaized, possibly giving rise to errors of one or
two seconds.
During my meetings with the Board a number of other items of information

were discussed but I believe that the data I have outlined include all
events having a significant bearing on an understanding of the aecldent.
c.
3-50
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS. AND SPACE ADMINISTF.:ATIO_'_
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20,_6
February 14, 1967
M]_vLOI_'DUM
To: Mr. James E. Webb

Admfnistrator

Subject: Further report on Apollo 204 Review Board Activities
On February i0 I met with the Apollo 204 Review Board at KSC to

discuss their progress in the investigation of the Apollo accident.
The Board now has 21 panels established and operating, each with a
specific assigned task, each chaired by a Government employee, and
each reporting to a specific Board member. A detailed Review Board
activity schedule has been established and is reviewed daily to
ensure that milestones are being met or that scheduled adjustments
are made as early as necessary. This permits close coordination
and integration of all the necessary activities, analyses, and
studies.
In order to speed up the investigative effort, the Apollo 0]2

spacecraft is being mapped in detail, using a 3-dimension, i coor-
dlnate system to which all physical spacecraft elements c .n _e
referred. Complete photographic coverage isbeing maintained, color
film being preferred since it permits more ready identification of
components and their condition. Each photograph is cross-referenced
to the master grid.
The Board has implemented a data control system that permits a visual
display, against a time-line background, of each step of the investi-
gation. As spacecraft systems are examined and as their utilization
in the 204 test is established, these are noted and color coded: at
a glance, one can determine whether a system might have caused the
accident or has proven to be non-contributory, and also whether a
particular analysis is still underway or completed. This method of
data control focuses on the critical areas requiring the greatest
attention.
3-51
I reviewed at some length the work and procedures of the panel that
is investigating the origin and propagation of the fire. While their
work is far from complete, I am satisfied that the procedures they
are following are well worked out. When thiswork is completed, it
will give us as clear a view as can be obtained from the evidence.
The panel has begun by examining each possible combustible within the
spacecraft, its distribution and characteristics, and its proximity to
each possible ignition source. Such combustibles include both solids
and liquids. At each step of spacecraft disassembly, panel members
are carefully removing both damaged and undamaged materials for micro-
analysis which, in turn, permits the identification of the material
that was burned. This allows a reconstruction of the final location
of all combustibles in the spacecraft and will point up irregularities
in this distribution if any exist. The physical evidence thus far
examined points to the following:
First, it appears the fire had considerable variation and

directionality, since damage in the spacecraft indicates
differences of intensity and timing. For example, an
aluminum tubing handle has a hole burned through it indi-
cating a temperature at that point of at least 1,400 ° F,
while its nylon hinge within two inches of the melted spot
is relatively undamaged indicating a temperature there of
less than 500 ° F.
Second, there is evidence that the fire may have had more
than one phase, but this is difficult to prove since the
last phase would obscure the evidence of the earlier. One
hypothesis, supported by the cabin pressure history, assumes
a small, low-grade fire whose heat was at first largely ab-
sorbed by the spacecraft structure and that was burning at
the time of the first crew report; that fire may have con-
tinued for as long as ten seconds. A more intense fire may
have then developed, causing the rapid increase in cabin
pressure. This fire was probably then extinguished by the
depletion of oxygen.
Other peculiarities require further analysis. These deal

with the ruptures in the spacecraft and the role of the fire
in burning through into the space between the inner and outer
hulls.
At this time, there has been no determination as to the source of the

ignition itself.
3-52
Additional information relating to the progress of the accident
has been identified and is being analyzed. A recording from an
onboard bio-sensor that appears relatively undamaged is in the
process of being read out at this time. Additional work to inter-
pret all background sounds on a high fidelity recording obtained
over the S-band link is being carried out in the hope of gaining
further information on the course of the fire. I also reviewed
with the physician who heads the medical analysis panel the condi-
tion of the personal effects, suits, and equipment of the crew as
well as data available on their actions during the course of the
accident. It is now clear that all three suits were burned through,
though the extent of suit damage varies; the co_,and pilot's received
the greatest exposure to flame and the pilot's the least.
Spacecraft disassembly is proceeding with great care; for example,

a false floor with plexiglass viewing ports has been installed to
permit continued examination without the danger of disturbing physi-
cal evidence. Current plans are for the final removal of the space-
craft to the industrial area by the end of this week. Detailed plans
for the continued disassembly of both the command module and service
module are in preparation and will be reviewed and approved by the
Board before further work is undertaken. It is important to note
that no single spacecraft element is touched or removed for analysis
without full Board approval and evaluation of its possible effect on
any of the other on-going studies or analyses.
Robert C. Seamans_ Jr.
(Page 3 of 3)
3-53
3-54
MEMORANDUM
To: Mr. James E. Webb

Administrator
From: Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr.

Subject: Interim report of the Apollo 204 Review Board
On February 22, 1967, I heard a presentation by the Apollo 204

Review Board at Kennedy Space Center of the significant information
developed to date and of their tentative findings concerning the
circumstances of the accident. The Board also discussed preliminary
recommendations. These tentative findings and preliminary recom-
mendations will serve as guides for those interim decisions to be
made in the conduct of the Apollo Program prior to the completion
of the Board report. I also reviewed the status of the investigation
and of spacecraft disassembly, and followed up on items previously
noted in earlier reports.
The spacecraft has been removed from the launch vehicle and is
now housed in the industrial area. There detailed disassembly
continues under careful supervision, each action being undertaken
in response to a specific Board directive. This disassembly is
far from complete, but a number of the major systems have been
removed and are being checked for further verification of the part
they played during the fire, the effect of fire on the equipment,
and the evidence that analysis might add to the overall picture
being built up of the accident. The heat shield has not yet been
removed, nor has sufficient internal equipment to permit full view
from inside of the entire pressure hull, and a large number of tests,
checks and analysis are continuing at NASA, university, and industrial
facilities around the country. At present, the Board has over 1,500
individuals, from nine government agencies and departments in addition
to NASA, from thirty-one industrial groups, and from several universities,
directly participating in the review and analysis. The Board currently
estimates that its report will be completed by the end of March. The
Board is developing procedures to assure that an orderly and rapid
transition of the personnel under its control from the current accident
investigation to redesign, qualification, and test effort where re-
quired can be made.
3-55
ORIGlr_AL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
In my last report, I noted that an intact on-board biosensor

_ecording was being analyzed for possible additional information;
_i,_s analysis is now complete and provides a little more than one
second's additional information and duplicatesdata already
examined that was available from the telemetry recorded during the
test and subsequent accident. The S-band recording also mentioned
in the previous report has been completely analyzed by the Bell
l,aboratories, including computer reconstruction and comparison, but
no significant new information could be derived therefrom.
The Board has not identified the source of ignition at this

time. Ignition sources that have been under review include:
possible chemical reactions, such as those in the on-board batteries
or in the air purifier of the environmental control unit; possible
spontaneous combustion of certain materials used in the spacecraft;
and possible electrical phenomena, such as electro-static spark
discharges, electrical arcing, or wiring overheating from shorts or
malfunctions.
Examination of the environmental control unit lithium hydroxide

and of the batteries indicates these were not the source of ignition.
Tests of the combustible materials used in the spacecraft show that
at least a 400OF temperature would be necessary for spontaneous
combustion, and that no such materials could have been subjected to
_hat temperature except by the malfunction of some other part of the
_pacecraft systems. An electrical malfunction is therefore regarded
as the most likely souree of ignition. While not wholly ruled out,
electro-static discharge is deemed unlikely in that all reasonable
concentrations of flammable vapors that could have been present in
the spacecraft were not sensitive to this type of sparking ignition.
By the time it has completed its final report, the Board expects to
have significantly narrowed the list of ignition sources that had a
relatively high possibility of contributing to the initiation of the
fire, but the possibility exists that no single source will ever be
pinpointed.
A good deal of the work involved in tracing the history of the

fire after ignition has been completed. The Board has considerable
confidence in its present theory as to the initial location, propagatio;_
mechanisms, and phasing of the fire. This hypothesis, and some of the
supporting evidence, is summarized as follows:
Present evidence indicates that the fire had three distinct phases.
The fire originated in the left, or Command pilot side, in the front
corner of the spacecraft, near the floor. It probably burned for
several seconds without being noticed by the crew or recorded on
instrumentation. Because it was below the couch level it was not v_sible
3-56
at this stage; because the crew were fully suited and breathing oxygen from
the environmental control system rather than from the cabin, it was not
smelled or heard. The left front corner shows the evidence of highest
heat and longest duration of the fire, and the witnesses watching
the television monitors place the first appearance of flame in that
corner (the television camera was mounted outside the spacecraft, looking
in through the window in the hatch). The first crew report of fire
was at 6:31:04, EST, indicating the fire had become visible. Because
the metal structure of the spacecraft absorbed the initial heat, the
fire did not initially cause an increase in cabin pressure.
By 6:31:12, the fire had spread and become intense, igniting various
materials along the left side of the cabin. Flames were hot and smoke-
free, rising along the wall and spreading across the ceiling. The
cabin shows heavy damag e in this area but little smoke, indicating that
the oxygen in the cabin had not been depleted at this time. The fire
spread and fed on nylon netting (installed to prevent objects from
floating into equipment crevices while in zero-g), Velcro fastening
material (used to fasten equipment to the spacecraft interior), and
the environmental control unit insulation. The cabin pressure began
to rise rapidly at this time as the atmosphere became heated.
At approximately 6:31:19, the internal pressure had risen to an

estimated 36 pounds per square inch and the sealed cabin ruptured.
This first puncture of the pressure vessel was a long tear in the floor
on the right, or pilot's, side of the cabin. With the high internal
pressure released, cabin gases and flames flowed both over and under
the couches toward and through the hole, moving from left to right.
This was the second phase of the fire. Flames passed through the hole
into the air space between the cabin pressure shell and the surrounding
heat shield; these flames then escaped through access hatches in the
heat shield and partially enveloped the outside of the spacecraft for
a moment. The short duration, left-to-right, flame motion is evi-
denced by heavier damage on the left than right side of equipment and
wiring on the floor, of the couches, and of the front panels.
With the rupture of the cabin and the rush of flame and gas outside,
the oxygen content of the cabin atmosphere was quickly reduced and
the fire smoked heavily, laying a film of soot on many interior surfaces.
This third and final phase of the fire was also characterized by con-
tinued localized burning. The environmental control system uses a
water/glycol coolant that leaked from burnt or burst pipes. Both high
and low pressure oxygen lines were connected with solder joints that
fail at temperatures below 400°F. The glycol mixture from the cooling
system, acting as a fuel and supported by the flowing oxygen from the
failed lines, caused continued hot burning in the left corner and
melted a large hole in the floor there.
3-57
The Board noted that the underlying design approach in Apollo
was to control the known risk of fire--on the pad or in orbit--by
isolating and rendering safe all possible ignition sources. The
experience in flight and in tests prior to the accident had suggested
that the probability of a spacecraft fire was low. Continued
alertness to the possibility of fire had become dulled by previous
ground experience and six years of successful manned missions.
Ground tests at the pad were classified as especially hazardous
only when propellants or pyrotechnics were involved, and different
procedures and safety precautions are taken in handling or working
under such conditions. Potential ignition sources inside the
spacecraft had been treated so as to be considered safe; neither
the crews nor the test and development personnel felt the risk of
spacecraft fire to be high. The Apollo 204 accident now proves
this assumption to have been wrong.
The assumption of ignition source safety led to the use of

several solid combustible materials within the spacecraft, including
nylon and polyurethane foams. From the point of view of possible
fire, these materials were distributed within the cabin without
breaks specifically designed to help localize fire if it occurred_
The Board noted that, in the event of a fire emergency, the

time and effort required to open the hatch was too long, and that
pad emergency procedures were focused on propellant hazards and
did not include provisions to meet spacecraft fires.
The principal preliminary recommendations of the Board are

designed to assist the Administrator in making his decisions
concerning the continuing Apollo program effort prior to com-
pletion of the Board review, These are:
That combustible materials now used be replaced wherever

possible with non-flammable materials, that non-metallic
materials that are used be arranged to maintain fire breaks,
that systems for oxygen or liquid combustibles be made fire
resistant, and that full flammability tests be conducted
with a mockup of the new configuration.
That a more rapidly and more easily operated hatch be

designed and installed.
That on-the-pad emergency procedures be revised to recognize

the possibility of cabin fire.
3-58
In addition, the Board has drawn attention to a number of
components, subsystems, techniques, and practices which it feels
can be improved to increase crew safety and mission reliability.
These include findings on the environmental control system solder
joints, location of wiring, electrical equipment qualification and
design, and the development of checkout procedures.
An important area of Board attention has been that of the

cabin atmosphere. The atmosphere and pressure selected for the
suit and the cabin, before launch and in orbit, have a very
important relation to spacecraft design, hatch type, crew
physiology, launch procedures, and mission capability. The
Board did not recommend a change in the use of pure oxygen in
the suit for either pre-launch or orbital operations. The Board
did not recommend that cabin atmosphere for operations in space
be changed from the currently planned 5 psi pure oxygen but did
recommend that the trade-offs between one- and two-gas atmospheres
be re-evaluated. The Board specifically recommended that pres-
surized oxygen no longer be used in pre-launch operations.
3-59
3-60
STATEMENT BY
JAMES E. WEBB
NASA is releasing today a third interim report on the work of the Apollo 204 Review Board result-
ing from two days of meetings with the Board by Deputy Administrator Robert Seamans at Cape Kennedy.
These meetings took place on February 25 and 24.
This statement and Dr. Seamans' third interim report have been reviewed with Chairman Clinton
Anderson and Senior .Minority Committee Member Senator Margaret Chase Smith and with Congressman
George Miller. In continuation of the Senate Committee's review of the Apollo 204 accident, Senator
Anderson has announced that the Senate Committee will hold an open hearing on the preliminary findings
of the Board and actions to be taken by NASA at 3 p.m., Monday, February 27.
In addition to the information set forth by Dr. Seamans in his three interim reports, I have had the
benefit of a review by three members of the Board -- the Chairman, Dr. Floyd Thompson, Astronaut Frank
Borman, and Department of Interior combustion expert Dr. Robert Van Dolah. This included the prelimi-
nary views of the Board as to the most likely causes of ignition, the contributing factors in the rapid
spread of the fire, the inadequacy of the means of emergency egress for the astronauts, and theneedto
recognize that all future such tests be classified as involving a higher level of hazard.
The following emerges from the preliminary views of the Board and the Board's preliminary recom-
mendations:
(1) The risk of fire that could not be controlled or from which escape couldnot be made was con-
siderably greater than was recognized when the procedures for the conduct of the test were established.
Our experience with pure oxygen atmospheres included not only the successful Mercury and Gemini flights
but a number of instances where a clearly positive source of ignition did not result in a fire. In one
such instance an electric light bulb was shattered, exposing the incandescent element to the oxygen
atmosphere without starting a fire.
(2) Our successful experience with pure oxygen atmospheres in Mercury and Gemini, our experience
with the difficulty of storing and using hand-held equipment under zero-gravity conditions, and our
experience with the difficulty of making sure before flight that no undiscovered items had been dropped
or found their way into the complex maze of plumbing, wiring, and equipment in the capsule, led us to
place in the Apollo 204 capsule such items as Velcro pads to ,which frequently used items could be
easily attached and removed, protective covers on wire bundles, nylon netting to prevent _/rticles dropped
in ground testing from being lost under or behind equipment in the capsule, and a pad or cushion on
which, in the planned escape exercise, the hatch could be placed without damage to the hatch itself or
to the equipment in the spacecraft. While most of these were constructed of low- combustion-potential
material, they were not so arranged as to provide barriers to the spread of a fire. Tests conducted in an
Apollo- type chamber since the accident have shown that an oxygen fire in the capsule will spread along
the surface of Velcro and along the edges of nylon netting much faster than through the material itself.
3-61 : "
(3) Soldered joints in piping carrying both oxygen and fluids were melted away, with resultant
leakage contributing to the spread of the fire.
(4) The bursting of the capsule happened in such a way that the flames, as they rushed toward the
rupture and exhausted throughit, traveled over and around the astronauts' couches. Under these con-
ditions, and with just a few seconds of time available, the astronauts could not reach the hatch and open
it. -
(5) This fire indicates that a number of items related to the design and performance of the'environ-
mental control unit will require the most careful examination and may require redesign.
Astronaut Borman, in commenting on his reactions to the conditions surrounding the Apollo 204
test and the subsequent knowledge he has gained as a result of serving on the Review Board, stated t9
Dr. Seamans, Dr. Thompson, and to me that he would not have been concerned to enter the capsule at
the time Grissom, White and Chaffee did so for the test, and would not at that time have regarded the
operation as involving substantial hazard, i However, he stated that his work on the Board has convinced
him that there were hazards present beyond the understanding of either NASA's engineers or astronauts.
He believes the work of the Review Board will provide the knowledge and recommendations necessary
to substantially minimize or eliminate them.
Dr. Thompson, Astronaut Borman, and Dr. Van Dolah have returned to Cape Kennedy andare
proceeding with the work of the Board. This will require several weeks to complete.
Chairman George Miller, of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, has announced
that as soon as the Board's work is complete, the Committee's Oversigh t Subcommittee, chaired by Con-
gressman Olin Teague, will conduct a complete investigation of all factors related to the accident and
NASA's actions to meet the conditions disclosed. Chairman Teague spent Friday and Saturday at Cape
Kennedy with members of the Manned Space Flight Subcommittee, of which he is also Chairman, review-
ing progress in the Apollo program. Dr. Seamans, Dr. George Mueller, and I will report further to him at
10 a.m., Monday, February 27.
3-62
PART IV
HISTORY
OF
THE ACCIDENT
261-101 0 - 67 - 8
PART IV - HISTORY OF SPACECRAFT 0 12 AND THE ACCIDENT
1. EVENTS FROM INITIATION OF FABRICATION UNTIL THE INITIATION OF THE

"pLUGS OUT" TEST
Spacecraft 012, assigned to Mission AS-204, was built at North American Aviation, Inc., Space
and Information Systems Division, Downey, California. Enclosure 1 shows sketches of the complete
space vehicle, the spacecraft and the Command Module. Fabrication was begun in August 1964 and
the basic structure was completed in September 1965. While the structure was being fabricated, each
$ .
component of every subsystem was subjected to acceptance tests and subsystems were assembled. During
this period a series of Preliminary Design Reviews were held between November 1964 and January 1965.
Installation and final assembly of subsystems into the Command Module took place between September
1965 and March 1966. Critical Design Reviews were held during February and March 1966. Check-
out of all subsystems was then initiated followed by integrated testing of all spacecraft subsystems.
A series of reviews of the spacecraft and checkout was held during the checkout and integrated testing
process. A two-phase Customer Acceptance Readiness Review was conducted by NASA at Downey
in conjunction with NAA in July and August 1966. After the August review NASA issued a Certificate
of Flight Worthiness and authorized the spacecraft to be shipped to the John F. Kennedy Space Cen-
ter (KSC), Florida. The Certificate included a listing of open items and work to be completed at
KSC.
The Command Module was received at KSC on August 26, 1966. It was mated with the Service
Module in the altitude chamber at KSC early in September 1966 and alignment, subsystems and system
verification tests and functional checks were performed. Many open design change orders were completed
and various malfunctions were noted and corrected. The first combined systems tests were begun on
September 14 and completed on October 1, 1966. Several malfunctions were noted and correction
of some of these was deferred to a later date.
A design Certification Review was held at NASA Headquarters during September and October
1966. This detailed review was conducted by a Board chaired by the Associate Administrator for Man-
ned Space Flight. Board Members were Office of Manned Space Flight Center Directors. This Board
issued a Design Certification Document on October 7, 1966 which certified the design as flightworthy,
pending satisfactory resolution of listed open items.
After the combined systems tests were completed at KSC in the altitude chamber, the first manned
test in this facility was performed. This test was conducted in air at sea level pressure and was made
tO verify total spacecraft system operation. The test was initiated on October 10 and discontinued on
October 11 to replace bent umbilical pins. The test was begun again on October 12 and completed
on October 13. On October 14 and 15, an unmanned test was performed at altitude pressures using
oxygen to verify spacecraft system operation under these conditions before a manned altitude test was run.
made. The manned test (with the flight crew) was initiated on October 18 but was discontinued after
reaching a simulated altitude of 13,000 feet because of the failure of a transistor in one of the invert-
ers in the spacecraft. The inverter was replaced and the test was completed on October 19. A second
manned altitude test (with the backup crew) was initiated on October 21 but it was discontinued
when a failure occurred in an oxygen system regfilator in the spacecraft Environmental Control Sys-
tem. This regulator was removed and found to have a design deficiency. While redesign was being
accomplished various spacecraft work items were completed..
On October 27 the Environmental Control Unit was removed and returned to the factory for a
design change to the water/glycol evaporator.
During this period a propellant tank had ruptured in the Service Module of Spacecraft •017 at
Downey. Therefore, it was decided that the tanks on the Spacecraft 012 Service Module should be
checked by special testing at 'KSC. In order to conduct this testing in parallel with further checking
of the Spacecraft 012 Command Module, the Command Module was removed from the altitude cham-
ber. The Service Module was later removed for tests related to the propellant tanks. The Service
4-1
Module and Command Module were reinstalled in the altitude chamber and the ECU was installed. A
water/glycol leak developed in the ECU, and it was again returned to the factory for further examination
of the leak problem. It was returned on December 14, 1966.
Also, during this period on December 21, 1966 the Apollo Program Director conducted a Re-
certification Review which closed out the majority of the open items remaining from previous reviews.
After The Command and Service Modules were reinstalled in the altitude chamber and testing in the
chamber was resumed. The sea level and unmanned altitude tests were conducted on December 27
and 28 and the manned altitude test with the backup flight crew was conducted on December 29 and
30.
It should be noted that this final manned test in the altitude chamber was very successful with
all spacecraft systems functioning normally. At the post-test debriefing the backup flight crew expressed
their satisfaction with the condition and performance of the spacecraft.
It should also be noted that in the altitude chamber tests the Command Module was pressurized
with pure oxygen four times at pressures greater than 14.7 psia for a total time of 6 hours and 15
minutes. The total time was about 21/2 times longer than the time the Command Module was press-
urized with oxygen during the test which was in progress when the accident occurred.
The Command Module was removed from the altitude chamber on January 3, 1967 and the space-
craft was mated to the launch vehicle on January 6 at Launch Complex 34. Various tests and equip-
ment installations and replacements were then performed.
The system was determined to be ready for the intiation of the Plugs-Out Test on January 27,
1967.
Of the many events which took place at KSC subsequent to the arrival of the spacecraft a few
stand out as possible indications of deficiencies in the program and some appear to have possible re-
lation to the fire.
The events that possibly may be related to the fire are those concerned with the occasions when
water/glycol spillage or leakage from the Environmental Control System was noted. This may be of
significance in that water/glycol coming into contact with electrical connectors can cause corrosion
of these connectors. Dried water/glycol on wiring insulation leaves a residue which is electrically con-
ductive and combustible. Of the six recorded instances where water/glycol spillage or leakage occurred
(a total of 90 ounces leaked or spilled is noted in the records) the records indicate that this resulted
in wetting of conductors and wiring on only one occasion. Action was taken to clean the water/glycol
from the connectors and wiring on this one occasion. There is no evidence which indicates that dam-
age resulted to the conductors or that faults were produced on connectors due to water/glyc01 which
contributed to the fire. If the cleaning were inadequate, residue would have remained on the wires.
Also, undetected wetting could have occurred which would leave a residue. Small quantities of water/
glycol were found in the Command Module after the fire. This, however, could have been due to
water/glycol line 'breakage which is known to have occurred during the fire. And while water/glycol
and its residue may have contributed to the spread of the fire there is no positive evidence that resi-
due was related to the ignition of the fire.
The number of open items at the time of shipment of Command Module 012 was not known.
There were 113 significant Engineering Orders not accomplished at the time Command Module 012
was delivered to NASA; 623 Engineering Orders were released subsequent to delivery. Of these, 22
were recent releases which were not recorded in configuration records at the time of the accident.
The effort and rework required on Spacecraft 012 at KSC was greater than that experienced on
the first manned Gemini spacecraft. However since the Apollo Spacecraft are considerably more corn-
4-2
plex than Gemini Spacecraftthis doesnot necessarilyindicatethat the quantity of problemsencount-
eredwas excessive.There is, however,an inferencethat the design,qualificationand fabricationpro-
cessmay not havebeencompletedadequatelyprior to shipmentto KSC.
Another item should be notedwhen consideringthe problemsthat werefound at KSC including
some of the problems encountered in the Plugs-Out Test prior to the fire. The prime purpose of all
tests conducted prior to launch is to verify and demonstrate that the space vehicle ground support
equipment, procedures and personnel are all ready for flight operations. Many of the tests involve a
"first-time" operation particularly in an overall sense. Therefore, inherent in the verification pr6cess
is the likelihood that faults will be found in procedures and in equipment. This Plugs-Out Test had not
been classified as hazardous because only those tests involving fueled vehicles, hypergolic propellants,
cryogenic systems, high pressure tanks, live pyrotechnics or altitude chamber tests were routinely classi-
fied as hazardous.
2. EVENTS FROM INITIATION OF THE PLUGS-OUT TEST UNTIL THE T-10 MINUTE
HOLD
The purpose of the Space Vehicle Plugs-Out Integrated Test, Operational Checkout Procedures
(OCP) FO-K-0021-1, Spacecraft 012 is to demonstrate all space vehicle systems and operational pro-
cedures in as near a flight configuration as is practical and to verify their capability in a simulated
launch. System verfication is performed, an abbreviated final countdown conducted and a flight simu-
lation made. All communication and instrumentation systems are activated and proper measurements
are monitored at appropriate ground stations. At the start of the simulated flight, umbilicals are dis-
connected and the spacecraft is on simulated fuel-cell power.
Specific objectives of this test for Spacecraft 012 as stated in the Final Procedure Document were:
a. To verify overall spacecraft/launch vehicle compatibility and demonstrate proper function of
spacecraft systems with all umbilicals and Ground Support Equipment disconnected.
b. To verify no electrical interference at the time of umbilical disconnect.
c. To verify astronaut emergency egress procedures (unaided egress) at the conclusion of the test.
The preliminary outline for this test procedure was written by North American Aviation, Inc.
(NAA) in July 1966. The test procedure was reviewed and revised periodically over the next few months.
In September the flight crew requested that emergency egress practice which was not in the original test out-
line be added. This addition was requested because a subsequent test, Countdown Demonstration, would
involve a fully fueled Launch Vehicle and this latter test was identified as hazardous. This egress test
was then added to the Space Vehicle Plugs Out Integrated Test.
The first draft of the Procedure was issued on September 26, 1966. After informal review and re-
vision a second draft was issued on October 19, 1966. After formal review by both NASA and NAA,
and further revision the formally approved procedure was issued on December 13, 1966. This proced-
ure was reviewed at KSC and operational and minor technical changes made. A major revision was
issued at 5:30 p.m. EST on January 26, 1967 and 4 additional pages were issued at 10:00 a.m. EST
on January 27, 1967.
The Plugs-Out Test was initiated on January 27, 1967 at 12:55 GMT (7:55 a.m. EST) when pow-
er was applied to the spacecraft for this test. After completion of initial verification tests of system
operation the flight crew entered the Command Module. The Command Pilot entered at 18:00 GMT
(1:00 p.m. EST) followed by the Pilot and Senior Pilot. The Command Pilot noted an odor in the
Spacecraft Environmental Control System suit oxygen loop and the count was held at 18:20 GMT
while a sample of the oxygen in this system was taken. This odor has been determined from subsequent
analysis not: to be related to the fire. The count was resumed at 19:42 GMT with hatch installation
and subsequent cabin purge with oxygen beginning at 19:45 GMT. Communication difficulties were
encountered and the count was held at approximately 22:40 GMT to troubleshoot the problem. Var-
ious final countdown functions were still performed during the hold as communications permitted. From
22:45 GMT until about 22:53 GMT the flight crew interchanged equipment related to the communi-
cations systems in an effort to isolate the communications system problem. This problem consisted of
4-3
a continuouslylive microphone that could not be turned off by the crew. The live microphone con-
dition was first noted by the test crew about 22:25 GMT and records indicate that the condition first
occurred between about 20:57 GMT and 22:18 GMT. During the troubleshooting period problems
developed in the ability of various ground stations to communicate with one another and with the
crew. None of the communications problems appear to have had a direct bearing on the fire.
By 22:20 GMT (6:20 p.m. EST) all final countdown functions uptothe transfer to simulatedfuel
cell power were completed and the count was held at T-10 minutes pending resolution of the com-
munications problems.
3. EVENTS FROM THE INITIATION OF THE T-10 MINUTE HOLD AT 23:20 GMT UNTIL
THE REPORT OF FIRE

From the start of the T-10 minute hold at 25:20 GMT until about 23:30 GMT there are no events
that appear to be related to the fire. The major activity during this period was routine trouble-
shooting of the communications problem. The records show that except for the communications prob-
lem all systems were operating normally during this period. There were no voice transmissions from
the spacecraft from 23:30:14 GMT until the transmission reporting the fire which began at 23:31:04.-7
GMT (6:31:04.7 p.m. EST).
During the period beginning about 30 seconds before the report there are indications of crew
movement. These indications are provided by the data from the Biomedical Sensors, the Command
Pilot's live mike, the Guidance and Navigation System and the Environmental Control System.
There is, however, no evidence as to what this crew movement was or that it was related to the
fire.
The biomedical data indicate that just prior to the fire report the Senior Pilot was performing
essentially no activity (or was in the baseline "rest" condition) until about 23:30:21 GMT when a slight
increase .in pulse and respiratory rate was noted. At 23:30:30 GMT the electrocardiogram indicates
some muscular activity for several seconds. Similar indications are noted at 23:30:39 GMT. The data
show increased activity but are not indicative of an alarm type of response. By 23:30:45 GMT, all of
the biomedical parameters had reverted to the baseline "rest" level.
Beginning at about 23:30 GMT, the Command Pilot live microphone transmitted brushing and tap-
ping noises which are indicative of movement. The noises were similar to those transmitted earlier in the
test by the live mike when the Command Pilot is known to have been moving. These sounds end at
23:30:58.6 GMT.
Any significant crew movement results in minor motion of the Command Module. This motion is
detected by the Guidance and Navigation System and is indicative of crew movement; however, the
type of movement cannot be determined. Data from this system indicate a slight movement at 23:30:24
GMT with more intense activity beginning at 23:30:39 GMT and ending at 23:30:44 GMT. More
movement begins at 23:31:00 GMT and continues until loss of data transmission during the fire.
Increases of oxygen flow rate to the crew suits also indicate movement. All suits have some small
leakage. This leakage rate varies with crew positions. Earlier in the Plugs-Out Test, the crew reported
that a particular movement, _the nature of which was unspecified, provided increased flow rate. This
is also confirmed from the flow rate data records. The flow rate shows a gradual rise at 23:,30:24
GMT which reaches the limit of the sensor at 23:30:59 GMT.
There is a variation at 23:30:50 GMT in the signal output from the gas chromatograph cable (the
gas chromatograph was not installed in the Command Module). When the gas chromatograph is not
connected, the cable acts as an antenna. Thus, changes in the electromagnetic field within the space-
craft are sensed when the cable is approached closely, touched or moved or voltage fluctuations occur
4-4
in other equipment.Variations found in the signallevel from the gaschromatographcable at earlier
timesin the test have beencorrelatedwith either crew movementor voltagetransientswhen equipment
wasturned off or on at theseearliertimes.The variation at 23:30:50 GMT, may have resulted because
it wastouched or approached by the crew since there does not appear to be any voltage transient
condition at this time which could have given the observed signal.
A significant voltage transient was recorded at 23:30:54.8 GMT. The records show a surge in the
AC Bus 2 voltage.
Several other parameters being measured also showed anomalous behaviour at this time. There
was a 1.7 second dropout in signal from the C-Band decoder and transmitter outputs, a brief dropout
of the VHF-FM carrier, a fluctuation in the rotation controller null outputs and a fluctuation in the
gas chromatograph signal.
4. EVENTS FROM THE REPORT OF FIRE UNTIL CREW REMOVAL

The events that occurred during this period can be comprehended most readily by examination
of Enclosures 2 through 6. These enclosures show a sketch of Launch Complex 34, the Space Vehicle
in the service tower and the interior ofa mock-up of a Command Module showing detailed reconstruct-
ion of Spacecraft 0 12.
Beginning at 23:31:04.7 GMT (6:31:04.7 P.M. EST), the crew gave the first verbal indication of
an emergency - a fire in the Command Module was reported.
Emergency procedures called for the Senior Pilot, occupying the center couch, to unlatch and re-
move the hatch while retaining his harness buckled. A number of witnesses who observed the television
picture of the Command Module hatch window during this stage of the fire discerned motion that
suggests that the Senior Pilot was reaching for the inner hatch handle. The Senior Pilot's harness
buckle was found unopened after the fire, indicating that he initiated the standard hatch-opening pro-
cedure. Data from the Guidance and Navigation System indicate considerable activity within the Com-
mand Module after the fire was discovered. This activity is consistent with movement of the crew
prompted by proximity of the fire or with the undertaking of standard emergency egress procedures.
Personnel located on adjustable level 8 (A-8) adjacent to the Command Module responded to the
report of the fire. The Pad Leader ordered crew egress procedures to be started and technicians started
toward the White Room which surrounds the hatch and into which the crew would step upon egress.
Then the Command Module ruptured.
All transmission of voice and data from the spacecraft terminated by 23:31:22.4 GMT, three sec-
onds after rupture. Witnesses monitoring television showing the hatch window report that flame spread
from the left to the right side of the Command Module and shortly thereafter covered the entire visible
area
Flames and gases flowed rapidly out of the ruptured area, spreading flames into the toroidal space
between the Command Module pressure vessel and heat shield, through access hatches and into levels
A-8 and A-7 of the service structure. These flames ignited combustibles, endangered pad personnel, and
impeded rescue efforts. The burst of fire, together with the sounds of rupture, caused several pad per-
sonnel to believe that the Command Module had exploded or was about to explode. Pad personnel fled
from the immediate area.
The immediate reaction of all personnel on level A-8 was to evacuate the level. This reaction was
promptly followed by a return to effect rescue. Upon running out on the swing arm from the umbilical
tower, several personnel obtained a fire extinguisher and returned along the swing arm to the White
Room to begin rescue efforts. Others obtained fire extinguishers from various areas of the service strucj-
ture and rendered assistance in fighting the fires.
4-5
The time interval betweenexit to the swing arm and return to the White Room is estimatedvar-
iously by the participants. Personsviewing televisionmonitors could not seemovementearly in the
White Room becauseof heavy smoke. Approximately one minute and thirty seconds after the first
crew report of the fire the Pad Leader reported over his headset that attempts had been started to
remove the hatches. This report was r/lade after the Pad Leader had gone out on the swing arm, re-
turned and entered the White Room one or two times and left to reach breathable air and his head-
set. It is therefore estimated that attempts to remove the hatches began one minute after the fire was
first reported.
Three hatches were installed on the Command Module. The outermost hatch, called the boost
protective cover (BPC) hatch, is part of the cover which shields the Command Module during launch
and is jettisoned prior to orbital operation. The middle hatch is termed the ablative hatch and becomes
the outer hatch when the BPC is jettisoned after launch. The inner hatch closes the pressure vessel
wall of the Command Module and is the first hatch to be opened by the crew in an unaided crew
egress.
The outer or BPC hatch was in place but not fully latched because of distortion in the BPC caused
by wire bundles temporarily installed for the test. The middle hatch and inner hatch were in place and
latched after crew ingress.
Although the BPC hatch was not fully latched it was necessary to insert a specially-designed tool
into the hatch in order to provide a hand-hold for lifting the hatch from the Command Module. At
this time the White Room was filling with dense, dark smoke from the Command Module interior and
from secondary fires throughout level A-8. While some personnel were able to locate and don operable
gas masks others were not. Some proceeded without masks while others attempted without success to
render masks operable. Even operable masks were unable to cope with the dense smoke present because
they were designed for use in toxic rather than dense smoke atmospheres.
Visibility in the White Room was virtually zero. It was necessary to work essentially by touch since
visual observation was limited to a few inches at best. A hatch removal tool was in the White Room.
Once the small fire near the BPC hatch had been extinguished and the tool located the Pad Leader
and an assistant removed the BPC hatch. Although the hatch was not latched removal was difficult.
The personnel who removed the BPC hatch could not remain in the White Room because of the
smoke. They left the White Room and passed the tool which was necessary to open each hatch to other
individuals. A total of five individuals took part in opening the three hatches and each made several
trips into the White Room and out for breathable air.
The middle hatch was removed with less effort than was required for the outer or BPC hatch.
The inner hatch was unlatched and an attempt was made to raise it from its support and to lower
it to the Command Module floor. The hatch could not be lowered the full distance to the floor and
was instead pushed to one side. When the inner hatch was opened intense heat and a considerable
amount of smoke issued from the interior of the Command Module.
When the Pad Leader ascertained that all hatches were open, he left the White Room, proceeded a
few feet along the swing arm, donned his headset and reported this fact. From a voice tape it has
been determined that this report came approximately five minutes, twenty-seven seconds after the first
report of the fire. The Pad Leader estimates that his report was made no more than thirty seconds
after the inner hatch was opened. Therefore, it is concluded that all hatches were opened and the two
outer hatches removed approximately five minutes after the report of fire or atabout 23:36 GMT. A log
maintained by a person monitoring voice transmissions from level A-8 sets the time of the Pad Leader's
report at 23:36 GMT. All records in this log are noted in minutes with no indication of seconds. Medi-
cal opinion, based on autopsy reports, has concluded that chances of resuscitation decreased rapidly once
consciousness was lost and that resuscitation was impossible by 23:36 GMT.
4-6
Visibility within the CommandModule wasextremelypoor. Although the lights remainedon, they
could be perceivedonly dimly. No fire wasobserved.Initially, the crew was not seen.The personnel
whohadbeeninvolvedin removingthe hatchesattemptedto locatethe crew without success.
Throughoutthis period, other pad personnel were fighting secondary fires on level A-8. There was
considerable fear that the launch escape tower, mounted above the Command Module, would be ignited
by the fires below and destroy much of the launch complex.
Shortly after the report of the fire, a call was made to the fire department. From log records, it
appears that the fire apparatus and personnel were dispatched at about 23:32 GMT. After hearing the
report of the fire, the doctor monitoring the test from the blockhouse near the pad proceeded to the
base of the umbilical tower.
The exact time at which firemen reached Level A-8 is not known. Personnel who opened the hatch-
es unanimously state that all hatches were open before any firemen were seen on the level or in the
White Room. The first firemen who reached Level A-8 state that all hatches were open, but that the
inner hatch was inside the Command Module, when they arrived. This places arrival of the firemen
after 23:36 GMT. It is estimated, on the basis of tests, that seven to eight minutes were required to
travel from the fire station to the launch complex and to ride the elevator from the ground to Level
A-8. Thus, the estimated time of firemen arrival at level A-8 is shortly before 23:40 GMT.
When the firemen arrived, the positions of the crew couches and crew could be perceived through
the smoke but only with great difficulty. An unsuccessful attempt was made to remove the Senior Pilot
from the Command Module.
Initial observations and subsequent inspection reveal the following facts. The Command Pilot's
couch (the left hand couch) was in the "170 degree position", in which it is essentially horizontal
throughout its length. The foot restraints and harness were released and the inlet and outlet oxygen
hoses were connected to the suit. The electrical adapter cable was disconnected from the communications
cable. The Command Pilot was lying supine on the aft bulkhead or floor of the Command Module,
with his helmet visor closed and locked and with his head beneath the Pilot's head rest and his feet
onhis own couch. A fragment of his suit material was found outside the Command Module pressure vessel
five feet from the point of rupture. This indicates that his suit had failed prior to the time of rupture
(23:31:19.4 GMT) allowing convection'currents to carry the suit fragment through the rupture.
The Senior Pilot's couch (the center couch) was in the "96 degree" postion in which the back
portion is horizontal and lower portion in the raised position. The buckle releasing the shoulder straps
and lap belts was not opened. The straps and belts were burned through. The suit oxygen outlet hose
was connected but the inlet hose was disconnected. The helmet visor was closed and locked and all
electrical connections were intact. The Senior Pilot was lying transversely across the Command Module
just below the level of the hatchway.
The Pilot's couch (the right hand couch) was in the "264 degree" position in which the back por-
tion is horizontal and the lower portion dropped toward the floor. All restraints were disconnected, all
hoses and electrical connections were intact and the helmet visor was closed and locked. The Pilot was
supine on his couch.
From the foregoing it has been determined that in all probability the Command Pilot left his couch
to avoid the initial fire, the Senior Pilot remained in his couch as planned for emergency egress, at-
tempting to open the hatch until his restraints burned through and the Pilot remained in his couch to
maintain communications until the hatch could be opened by the Senior Pilot as planned. With a
slightly higher pressure inside the Command Module than outside, opening the inner hatch is impossible
because of the resulting force on the hatch. Thus the inability of the pressure relief system to cope with
pressure increase due to the fire made opening of the inner hatch impossible until after cabin rupture,
4-7
and after rupture the intense and widespread fire together with rapidly increasing carbon monoxide
concentrations further prevented egress.
Whether the. inner hatch handle was moved by the crew cannot be determined because the opening of the
inner hatch from the White Room also moves the handle within the Command Module to the unlatched
position.
Immediately after the firemen arrived, the Pad Leader on duty was relieved to allow treatment for
smoke inhalation. He had first reported over the headset that he could not describe the situatibn in the
Command Module. In this manner he attempted to convey the fact that the crew was dead to the
Test Conductor without informing the many people monitoring the communication channels. Upon
reaching the ground the Pad Leader told the doctors that the crew was dead. The three doctors
proceeded to the White Room and arrived there shortly after the arrival of the firemen. The doctors
estimate their arrival to have been at 23:45 GMT. The second Pad Leader reported that medical sup-
port was available at approximately 23:43 GMT. The three doctors entered the White Room and determined
that the crew had not survived the heat, smoke, and thermal burns. The doctors were not equipped with
breathing apparatus, and the Command Module still contained fumes and smoke. It was determined that
nothing could be gained by immediate removal of the crew. The firemen were directed to stop removal efforts
When the Command Module had been adequately ventilated, the doctors returned to the White Room
with equipment for crew removal. It became apparent that extensive fusion of suit material to melted
nylon from the spacecraft would make removal very difficult. For this reason it was decided to discon-
tinue efforts at removal in the interest of accident investigation and to photograph the Command Mod-
ule with the crew in place before evidence was disarranged.
Photographs were taken, and the removal efforts resumed at approximately 5:30 GMT (12:30 a.m.
EST) on January 28. Removal of the crew took approximately 90 minutes and was completed about
seven and one-half hours after the accident.
LIST OF ENCLOSURES
Enclosure
IV-1 Schematic of the Complete Space Vehicle, the Spacecraft and the Command Module.
IV-2 Aerial view of Complex 34 with Supporting Facilities.
IV-3 Schematic of Spacecraft Launch Vehicle in Service Structure with Access Arms Extended.
IV-4 Drawing of Umbilical Tower, Access Arm and White Room Positioned at the Command
Module.
IV-5 Photograph - Interior of a Mock-up Command Module, Without Couches, Configured

Similar to Command Module 012 at the Time of the Accident.
IV-6 Photograph Interior of a Mock-up Command Module, With Couches, Configured

Similar to Command Module 012.
4-8
LAUNCH
ESCAPE
COMMAND MODULE SYSTEM
SERVICE MODULE-_
LEM ADAPTER
COMMAND
INSTRUMENT UNIT MODULE
S- IVB STAGE
SERVICE
MODULE
LEM ADAPTER,,,,_
S- IB STAGE
c£
i C)
O
SATURN IB
FORWARD
HEAT SHIELD
CREW
COMPARTMENT
HEAT SHIELD
AFT
HEAT
SHIELD
APOLLO COMMAND MODULE
ENCLOSURE IV- I
4-9 / 4-10
SEQUENCE
ONE SECOND SCALE
V
23:30:45 23:30:50
23:30:00 23:30:40
4i 41_ 4_ 44
I 4_ 4( 4_ 4_ si1
_IR TO GROUND VOICE
S-BAND OPEN MIKE SOUND INDICATING MOVE[,
r I II1[ I I i!,,, ,
I I I II
COMMUNICATIONS
C-BAND BEACON DROPOUT 23:30
VHF-FM CARRIER D
INSTRUMENTATION LOS V.F-F_
GAS CHROMATOGRAPH SIGNAL STARTS INCREASING 23:30:50"---_
I
\
ELECTRICAL POWER
AC BUS 2 T
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM

C
OXYGEN F
SMALL STEP OF 0,5 SEC DURATION ON MIDDLE
GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION

I
I _ MIDDLE & OUTER GIMBAL ACTIVITY
r._ ACITIvITY
STARTING SUBSIDES
23:30:39 23:30:44
STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM ROTATION CONTROLLER OUTF

TIMES SHOWN ARE DERIVED FROM SAMPLED MEASUREMENTS AN
3F EVENTS UNCERTAIN BY THE SAMPLING RATE OF THE SPECIFIC MEASURE_
23:30:55 23:31:00 23:31:05 23:3 :10
03 04 06 07 08 09
58 59
_t........_
END OF TRANSMISSION --
T BEGINNING 23:30:39.5 ENDING 23:30:58.5 1_ FIRE
:ANSMISSION ON S-BAND 23:_
_._..._..__.j i Ul j
CCW ROLL El"
I
S BAND &
I
LOS S-BAND VHF FM INTERLEAVED HARDLIF
PLT SUIT FLOW STARTS
COMf::_RESSOR INLET TEMPERATURE STARTS INCF
ACCUMULATOR QUANTITY STARTS DECREASING
CMD SUIT FLOW STARTS FLUCTUATING 23:31:12.9
SURGE TANK PRESSURE STARTS DECREASING 23:31:12.4--

I
:08.4
CABIN & SUIT PRESSURE START INCREASING 23:.!
I
SRP SUIT FLOW BACK TO NORMAL 23:31_11.'9 I
TEMPERATURE INCREASING AND SUIT DELTA P INCREASE 23:31:04
I SRP SUIT FLOW TO LOWER LIMIT 23:31:09.6 |
MAXIMUMICAUSES C&W ALARM 15 SECONDS LATER} 23:30:5g.4_
t 1
LV PITCH & YAW ACCELEROMETER DISTURE
JTER GIMBAL 23:30:54,9 q

I
/
INNER GIMBAL & OUTER GIMBAL DISTURBAI
I
MIDDLE GIMBAL DISTU
GIMBAL ANGLES START TO CHANGE 23:3
[
BANCE STARTING 23:31:00 _"-'_
ROLL RATE OSCILL
"RANSIENT 23:30:54.85
ATION CONTROLLER MOVED IN PITCH RJLL AF

i ARE
:NT
FIVE SECOND SCALE
23:s,:,_ 23:31:20 2s:31:2_ 23:32"01

12 13 14 I 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24
I I I I I I I I I I I
_INNING OF LAST TRANSMISSION 23:31=16.8_ END OF LAST TRANSMISSION 23:31:21.8-- --LOS DOWN LINK S-BAND 23:31:22.4
,, r
VHF FM CARRIER OFF 23:31:22.32 ]
--INTERLEAVED HARDLINE DATA LOST PRIME FRAME COUNT 23:31:2
INTERLEAVED HARDLINE DATA RECOVERY 23:31:18.39B_ -- LOS INTERLEAVED AND SPLIT PHASE HARDLINE DATA 23:31:21 ..
'[ IT P4 SE HA _D_INE DATA RECOVERY 23:31t17 659-- INTERLEAVED AND SPLIT PHASE DATA RECOVERY 23:31:21.
VHF*FM DATA RECOVERY 23:31:17,58 F_-l_r__ -OS IN TERLEA VED HARDLINE DATA 23:31:22"16 I
LOS SPLIT PHASE HARDLINE DATA 23:31:2_.40
I-- REWSW,
TCHESS-0'ON' MA,NBUST,ETO'BATA C'POS,T,ON'2S:3':' .0F'G2-31
I I
CREW SWITCHES S-10 "ON' (MAIN BUS TIE TO 'BAT B & C' POSITION) 23:31:12.4 FIG 2-3 I GSE DC ROW
1 f iI IF
EDS "UNSAFE A" CAME ON 23:31:21
BATTERY COMPARTMENT PRESSURE AT UPPER LIMIT (21_3 PSIA) 23:31:15.8
, I EDS'UNSAFE
B"CAME
ON23:31:2 I
23:31:14.3 GLYCOL PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE STARTS INCREASING {RESPONSE TO CABIN PRESSURE INCREASE)23131:14.4
CAUTION & WARNING DUE TO HiGH OXYGEN FLOW AT 23:30:59 15 SECOND TIME DELAY NORMAL 23:31:14.7
J i CMD SUIT FLOW STARTS DECREASING 23:31:15.1
CO 2 ABSORBER OUTLET & SUIT MANIFOLD TEMPERATURES START INCREASING 23:31:16.0
-- CMD & SRP SUiT FLOWS TO LOWER LIMIT 23:31:16.3
1 [_ ACCUMULATOR QUANTITY INCREASING GLYCOL PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE TO UPPER LIMIT (HEAT RESP(
_ PLT ACCUMULATOR
SUIT FLOW STARTS QUANTITYFLUC AT
TUAT,NG UPPER 23:3, LIMIT
:16.2 23:31:17:1
'_ ' I _ GLYCOL EVAPORATOR L'QU'D TEMPERATURE 'NCREASES 1" F 23:31:17.5
BOOSTER G & N O
f
I ERCS JET ACTION INDICATED ON P R 23:31:20
PITCH RATE OSCILLATES FROM 23:31:14.5 TO 23:31:20.3

--3
TO 23:31:20.3
SEI
\
23:33:00
AIR/GROUND VOICE
COMMUNICATIONS
INSTRUMENTATION
POWER'O_'VER,_,ED23:32:47.4 ELECTRICAL
o_M,,,oEo'o_
_'23:32:_6.4 i], POiER
ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROL SYSTEM
GUIDANCE AND
NAVIGATION
3:31:45
STABILIZATION AND
CONTROL SYSTEM
NCE OF EVENTS
AERIAL DRAWING OF LAUNCH COMPLEX 34
OPERATIONS SUPPORT
BUILDING
SERVICE STRUCTURE
PARKED IN LAUNCH POSITION)
HIGH PRESSURE
GAS FACILITY
LAUNCH CONTROL
CENTER
BLOC KHOUSE)
P RESCUE VEHICLE
REVETMENT
UMBILICAL
,.-i
m
LOX FACILITY
m
.<
EMERGENCY VEHICLE ROUTE

EMERGENCY VEHICLE ROUTE
GH2 FACILITY
SKIMMING POND
& BURN STACK'
FUEL FACILITY (RP- 1)
_LLH 2 BURN POND __
LH 2 FACILITY
4-12
VIEW OF SPACECRAFT LAUNCH VEHICLE IN SERVICE STRUCTURE
WITH ACCESS ARMS EXTENDED
LAUNCH ESCAPE SYSTEM _ "" Jl _
COMMAND MOD
SPACECRAFT LM ADAPTER ,
UMBILICAL TOWER
INSTRUMENT UNIT
I===
_1_t=11 I:::::::
SERVICE STRUCTURE
ENCLOSURE IV-3
4-13
4-14
LC-34 EGRESS ROUTE FOR ASTRONAUTS
UMBILICAL TOWER LAUNCH
\ C ESCAPE
SYSTEM
_J
WHITE
SWING ARM
(ACCESS ARM)
rrl
Z
t_
I-
0
eft _ ...-. _" FLOOR
c
m I _i ,I I, :
I i '__.... I LINE
i.;111 hi I: I,,
!II1_iIi[lli/l!ll_,,_
,
/ !,!I,!I!i!i!!!!!
!_
SERVICE
h'lllilllrl',l_
.¸ MODULE
SPACECRAFT
UMBILICAL
ARM
4-16
VIEW OF COMMAND MODULE MOCKUP INTERIOR LESS COUCHES
261-101 0 - 67 - 9 ENCLOSURE IV-5

ORIG_NAL PAGE tS
OF PCOR Q_A_LFFY
VIEW OF COMMAND MODULE MOCKUP INTERIOR, COUCHES INSTALLED
ENCLOSURE IV-6
I:
o_
PART V
INVESTIGATION
AND
ANALYSIS
PART V. INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSES
1. INSPECTION AND DISASSEMBLY
Immediately after the accident additional security personnel were positioned at Launch Complex 34
and the Complex was impounded. Prior to disturbing any evidence numerous external and internal photo-
graphs were taken of the spacecraft. After crew removal, two experts entered the Command Module to
verify switch positions. Small groups of NASA and North American Aviation management, Apollo 204
Review Board Members, Representatives and Consultants inspected the exterior of Spacecraft 012. On
January 28, 1967 an astronaut entered the Command Module to verify additional switch positions needed
to clarify data.
The Board established procedures for disassembly of Spacecraft 0 12. The first step of disassembly
wa_ to establish safe working conditions at the spacecraft. This was accomplished by: (1)
removal of the Launch Escape System, (2) removal of safetying of all pyrotechnics, (3) examina-
tion of spacecraft structure for integrity, (4) examination of all pressure vessels for potential
hazards, and (5) Sampfing of spacecratt atmosphere for harmful contaminants. After safe working
conditions were established disassembly proceeded. A series of close-up stereo photographs of the
Command Module was taken to document the as-found condition of the spacecraft systems.
The task of searching the physical evidence was difficult and time-consuming because of the small
entrance and confined area of the Command Module. In order to remove the components as quickly
as possible, two persons at a time were permitted to enter the Command Module for component removal.
After the removal of each component, photographs were taken of the exposed area. This step-by-step
photography was used throughout the disassembly of the spacecraft ( Enclosures 1 through 11). Approxi-
mately 5000 photographs were taken.
After the couches were removed, a special false floor with removable 18-inch transparent squares
was suspended from the existing couch strut fittings to provide access to the entire inside of the
Command Module without disturbing evidence (Enclosure 12). A detailed inspection of the spacecraft
interior was then performed followed by the preparation and approval by the Board of a Command
Module disassembly plan. Command Module 014 was shipped to KSC on February 1, 1967 to assist
the Apollo 204 Review Board in the investigation. This Command Module was placed in the Pyro-
technics Installation Building and was used to develop disassembly techniques for selected components
prior to their removal from Command Module 012.
By February 7, 1967 the disassembly plan was fully operational. The concentrated effort of
organized and coordinated component removal continued on a three-shift seven-day-a-week basis. All
suspect circumstances or conditions were brought to the attention of the Apollo 204 Review Board.
All interfaces such as electrical connectors, tubing joints, physical mounting of components, etc.
were closely inspected and photographed immediately prior to, during and after disassembly. Each
item removed from the Command Module was appropriately tagged, sealed in clean plastic containers
and transported under the required security to bonded storage (Enclosure 13).
On February 17, 1967 the Board decided that removal and wiring tests had progressed
to a point which allowed moving the Command Module without disturbing evidence. The Command
Module was moved to the Pyrotechnics Installation Building at KSC where better working conditions
were available.
5-1
With improved working conditions, it was found that a work scheduleof two eight-hourshifts
per day for six daysa weekwassufficientto keeppacewith the analysisand disassemblyplanning.
The only exceptionto this was a three-dayperiod of three eight-hourshiftsper day usedto remove
the aft heat shield, move the CommandModule to a more convenientwork stationand removethe
crew compartmentheat shield(Enclosure14 and 15). The disassembly of the CommandModule was
completedon March27, 1967.
Fromthe beginningof disassembly,actionwastakento catalogandplace on display the hundredsof

items that wouldbe removed from the Command Module. The Pyrotechnics Installation Building was as-
signed to the Board for this purpose. A bonded storage room was established to receive and catalog com-
ponents as they were removed. Command Module components were then displayed in a bonded area. The
purpose of this areawas to permit investigators to make visual examination of Command Module components
(Enclosure 16) • During the course of the disassembly over 1000 items were removed from the Com_nand
Module. A list of all removed components was maintained and distributed weekly to the Board. This list
identified the location of components in the Pyrotechnics Installation Building as well as those under-
going further analyses and tests at other locations.
Throughout the disassembly operation, experts meticulously studied the exposed portions of the
Command Module. The relative consumption of combustibles and sooting patterns were studied for
clues as to the site of the ignition source. All structural elements, covers and panels were examined
for evidence of association with the ignition. Component systems and parts were studied inch by inch
with magnifying glasses and frequently parts were taken into the laboratory for microscopic or metal-
lurgical analyses. Wire bundles were given particular attention and after separation, the individual
wires were examined'under 7 power magnification for sites of possible arcing.
All components that showed evidence of abnormal fire effects were examined internally and many
were tested for functionality. Many components showed burning of internal insulation or potting ma-
terial but in all cases they were exonerated on the basis of direction of flame travel or on the basis
that there could be no communication with combustibles outside the component. Particularly suspect
components were disassembled for detailed examination and analyses. All of the data developed by
these visual and laboratory examinations were coordinated in making the final analysis as to prob-
able ignition sources.
2. CHRONOLOGY OF THE FIRE
It is most likely that the fire began in the lower forward portion of the left-hand equipment bay.
This would place the origin to the left of the Command Pilot, and considerably below the level
of his couch.
Once initiated, the fire burned in three stages. The first stage with its associated rapid temperature
rise and increase in cabin pressure, terminated approximately 15 seconds after the verbal report of fire.
At this time (about 23:31:19 GMT) the pressure vessel, which constitutes the Command Module cabin,
ruptured. During this first stage of the fire, flames moved rapidly from the point of ignition, travel-
ing along the Raschel net debris traps which were installed in the Command Module to prevent items
from dropping into equipment areas during tests or flight. At the same time, Velcro strips positioned
near the ignition point also burned.
Based upon pressure and temperature measurements taken during the fire, the fire was not intense
until about 23:31:12 GMT. The slow rate of buildup of the fire during the early portion of ,the first
stage is consistent with the view that ignition occurred in a zone containing little combustible material.
The slow rise of pressure could also result from absorption of most of the heat by the aluminum struc-
ture of the Command Module. The original flames rose vertically and then spread out across the
cabin ceiling. The debris traps provided not only combustible material and a path for the spread
of the flames but also firebrands of burning molten nylon. The scattering of these firebrands con-
tributed to the spread of the flames.
5-2
By 23:31:12 GMT the fire had broken from its point of origin. Evidence is strong that a wall
of flames extended along the left wall of the module, preventing the Command Pilot, occupying the
left hand couch from reaching the valve which would vent the Command Module to the outside at-
mosphere. Although operation of this valve, located on a shelf above the left hand equipment bay,
is the first step in established emergency egress procedures, such action would have been to no avail
because the venting capacity was insufficient to prevent the rapid build-up of pressure due to the fire.
It is estimated that opening the valve would have delayed Command Module rupture by less than
one second.
Emergency procedures called for the Senior Pilot, occupying the center couch, to unlatch and re-
move the hatch while retaining his harness buckled. A number of witnesses who observed the tele-
vision picture of the Command Module hatch window during this stage of the fire discerned motion
that suggests that the Senior Pilot was reaching for the inner hatch handle. The Senior Pilot's har-
ness buckle was found unopened after the fire indicating that he initiated the standard hatch opening
procedure. Data from the Guidance and Navigation System indicate considerable activity within the
Command Module after the fire was discovered. This activity is consistent with movement of the cxew
prompted by proximity of the fire or with the undertaking of standard emergency egress procedures.
The Command Module is designed to withstand an internal pressure of approximately 13 pounds

per square inch above external pressure without rupturing. Data recorded during the fire show that
this design criteria was exceeded late in the first stage of the fire and that rupture occurred at about
23:31:19 GMT. The point of rupture was where the floor or aft bulkhead of the Command Module joins
the wall, essentially opposite the point of origin of the fire. About three seconds before rupture,
the final crew communication began at 23:31::16.8 GMT. This communication ended shortly after
rupture at 23:31:21.8 GMT (a detailed discussion of the two voice transmissions during the fire
is given in a subsequent section) .
Rupture of the Command Module marked the beginning of the brief second stage of the fire.
This stage is characterized by the period of greatest conflagration due to the forced convection that re-
suited from the outrush of gases through the rupture in the pressure vessel. The swirling flow scat-
tered firebrands throughout the crew compartment spreading the fire. This stage of the fire ended
at approximately 23:31:25 GMT. Evidence that the fire spread from the left hand side of the Com-
mand Module toward the rupture area was found on subsequent examination of the module. For
example, the leg rest control handle on the left side of the left hand couch is fabricated from alumi-
num tubing. Tongues of flame pouring over the control handle melted its left side. However, a
nylon button at the base of the handle was unconsumed and only slightly deformed. Similarly, flames
spreading across the floor beneath the couches caused more burning on the left side of three nylon
helmet covers than on the right. The underside of the couches above the helmet covers was rela-
tively unsooted. A lack of soot indicates a fire of only short duration beneath the couches some time
after the couch structure had become heated. Further, storage boxes situated on the floor were dam-
aged only slightly. Fire across the floor of the spacecraft lasted but a few seconds and spread from
left to right.
Damage to the crew suits is also indicative of the spread of the fire from left to right. The Com-
mand Pilot's suit was damaged worst while the Senior Pilot's and Pilot's suits sustained progressively
less damage.
Evidence of the intensity of the fire includes burst and burned aluminum tubes in the oxygen
and coolant systems at floor level.
The pressure in the Command Module is estimated to have dropped to atmospheric pressure five
or six seconds after rupture. The third and final stage of the fire began at about 23:31:25 GMT.
The third stage was characterized by rapid production of high concentrations of carbon monox-
ide. Following the loss of pressure in the Command Module and with fire now throughout the crew
compartment, the remaining atmosphere quickly became deficient in oxygen so that it could not sup-
5-3
port continued combustion. Unlike the earlier stageswhere the flame wasrelativelysmokeless,
heavy
smokenow formedand largeamountsof sootwere depositedon mostspacecraftinterior surfacesas they
cooled. The third stageof the fire could not havelastedmore than a few secondsbecauseof the
rapid depletion of oxygen. It is estimatedthat the CommandModule atmospherewaslethal by 23:
31:30GMT, five seconds afterthestartof the third stage.
Although most of the fire inside the Command Module became extinguished shortly because of
lack of oxygen, a localized, intense fire lingered in the area of the Environmental Control Unit. This
unit is located in the left hand equipment bay, near the point where the fire is believed to have
started. Failed oxygen and water/glycol lines in this area continued to supply oxygen and fuel to
support the localized fire that melted the aft bulkhead and burned adjacent portions of the inner sur-
face of the Command Module heat shield.
The loss of telemetry data at 23:31:22.4 GMT during the second phase of the fire makes deter-
mination of precise times of subsequent occurrences impossible. Thus all further times arebased
on less precise evidence such as entries in logs maintained by personnel monitoring various facets
of the activity, review of voice tapes maintained of conversations between the Pad Leader and blockhouse
monitors, and where so indicated, witness estimates.
3. DATA ANALYSES
a. SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION
All data have been analyzed by the panels and the Board with frequent help from consultants and out-
side specialist groups. Specific tests of Spacecraft 012 equipment were initiated on approval by the
Board where results would contribute to an understanding of the cause of the accident.
A summary of these results follows.

b. ANALYSES OF RELEVANT TIME LINES
Enclosure 17 displays significant data that were obtained just prior to the report of the fire
by the astronaut crew. These time lines cover the period of one minute before the fire report
until all data signals were lost. The data shown includes signals from the gas chromatograph
channel, the voltage of the AC bus 2, the C-band beacon, the VHF telemetry carrier, the flow
of oxygen into the suit loop, various indicators of spacecraft motion, the biomedical data from the
Senior Pilot, and audio signals (voice and noise)received on the S-band communication link. An
analysis of each item and a summary of their correlation follows.
(1) Gas Chromatograph Telemetry Data Anomaly

The gas chromatograph was not installed for the Plugs Out Test and the connector that
carried the telemetry data signals and the required AC power was open ended and was placed
on the gas chromatograph shelf prior to the test. Power to the AC line in the connector
was turned on during the test as required by the test plan.
A careful examination of the data records disclosed activity on this channel eight times
up to and including the activity shown at approximately 23:30:50 GMT. Subsequent test-
ing has demonstrated that the telemetry data lead in the connector has the characteristics
of an antenna, and consequently can detect changes in electromagnetic fields within th e space-
craft. Movement of this cable within a constant electromagnetic field will also produce sig-
nals of the magnitude observed during the Spacecraft 012 accident.
The disturbance at approximately 23:30:50 GMT indicates that such a change in the
electromagnetic field took place. This change could have resulted from movement of the
5-4
connector. Evidence indicates that although the connector was not in its originally stored
position after the accident, it probably was there during the initial stages of the fire.
(2) AC Bus 2 Voltage Anomaly
A momentary increase in AC bus 2 voltage on all three phases was noted at approxi-
mately 9 seconds before the report of fire, and at the same time telemetry data from equip-
ment powered from AC bus 2 showed abnormalties. These were:
1. Dropout of C-band decoder and transmitter outputs for 1.7 seconds.
2. Momentary dropout of VHF-FM transmitter.
3. Fluctuation of rotation controller null outputs.
4. Gas chromatograph telemetry signal transient. Other equipment connected to AC
bus 2 at this time had no data monitoring capability that would detect effects of power tran-
sients.
The power distribution system was in the standard configuration at the time of the ano-
maly. DC bus A was receiving power from the ground DC "A" power supply. This power
supply in turn powered AC bus 1 through inverter no. 1. Similarly DC bus B received power
from the DC "B" power supply and powered AC bus 2 through inverter no. 2.
A possible explanation for dropout of the C-band decoder and transmitter, the inter-
ruption of the VHF-FM transmitter and rise in AC bus 2 voltage follows. The post-landing
bus supplies power through a single conductor and circuit breaker to the power relay holding
coils for both the C-band beacon and the VHF-FM transmitter. Temporary loss of voltage
to the relay holding coils by unknown cause, would temporarily interrupt power to the C-
band decoder and VHF-FM transmitter. The resulting transient to the voltage level on AC
bus 9. could account for other measured phenomena.
The most probable cause of the AC bus 2 transient and associated indications was a
momentary short or interruption of DC bus B. Analyses and subsequent testing correlate
with this conclusion as follows:
(a) AC Bus Transient

This high voltage indication can be interpreted as evidence of a momentary drop
of DC voltage input to the inverter which results in a drop in AC output and a subse-
quent overshoot upon recovery. First indication of a disturbance was noted during
apparent recovery. The voltage decrease was not seen because the channel was sampled
only ten times a second.
(b) C-band Beacon Dropout
The 1.7 second dropout observed is the minimum recovery time of the protective
circuit internal to the beacon. A momentary interruption of AC bus 2 power for a peri-
od as short as 10 milliseconds would cause the C-band beacon dropout. These results
were verified by special tests on a C-band beacon similar to the one used in Spacecraft
012. The most probable cause of the beacon dropout was a momentary loss of AC in-
put power to the beacon particularly since the transponder dropout was coincident with
a transient on the AC 2 bus and the beacon performed normally after recovery from
the dropout until loss of data.
(c) VHF-FM Transmitter Signal Dropout
The RF carrier dropout was observed by all monitoring ground stations and the dura-
tion of the dropout was approximately 20 milliseconds. The recorded data wave train
from the VHF-FM transmitter also indicated dropout. A dropout of this rmture has been
duplicated by several special tests with a similar transmitter under similar conditions.
Because the VHF transmitter recovered, the most probable cause of the dropout was
a momentary interruption of the AC input power.
(d) Rotation Controller Null Output Transients

Momentary transients were noted on each of the three control axes. The rotation
controller, whose output was reading slightly off null just prior to the anomaly (the con-
troller was pinned), was supplied by phase A of AC bus 2. Transient voltages on the
5-5
phaseA bus would mostlikely be detectedon the controller output. Special tests have
shown that the null output transients experienced can be duplicated by a momentary _
interruption of AC bus 2 phase power.
(e) Gas Chromatograph Telemetry Signal Transient
As previously discussed this transient could result from a change in the electromag-
netic field. Such a change in the electromagnetic field could also be the result of dec-
tric arcing.
(3) Anomalies in Oxygen Flow
Enclosure 18 is a schematic of the suit loop. Oxygen is normally suppliec_ from the
surge tank and the service module cryogenic storage tanks through an oxygen regulator which
controls the supply pressure to approximately 100 psig. An oxygen flow transducer is in-
stalled in the supply line downstream of the oxygen regulator and oxygen is supplied to the
suit loop through a demand regulator. The oxygen in the suit loop is circulated to the three
astronauts through three separate branches. Each branch has an individual flow rate transducer:
The flow rate of oxygen started to increase approximately 40 seconds before the reported
fire. The output limit or saturation of the flow transducer, which corresponds to a flow
of 1.033 pounds per hour, was reached approximately 5 seconds before the first fire report.
The oxygen flow transducer stayed in this saturated condition until loss of data occurred.
The Caution and Warning Alarm was actuated 15 seconds after the oxygen flow exceeded
one pound per hour. This delay is normal and prevents actuation of the Caution and Warn-
ing Alarm during normal short duration, high flow conditions.
The stable oxygen surge tank pressure, coupled with the normal oxygen regulated pres-
sure, indicates that oxygen flow rate was not greater than 3 to 6 pounds per hour until ap-
proximately 7 seconds after the first fire report. Beyond that time the oxygen flow rate was
much higher.
The initial flow rate increase is probably due to crew movement which normally results
in increased leakage to the cabin at low differential pressure conditions. Enclosure 19 shows
that at approximately 23:31:03 GMT the oxygen flow had increased to the suit loop to the
extent that the pressure differentials across the suits and compressor were increasing. There
was an indication that suit circuit flow through the Senior Pilot's suit was interrupted for
about two seconds at approximately 23:31:09 GMT. This interruption further irL-
creased the pressure differentials in the circuit. The interruption in flow to the Senior Pilot's
suit is not completely understood; however, it probably was caused by manipulation of the
suit hoses or associated controls.
(4) Indications of Spacecraft Motion
A number of individual signals were received which are indicative of slight motions of
the spacecraft within the last minute prior to the first fire report. These signals were of a
random nature and are similar to signals that were obtained from the spacecraft during known
crew movement.
These signals included corrective torque signals to the gyrocompasses in the Inertial Measur
ing Unit, a brushing or tapping of the Command Pilot's live microphone, the previously
mentioned increase in oxygen flow attributed to suit leakage and an increase in the attention
level of the Senior Pilot most noticeable between 23:30:30 GMT and 23:30:45 GMT. The
Senior Pilot was the only member of the crew from whom biomedical data were recorded.
The nature of activity of the crew during this period could not be determined.
(5) S-Band Transmissions
There were no voice transmissions from the spacecraft from 23:30:14 GMT until the
first indication of fire in the spacecraft by the crew. During this time the Command Pilot
had a live microphone condition as noted previously. Two voice transmissions were subse-
quently received. The first of these was the first indication of the existence of a fire by
the crew.
5-6
(a) The Live MicrophoneAnomaly
Voice tape analysesand instrumentaiondata recordsshowthat a live microphone,
constant-keyingcondition,existedfromthe CommandPilot positionduring a considerable
portion of the final test period. This conditionapparentlydid not exist beyondthe first
of the final two voicetransmissions
from the spacecraft.
Audio circuits are normally actuatedby a crewmanpressinghis Push-to-Talk(PTT)
button on the cobra cable or in the CommandPilot's case by pressing his con-
troller PTT or hiscobracablePTT button (Enclosure20). This actionservesto ground
the microphoneamplifier in the individual crewman'saudio panel as well as the diode
gate in the audio center on the S-bandaudio output. Thesefunctionsallow signalsto
modulatethe S-bandtransmitter.
The problem has been isolatedto the PT-F or keying line that runs betweenthe
cobra cable, translation controller, CommandPilot audio control panel and the audio
center. Crew attempts to isolatethe problemwereunsuccessful althoughthe Command
Pilot's cobra cablewas absolvedafter troubleshooting.Subsequenttestinghas alsofailed
to disclosethe causeof this problem.
Power limitations and subsequenttesting of this circuitry indicatesthat sufficient
current cannot be carried by this keying circuitry for it to be considereda possibleigni-
tion source.
(b) VoiceTransmissions
The final two voice transmissions were madeon S-band. No voicecommunications
on VHF were madefrom the spacecraftduring this period. The first transmissions lasted
from 23:31:04.7 GMT through 23:31:10GMT and the secondlastedfrom 23:31:16.8
GMT through 23:31:21.8GMT. The tape recordingsof thesetransmissions havebeen
analyzedextensivelyandthe resultsarepresentedsubsequently.
(6) CabinPressure Rise
The cabin pressurefor the period from first report of the fire through lossof signal
is shownin Enclosure21.
First indication by either the cabin pressureor battery compartment(opento the
cabin) sensorsof a pressureincrease occurred at approximately 23:21:11 GMT or about
6 seconds after the crew first reported the fire. The pressure exceeded the range of these
transducers, 17 pounds per square inch absolute (psia) for the cabin and 21 psia for the
battery compartment transducers by 23:31:16 GMT. Data from this time until loss of
signal were derived from the response of Guidance and Navigation equipment to the
different pressure changes. The cabin ruptured at a time of about 23:31:19 GMT and at
a pressure of at least 29 psia.
Rupture occurred in the +Y, -Z quadrant and the resulting jet of hot gases caused
extensive damage to the exterior structure (Enclosures 22 through 25)
(7) Summary of Relevant Events
Between 30 and 45 seconds prior to the report of fire, both the Command Pilot and Senior
Pilot were active. The nature and level of the activity remain unknown. Except for the
transients in data measurements that occurred approximately 9 seconds prior to the report
of the fire, there are no other identified relevant events that preceded the fire. It should
be noted that these data transients and subsequent activity of the crew may as easily be as-
sociated with the result of the fire as with the cause.
The increase in oxygen flow to the suit loop prior to and immediately following the
report of the fire and its effect on the pressure distribution within the suit loop is the re-
sult of normal demand regulator response to oxygen leaking from the circuit to the cabin.
This is further compounded by the response of the regulator to the rise in cabin pressure.
5-7
c. ANALYSESOF CREW VOICE TRANSMISSION DURING THE FIRE
The tape transcriptsof the voicetapesfrom the CommandModule during the period of the
fire have been analyzedextensively.Theseanalysesincluded a reviewof all transmissions prior to
the fire that were made by the crew during the test in an attempt to aid in the determination
of who madetheselast two transmissions and what was said. Theseanalysesweremadeby NASA
personnelfamiliar with the communicationsystems,the crew and their voice characteristics, the
sequenceof eventsbefore, duringand after the fire as determinedduringthe investigation. The
Boardalso reviewedthesetransmissions.Expertsat the Bell TelephoneLaboratories perforr_ed ex-
tensive analyses of the tape record..
Except for a portion of the first transmission which is quite clear, the remainder of the transmissions is
not clear and it is impossible to define exactly what was said by the crew.
T_r0 points made by the Bell Telephone Laboratory experts should be noted:
1. The present state,of-the-art of analyses of voice records is such that little if 'anything can be
determined as to what was said if the recording is not sufficiently clear to be intelligible by listen-
ing alone. Analyses can provide some clues as to who may have made the transmissions; however,
these clues are not definitive.
2. When the recording of the transmission is not clear, there will be nearly as many interpre-
tations of what was said as there are qualified listeners.
A summary of various interpretations of these transmissions is made in the following paragraphs.
The analysis of the first transmission is as follows:

This transmission began at 23:31:04.7 GMT with an exclamatory remark. This trans-
mission is not clear. Listeners believe this initial remark was "Hey" or "Fire" but this is
not certain.
Some listeners believe and laboratory analysis supports this belief that this transmission was
made by the Command Pilot. This remark is followed by a short period of noise (bumping
sound, etc.).
The second portion of this first transmission begins at 23:31:06.2 GMT with an unclear word.
Most listeners believe the first word to be one of the following:
'"I've"
"We've"
The remainder of this transmission is quite clear and is: "...Got a fire in the cockpit' ', followed
by a clipped word sounding like "Vheh", which ended at 29:31:10 GMT. Many listeners believed
this transmission was made by the Pilot and laboratory analyses tend to support this belief. How-
ever, no firm conclusion can be drawn.
The analysis of the second transmission is as follows:

Following a 6.8 second period of no transmission, the second transmission began at 23:31:
16.8 GMT and ended at 23:31:21.8 GMT. The entire second transmission is garbled and is,
therefore, subject to wide variation of interpretation as to content and as to who made the
transmission and no definitive transcription is possible.
The general content of this transmission consists of what appears to be three separate
phrases. It has been interpreted several ways by many listeners. The following is a list of some
of the interpretations that have been made:
1. "They're fighting a bad fire - Let's get out .... Open 'er up."
2. "We've got a bad fire - Let's get out .... We're burning up."
3. "I'm reporting a bad fire .... I'm getting out .... "
5-8
This transmissionendedwith a cry of pain. Somelistenersbelievethis transmissionwasmade
by the Pilot.
It shouldbe notedthat:
1.The total duration of these two transmissionwas brief, lasting 10.3 seconds;the first
lasted5.3 secondsand the secondlasted 5.0 seconds,with a 6.8 secondperiod of no trans-
mission.
2. The transmissionsprovide evidenceonly of the time the crew first reportedthe exis_
tenceof the fire anddo not provideany direct information as to the causeof the fire.
d. MEDICAL ANALYSES
Lossof conciousness was due to cerebralhypoxia due to cardiac arrestresultingfrom myo-
cardial hypoxia. Factorsof temperature,pressureand environmentalconcenrationsof carbon mo-
noxide, carbon dioxide, oxygen and pulmanary irritants were changingextremelyrapidly. It is
impossibleto integratethesevariablesonthe basisof availableinformationwith the dynamicphysi-
ological and metabolicconditionsthey produced,in order to arrive at a precisestatementof time
when conciousnesswas lost and when death supervened.The combinedeffectof theseenviron-
mental factors dramatically increasedthe lethal effectof any factor by itself. It is estimatedthat
consciousnesswas lost between15 and 30 secondsafter the first suit failed. Chancesof resusci-
tation decreasedrapidly thereafterandwereirrevocablylost within 4 minutes.
4. CAUSEOF THE APOLLO 204FIRE

The fire in Apollo 204 was most probably brought about by someminor malfunctionor failure
of equipmentor wire insulation.This failure, which mostlikely will neverbe positivelyidentified, ini-
tiated a sequenceof eventsthat culminatedin the conflagration.
A great deal of effort has been expended in an attempt to find this specific initiator. Although un-
successful in this search, this effort has produced a fairly good understanding of the types of things that
may have been the initiator and the types of things that probably could not have been the initiator.
Electrostatic discharge, spontaneous combustion of flammable material, mechanically produced heat

by machinery and heat from the impact of a struck object have been eliminated as reasonable possibi-
lities of ignition of the fire. The flow of oxygen through orifices or metering valves can create heat
through the excitation of resonating frequencies in the gas. However, a thorough examination of the
hardware and evaluation of recorded performance of the equipment eliminates the energy of flowing
oxygen as a possible initiator.
The most obvious source of energy needed to initiate the fire existed in the spacecraft's power
distribution system. Current carrying wires were distributed through out every major region of the
Command Module. The most likely ways in which electrical power can initiate a fire are the following:
1. Through malfunction of the equipment being powered which in turn ignites or initiates a fire
in nearby combustibles.
2. Overload in the conductor resulting from shorts in equipment or wiring. This overload will
cause the conductor to overheat and ignite nearby combustibles (Enclosure 26).
3. Electric arcs that are created when the insulation is defeated between power carrying con-
ductors and the spacecraft structure or equipment.
A large majority of the wires were left undamaged. However, there were a number of cases where
exposed wire showed extensive burning, overheating or complete destruction. There were also several
places where pitting of exposed conductors and adjacent structure indicate that an electric arc had
occured.
a. MALFUNCTION OF ELECTRICAL POWERED EQUIPMENT
After removal from the spacecraft, each component or subassembly was critically examined
to determine whether or not it could be associated with the initiation of the fire. The vast
5-9
majority of thesecould be classifiedas non-initiatorson the basisof externalexaminationand
recordedperformance.If, however,there was any suspicionthat an item was involvedwith
the initiation of the fire, it was subjected to intensive scrutiny that involved one
or more of the following procedures:Laboratoryanalysisof damage,electricalcontinuity and
resistancetests, functional performanceusing establishedproceduresfor "bench checks"and,
carefuldisassembly which includedrepeatingsomeof the abovestepson individual parts of the
assembly.The resultsof this effort led to the conclusionthat none of the electricallypowered
spacecraftsystemsor subassemblies wasassociated with the initiation of the fire.
b. ELECTRICALLY OVERLOADED CONDUCTORS

The Apollo spacecraftwiring is protectedwith Teflon insulation.Teflon waschosenas the insu-
lating material after a seriesof testsclearlyshowedthat it was the leastlikely to burn when over-
heated by shorting. Individual conductorsin a wire bundle using Teflon-insulatedwirescould
be meltedto destructionwithout initiating a sustainedfire in the bundle when locatedin a 100-
percentoxygenatmosphereat 5 psia. The Teflon-insulatingmaterial provideda high degreeof fire
protectionto wire bundleswhich may containelectricallyoverloadedwires. Primary protectionto
wiring in the spacecraft,however,wasprovidedby circuit breakersand fuseswhich protectedall
power-carryingconductors.Critical analysesof all circuit breaker installationsshowedthat this
protectionwas providedadequatelywith only a few exceptions.Severalindicationsof shortedwiring
were made the subject of individual detailed investigations.Theseinvestigationshave all proved
negativeexceptfor a few casesthat couldnot be exoneratedcompletely.
c. ELECTRIC ARCS
Teflon has excellentfire resistancebut low resistanceto cold flow. The Teflon coveringon the
wire used in Apollo 204 could be damagedeasilyor penetratedby abrasion.The coveringcould
also be damagedwhen forcedagainstthe structureby poor installation.The Boardfound numer-
ous examplesin the wiring of poor installation,designand workmanship.(An exampleis shownin
Enclosure27 where a wrench socketwas found in the spacecraft.)If a power conductingwire
experiences penetrationof its insulationby the metal structureof the spacecraftor spacecraftcom-
ponents, an instantaneousshort to ground is created at the point of conductorcontact.An arc
or a seriesof arcs betweenconductorand structureresults.The arcing action may be terminated
by the blowing away of moltenmetal at the point of contact,or if sufficientmechanicalpressure
exists,fusion betweenthe conductor and structure may occur to createa continuousshort. The
previous occurrenceof an arc can be determinedthrough examinationof hardwarebecausea
characteristicpit or crater is left atthelocationofcontact.Tests in a 16.5psiaoxygenatmosphere have
shown that sparksblown from arcs can ignite combustiblematerial severalinchesfrom the arc.
Circuit breakersand other practical circuit interrupting devicescannotact rapidly enoughto pre-
vent an arc. Thus, arcs cannot be eliminatedas a potentialsourceof ignition energy.As noted
previously,there were strongdata indicationsof an abrupt, short-durationvoltagedecrease.This is
consistentwith a quickly terminatedarc. During the examinationof hardwareand wiring, parti-
cular emphasiswas placedon locatingcratersnear power cables.While severalsuchcraterswere
found, only one appearedto be linkedcloselyto the time of the fire by other supportingevidence.
A completeinvestigationof the evidenceassociated with this possibleignition sourcehas relegated
it to a low probability. Studiesof fire damagepatternsindicate that the most likely regionfor the
start of the fire is underneaththe lighium hydroxideaccessdoor. Damageis so extensivein this
location that the physical evidenceremaining provideslittle interpretiveinformationiEnclosure
11). Powercable insulationpassingunder this doorwaspotentiallyvulnerableto arbrasionfrom the
corneralong the lower edgeof the door.(Enclosure28 showsthis cable as it is installedon Space-
craft014.)If this cablewerethe cause,it cannotbeprovensinceboththe powercableand the inside
edgeof thedoorwerecompletelydestroyed.Itis mostprobablethatthe fire was initiated by an elec-
tric arc either in this location or in someother regionnear the EnvironmentalControl Unit.
Other poweredcablesin the EnvironmentalControl Unit may havebeen the sourcebut extensive
destructionof themprecludesa positivedetermination.The time of initiation probablycoincideswith
the spacecraftpowerinterruptionat 23:30:55GMT.
5-10
The Board's investigation was facilitated by the wide application of simulation techniques.
The consequences of several types of electrical faults were studied in this way. The most valuable
simulation, however, employed full-scale fire tests in a boilerplate mock-up with combustibles arrang-
ed in the configuration of Command Module 012. These tests were conducted by MSC for the
Board. Ignition was obtained by a hot wire in the general area in which ignition is suspected to
have occurred in the fire and provisions were made for simulating rupture at proper time and
location.
Total time of the fire and the pressure history reproduced those of the fire quite closely thus
adding confidence to the deduced origin and mode of propagation of the fire. Such simulation
techniques should be applied in examining the fire hazards of future spacecraft. They provide a
reliable means of assessing fire hazards. They have also demonstrated that laboratory tests on small
samples may give misleading results.
d. EFFECT OF COOLANT ON ELECTRICAL WIRES AND EQUIPMENT
The discussion of possible electric power distribution malfunctions in Apollo 204 cannot be
complete without inclusion of the effect of Environmental Coolant System coolant leakages. The
Apollo Block I Spacecraft uses RS-89 as a coolant. This coolant is a mixture of 6 2.5 percent eth-
ylene glycol, 35.7 percent water, and 1.8 percent stabilizer and corrosion inhibitor. Although the
mixtureiis not highly combustible, leakage and spillage of this fluid present a considerable fire
hazards. The water evaporates more readily than the ethylene glycol and the inhibitor consists of
two combustible salts which do not evaporate. Consequently, spilled coolant can become a danger-
ous combustible if it is not removed properly. The inhibitor mixture presents a second hazard in that
it is also hygroscopic and electrically conductive. Thus, the residue from coolant that was spilled
and subsequently evaporated, remained slightly wet. This residue is corrosive and may conduct
electricity if it wets electrical wiring or equipment that does not have water-proof insulation. The
conductive path so formed will progressively improve itself as dendrites grow through electrolytic
action. The RS-89 coolant is particularly dangerous in the presence of damaged or improperly in-
sulated electrical equipment and harnesses. During the design of Apollo Block I Spacecraft a de-
cision was made to seal electrical components and connectors. As a result, many of the Spacecraft
012 electrical systems were watertight. ( Block II Spacecraft are designed: to have complete sealing
of electrical equipment and harnesses.)
Coolant in the spacecraft is used to extract heat from the cabin atmosphere and from the
circulation loop to the spacesuits. It also provides direct cooling through coldplates to numerous
pieces of electrically powered equipment. Thus, the cooling system is extensive throughout the Com-
mand Module. The plumbing that carries the coolant is assembled from aluminum tubing utili-
zing both metallurgical (soldered, brazed or welded) and mechanical joints. Numerous plumbing
joints are distributed throughout the spacecraft. It was found that the solder joints were improperly
designed in that strength margins were inadequate to resist damage from unplanned loads. Such
loads may result during equipment installation or when tubing is used as hand-holds or is bumped
by technicians working in the Command Module. The result was that a number of leaks in solder
joints were experienced during the history of all Block I spacecraft. The mechanical joints also had
leakage problems.
There is no substantial evidence that coolant was involved in the initiation of the fire. How-
ever, this coolant, when spilled on damaged electrical wires and equipment, provides both the fuel
and the ignition mechanism to start a fire. This has been demonstrated in laboratory tests.
e. SPACECRAFT ATMOSPHERE
The use of pure oxygen in American spacecraft has been the subject of much consideration.
The use of a diluent gas, either nitrogen or helium, in large proportions would undoubtedly reduce
the risk of fire to a significant degree. At the same time it would introduce other operational prob-
lems and risks. There is no obvious advantage of one diluent over the other, although much pro-
261-101 O- 67- 10 5-1 1

gress has been made in developing the complex technology required for controlling gas concentra-
tions to maintain a proper mixture reliably. This technology is still far from being fully developed.
Furthermore, there are many difficult operational problems that must be solved in a reliable manner
in order to decrease rather than increase the risks before undertaking the use of a two gas system.
The desirable characteristics of a two gas system, however, should not be ignored. The develop-
ment of technology that will warrant confidence in the sue of such a system should be continued.
f. SUMMARY
Although the Board was not able to determine conclusively the specific initiator of the Apollo_
204 fire, it has identified the conditions which led to the disaster. These conditions were:
1. A sealed cabin, pressurized with an oxygen atmosphere.
2. An extensive distribution of combustible materials in the cabin.
3. Vulnerable wiring carrying spacecraft power, i
4. Vulnerable plumbing carrying a combustible and corrosive coolant.
5. Inadequate provisions for the crew to escape.
6. Inadequate provisions for rescue or medical assistance.
Having identified the conditions that led to the disaster, the Board addressed itself to the ques-
tion of how these conditions came to exist. Careful consideration of this question leads the Board
to the conclusion that in its devotion to the many difficult problems of space travel, the Apollo team
failed to give adequate attention to certain mundane but equally vital questions of crew safety.
The Board's investigation revealed many deficiencies in design and engineering, manufacture and
quality control. When these deficiencies are corrected the overall reliability of the Apollo Program
will be increased greatly.
5-12
LIST OF ENCLOSURES
V-1 Photograph -Upper Left-hand Equipment Bay Avove Environmental Control Unit.
V-2 Photograph - Upper Left-hand Forward Corner of Command Module Interior.
V-3 Photograph - Upper Right-hand Forward Corner of Command Module Interior.
V-4 Ph otogra ph - Right-hand Side of Forward Lower Equipment Bay.
V-5 Photograph - Gas Chromatograph Compartment in Lower Left-hand Side of Forward
Equipment Bay (Cameras Laying in Compartment).

V-6 Photograph - Lower Left-hand Forward Corner of Command Module Interior.
V-7 Photograph - Command Module Floor Showing Helmet Covers and Lithium Hydroxide
Canister Storage Box.

V-8 Photograph - Left Rear Corner of Command Module Floor.
V-9 Photograph - Command Module Electrical Panel Showing Isolated Fire Damage.
V-IO Photograph - Environmental Control Unit in Lower Left-hand Equipment Bay.
V-ll Photograph - Close-up of Failed Environmental Control Unit Tubing.

V-12 Photograph - Transparent False Floor Used During Disassembly.
V-13 Photograph - Bonded Storage Area.

V - 14 Photograph - Aft and Crew Compartment Heat Shields After Removal.
V-15 Photograph - Command Module 012 in Final Disassembly Area.

V-16 Photograph - Bonded Area to Display of Removed Command Module Components.
V-17 Time Line of Significant Data.

V-18 Suit Circuit Simplified Schematic.
V-19 Graph Showing Suit Circuit Oxygen Flow Rates.
V -20 Schematic of Audio Push-to-Talk Circuits.
V -21 Time Line Cabin Pressure.
V -22 Drawing of Inner Face Sheet of Aft Bulkhead Showing Ruptured Areas.
V -23 Drawing of Outer Face Sheet of Aft Bulkhead Showing Ruptured Areas.
Y -24 Photograph - Inner View of Aft Heat Shield Showing Damage.

V -25 Photograph - External View of Aft Bulkhead Showing Damage ( View from Bottom) .
V -26 Cut-away View of Command Module Showing Exposed Nonmeta Ilic Materials.
V - 27 Photograph - View of Socket Found Adjacent to Wire Bundles During Disassembly

of Command Module 012.
V -28 Photograph - View of Wire Bundle in Command Module 0 14 Containing DC Power
Leads Passing Over Tubing and Entering Environmental Control Unit. A Similar
Arrangement Existed in Command Module 012.
5-13
:\
5-14
ORiGiNAL PAGE 15
OF pOOR QLLa_TY,
LEFT HAND FORWARD EQUIPMENT BAY
ENCLOSURE V- I
EXTREME UPPER LEFT HAND CORNER BETWEEN LOWER EQUIPMENT BAY
AND LEFT HAND EQUIPMENT BAY
ENCLOSURE V-2
J(,
EXTREME RIGHT HAND CORNER ABOVE LOWER EQUIPMENT BAY AND RIGHT HAND EQUIPMENT BAY
ENCLOSURE V-3
RIGHT HAND SECTION OF LOWER EQUIPMENT BAY
ENCLOSURE V-4
LOWER LEFT HAND SECTION OF LOWER EQUIPMENT BAY
ENCLOSURE V- 5
VIEWOF FLOORBELOWLOWEREQUIPMENTBAY
ENCLOSURE
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ENCLOSURE V- 8
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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
INTERIOR VIEW OF PANEL 13 SHOWING DAMAGE NEAR THUMB WHEELS
ENCLOSURE V-9
VIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL UNIT
ENCLOSURE V-IO
ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROL SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION HARNESSES
AFTER ACCIDENT
ENCLOSURE V-11
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40
_1. CABIN PRESSURE TRANSDUCER

38 (_ PRESSURE DEDUCED FROM G&N CDU GIMBAL ANGLES
X DESIGH ULTIMATE PRESSURE - 12.9 PSI DIFFERENTIAL

36 _ ESTIMATED MAXIMUM
[] ESTIMATED MINIMUM PRESSURE
PRESSURE BASED UPON
PREDICTED ACTUAL
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TIME IN SECONDS AFTER 23 HRS 31 MIN
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ENCLOSURE V-21
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ENCLOSURE V-24
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2_1-101
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5-54
PART VI
FINDINGS, DETERMINATIONS
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
o
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Part VI
BOARD FINDINGS, DETERMINATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this Review, the Board adhered to the principle that reliability of the Command Module and the
entire system involved in its operation is a requirement common to both safety and mission success.
Once the Command Module has left the earth's environment the occupants are totally dependent upon
it for their safety. It follows that protection from fire as a hazard involves much more than quick
egress. The latter has me_it only during test periods on earth when the Command Module is being
readied for its mission and not during the mission itself. The risk of fire must be faced; however,
that risk is only one factor pertaining to the reliability of the Command Module that must received
adequate consideration. Design features and operating procedures that are intended to reduce the
fire risk must not introduce other serious risks to mission success and safety.
1. FINDING:
a. There was a momentary power failure at 23:30:55 GMT.
b. Evidence of several arcs was found in the post fire investigation.
c. No single ignition source of the fire was conclusively identified.
DETERMINATION:
The most probable initiator was an electrical arc in the sector between the -Y and +Z spacecraft
axes. The exact location best fitting the total available information is near the floor in the lower
forward section of the left-hand equipment bay where Environmental Control System (ECS) instrumentat-
ion power wiring leads into the area between the Environmental Control Unit (ECU) and the oxygen
panel. No evidence was discovered that suggested sabotage.
2. FINDING:
a. The Command Module contained many types and classes of combustible material in areas con-
tiguous to possible igntion sources.

b. The test was conducted with a 1-6.7 pounds per square inch absolute, 100 percent oxygen atmos-
phere.
DETERMINATION:
The test conditions were extremely hazardous.
RECOMMENDATION:
The amount and location of combustible materials in the Command Module must be severe!y
restricted and controlled.
g. FINDING:
a. The rapid spread of fire caused an increase in pressure and temperature which resulted in rupture
of the Command Module and creation of a toxic atmosphere. Death of the crew was from asphyxia
due to inhalation of toxic gases due to fire. A contributory cause of death was thermal burns.
b. Non-uniform distribution of carboxyhemoglobin was found by autopsy.
DETERMINATION:
Autopsy data leads to the medical opinion that unconsciousness occurred rapidly and that death
followed soon thereafter.
4. FINDING:
Due to internal pressure, the Command Module inner hatch could not be opened prior to rupture
of the Command Module.
DETERMINATION:
The crew was never capable of effecting emergency egress because of the pressurization before
rupture and their loss of consciousness soon after rupture.
RECOMMENDATION:
The time required for egress of the crew be reduced and the operations necessary for egress be
simplified.
5. FINDING:
Those organizations responsible for the planning, conduct and safety of this test failed to identify
it as being hazardous. Contingency preparations to permit escape or rescue of the crew from an internal
Command Module fire were not made.
a. No procedures for this type of emergency had been established either 'for the crew or for the
spacecraft pad work team.
b. The emergency equipment located in the White Room and on the spacecraft work levels was not
6-1
designed for the smoke condition resulting from a fire of this nature.
c. Emergency fire, rescue and medical teams were not in attendance.
d. Both the spacecraft work levels and the umbilical tower access arm contain features such as steps,
sliding doors and sharp turns in the egress paths which hinder emergency operations.
DETERMINATION:
Adequate safety precautions were neither established nor observed for this test.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
a. Management continually monitor the safety of all test operations and assure the adequacy of
emergency procedures.
b. All emergency equipment (breathing apparatus, protective clothing, deluge systems, access arm,
etc.) be reviewed for adequacy
c. Personnel training and practice for emergency procedures be given on a regular basis and reviewed
prior to the conduct of a hazardous operation.
d. Service structures and umbilical towers be modified to facilitate emergency operations.
6. FINDING:
Frequent interruptions and failures had been experienced in the overall communication system during
the operations preceding the accident.
DETERMINATION:
The overall communication system was unsatisfactory.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
a. The Ground Communication System be improved to assure reliable communications between
all test elements as soon as possible and before the next manned flight.
b. A detailed design review be conducted on the entire spacecraft communication system.
7. FINDING:
a. Revisions to the Operational Checkout Procedure for the test were issued at 5:S0 pm EST January
26, 1967 (209 pages) and 10:00 am EST January 27, 1967 (4 pages).
b. Differences existed between the Ground Test Procedures and the In-Flight Check Lists.
DETERMINATION:
Neither the revision nor the differences contributed to the accident. The late issuance of the
revision, however, prevented test personnel from becoming adequately familiar with the test procedure
prior to its use.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
a. Test Procedures and Pilot's Checklists that represent the actual ,Command Module configuration
be published in final 'form and reviewed early enough to permit adequate preparation and participation
of all test organization.
b. Timely distribution of test procedures and major changes be made a constraint to the beginning
of ar/y test.
8. FINDING:
The fire in Command Module 012 was subsequently simulated closely by a test fire in a full-scale
mock-up.
DETERMINATION:
Full-scale mock-up fire tests can be used to give a realistic appraisal of fire risks in flight-configured
spacecraft.
RECOMMENDATION:
Full-scale mock-ups in flight configuration be tested to determine the risk of fire.
9. FINDING:
The Command Module Environmental Control System design provides a pure oxygen atmosphere :.
DETERMINATION:
This atmosphere presents severe fire hazards if the amount and location of combustibles in the Com-
mand Module are not restricted and controlled.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
a. The fire safety of the reconfigured Command Module be established by full-scale mock-up tests.
b. Studies of the use of a diluent gas be continued with particular reference to assessing the problems
of gas detection and control and the risk of additional operations that would be required in the use
of a two gas atmosphere.
6-2
10. FINDING:
Deficiencies existed in Command Module design, workmanship and quality control, such as:
a. Components of the Environmental Control System installed in Command Module 012 had a
history of many removals and of technical difficulties including regulator failures, line failures and
Environmental Control Unit failures. The design and installation features of the Environmental Control
Unit makes removal or repair difficult.
b. Coolant leakage at solder joints has been a chronic problem.
c. The coolant is both corrosive and combustible.
d. Deficiencies in design, manufacture, installation, rework and quality control existed in the _elec-
trical wiring.
e. No vibration test was made of a complete flight-configured spacecraft.
f. Spacecraft design and operating procedures currently require the disconnecting of electrical con-
nections while powered.
g. No design features for fire protection were incorporated.
DETERMINATION:
These deficiencies created an unnecessarily hazardous condition and their continuation would im-
peril any future Apollo operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
a. An in-depth review of all elements, components and assemblies of the Environmental Control
System be conducted to assure its functional and structural integrity and to minimize its contribution
to fire risk.
b. Present design of soldered joints in plumbing be modified to increase integrity or the joints
be replaced with a more structurally reliable configuration.
c. Deleterious effects of coolant leakage and spillage be eliminated.
d. Review of specifications be conducted, 3-dimensional jigs be used in manufacture of wire bundles
and rigid inspection at all stages of wiring design, manufacture and installation be enforced.
e. Vibration tests be conducted of a flight-configured spacecraft.
f. The necessity for electrical connections or disconnections with power on within the crew com-
partment be eliminated.
g. Investigation be made of the most effective means of controlling and extinguishing a spacecraft
fire. Auxiliary breathing oxygen and crew protection from smoke and toxic fumes be provided.
11. FINDING:
An examination of operating practices showed the following examples of problem areas:
a. The number of the open items at the time of shipment of the Command Module 012 was not
known. There were 113 significant Engineering Orders not accomplished at the time Command Module
012 was delivered to NASA; 623 Engineering Orders were released subsequent to delivery. Of these,
22 were recent releases which were not recorded in configuration records at the time of the accident.
b. Established requirements were not followed with regard to the pre-test constraints list. The
list was not completed and signed by designated contractor and NASA personnel prior to the test,
even though oral agreement to proceed was reached.
c. Formulation of and changes to pre-launch test requirements for the Apollo spacecraft program
were unresponsive to changing conditions.
d. Non-certified equipment items were installed in the Command Module at time of test.
e. Discrepancies existed between NAA and NASA MSC specifications regarding inclusion and pos-
itioning of flammable materials.
f. The test specification was released in August 1966 and was not updated to include accumulated
changes from release date to date of the test.
DETERMINATION:
Problems of program management and relationships between Centers and with the contractor have
led in some cases to insufficient response to changing program requirements.
RECOMMENDATION:
Every effort must be made to insure the maximum clarification and understanding of the responsi-
bilities of all the organizations involved, the objective being a fully coordinated and efficient program.
6-3
This pageleft blankintentionally.
6-4 _ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 O - 261-101

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APOLLO
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SPACECRk.FT
i mlJ • i
E
"l'hc" v+|_,l( ¢'Cla|l _% +(_'l i (bll_.J_.l.N OId laurb(h escape s.)szem (L.E5) assam-
*Iv, command m, wluh. _(: ?+h..,rl_.l_'r m(x:lu]r ,+._/M). and Ihe spacectafL,'
lunar
rapidh
module
'+rlmlralan_
ad..q_l,, (_I.AI.
Ibr
I hr !.1 "_ a.'++,emMy pro_sde_+ the means for
(" .%1hr_m lh,..5 ._1 dunne_ pad or .,+uborbilal aborts, E
+lEe (. %! It)l'm_, the .,p:at¢-_ I.S|l'¢¢lli_t( i ¢cnter. ('on|all'iN necess:Sl'.V aUtO*
marie and m.,snu+sl rcluij_nsr'n! I(* ¢lJ;:Ir(_| ;stud mc)l_atof the spacecr++ft
s.v,vtrm...,. :,lncl c'(mz_ln,, the rt flu.'l('(] rCluipmc'n! for safely and c(,_:_[ort of
lhe ¢lev,'. lh¢- ._ ++| i-+,a r+vlindliral _+ltUCtUle located belween Ihe C/M
and tb,..%leA. I! cc+,_l_in- lhc" pXC,l,ul,.ic,n ._.,',._emm fur :*llilU_c" at+c[ vt-loc-
II_, [h,ln_l" fn+Itt'us.('l_,. X|I_I l,l till" ¢<)n',timtl|+I£'_ ,, used it) l_le ml%slon _Ii_"
E
mimed in the-5"_,I, lhc" %1A is • llunc_Itrd COliC" v.'blth connects the
.%1 10 the' launch _,s.'lll¢lr. 11 "_l_,ll l,l+,vldC"N, lhe +pa(e ,^'herein the lunar
mudul¢ It. ".Mr _- . arlied im lun:.ll llllSNillllN.
TEST 114 PROGRESS AT TIMe" OF ACCIDEXT
Sparccsall
lime ul
dull',
II."
dc',+,l[malcd
ltl_
a¢.
,,.,s
ll|rlll
O{.I'
lln¢|rl
l,n
"OliI_ +i *'Plu*_t*
l_4t_U_ll+*
FO-IC-D0"I-I
_;, l+tH._ .,
"apphcd
Uut
Ol-_.+atl(,nal
to
]ntc'+ratc.d
lh,s lesl,
Cllet'kc,u|
Test"
V,'_thm
al
Pro{t*'-
lhe
Ibis
B
lelmt lhis procedure is lifli'n It'll.fief| to Is OC.P-O02I.
TESTS AHD AHALYSES
RP.%u|I_ of le..l',.-_ind +nal_**.e*. nnl camp]tic" at Ibe time of publicalion

_)f Ibi_ r¢-port hc r+mt.;int'+!
,,,,:ll m Ap|){'ndlx (;, Adc|r'nd_, and Cot_iKenda.
lhrouetb-ul
1"o (nn,.'cri
this ,c';,+)_i. lime is %|-'*led ill (;leC"nv,'ich
(;MT ;- f._ tC"ru Sland_*d I'ime (L.ST).
CONVE:RSION OF TI_E
M.£'an Time (GMI').

subtract IT ]sours.
E
Fo+r cx'-+mple. 23:51 (,Mr ¢onverled is O:'li p.m. EST.
i i II II I|l t
i •
. L.-'
r
Q
4 ! •
U
t,
_U
N
U WITNESS STATE)_ENTS & RELEAS ES
APPEI'UDIX B
U TO
...... FINAL REPORT OF
[1 APOLLO 20"_ REVIEX_¢ BOARD
D
U ,/
°
... , • • .kk
D
F_
t.J
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_D
_l B-I
• ,41
:. II,
r
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'lille ,._lDa(-eCralt (% "(:|

i
APOLLO
ron.,J..,t_, of
SPACECRAFT
a launch e_c_P_" _'_'s!'_m

Ul
(I.E5)
iii
assem.
[
t_h', co:nman(I m,_lul,, t( M_. ',rifler module (S/M), and Ihe spacecraft/'
IIm-lat
rapiclh
ilR- (
module
,.eparalin_
_.1 I()rm.
_'ddl:_,
Ihe
Ihr
(%I.A).
(: ".M from
%paLr_Jalt
I h¢" l.l'_
the
(ou_r(,I
as.'_embly
.5 ._1 durin_
¢('ntrr.
pad
pro_ide._
contam._
or suborbital
the
necessary
means
aborts.
for
auto..
[
malt(- and manual rquipm(-n! Io (tmlrol ;_nd monitor Ihe spacecraft
_.-._.lrm.'.. an(I (ozztain.., tile ri'qull¢'d equJpmen! for safety and (()mforl oi
Ihr ctt.w. |ht- ._ _,! J,, a L'_ltndJlcal slrUClure I¢)caled between Ihe C/M
and Iht. 51_A. It ¢(illlaln- Ill(" pr¢)llul'.inll sv_.|ems for allllude an_ vcloc-
ill" '[ hilll_l" malleu_(.l.,,.. _'IID,.I ,,( lh(- ¢,I)n,..umahle.. used in the r:.'_i_,slon are
slca, red zn t._zz• .%'_,1. ihr %i-A z,, a ;fuzw_lrd ¢o_le whzih connects the
_$'SI
module
Io the
(I.
launch
"M_ z.,, ¢.lrrird
_'lJz('lc.
on
h al,,o
luna_.mi_..sion.,.
in_wides the space wherein Ihe lunar
E
TEST IN PROGRESS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
5par(-c_aft (ll_ ,,;i_ snz¢l,;i..oin_ a "'Plu_-_-Ou! Inter, fated Test" at lhe

lime
dime.
ol II_"
di'%tt_nalrd
d(¢ td*'.,
O(:P
,.n Ja_,ua¢_.
I'O-K-No_i-I
ItT. I_.th7.
applied
Ol:_.raltonal
Io this te$1.
Checkout
Within
Proce-
this
k
lfpOlt thi,, procrdme is.(_ft(.n t¢lz-rred to a% O(.P-0021.
-#_. TESTS AND ANALYSES
Rcsuhs of |e-,t_ and aual,,,,e,, not complete at the time of publicalion

of Ihi,_ r_'port _ill l)r contained m Appendix (;, Addenda and Corri._enda.
l
"to
For
(o.Verl
example.
(;MI
23:$1
t_r,, l.a
¢,;_fl"
tern
CONVERSION
converted
•
Standazd
is 6:$1
l'ime
OF
p.m.
i
TI,_E
(E.ST).
"EST.
subtract ]7 hours.
L
•
• _ f ¢#
D
H
WITNESS STATEMENTS & RELEASES
APPEIqDIX B
B . .- TO
FINAL REPORT OF
B APOLLO 204 P.EVIEW BOARD
j ..
iB
iD
:]
!
ID
i -
I
i_
i . . . . .. .
•-..
B-I
1 i
J
APPENDIX B
I [J WITNESS STATEMENTS AND RELEASES
Contents Page
Index of Witnesses (Statements enclosed) B-3
N Index
List
of Witnesses
of Common
(Statements
Abbreviations
in general
and Definitions
file) B-7
it .....B - 33
D Witness Statements
.,
B -37
° , :C - .....
D The presentation of witness statements is in order of importance
to the incident as determined by the Task Panel 12 (Witness Statements).
:1D t/
0
. • . .- .. .
D
-_::
B-3
.
t,
t
INDEX OF WITNESSE_
STATEt, AENT$ EblCLOSED
:1 Number Nmne Position Location During. Accident

Organization
1 5---
-!
!
N 1 Babbitt, Donald O. NAA Project Engineer,
Pad Leader
Adjustable
Structure
Level AS, Service
lD
t
2 Gleaves, Jam.es D. NAA Mechanical
nician
Lead Tech- Adjustable
Structure
Level AS, Sen'ice
i 3 Curatolo, Lewis NAA Project Engineer,

Pad Leader
"Adjustable
Structure
Level A8, Service
4 Reece, L.D. NAA Systems Technician Adjustable Level A8, Service "
D Structure
5 tlagar, Richard A. NAA Systems Technician, •Adjustable Level A8, Service

(Electrician) Structure
6 Baehnnd, Richard L. NAA Systems Technician Adjustable Level A8, Service

Structure
D •7 Clemmons, StephenB: NAA Systems Technician Adjustable Level A8, Service

Structure
8 Cromer, James Earl PAA Elevator Technician 200-foot Level, Umbilical

Tower
9 Pleasant, Joseph H. NAA Systems Technician Adjustable Level A8, Sen'ice

Structure
Q 10 Davis, 'Bruce _,V. NAA S_tems Technician Adjustable

Structure
Level A8, Service
J 11 Hickenbottom, NAA Systems Technician Adjustable Level AS, Sen'ice

Friend Dale Structure
12 Hawkins, Jerry w. NAA Systems Techniclan Adjustable Level A8, Service

Structure
t
13 Brown, W. Donald NAA Mechanical Inspectori! '._:': Command Module- Adjust-
able Level A8
i,:i
14 Oweus, Jessie I.. NAA S)'stems Engineer Adjustable Level ;3.8, Sc_'icc
Structure
15 Hedhmd, Robert C. NAA Systems Technician Adjustable Level A8, Service

Structure
16 Markovich, John E.. NASA QC Inspector Adjustable Level AS, Service

Structure
* Left Adjustable Level A8 at 1730. Returned to rclicve Babbitt at approximately 1838.
_: B.5.
V"
t
Adjustable Levt'l AS, Service
i 17 Stoeekl, Joseph L. NASA QC Inspector
Structure
r
! -
Adjustable. I,evel A8, Sen'ice t__-
18 Rogers, Henry H.,Jr. NASA QG Inspector
Structure
i
Electrical Leadman Adjustable Level A8, Sen'ice

19 Journey, Creed A. NAA
Structure
! 22 Schneider, WilliamJ. NAA GSE Technician Adjustable

Structure
Level A7, Service
E
Systems Technician Adjustable Level A7, Service
21 Howard, Dave E. NAA
Structure
! Adjustable Level A7, Service

1 22 Scott, J.C. NAA QC Inspector
Structure r
200 Foot Level, Umbilical
23 Bass, Robert I. NAA Systems Technician
Tower
F
GSE Technician Umbilical Tower - 190. Foot
2.1 McConnell, John C. NAA
Level
4
GSE Leadman Elevator, 2nd Level, Pad 34

25 Belt, Burt B. NAA
Systems Technician Adjustable Level A7, Service

26 Rackle'ff, George W. NAA-Tulsa
Structure "
NAA GSE Technician Adjustable Level A7, Service _7

27 Williams, Samuel
Structure
28 Rooker, Forrest R. NAA GSE Technician Adjustable Level A7, Service t"
Structure
GSE Electrical
29 \Viugfield, XVilliam tl. NAA
Technician Adjustable Level A5
30 Nelson, Marvin L. NASA Q.C Inspecior Adjustable Level A7, Sen'ice

Structure
31 •
Mltche,, I!
Patrick E. NASA C_C Inspector Adjustable Level A7, Service
Structure
f
! k
32 Deaver, William C. NAA Electronic Technician Adjustable Level A7, Sen'ice

Structure
!
l Elevator (3rd level going up

t
Mechanical Technician
33 "Medcalf, _,Villis M. NAA
to A8) Complex 34
QC Inspector Complex 34 Fuel Area

34 Foster, Robert C. NAA
35 Chauvin, Clarence A. NASAtKSC Test Conductor Acceptance Checkout Equip-

ment, Room 1, MSO Bldg.
i B-6
i
¢,
36 Schick, 'William II _. NASA/KSC Assistant Test Test Supe_rvisor's Console
!
... (DLO) Supervisor LCC 34 Blockhouse
iD 37 Propst, Gary W.
,.
RCA Technician,
Control Racks"
OTV, Communication
Racks LC 34 Blockho,_se
Control
-°... .
38 Casweli, Alan R. - _CA Communications Communication Control

-'. Controller Racks LC 34 Blockhouse
39 Sla)aon, l)onal¢l K. NAS:VMSC Director of Flight Astronaut Console - LCC 34

Crew Operations
40 Cain, Daryl O. NAA Spacecraft "rest Acceptance Checkout Equip-

Conductor (017) ment Room .2, MSO Bldg.
.I
41 Jones, Donald R. """ NASA/KSC Chief, S-IVB, Elect- LC 34 Blockhouse, VIP
!n _..
trical Systems Room
* 42 Eybel, Charles G., Jr. GE Technical Audio CIF Building

and Rubio, Jose Manuel Monitors
43 Jorolan, Albert E. NASA/KSC LVO ,Measuring In- LC 34 Blockhouse

strumentation Engineer
44 West, LeRo¥ G. NAA Spacecraft Technician LC 34, Level A-Sat Ingress
45 Burch, James A., Jr. PAA Fireman Cape Kennedy Fire Station
.J •
46 Mooney, James C. PAA Asst. Chic[, Fire Dept. Cape Kennedy Fire Station
-°
m
i
B-7
i
i
INDEX OF WITNESSES STATE_I,ENTS IN GENERAL FILE

i
A. T.V./40NITORS
Name Organization Position Location During Accident
]u Allen,
Anderson,
Ernest E.
Robert L. III
Chrysler
Chrysler
Supervisor
Technician
LC
LC
34 Blockhouse
34 Blockhouse
Barwick, Dean E. NASA/KSC Flight Crew

Systems Engineer LC 34 Blockhouse
D Bishop, Charles M. Ch.rysler S-IB Events Display

Console Moni tor LC 34 Blockhouse
I] Blasky, M. Douglas Associate Engineer

Scientist CIF Building Room 307
D Blocker, R. D. Douglas S-IVB Stage Historian "LC 34 Blockhouse
Brinda, W. Douglas Engineer, Measuring

Panel Monitor LC 34 Blockhouse
Broadbent, Joseph _,V. Chrysler Console Operator LC 34 Blockhouse
D Brown, William O. Chrysler OIS Monitor LC 34"Blockhouse
Brunais, Ellsworth G. Chrysler Flight Control

Console Monitor LC 34 Bl0ckhouse
Bunyak, R.S. Douglas Propulsion Panel

Monitor LC M Blockhouse
Carothers, Dale NASA/KSC Spacecraft Test ACE Control Room _1 MSO

Conductor Bldg.
Cheesborough, Richard S. NASA/KSC ST-I84-M Systems

Engineer CIF Building Room 307
Childers, Leonard H., Jr. Chrysler Monitor Swing Arm

Panels Complex 34 Trailel" 1-048
f--_
!,
Colcnaan, Gerald C. Douglas Branch Chief
Development Engineer LC 34 Blockhouse
0 Conely, F.E. Douglas S-IV B Test

Conductor LC 34 Blockhouse
0 Coonce, James M. NASA/KSC Operator Console A4 -LC 34 Blockhouse
Dillon, James E. Chrysler . ECS Technician LC 34 Blockhouse
B°9
- • •
I
l)onnelly, Paul C.
i
NASA/KSC Launch Operations I
Manager LC 3-1 Blockhouse
Eddy, Robert IX'. Chrysler Monitor. Firing

r i
Panels LC 34 Blockhouse
Edson, William NAA Test Conductor ACE Control Room 1 MSO
Elliott, John G. Douglas

/
Supervisor, IB, Mech-
anics & Reliahility CIF Building
Eri, Donald G. RCA Manager RCA Oper-

ations LCC 34 and 37 LC 34
Gaskins, R. B. NASA/KSC Test Project Engineer

('SIC 017) Observation Room 2 MSO
Gay, Charles D. NASA/KSC Chief, Spacecraft Test

Conductor LC 34 Blockhouse
- Gehres, Charles E.
Grant, Fred C.
Chrysler Technician LC ( 34 Blockhouse
g
Douglas Associate Engineer
• Scientist CIF Building Room 307
Gruene, Hans F. Dr.
NASA/KSC Director, Launch
Vehicle Operations LC 34 Blockhouse
•lIarris, Robert'V. Chrysler Technician " LC 34 Blocl_hou_e
ttoenstine, T.V. IBM

I.U. Measuring
Tracking Panel
and
Operator LC 34 Blockhouse g
Jatulso, A.J. Douglas Electronics Supervisor LC 34 Blockhouse
Jolly, Dennis M. NAA %.=

Enviromnental Control
System Engineer ACE Control R.oom 1 MSO
.l umpa,.j.j. GE/ASD ACE Display ,Monitor LC 34 Blockhouse

t
Kapryan, Waher J. NASA/MSC f
Assistant Apollo
Program Manager LC 34 Blockhouse
KCh-:.. lames A.
NASA/KSC Mo:fi:or TV Cons_,]._ LC 34 Blockhouse
g_
:,m_'. John W. NASA/KSC Chief Public Information LC 34 Blockhouse
Klcin_hmidt, C1L. Douglas Group Engineer-
ORD/HYD
LC 34 Blockhouse U
Kranzfelder, William J. AC Electronics Associate Project ACE Control Room
Engineer (G&N) 1 MSO N
Kuznicki. Henry S. NAA Test Couduct or ACE Control Room
1 MSO
N:1
B-IO
i
i
Leahnan, Roy E. N _A/
a ,x. :_. KSC Electrical Engineer I.C 34 I_tbckhouse
Lee, Chet M, NASA Hqs. Observer LC 3-t Blockhouse
i Levetto, MarioJ., j r, Chrysler Tcchnlcian ECS LC 34 Blockhouse
B Linsday, Tho,nas H. Jr. NAA Lead

Procedures
Enginee/"-
LC 34 Blockhouse
1
I
McDonald, Randolph D. Chrysler Technician LC 34 Blockhouse
McCreary, Martin E. NASA/KSC" SII Electrical Systems LC 31 Blockhouse
McNally, Edward Chrysler Swing Arm Electrical

I Design Monitor CIF Room 307
!
B McNeely, Mauriee L. Douglas Mechanical Engineer LC 34 Blockhouse
Martin, Virgil _I. Chrysler Technician LC 34 Blockhouse

B Mason, Lyman, H. Chrysler Electrical Monitor CIF Room 307
D Mercier, Alfred B.
Chrysler Console Operator LC 34 Blockhouse
Meyer, George t2. PAA Pad Safety LC 34 Blockhouse
U Miller, K.J. NASA/KSC Electrical Engineer OIS Monitor LC 34
Monshor, "Raymond M. Chrysler Technician LC 34 Blockhouse
B Moser, Robert E. NASA/KSC- Apollo/Saturn Test

Manager LC 34 Blockhouse
Neely, R. D.
Chrysler Technician Firing Room LC 34
Blockhouse
! Nelson, Isaac H. Chrysler Water Control Panel

Operator LC 34 Blockhouse
D Orman, Donald L.
NASA]KSC Engineer, G&C LC 34 Blockhouse
Page, George F. NASA/KSC Test Supervisor LC 34 Blockhouse
Parker, Marion, J. Chrysler Fluid & Pneumatics

Group Electrical Unit CIF Room 208
Payne, Viron E.
NASAiKSC Test Support Controller LC 34 Blockhouse
Peacock, MaxJ. Chrysler S-IB Test Conductor LC 34 Blockhouse
Perry, Earl M. Chrysler Monitor, Propellant

Event Display Panel LC 34 Blockhouse
ta B-f1
Pctrone, Rocco A.
i
NASA/KSC Director of Launch
!
Operations LC _ 34 Blockhouse
]
1
Ragusa, James M. NASA,' KSC Engineer CEgress
Committee) LC 34 Blockhouse
J Rengcrs, William C. Chrysler Monitor,

pellant
SIB
Dispersion
Pro-
Panel LC 34 Blockhouse
Rockwell, Richard G. Chrysler Procedure Coordinator LC 34 Blockhouse
Roosa, Stuart A., Capt. NASA / MSC Astronaut LC 34 Blockhouse
Sassard, Jack P. FEC Technician LC 34 Blockhouse
Schiedel, Gerald F. NASA/KSC Test Conductor,

Spacecraft 017
ACE Control
2 MSO
Room
E
j Seoville, Donald A. NASA/KSC Mechanical
Engineer
Systems
LC 34 Blockhouse E
1 Siskind, Jay S. NASA/KSC Electrical Systems
Engineer
! Smith, George E. Chrysler Power Supply & Launch
LC 34 Blockhouse
:t Sequence Panel Operator LC 34 Blockhouse
.4 Smith, Joe R. NASA/KSC Staff/Director of /
1 -Smith, Wallace S. Chrysler

Information
Technician
Systems LC
LC
34 Blockhouse
34 Blockhouse
Talone, John J. NASA Program Coordinator CIF Building

with MSFC Room 307
Terry, j ames F. NASA/KSC Guidance & Control

Engineer LC 34 Blockhouse
Tobaek, D.S. " IBM Technician, Telemetry LC 34 Blockhouse
Turner, Charles A. General Egress Committee LC 34 Blockhouse

Electric
_L
Turner, John T. NASA 'KSC i
F!igh" C::mp. S vstcn:s
Engineer LC 34 Blockhouse
Weaver, Billy H. Douglas Test Planning and CIF Buidling Room

Evaluation 307
Williams, Michael F. NAA Flight Test Engineer LC 34 Blockhouse
Wi.lson, Virgil C. Chrysler Console Supervisor LC 34 Blockhouse
Yount, Lawrence H. ChG,ster Manager, Launch Systems LC 34 Blockhouse
] B -12.
_t.f 7¢
!
! i
B. AUDIO WITNESSES
I
Name Organization Position Location Du__ Accident
Barber, :Chester E°
Chrysler Technician LC 34 Sc_s_,-e Structure
Ist Floor $\'¢'_ ,_ide
D Branch, Robert B. Chrysler Acting SIOT LC 34 OA'I" _¢,_om l_52-foot
Level
Crane, John D. Douglas Electronics Tech. LC 34 l16-fo_q Level

..,-_
D Darn'her,: Pete M. Douglas Vehicle

Engineer
Checkout
LC 34 Mc,,xuring Station
Eldridge, Robert _I'. Chrysler Technician LC 34 ll6-lo_x_ Level
•Gillespie, Dallas K. C,hrysler. Assistant SlOT LC 34 OAT _,'.',,m 152-foot

. :o . . Level
Ham, Edwin j... Chryaer Technician (S IOP,. LC 34 OAT Station 152-

Recorder Operator foot Level.
Kelley, Dean W. Chrysler Technician LC 34, 152-lo_q Level
Kelley, John E. Chrysler Technician Umbilical

D ,:'. ?. . - ..
Eject Test
-j'
LC 34 88-foot
.. ,
l ,cvel
Kemppainen, *_Villard K. NASA/KSC: / •

Engineer (Eg-,'_s
B ,e . - • .-
Monitor) LC 34 Blockh_use-
Leckie, G.E. IBM Technician LC 34 IO OAT Station
Lindemanr_, Vincent ,I- Chrysler Flight Control

Recorder Operator LC 34 BlockL...s e
Martin, Obrey E. Chrysler Technician

LC 34, Supf,.,,, 'dldg. Room
123
Matson, Claude D. Chrysler Technician LC 34, ll6-fo,,t Level
Pendlcton, "Pl_i]ip L. Chrysler Technician• LC 34 BlockL,,use
Pcrkin._. William J. Chrysler Techni clan

LC 34 ;Xl_'.t:. ,i.g Station
Rogers, Lyman F. NASA/KSC SI Quality

D Surveillance LC _4 House Frailer
Roof, Jesse M., Jr. Douglas Engineer, 'GSE LC 34 Level A-4 outside
IU door
Schlict, Wilber G. F1EC " Technician LC 34, AGCS Area
[_ B-!3
LC 34, L_'el A-4 Near
i Tipton, CharlesJ. Douglas Electrical Technician
forward inter_tage
Whitaker, Billy B. Chrysler Technician Monitor

OIS LC 34, AGCS Trailer 609
Technician RI: &_FM LC 34

Whitehead, Claudius D. III ;-hrysler
]
C¢ RELATED AREAS
Position Location During Accident

Name Organization
!
FEC Telemetry Technician CIF Building Room 291

Aderhold, T.R.
4
LC 34 Umbilical Tower 220-
Anderson, Deal L. Bendix • Engineering Specialist
foot Level
(021
LC 33,, outside aft inter-

Barnum, George V. Douglas Operations
Engineer stage of Launch Vehicle
Crew Chief, Fire Dept. PAA Fire Station

Batts, Bruce H. PAA
÷
Elevator Technician LC 34, Ground Level Um-

Beavan, Harry E. .PAA
bilical Tower
i Bilbrey, H.F. PAA
PAA
Sgt. Security
Fireman
Police LC 34 Level A-4
PAA Fire Station

Blankenshi'p, J ames R.
Bohlmann, R.R. NASAIKSC Communications

Engineer ACE Control Room I MSO
| Brandon, R.E. NAA Power and Sequential

ACE Control Room 1 MSO
Engineer
Bruckner, tt.P. Bendix Manager, Support

Branch Unknown
t
NASA/KSC .Q C Inspector LC QC Trailer
Cain, James L.
NAA Technician LC 34 Ist Level

Caris, Robert D.
NAA Technician Home

Colcvcll, \Villiam E.
NASA_KSC Project Engineer VIP Room of Control Room

Crcighton, Henry C.
1 MSO Building
k
|
Security Police LC 34 Main Gate
Darnell,Burnard E. PAA
-t
Fireman PAA Fire Station

i Dawes, Benny L. PAA
LC 34 insideSIVB Aft Inter-

! Dike,J.L. Douglas Propulsion Engineer
stage
B-14
m • _ _ .... .,_.r,_ _ _:._._.._ ................. ... .. ......................... .4 ..4: ..................
!
!
J l:annin, IAonel E. NASA/KSC
NAA
" Mechanical
Spacecraft
Em,_ineer
Technician
LC
LC
BloCkhouse
34 Level
Console
A8 at lngr-:ss
8.-\
Fuhz, James D., Jr.
Gallagher, Martin E. Dr. PAA PAA Doctor PAA Cape Dispensary
Goodwin, Gewin H. NAA Technician LC 34 - Level. 7
Gorman, George W. Chrysler Q C Inspector LC 34 Level A4
Gornto, Jack P. PAA Asst. Chief Fire .

Department PAA Fire Station
N
I
Guidry, Mark NASA/KSC Electrical Sequential
Systems Engineer ACE ControlRoom 1 MSO
Hanna, Paul R. • PAA Fireman PAA Fire Station
D Hennigan, Thomas R. PAA Security Policeman LC 34 Ground Level West

Side
D
1 Hinton,
Hipp,
Hughes,
J.H.
W.L.
Maynard S.
Bendix
PAA
PAA
Manager,
Chief,
Supervisor
Propellant
Syst. Component Dept.
Fire Department
Laboratory
Home
LC 34, Umbilical
_, ......
Tower 70"
Level
James, George H. NASAIKSC Q C Inspector Ground Level of Launch Stru-

cttt_e
Jennings, J.B. Douglas Engineer Scientist LC 34 Inside Launch

Vehicle aft interstage
B Jones; Ronald H. Chrysler -"ECS Technician :.... LG 34 Service

ECLq Room
Structure
Kincaid, Randal L. Douglas Electronic Technician LC 34 Blockhouse
McMillan, Kenneth C. . PAA Assistant Chief; Fire Dept. PAA Fire Station--
McMyler, William F. Bendix Navigation and Control

Test CIF Building Room 307
Mills, Edmund B., Jr. Douglas Electrical Lcadman LC 34 inside Launch Ve-
hicle aft intcrstage
Minnich, WiUiam T., Jr. NAA Spacecraft Technician LC 34 Level A8 at Ingress
Moody, Samuel P., Jr. NAA Environmental Control

System Supervisor Office MSO Building
Moore, Dan L. Douglas Missile Technician LC 34 lnside Launch Ve-

hicle aft interstage
!
i U:- B-15
I
Neal, Cecil E. PAA Crew Chief, Fire Enroutc from LC 37 to Fire
,I,
Department Station
1
i
1 Olson, R.D. Douglas Electronic Technician LC 34 Inside Launch Ve-
t |
hicle aft iuterstage
i
t NAA Communication
Ostigtq', J J. ¢
;i -
Homer, Mih J. Douglas Section Chief, Structural .-_:_:
Mechanical LC 34 Blockhouse" f
i
Pride, jim IB'M Measuring Technician LC 34 Blockhouse
i
Rector, Murray M. PAA Fireman Cruising run crew
i
1
Rink,
Salye",
Elmer
Waher
B.
D.
Bendix
NASA/MSC
Propellant
Suit Technician
Sampler Home
LC 34 Trailer
[
It
1
Scarborough, Robert K. PAA Pad Safety NIE Corner of LC

Area
34 Pad [
t
1
Schmyser, Clayton F. Chrysler Technician Leadman LC 34 Service
152-foot Level
Structure
i
i Sheelcy, Vester NAN Weight Engineer LC. 34 Level A8 at Ingress f
]
t
Sutton, Cermon S. NASA/KSC Q. C Inspector S-IB Launch Comple_ 37
-.%
Vallin, Jose NAA Electrical Systems
1 F.a_gineer Office MSO Building
NASA/KSC
i Van Hooser, John C.Jr. Technician-Biomed. ACE Control Room 1MSO
Vaughn, Charles M. NASA/MSC Engineer, RASPO/MSC Location Unknown

tr
Warner, Alonzo E. NAA Electrical Power Systems
i Watts, Wilburn Virgil Douglas Inspector, Missile Field LC

hicle
34 inside
aft interstage
Launch Ve-
[
Wilde. Waiter L. Douglas Electrical Technician C"
LC 34 inside Launch Ve- !
hich: aft iuterstage k.
_,Visenbaker, Harvey M. Jr. Ghryslea" ECS Technician LC 34 Service Structure
|
ECS Room r
Wright, Edward E. jr. NASA/KSC Environmental Control
.i
Systems Engineer ACE Control Room ' I MSO ty
Yon, Ted Jr. NAA SuperMsor Mechanical

Systems White Room during Ingress
:]
.i
B-16
.q
D. MISCELLANEOUS
Name Organization .Position I.ocation During Accident
Abrams, Robert D. ChD, sler Launch Operations

Inspector Complex 34 Launcher
D Acuna, R. Chrysler Launch

Inspector
Operations
.. LH 2 Facility
Station Patching/
D Adams, John P. Chrysler
Oscillograph Monitor Blockhouse 3.t. Floor 1
Adrian. Kenneth R. Chrysler Measuring System En
D gineer (RIME) Blockhouse 34, Rack C-24
FEC Technician Blockhouse 34 2nd Floor EA

Albright, Charles G.
Recorder 1
PAA LC 34 Blockhouse
Allen, R. H. Security Police
Allen, Ronald D. Chryslex Quality Survci!lancc Complex 34, Vehicle Mech.
l Off.
U Allshouse, Dennis W. Chrysler Structure RF Technician Service Structure, RF Room
/ •
Alva, Martin Chr_ler RF Unit Supervisor Blockhouse 34, Floor 1
Arlotti, Elio Bendix Laboratory. Technician At Home
Bendix Technician At Home

Arrington, H. M.
Avery, Charles B. Chrysler Support Engineer Complex a4'. St.ppor Bide.
Ayling. William T. Chrysler Launch Branch In-

spection Pro.pellant Net- Complex 34 Inspection Trail-
works er
Baer, John D. Chrysler Launch Operations

1nspcctor Complex 34, PCD
Bai!cv ._:ncs A. Douglas Flight C'.-,n'.ro! Eng i:wer l.C: 3t Bloc!;houae
NASA/KSC Teclmician At Home

Ball, George D.
Ball, Melvin B. Chrysler Magnetic Tape Recorder

Operator Blockhouse 34, GSE Statior.
Banks. $amuel B. Chrysler Trailing Wire Recorder

Operator Blockhouse 34 C-17
rl
B-17
r
Barkdoll, Mihon E. Cht3'sler }
,Monitor I iydraulic
Recorders on Sill Blockhouse , J! t
3 Firing lZoo,n
{
i
} li.',ron. Thomas Ronald N/A
.i N/A
-j Barnes, Harold F. NASA- KSC Q C Inspcctor LC 34 Blockhouse.
|
Barrow, John M. NASA/KSC Q C Inspector I,C 34. LVOQuality:Frai!- L
er 25-t
i
4
i
Bassctt, Paul J. Chrysler Supporting Test MGSI-; Service Structure 17" Level
[
Bauserman, C.R. NAA SPS Engineer ACE Control 1 MSO
I
Bayless, D.A. Douglas Engineer ScientL, t LC 34 Blockhouse E
1
Beagle),, Richard G. Bendix Systems Safety Supervisor Left Complex for "Dinner
4
t Beale, W. David NASA/KSC Instrumentation Engineer
1 LC 34 Computer Room
i
J
Boeker, Donald E. Bendix Chenfist Lab. Building H5-994
D
Becls_!e, H.D. NAA Technician LC 34 188-foot Level
,t
Bell, C.H. iBM BUTM Oscillograph Blockhouse. 1st floor RF sta-
i tion
Bennett, John Douglas Branch Chid LC 34 Operations Office g

Benton, Edward G. Bendix Technician South Center sit]c of 4th ad-
Benziger, Ernest T. Chrysler

. .._,i: _'_,
Launch Operations
jnstable level (34)
D
Inspector Complex 34, ECS Bldg.
Bielling, R. IBM AGCSStabilizer Panel

Monitor AG CS
Birch. Ken _V. Douglas Associate Supervisor I,C 34, Operations Office
!?
Bitterling, M.D. Douglas Group Engineer LC 34 Blockhouse
Blocher, Richard H. Bendix Foreman

Bldg. 3-66220 (Cape)
l;M_t,:r. DonMd T. Chrysler _\'otk 0i.ie_ (;Ox:trc] C',mi,!::x '.'_. Trailer 169 |
,2.2
ik-:d. Raymond H. Chrysler Chr)'._h:r Tc-t (.)fficc ('Oml,lex '3.t, Supi)or t Bldg.
l
1
Boot, Clifford O. Chrysler Group Leader, Technical
I Documentation Unit
f
Complex 34, Support Bldg.
!
I"
Borland, Thomas IBM
!
i
Mechanical
Technician
Systems LC
fvtl
34, Mcchanical Trailer
L
,-_r "" I mq
i _ Braun, Jame._ E. Bendix Quality

Technician Assurance" Complex B4 / 37
Chrysler DEE-6 Blockhouse 3,1, Floor 2

Bouwsma, Wit|Jam J.
B,'ecken, E. R. Douglas Engineer Itydraulics

Panel Operator LC 34 Blockhouse
l']eetrical Engineer LC 34 Blockhouse

Bryan, Frank NASA/KSC
\;chicle Measuring Service Structure, Measuring

Bretzius, Edward D. Chrysler Station
Unit Supervisor
Brewer, Charles W. PAA LC 34, 27-foot level of Service

Security Po!ice
Structure
Brown, l_nald L. Chrysler Field Teclmician in

MSAU Complex 34, Support Bldg.
Brown, Julius I_,sler Battery Attendant Coi_lex 34, AGCS
Bruce, David k Bendix Propellant Sampler At Home
Buchanau, l). -E. IBM Stabilizer Panel Monitor LC 34, RackB57, Stabilizer
r
Bumgardncr. Albert NAA Mcchanical Technic inn I,C 3-!, Sc,Mce Structure
Elevator, bottom
Burke, Edwin L. Chr_l_ Engineer, SIB Airborne

. Networks Service Structure, Floor 2
Burlington, D. IBM Technician LC 34, AGCS
Burmeister, Gerald A. Propulsion Engineer Umbilical Tower, 100-fo0t

Douglas
Level
1
Burns. Robcv_ FEC Technician. At I tome
Byers. .-\ :_dv Douglas Mechanical Technic|an LC 34. Umbilic:d Tower,

10th Level
Technician ACE Control Room 2.

N Byrd, Herman C. NAA
MSO Building
Byrd. \'.':.21.:-:_ R. Bendix Systems Safety S:q_,.:,'visor Cc, mplcx 37

rq,.
(.:all, ' .... Chrysler Launch Crew Y.lanagcr Blockhouse 3-I. VIP Roon:
Carlson. Norman M. NASA/KSC SI Test Operations LC 34, Blockhouse Firing

Branch •Chief Room, Console A-12
Carlson, R. D. Douglas Electronics Propulsion LC.; 34, Blockhouse, 4B Fir-

Coordinator ing Room
Carnes, Thomas H. Chrysler AGCS Networks En:

Blockhouse 34, l'ower Rack._
gineer (AINW)
B-19
Special Systems Complex 34, Support Bid:.2.
_._arnley, Macey H. Chrysler
Service Structure, 152-foot

,t Q C Inspector
Carpenter, "Warner H. Chrysler
Level
i Lead ,Man Mechanic LC 34, SS, ll6-foot Level
Cesare, Donald E. Douglas
Technician At Itome
Chaillc. Wiiliam N: Bendix
l
DRSC GSI" Ground

_Chaitoff, ,'Xliho;_ Chrysler
J
Station Blockhouse 34, Floor I
!
i Chambers, Milton NASA/KSG Chief,

bilizer
Gyro and Sta-
Systems Branch CIF Building
Technician LC 34, SS, OAT Room

Charvet, Andre John Douglas
! Clements, K.D. NASA/KSC Engineer LC 34, Support

Room 129
Bldg.,'
LC 34 Blockhouse
Clifford, Harold S. Dougl Engineer Scientist
IBM Technician LC 34, StabilizerSystem

Cobrin, R.
B56
Shift Supervisor CIF Building, Room 297

Collier, J.O. FEC
-i Electronics Technician LC 34, SS, Measuring Sta-

Collins, William C. Douglas
tion
/
! Comptom, R. L. IBM Technician LC 34,(Ground Computer.

AGCS
Conner, R. P. Douglas Associate Engineer LC 34 Blockhouse
Conrad, Harold E. Chrysler Engineer Complex 34, DEE-6
Cook, Ross L. IBM BUTM FY,I FM System LC 34, BUTM FM/FM

,Moliitor Moni tot
4
Cooley, Dudley M'. Standby Relief Operator,

i Firing Room Complex 34, Support Bldg.
Corrcll, Carl C. Chwslcr Field "I'cci_:::.ci:m

(Valve I_- :._" Complex 34, Support Bldg.
Cortez, Romo V. NASA/KSc "l'clcmc::2. Fcclmician LC 3-t, 13tockhouse "i_I

Ground Statiou
4
t
It
Cottingham, Robert R. FEC ECS Measuring .Monitor Blockhouse 3.t, P, ack G54
Cr_ssman, John H. P. NASK/KSC Q C Inspector " . LC: 34,:Trai_erq-254
Crosswcll, A. L. NASA/KSC Measuring Engineer Service Structure Measuring

Station
B -20
,$
fr_ South Cchtcr of -ill,, ,\,1; tst-
Cuchens, Jamt's K..It. Bendix [.iIc Support "lk.chnician
L:I
able l.cvt]l ((.:tmq,lcx 3 t)
/
Checkout Engineer I.C 34 l|lockhouse

Dahlgren, Richard S. Douglas
|
Dasse, H. D. PAA Security Police Security I Icadciuarters"
Dean, John O .... Bendix "Propellant Mechanic Spaceline Sho;- Complex 34
Dearth, Alfred E. Chr3.sler Vehicle Inspection

Supervisor Complex 34
Demco, Alan NASA/KSC Instrumentation LC 34, Blockhouse, DDAS

Technician Ground Station
DiGiorgio, George R. Chrysler Pneumatics System

Engineer GSE Complex 34, AGCS
D Dobbs, Bruce S. Douglas Group Engineer,

Electronics LC 3,t Blockhouse
Drott, Art G. Douglas Engineer Scientist LC 34 Blockhouse-
Dryden, Guy IBM Technician CIF Building, Room 307
DuPriest, W. R. Bendix Acting Foreman At Home
Durnin, Chester W. Chrysler SI B Vehicle Instrmnen- Service Structure, .Measuring

tation Measuring Engineer Station
Dybevi_.k, Lowell H. Douglas Associate Engineer/

Scientist CIF Building
Ebbert, Carl S. Chrysler Launch Operations

Impector Complex 34, Support Bldg.
Edgar, Lawrence A. Chrysler Simulated Propellant

f_
Loading, LOX System Blockhouse 34, LOX Racks
Edlund, L. R. Douglas Engineer/Scientist LC 34 Structural Mechani-

cal Trailer
Elder, J. IBM Technician LC .34, IU Doorway
Edmands, Edward C., J.r. Chrysler ESI" Measuring Unit

Supervisor Blockhouse 34, C-19
IBM Technician LC 3 _, Blockhouse 1st l'loor.

Ground Computer
NASA/KSC Guidance and Control

Technician CIF Building, Room 307
B -21
I
Evans, RMph M. Chrysler Launch Operations

D.,-,
Insl)ector Unit Supervisor Complex 3.t, Trailer 1-069
I
Evans, Raymond T., Jr. NASA/KSC Propulsion and Mechani-

cal Technician LC 34, l.evel A-4 U
Evitt, Johnnie E. Bendix Operator of 02 Condition-

ing System At Home
Evjen, J. IBM Technician LC 3.I, Blockhouse, 1st

Floor, Ground Computer
Fairman, J. w. NAA Technician LC 34, Level A-6
Fickey, Edsel W. Bendix Chief Chemist At Home
Ford, Francis B. Bendix Quality tMsura'nce

Technician At Home
Forknall, George Bendix High Pressure Mechanic At Home

o
Foster, J. S. PAA Pad Safety Supervisor 'At Home
Fox, Beecher, H. Chrysler Electrician Complex 34, ECS Breaker

Control Room
Fredlock, Armistead III NASA/KSC Telemetry Technician LC 34, Blockhouse, DDAS

Area
Freeze, Daniel S. Douglas Engineer/Scientist LC :34 Douglas Electronics

,-. Trai!_ " •
Fritz, Richard J. Douglas AGCS Technician-Guid-

ance Control System LC 34 AGCS ""-
Frost, J. C. General Elec. Quality Control Spec- Operations Mobile T_ailer

ialist Located South of the Block-
house
Furr,. Glynn R. Chrysler Operator & Monitor TM Blockhouse 34, TM Checkout

Receiving Equipment Station
Galasso, Vincent F. Chrysler Vehicle Networks Service Structure, 27 - foot Le -

Electrical vei
P
(;w,':,zz;., Trent 1). C tiryslcr Senior .qvstcm_ l,amlch Service Struc:ture, 27-foot I,e-
and Test Engip.ecr vel
Gay: John B. Chrysler Launch Technician Field

Supervisor Complex 34, Support Bldg.
Gerard, Jerry Douglas Engineer/Scientist LC 34, Douglas Electronics

Trailer
B -22
Gib[,ons, Timmas D.
Chrysler ;_(;CS Networks En-
I
gineer (2\1NW)
Comple_ 34. L/rancher
Gfl}son, John H.
Chrysler
Pull Trailing Wire
leasurcnm,lts Cable .-\fi rr
0 Givens, Charles
Liftoff +5 Seconds
Complex 34, AGCS IIM:;.
Bendix
Electronic Technician
Complex 37 Storage Battery
Glusing, W. H.
NASA/KSC
Instrumentation
Engineer ACE Control Room 1.
MSO Building
Goard, Garnett D."
Bendix
Propellant Sampler
LAB Building tt5-995
Goodwin, Gilbert D.
Chrysler
Monitor. A1 Engine
Actuators During Ity-
draulic Runs
Service Structiare
Gordon, Eleanor L.
PAA
PA.A Nurse
Gorrel], Gene p. PAA Cape Dispensary
Chrysler
Senior Systems Engin-
eer, Launch er & Firing
. Accessories Service Structure, 27-foot Le-
vel
Graboski, Diana L.
Chrysler
Systems Design Clerk
Graham, Ira F.,Jr.
Chrysler
Engineer, S1B Airborne
Networks
Service Structure, Level 2
Gray, Stanley D.
Chrysler DEE-3
Blockhouse 34, Firing Room
Grenier, Frederick C.
Chrysler
Launch Operations
Inspector
Complex 34, Trailer 1-069
Gustafson, Gary F. IBM
Oscillograph Monitor,
BUTM LC 34, BUTM Oscillograpia .
• Monitor
Hacker, Ford
Chrysler
Field Technician Service Structure. 27-foot Le-
Supervisor (.XIGSE) vcl
Haffncr, Gordon j. Chrysler
Operate
DRscXroni,;i} '
Tape Recorder : :!i"i_->_.:_._ Biockhouse 34. Floor 1
Hanson, R. O.
J Douglas Elei_tronies re c h ,-;;,_i_'_;;'_2{#
•-" -7'i'r:: '" LC 34 Lqockhouse
IIarbaugh_ Weldon R.
Chryslt.,- L'ilit <, " "
,._d[ 'L'I".'ISOI. /.f:l.lil-
Service Structure. 27-h_ot I.e-
ehcr t,' l"ixiug-'\cccs._'.n'ies VC]
Harms, Eugene H. Chrysler

LO2 Systems Engineer
Blockhouse 34, Console 17
tlarman, Joseph F. Chrysler
Stock Man
Complex 3,t, Support Bldg.
t Hartman, William L. Chrysler AGcS Power Technician
} Blockhouse 34, Power Racks
& PCD
B -23
• ° ! •
Techuician/I'(:D Blockhouse 34, IPCD Area !_
l lawk, Larry A. Chwslcr
Security Police l,C 3.t, Main Gate '

l la.vcs, Oliver B. PAA _'2
• Security Police LC 34, Rest Room - ,_]

llayes, Raymond E. PAA
tlayncs, Bill L ..... NASAIKSC Electrical Systems

Engineer LC 34, Blockhouse t_
CITC Backup Complex 34, Support Bldg.

Ha-zehon, James T. Chrysler
LH2 Technician Blockhouse 34, LH 2 Facility

lleinbaugh, James R. Chrysler
I Icimniller, Waher R. FEC ECS Technician Complex 34, AGCS B

Backup Test Conductor LC 34, Support Bids, Room
Heins, Don IBM
117
Ilennig, Robert L. Chrysler Measuring System

Technician Service Structure, Floor 2
Hems, Edward E. Douglas Electronic Technician LC 34 Blockhouse

D
S1B Telemetry Monitor Blockhouse 34, Floor 1
Hillman, Harry E., Jr. Chrysler
Technician LC 34, Vehicle Networks

IHnkle, R. R. IBM
Office, £nd Floor
I
Hoblitzell, Wm. Roy, Jr. Bendix Propellant Mechanic Spacecraft Line Shop - Com-
plex 34
!
Hoeweler,'- Harold H. Chrysler Field Technician Service Structure, A-1 Level
! Hogston, Wm. Charles Bendix Propellant Sampler Complex 34/47
Chrysler Monitor S1 Engine Move-

ltoisington, Robert E.
merit During "I'cst Service Structurc
Holland, D. L. A°C° " Guidan.ce & Navigation MSOB]ACE Control Room

Electronics System Engineer 1
llo!mes, Earle C., Jr. Chrysler Technician, Propellant

Tanking Computer Complex 34, Support Bldg.
!! ;_i_:gor. Jnmcs L. NASA!KSC .tD_u_diry Coqu'oi Sea-vice ,_tructure P

{
llopkins, Robert L. Chrysler LO2 "Fechnicial_ Complex 34, LOX Trailer
tlopper, U. E. Bendix Technician At Home"

4
,i lloraseholder, LeRoy XV. Douglas Electronics
Telemetry
Engineer
GSE Operations
LC
Blockhouse
34 Blockhouse
34, Floor 1
} loward, J. Ron Chrysler
t
B - 24
f"7
U Howell, Harold V., Jr. NAA Technician
LC 34, iLevcl A-6
t tubble, E. E. NASA IKSC Pneumn tics Technician • LC 34, 'Frailcr-148
Hughes, K. L. Douglas Technician LC 34 Blockhouse
Hughes, W. NASA/KSC LOX Area Inspector I.C 34, LOX Trailer
Hunter, H. D. NASA/KSC IU Technician LC-37 "
Hutchinson, Bcrtie O. Chrysler Recorder Monitor . Blockhouse 34, Firing Room -
Iniestra, P. O. GE ACE Moni tor Equipment LC 34 Bloc ldmusc, 1st Floor
Jackson, Richard F. Bendix Special Pneumatics ttigh

Pressure Gas Mechanic At Home
t Jacobs,Thomas W. Chrysler Support S1B Telemetry

Checkout Complex 34, Trailer 2-045
D • Jensen, Gerald L. Chrysler Project Technician Complex 34, Trailer 847
Jewell, W. O. NASAIKSC Electrical Technician LC 34
Johnson, Frank O. GE Computer Maintenance Computer Room 1, MSO

Specialist Building
Johnson, French F_, NASAIKSC Electrical "l_echnician LC 34, Blockhouse
Johnmn,. Robert W. Chrysler QC Surveillance

8 Service
Station
Structure, Measuring
Johnson, William A. Douglas Electronic Technician LC 34, Service Structure
0 27' Level
Jones, C. W. Chrysler S1B Stage Electrical

Networks Engineer Service Structure, Floor 2
Jones, Lawrcnce D. Bendix Technician Titusvitte Fishing Pier
Joslin, John j.
Monitoring oDoP
Ground Station Blockhouse 34, Floor 1
Joyner, A. L. NAA Instrumentation Engineer ACE Control Room i,

cA ,MSO Buil.!ing
Kaminski, Leonard T. Chrysler l.aut,ch Operations Group

Supervisor Complex 34, Trailer 1-069
Kammerude, Stanley D. C_11_er RP-1 Technician Complex 34, RP-1
Karli, Richard O. Z agL Lead Engincer-SIVB LC 34 Blockhouse - -:
"Keefe, John J. _las Associate Engineer/ LC 34, Service Structure

Scientist Aft lnterstage
B -25
Neever,N. IBM Technician LC 34,124 Sta ilizers, Rack ."_-
B55
,- Kelley, Donald E. Bendix Superviso D. Engineer, ¢_

, System Safety Support f_
] Department At Home
Kenny, B. IBM .Technician LC 34, Blockhouse, 1st Floor ._
• Kiernan, John Bendix Systems

SupervisorSaIety At tlome
: King, John W. FEC Technician (;IF Building, Room 297,
?_ TM Station
" King, joseph J. NASA/KSC .Planning Technician LC 34, Blockhouse
Kirby, R.G. IBM Teehnician CIF Building, Room 307 N

._.
II
! Kitchens, T.R. IBM IU Ground Electrician LC 34

•
Koby, Raymond Chrysler Telemetry TRS-1 Station Blockhouse 34
Koivu, Ray A. Chrysler GSE

niclan Mechanical Tech- Service Structure, A-1 -
,i
Kubasko, James NASAIKSC Quality Surveillance LC 34, Service Structure
] Lambert, Walter A. Chrysler Turn-Off

Breaker
Circuit
Complex
/
/
34, AGCS
•
Area
i
?
Lambert, William F. Bendix Propellant Mechanic In Shop - Complex 34
i FEC Teehnieian CIF Building, Datacore Mod-
Langston, Gerald R.
ule
l.ane, R. E. PAA Security Police Security Headquarters
• L'tudermilch, Ray H. NNSAIKSC Telemetry Technician LC 34, Blockhouse
Lee, Robert E. • NASA/KSC Instrumentation Tech-

nician LC 34, OfficeTrailer
I.c:nnmn, t"toyd C. Chrysler Pneumatics Control

System "lcc i,;,ic [a_ (,omp:c•: o-_, PC;D Area
Lewis, J. E. IBM IU Complex Manager LC 34, 2nd Floor

4
!
Lewis, John D. Bendix System Safet y Supervisor Driving in Cocoa Beach, Fla.
Lewis, William K. NASA/KSC Technician LC 34 Blockhouse

I
!
Lewis, Richard W. Chrysler Q C Inspector Service Structure, A-1
L-
-i B -26
r
Long, R. G. NASA/KSC
!
Chief, Planning & LC 34 Blockhouse, VIP
Technical Support Room
0 Luke, Rodney C. Douglas Mechanic LC 34, Umbilical

110-foot Level
T0w_,
Mack, C.J. PAA Security Police At Home
Mahoney, Richard H. Chrysler Pneumatics Tcclmician Complex 34, PCD Area

0 Maki, Paul W. Bendix Propellant Mechanic At Home
Malkemes, R. F. Bendix
Senior Engineer, Spec-
ial Pneumatics Facility, 220-foot Level of Complex 34,
High Pressure Gas Dept. Umbilical Tower
Mann, Richard C. Chrysler Monitor S1B TclemeuT

Data
CIF Telemetry Station
D 'Martin, John D. B_ldix ..,

Quality
Technician
Assurance Spacecraft
• Complex 34
Lines Office
Martin, Jo_l D. Chrysler S1B RF/TM System

Engineer Blockhouse 34, Floor 1
McCarthy, Daniel J. Bendix Quality Assurance

Technician At Home
McEaeher'n, Charles A. NASAIKSC / •

Propulsion and Mech-
anicalTechnician
CIF, Room 307
McMechen, Margaret A. PAA PAA Nurse. At Home
McRae, Walter LeRoy Bendix

Propellant Sampler Driving in Cocoa Beach, Fla.
Meisch, John A. C°nwsler Assisting Senior Service Structure, 27-foot Le-

Engineer/Trot Box vel
Mellott, Douglas _V: NASAIKSC Guidance and Control

Technician CIF
Miner, James W. Chrysler Support Telemetry Checks See'ice Structure_ A-1

f_
.Merrill. K. R. PAA Chief. Sccmi:v P.Ci:c At t-.",_
om c
Mook, Gerald L. Douglas Lead Enginecr/Vchiclc
U Systems LC 34 Blockhouse
Moors, Dave IBM Technician

LC 34, RUBM, Rack C-7
0 Mor:rison, Joseph E. Bendix Propellant Sampler Winter Garden, Florida
Muldoon, Raymond Douglas Missile Field Checkout

Technician
LC 34 AGCS
B-27
_¢_.._. ...... _'_" _"_.._.-._._ 7_-,_-77 7__ - !" ........ _- - . , _. .
: I
r',
Mullin, J. T., Jr. NASA/KSC Electrical Systems _ "
Engineer LC 34 L2
1 Munson, Harry G. Douglas Supervisor Xlanufact- '¢_

!
1 uring Operations LC" 34 Operations Room
4
i Muys, Paul RCA Communications Tech-

nician MSO Bldg. Room 44,/.0
t
Nadeau, Robert T. Chrysler Technician, Vehicle
!
Measuring Station Service Structure
Nicholson, John L. PAA Security Police Road at N.E. Corner of LC

34
Niedert, Myron A. Douglas Engineer CIF Building, Room 307
.l No_,ell, G. C. Douglas Structural Mechanical k_

• Engineer CIF Building
Oberlin, Donald Chrysler S1B Hydraulic Pnl.

Operator Blockhouse 34, Rack 44
O'Brien, J. J. IBM Technician LC 34, OAT Room 1521

Level
O'Hara, A. D. NASA/KSC LV & Test Ops. Mgr.,

Saturn 1B LC 34 Blockhouse
Olsen, Stanley Chrysler Supervisor, S1B

Vehicle Telemetry Blockhouse 34, Floor 1
i
O'Ncal, E. H. Douglas Mechanical Leadman LC 34, Mechanical

Trailer
Otto, William E. Douglas Associate Engiueer LC 3t. Service Structure

OAT Room, 152' Level
Overstreet, Clyde F. NASA/KSC Electrical Systems

Engineer LC 34, Blockhouse
Overton, T. L. Douglas Engineer l)r;:ftsia:nl LC 34. Sere'ice Structure,

114- foot t.evel
i Parker, Sanford Douglas Missile Mechanic LC 34, Sere, ice Structure,

116-foot Level
.!
!
Payne, W. D. Douglas Inspector LC 34 Blockhouse
! Pearson, Charles A. Bendix Propellant Sampler Lab Bldg. H5-995
Penovieh, F. R. NASA/KSC Guidance & Control

Technician LC 34, Support Bldg_
.... -.......... B-28

.i
: Perry, William IBM Technician : I.C 34,1 Blockhouse RUCP

Console
i Phyllis, Howard L., J r. Bendix Propellant Sampler At ttome
Pigg, Robert W., J r. GE Computer NIaintcnance
Specialist Computer Room 1", Bldg.

.... Pipher, Marvin Douglas I.cad Engineer - "FM
& RF . LC 34 Blockhouse
Pirtle, James E. Bendix Lab Technician Lab. Bldg. H5-995
Pittman, William E. Chrysler OAT Battery Room Service Structure, ll6-foot

Level
Platt, Philip C. Chrysler Launch Operations
Inspector Complex 34, AGCS
, Ploski, B. T. IBM Technician CIF Building, Computer

_-- ', " Room 231
..
..<::i_ Pomeroy, Norman O. Chrysler Lab Technician Complex 34, Support Bldg.
I Pornovets, Michael Bendix PropellantS'ampler At Home ' "
Porter, Earl G. FEC Tape Recorder Operator Operating Tape Recorder
Powers,. Tim L. Chrysler .LOX Technician Complex 34, LOX Trailer
Puckett, Paul E. Chrysler Support GSE Operations Service Structure, I7-foot Le-
_ vel
Rainey, C.R. IBM Technician : • LC 34,Flight Control Rack
" B47 .
Raley, E.O. NASA/KSC Instrumentation Engineer LC 34. Service Structure
Reynolds, E.A. NASA/KSC G & N Engineer ACE Control Rm/MSOB
Ricci, P.A. Dougl_ Senior Engineer-Launch

Operations LC 34, Operations Office
Richards, Charles W. Chrysler Mechanical Support Service Structure, 27- foot Le -

vel
f%
:i Richard_, .I.er,'v I.. Bcndix Specia! l'ncum:aivs. I Iigh
Pressure Gas .Mechanic At ltomc
Richards, Ronald F. Bendix Technician At Home
Richardson, F.G. GE . Project Engineer Unknown .
Riekert, James D. Chrysler Monitor Umbilical
Housing Eject Service Structure, A-I
tr_ Riddle, Albert L., Jr. PAA ,o- Security Police LC 34, Blockhouse
• )-- "% -, . - . . .
"," .__g_;-, .:_'-:..:.'C.g_.- %. .... " . ..... . _...... :.
"...... :77"_!:_7::i/:,;::_ :• , _;_;:!_i_?::_i!. Z: _ .

I
Ridlehoovcr, ,l. O. Bendix SMcty & Security [
Supervisor At l lome ' i.
Ries, Edward E. Chryqcr Digital l{angc Safety f
!
1 Ritcliie, A ..... IBM
Ground
Technician
Station Blockhouse 3.1. Floor
q
1 L
Theodelite tlut-124 Systems f-
i i
!t Robelen. Kenneth F. GE Quality Control Spcci:dist * IS() Building, ACI_ Stations

L
l&3
F
1 Roberts, Wayne Ehon FEC Magnetic Tape Recorder L
1 Operator CIF Building, ,Module II
1 Robinson, Wilbert L. Bendix Systems Safety Supervisor At Home

F
L
Rogers, Perry M. NASA]KSC Measuring Brandl
Technician LC 34, Blockhouse E
Rouse, Carroll R. NASA/KSC Electrical Systems
Engineer LC 34, Blockhouse
Rowe, D. O. NAA Technician LC 34, 100-foot Level S. E.

'I
of. gantry
1 Ruch, Herbert E., J r. Bendix
:/|
Engineering Specialist At Home
Rudasill, Charles H. Bendix Foreman Complex 39A

:21
Rush, Russell D. Chrysler LH 2 Technician Complex 34, LI-I 2 Facility
Russell, Orlando L. Chrysler System Test & Launch

Engr. Supv. Complex 34, PCD Area
Ryder, Barry A. Bendix Propellant Sampler At Home

L_
Sales, Amos tI. Chrysler Launch Operations Complex 34, Liquid Oxygen
Inspcctor Fac.
Sample, Carl W. GE Decommutation Main-

MSO Building, Computer
tenan ee Specialist Room 1
Samples, Robert E. Bendix Laboratory S,,pmwisor.

D
Gas Anah'sis Lab ,.\t ttome
! .
Sanders, William hl. Chrysler U
"lcchnicia n, t'I_EV )' 1
l,iocnhouse 3t
Santos, Tomas IBM Technician

LC 34, RackB-53 Computer
Console
i -
Sapp, L. A. Douglas Electi'_iaics Technician LC 34, Service Structure,
Forward Intcrstage
Satterfield, Waher D. Chrysler Field Technician Complex 34, Valve Lab
B -30
I
t D
i
Sawyer, Artimr L. NASA/KSC Electrical Systems

i Engineer LC 34
I
Schlaefer, Bryant C. Bendix Propellant Mechanic At tlomc

.!
4
! Schouhz, P. A. NAA Stabilization & Control ACE" Control Room I.
,, MSO Building ,
Shackelford, David A. Chrysler R F Technician Service Structure, -\-1
Shoal, Joseph M. Chrysler Recorder Operator

Monitor . Blockhouse 34, Firing Room
•- .: .: ..
D Sccor, Ray
-". , . ,
L.
•
Douglas Mechanical Technician LC 34, Service
foot Level
Structure, 116-
• - Shoekle);;'_::;Ri:: ";L._:_(_-'::::_i_ 'i Douglas Electronics Test

N p
Technician
LC 34, Service
foot Level
Structure, 116-
.... :' Shor4. JacE __i'i;_ASA/KSC Q, C Inspector LC 34, Service Structure
ShramEojotih_J¢_:: _;-_%_7=
_',Y:/NASA/KSC Guidance & Navigation
4 Engineer LC 34, Blockhouse
Shreves, Dolores C. PAA PAA Nurse PAA Cape Dispensary
Sibley,L.F. Douglas Electronics Technician LC 34 Blockhouse
Simon, Marion Douglas Chauffeur Driver/Com-plex 34, Service

Structure, ll6-foot Level
Simonelli," R.B. Douglas Electronics Engineer LC 34, Service Structure
Skog, Roy E. Bendix Technician At Home
Sonnenthal, William L. Chrysler Engineer Service Structure, 17-foot Le-

vel
[ , Spiller, ttenry '_V. Chrysler Launch Operations
Inspector Service Structure, A-2
Solo, Dennis IBM Technician L_ 34, Rack B-51 Flight

" Computer
Staveland, Allen m. Chrysler Field E,:gineer C'omplex 34. Support Bidg.
Stelly, J. N. • NASA/KSC Stabiliz.ttion & Control ACE Control Room l,

Systems Engineer MSO Building
Stewart, David D. Chrysler SIFC S1B Flight Control

Engineer Service Structure
Stubbe, R. E. Douglas Associate Engineer

Scientist- At tlome
B-31
Sudimak,Basil Bendix IIPG Mechanic At llomc 1
Szott,RonaldD. Bendix Propellant Sarnl)lcr,_r At I lome
Tatham,Steve NASA; KSC Standby Van Driver MS() Building

[
Taylor, EdwinR. GE Te_t Operations Engr. Office, MSO Building r
T,'tS-Ior,
P. IBM Technician
1
LC 34, AGCS
Terry,Marvin E. Chrysler Senior LC 34 Meas.

Sta. Engineer Service Structure, Mcas. Sta.
i
Theobald,P. O. IBM Manager, Measuring & LC 34, Firing Room,

Telemetry Systems Ground Networks Panel
Thawley,John H. ChD, slcr Field Technician Service Structure, Floor 2
"l'hcofrastou, Perry IBM Technician LC 34, Blockhouse
Thibodcaux, Albert W. Chrysler Engineer, Airborne Net-

works * Semite Structure f
!
Tl_omas, J. L. FEC Technician CIF Building, Module 2 t
Data Core
Thomas, Palmer S. PAA Security Police LC 34, base of Service

Structure
Thomason, James R. Bendix Technician Main Gate of Complex 34
Thompson, Arthur L. Chrysler Monitor Hydraulic

Reeorders/S1B Blockhouse 34, Firing Room
Thompson, John P. Ch_-s!er Support S1B Telemetry

Checks Service Structure. A-1
Thomson, j. C. NAA CD:o/Fucl Cell Engineer ACE Control Room ,m

l)
MSO Building
TAler, Philip S. Chrysler Air Conditioning

Technician Complex 34, ECS
NAS-\/K 5C E!cctronics Technici:_ n
Bendix High Pressure Gas , !

Mechanic GOX Pad, Complex 34/37
.f-
t
Tribe, John NAA RCS Engineer ACE Control Room l, i
u
MSO Building
'Tucker, S. S. NAS:VKSC lnstrumemation Systems t

Technician " LC 34. BlockhOuse
B -32
• ..-. +'::L . 2•.2C5 +... ::1£ "T _'
.. :- . ...,. .
Turner, Charles A. NASA/KSC Guidance & Navigation

Systems Engineer CIF Buil_ting .
D Turner, Clark C. Chrysler Launch

Inspector
Operations
Complex 34, P'CD Area
i
0 Tuss!er, H. R.---- Douglas Engineer/Scientist LC

between
3-t, Service
A-2 &
Structure
-4 Levels
Tutwiler, C. IV. Douglas

0 Section Chief,
Electronics
Saturn
LC 34 Blockhouse
Tzareff, Paul P. Chrysler Support Test Operations,

0 MGSE
ScrviccStructure, 17-footLe-
vel
Van Skaik, Albert L. Chrysler RP-1 Technician

.Complex 34, Trailer (RP-1)
Vozzola, D. B. IBM Measuring Systems
l°
Engii,cer LC 34, Rack C5
Ii
• Vreeland, Arthur E..Jr. FEC Technician

CIF Building, Data core Mo-
dule 4
O Wakefield, Lester S. Chrysler Valve Lab Inspection Complex 34, Support Bldg.
Walden, Gerald B. NASA/KSC Vehicle Measuring
B Walsh, J.ames P. Bendix

Technician
LC 34, Service Structure
Propellant Sampler Complex 34t37
0 Waiters, John R. Chrysler Propellant Tanking

Computer System
Complex 34, Support Bldg.21.
0 Walters,.Jurd A. Bendix High Pressure

M'cehanie
Gas
Complex
Console
34, 02 Conditiordng +
I
Ware, Edward J.
'+
+.
J
.,°
Washburn, j. F_,.
Chrysler
IBM
Chemic,_l Cleaning
Technician
P LC 34, Rack B-52
+D Watson, James R. Chrysler AGCS Ground Networks Complex 34, AGCS

_,Vegelin, Vqendell Chrysler Quality Surv{'iila:ace
Vq Service Structure, A-I
I+, \_'c._t. Edward L. NASA/Ks C (.) C !l .... ,+,'t<,r At I lomc
Whitcsidc, C. A. NASA/KSC Guidance & Navigations
Systems Engineer CIF Building, Room 307
Whiting, Donald F. NASA/KSC Q C Inspector ACE COntrol Room ,
MSO Building
Whitson, James T. Chrysler Support Plugs-Out Test Complex 34
B -33
Whin, William B. Chrysler Pncumntics S),st cnt
Complex 3-I, AGCS
Engl ilecr
Williams, Arthur J. Bendix System Safety Supervisor School PTA Dinner
Williams, Carl M. Bendix Technician Main Gate, Complex 34

,j
t
q Williams, Terry A. Bendix Propellant Mechanic At Home
I
Williamson, E. L. Bendix Supervisory Engineer.
PSCL Dept., Analytical
I
| Laboratory At Home
|
! Wilson, Dwayne W. Douglas Missile Field Test LC 34, Service Structure; lI6-
Technician foot Level
Wilson, James C. Jr. Chrysler Launch Opts. Imp.

Unit Supv. Complex 34, Trailer 1-069
IBM Technician LC 3.t, Blockhousclstfloor,

oWinborn,J. E.
Ground Computer
Wise, Harry E. Douglas Missile Mechaafic LC 34, Service Structure

Structure, ll6-foot Level
Woodson, Mason C. Chrysler SIB Vehicle Electrical

Networks Service Structure, Floor 2
Laboratory Technician At Home

Wright, Roger N. Bendix
Wybranowsld., Edward W. Chrysler LH 2 Panel Operator Complex 34, LH 2 Auto Load

Panel
• Year,/, James R. Douglas Associate Engineer ....

Scientist At Home
Young, W. IBM Tech,fician LC 34, T:light Control Room

Rack B-15
!
B -34
D COMMON ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFII'IITIONS
0 ACE Acceptance Chcckout Equipment
AFET Facility Electrical Technician - (CALL SIGN)

(AGCS Room)
AGCS Automc_tFc Ground Control System
APi_S Power Distribution System - (CALL SIGN)

(AGCS Room)
D B/H, BH Blockheuse
,.i_:_!_
BPC ,..-..,,ii_t Protectlve Cover
[I CAST+ Astronauts Communications Console - (CALL SIGN)
CIF Central Instrumentation Facility
c/M Command Module of the Spacecraft
Carom Communications and Radio Frequency
CPX Complex
B CSTC Spacecraft Test Conductor - (CAll. SIGH)
CVTS Space Vehicle Test Supervisor - (CALL SIGN)
ECS Environmental Control System
EDS Emergency Detection System
G&N Guidance and Navigation
:, F_
GSE
7L_ Ground _upport Eqt_ip_icnt
IDR •Interim Deviation Report
INST Instrumenlation and Telemetry

i
LC
.,
n Launch C_mp!_x
LCC Launch C<_._i'c,! C:.n._or
LES Launch Escape System
MILA Merritt Island Launch Area (now Kennedy Space

Center, KSC)
-+
MRC$ Reaction Control System - (CALL SIGN)
D NAA North American Aviation, Inc.
B-35
i U- .
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administrction
OCP Operatlonol Checkout Procedure

L
OIS Operational Intercommunications System
F
] OTV Operational Television
L
i
PA or P/A Public Add:ass System
e r
I
PAA Pan American _'orld Airways, Inc.
P&S Power and S._quential [

f
PL or P/L Pad Leader
PLSS Portable Life Support System p [

QC Guali_y Control
RCS Reaction Control System [

RF Radio Frequency t
S/C Spacecraft
SCS Stabilization and Control System

L
SCET Command Module Electrical Technician (Service Structure)
(CALL SIGN-AB) .... t
t
SCMD Commend Pilot - (CALL SIGN)
!
SCMT Commend
(CALL
Module Mechanical
SIGN-A8)
Technician tService Structure
J
SFDS Fluid Distribution System (Service Structure)
(CALL SIGt_-AT)
i
1 SLA Spacecraft/Lunar Module Adapter
S/M Service Module

i
SPAD Pod Leader - (CALL SIGH)
SPLT Pilot - (CALL SiGI_)
i SPS Service Propulsion System

1
.SSET Service Module Electrical Technician (Service Structure)
(CALL SIGN-A7)
SSRP - Senior Pilot - (CALL SIGN)
B-36
I
STC Spacecraft Test Conductor
T/C, TC, T.C Test Conductor
TM Telemetry
Test Project Engineer

TPE
T SUPER Test Supervisor
UFET Umbilical Tower Facility. Electrical Technician
YOX Voice Transmission "
White Room
1
1
i .
I
1
1
I
1
f_
_J
1
I
1
1 B-37
_..- :5: :: • : • .. ':_. .5:., _, :: • .......i _!:,. : •f> -i.: : _.: ::i_!;/i:
i;¸
. • ..
DONALD O. BABBITT i ,: ::,
t .NAA
JANUARY 2B, 1967
I was stationed at the Pad Leadei"s desk, verifying that per tim procedure, support was ready fi)r urn. '
bilical pull at T-0. The time period in here I can only 'estimate as 5 m 15 seconds. I heard on the
head set (Channel Black-3) Mr. Ctmffee say, "'There .is a fire in here," (or words to this cffcct). |
ordered the mechanical lead man, Mr. Glcaves, to "Get them out of there" (meaning remove the
hatches and get the crew ovt of the Co,nmand Module). I started to turn toward the Communicatio::s
D Box (on my left)., when out of the corttcr of my eye, I saw flame come out fi'om under
the steam duct. I almost completed my turn when I was hit by a concussion
the •boost near
or sheet of flame (I don't
remember hearing an explosion) and was pushed toward the communication boxes. My next thoughts
D were to get out of there.

Room) arm, and went
1'I never had time to notify the blockhouse).
across it to the mnbilical
I went to the umbilical
tower where I encountered
(Whi:c
three of the spacecraft
mechanics and an elevator talker who had a head set. I told the talker to inform the test supervisor
that we were on fire and that I need firemen, ambulances, and equipment. With the three mechanieg
D (Messrs. Gleaves,
to the White
Hawkins,
Room
and Clemmons)
to Ix3, to remove
we grabbed
the hatches.
the only CO 2 bottle
The smoke and heat was
available
so intense
and went back
that we could
only spend a short time in the White Room (possibly I-2 min:ttes). After several tripsback and fort!:
Mr. Oleaves almost passed out due to smoke inhalation so I ordered him to stay out, which he did
but for only a short time.
D Alter
(NASA
available,
the smoke
and NAA)
had
had been
eleared some, I could see that
able to get back into level A-8 and were fighting
so I got some more men and continued as best we could (because
fires with
of the smoke
the Spacecraft Technicians and ('_uality Control
everything
and heat','
to remove the hatches. We attempted to both remove the inner hatch or lower the hatch down inside
the Command Module. We were not successful in removing the inner hatch and could only lower the
hatch about 75 to 80% of the way because of obstructions. I was at that time only able, again because
of the smoke which was considerable, to observe only two of the flight crew but could not recogn'.,ze
B who it was. The inner hatch was extremely

to the hatch. My observation
hot and we could only handle
at the time of hatch removal
it with fl_e handles attached
was that the flight crew were dead and
that the destruction inside the Command Module was considerable. After informing the test supervisor
of what I had observed (while adlaering to security guidelines wherever possible) and continued to direct
the crew in putting out the fires, I asked the senior Pan American firemen m specifically check the
Launch Escape Motor for hot spots and general heat.
I was relieved by Mr. Curatolo, NAA 1st shift pad leader.
I proceeded down' the umbilical tower elevator, met the two NASA doctors and briefed them on what
B they
Shop
would
Trailer,
find. I then
for treatment
proceeded
and
to the
checkup.
Pan American
I was treated
Dispensary,
for smoke
with a short stop at
inhalation, flash burns,
the NAA
and eve
irritation, and ordered to remain overnight.
I feel that tlie Spacecraft Crew (Technierd. M,.-chm_ical. NAA Qua!ity Control, and NASA Quality
Control) performed conamen.dably well i:l ,b.i_ emergency.
I feel that there should bca number of things taken care of immediately by safety from the standpoint
of working crew and Equipment Safety;
D Is/ Donald O. Babbitt
B -39
4" "
JANUARY 29, 1967
The Pad Leader is on tile t|pper level by the spacecraft• l-ic is more "or tess in
WI LLI AMS:
charge of pad operations. Ite reports back to the blockhouse and whp in turn
--reports back to tile control room where the test is being run from. The test is
run froxl_ the blockhouse and the control room is back here in this building, l h"
was taking direction from the blockhouse or the North :\merican project engineer
who is back herc. 'l'hc activities up there fall under his responsibility.
PETRONE: Where would you want him to sit or speak from the microphone? Put him there
next to you, Dr. Thompson.
1
One thing I think we should say is that the statement tl'(at you make will remain
THOMPSON:
i
in the same -- leave yourself in the same category in keeping all this testimony
! within
talked
the same restraints
to us doesn't
that have operated
relieve
up to now. The fact that
you of that obligation.
you have
i I_ABBITT:
PETRONE:
I understand
We cannot
perfectly.
hear you.
I have a hoarseness because of smoke danmg, cr so I ask if I can move a -little

i BABBITT:
closer. May I speak freely or ......
i THOMPSON: Go ahead. Tell us what happened, to your observation.
t BABBITF: Well, as the North American pad leader on the 2nd shift, I was stationed at the
1 pad leader's desk. At the time of the incident I was verifying that we were ready
t at T minus zero for umbilical pull as per the procedures. This is a manual pull
it and we were checking to make sure all our lines were clear. At the time it had
zi
1
4.
happened,
Chaffee
I heard
say something
and I can almost definitely state that'l
to the cffeet of fire in the command
believe
module,
it was Mr.
fire in the
spacecraft, the term fire sticks to me more than anything else. I ordered nay
mechanical lead man. Mr. Glceves, to proceed toward the hatch for removing
the crew, and started to turn. I was facing the spacecraft. You gentlemen are
familiar with the layout up there.
THOMPSON: We have been thcrc.
t'ABIHTT: You knox*."where the pad leader's desk is?
1 t t( )Y.!l'SON: "l'hvt the ucs_:'

_ xx_,," the iclc'_>!ac;;_', c_:-_it?
t BABBITT: Yes, sir.

!
t TItOM PSON: You were at the desk?

t
BABBITT: Yes, sir, I ,.,as facing the umbilicalat the time.
PETRON'E: Were you sitting down?
i
!
"i" B -40
!
... . ......... -.............. _ . . ............................
.. :,. J -.
I
i
I
B BABBITT: No, I was standing.
blockhouse either on
I had
normal
started
comm
to turn toward the cmnm
line or page whichever
box to call th,:
was opcnl Out t,l
1
the corner of nw eye I believe 1 saw which was fli'tnle from under the bt_,,sl
I B, protective cover in
turn. I never made
the area what couhl
it to the comm box
be the steam
because
duct and contimfi,_g my
at that time more o." less ovcr
1 my head I .fch a pressure and heat and flame and I never made the call to the
blockhouse. Xly next ..thuu,t;hts were to get out of there as quickly as I could.
1 proceeded out across the umbilical arm. the walkway there, to wh&e I got
to a telephone lalkcr who was at the elevator of a crew st;.tndhlg by whic]:
i
would have been the ,mrnml emergency egre.,s test and they had a man stationed
B there and told him to inform the blockhouse thx'ougla his channels of what was
taking place. I was preceedcd out the umbilical arm by three of my mechanics,
Mr. Gleeves, Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Clements. From that time on it was -
]
21
D we were spent as quickly
the hatches. I probably
as we could,
could answer
but with
questions
the amount
better than
of smoke, removing
I could speak freel_:
on this. If there is anything specific.
B THOMPSON: Let me ask you one question about tile full length of time involved between any
untoward event andlor enveloping tiamcs. How long a period of time do _ou
think that full action?
BABBITT: I can only guess, sir, there would be a matter of at the most maybe two to
D three seconds and

to the comm box.
tile time it would take me to turn approximately 90 degrees
LONG: Is this two to three seconds from when you heard Chaffee's voice until youper-
B zonally felt ......
BABBITT: Yes, sir. ---
B TI-iOMPSON: That is, this means then that the first evidence you had there was anything
untoward happening was.that voice.
B BABBITT: Yes, sir.
YARDLEY: And almost simuhaneouslv you saw this flame coming --
BABBITT: As I was turning I saw it from under the boost cover.
YARDLEY: Two or three seconds after that you felt the big pressure?
BABBITT: Yes, sir. In seeing Ihe flame under the boost cover we, also, having been out
r7
I tllf2!'C alld !)Ct'n 7ttl t].C "_ ",;,v'C(!'_:[| Di::_:\: tiZI!'.E V.'Iw;I '.•,'C ¢10 Z" liOl'l.q:_} e,_l_itl press-
i urc ¢
chcc.< i to wh,.;c cci:c[ ;'al._
i ita. ," _,....
, ,, .o ,..,_ th, c':,bi:., wc hear the. l beiieve
I heard and at the same time saw tim flame - the normal noise that we hear
with •this cabin relief valve going with the steam duct. The noise is sort of hard
to describe but it is something that we hear all thc time and know what is
ta_dng place at that time.
1
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I MATHE_VS-
BABBITT:
Were
To n W left.
you turning --
,Q
B -41
iB -¸-
I
MATHEWS: To your left - but you saw tile flames under the boost protectiv_ cover and not t
.i
coming out of the I_,CS doors?
7
BABBITT: Right, I would attribute this to be in the area of the steam d,'.=.:l, it would bc
I
only speculatidn for me to say that maybe the cou'ul-.and pilot 'L:<J duntped the
1
cabin or maybe the normal ri:lief valve ha'td dtnnpt'd.
I
j-
-YARDLEY: You say you hear this'relief valve all the time and arc familiar v-:i: it.
1
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BABBITT: When we are doing _i cabin pressure check.
i
YARDLEY: In other words, it dumps normally at 5 psi differential.

I
i BABBITT: Yes, sir, and its noise that most of us are familia¢ with having ?,.Card it a nurn-
l bet
but
of times,
also I heard
not only
it the same day.
in the altitude chambers prior to the a._5:ude runs there
I_AGET: That was before you saw the fire or after "_
BABBITT: It was before the main flame came. But we - I saw and I heard the venting
sound and then as I say I continued my turn and a sheet c,f flame came to-
!
wards me.
VOICE: Who did you ii_truct to go to thc hatci_ opening?
i BABBITT: My mechanical lead man, Mr. Oleeves, and as required he takes a crew with
• him. I understand it was Mr. Clemcnts and Mr. Hawkins also. .
TH OM PSON: There is, I understand, an override on this relief, the pilot pressure relief that
! the pilot can use as an automatic relief of pressure, too.
)i
BABBITT: Yes, sir.
VOICE: The pressure relief knot last night were not in the manual order.
YARDLEY: That would indicate that the pressure had built up in avt W short time from
16 absolute to say 20?
VOICE: What is this steam tube?
BAPBI'FT: There is a hole coming up i_ is :: duct coming off the EC"Z -- coming out the
side of the spacecraft, and we have a, with a boost c_v.-:-: on, would have a
tube inserted i.n there - to vent this downward.
i THeM PSON: There's

desk.
one impr_si6n we got out
o..
there, that the flame sk-ot out way over the
! BABBITT: Yes, sir.

.J
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! THOMPSON: With the paper -- did you see that flame. D,'as it a jet of flame or can you
describe it m anyway?
• .a :a .• -,
!i - B -42
• . ..-<..
BABBITT: All l saw was flame coming • overhead as I was almost tur0cd toward the com-
munications hox. My back was more or h'ss, tow:lrd tile commmad mochtle, l
was turned mavhe of a possilfie 90 degree ttlrn there, we'll say 7"5 dcgrtes. ;dt
I saw flame come overhead and fch the heat and concussion of it.
TItOMPSON: The papers on the desk, though, were charred.
BABBITT: Yes, sir.
THOMPSON: " The distance is, whal do you think, 10 _o 12 feet?
BABBITT: I would.say it must be 12 fect.
D THOMPSON: On a horizontal, on a level with only desk height.
BABBITT: Yes, sir.

D THOMPSON: Our question was, it was a rather narrow confined area that got the full ex-
tension of the that flame?
Q BABBITT:
As I understand it, I have not been out to the pad since this has happened, as
I understand it, but I believe myself and several people who were very near
there, the desk, were very lucky to get away.
THOMPSON: They were rather close to the desk despite the fact that the desk itself, the
papers on the desk were burned?
BABBITT: Yes, sir.

)'¢ •
MATHEWS:
I think you have to be careful to assume that was a jet because there are a
number of evidences around that are more direct that indicated it was pieces
of flaming material that fell in the area.
BABBITT:
blight I answer that. My white coat that I had on and my Shirt that I had "on
which were - well. the white coat looked like it had been" hit with material or
something like this to burn holes in it. ,"xlv white shirt looks like it would be
residue from. tl,e shirt that I had on looks like it would be the residue from the
white coat, from being burned as such.
YARDLEY: Like a cigarette ash burn hole?
n BABBITT: .Yes, sir.
FAG ET: "Yhere were a mmfl_cr of these holes?
U BABBITT: Yes, sir. They were mostly

turning t9 the left..May
on my
I illustrate?
right shoulder which as I say, I would be
VOICE: , Wh_, clon't you make us a sketch? ; -_.
BABBITT: I think I Can do it assuming the spacecraft "is in front of me here and my
comm boxes are over here, I was turni_:g, the comm boxes are a little low. so
B -43 ..
.
! f
down towards those and it was more my ri t shoulder di_;:_;})-; _::+;_;:

I wz_ turning
I
was L_ with it.
!
TItOMPSON: 1Vhere -'.are the desks in relation to where you were standing?
BABBI'I_F: It wc=]d have been behind me.
t VOICE: Do
nalTI_.
you have a feeling that this area round you was pretty well filled w;ah
BABBITT: Yes, s_r, very much so. I had the feeling that if I stayed low, I could get out
all rz_ht, and I had the feeling, too, that the only direction that 1 had open
to go from there was toward the umbilical arm. It just looked to me, ahiwugh
I hoamtly can't answer whether I even looked at the other direction - it looked
to me that was the only area open for me to go towards.
You had on a head set and a hard hat?
_ABBITT: I had on a head set and a white hat.
- - . _
FAGET: And _.em say you felt pressure on your head?
1
BABBITT: Yes, sir. I felt a pressure - not as a blast or anything, but a positive pressure
to where I was forced toward the comm boxes or towards . away from the
spacecraft.
VOICE: . Did this over-pressure last very long?

/
/ •
BABBITT: No, sir. it did not.
(Background discussion)
VOICE: Was the kind of pressure you felt the kind you would feel if someone opened
• a furnace door? Was it that combination?
1 BABBITT: Yes =-;:-- more that o:" the pressure of someone gently but suddenly pushing you.
It wasn't a hard pressure or anything of that sort but just a positive pressure.
1
.-
WHITE: Have you ever lit a gasoline or something in a bottle or bottom of a can and
thro_aa a match in it? Was it that type?
t
BABBITT: Yes, i: was. (Looking at drawing,, This would be the umbilical arm. I was
star. :::..:
...... _.-Jo:.m;: ;::. lizc mr'..i,;ic;d :,.,:z,. ti,c p..-_, le;v&'rs d,zsk bcivg.. here. l would
be faC=-:g in thi_ d_rc,:tio,a wi:cn 1 herod the words. "'Fire" and I turned in
this direction toward -- which would be the communications boxes, and as I
say, the boxes are a little low /_o I had to bend over slightly to get to them.
The umbilical arm being her,5.': I went out this direction to the arm and then
out here.
MATHE_,VS: In other ,words, you went out pastthe place where the flame was coming out
thru the boost protective cover. +-
B-44
BABBITT: I think - that would be where the white room would be attached. That Would
he approximately here. The length of the white room here. I would be in this
area here..The steam duct. It is, asyou face the hatch, it's to the 16ft and he-
low the hatch.
VOICE: Where is the cabin vent valve?
• BABBITT: It is right here.
VOICE: Does it come out through the steam duct?
BABBITT: This is what we call the steam duct. It vents through this duct.
PETRONE: The boost protective cover limits might be interesting. Where were the limits
of the boost protective cover?
BABBITT: The -- it Would be in this general area. I can see it from where I am.
YARDLEY: You didn't see it coming out the side, dyer there? Right behind the desk?
IJ
BABBITT: No, sir, I did not. Tile limits of the boost cover is the sections that we had on,
would be approximately here and say over here.
YARDLEY: But you saw it over on this side?
B-kBBITT: lVe saw it here, underneath here. which would be in the general area of the
steam duct, _,
VOICE: Was this the initial thing that you saw? /" •
BABBITT: This was the initial thing that we saw. I saw it as I was turning, which an
over pressure wou_l cause the thing to vent. .,,
MATH EWS: When did you hear that? Can you give us any estimate of time between that
period and when you fi_t heard the fire signal?
BABBITT: I heard the fire signals, well, you mean as to clock time.
MATHEWS: No, the estimate of how many seconds.

YARDLEY:
BABBITT: In relation to hearing the fire signal. The time it would take me to say to a
man standing in front of me. "'Get them out" and turn, like that. _A'hatever
lengtK of time timt is..
YARDLEY: Was that valve sound a single sound or .......
BABBITT: Sort of a whooshing sound.
MATHEWS: Did it signal more than once?
BABBITT: All I heard was once.
- B -45
PETRONE: l,V,'m there a definite click or just a whoosh? •
k
BABBITF: There is a definite whoosh and a cutoff, in nornml conditions.
VOICE: You used the p!_rase earlier whcn you wcrc talking about Ibis flame by thc L
-steam duct area. You used this phrase, "_Sceing it out of the corner of your
eyC'. Is there any doubt in your mind ,as to whether you saw a flame? " r
L
_-BABBITT: No, sir, there is not. There is no rcal "doubt in my mind that I saw it. It's
an outstanding feature of things that we normally scc in thcre. There is some-
thing that was
cations box.
unusual, but I was still making my turn towards the communi- [
FAGET: 3,Vheaa did you inhale the snioke to your knowledge?
[
BABBITT: After We had proceeded out on the umbilical arm. The - I talked to the tele.
phtme talker, to the talker
in with the three.mechanics
at the top of the elevator.
who were with me to get
Then I proceeded back
to the hatch if possible.
F
We were in there time is - it's hard to say how much time there was. I
would
able
say not more
to tell that we
than
could
30 seconds. In
feel the hatch.
there long
We could
enough to know and be
see it up very close but E
the smoke was so thick that we couldn't stay in there very long. We went ou.,
grabbed the only C02 bottle on the umbilical arm on that level, went back
in again, spent a little longer in there, we got the boost cover hatch off. The F
tools were in the white room.. We had placed them there for the emergency
egre_ test anyway. So we knew where those were. It was just a single multi-
putlw_e tool. After taking that off, we left again. %re made any number of r
1
" 41m.,
trit_ in and out of there. I guess on possibly the third trip tlae smoke had
cleared enough down on the deck below the umbilical arm to where I could
my
I had.
head, set and I stepped
with the blockhouse,
down and put it on and that's
then. From that
the first contact
time on, we made a number of E
in and out. We did as we could as long as we could stay in there and
tlum came out. We more or less went in as a group and came out as a group.
As I was coming out I would report to the blockhouse, as best I could at the
time. I know Mr. Page prolx:bly tilought that there was something wrong that
I kept yelling for people and equipment and things. At the time the smoke t"""
was so heavy that I couldn't see that there were people. My own spacecraft L
teclmieians, mechanics, NASA QC, NAA QC had gotten back into the level
and were on the other side and were working on the fires in the area. We
needed, at the time, we needed some sort of as I call it some sort of a battle
lantern. The._e old Navv lanterns timt you pick up. We couldn't see the hatches
"_'e;] cPoug}_ -to _:.c,','_: vcz-, l(':z . :\t ¢):_:"tri i, ira wc ltztd to spend more than half
of the tinic in ll,c:c i_:_;;{'z; _,s ti,: toe,} b,-('aL;_.:: :t_ we came okil We2 1lzUSt hg.lVC
placed it in a little diffcicnt 1,_,_izicm. ;ks I was informed later on, it was abow.
3 five minutes before We got the hatch of[. i may very honestly have been possible
4 15 lID 30 seconds late in reporting it to the blockhouse, because during that
t period of time we were tD'ing to maneuver

out which has to be rotated
the inner lmtch,
to get it out or to get it down,
to either take it
to drop it down
i imide. We finally, I told them to drop it. inside to place it in there as close
1
1
as they
off- Then
could
I
and
went
then
back
I reported it to the blockhouse
in and made
that
my own observations
the hatches were
on what I saw.
B-46
I
VOICE: Did you have to get special handling cquilnnCnt to hamlle the imu:r imtch?
I
I
BABBITT: There are handlc:i (m the inner hatch which, fol:tunately, were hot. yes. })tit
they could handled. The face of the hatch itself was extremely hot. but the
handles were cool enough where wc could handle i.t and could lower it or-
maneuver it.
VOICE: With your bare hands?

r
BABBITT: YeS, sir.
:D VOICE: Vehat exactly was this fire indication at the steam vent? "_Vas that the only part
of the time you took off for the utnbilical arm?. Was that the only evidence of
fire?
? BABBIll': Prior to the main force, yes sit'. that was the only imprmsion that I had. :ks I
say other than the call that I heard.
i BAXTER: As to tim - I'm interested in the sequence again. As to the time you heard the
fire sounded' by one of the indMduals thc time you saw the flame coming out
of the Vent the time you could tell it on the back of your neck. Could you
give us this one time again?
BABBITT: Colonel, that's the thing I can't give you in time unless I timed it myself.
Maybe one to two seconds. That's in the time it would take as I tried to
illustrate to tell a man to get the crtas" out and start turning towards there.
Seeing this but cominuing to turn anyway one to two seconds, was all that I
can say.
BAXTER: First time was the signal that you heard over the intercom? "
BABBITT: Yes sir, the term fire, I couldn't tell you whether he said, in the Spacecraft, or
in here or Command Module.
VOICE: Fire?
BABBI'YI': Right.
VOICE: Then the vent valve?
BABBITT: Then the vent valve.
VOICE: . Then on the back of the neck?
BAI_I_!'I-F: Ikight. yes sit'.
YARDLEY:. Did you hear any other noise after the vent valve immediately preceeding this
big rush of heat?
. BABBITT: No .sir, I don't remember hearing the pre_ure release, the main force. Maybe "
it wasbecause I had my back to it. I didn't hear it.
_ B-/,7
i
f
t
t
LONG: Itave you given all t,f this alsu on tape. has all this been recorded?
"i
t
i
BABBITT: I have only spoken to my own managcnleut.
|
g_
,t YARDLEY: Did you make a written statcmcnt?
1
f
BABBITT: Yes sir, I have.
-1
1
i _LONG: The reason I'm interested is that tim mmc of these sequences, events, that
] followed for plus 30 seconds would be intt:resting to lo0k at but the problem
t is somewhat
Is that available?
lengthy..Maybe it would bc better if we have it in a state,nent. t
I
! BABBITT:
FAGET:
I have
30
onds,
seconds
written
it happened
I'd like to ask you some

a little
a statement,
bit
so fast, it's
more
yes sir.
if you
hard
_fiore
Wish
I may
to explain
questions.
me
be able to amplify
to in: writing,
it any
Now
better.
on the
but
events
possible
the
when
the
first 30 sec-
you
first
first
i
T
went into the white room..
BABBITT: After we had evacuated?

l
VOICE: The first time in and tell me when that was.
BABBITT= My very first time in the white room that day, was when ......
t
9
VOICE: No, no, after the fire. i
BABBITT: O, K°
VOICE: How long after the fire when you first went in and I'd like to know about .the
condition about the smoke in the white room, what ,your impre_ion where it
was coming from and could you see in the window.
-i BABBITT: O. K. As we proceeded imo across the umbilical arm. there was billowing
i smoke coming out the level.
VOICE: Billowing smoke, what color?

|
1
BABBITT: It was avcry dark gray. Seems to stick in my mind. It was a ve W heavy,
thick, s,noke. .\s we l_ro,",'"ded in farther, knowing the umbilical arm as we
spent qYi.:c a t,h o; ti:;:_" ,_;a _t. tl:< :,:-,.:,;:c x'.::_ _i'..crc v.c cou!d see to a certain
extent tt;,,ards .ur h::ci a_a,_ ou: i_an[is, l_,,' hatch window -- 1 hoficstly tmn't
remember looking at it.
VOICE: You didn't see any flames; is that_it?
BABBIq'I": No sir, I don't bdieve I did, but,I don'4, honestly remember looking in there.
: , ":-.-....
._.:;..
:7 •"
-: . .• . . .
VOICE: Can you recall seeing fire or.,. lig.hling?

i .( _
i
! BABBITT: l&d
.... _ .--__:_. _
see fire m:.thCr_i2_re'that
_ . -,_?i_ _._' ,-,..... ,.
I saw primarily was from under-
]
i
t
i
H neath, coming
ule. We used
up under tile hood of tile white
the one fire extingui.,her
room outside !the command
that we had to put'out
mod-
any small local
fires in the white room of which they were only around the hood of the white
room. Then as i say, the smoke was heavy and billowing enough to where we
could only see in a small area we were trying to work in. We had to be pretty
close to do that.
VOICE: That first moment you did not locate the tool.
BABBITT: Yes sir, we did locate the tool, because we had placed it in a specific spot. As
I say, we had done preparations for the emergency egress teams that would have
made a normal emergency egress test later on, so we knew where the tool was.
D PETRONE: I've got a question I may poseto the Board to ask you.
BABBITT: Yea sir.
D PETRONE: The white .room .quite large is up high. This area over the hatch is up fairly
high and the boost protective cover is about right to the right of the shelter
D there's
tween
a gap in there now which has been blown
the boost protective cover and the heat shield.
out a couple of inches be-
You were standing here as
you looked. Just where did you see the flame? Did you see it in this area or
did you see something come up over the top? .....
BABBITT: Before all of tiffs happened, tiae boost protective cover was laying not perfectly
flat against .the command module, butwe will say within 1/4 to 3/8 of an inch
B from
there.
it. It was-faired
As I say I - it appeared to me
in as it would normally
to be more
be. There
underneath
was no large gap
the white room
which iswhere the steam duct would be.
B PETRONE: The ate.am duct is on this corner.
-B BABBITT: Yes_ sh'.
PETRONE: And roughly how far from the aft h,cat shield?
BABBITT:- • The steam duct itself is about, I'd say a foot above the aft heat shield.
PETRONE: •Fairly low, then isn't it?
BABBITT: Right, but where I would see [t would be below the aft heat shield because of
the section of the boost protective Cover that was on there. In fact we would
r see it to a certain extent almost do',:u_ at the :crvice module.
k.J
PETRONE: Iaodking from here, your line of sight would take you to here.
D BABBITT: My line of sight, being - my drawing isn*t too well in scale. Standing here we
can _ this area underneath here, and it was underneath the hood of the white
tootlL
PETRONE: You looked then underneath the hood when you first saw flame and What dir-
ection was it going?
B.49
i
H neath, coming
ule. We used
up under the hood of the white room outside I the command
the one fire extinguisher th:|t we had to put ! out any small
mod-
local
lures in the white room of which they were only around the hood of the white
room. Then as I say, the smoke was heavy and billowing enough to where we
could only see in a small area we were trying to work in. We had to be pretty
close to do that.
VOICE: That first moment you did not locate the tool.
BABBITT: Yes sir, we did locate the tool, because we had placed it in a specific spot. As
I say, we had done preparations for the emergency egress teams that would have
made a normal emergency egress test later on, so we knew where the tool was.
PETRONE: I've got a question I may pose to the Board to ask you.
BABBITT: Yes sir.
PETRONE: The white room quite large is up h,[gh. This area over the hatch is tap fairly
high and the boost protective cover is about fight to the right of the shelter
[. there's a gap in there now which has been blown out a couple of inches be-
tween the boost protective cover and the heat shield. You were standing here as
you looked. Just where did you see the flame? Did you see it in this _rea or
lD BABBITT:
did you see something
Before all
come up over the top?
of this happened, the boost protective cover was laying not perfectly
flat against the command module, but we will say within 1/4 to 3/8 of an inch
from it. It was faired in as it would normally be. There was no large gap
there. As I say I - it appeared to me to be more underneath the white room
which is where the steam duct would be. -_
PETRONE: The steam duct is on this comer.
BABBITT: Yes, sir.
PETRONE: And roughly how far from the aft heat shield?
BABBITT: The steam duct itself is about, I'd say a foot above the aft heat shield.
PETRONE: Fairly low, then isn't it?
BABBI'I_: Right, but where I would see it would be below the aft heat shield because of
the section of the boost protective cover that was on there. In fact we would
see it to a certain extent almost down at the :crvice module.
PETRONE: Looking from here, your line of sight would take you to here.
D BABBITT: My line of sight being - my drawing isn't too well in scale. Standing here we
can se© this area underneath here, and it was underneath the hood of the white
rOOm.
PETRONE: You looked then underneath the hood when you first saw flame and what dir:
ection was it going?
B-49
iiiili ) H_ !ii!i ¸
_.14.
J. C. MOONEY
PAA V
JANUARY 27, 1967
At approx'M, ately 6:27 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, the Egress Team was preparing for the egress
drill on Complex 34.
t..'pon receipt of the alarm via the radio from Pad Safety Office, Complex 34, I started to respond
to the Complex in No. 250 vehicle. Before I reached the Dispensary, tile Superintendent, Range Op- t
erations called on the radio and requested the Egress Team. I radioed the Station and requested all
3 units prepare to roll. I turned around and proceeded to the Station and parked No. 250 and enter-
ed No. 3 Ml13 which was ready to roll at that time. Time elapsed was about 2 minutes. We then
proceeded to the Complex led by Egress membcrJ. Blankenship in P-6 truck No. 16:
I eatled the S.R.O. on Fire Crash Net and advised him our 3 units were responding. Upon.arrival
at the south gate of the Complex, we again notified the S.R.O. of our location. We proceeded to the
base of the umbilical tower and parked in our designated area. Egress members Blankenship, Crowl,
and myself proceeded up the elevator to the 8th adjustable level." Upon arrival at the spacecraft, I
met j., Blankenship coming back stating that we needed Scott Air Paks. They were ordered from be-
low. I then met the Assistant Test Conductor from North American Aviation and asked him what
condition existed. He stated the spacecraft was burning and he thought that we had 3 dead people
in there. Upon approaching the spacecraft hatch we found it almost impossible to remain without
breathing equipment, which had not arrived yet.
• r L - _ ._
The hatches were removed and all 3 bodies could be observedthrough the hatch. They all appeared
badly burned and no movement was visible. I then contacted the Test Conductor again and asked
about the status of the spacecraft and the Launch Escape System. He informed me that they could
not shut off spacecraft power since it was on internal power and that the Launch Escape System was
armed. I instructed all my personnel to not to try to enter the spacecraft until our Pad Safety Officer
and Spacecraft Test Conductor had assured us that all power was off and the Launch Escape System
was disarmed;
We attempted to remove smoke and fumes from'Environmental •Chamber by disconnecting the A/C
duct and using it to push the smoke out. Blankenship was notified to call Crash and have Chief Hipp
not ifled.
| .
\','e w¢.re told by Spacecraft Test Conductor and Astronaut Doctor to begin removal of astronauts.
|
but. [aund that power was still on and we moved back until Chief Hipp arrived. We then checked
with Pad Safety Officer, Test Conductor, etc., and determined that we would wait until given per-
t
mls_ion to enter the spacecraft. It was given by the Doctor. Then Chief Hipp and we proceeded to t
|
remove Ed White from the spacecraft. He was wedged in under Gus Grissom and with his back to
I
the ea_., wall of the spacecraft lying on his left side. We removed White with a good deal of difficulty
.,::d to,_.k him to the ambulance waiting at the base Of the base of the structure. We then wen: back
:., _! .' .,_x_cecraft and removed Gt:$ Grissom and placed him in an ambulance, returned to the space-
::._'. ,,nd removed Chaffce. Notified Pad SMety .and Security that we had. completed our assignment
aad were returning to Headquarters at 2:30 a.m., EST. E
I-
.MI persons involved performed their duties flawlessly and without any questions at any time. Mare"
i
mggestions were made and tried; some with a great deal of success.
i
ALl members are to be congratulated for their tireless efforts. We were only deeply sorry that we could
i
not do more for all involved.
i
!
!
B 179
t
l
BABBITT: It was more or less down, more or less down under the heat shield - boost
protective cover.
PETRONE: And what color was it?
BABBITT: Oh, I would say a bright orange - it wasn't a yellow flame. It was more like
a bright orange.
FAGET: This was after you felt the heat.
BABBITT: No, this was before.
FAGET: Before you felt the heat.
BABBITT: Yes, sir.
MATHEWS: You never saw the thing coming out other than ---
BABBITT: As I say, I did not see the main flame.
BORMAN: Priorto'all this, you saw no smoke or smelled no odors whatsoever.
BABBITT: No sir, I mightpoint out as I beli'eve has been pointed out before. I came in
my normal shift around 3:30. Mr. Cortolla the first shift pad leader remained
on since he had started the -- he had put the crew in and had started the
.cioseout. We normally do this rather than relieve and make a break in the
middle of an operation like that. I was present when there was an odor detected
coming out. We had a sensing port which we use to check the oxygen level
in the spacecraft as a part of the cabin pressurization and this sensing port is
right, very near the white room door and Iah- the other people working in
there smelled this odor. This is the only •unusual item that we ran into.
MATHEWS: That was the odor that Grissom alluded to.
BABBITT: I believe it is, yes, it was that - the odor that he mentioned was before I had
come in to work, before I had come up to the white room, to that area.
VOICE: You smelled this how long before the fire broke out?
BABBITT: Oh, it was a good 2t/_ hours. The inner hatch was closed.
MA'FHEWS: V_'hat was the odor like?
BABBITT: It was sort of a pungent odor, an odor like, oh, not carbon tet or anything
like that, a mixture of maybe ammonia and oh, just a - the way I can describe
it is a strong potting compound odor, some of the commercial potting com-
pounds.
MATHEWS: It was an oily odor, was it?
BABBITT: No sir, it wasn't.
B-50
B MATHEWS: Was it a volatile material odor?
BABBITT: It didn't appear to be, no. It reminded me of a potting compound that we had
B been using earlier that we were all familiar with.
THOMPSON: Did it smell more like an overheated potting material?
B BABBITT: No sir, this smeUed like removing the cap from this potting compound in pre-
paration to use it.
B VOICE: How widespread was that odor?
BABBITT: As I say, we were right near the sensing port where we attach the Beckman
B analyzer
going imo
and
the
there
white
was just
room.
a venting
-- The
out
wall
there.
on the
That
right
is right
as you
beside
go in the
the hatch
door.
B MATHEWS: Could you think a little bit more on what

someone a note on what that odor was like?
that odor would be like and give
iB BABBITT:
WHITE:
BABBITT:
Yes sir.
That sensing
It goes into the cabin.

port going into the suit loop or
It comes out the same

into the
point
cabin?
of the hatch that we press-

urize the cabin with.
B YARDLEY: You were smelling what coming out of the Beckman?
BABBITT: Right. _- _"
B YARDLEY: In other worlds, this was a sample of what was going through the Beckman into
the exhaust, to the white room?
B BABBITT: Right.
VOICE: And was this just a temporary whiff or did it persist for a long time?
• BABBITT: No, with the Becl-anan analyzer, you repeatedly squeeze the bulb to get air
samples, and we were getting it continuously while we were taking our samples.
D YARDLEY: So when you sampled, you got it?
: .r"4
BABBITT: Right.
VOICE: Then it went away alter a while.
D BABBITT: It appeared to. After we had purged once more, it appeared to lessen.
VOICE:
B BABBITT:
You
As
repurged
I understand
the .cabin
it,
to get rid of it?
as I say, I was only observing it at the time because the

Other pad leader still had the control of things.
B -.51
_. _...,._ _t.• __ ._ _,_ _*_, _ __,_ _o _.-_-, _,_. _-_ _ -:,._ - - _,_:-_ _ _a*_ _._.-, __._ _ _ _ ,,_._-_ _._,_,_ ..... _._ _, -_,_ ....... , •
I •
i
• • I f
1 DONNELLY: It took them a l°ng time to purge? Correct? You know nominal, is 20 minutt_
and you were in there for at least an hour purging. Is that right, George, about
t an hour?
PAGE: Yes -- something to the effect of recalling - I think the numbers were that for
the first 20 minutes they got 50%, then they purged again for 1.5 minutes.
About 75% at that time they suspected the Beckman analyzer. They got ano-
ther Beckman analyzer and did another purge -- (interrupted) (goes right into
• the continued typed sheet) -, and got 92.%
1 PETRONE: I'd record that for the record that statement by George Page who is Test
Supervisor.
i
t LONGi Is that sequence of purging in itself unusual?
! PETRONE:
DQNNELLY:
No,
No,
its been
"it's lortger
encountered
than what
before,
you
it's longer
set your
than
sight
the
for,
nominal
but it has
time.
been encountered
prior in an altitude chamber run. You can't say that it's something new.
VOICE: i think the real details on that could be better defined -- by others.
THOMPSON: Are there any other questions •that you want to ask while • he's here?
iI -
i LONG: One thing 1 gather is that none of you was equipped with any kind of mask.
That is not the procedure for this.
BABBI'rr: We had gas masks up there, yes sir, they were the standard, oh, I, believe min-
ing gas masks. I myself tried twice to use them, I had - because wall, the first
time, I pulled the tape off the bottom of one of them and tried it and it just
maeked up tight at my face like I wasn't getting any air through it, so I tried
another one and they had the telephone talker because I couldn't see too well,
because the amount of smoke that I had been in --had him pull the tape off
it -- he hadn't been exposed to any smoke. I tried it and it didn't work either.
I have heard the same comment from a couple of nay mechanics also. Wc did
!
have masks at _ork. yes, but the masks didn't work long enough for anyone to
spend a long period of time in there. They, it_e men, said they'd get in there
maybe spend possibly a minute or a minute and a half and they would start
choking up, too.
!
MATttEWS: One thing I would have done, you may have stated, I think you did say you
initiMly wen: imo the white re,am and approache.d tb_c hatch a_d thought there
were flame's in that area.
i . BABBITT: There, we saw, flames around the hood area of the white room.
MATHEWS: And how long a time was that between the first time, between the fire signal
mad that sighting.
BABBITT: Possibly 30 seconds. 30 - 45 seconds. As long as it would take me .to go out of

the to the umbilical arm and turn around and come back into the white room.
i
1
B - 52
4
i ...... : <?+
I
FAGET: Ilow long once more, how long was it from tile time you h_ard the relic," valve
and you felt to your right side was pressure,
• BABBITT: Nearly simuhancously? or were
! VOICE: No, they were not simultaneous. There was a delay between them, yes. I could
t 0 speak
answer
in terms of two and
you really .how long it was.
three tenths of a second but tile time isn't, I couldn't
D VOICE:
VOICE:
What
Yes
happened
sir, it was
before
such
that
a quick
.... it was less than
period of time that

....
I couldn't tell you how long it

was.
D VOICE: Dr. Debus asked a question, would you like to answer?
B VOICE: Yes sir.
DEBUS: This arrow indicates that you went tlils way....

Ii
; . . ;2 " "
VOICE: Yes sir.
D DEBUS: and you gave the othei's order to tell the blockhouse ....
VOICE: I gave, I went out the the talker at the umbilical tower elevator.
DEBUS: It is all the way ....
o.
VOICE: It is all the way out to the end.
D_BUS: Did you observe at that time anything back towards the white room.
BABBITT: Smoke and flames, that's all I could see. " "
DEBUS: You saw flames in the white room•
BABBITT: In the whole area there was random fires.
DEBUS: Including the platform enclosure?
VOICE: Inside, yes sir.
VOICE: Yes. Can you estimate how long it took for your departure to go back to the
white :'oom. There is a d,:_o: I l,e,lc ,'e.
D VOICE: Yes sir, there is. That door

who went out ahead of me.
by the way was opened by the three mechanics
VOICE: They went out here, opened the door and then went in?
VOICE: • Yes sir.
:1
i _--- B-53 ,.
i-
DEBUS: "_Vas there anybody in the white room at the time? l

i
PETRONE: Which door, there are two doors there.
BABBITI': OK, there is a door this thing right here on the white room. There is also a
.. _door .....
DEBUS: Does that have an automatic closer?
VOICE: That door we have locked open as part of the procedure for the emergency
:4 egress which would have normally taken place.
VOICE: This door here opens inward?
VOICE: Yes.
VOICE: I came across up the three small steps and out this way through this door. This
door was already open. As I understand it fi'om mv two mechanics, my three
1
.I
mechanics,
went
through
--
they were
they
it.
went
approximately
out this way.
somewhere in this area when the main force
The door was already open when I went
i DEBUS:
BABBITT:
What
The flame
do you describe
and'heat
as the main
lhat hit me at the

force?
largest part of it.
iI DEBUS:
BABBITT:
While
Yes sir, while

you were still there?
I was still up there.
VOICE: Where's the other door to the part of the white room that opens into the hatch?
Is there one on the other side?.
VOICE: There lsn

• "t a door as such, there's a large area.
PETRONE: There's another door ....
VOICE: There's another door on this end ....
DEBUS: that's always opened close it ....
VOICE: No it is not. no.
PETRONE: For the test ....
VOICE: For our normal operation we kept this door closed, then we could control the
access to the white room and try and maintain white room conditions.
--_°
DEBUS: " How was this door during the event?
VOICE: This door? Was closed•
B-54
VOICE: Vas it locked?
l,
t VOICE: I believe it was, ye._i
!D DEBUS: There was nobody else inside the enclosure?
VOICE:
To my knowledge, no, Dr. When it happened, my only thoughts were toget
i out. The only way I could see out was across the umbilical.
t
,D
i VOICE: Where were )'our three mechanics that preceded you?
VOICE:
They were, as I say, I had given the order to get them out.
VOICE:
Yeah, but I mean where were they before this ever happened?
i VOICE:
Before this ever happened the), were right near me because they were the same
gentlemen who would be working on the umbilical pull at T minus zero.
VOICE: VCas there anybody up there near the hatch?
D VOICE: No sir, there was not.
D DEBUS:
So you
therefore
felt
you went
that you
there•
could
Then
not get
when
the
did
astronauts
you decide
out
you
that
could
flame
try
sheet
by
and
now?
Had it subsided?
VOICE:
After it had subsided my thoughts are sort of confused to be honest with you
as to which I really thought of first and get back in or to let the blockhouse
know what was going on. After I told the telephone talker'up here to notify
the blockhouse, then the four of us proceeded back in here.
t DEBUS: So by that time something had subsided
BABBITr: Yes sir, I would say this was possibly 30 to 45 seconds.
DEBUS: I see. So was there still ,amesC' visible in a flow out sheet? Or was there more
localized?
B BABBITT:
No sir,
even see the smoke
more random
was
fires,
thick
small
enough
fires. To
where
be honest
we couldn't
with
initially
you, we couldn't
see the fire
in this area. I saw ....
DEBUS:
IA That arca would 1)c c.l._,>c.d bv "he cv,..:;c,_-urc, tl,is is ot,.Ad..*_"
" the enclosure.
VOICE: This would be the main ....
D VOICE: Is that inside the enclosure?
0 VOICE: Yes sir, there is a large portion inside.
•VOICES: Jumbled questions. Inside what enclosure?
D B -55
VOICE: This would be the level 8 structure here and this portion is inside that structure. "
i
DEBUS: Whena you went in" and out you went out here to get some breath of fresh air.
VOICE: Yes sir.
VOICE: And hack in through here.
VO ICE: Yes sir The p_iod of time I was talking to Mr. Page, the test supervisor, I
was appro.,dmately here. I found my headset was approximately here.
VOICE: No_" Gn the headset, is your assumption you started out with the headset but
dr_ it on the way out?
- -!
VOICE: I ha, me a feeling, that I ran out from under my headset. I don't think I took it
off gist. t
•YARDL EY: Were you plugged in at the time?
f
VOICE: • Yes_ sir.
VOICE: %,_Ixe_ ",_ere )-our gas masks? i i/ i:i ¸,!.!

VOICE:
The-gas masks would have been in a box right here.
V.OICE: You had to go back over and get them out.
VOICE: Yes. the ......
YARDLEY: How did you get around to there?
VOICE:
Well. there was some down on the umbilicaltower, there were some on the
meat level below, and one of the men got some::,up to -:us....... .
(" .., . " ..
VOICE: Yott didn't actuaU F go down and. ....
VOICE: We had about five of them, five or six. "t,
VOICE:
"These icere used yes by the crew other people who came back in. There was a
problem, with that, also, which I should poim out in that when you went out
the dk_rs on these leve_, :on levels, six, seven and eight, they were the crash
bar type doors. $_,qlen you went Out, you were L_ckcd out. One of my mech-
anics, Y.lr. Metcalf, wear down as I undeist._:-d it abou_ four levels on the
gantry, c::'uc across on the first tcvel hc could, ;_:ui came back up the one side
• only wb.,'re there is a door that is always uu_o.'kcd from the outside, which
would be our normal access, this is done for cleanliness, and security reasons. i "
So, m_st of the crew until someone opened the doors was locked outside-o! the
level 8.
._.- .. • .
VOICE:
How many menwere in the enclosure at the time started this and at various
intervals.
f
L
B-56
I • ° i
VOICE:
Up on this level I woul(I have Io cstiuiale aboul 18 to 711 a_ lhe time. Vqe have
a llOrlllal _iliiiCeCl-_il I crew Uli herl2 arid (_)(; lllus we h:ld (.._E people also who
were supporting us for the umtiilical pull, down on h'vel A7 but up on struct.
B ur_i _! they couhl

more GSE, nlcchanics
SUplmrt the tunllilical
and trchlficians.
froin below .to prevent damage was
B VOICE:
Do you knilw when tile east door, Colonel Baxter, of the white room is open?
VOICE:
,No sir, ! don't, it was much after I left.
D VOICE:
IVhieh door is that, the one right there by.... .
VOICE:
B %%'ithin
lit" getting
your
crew
crew,
out
sir, is there
in emergency
any
removal
sumnmry
crew,
responsibility
you speak
about
of these
the question
18 people,
was this particular responsibility specifically )'ours or the three mechanics you.
B had with" .you? Others

lime.; ....
that were pre'sumed had orders to be "involved at this
VOICE:
It was the re._ponsibility of the zilechaniclil lead man take his direction from
B me
_lI'
and lie had
relieved
delegated, designated
in ease we had some
certain
condition
mechanics
tO
to be with him unless

where we had to take tim hatch
itilt. We thought more in terms, of test scrub or something like this. Most of
B our
two
mechanics are experienced
of his best men
in taandling
to work with this
the hatches anyway.
and they were staying
But lie picked
right with it.
THOMPSON:
D I think I understand
.raw. The
that
first thing
the situation
in sequence,
relative
first was
to what you, the
audible indication
first things
of trouble,
d.e voice.
B VOICE: Yn sir. --
/ •
TH(),M PSON:
I] lieeond, and with a very

mew flames on the far side.
short period of time, maybe two seconds later, you
VOICE: Yes sir.
THOMPSON:
And from there on there were many, there was flame and smoke and all this
other action and I don't believe that you siiid you ever got to see flame inside
B VOICE:
die, this capsule.
Not to my knowledge. We, in the time that we spent in there I have to be very
n honest with you I don't think we specifically tried to look in there.
TFtOXIP.qON: .I ui-_dcrsmod you This

dr-.._-, .i:c)t mcari t}ierc wasn't fialne, il means as far as
}'¢,u re ¢'onc_:rl3ed your
obscr,-ation was flames is all identified with external
VOICE:
Y_'¢ iir. At the timeI will say this, at the time that we did get the inner hatch
D opeu, wi: saw no flame then.
VOICE: Great deal of smoke inside.
B -57
VOICE: Yes sir, there was.
-.k%_::
L
PETRONE: In fact, what was your, who reported this. Who w_ts there when the hatch
opened?
L
VOICE: I _'_,'_$.
PETRONE: What did you report, sir?
VOICE: Ytm sir, I reported to tile t_t supervisor the hatches were off.
D
PETRONE: Do you remember your words, can you describe for us what you saw and re-
ported? In terms of smoke and visibility..
! ,
VOICE: I have to be honest with you gentlemen, when the hatch came off and I looked
in, I believe Mr. Page will I may have been evasive on it, I tried to give the
impression of what I saw, and there was a catastrophe, but knowing that the F
communications circuits arc rather open, I tried not to compromise tlfings, too.
I think I got this impression across, but .....
PETRONE: I was wondering, tim question of smoke billowing out, did more smoke come,
D
was there still a pressure?
VOICE: No, there was no pressure. There was smoke in there, yes sir.
PETKONE: Did it billow out? _
VOICE: Not necessarily ...... BILLOW .... It was more a layer, laying in thm2e. Which, as
E
we got the hatch off,
VOICE: Did you have a good deal of light when you looked at that point?
VOICE: No sir, it is not, even under

the spacecraft.
normal conditions,
You can't scc that well .... in there.
unless we have lights inside
I wish Mr. Pctrone, I .could
7
answer you really on what 1 did say because I don't remember.
r
-PETRON E: I did hear you, I _;vanted the board to hear what you said. L
VOICE: I said I tried to keep from-compromising the situation but get my impression
U
\'OtCE: Some of the words you said were "'I cant see much but I can feel ....
PETKONIS: I recall that. Since it's not possable to describe what it looked like.
i
VOICE:
C
VOICE: Gcmlemen, I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you. May I say one thing?
t
! I can't commend my crew - by my crew I speak of not only my mechanics
i and technicians but my QC people
they did. The effort they made towards
and NASA QC people enough
the whole thing. That's
for what
really the only
L
1
thing I wanted to say about it, the effort was - it was fantastic - they're lfighly
! trained and they showed it. F
I
I
B-58
C
DONALD O. _A6EITI'
I'IAA
D FEBRUARY 3, 1967
QUESTION: Would you identify yoursclT I,v name ;'rod ,,_.:iiza:i_n?
ANSWER: My name is Dcmalt[ l_abbitt and I ',v_,rk io, N-: th American Aviation.
Mr. Babbitt. you arc prolmbly aware of the critical nature of vhe informa:ion-
0 QUESTION: ,..
whicli
that you
you
do
have
.not
previously
(li_cvss your
b_:'nisht-d
ol,servathmx
_m't wi;i !ur:lish
or vi,.v.point_
to
with
this panel,
anyone
and
other
we
than
ask
Apollo l'It_,iew Bo:trd xncml.,cr.- or n_rt_:t)("rs o, t z_ancL, or other designated per-
D sonnel.
that you
Mr. Babbitt.
supplement
wc
this
have
with
_':m,"
whatever
wr,m'n :tatc,nent
comments you
and we
would
would
like
like
to make
to ask
to
expand as you fcel appr.opriate, fi'rma ,tilt" time that you first were aware of the
0 _tuation
or approximately
and till you
that
were
period
in the
of time.
White" Room and were able to get to the hatch
ANSWER: As ttm North American Pad Leader, ! was located at the Pad Leader's cle_
0 which
on
problem
the
is
south
approximately
started
side
the
of the
incident,
.till degrees
gantry level
x:-;,,_ re'e,"
to the
8.
the
The
right
hc'adset
first
of
on
the
word
command
Channel
that .I received
Bkmk
module
3,
of
hatch
I t.,:z:rd
any
0 the
term
words,
"fire"
"Fire
stuck
in
out
- it
more
was either
than
in the
anything
command
else. I,
module
in turn,
or
gave
in here
word
-'"
to
"l"i.,e
my
J mechanical lead lnit_l. Nir. Git.,_v_-s. li_ gel. the crew out. gt:_d had started ,_
D turn
box,
to
or
the
to
left
get on
to
the
change
Public
my
Address
Operations
I'PA)
Intercommunications
system to notify the
Systems
blockhouse.
(OIS)
At
that time I never completed nay turn because 1 was hit with,a force of flame
or pressure, both flame and prc'ssur¢, that forced me toward :.the comm. box and
0 down slightly.... I was hit by the force of pressure and heat. Sly immediate
10 reaction
co.mpleted
arm
reaching
and
umbilical
was
my move
to
to
get
the
out of the umbilical
clear
tm,:,z'
air
out
.outride,
of
I came
clc",-.v.,_r _tr:r;di_,_: !,v
there,
comm.
ann,
to evacuate
box.
out
My moves
to the umbilical
upon
f'n the
were
the
toward
tower
area,
the umbilical
itself,
a telephone
- w!:icl, woa!d
and
talker
upon
have
who
which
been
was at the
the ;;o:'-
I did do, I never
real emergcncy cgre.-,_ test. and mid hun u, no_.ifv the blockhouse that we had
a bad fire o'a t;m ic,'el near tLc co:;.,n;,.,vq mr,ch:Ie, and then as I also came
onto the umbilical arm, 1 met three of my mocha,lies. Mr. Gleaves, *ir. Clem-
mons, and Mr.' Hawkins- After notifying the telephone talker at the elevator
D on
into
the
the
umbilical
White Room
tower,
to
the
attempt
three
what
of us
we
with
could
a ('(7) 2 bottle,
in removing the
proceeded
hatches.
back
The
time period as I bdievc it ."r,.Jm tht- tim,., that i hcznd the wo:ds "'Fire". fro:z_.
r-l, the audio OIS svs_<n tii' x,':, v.-_ _, b:tck h,to t!!f: x,.'hite room. I carl otilv es,:,-
t!
, j
how lopg this t:m-" ,,.ov:,d b: ". .,r, ,.vc i:,.'t,,ccc'dcd i,ato the _\ i_it_: l_.,._o:n, t_;e s:::c;<:.
was extreanely heavy. It appeared to me to be a heavy thick grey smoke, vt:ry
billowing but very thick, we couldn't, as we went in the first time. see the
hatches well tO work, we worked as we could by feel on the boost cover hatch,
we had "to .come out in approximately, I would say twice, to even finish the
0 boost
tmo_ke
cover
started
hatch
clearing
and go
some,
back
but-we
in after removing
there was
the
still
boost
a problem
cover
with
hatch,
staying
The
in there. We made several trips in and out. We could see as we worked fin the
outer ablater hatci_ a litttt: bit l_vttc'r. We could see v'hcre we were working, b,_,t
0
B -59
0-- .
• " ° " i • '
could ,lot see the whole h.m'h itself, and knew the general arc;_ of ti,c pkwe ! i
for placing the tool for unl,m:hing the hatch, and as we rcmovgd it. v'c got
it outside tim Whitc Room and also, aI0out that time. 1 had to chan_e crews
I?':i
in working there, because Mr. GIcaves had come very close to pasFn_.out
from smoke. I had to order him out. Mr. llawkins was in not too g&ad a
slmpc and Sir. ('temmons was also the same way. :ks sse came out v'i'h the
.outer ablater hatch I obsdrved more pet, pie in thc level A-8, the gan]w level
A-8, and I motioned for two more of _ht:m to come in and assist us in re-
moving the hatch. \Vhen wc went in for the inner hatch, we could see.the
Imtch fairly well. We could see the whole hatdl well cnougl_ to work op. it,
the handles on the hatch, on. the outcr side of it, were cool enough to hold
! ...... on to but the face of the hatch itself was extremely hot..-ks we unlatched the
f inner hatch and we attempted to rotate it (you have to go down slightly and in-
ward and-rotate the ltatch to take it all the way out} we were unable to do
this, eifl, er due to the speed or confusion or obstructions, so I told ti,em to
t drop the hatch straight down, meaning to put it down on the floor, inside the
command
This terlninatcs
module near the wall so that we could clear it.
the _tatement of Mr. Babbitt.

D
t
" DONALD O. BABBITT - -
! N-AA
I
! ......... FEBRUARY 8, 1967
1 QUESTION:
This
Babbitt
asked
Statement
whowas
you to come
consists
.Pad
of an
Leader
in today to go into some
additional
on 34 during
suttemcnt furni,ia¢',t
the incident.
by Mr.
Mr. Babbitt,
detail with us "on 5'our observa-
Donald
we've
E
i tions
eerned
when
with
the inner
the
hatch Was finally removed.
configuration o1" the flight crew
And, we are particutmly
members
con-
as welt as you cart
1 recall.
ANSWER: "_h,rhen the" inner hatch was first lowered, the only thing that I ,could observe
was smoke inside. We
very well as I could tell. :ks th.e men working
could only feel the
with me wet:; out because they'd
flight crew. We could not see them
[
been in the smo, x: qui-e a w,me. I wen'. b',.ck in. oh. ,2:-.7:-.,:dn'atcty ore- n, in-
ute or a minute and a half later: and all d_at I could .:,L_.ervc was what ap- F
peared to be Mr. White iaying on his back witil his ar::.s over his head, ap- L
peared to be reaching RJr the hatch or in something ix that vicinity. I also

observed what appeared to be ,Mr. Grissom laying with one of his arms through
1 and
again
appeared
for
to be reaching
a slmrt bit and
in the direction
came
of the :'.-a'._n also. I went out
ba,.ck in maybe thir_-.- seconds after that. 1
* r"
could see a little bit more ii_c sm_ke hart c!c:,rcd .,o:pc :.._:":. /_il t},at l could
[
really see was. oh maybe, to _',qe v.'t:ist oi .Xi:-. \Vhite. i: :-i:_pearcd to rne that
th_2v; I at tidal L'ot {:.,c illIlu'C-_i'.'_'_ ,l ..'_ Ih,v -.vg_c ¢);r. ',:.-: ,-..:... an,'i tt;er'_ I "O'
the impression that no they were on :he seats. !t appea,,':.. ::,at their auitb were
1
shredded, I could see bare skin. No one, at:any time wh:2e i was in the \Vhite !
Room or up on Level A-B, touched the crew. other than as 1 say when we first
l_vered the hatch and could feel in there to see what :..as near the hatela, if
m could feel the crew at all. One ot the firemen ste'_.,.:.ed in for just a veo"
:1 r,laort period of time. I directed him not to bring an}" F.-e apparatus into the
_'hite Room and he stepped back out again, z%s I sat..ha one else from the
t
1 time that I was up there, went in the White Room -.:_ myself. The crew
appeared to me to be in thcir normal, iu-tlight poaitio_:. " crould only scc ,.:'!,.rt
1
I
B - 60
D _appearexl
I could
to
not
be
see
.Mi.
his
Grissom's
body that
left
weU,
arm
but
reaching
it had the
t!trougli
appearance
Mr. White's
of beii_g
arm.
i:_
its satisfactot 3, or its non_al position. I-did not obscrx, e klr. Chaffee because
U I was
V_'hite
a little
appeared
bit too
to me
far
to
to
be
tit(" right
as
of
I say,
tile
laying
hatch
in
and
his
could
normal
not see
boost
hint.
position,
3.lr.
l
could not tell whether his head rest was up or down. In [act, I couldn't even
D see
face
his
plate
features
on his'
because
helmet.
of
My
the, what
observations
appeared
are based
the smoke
on the
or soot
looking
bl;icket'_ed
from the
inside of the White Room as close as I could to the hood without stepi)ing on
the hood of the "_Vhite Root:l. The hatch was lowered as far insid:_ as we could
D lower
three
it,
to four
and it was
inches.
still sticking above the lower edge of the hatch lrame about
B This concludes the statement given by Mr. Babbitt.
U
U
D
J •
. - • o . . .
B - • :.. .... % .
• . o
D ••7 •_
• . . . .
.
. . .. . .
0 JAMES D. GLEAVES
NAA
JANUARY 29, 1967
D
PETKONE: Are you ready for hi,'. Gleavcs?
THO._ IPSON; IVho is the next?
PETRONE: Xlr. Gleaves, mechanical lead technician.

D TItOMPSON: %Vhere was he"
D PETRONE: He was on the platform.

of the technicians.
Mr. Babbitt
"-
reported lie would be the man in charge
N
&z_.'
THOMPSON: Mr.
what
Gleaves, we are asking you to appear
transcribed
before us and give us your
and with the und.,3r::i.anding, however, lh;_,t the same
account
restrict-
ions continue regarding holding all this information under restraints. So with
that I think perhaps you could just go ahead and tell us about where you
-were and what you saw and then there will be a lot of questions probably.
GLEAVES: The last I remember we were waiting at ten minutes and we were holding
for this communication problem and there were about four of-us in lhgvicinity
of the umbilical waiting to jettison lho umbilical when it came time for t'._;
to do so. And Don Babbitt, the pad leader, turned up the monitor a little
D louder
went
and during
for coffee break
this communication
and on this communication
problem we sent most of our guys down
deal if I remember
from black 3 to black 2 or from black 4 to black 3 and the instant
correctly zhey
Mr.
Babbitt flipped a switch as far as I can tell I believe it was Mr. Chaffee that
hollered that we have a fire in the spacecraft. And immediately we :an to the
white room. And as we started up the swing arm there was a loud shoooooo.
Like maybe Orissom or one of them had dumped the cabin pressure. And as
n we entered
fixing
the white
to happ.':n
room there was a big flash and we knew something
and we started bact: out. .:ks we did so. tim spacecraft
was
e::-
ploded and fire al_d debris covered the whole right side It eppcared that the
flames and :ill lhc debris c::p.ic out the ri,dilt side of the .-imce,:,ait. Ill the arc:,.
of the rendezvous windows in this area. And it knocked us up against the or-
ange door, which I might Say opens the wrong direction. We had trouble get-
ting out due to the mioke and fife in this area. But once we were out in tt_e
0 swing
v.'hite
arm
room
everything
and
settled down
the snaok_:, heat
in just a few seconds. I returned
and [hmacs ",vcrc so bad at tile halch
to the
area
that we just co,.Adn't _ta,," llclt, tll_: imtch. S;o v,'c wot;ldn't ....
,VOICE: The three of you?
_)}': :- No sir, I returned. Right. Then in the meantime a gentleman named L. D.

!_,i. Reeee found the-oxygen nlasks and was handing out the oxygen masks we llnd
_.i?:::_ ,-_/, " trouble locating-the strip of tape on the bottom because they were painted the
_>.._!_:.] - same color as the connector. And several times, one, two, three or four of us
_ : : .:. returned without masks and stayed as long as we could, then finally Babbitt
: "" and mysdf entered the white i"oom after the fire had been extinguished by Jerry
Hawkins and on all fours ! crawled. I found the too! to remove the al-,Iz,tive
hatch. I removed the ablative hatch and 1 didn't have a mask on at tifi_ time •
0
8 -6a
• I
I
and I just couldn't take it no 16ngcr so 1 rmurned out al_d I gave the tool to
Jerry ttawkins. Steve Clcments and [,, D. Reecc. And they rt.mm, ed the abla-
tive hatch aud g. I). Rccce threw it out on Icvd A8 a_ad tbcu these guys, ;t[_o
they had masks on, they removed the inter hatch and it was so hot they just
let it drop down under the couch. So they come back out and I in return went
in and kicked the inner hatch and it sort of fell down under t.he couch. I push-
ed but it was still hot and inside the spacecraft was black aud tilled full of
smoke. You couldn't see an vthhig at all. So I returned to A8 anti out of' the
white room and got a flashlight aud went back in and tried to see inside the
spacecraft but the heat was too g,'eat and the s:noke was too bad so we re-
turned out on A8 and we conti:mcd to go back in. And as far :is I can re-
member it took maybe 10 or 15 minutes for any fireman or an), help to get
1
to us up on tim swing arm.
THOMPSON: Is there any point here? Could you draw a sketch indicating the sequences?
BAXTER: Before you draw it, do you remember who the first assistance was other than
you three mechanics?
@LEAVES: Do you mean from below? _
BAXTER: Right. _ " ....... i " "
1 GLEAVES: We had two of our guys I don't remember their names. Willk: Mcdcalf and
!
some other guy came up ,to help us on the swing arm. From below on A8
t. there was a NASA QC anti a couple c.r N_;rth American .QC ::'hh fire ex-
I tinguishers
Out. This
desk was here
fighting
being
the fire in and
the.command module
we had an electrician
around the hatches
in thewhite
as they were coming
room here the pad leaders
sitting hei'e .talking to an engineer,and if
I remember right we had an electrician sitting here at the lead man's desk, the
umbilical being here I was standing in this area. We had a man here sitting
!
in a chair monitoring the 401 unit wtfich was supplying GO2 to the OP-1 on
sector 1 and another one of the mechanics was standing here. And when Babbitt
turnerl up, Babbitt was sitting inthis area when he turned up the monitor.
1 and
in
they hollered
the v,'i_itc room
tl',erc
v,itl: Mr.
is a fire in the
ttav•klr::;
spacecraft,
at_d a .QC i,
I immediately
the same vici_aitv
run and went
as rye went
up these two stairs we heard a kind sl-o_>_og', like ma;'be the',' h:qd dumped
cabin p_cssure. And c,hcc wc cv.te_'cd the white _oo:u there was a trcmendoos
flash and maybe the reflection come'out of the hatch, I don't know. But there
was a tremendous flash and then smoke and we started running in tiffs dir-
ection and as we did from what 1 could tell the fire and debris just covered
this whole area, just one trig boom. one big blast.
\"OICE: \V!fich d_.or did v<m ",:t c,,.,_:,q_t b;?
GLEAVES: This is thc or,ingc door ti_at the ast,imauts cmcr fc6,a tl:c swing arm. This
door opens in this direction, it knocked us against this door and we had to
unpile to get. out. In fact, the smoke and all was real bad at this time.
VOICE: _ras there any noise asmciated with the flash?
GLEAVES: Yes sir, it exploded just like a big hang.
VOICE: Did you sce anything of the hat::h regard to .the hatch or to. the hatch wind,aw?
1
B-Ol
i ....
t
!
H GLEAVES: Well, as I cntcrcd the hatch, i mcau as I entered the white room we saw this
,| flash smoke and we thc)tGht it wiu,_ going to l)]ow or ,_omctifing bad was goit'_
! to happen so we came out of the wifitc :com. And the i,stant we came imo
U this area which is ahout three feet maybe from this door it exploded.
!
PETRONE: You were outside the whiie room?
1
.!
t
D GLI';AVES: That is rigtit, Witt_ the flash and a lot of s'noke and tlwn we run,
PETRONE: Was this direction of this explosion in the white room?
!
"l
[
D GLEAVES:
J
No sir, it was from this direction. The white room fits up in this area and
this is all open to the umbilical.
!
n PETRONE: You identify this as coming from the direction other than .the white room?-
N GLEAVES: Yes sir, it come out between

in the neighborhood where
the white
the window,_
room and the umbilical
are that is where it seemed
I would say
to he. In
t I, that area.
THOMPSON: Can you indicate how far around that exterior shield goes, the outside shield, the
boost protective cover, how far around that that comes rdative to your picture?
,i GLEAVES: XVdl, the night before we had imtalled the boost protective cover for this run
on our shift. And the l:,or_st protective cover when nmvbe a foot on the other
side of flyaway umbilical, it went ii'om there around to the same location on
D the other side, which if 1 am not mistaken is OM8 the opening

13 here was still ofien but it covered this area.
here and maybe
1
VOICE: Show me where the door is into the white room.
J
VOICE: Well, the door into the white room is a sliding door right here in two pieces.
VOICE: That is the one if you had cominued to go into the hatch you would have
!
gone?
VOICE: No sir, we wcre into t]:c v. lal;," :_u,rp..

: :4
U
PETRONE: What was the position of rite tl_m' "
;t
VOICE: The door was in this positio._ right here.
I
I'ETP.ONE: Opcn or closed?
\'( ); Ci.: ilLL',C .i'

•_l-'
_•
'II!_ do¢.;_$
, ,
x,,..
kickcd it open. Yc__ :,ir.

i
PETRONE: How many people got into the white r,_,in _
CLEAVES: Myself and one guy behind us.
PETRONE- You were fully in?

t
(;I.F.AV ES: Yes sir.
B -65
!
1
-I FAGE'F: Did you have a chcmc6 1o look into the hatch? You were lt×_klng ill what dlr-
] cction? At the time you felt thb_ c::plosion
WITNESS: TkXr}ten we saw the explosion, we were on our way back Ollt becauc,: we. }lad ,ccn
the flasl_, tim smoke, and we knew somcrMng was fixi:lg to happen and v'c left.
:1 FAGET: --Ynu saw the flash, it came fi'om around the seal, in the white room?
WI'FN ESS: The reflection appeared to come out.., the hatch. There is a glass in the hatct;.
yes, sir.
THOMPSON: As I understaald it, the point you':'e making is that you did not see il-_me dir-
ectly, but you saw the whole area light tip, reflecting a fla:;h, is that right?
'WITNESS: Yes, sir.
MATHEVqS: Where were you, where did you say you thought that .... ? You say you thought
the flash came from the window?
_TFNESS:
i On all three hatches. There's a little window on the boost p,'otectivc cover on
the inner hatch. On the outer hatch it gets a little larger, and the one inside
is a little larger than it is. But there is a direct view from there into the SO.
FAG ET: But you didn't get a chance to look in it?
WITNESS: No, sir.
FAGET: Is that where the light looked like where it came from in there, or from around
the hatch?
WITNESS: It just appeared that there was abig flash, and 1 couldn't tell whether it crone
out through the window or whether it was coming f,'om elsewhere. But there
was the whole area lit up.
FAGET: The whole area?
1
t
\VI'-f'NESq
r
IAGE'Y: Inside the white rocmE'
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
1 YARD Lt'7.'_/: 7]-l.,,tt w&sn t the victory .... ;,s sc,.,'ral ._cconds later v,'hcn you got out of....
J
t
'",I C'_ L.v.:£:
be to try to get o_'t. .',,x] ,:_ _vt ,'htcrcd 'he v. hite room. tLc.,: was a Ix!g
flash, and then we turned and started to run, and as we did, it blew, and
there was an explosion and a trt:mendous amount of flame and smoke.
BORMAN: Than now did you m that door that was cloud?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.

out_
BORMAN: you rat:
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
___ VOICE: Which door did you run out?
WITNESS: _,Ve ran out this door here, we ....

B VOICE: Then out it again, anyway though you regrouped and ....
B WITNESS: Yes, sir. That's the only door we could get out.
VOICE: If you went out tim other door, you couldn't get out that way because that
D was really burning? Out there?
WITNESS: In this area? Oh yes, the Pad Leader's desk was on fire, and there was debris
and all, laying here on fire.
B * VOICE: Tell us about this explosion. Try to think of some analogies to describe what
is sounded like, now that you think about it, was it a crack, was it a whoom
as if you threw a match into a barrel of gasoline, what was the character of
the noise?
WITNESS: I would say it was like maybe when you were a kid and you put a fire-cracker
in a tin can and it exploded and yOU had the lid on it tied down -and it blew
the whole side out of the tin can with the flames shooting out.
BORM'_,N: The noise was li[e that firecracker?

o
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
D BORMAN: It was a loud bang, a loud explosion? Pardon?
n _,'_,ITN ESo:
• T t"
Bang? Yes, sir.
I,Ot_,,IAN. _,Vonid you revic_v tot us again what you wcre aaymg about the men up near
U
thuse oxygc, bottle_, \vhltt tht:v ',_crc c]omk4 tip lhel'c:'
-WrFNESS: In this area?
n
D:'e t,:_:l two (1(1'_ l::'r'!'., _::,t!r'.,e !::'r:" on :, ".v3,:,,-ev.:h:<'[: i" :_ ZO(-) 02":L._Q] un:t
V,-_ • ""',.,.t X; _ _.v, :C _''';,'.
, .... 1 ..... 1,: c_.:.., '.;:. I: |c_ >,::,,! _.
, [(_ t,_'_" I '_,'t
,,, ...... [;.d _::,': l'tl: :_, ,'-_
_,Ve had a man ....
BORMAN: TI_ was being fed at the time of the fire?
WITNESS: Yes, sir. We had a man here Wtmse prime job was to monitor that to make sure
tlae_ seas 750 psi remaining on this gauge at all times. Anytime it got low, this
m_ta changed the bottle. Then we had another man standing here with myself
at the umbilical .... I believe he was in this area, he was actually closer to the
• S/C than mysclf, but hc wits hctwet.'n me and the white :'oom,. and we wc:c
standing there waiting to pull the lanyards to jettison the flyway umbilical when
. B _67
._._._,_._._,..: .......................................................... 7:7- 7-. ....... _ • "
;
i
1
our time ca;p.c -'p which was T-10 and holding. I
l
BARTON: This GCr 2 ".,:.-, L,zin,_ fi'd v'lwrc now? Dot:s thai go intu the u,v.biligal i'lito the
sc_'ice nlod ttie_--: *"
!
4 WI TN ESS:
| This GO2? N:. -St. it goes into _ector 1 down on the selx'icc module.
VOICE: Is this what tE':,' call'the pad t,rvssure on the tank?

i
PETRONE:
--I
$ WITNESS: Yes sir, it:s in a test purl no, it's ah. in a servicing port, fill port, right ....
into .... "
I
1 VOICE:
PETRONE:
Into the cryo cx'5"gen .... that's
This isn't a typical engineering

yore" ox,.,-or, fzr. this test. directly
way to describe
from a I ::th"
right.
it. Your two bottles - you draw

fed into thc .%'vtem rath::r than
rise cryogenic w-qem you normally draw }'our oxygen from the cwogcnic tank,
liquid oxygen, in the service module, as it boils off you feed it into the com-
mand module, into the surge tank which has been described to you a few times,
in earlier di_-t:_inns, into the surge tank into a set of regulators" as you go into
.}
the cnviron:::=:::a' control system, c::bin, of the suit loop. So this, for this t:_t.
we had no cryogenics aboard. It gives you the oxygen pressure you need to feed
the 02 into tee .:-.'_,!)in.
VOICE: And at the same time is one feeding oxygen to the fuel cells?
PETRONE: Fuel cells were not active. They were bypassed - they werc on'- you will find
that the power systcm was not running. We had other things. The fucl cclls
were not active.
t THOMPSON: IVeli, I think it will be very impoi'tant, in that, to know where they were by-
! passed because there are a number of parts of the system brought in even thougl'*
I
?
the oxygen 5, i =:-:g ,red iq f,'o:n ....
P=:. i I-:.O,\ E: I am n_'_ >.-:e :.,_:t _|,-. ( :.::v,.-s is tbc _:: ;:: ;.o .2_i.':: ){>i, ti:." dvt_zils on It:'.* c.sn-
i
! figuration, but v'c on tl.',e panel, *Iv. \Vilhams, is on .... the final configuration
J of the bottles, the loops and where thw'rc tied in.
WILLIAMS: This shows the 6th deck. The phttform and tile steps.
IL._)_. i 1..,.: Thg;i's a p._:. : _ ::.,a:!e ca,!::r i v,-_:-::. ! ".3 b.:: :v:c.
\"O._ CE: _,_!i, ic _. _,.'- - "-.-- ;::t_ t.. . ,.,t c,::: _,c- "',,. t:-:'o, ,.:,i: _:,c::..:,! v.i,c, .:'._kc.;.t
came out the door or did you not wl.it for timm? You went back b)' )'oursd_
WITNESS: Well, when Babbitt came out. he was screaming for someone to please get them
out of 'there. And, x_'e returned, not only myself, 1 returned first, but I came
back out arid at that time I was given a fire extinguisher, and I pasged-it to
Jerry HawkLas, and he, in turn, went in and emptied it to extinguish the fire
around the hatch. But, there was five of tls OUt here, and we each took turns
going in and trot_trying to do ._omethil_g.
2
B -68
. 17..,:
..... ;.7:711;7"_; ..... ;.....
VOICE: Did you have a gas mask?
-_ WITNESS: At some times I had a gas mask, yes. Other times, no.
FAGET:
At any time tha't you went in there, did you notice flames inside ....
WITNESS: Inside the bird?
FAG ET: Through the window, yes.

¢
D WITNESS: No sir, the smoke

was definitely flames
was so great
coming
that you just
up outside like
couldn't see anything..
it was coming
But there
up from the next
level around the hatch.
D THOMPSON: I think you've answered this question, but I want to be sure•I understand it.-
The point where you were just prior to your receiving a first indication that
.there was anything unusual about the whole thing, what was the first indication
that you had that there was anything wrong? Where were you?
It
WITNF.SS: I was standing in the area of the umbilical.

• 27..
THOMPSON: And what way were you looking at that time? Do you know which way you
were facing?
WITNESS: Yes, I was talking to the pad leader, or I had been talking to the pad leader.
THOMPSON:
D And what was
thing wrong?
the first event that gave you an indication that there was some-
WITNESS: When: Mr. Babbitt switched on the communication. Like I say, it was either
from Black 3 to Black 2 or from Black 4 to Black 3, I don't really remember
which it was, but the minute he switched, it sounded as if it was Mr. Chaffee
hollered, "'We have a fire in the SC.'" And at that time, we all run in this
direction toward the white room.
VOICE: Why did they switch it!'
U VOICE: They were having a communication problem.
VOICE: Well, why did they switch it at that particular time?
VOICE:
i Because as he monitors the tlifferent channels on his head set, when-he follows
i
the test, and when the blockt_ousc who it is says go from Black 3 to Black 2,
he immediately switches.
VOICE: VCe assume that he switched over to this because the blockhouse had instructed
him to:
[l VOICE: Well, because everyone on this channel was switclfing.

-.
[l VOICE: Right, before they switched,

they
they were talking to Mr. Grissom,
told him he was very garbled; the), were talking
and Mr. Grissom
to Mr. White and he
said he was a little better than Gus, but he was still garbled, and ._h'. Chaffce.
D they told him that he was thc bes t of all. That they could understand him more
1
i plainly than an)' of the others. A:xd when they asked them all to switch and
i-
,i tlmt's when they started flipping chatmels, and that's when I'd rsay it was Mr.
Chaffce hollered that We have a fire in the SC.
-t Ir"
t
VOICE: Hoar much switching action was both in the capsule and on the loop? t
i
I VOICE: Everyone on' the loop evewwhere was changing switches.
! t
4
L
PETRONE: Do you know what the time was, of the switching?
i
!
WITNESS: No. i believeit was in the neighborhood of 6:30. L
t
PETRONE: No, I meant were we switching xeithin ten seconds.
I
F
!
WITNESS: We were at -10 minutes and holding for this communication problem. L
PETRONE: Yet, I know that but, in relation to the fire or the flash or the glitch of the
communications when was the last time there was direction to do switching?
F
t2
_,qITNESS: At this, when they switched from Black 3 to Black 2 and someone screamed -
Mr.
_d
Chaffee
Mr.
I think
Babbitt
screamed,
throwed
we have a fire in the SC, immediately
his headset down and was coming
I run
behind us at the
[
same time.
i
f:
7 DEBUS: Can you describe what Grissom said, it was garbled, could that have been a L
call of fire or somcthing? Was that around the same time?
"-2
WITNESS: Pardon me? F
J
:J DEBUS: Ycm said that as you checked communications that Gus Grissom said sonaething,
tl_t it was garbled. F
L
WITNESS: Wdt, they were talking to them.
DEBUS: Right.
WITNESS: The astronauts. Ax_.d they were checking this commuriications problem.
[
DEBUS: And when was it?
.f
WITNESS: It was just
3, whichever
prior to switching
it was.
from Black 3 to Black 2 or from Black 4 to Black E
I','].!;T.; S: Aaxd then was tb_t after the word th'c?
WITNESS: That was before the word fire. ,_. mattcr of maybe 30 seconds or a minute.
J VOICE. You heard this through your headset?

.:t
j
WITNESS: No sir, I heard it through the monitor. I wasn't on the squawk box.
THOMPSON:
i vArelL
. sl'muld
cations
I think
renew
problem.
there's a point
it. As I understand
liere that has been established
it the hold was on account
and perhaps
of the communi-
he
B-70
.
!
N WITNESS: That is affirmative, yes sir.

i U
-i THOMPSON:
WITNESS:
It was on the ten-minute
then, is it correct
another citannel
hold? Because
that some change
because of that problem?
of the communicat_o::s
thcre decided
problem?
that everybody switch
.'Xt_c!
to
Right, they were switching trying to determine what the problon was. Whether
it was inskle the spacecraft or the blockhouse or just where.
THOMPSON:
0 VOICE:
The
They
communications
were switching
problem
around
.....
from" different thin_.
BORMAN- Internal switching, internal SC controls.
WITNESS: Right.
PETRON'E: Dr. Thompson, I think on this ....
VOICE:
g PETRONE:
They had done this prior on the C-band or S-band or mmethh g else.
You can get a communication engineer to relate how they, what they do in
the SC vs. on the ground. Remember, we said we were on S-band communi-
0 cations.
what
And,
was being
this configuration is very important,
over the air, whether
what channel
you Were OtS or operations
they were on,
intercom
system. What switching is done on the ground vs. what's in the SC. I think
0 THOMPSON:
that's most important.
Well, there's one point I would like robe clear on and that is the duration or
the previous history of this problem, how long prior to this final swltchover
0 had that problem existed. Had it been, had it existed for two hours?
PETRONE:
Yesterday, in our summary, when the astronauts in their suits got into their
N suits got into their SC, it was the

check with the actual speaker
first time you could make a communications
system and so ou. Aml. there had been a _eries
of difficulti_ in being able to hear. Either due to the air rushing by the mike
or due to other difficulties, there had been a series of let's go VHF, go. hard-
line, OIS, or S-band, .so this had been the entire time the}' were in there,
at various times there were switches in communications being made.
g THOMPSON:
Well, in other
in communications.
words, there was nothing
Is that the point?
so unusual about having a problem
PE']" RONE: Yes, there is nothing t||mst|al ....
THOM PSQN:
We will develop in a subsequent.
0 PETRONE:
At that partlcular time, that was nothing unique?
THOMPSON:
We will develop the actual timing of this thing I think in subsequent review
0 of the information.
VOICE:
I guess it is a fair statement to makc that the channel s.witching that this man
0 did and the other man did, there's no physical connection between this man
0 B-71:
j ,j ,2,.,:_ " "
between those systems and the spacecraft.

1
THOMPSON: Well, we will.
VOICE: Except they were switching at the same time.
He said they were swltcMng at the same time. Now that's the thing I thi_k
VOICE:
we'll have to, I don't think you _vould even know they were switching at the
1
same time.
I think we have apparently got just one point that seems somewhat important
JEFF:
and that is to say whether because of the switching of communications one
didn't hear the word "fire" for the first time.
VOICE: Yes, I third_, that will show up later.
We will have a review of events, recorded events. It will clarify that to the
THOMPSON:
extent it can be clarified. But Glcaves is not the man in the position to gh'e
us much. Information on that as far as I can see except to establish the pur-
pose of the hold and the fact that it's been a problem.
VOICE: You were monitoring the crew panel .... all this time?
PETRONE: Yes. I was on 1, 2, 3, and 4. I was on all the channels.
MATHEWS: Any garbled conversations that you couldn't identify the nature of the conver-
sation?
• t
PETRONE: NO. ""
THOMPSON: Let's get back to any further questions that you want to ask now before we
let Mr. Gieavesgo: ....
1
i VOICE: Mr. Gleaves: Did you go out the door before Mr. Babbitt?"
GLEAXrES: Yes sir.

I
VOICE: You did?
GLEAVES: Yes sir.
CLEAVES: In'fact, Mr. Hawkins was first and I was 1)eh]nd ldm and Who was behind me,
I don't really remember. But I kx_ov.' he and I were the first two out this door,
i BORMAN: I was going to ask: Can you give us.your esthnate of time be.tween when you
heard the fire call and went into the Wlfite Room? tlow much time do
you think that took? And between the time you decided to exit the White
1 GLEAVES:
Room before this big explosion.
I would say it was just a matter of just a few seconds.
BORMAN: There was two periods of a few seconds each then you would say?
i
GLEAVES: No, I would say from the time he hollered "there is a fire in the spacecraft"
1
B-n. "
............ _./7-
t
and we started rumfing until the time we headed for!the door, was just a
matter of seconds.
D BORMAN: Yes, well,

White Room
I was trying
and then
to break
you saw
down the
this flash
two periods;
outside and
one you went in the
decided we better get
out of there.
D GLEAVES: And we immediately, there was no hesitation, we immediately tunaed and ran
out. In fact, I ahnost rata over Mr. Hawkins.
BORMAN: The first time was how many seconds would you guess to run that distance to
get into the White Room before you decided to switch.
D GLEAVES: Jmt a couple maybe three.
BORMAN: And then you started running out and got about to the door and this other
n thing
almost
happened
thatlong
.... the Bang .... Would
between
you say that was "9.3"
the flash and tlm other "boom"?
seconds? Was it
Was it about as
long as it took you to get out of there?
N GLEAVES: No. When it flashed, them we remember smoke, then immediately it blew.
BORMAN: So there wasn't much time to ....
VOICE: But he got all the way from the White P_oom out to the orange door in that
length of time.
GLEAVES: No, we got almost to the white door which is maybe as far as here to the mike.
And it's not that great a distance from there.
VCDICE: " You go through the white room door? "" :_
GLEAVES: Right. " " -: " i};i_/_
FAGET: From the time you heard fire until the time you beard the bang.
GLEAVES: Pardon .....
FAGET: From the time you heard fire until the time you heard the relief valve.
GLEAVES: I say it couldn't have been over 10 seconds at the most .... or 15.
YARDLLY: You mean, it might have been on ord':r of 10-15 seconds? But in the other
e'l
period it was only-one or two :.cconds.
• i ;
GLEAVES: That's right.

. -.-
D BAXTER: Sir,
Pad
back to the....we,
egress.
I say we .... there e.-d._ts procedures
I know you can't think of eve_'thing,
for emergency eg'ress.
but do you have a procedure
that would come close to meeting this kind of thing and did you or were you
D just reacting
trying to do?
spontaneously or did you have pad egress procedure you were
CLEAVES: No sir, we are well aware of how to get these hatches off. Then he hollered
B-73
I
I
t
i "fire" and all we could think about was to get the hatches off.
"i:Y-
BAXTER: Could you have used more help?
IL!
! GLEAVES: No sir.
BAXTER: You couldn't physically, get people in there?

!
GLEAVES: That's right. After the explosion we re-entered the '_Vhite Room and the fire
was too great and the heat and the smoke was too intense .... you could not
breathe in there. After we could not breathe ....
VOICE: I believe dmy had more help dui-ing that period that they would have under
|
:i a hazard egress condition.
BORMAN: I think there is one thing of significance here your job was in 10 minutes to
get that hatch off.
!
PETRONE: No.
BORMAN: Were they going to pull the hatch?

,!
! PETRONE: *,'de were going to plus three. .

r
GLEAVES: The astronauts were going to pull it from inside and we were to assist them on
the outside of catching tl_e hatches as they came out.
t.
PETRONi_: In 10 minutes he was go!ng to pul[the umbilical when we picked .up the count.
The egress would have been practable at the end of the count planned at plus
1 three :hours.
VOICE: What were the words from the crew the first words you heard? t
-/ GLEAVI_S: $_,rhen Babbitt savitched channels, the first thing we heard was that one of them !
hollcrcd, ""_ge have a fire it: tt:c spacecraft".

t
VOICE: It wasn't just fire?

|
t GLEAVES: I
No sir. ""1_re have a fire in the spacecraft."
VOICE: That was actually the sentence?
(;I.t'.AVES: He may have hoCk.red th," word "fire" before Babbitt switched. And then he
did say, "'We have :: fi-c .in _i'_: SFacccraf:."
i THOMPSON:
GLEA VES:
You were not wearing
No sir. I was listening

a headset?
to the monitor.
TI IOMPSON: An), further questions?

!
THOMPSON: Well, thank you, Sir. Gleaves.
f
i
J
B -74
D j EFFS: Llr.
talked
Chairman.
about it.
I
I know
know
my
it is
people
slight
have
side
bccn
i)oint
trying
here
to
to tills.
work with
It came
that
up. '¢_'e
garl)led
transmission too. TO see if we can get some information out of it. I preslu:'te
D the
later
data
on.
team
Thez'e
is also
might
working
be something
with that
there
and
we
you
should
will hear
try and
a report
set: if we
on that,
can't
e_'t_ct.
B
D
D
D
D /
r_
..°
B-75
•. •• . .- <
D •LEWIS CURATOLO
NAA
i
i
- FEBRUARY 22, 1967
0 My assignment as Pad Leader on Spacecraft 012, 1 was responsible for 1st shift activities concerning
Test and Operation of the Spacecraft and Ground Support Equipment at Launch Complex 34. The
0 -_cheduled
logically,
activity for January 27, 1967, was tile performance of OCP-0021
to the best of my know'ledge the events of the clay were as follows:
(Plugs Out Test). Chrono-
Power was applied to the Spacecraft anti Ground Support Eqt.ipment at approximatel_ 0813. Normal
D power up pr_-_ed.ures
Ground Support
_¢ere
Equipment
followed.
power
System
up. No
power
major
up began ahnost inunediately
discrepancies
after the Spacecraft,
were noted during the power up se-
quence. - i. ; :,=_:_:_
....
0 During the power

At approximately
up
1300
portion
I notified
of the procedure we
the T_t Conductor
experienced many OIS communications
and Test P_'o.ject Engineer
wob|ems.
that we were ready to
perform Grew ingress. The Suit Technician and the Spacecraft Technician performed the pre-ingress
0 layout of the
harnesses, and
cockpit
routing
and couches. This procedure
of the 02 Umbilical
consists
hoses. I instructed
of laying out the pilots seat and shoulder
the Spacecraft Technician to remove all
foreign objects 3nd materials from the Spacccr2ft interior. At this time the Technician handed out a
0 number
and Spacecraft
pieces of foam
of plastic
honeycomb
rubber
bags and some foam rubber mats,
structure.
wrapped
which we normally
During the pilots ingress I handed the Spacecraft
in velostat which were to be used for protection
use for protecting
Technician two
of the inner hatch
wire bundles
during the scheduled emergency egress pt'oeedure.
D After completion of the Grew ingress we proceeded with Hatch closeout, and Cabin purge, as directed
by the Environmental Control System et',gineer and Test Proicet Engineer. During Cabin purge we
0 detected a strong
trol System
pungent
engineer,
odor which smelled
and he directed
like MEK. We reported
us to do another purge because
this to the Environmental
the 0 2 content
Con-
inside the cabin
was orily 75%. We did another purge and pressurization aad oblaine.d a no_,
_-_o _,_- _ on the ana!Tzer"
...... m_,
At this time we were directed to proceed with outer hatch and Boost Protective (_lover closeout. We
B installed the outer
some diffieulty
crew hatch
in getting
and started with the Boost Protective
the Boost .Protective
(2over installation but experienced
Cover to lock in, so I notified" the Test Project Engineer
and asked for an Interim Discrepancy Report..The Boost Protective (2over was left unlatched and we
B were instructed
Test Conductor's
by the Test Supervisor
instructions
and Test Conductor
and at "this point (1730)the
to clear the White
2nd shift PadLeader
Room. I followed
(Don Babbitt)
the
relieved
me. After gi':ing _... Babbitt a turnox'er on the v,:xt _ec_.
, .......
,e-co of e_'cnts I left the mrvice structure and
positioned myself in the Operations Trailer to monitor the "'Liftoti" sequence Of the pro=edure. rt_is
was my location at the time of the accidem, ..\l:pro:.:_mately 5 to 10 minute_ ,-.her the accid/:nt I was
instructed by the CVTS to go hack t0-the A-8 level of the service structure to relieve Mr. Babbitt.
Upon re-entering the A-8 level I observed that some areas of the Spacecraft exterior Were still smolder-
D ing, and the Grew Hatch
the White Room to aliow
had been removed.
the smoke
1 instructed
to dissipate
the firemen to remove
and allow the interior
the shear panel from
of the Spacecraft to cool. I
entercd the White Roe.m and observed -tha_ the f'oc,dlighr_ on the Crew (]ouches were still illuminated
and the rr..a.:n dis2.!ay Console !iu},ts x.zc:x' still 1i'. J re':,or,(-:t t}:i- cc_ndhion, to the Control Room and
the b!ocI:b.ousc, t ob,:crved that t}_v i:o-.'_," of t}'.'." ._;,.-._ior t'il;_; v.'a:_ ".,::d_cd [:ct'..ecn the C;rcw Couc_.aes
and the hatch bulkhead; the Command Pilot wl, s post'ioned .in the center .couch with his body part-
0 ially hanging
I observed that
over the center
the Command
couch. The
Pilot's
Pilot was
leg pans
in a reclining
were in the
position
rest position,
in the
the
Pilot's
Senior
Couch.
Piiot's leg pans

were ha the boost position, and the Pilot's leg pans were in the full down position.
0 I was relieved by Mr. J. Murphy at approximately 2100. ..• :+• .
/s/ I,. Curatol6
" U-- B-.77 :-

- • L : " i --
.... _ _ _ _. ..i " _ __, _ _ _'_-_,.__
o. .
L . --
-._.__i__i!__
__ .__._
!
B
L.D. REECE
0 • JANUARY 27-28, 1967
B At the instant of first indication

above the fly away.umbilical.
of a problem,
I was standing
I was on station at the cut-out
oil the side of the cut-out nearest
in service tower directly
the pad leader's desk.
When the 10 minute hold was annoul:ced, I had moved m;ound only slightly and had stayed pretty
much in this area listening to the comnmnications problem being discussed. I believe communications
B requested a test'count
and Black 3."
from one of the crew so he could "Investigate Cross Reception Between Black 2
0 A vet3" few seconds later

electrical fire in the C/M."
a seemingly calm voice said, "There is a fire in the C/M" or "There is an
Turned toward the C/M intending to go into White Room and assist removing hatch. Immediate (1-2
see.) there was a sheet of flame shootiug .out from C/M 17 access. Another 1 sec. I was inside _ ....
Room with one or two other persons, I don't know what happened the next 1-2 seconds, as I became
seared and turned and ran across swing arm to elevator where several people were yelling and screaming
D that there was a fire and to help us.
A couple of seconds later some one got their wits and yelled, "Fire Extinguisher." Some else yelled,
"Gas Masks." I got the extinguisher from hook west side of No.22 elevator door and carried it back to
step down and handed it to Glcaves. Turned back got a couple of masks; put one on; gave one to
someone and went back to White Room to open hatch. Smoke was so thick, very black, could not find
D tool or anything
then 'returned
mask didn't
else. Went to level A-8, had nothing
to White Room
work and was blinded
two more
and choking.
to use. Went back to swing arm outside
times trying to open hatch and lead!ng,Gleaves
Last time inside Gleaves located tool, got
door.
B.P.C.
out as his
cover
off or partially of[, left again, and I stayed and helped Hawkins remove outer hatch. I think I got
D scared again as I returned

in. I could see nothing
to swing arm, then went back to find hatch
at all, but finally made out the left hand head floodlight
(inner)finally
very
being pu.'.hed
faintly. I was
:very highly excited at this time,, and thinking I heard crew I leaned in as far as I could feeling around
center couch. I felt no one, but still convinced I had heard them, "I took mask off yelled several times
k-._, to crew, felt around, then left mask on e,.,.nter couch and returned to swing arm.
i
!
I tried several gas masks after this, bt-'t all were l_rol:t:n or wouhl not work. In meantime several mc:_
had been applying exti_aguishers, so as area got smoke "cleared out, I gathered all Inspection Documents
few at time and put on southeast elevator and called Ir_peetion Trailer to meet me at ground level.
At critical time between healing crew announce fireand going out swing arm, I just am not sure how
many explositms occun;ed, poasibly two.
/ S ;" L. D. Reece
D
D
B-79
REPORT ON 012
B I was monitoring
a fire in thc
the OCP on level 8 at tile plus axis with
command module. I started for the White
Dale
Room
Hickenbottom.
and had i'eachcd
Dale told me there was
the +Z axis when I
heard two loud "pops. I stopped momentarily and at that time fire shot out of the command module
D at the +Y and -Y axis. The time elapsed couldn't have been more than a couple of seconds.
_| Is/ R. A. Hagar
D SECOND STATF_\IENT
JANUARY 27, 1967
While monitoring the OCP I heard the report given "fire in the spacecraft." I was on level 8 at the
+Y axis. I started for the White Room and as I reached the +Z axis I heard two loud pops, at
this time fire blew out of-Y and +Y access panels. I went out on one of the elevator arms and at this
time all of level 8 was on fire. I then proceeded to leave the tower.
D IS/ Richard A. Hagar
JANUARY 28, 1967

B
B Everything
plan. My
relating
name is
to
Richard
this AS
A. Hagar,
204 plugs
my organization
out
is Xorth
test is classified
American Aviation,
in accordance
my position is
_th the mission failure
spacecraft electrician, my supervisor is-Carl Black; and my station call sign _is SCO. On January 27,
1967, I was sitting at the -Y axis of the command module monitoring the OGP with Dale Hicken-
B bottom, QC with North
was a fire in the co:nmand
American.
module.
At approximately 6:30 there was a broadcast on the net that there
At thi._ .time I ic.% mv t,o_i_ion - I v,'a_ m_:_im:'iqg here, and wal_ed
" '
to the +Z axis going towards the D,'hite Room. At this time t noted ,,wo loud pops, two loud bangs,
and at this time fire shot out of +Z and the -{Y and the -Y axis. Quite a bit of fiame to be exact.
Li At this time, noting the flame com!ng out I turned and went out onto "one "of the elea, atcd platforms;
however, I left the gantry. At tiffs time, "I reported to the tech trailer, and reported to my supervisor,
N Carl Black,
for a short
happened on
and stood by the trailer
meeting where
the level, and
we wrote
until approximately
down
11:30 when we went to the operations
our recollections of the OCP and the test and what had
then we were to come to the "War Room for another meeting.
trailer
At this
time, Mr. Pearce asked D_cI: Bachand and m;scif to g,_ into th': corona: ;_ r,qod'aie after they had
f_
removed the ast;(mau> ....
.......cz ci_ccl.', ti_roz:_h the , ,v._:p{_>t:lull:
:"' and 50 ._or[i, tea sue if t!ic,c wa3 anything
L_
unusual and maybe out of place. At this time upon entming we went to ti_c OCI' up and around
where they were testing at T-minus 15 minutes. Up to this point everything seemed good. The two
B main things
on the forward
that we did note, panel
equipment
150, the pyro panel,
bay in the right hand corner
was out of position; it is normally
and it was approximately 8 inches
mounted
forward
.of the equipment bay sitting off two brackets. It had not, from all appearances blown out since the
mounting screws were laying right in front of it in a neat pile, and if they had of blown, why they
B would have
three circuit
stripped
breakers
the screws and probably
engaged,
blowfi around the command module there. There
they were Batt A power entry, Batt B power entry and Batt C power
were
etm'y. The otlmr circuit breakers on the panel were open. Starting after T-minus 15 minutes wl,ere v'e
B -81
would have picked up the count, which is T-plus 36, the only two things we checked into the sequence gd,
and fuel cell 3 on panel 18, fuel cell 3 to bus A was in the center position, and fuel cells 1 to bus B
w;ts in the center position. The other fuel cell switchc_ on the busscs were off, and you first step in
,I
sequence page 6, I don't recall the paragraph right now, but _ere to throw these to "ON" momen-
tarily. It looked like this might liave bccn done ahead of time, 1 don't know what bearing offlland,
this is done but going on 9206 sequence 06 the battery" relays buses were open and on the command-
rr's panel 8, which would have been a few of l'fis call-outs. The rate _'ros were in the normal position
k_
and it looked generally: pretty good. The test light or the abort light was hanging about half way out.
It looked like there had been some flames shooting out beside it. But I believe that does it generally.
This is .all I have to relate concerning this test.
,i
. .-: • .
i! ..
¢.,_.
i f_
r_
z
!
"ll
I
"'i" B -82
i
t
I
i
D
!
I
j[]
1
1
I RICHARD _,. B._.CHAND
blAA
t JANUARY 27, 1967
At the time of. this incident, I was standing abont 10 feet from the outside between the +Z and +Y
axis, level 8A, facing away from the C/M. When I heard the astronaut give the alarm over the headset
of "Fire in here," I turned to look at the C/M. I heard a low burp, then a large whoosh, then a
B wall
pushed
of flame
me backward.
from the
I dropped
side
my
of die
headset,
C/M
turned,
jumped from floor-to-ceiling
-and
and a pressure
ran to the exit on the northwest
and
corner.
heat blast
! I called the elevator which arrived in about 30 seconds and went down in it. This is all I remember
of the incident at this thne.
_....
Is/ Richard L. i_achand

January 27, 1967
B JANUARY 29, 1967
Everything related to this AS-204 plu_-out test is classified in accordance with the mt:ssion failure plan.
B My name is Richard
ectronic. My supervisor
L. Bachand, Tech Support Crew. My position
is Carl Black. My station call sign is .SCET,
is Spacecraft Mechanic
which is the Command
Senior
Module
El-
electronic tech. On January 27, 1967, I was part of the before-meritioned test. I was on the adjustable
8 level, C,ommand _Iodule level, between the +Yand +Z axes, _pproximately 10 feet from the Com-
mand Module. I was monitoring "the command channel and active on green ten with MRCS (sta-
tion call sign) at the time the alarm was given b i" tbc _stronaut tb_:t there wa_ a fire in the Command
B Module.
Spacecraft;
1 was facing
and I heard
away from tht: Command .Module, and immediately
a .'=mall buri_ or thump wl'iich I didn't
I turned and looked at the
,-_.o-,' exactly what it was at the time.
I have been told since then that several others ilcard it and again find it is the Command Module
pressure relief valve: Immediately following this, I'd say less than a second later, there was a large
B "woosh" and
floor-to-ceiling.
a wall of flame
Everywhere
rose up between
I looked
me and the. Command
there was flame. I dropped
Module.
the headset, turned
I'd say it was from
around, and ran
for the exit which was on the northwest corner. I got out throti_h the door. which locked behind me,
f"i
and I'd say tess than _(I seconds I:_tcr. :he ci:.'-'::m: _'o" th_,;e, and I went down on the el,",.'ator. This
is all I have to relate.on:coming: thi_, teat. NI,." na:::e i_ i_.ichard t,. _ ,,: _i.
ii _:-- B - 83
t
1
ID
!
! _ STEPHENB. CLEMMONS
I -- .AA
-i] .JA UAR't

2,. 19a
2. Went to get g_ mask

3. Second attempt to enter C/M. Helped to remove B.P.C. access door and outer hatda to C/M.
i [p_j 1. First attempt to enter CIM
4. Went to get another gas mask. via white room.
B 5. Helped to remove inner hatch.
.- JANUARY 27, 1967
i:! • After hearing

from the edge
the words,
of the boost
there's
protective
a fire in here,
cover at the
I turned
next
toward
opening
the
as diagram
S/C and saw
shows.
a white glow coming
Don Babbitt yelle.'t: there's a fire inside and ] ran toward the white room. Babbitt, Gleaves, Hawki.-.s,
drove us out of the swing arm. We tried to find some gas masks but there was a little time required
ii!i _: L.D. Reeee and myself tried to get in but by this time (10 seconds approx.) extreme heat and flames
finding any. When we finally found some, one mask came off the hose and two could riot be opened
on port at bottom. By this time, the flames and smoke had subsided so that we could attempt to open
_] the hatch. We finally removed the outer hatch and outer elM cover, after some difficulty because of
minutes or less. 'With fresh masks, we attempted to remove the inner cover. On opening the last hatch :
we were driven back by the heat and fumes/smoke. I saw no fire and the small florescent Jigh.ts .on the
! a-binding condition on B.P.C. By this time our masks had been used up. All this occurred within 4
• seat head rest area was still burning. Before leaving, I smel: myI hand
• • inside but I could feel nothing
or see anyg-in-
- c, because of smoke/heat. I Ct"'. CA' not ' hear as1\" so-::m_ etmttmg frc,m inside. By this time my
; gas mask was used up and the fireman arrived. :X,ll this tool: place no longer than s,.x minutes after it
_'.i,
_ started, or so it seems.
-_ Then joined the other personnel putting the fire or remains out. There were not too many significant
| _ items except when it started. There seemed to be a loud venting of gases, then ignition Which sounded
_i! like a gas jet being ignited. There was no loud explosion and the fire seem to come from all directions
e,:iting fror:'_ tl-e comm_nd modu!c access ports. • ....
i
¢'_ .Is' Stephen B. Clemmons

m ,
!
- ,w, .., _ __
Q _ :_¢ °'
B -85
D
JAMES EARL CI_OMER

PAA
D JANUARY 27., 1967
1215 - I went on station for the 220 foot level of umbilical tower for egress mode.
1245 - This was about the time the astronauts arrived. From this time until accident it was routine test
on elevator which was in egress mode all this time.
!
About 1530 - During this time Bendix crew on 220 foot level changed crews on tlie unit on 220 foot
level. I obtained permission from French Johnson for them to ride elevator. I was in Blue 3 on the
head set and was monitoring Black-3 at this time. There was two sampling men which came up and
took samples in the 8th levd and then returned to the ground:
Accident At the time of the accident, I was on 220 foot level standing beside elevator looking at
White. Room, there was a flash of fire which came out of the White Room doo r, the conct_ssion blew
the side doors open, personnel left 8th level onto the catwalks to get their breath. Personnel came from
White Room and told me to tell someone that the spacecraft was on fire which I repeated over Blue
3.1 asked for gas mask to be put on elevator 1 to the 8th level catwalks. I also reported the 8th levd
was on fire. I assisted the personnel on the 220 foot level with gas masks and the one fire bottle on 200
foot level. I asked that the :elevator stay at 220 foot level whiCh,lt did for quitc some time. Personnel
used all fire bottles that could "be found: Personnel made repeated trips into_the capsule, but had to
return for air bccause of thc gas and smoke, one made rcpeatcd trips in until one fellows put him
and theirseivcs on elevator which I sent to the l_ottom to tim ambulance. The elevator_rctUrned to tim
220 foot level for stay-by. From this time on Ilarw and I controlled the elevator from top to bo',tam
iu for personnel
the elevator
that was pcrmitted
at about
to use the elevator. X;'e ,tared
9:50 p.m. (the egress) at the bottom
in this Configuration until we secured
level. Which then we went to elevator 4
and put it on express from the 1st. 6th, and 8th levels.
B-87
I
D
D JOSEPH H. PLEASANT
NAA
FEBRUARY 7, 1967
On Friday, January 27, 1967, at approximately 1830 hours, I was on Level A-8 of the structure stand-
D ing near the stairs to the %_'nite Room.

and about that second, there
At that time, someone
was a muffled explosion
yelled, there's a fire in the Spacecraft;
and fire shot out from around the bottom of the
Command Module in several "places. The Level immediately filled _ith smoke and some visible flame
H about the Spacecraft.

CO 2 bottles were brought
The CO 2 bottles on that
from another levels to
Level ,,'ere being
help. Every attempt
used by perso_mel to fight the fire.
was made to open the hatch for
!
the astronauts' escape. There were no elevators available, so I climbed from Level 8 to Level 6 over
D the eat walks and then to A-5 where

but they had already been notified.
I went into a Douglas room and called, the Fire Department;
I
i
At that time, someone
times. I went to the
was paging
Tech Trailer
for the Tech Trailer to come up on headset.
by way of the stairs and reported
This
in on headset
was
but
made several
no answer. I
immediately started with a head count of the GSE personnel and notifying higher level of supervision.
When the first-aid trucks arrived, I Sent five GSE technicians to the Dispensary which had been on sta-
tion or or near Level A-8. Names as follows: B. Belt, A. Journey, J. McConnell, W: Wingfield and W.
Schneider.
/s/ J. H. Pleasant
i
B -89
!
D
U
BRUCE W. DAVIS
NAA
JANUARY 27, 1967
I was standing at the umbilical on the adjustable 8 level at the time of the fire. Just previous 'o the
fire I heard that the astronauts were having trouble witl_ communications. They we_'e instructed to
change to Black 2 channel. At this time I heard someone say, "'There is a fire in the cockpit.'" I
turned around and after about one second I saw flamc._ within the two open access panels in the
command module near the umbilical. Someone said, "She's going to blow." Before I could turn around
I heard a whoosh and flames shot out of the access panels. Someone shouted, "Clear tile level." As
I turned around and ran toward the south west door I felt a large breeze and fch the flames. Several
of us got out the door and turned to look back through the window and all we could see was flames.
Someone said the Launch Escape System is going to blow and some guys climbed down the beams to
the next level. We looked back and someone said, "There's nobody alive in there.'" The elevator
finally came up and we got on it and rode down _to the. bottom floor.
" " /s] BruCe W. Davis:
B ,.91
FRIENDD. HICKENBOTTOM
NAA
JANUARY27, 1967
I was on level A-8, on a head set, monitoring the test, located on the south side of the tower, near
the Quality Control desk.
I was facing east when I heard a report on the headset that there was a fire in the.Command Module,
this report I believe came from Chaffee, at that instant I looked northeast and saw a spurt of flame
come from the area under the white room and heart a report that sounded like a small explosion
followed by a louder, more distinct noise, and flames shot out of the openings of the Command Mod-
ule.
At that time I left the headset and went to the phone which was located on the same level at the
southeast corner of A,8.
I reported a fire in the Command Module on Complex 34, Level A-8 to the PAA FireDepartment
and waited for the indication that the- understood me, which they did.
At this time I walked to the elevator on the southeast 'corner, called it and returned to the door-where
a fire extinguisher was, I took it and started to fight at the south side of the Command Module and
continued until the firemen arrived.
. . .. * • . .
Time was approximately 1820. crew reported fire, Fire Department called on way to get fir_ exting-
uisher, elevator arrived, (Rogers, NASA Quality Control, covered me with smock), ran out of ex-
tinguisher, flames are at all ports, up to 5 feet high near pad leader desk. Documents caught fire
from objects blowing out near Pad Leader's desk. Got new fire extinguisher, flames are high again,.
flames secured on area near Quality Control desk, partially seemed by the Pad Leader's desk. Fire
Department arrived and finished the flames in the area near Pad LeadePs desk, The area near the
umbilical island was hard to put out.
The area had such dense ' '_

- - smG._e t. at it "vas not possible to dete:mi.le, wt.ere the major flame ;:rea was,
but it was dcfinite!y on the north s;.de near the umbilical and on around near the hatch. Flames were
at tim_ very near the base of the Launch Escape S_tem (LES).
Hagar and I were discussing the jackets and other non-test related items, the count was at about 10 and
we were having communications problems. This communications problem was not of such magnitude
tb.at it kept me from hearing the report from the astronaut that tiaere was a fire in the cockpit.
Is/ Dale I-tickenbottom
. . - .
-- B -93
I
0
D
D
D JERRY W. HAWKINS
NAA
n JANUARY 27, 1967
I was located at the swing arm at the passway from level A8. Someone yelled fire, and I saw flame
billow from the Spacecraft toward the pad leader's desk. The next thing, fire was showing up in many
places; people were coming toward the swing arm; the area was rapidly filled with smoke and fire.
We opened the swing arm exit and went to the umbilical tower to get gas masks and return to the
white room, but fire and smoke was blinding. We ran back to the umbilical tower and found a fire
extinguisher, returned to white room and put the fire out around the hatch area. My hose came off
D my gas mask,
how long.I'm
others."
and I had to return to the swing arm. Gleaves,
not sure, choking,
I returned, and Clemmons
and handed me his mask.
and I removed
my lead man, came out a little later,
He said "I got the B.P.C. ,hatch,
the outer and inner hatches. We couldn't
get the
see in-
side, but leaned in and felt for the crew. The heat was tremendous, and I got ashes or soot on my
D hands,-and
momentarily
all objects
for fresh
were too hot to touch. I was getting smoke in my
air and a flashlight - 10 - 15 seconds - returned to hatch
mask at this time and left
with lite and there
was nothing but what appeared to be a blanket of ashes across the crew couches, and no one could
be made out any_vhere in the C/M. The firemen arrived, and I left the white room to inform pad
q,J
leader of condition inside C/M. Then helped Oleaves to umbilical elevator down and to medics.
f_ /s/ Jerry \_'. Hawkins
B-95
°
I il,f!
W. DONALD BROWN
I
NAA
JANUARY 28, 1967
\
Was at Quality Control de_ when Command Module access panel 10 seemed to ignite as _ minor
type explosion. During this period 2 wooshea (loudj of escaping gas were heard. The area L:8 became
immediately full of smoke, grey. I went to L-7, top of Sen, ice Module (S/M)," Sector I and II, were
burning. Also quads A and B were on fire• Fi_'e was coming from insife Sector I access from below"
the access {much grey smoke). I* returned to Level-8 from Level-5 and smoke was still coming from
under and left-hand side of BPC. Upon returning from• L-6 with extinguisher was told to leave area.
I do not recall any times (clock) of these events. / .
/s/ W. D. Bro_;n
iD
l
%
i t.•_
'a
i
- ..•• ° • u - •
• -r
n B - 97
. • _- S _>_<_
S_•ii_.!-_
JESSIE L. OWENS
HAA
"JANUARY 27, 1967
. - . ? • . -
Accide_t Report - Launch Complex 34, Level A-8

Time: Apptm_fi_nately 6:30 _ - .
0 My position
telligible-
was near
enongh to hear
the Pad Leader's
switch
desk (by the water cooler).
to Black 4-or
Garbled
Black 2 - then fire in Command
communications,
Module
but in-
-I tTrned,
looked at the Pad Leadm:, looked back at the Command Module at the White Room P hatch a_'ca,
•heard what sounded like the cabin relid valve open.and high velocity;gas escaping. Withln:"tW6 sec-_:_t:- -
onds (I estimate) high velocity gas came out the access panel in the +Y direction from the G _and .N
(Guidance and Navigation System). Immediately this gas burst into flame somewhat like lighting an
0 acetylene totaeh.
flame wall. I tamed
I turned to go
to exit through
to the White
the northeast
Room at the above
door to the elevator
noted instant but was met by a ___ .
and my hair was singe d in the <
back under my white cap {evidence of the height of the flame). I exited to the crosswalk but no ele- "
0 vator was available

imide, I couldn't
-
get in. I climbed
down the stairs and toihe
turned back to into the A-8 area but flame and door being latching
out .on the structure
nearest trailer and phoned C..,_.
type from
and down
Stephens.
the beams
•.........
to the stair area, went
. . ,._
.,,_ . ...... • _ - - ..._ . : :._;_,
NOTE: "l_e smoke.I bre_..thed was foul and of an irritating n.ature.-The flame• was orange.
Is/ Jessie Owens, NAA Supt.
0
.
• • • "
0 •.- ,. :,; - (
B -99
L
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!5 + _:
i).
i.i
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+eTOUO
i :
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SNIZA- 03-S(301 g
APOLLO OP ERA _1 J.ONS I IANDBOOI<
1:4
i!3
NOTE: The lmrtion of the text affected by tile current changes is
indicated by a vertical line in the outer margins of the p_ge.
•/!_i:i! {} 0
TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES IN TIqIS PUBLICATION IS 6 ..

CONSISTING OF THE FOLLOWING: ,i t "' \ /
Page Pagei'
4i
Title Z.8-I thru 2.8-70
A thru E Z. 9-1 thru 2.9-38
i th ru
1-i thru
xii
I-ZO
Z.
2.
10-1
11-.i
thru
thru
2.10-10
2.11-6
[
2-i thru 2-2 3-1 thru 3-21.2
4-i thru 4-50
2. l-I thru Z. I-i0
Z. 2-1 thru 2. 2-48 5-1 thru 5-Z0
Z. 3-1 thru 2.3-72 6-i thru 6-52
Z.4-1 thru 2.4-38 7-1 thru 7-2

8-I thru 8-2
2.5-I thru 2.5-44
Z.6-1 thru 2.6-48 A-I thru A-6
2.7-I thru Z. 7- 48
%'a
CHANGE INFORMATION
This handbook is subject to continuous qhang¢ or revision, on a priority

[
basis, to reflect current engineering or mission changes, or to improve content
or arrangement. The content and the changes are accounted for by the above
last of Effective Pages, and by the following means:
Record of Publication: The publication date of each basic issue and each change
:/ii_
issue is listed on page I3 as a record of all editions.
[
Page Change Date: Each page in this handbook has space for entering a change
date. The latest publication date will be entered in this space each time a page
is changed from the basic issue.
'*]he aiterisk indicates pages char_ged, added, or deleted by the current change,
Manuals will be distributed as directed by the NASA Apol!o Program Office. All requests for
manuals should be directed to the NASA Apollo Spacecraft Program Office at HoustoG Texas.
i{i:_
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I:13
R_2COI{D Ot;' PUBLICATION

q
!i
This issue of the Apollo Operations Handbook,
Spacecraft 01Z, dated 1Z November 1966, constitutes

:?i
a revJ. sion of the handbook, dated !6 September 1966.
Subsequent changes may be issued to maintain infor-

,t
mation current with spacecraft configuration throt.gh
completion of the mission. This record will reflect
the publication date of any reieased changes.
_t
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:.:is
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SMEA-03-SC012
APOLLO OPEP.ATIONS HANDBOOK
:i:i!i
:!:i
/]
LATE TE2CHNICAL CHANGES
[:ii _" The items listed below represent technical changes which have been approved too
late for inclusion in the 12 November 1966 printing of the Apollo Operations' Handbook.
Source Description of Change Section Affected '
2.5
MCR Change S/M RCS fuel from blendedhydrazine
A1735 mixture to monomethylhydrazine
MCR Addition of inverter synchronizer power panel 2,3
1591 which provides circuit breakers for the control
i iii
i ii: i J{EV 3. of power to the phase synchronizer unit.
FEO This is a nomenclature correction for the 2. 8 and 3
M-.53025 S-Band switch on the MDC panels No. 13, Z3

(10-13-66) and 26. This change is required due to wiring
changes. The S-Band switch was marked
"PTT", "OFF" and "VOX". The switch is
now marked "OFF 'f , "OFF" and"T/R".
i
iB MCR Modification of Crew Couch Lockouts. This 1,2,3
A1733 MCR removes the lockout solenoid actuator
(i0-11-66) and wire harncss from the X--X a-:is strut
lockout mechanism. Add an adapter to the
lockout mechanism assembly to fix in the
locked position. The switch on panel No. 9
and the wire harness assembly on the struts
will be removed.
SX'IfA-0 3-SC0 12
A POLI,O OPER.ATIONS HANI)!3OOi<
(i
,!i!
[
SYNOPSIS OF SiGNIF!C-kNT CHANGES
E
This tabulation does not list all changes, additions, and/or deletions in the handbook.
Its
_.,X/SiC
purpose
ITl.
is to assist the reader in determining the significant technical changes in each
[
PART I. TECHNICAL CHANGES
Handbook
I land boo k [}.
System( s )
Se c ti o n( s )
: :;_ Affected
Affected Description
: i
GEN
Updated loci<out mec'hanisms on shock struts.
Updated forward hatch

o
cover.
GEN
SEQ
[
Revised I_CSC circuit diagran_ to include entry battery
11;}
backup
HZ purge
power
line
to pyro
heater
bus.
EPS.
[
EPS [
Fuel cell H 2 and ()Z reactant shutoff valves holding
voltage control
EPS
Cryogenic system response and operation
PROP
Revised, updated, and assembled end-to-end circuit
and system diagrams. Added electrical power distrib-
ution
operating
diagrams
ranges
and
and
power
panel
requirements.
references to
Added
measurement
[
lists.
Added tabular data for color markings contained on SPS, EPS

i!I
indicator displays and updated art. and ECS
•:!i!
Added typical charts from MMDB to determine S/C RCS, SPS [
consumable data. and EPS [
-?
4
Added data on S/C attitude controls. RCS
.4 Updated SPS ]Delta V and Engine Gimbal Angle charts. SPS
[.
{
:a.
,5
h_: .... : '-. F,asic D:_te 12 Nov !966 Clmn,z-' !)at< P;_ge in-
SM2A-03-SC012
APOLL.O OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
/
/
FOREWORD
This handbook and its contents are restricted to the require-
ments for Spacecraft 01Z. It presents, in one document, descriptions
of the spacecraft systems and equipment, and listings of the flight

crew operational procedures necessary for the safe and efficient
function of the spacecraft throughout its planned mission. This

handbook is designed pr{marily for use by the flight crew, and
secondarily for use by the mission flight controllers, flight planners,
and trainer operators.
NASA comments or suggested changes to this handbook should
be addressed to the Flight Planning Section, FCSD, MSC, Office
Code CF 32, Telephone HU3-4Z71.
_{ _ NIission Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 C]_ap_ee Date Page i/ii
)
SM2A-03-SC012
, t+',r'-.,
+.... ; L. (+) OPFRATIONS HANDBOOK
!:ii!_
; i:_iq TABLE OF CONTENTS
• i+ [23
+[+! Section
Title Page
i 1-1
,GENERAL INFORMATION.
1-1
1.1 Spacecraft 012 Configuration
: :4 _% i -ii
5{ 1.1.1 LES Assembly
1-4
1.1,Z Command Module
-,,, I-6
1.1.2. i t_orward Compartment
• .++ t_+i. I-6
1.1.Z.Z Crew Compartment
1-6
1.1.2.3 S/C Controls and Displays
!-6
1 1.2.4 C/M Mechanical Controls
1-12
1 1.2,5 Crew ]/2quipnqent and Equipment Bays
1-15
t 1.Z.6 Food and Water
1-15
'e 1 1.2.7 Waste Management
1-15
1 1.2.8 Survival 1_2quipm ent .
:_ iiii
• ° 1-15
1 1.2.9 Aft C_mpar tment
:J 1-16
1 1.3 Service Module
1-16
1.1.4 Spacecraft LEM Adapter
1-16
1.1.5 Spacecraft Systems
1 -t6
1.2 Launch Vehicle Configuratton
S-1B i%co ster 1-19
1.Z.1
1-19
1.2. Z S-IYB Second Stage
L:i !,3 Mission 209A Weight Status
1 -19
,1
1-19
2:} 1.4 Postlanding and Recovery
+I SYSTEMS DATA•
2-'1
i:i 2.1-1
2.1 Guidance and Control
2.1-1
2o1.1 Systems Interface, Guidance and Control
2.1-1
Z.I.2 Coasting Flight
2.!-2
2.1.3 Powered Flight
Z.1-2
2.1.4 Atmospheric Flight
Guidance and Navigation Systems (G&N) 2.2-1
2.2
Introduction 2.2-1
2. Z.I
2.2-1
Z.2. Z Functional Description
2.2-7
2,2+2. 1 Operational Modes
2.2-11
2.2.3 Ivlajor Component/Subsystem Description
2.2-II
Z.Z.3.1 Inertial Subsystem
Z.Z-!3
2. Z.3.2 Optical Subsystem
2.2-16
2.2.3.3 Computer Subsystem
2. Z.4 Performance and Design Data 2. Z-40
Z. 2-40
2.2.5 Operational Limitations and Restrictions
2.2.5.1 S/C Attittad e Z. Z-40
li
Z. 2-41
2.2.5.2 IMU Operation
+
i
i '+."
,'_:
:i _i_ :v_
" +'+ _ion Basic Date 12 Nov ! 9 __6-6- Change
....................... Date Page iii
.... • . + :.:+ .. • . ..... :. . + .

SMZA-03-SC012
APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK

?
Title Page
Section
Z.Z-41
Z.Z. 5.3 Optics Operation 2. Z-41
Z.Z.6 Telemetry Measurements .
2. Z-45
Z.Z.7 G&N Power Consm-nption
g. 2-46
2.2.8 Interface Signals
Z.3-1
Z.3 Stabilization and Control System (SCS}
2.3-i
Z.3.1 Introduction
i 2.3-3
Z.3. Z Functional Description
Z.3-3
J
Z.3. Z.1 Control Capabilities ..
2.3-7
Z.3.Z.2 Apollo Reference Axes
Z.3-8
•! Z.3,Z.3 Subsystems
2.3-4Z
Z.3.3 Flight Control Profiles
Z. 3-44
Z.3.3.1 Ascent
Z. 3-45
2.3.3.Z Coasting Flight (Earth Orbital}
Z. 3-48
Z.3.3.3 Powered Flight (Earth Orbital)
2,3-51
Z.3.3.4 Entry •
Z. 3-53
2,3.4 Major Component/SubsTstem Description
Z. 3--53
2.3.4.1 Rate Gyro Assembly
2.3-54
2.3.4.2 Attitude Gyro Accelerometer Assembly
Z.3.4.3 Pitch, Roll, and Yaw Electronic Control
Assemblies
7j
Z.3.4.4 Auxiliary Electronic Control Assembly
2.3.4.5 Display and Attitude Gyro Accelerometer Assembly
2.3-56
Electronic Control Assembly
2.3-57
Z.3.4.6 Rotation Controls
2.3-57
Z.3.4.7 Translation Controls
Z. 3-61
Z.3.4.8 Flight Director Atti.tude Ind'_cator
Z. 3-65
2.3.4.9 Attitude Set/Gimbal Position Indicator
2.3-66
Z.3.4.10 Velocity Change Indicator
Z. 3-67
Z.3.4.11 Electrical Power Distribution
2.3-67
Z.3.5 Performance and Design D, ata
Z. 3-67
2.3-67 g
3 Z.3.6.1 S/C Attitude Change
2.3-71
Z.3,7 Telemetry Measurements
2.4-1
Z.4 Service Propulsion System (SPS)
i! Z.4.1 Functional De s c r iption
2.4-I
Z.4-Z
Z.4. Z Major Component/Subsystem Description
Z,4-Z
{ Z.4.2.1 Pressurization Subsystem
Z.4-6
Z.4. Z.Z Pr ope!lant Sub s y stem • •
$ Z.4-7
Z.4. Z.3 Bipropellant Valve Assembly
2.4-9
! Z.4. Z.4 Engine Injector
Z.4-9
Z.4.2.5 Ablative Combustion Chamber .
Z.4-9
2.4. Z. 6 Nozzle Extension
2.4-9
Z.4.2.7 Flight Combustion Stability Monitor FCSM}
Z.4-11
2.4.2.8 SPS Electrical P,eaters
? Z.4-11
! 2.4.2.9 Thrust Mount Assemblies
2.4-18
Z.4. Z. 10 Propellant Utilization and Gauging Subsystem (PUGS)
2.4-30
2.4.3 Performance and Design Data
• I
?,,,',-:_,n Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 Change Date Page iv I
J
3
SMZA-03-SC:0 iZ
4 APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
_ : :::i
<I
Secti6n Title Page
2.4-30
2.4.3.1 Design Data
2.4-33
2.4.3.2 Performance Data
'!_!i 2.4-33
2.4.3.3 Power Consumption Data
i! 2.4.3.4
2.4.4
SPS Electrical
Operational
Power
Limitations
Distribution
and Restrictions
2.4-35
2, 4-35
2.4-35
%!ii! 2.4.5
2.5
Telemetry
Reaction
Measurements
Control System (RCS)
. •
2.5-I
2.5-,i
2.5.1 Introduction
<ii 2.5-1
2.5. Z S/M RCS Functional Description
Z.5-4
Z.5.3 S/M RCS Major Con_ponent/Subsystem Description
di:i_ 2.5-7
Z.5.3. 1 Pressurization Subsyste:n
Z. 5-3
/!7 ._ 2.5.3.2 Propellant Subsystem • • •
2.5-_
2.5.3,3 Engine Assemblies
2.5-13
2,5.3.4 Pressure Versus Temperature Measuring System
LJ Z.5.3.5 Engine Thrusting Logic
2.5-15
:id S/M RCS Performance and Design Data
2.5-16
2.5.4
2.5-16
Z.5.4, 1 Design Data
Performance Data 2, 5-18
2.5.4.2
2.5-18
2.5.4.3 Power Cons_rnption Data S/M RCS and C/M RCS
S/M RCS Electrical Power Distribution Z. 5-19
Z.5.4.4
2.5-19
2.5.5 S/M RCS Operational Limitations and Restrictions
2.5-19
2.5.6 S/M RCS Telemetry Measurements
C/M RCS Functional Description 2.5-23
Z.5.7
2.5.8 C/M RCS Major Components/Subsystem Description 2.5-24
Pressurization Subsysten_ Z. 5-27

Z.5.8. 1
Z. 5-Z8
2.5.8.2 Propellant Subsy s%e:n
Z. 5.8.3 Z. 5-30
Engine Assembly
2.5-34
2.5.8.4 Propellant Jettison
2.5.9 C/M RCS Performance and Design Data 2.5-39
Design Data Z. 5-39

2.5.9.1
2.5.9.2 Performance Data . • 2.5-4]
Power Consumption Data Z. 5-41

Z.5.9.3
2.5.10 C/M RCS Operational Limitations and Restrictions Z, 5-41
2.5. 10.1 C/M RCS Electrical Power Distribution Z. 5-41
2.5.11 C/ivl RCS Telemetry Measurements Z. 5-41
2.6 Electrical Power System (EPS) 2.6-i
Z.6.1 Introduction 2.6-I
2.6.2 Functional De s c r iption 2.6-I
2.6.2.1 2.6-i
Energy Storage
2.6.2.2 Power Generation 2.6-2
2.6.2.3 Power Conversion 2.6-2
Z.6.2.4 Power Distribution 2.6-2
2.6.3 Major Component/Subsystem Description. 2.6-5

2.6.3.1 Cryogenic Storage • 2.6-5
2.6.3.2 Batteries . 2.6-6
2.6.3.3 Fuel Ceil Power Plants 2.6-12
2.6.3.4 Inverters 2.6-17
• ::} l,,l
ssion Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 change Date Page v
]
:•! " !: _ : !i• :: ': _ i: _:._i_ :< :!!_ ..... : :__ i: i: ! : !: •! ; i: ::: :!!:ii i
SMZA-03-SC012
APOLLO OPERATIONS I-IANDBOO]_
jill
i i
Title Page
Section
Z.6.3.5 Battery Charger

z. 6-2z E
z. 6.-z5
2.6.3.6 Power Distribution
Z. 6-30
2.6.4
2.6.4.1
Performance
AC and DC Data
and Design Data
2.6-30
Z. 6-34
I
2.6.4. Z Power Requirements
2.6-36
" iX
2.6.5.1
2.6.5. Z
Fuel Cell Power
Cryogenic
Plants
Storage Subsystem
2.6-36
2,6-38 [
Z. 6-39
2.6.6 Telemetry Measurements
2.7-I
2.7
2.7.1
Environmental
Introduction
Functional
Control
Description
System (ECS)
•
Z.7-I
2.7-Z
I
2.7.2
Z. 7-3
2.7.3
Z.7.3.1
2.7.3.2
Major
Oxygen
Pressure
Coraponent/Su.bsystena
Supply Subsystem
Suit Circuit Subsystem
Description
Z.7-3
2.7-7 I
2.7-13
Z.7.3.3 Cabin Pressure and Temperature Control Subsystem .
2.7-17
2.7.3.4
2.7.3.5
Water--Glycol
Water Supply
Coolant
Subsystem
Subsystem
Z. 7-24
Z. 7-26
I
Z.7.3.6 ECS-Waste Management System Interface
1 2.7.3.7
2.7.4
2.7.4.1
2.7.4. Z
Electrical
Performance
Metabolic
Oxygen Supply
Power
Data
and
Distribution
Design
Subsystem
Data
2.7-28
Z. 7-31
Z.7-31
Z. 7-31
I
Z. 7-32
2.7.4.3 Pressure Suit Circuit Subsystem
2.7.4.4 Cabin Pressure and Temperature Control
Z.7-32
Subsystem •
2.7.4.5 2.7-32
Water-Glycol Coolant Subsystem
2.7.4.6
2.7.4.7
Water
Waste
Supply
Management
Subsystem
System
Z. 7-33
Z. 7-33
I
ECS Power Consumption Data 2.7-33
2.7.4.8
2.7-38
2.7.5
2.7.5.1
Operational
ECS
ECS
Caution
Caution
Limitations
Placards
Notes
and Restrictions
2.7-38
2.7-38
I
2.7.5. Z
Z.7.5.3 ECS General Data Z. 7-39
2.7.5.4
2.7.5.5
Cabin
Cabin
Depressurization
Repressurization
Rates
Rates •
Z. 7-39
2.7-39
I
2.7.6 Z. 7-44
Telemetry Measurements
Z.8-1
2.8
2.8.1
2.8.2
Telecommunication
Introduction
System
2.8-I
2.8-2
I
Functional Description
2.8.2.1 Voice Conamunications 2.8-2
2.8.2.2
2.8.2.3
Data
Tracking
Operations
and Ranging
2.8-6
2.8-10
I
2.8.2.4 Unified S-Band Operations 2.8-12
2.8.3
2.8.3.1
2.8.3.2
Major
_V'oice
Connponent/Subsystem
Instrumentation
and Data
Equipment
Equipment
Description
Group
Group
2.8-.13
2.8-14
2.8-17
I
I
:_ _;',_ ..... i .... Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 Chan_e Date Page
?
f ii] SM2A-03-SC012
/i
Section Title Page,
RF Electronics Equip_nent Group 2.8-42

2.8.3.3
2.8-37
2.8.3.4 Antenna Equipment Group .
Electrical Power Distribution 2.8-62
2.8.3.5
Perfomnance and Design Data
z. s-_z
2.8.4
2.8-67
.2.8.5 ' Operational Limitations and Restrictions
2.8-'6 7
2.8.5.1 Antennas
2.8-_7
2.8.5.2 Data Storage Equipment
2.8-68
2.8.5.3 Unified S-Band System
2.8-62
2.8.5.4 General
2.8-69
Z.8.6 Telemetry Measurements
2.9-I
2.9 Sequential Systems
Introduction 2.9-!
Z.9.1
2.9-1
2.9.2 Function al De s c r iption
3.9-i
2.9.Z.I Sequential Events Control System (SECS)
2.9.2.2 Emergency Detection System 2.9-4
2.9.2.3 Launch Escape System 2.9-10
2.9.2.4 Earth Landing Systern Z.9-1!
2.9.3 2.9-14
Major Cornponent/Subsystern Description
2.9.3.1 Sequential Events Control Systen_ Z.9-14
2.9-34
2.9.3.2 Emergency Detection System
2.9.3.3 Launch EscapeSysten_ 2.9-32
2.9.3.4 Earth Landing Subsyste_T_ 2.9-33
2.9.4 Performance and Design Data 2.9-33
Z.9.4. 1 Power Requirements 2.9-33
2.9.5 Operational Limitations and Restrictions 3.9-3_%
2.9.6 Telemetry Measurements 2.9-36
Z. lO Caution and Warning System (C&WS) 2.].0--i
2. 10. I Z. i0-!
Introduction •
2. I0.2 Functional Description 2.10-I
2.10.3 Major Component/Subsi"stern Description Z. 10--3
2.10.3.1 Electrical Power Distribution.. 2. I0-3
2.10.4 Performance and Design Data 2. 10-3
3.10.4.1 C&WS Power Consumption Data Z. 10-3
2.10.5 Operational Limitations and Restrictions Z.,i0-3
2.10.5. 1 C&WS General Data 2. i0-3
2. I0.6 Telemetry Measurements Z. !0-10
Z. ll Miscellaneous Systems Data 2.11-I
Z. ll.1 Introduction 2. i]-!
Z.!l.2 Clocks 2. 1!--!

Z.11.3 Digital Event Timers . 2.!i-i
2. i1.4 Accelerometer (G-Meter) . Z. 11-i
2.11.5 Command Module interior-Lighting 2.1!-t
2.11.5.1 Functional Description 2.11-Z

o
2.11..6 Cm:nmand Module Uprighting System ..1i-2
Z. ll.6.1 Functional Description 2.1]-2
{,}_,
3 CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS . 3-1
<t'4
3. 1 Controls/Displays Locator Index
:_ .q_ }di. ssioc-' Basic Date ].Z Nov I_..66 Change Date Page vii
SM2A-03-SC0]Z
Title Page
Section
4-I
4 PERFORMANCE
4-L
Introduction
4,1 Crew Display Instrument Markirfgs and Accuracy
4-1
Data
4-3
4:.I. 1 Service Propulsion System Indicators
4-4
4.1.2 Reaction Control System Indicators
4-5
4.1.3 Electrical Power Systelza Indicators
4-11
4.1.4 Environmental Control System Indicators
4-13
4.1.5 Telecommunication System Meters .
4-15
4.1.6 Sequential Systems Indicators
2_ 4--16
:.2:J
4,1.7 Miscellaneous Indicator s
::ii!_ 4-18
4.2 Consumable Requirements
::i!i_ 4-18
4.2.1 S/M RCS Propellant Consu_nption Data
4 --Z-5
4.2.2 C/M RCS Propellant Consun_ption Data
) 4-27
4,2.3 SPS Propellant Consur:_ption Data
4-30
!<i 4.2.4 EPS and ECS Consm_ption Data
4-34
iiiil!_ 4.3 RCS and SPS Thrusting Data
::::_
4-34
4.3.1 RCS Translation Control
4-34
4.3.2 RCS Rotation Control
4-39
4.3.3 SPS Engine Thrust Performance
i?i S/C Operational Constraints and Lin_itat[ons
4-39
4.4
4-39
4.4.1 Operational Constraints
4-43
4.4.2 Operational Lhnitations
5-1
EXPERIMENTS AND SCIENTIFIC EQUIPMENT DATA
5-1 [
Introduction
5-1 I
5.1 Scientific Equipnaent
5-]
5.1.1 Medical Data Acquisition System (MDAS)
::ii_!
_ii!!:} 5.1.2 Electrical Cables and Adapters 5-i [
5.1.2.1 Octopus Cable 5-5 _
5-5
5.1.2.2 Cobra Cable T-Adapter
5-7
_._ 5.1.2.3 PGA and CWG Electrical Adapter Cables
5.1.2.4 Hardware Power and Signal Cables 5-7 [
5--7
5.2 Medical Experiments
5-7
:!J 5.2.1 In-Flight Exerciser (M-3A) (M003) .
5 -.7 _:
5.2.1.1 Equipment Description
5.2. i.2
5--9 I
::i:i::!_} Exper in_ent Procedures
5-10
5.2.1.3 Crewman Participation
5-10
5.2.1.4 Recovery Requirements
::i?_
<i:i: _ 5.2.2 In- Flight Phonocardiogram (M-4,A) (M004} 5-10 I
:::.: _
5-10
5.2.2.1 Equipment Description
iii
5.2.2.2 5-11
!:!i Experiment Procedures
5-11 i
5.2.2.4 Recovery Requirements 5-11 !
5.2.3 Bone Dem'[neralization (M-6A) (M006} 5-11
' ,.,, ,. ::_.,!on

_- Basic Date IZ Nov -- ......
1966 Change Date Page viii i}
:i
SMZA-03-SC012_

ii_i
i
Section Title PD.ge
5-11
5, 2.3.1 Equipment Description
5-11
5. 2.3.2 Experin_ent Procedures
5-12
5. Z.3.3 Crewman Participation
5-1Z
5. 2.3.4 Recovery Requirements •
Human Otolith Function (Vestibulal _ Effects)
>. Z.4 5-£g
(M-9A) (M009)
5-]2
5. Z.4.1 Equipment Description
5.Z.4. Z Expe r inqent Procedures 5 - l_g
5-13
5-13
5.2.4.4 Recovery Requir ernents
5-13
5.2.5 Cytogenetic Blood Studies (M-ll) (M011)
5-13
5.Z.5.1 Equipment Description
5-13
5.2.5. Z Equipment Procedures
5-14
5-14
5.Z.5.4 Recovery Operations
Cardiovascular Reflex Conditioning (M-48) (M048) 5-14
5.2.6
5-14
5. Z.6.1 Equipment Description
5-15
5.2.6.2 Experiment Procedures
5-15
5.Z.6.4 5-15
Recovery Requirements
5-16
5.3 Scientific Experiments
5-16
5.3.1 Synoptic Terrain Photograph (S-5A) (S005)
5.3.1.1 5-16
Equipment Description
5.31.Z 5-]6
Exper in_ ent Procedures
5-!6
5.31.3 Crewman Participation
531.4 5-17
Recovery Requirements
53Z Synoptic Weather Photography (S-6A) (S006) 5-17
532.1 5--17
Equipment Description
53Z. Z Experiment Procedures 5-17
532.3 Crewman Participation 5-17
53Z.4 Recovery Requirements 5-17
5.4 Technical Experiments 5-18
5.4.1 In-Flight Nephelometer (T-3) (T003) 5-18
5.4.1. i Equipment Description 5-18
5.4.1.Z 5-18
Experiment Procedures
5.4.1.3 Crewman Participation 5-18
5.4.1.4 Recovery Requirements 5-19
CREW PERSONAL EQUIPMENT 6-i
Introduction 6-i
6.1 Crew Compartment Configuration and Crew

Environment 6-1
6. Z Mirrors 6-2.
6. g.l Internal Viewing Mirrors (CFE) 6-.2
6.2.2 External Viewing Mirrors (CFE) 6- 3

6.3 Crewn_an Optical Alignment Sight (COAS) 6-4
6.3.] Operational Use 6-5
.t kiis:s:on Basic Da.te ]2 Nov 1966 Chanee Date Pace _x
.::..:,,.:. :. . .,......: . _ ::.:.,:... , ..... , . ...... .... ....... ...... : :.- .:.:.... , : • ..., .....
:i:::
A
<i
SM?.,A-03-SC01Z
_,PGLLO OPERATIO N'S HANDBOOK
)i
Page
Title
Section
6.4 Space Suit Assembly (GFP)

6-6
6-6
E
6.4.1 Space Suit Off or Shirtsleeve Environment
::[{I 6-6
6.4.1.1
6.4.1.2
Constant
Flight
Wear
Coveralls
Garment ,•
6-6
6-7
[
6.4.1.3 Gon%n_unications Soft Hal: 6-8
6.4.1.4 Constant Wear Garment Electrical Adapter
6-9
6.4.1.5 Electrical Umbilical "Sleep" Adapter
6-9
6.4. Z Space Suit On Environment
{ 6-9
<{ PGA Unpressurized or Ventilated
6.4. Z.1 6-9
iii:_! 6.4.2. Z PGA Pressurized
6-9
:'"5
-n 6.4.3 PGA Description
6-9
6.4.3.1 PGA Components
3a 6-12
6.5 PGA Stowage •
ii
"!
6.5.1
6.5.2
Torso
Helmet
and Glove
Stowage
Stowage
6-12
6-1Z
6-13
[
6.6 PGA Connecting Equip,nent
6.6.1 Pressure Garment Assembly (PGA) Electrical

6-13
Adapter (GFP)
6-13
i.! 6.6.2 Oxygen Hose (Umbilical) (GFP)
6-13
.:!{ 6.7 Crew Couches
6-14
6.7.1 Crew Couch Structur e
6-15
;i 6.7.2 Crew Couch Positions
6.-15
6.7.2.1 Occupied Positions
6-16
6.7.2. Z Unoccupied Positions
6-17
6.7.3 Grew Couch Component Description
6- ! 7
i ) 6.7.3.1 Headrest
6-18
6.7.3.2 Backrest
6-18
::J 6.7.3.3 Armrests
6--18
6.7.3.4 Seat Pan and Footrest
6-19
6.7.3.5 Crew Couch Pads
6-19
6.7.4 Mechanical Adjustments
6-19
6.7.4.] Headrest Adjustments
6-19
6.7.4. Z Armrest Adjustments
,) 6-Zl
6.7.4.3 Seat Pan Adjustment Directions
6-22
i:!i,I 6.7.4.4 Footrest and Footstrap Adjustments
6-2Z
6.'1.4.5 D-Ring Handle Extension
6-2Z
:!i
i :L
6.7.4.6
6.7.4.7
Docking
Shoulder
Position
Strap
Adjustment
Adjustment
6-Z3
6-23
6.8 Crewman Restraints
:!{ 6.8.1 High G-Load tlestraints
6-23
t 6-23
6.8.1.1 Crewman Restraint Harness
?j!<_ 6-24
6.8.1.2 Weightless Restraint I
Guidance and Navigation Station Restraint
6-25 i
6.8.1.3
6-26
:41i 6.8.1.4 Crewman Sleeping Restraints
6-27
6.9 Flight Data File (GFP) •
6-28
6.9.1 Commander's Flight Data File
:ii 6-28
6.9.2 Senior Pilot's Flight Data File
6-29
:!i 6.9,3 Pilot's Flight Data File
:< :
i
....._
:{ _'_ , :: Basic ]Date '12" Nov _1966 Change Date Pa_e x
:!!iii_{::_:-'*_';,_:
, :_ ........................ i-.,-
: iii SMZA-03-SC01 ?-
Section Title Page
6-30
6.10 Crewman In-Flight Tool Set and Workshelf (GFI3)
:•(i! 6-31
6.10.1 Torque Wrench (Tool A)
i "!i!ii_
l 6-31
6.10.2 Adapter tlandle (Tool E)
:i _i?i 10-Inch Driver (Tool H) " 6-31
6.10.3
6-31
6.10.4 4-Inch Driver (Tool L)
: 5] 6-31
.6. 10.5 Emergency Wrench (Tool t3)
T-Handle (Tool C) 6-32
6.10.6
6.10.7 End Wrench (Tool F) (2) 6-3_
6.10.8 5/3Z-Inch Short Driver (Tool J} 6 - 3£
::,ii 6-3Z
6.10.9 4-Inch Torque Set Driver (Tool R)
. t' ;N
6-3?,
6. 10. 10 In-Flight Tool Set Tether
-:i! 6-32
6.10.11 D-Ring ;Extension Handle (Tool N)
':!i 6-32
6. 10. 12 Operational Use
6.10.13 6-32
Stowage
6.10.]3.1 In-Flight Tool Set Stowage Pouch and Tool Set
Drawer 6-35
::_
6-35
6. 10. 13. Z Miscellaneous Stowage
6. 10. 14 Workshelf Assembly 6-35
6-36
6. 10. 14. 1 Usage
6-37
6.11 Drinking Water Subsystem
6.12 Food 6-38
6-38
6.12.1 Use .'
6-38
ii 6.12.2
6. 1Z.Z.1
Stowage
LEB Food Stowage Compartment 6-38
6.1Z.Z.2 RHEB Auxiliary Food Compartment Drawer 6-39
6. 1Z.Z.3 LHEB Food Stowage Compartment 6-39
6.13 Personal Hygiene (GFP) 6-39
6.13.1 Cleansing of Teeth-Oral Hygiene Assembly 6-39

< :!_
6.13.Z 6-40
Wet Cleansing Cloth
6.13.3 6-40
Dry Cleaning Cloth .,
6.13.4 Towels 6-41
6.13.5 6-41
Tissue Dispensers
6.14 6-41
Medical Supplies (GFP}
6.14.1 Monitoring Equipment 6-41
Clinical Physiological Monitoring Instrument Set 6-41

6.14.1.1
II•_3;'
6.14.1.z Personal Biomedical Sensors Instrument Assembly 6-42
6.14.1.3 Biomedical Preamplifier Instrument Assembly 6-42
6.14.1.4 Bioinstrumentation Accessories Kit 6-4Z
6.14.1.5 Personal Radiation Dosimeters 6-43
6.14. Z Medical Kit (GFP) 6 -43
614.2.1 Packaging 6-44
614.2.2 Stowage 6 - 44
614.2.3 Medical Kit Additional Usage 6 -44
615 Survival Kit (GFP) 6 - ,i4
615.1 Stowage 6 -44

615.Z Survival Kit Container Operation 6- 46
6 15.3 Contents of the Survival Kits 6-46
:_ _:i_ Mis:.-',ion Basic Date iZ Nov 1966 Ci:an_e Date Page xi

::, t;:!a; ......................
: .!
}:"
SM2A-03-SC01Z
Title Page
See[ion
6.15.4 Description and Use of Survival Kit Colnponents

6-47
6-47
E
6.15.4.1 Liferafts
6-47
_!::i_
I 6. 15.4.2
6.15.4.3
Beacon/Transceiver
Survival
Survival
Lights
Glasses
(Z)
(3)
6-48
6-48
'
E
6. 15.4.4
6-49
> iili 6.15.4.5 Survival Knives (Z)
6-49
6.15. .6 Water Cans (3)
6-49
6.15.4.7 Desalting Kits (2) Plus Tablets 16)
• 6-49
6.15.4.8 Emergency Medical Survival Kit
6-49
:i! 6.15.5 Sea Water PmYLp (CFE) 1_
H
6.16 Stowage
6-50
!2
7-1
SYSTEM SCHEMATICS
•
:_
ii_:!.ili_
u!i!_
I
!4_:,;._o_ Basic Date 1Z Nov J.96_6 .Change Date Page xu _"
{
SM2A-03-SC0 ]Z
APOLLO OPERATIONS I-IANDBOOK
!
GENERAL IN_WORMA 7ION
SECTION 1
GENERAL INFORMATION
]
{
IN T RODU C TION.
i
This section contains infdrn_ation relating to the A'po]lo spacecraft OhZ
!
/ configuration, and a description of tiae launch vehicle and booster used for
the mission.
•i i.i SPACECI<AFT 0 IZ CONFIGURATION.

4
Spacecraft 01Z (figure ]-i) conforms to a Block I CSM configuration
consisting of a launch escape system (LES) as-sembly, comn-.and module

•]
(C/M), service "_nodule (S/M), and the spacecraft lunar excursion module
adapter (SLA). This spacecraft, designed for an earth orbital mission,

does not contain a lunar module (LM) within its adapter. (For a description
of the launch vehicle used with spacecraft 01Z, refer to paragraph ].2)
d
.]
[_9_ The IBlock I configuration missions for the Apollo
program provide the following:
":i e Command module and service module development for

earth orbital missions
•'i
.i • Demonstration of systems operational capabilities
including all types of aborts, land and water recovery,

Saturn IB and Saturn V operation and capability, and
systems operation during earth orbit
Development of qualified teams for checkout, launch,
manned space flight network (MSFN), recovery, and

flight analysis.
<i! 1.1.1 LES ASSEMBLY.
1 The LES assembly (figure ]-i) provides the means for separating the
C/M from the ].aunch vehicle during pad or suborbital aborts. This assembly
consists of a Q-ball instrumentation assembly (nose. cone), ballast com-
partment, canard surfaces, p_tch control motor, tower jettison motor,

launch escape motor, a structural skirt, an open-frame tower, and a boost
protective cover (BPC). The structural skirt at the base of the housing,
which encloses the rocket motors, is secured to the upper portion of the tov.'er.
SPACECRA'ET 0 ]Z (_ONI:
.... I£_U_J{ATION_
.,Nli ._ s ion Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 Change Date Page ]-I
i_
SMZA-03-SC012
GENERA L INFO_RMA TION
E
Q-BALL (NOSE CONE)
_!!iii
i r_r
_/_.PITCH CONTROL MOTOR
C ANARDS _'_ IETTISON MOTOR

°
[
LAUNCH ESCAPE MOTOR '''''_
/ "2
.i,- STRUCI UPAL SKI RT
I
i_
¸:
]
[
TOWE,_ATTACHMENT
(_, _!_1
BOOST
COW
PROTECTIVE
OMMAND MODULE
[
C/M-S/M
UMBILICAL
C/M TO S/M FAIRING 7
J
MODULE
REACTION CONTROL
SYSTEM ENGIN[
EPS EADiATOR
[
ECS RADIATOR
SPACECRAFT LEM
ENGINE EXPANSLON NOZZLE
ADAPTER
PANEL JUNCIION
_"_ (BETWEEN FWD AND AFT

PANELS)
;INSTRUMENT UNIT
(SHOWN AS REFERENCE)
SM-,2A-644 H
Figure I-I. Spacecraft 012 Configuration (Sheet 1 of 2:)
i_ill SPACECRAFT 012 CONFIGUE_ATION
:_i::_ 1- 2 I
....._ Mission Basic Date 1Z Nov 1966 Change Date Page _,
SMZA-03-SC012
APOLLO OPER.ATIOi'_S
HANDBOOK.
GICNER.AL INFORMATION
x,_ = 1464.238
1
X L = 400.762
-!
XL = 3_3.70'.I
i
. .7
:=a
_'l = 283 .f_30
tES i
j .
<.?
x L = 138.000
XL = 118.300
XA = 1133.505
X C = 133.500
a
, ,Z _T'
XA = IC83.476
' l LES-C/M SEPARATION PLANE

x C = 83.470
elm XL=0
/
APOLLO S/C 1
ClM-S, IA SEPARATIGN pLANE
,_.k = 10O0.000
>'< = 0
993.00 XS = 352.000
355.00
,j
S/t,;
J ..... L----
"XA = 838.000
XS = 200.000
-:]-----_7-- -7 , _I
//z'''? <'i I xA
Xt
=
=
APOLLO
LES
S
REfEReNCE
C REFERENCE
STATIONS
STAIIL;NS
Xc = C/M REFEREb_C[ S_ATIONS
XS = S/h_ RfFERENCE SIAT_ONS
NOT[:
ABLATIVIE _.AATERIAL DIMENSIL_-NS

ARE NOT INCLUO[D ON C/M
'':4
:i iI
PLANE XA _ '_83. 300
.q
XA = 502._,9
AFT INTERFACE TO
5-1VB INSTRUMENT UNIT SM-2A-7OTB
/< i_}
,Figure 1-1, Spacecraft 01Z Configuration (Sheet 2 of Z)
SPACECRAF'£ 012 CONFIGUP_ATION
].._
Ivi.i s _.;i o n Basic Date' IZ Nov !966 Change Dave Page
SMZA-0 ]-SC0 1Z
GENERAL INFOILMATION E
The BPC (figure l-Z) is attached to the lower end of the tower to protect the
7J
C/M from thermal heat during boost and from exhaust damage by the
launch escape and tower jettison motors. EXplosive nuts, one in each
)I
tower
information,
well leg,
refer
secure
to the
the tower
sequential
to the
systems
C/M structure.
in section
{For
Z.)
additional
E
!i 1.1,Z COMMAND MODULE,
T_ The C/M (figure i-3) forms the spacecraft control center, contains [
necessary automatic and n_anual equipn_ent to control and monitor the
spacecraft systems, and contains the required equipnlent for safety and
conform of the crew. The module is an irregular-shaped, primary
structure encompassed by three heat shields (coated with ablative material
;3
and joined or fastened to the primary structurei forrning a conical-exterior
J_
shape.
and an aft
The C/M
compartment.
consists of a forward compartment, a crew compartment,
[
E
:!i
/ t _,ONEYCOMB CORED-LAMINA1 ED
ii FIBERGLASS PANEl..
:::i!i COVER SEAL

HARD _
_ 0.3' THICK CORK ABLATOR
a_
?ii
41
C/M HEAT SHIELD ABLATOR
H[_ERGLASS RING/)/ _' _
FORWARD BOOST COVER
E
(HARD CON STRUCTION)._
RCS PITCH MOTOR PORTS
8" DIA
Wl_ ENTRY
HATCH
'AM,
COVER
SPLIT LINE
[
BOOST
COVER
(SOFT PANELS)
VENT
RCS ROLL SCIMITAR RCS ROLL MOTOR PORTS

MOTOR PORTS ANTENNA
VENT
RCS PITCH MOTOR PORTS SM-2A-I031
Figure I-Z. _oost Protective Cover
:{ SPACECRAFT 012 CONFIGURATION
Mi-is:,c,n ....... ........ Basic Date 12 Nov ].966 Ct,an_." _e Date Page 1--4 _:_
;] SMZA-03-.SG0 !Z
APOL)L0 OPERATIONS [JlANDBOOK
f_
¢:..i_
GENERAL INFORMA TION
_n::j
!%'i
-Y_-Z
PLUG
(FOR APEX COVER
i:<!
PILOT PARACHUTE)
LAUNCH ESCAPE TOWER

4 FORWARD HEAT SHIELD [TYPICAL)
<3
> ;<7 (APEX COVER)
PITCH
OPTICAL SIGHTING ENGINES
PORTS
FWD ViDNI NG
<i
(RENDEZVOUS)
Vii N'D OWS
CREW
COMPARTMF NT
HEAT SHIELD HATCH
?.i
PITCH
I ENGINES
AFT
YAW ENGINES
:ii:}_ ( C/M TO S/M

SIDE WINDOW UMBILICAL
(TYPICAL 2 PLACES)" HATCH WINDOW
<I ROLl_ ENGINES
::4 (TYPICAL)
AXES
4-X ,v
4 +Z .. 11+
? BREAKOUT PLUG \ _. '_:a___z
x_ .LEFT-HAND FORWARD -y " -X
FORWARD //_k:_-____ /EQUIPMENT BA'_ m_-. FORWARD ACCECS H,_TCH

ICOMPARTMENT \ //_ T_--_ / RIGHT-I-IAI'4 D ./__ 7'_--_, / " '
' }ii \/2<_

"Z//,,lll
_k\/
[ \2.
FORWARD A_r---_X\
EQUIPMENT BAY _i X.,>(_'_X
_.FORWARD
/COMPARTMFN',"
CREW COMPARTMENT ./_l ." l!/\_ .. I((11', _" I_,, \/
, , .-, LOWER , i "
CREW COUCH {/ __ I[ "'_i]:-"X\_¢ -_(._ _,_q"_--_'H'c[_,)t\ _,. /COMPARTMENT

(TYPICAL)...._ /__#_._ JI r,!_<___\Z\ AV_'_J;7--ll-._qL_.,_\/"
._,. _. .. _ • _) _ -, \/
<! _,._%_: - X ...... ""Wt'"/'<_ EQUIPMENT BAY 7-< .... /_....-"-i"z/J...._,,_,_ _f'\\ \
i_!iiii
I
_X AFT EQUIPMENT STORAGE R,AY / -_:___._"l-J
LEFT-HAND EQUIPMENT BAY AFT COMPARTMENT/J-
\
AFT COMPARTMENT
] NOTE:
CENTER COUCH REMOVED FOR CLARITY.
SM-2 t,-6d 2 F
Figure I-3. Spacecraft 0!2 Command Module
4
SPACEC]JtAFT 01Z CONFIGURATION
:4 !-5
M[ssion Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 Change Date Page
/:ii
:::f_ SMZA-03-SC0 IZ
Y
APOLLO OPERATIONS HAND_._OOK
>7
GENERAL Ii'_ FORMATION
1.1.2.1 ]_'orward Compartment. F

i!iii:i
ill The forward compartment (figure 1-3) is the area outsidie the forward
access tunnel, forward of the crew compart.,nent forward bulkhead and is
covered
perimeter
by the
of the
forward
tunnel
heat
contain
shield.
the
Four
recovery
90-degree
equipment,
segments
two
around
negative-pitch
the
[
reaction control system engines, and the forward heat shield release
mechanism. Most of the equipment in the forward compartment consists
of earth landing (recovery) system components. [
The forward heat shield, or apex cover, is made of brazed stainless-
steel honeycomb and covered with ablative material, it contains four

recessed fittings which permit the launch escape tower to be attached to the
C/M inner structure. Jettison thrusters separate the apex cover from the
C/M after entry or after the launch escape assembly is separated during
an abort. (For additional information, refer to the sequential systems in
section Z. )
1.1.2.2 • Crew Compartment.
The crew compartment or inner structure (figure 1-3) is a sealed

cabin with pressurization maintained by the environmental control system
i iiiiii
!
(_CS). The compartment, protected by a heat shield, contains controls and
[
displays for operation of the spacecraft and spacecraft systems; contains
mechanical adjustments for the crew couches, restraint harness assem..
blies, hatch covers, window shades, etc.; and is provided with crew
equipment, food and water, waste management provisions, survival equip-
merit, and scientific experiments equipment. Access ha_c1_es, obse__.vatio_
windows, and equipment bays are attached as part of the compartment structure.
The crew compartment heat shield, like the apex cover, is made of
brazed stainless-steel honeycomb and covered with ablative mater_al. This
heat shield, or outer structure, contains the S/C umbilical connector outlet,
ablative plugs, and a copper heat sink for the optical sighting ports in the [
lower equipment bay, two side observation windows, two forward viewiz,_g
windows, and the outer cover for the side access hatch which also con.rains
an observation window. [
1.1.2.3 S/C Controls and Displays.
Information relating to controls and displays for operation of the [

spacecraft and its systems is provided in section 3.
1.1,g,4 C/M Mechanical Controls. [

Mechanical controls (figure 1-4) are provided in the crew compart-
ment for manual operation of the crew couch assembly, side access hatch
covers, forward access hatch cover, and manual override levers for the
/
SPACECRAFT 01Z CONFIGURATION
ii! .Mission Basic Date. 12. Nov 19(:6__Change IDate_ Page 1-0 !
SMZA-03-SCO] Z
[I GENE]KA I_,INFORMA TiON
CONTROL
VI E_,_
ECS CAJUN AIR
!
l
PRESSURECONTR0_-S
i _:i_
_
, i<{_i
i
AUTOMATIC
/_
RELIEF VALVE AND I
L!NKAGE (2 PLACES)
VIEW
J
X-X A_ENLIATION STRUT

LOCKOUTt¢IECHANtS/I
(4 PLACES) VIEW
Y-Y A'RENUATION
_s ATTENUATION
STRUT(2 PI.ACES)
STRUT
COUCH
/ BEARING
STRUCTURE _ , SWIVEL /_/, PAD
}{
RUSHABLE CORE
_i
I , LOCKOUI"
ME C,HA NIS/v',
MANUAL RELEASE/! _ "'_

, LOCK IqL.H
.iI N'_I.0N
FAS'[ENER
HOOK
ROD END TAPE GRIP
SM- 2A-.752E
t, '_i
Figure 1-4, CIM Mechanical Controls (Sheet i of 3)

:,2}
' [i_;t
w
SPACECRAFT O IZ CONFIGUIIATION
?
f%,:_ Missi.on Basic Date, 1Z Nov 1966 Change ])ate Page 1-7
J':F-_ SMZA-03-SC012
U
; ::::3
GENERAL INFORMATION
L_
INNER HATCHCOVER
D
,,>;•
Z::I
il
:!ij
: :&
G_
:,;: e
:?4
; si{t
J
....
::=?
; ; ¸!7:]
BELLCRANK
(TYPICAL)
VIEW_
OUTER HATCH COVER
EMERGENCY EXTERNAL RELEASE
(viEw rotAteD 180 DEG) SM-2A-753C
Figure 1-4. CIM Mechanical Controls (Sheet 2 of 3)
!i .£l
SPACECRAFT 0!2. CONFIGURATION
I--8
'M{t_sion Basic Date 12 Nov 1966___Chang e Date Page
4
SMZA-03-SC012

7i
_:_':3 GElxlEtLA L ].1"<FOI<MA TION

<_<_
ii
b,
<
i @ FORWARDACCESSHATCH COVER --
(EAPkR[ ICDE[I_F MAI N
DISPLAY CONSOLE)_ //(2 PLACES) ]:i:: /// _--_"__'--_-Z" .L-:'--,_ __
J F_
PLV
E_CTR
CAL__..-_.--Y- tLU 7_ /LOCK e N /A "_* \.'X
CONN_CTOR'I-
_ "1 _%'.,( // _ -, _\:
_/;7 IV ----'--m 7_\ _ RACHET WRENCH // ".\ .., *" _"_.X\
,_, , , <':'_'_%_
'_. :, .... . ,.
:7!ii
/J'_71-_R_-// " "_X¢-_ ' / ... .: <.::;..::;.it!
.'_'gA '._a.5,P) \
'2
,:5,!
I
D • _ "-----4__5g _ ,CLOSEOPOS,i,ON'
AIR OUTLET VA" LVE '
AIR INLET VALVE / CAUTION DECAL
D
(CLOSED POSITION) OUTLET VALVE (2 PLACES) .
LOCK PI N
OUTBOARDVIEW
POSTLANDING VENTILATION SYSTEM(PLV}

b-"_ '
FORWARD.'-,,...__^_'_'_v<
HATCH
_J LOCKi NG MECHANI SM
ACCESS HATCH _*ID ACCESS ER

BREECH-LOCK
HATCH COVER
VALVE_- il / 1...... ( I !1 "AIR OUTLET
D /
/ VENTFAN /11 I 7 _" ..........
IIw<v<\
_.... \
PLV ELECTRIC._& CONNECTOP,

CROSS-SECtiON VIEW (TO RECEPTACLE BACK OF MDC)
11
g{
LANYARD (1O A_ BEAM
_!i!!
1 EXTREMITY ON LEFT
AND CENTER COUCH)
SM-2A-g56A
<]
Figure I-4. C/M Mechanical Controls (Sheet 3 of 3)
[ SPACECRAFT 012. CONFIGURATION
i-9
[_ lviission Basic Date 1g Nov 1966 Chan_e Date Page_
a .......
SMZA-03-SC01 Z
H
G]£NERA % Tj_NI, ORMATION
• !! •
ECS
covers
cabin
are
pressure
in the stowage
regulator.
area
Tools
under
for opening
the work
or
table
securing
in the lower
the hatch
equipment
D
bay; the tools are components of the in-flight tool kit.
Crew Couch Controls.

1.1.2.4.1
2 Crew couch manual controls for each headrest, armrest, and seat pan
assembly are provided for individual, crew comfort. The crew couch
assembly can also be manually adjusted for crew positioning during simu-
lated dockh_g
couches, and
maneuvers,
crew access
crew convenience
to all equipment
in getting in and out of the
bays in the C/_X/[. (For additional
N
information, refer to crew couch assembly in section 6.)
{
1.1.Z.4.Z
Couch Attenuation
attenuation
Struts.
struts are provided for connecting the crew couches
B
tO the Eight
C/M inner structure. (See "
flgUrre t eI-5.)
tl_rough Eachcrushable
strut is aluminum
capable of
absorbing energy at a predetermine
{7]q
i}{!!
+X
:i
+Y
/ 4ATCH
7l X-X
HEAl)
RUTS
FOOT STRUTS
{'}}
-Z
: {
q
a
5_
7:1a
:{
£:iiI
!! -Z STRUTS
1{
:::14
y-y STRUTS
_
-X
{ BEARING PLATE
ST-625A {,+ }
i 1_igUre 1-5. Internal Attenuation System
:_ SPACECRAFT 01Z CONFIGUIZATION
({ L.:>_:o,."• Basic [)ate 1Z Nov _]°_'_"

_,,.o Change Date Page, l-]0 [
.'5",,i,::, - 03 - .)k_ %n
APOLLO OPFgR_ATIONS i-IA_NDBOOK
l__, GENEtiA L INEOIt:,L-\ TION

Li:_
.j
4
v
honeyco,-nb cores conlained within the strut cylinders. In effect, the strut
pisto,_ action during C/NI in, pact absorbs energy that the crew is not capable ,
of absorbing.
t
Two Y-Y axis struts are located at the outer extremities of the couch
J
assembly at the hip beam. The cylinder end of eack strut is firmly attached
to the unitized couch while the piston end, containin_ a flat circular foot,
reacts against a flat bearing plate (attenuation panel) attached to the structure.
Two Z-Z axis struts are attached to the main couch bean, s under the"
unitized backrest and the aft bulkhead of the structure, just below the side
access hatch. In addition to the crushable cores within the struts, friction'
brake snubbers are provided on the end of the pistons for additional breaki_{g
action. D_.ring a con-_pression stroke or initial tension load, these friction
brakes act in conjunction with the inner pistons which simultaneousi',- crush
the cylinder inner cores. Additional tension loads are absorbed by a conch]-
nation of the outer and inner friction mechanis'ms which continue the
crushing action of the cylinder cores.
::1 !_l
Four X-X axis struts are attached to the forward C/M structure and
the beam extremities of the couch. These struts, except for the addition
of lockout mechanisms, are basically the ._san_e as the Z-Z axis struts. A
lockout mechanism, is provided on each strut to prevent any strut attenu-
ation prior to impact (during .normal ,:nission flight loads). Upon i'r_pact
the honeycomb core will be crushed, allowing the piston rod to stroke.
;'J
Crew Access Hatch Covers.
The C/M crew access hatch is provided with three covers (inner,
outer, and boost) and the necessary latching mechanisms for securing 'the
covers to the C/M. (See figure 1-4.) Latches for these covers can be
manually operated from either side of Cite hatch by a removable handcraqk
or torque wrench','ith a 7/i6-inch drive. The inner cover is equipped with
] a sealed
the
drive,
C/M
a rack-drive
inner structure
bar, and six latches
(to
which
pre!oad
engage
the
fittings
hatch
on
for sealing). The outer cover
is equipped with beilcranks, rollers, and push-pull rods, an overcenter
1 lock,
ablative
and
screw-in
22 latches
plug
which
is used to protect
engage
the outer driver
fittings on the C/M outer structure.
shaft in
the outer
An
hatch cover. This plug must be removedbefore a handcran_ can be inserted

into the drive shaft from outside the C/M. An emergency latch re_ease is
also provided for the outer hatch cover, but can only be operated by person-
nel outside the C/M during recovery procedures. The boost hatch cover is ,
also equipped with :nechanical components (including Z2 latches) for instal]lug
it flush with the boost protective cover. This hatch cover makes it possible
i for
ground
cover
the crew
support
from the
to get in and
tool
outside
out
(Gi5-824105
the C/M.
of the S/C
handle)
A plunger
is
during
used
prelaunch
on
to
the
operations.
remove
inside
A
of
(pull)
the
the boost
o<tter hatch
....... _,_ engages a latch drive push-plate to release the boost hatch cover frown
inside the C/M.
1.1.2.4.4 ]-_orward Access Hatch Cover
The C/-M forward access hatch is provided with a cover that can be
operated fron_ either the inside or outside the crew compartment. (,¢;:_!side
operation is possible only after the launch escape system, boost protective
cover, a_d forward heat shield have been jettisoned. (See fig_re t-4.) A
breech-lock ',nethod is used to engage and rocate the cover in the forward
end of the tunnel ring. The internal pressure of the C/M will assist to
seal the hatch, cover by forcing it against its seat. A jackscrew (with a hex
SPACECRAFT 0 1Z CO.NFIGUIZATION
_{, ,ki-,-'-s:_o': ]3asic Date 12 Nov 1966 C}:a:-_e ]Date Page 1-11
": 19
SMZA-03-SC01 g
APOLLO OPEt_A'FIONS I_ANIDBOOK

E
i:iii GENERAL INFORMATION
socket at one end) is mounted on the cover and will bear against a bracket
on the tunnel wall. \Vhen turned by a handcrank or torque wrench with a
5/32-inch drive, the jackscrew will intend and allow the cover to be rotated
and removed. The cover is rotated by use of the inside handholds or the
outside by an item of GSE and can only be retrieved fronq within the crew
compartment end of the tunnel.
1.1.Z[4.5 \Vindows and Shades.
Five windows are provided through the inner structure and heat shield
of the C/M: two forward viewing, two side observation, and the crew access
: _ hatch windows. (See figure i-3.) During orbital flight, photographs of
external objects will be taken through the viewing and observation windows.
i:i[
The inner windows (including the circular inner hatch window) are made of
:::]b!
:i[_
:::uh_ ten_pered silica glass with 0. ZS-inch-thick double panes, separated by 0. i
:if inch of space, and have a softening temperature point of 2000°F. The outer
windows (including the square outer hatch window) are made of amorphous
fused silicon with a single 0. 7-inch-thick pane. Each pane contai,s an
antireflecting coating on the external surface, and has blue-red reflective
coating on the inner surface for filtering out most infrared and all ultraviolet
ii i!i:i[ rays, a softening ternp'erature point of 2800°F, and a melting point of 31]0°F.
Shades are provided for controlling external light entering the C/M
through the triangular forward viewing windows, the square side observation
windows, and the circular inner hatch window. These shades, individually
designed for each window configuration, are made of n_ylar film which has
been heat-treated to roll up when not held flat. The shades are opaque for
zero light transmittal, have a nonrefiective inner aluminized surface, two
snap fasteners and fabric handles for attaching or removing from a partic-
:!I ular
surface
window, and a 3/4-inch
for holding
strip of Velcro
the
hook material
shade against the Velcro p_le around
around the outer
the perimeter of
the window. If desired, a shade can be peeled back from the Velcro pile
material and stowed in place on one side of the window.
[!i[
1.1.2.4.6 Cabin Pressure Controls.
Two control levers for manually operating the ECS cabin pressure
i relief valves are located near the C/M left couch and left side window. (See
: :i!i_ figure I-4.) These levers are provided as a mechanical override for open-
ing and closing the redundant sides of the automatic cabin pressure regulator.
(For additional information, refer to the environmental control system in
section 2.)
1.I,Z.5 Crew Equipment and Ecj_ipment Bays.
Each crewmember has personal and accessory equipment provided for

his use in the crew compartment. Major items of personal equipn_ent con-
sist of a pressure garment assembly (PGA) with attaching hose and
umbilical, a communications assembly, a constant-wear garment, bio-
_]fl
medical sensors, and radiation dosi_-neters. Major items of accessory
equiprnent shared by the crew consist of an in-flight tool set and a n_edical
kit. {For a detailed list of crew equipment, refer to section 6.) (Specific
//il
items contained in the C/Mequip_-mentand storage bays are listed in figure 1-6.)
i SPACECRAFT 012 CONFIGURATION
1-12
f ",::. '-'o_: Rasic Date IZ Nov 1966 Change Date Page
•L{!
>
SM2A-03-SC012
•}7:t
GENERAL INFORMATION
] ! ¢"_
_,,'<
÷X _.y
:: i
-z ®
>i!i!i
_:-_ L -')) i ' ]
"!
_ !1:# ; !1
.>,ii!
I..............
RD EQUI PMENT BAY (RHFEB)AND RIGHT-HAND EQUIPMENT BAY (RHEB) AFt EQUIPMENT STOWAGEBAY (AESB)
17 Crew alienation st_t (X-X cxls) I Battery charg_ r
18 Crew ettenuatlon sI_I (Z-Z axis) 2 CO2 absorber contalne_

3 Pyre patlelles csnd circuit bm_er panel
19 IVnose correcting capacitor fuse box
20 Comportments T, S and Z (ref) 4 Fecal cunlster (st_w_d)
5 IV Icr_ _tom_e •
21 Circuit ir, ter_pter
22 I_ight crew _uch ' " 6 CO 2 absorber containers (4)
merit (ref) 7 Pen lights _mpadment Z

23 Crew attenuation slrut (Y~y axls)
24 Side shock attenuotion panels 8 CO 2 _bsorber containers (6)
25 Waste storage h,let (on bulkhead) 9 Compartment y
(,_f) 26 Stowed fecal canister (ref) l0 Compartment T
27 S_nitotlo_ supply slowag_ 11 Compartment S
28 Scientific equipment _m_rtment E 12 PGA and deep restraint stowage bag
29 Boiler,/ charger (ref) 13 Crew acces_ hatch (ref)

14 PGA helmet, _o,nm _fl _t, light wt h_ds_t stowage
15 Bolkh_ wlmways t_yplcal)
B 16
17
18
S_cesait
Aisl_v_y
Fe_l _nlster
(2),
lander
_ge
life vest
ce,,l_r
(3),
c_cbf
0bsi_ionl
sleeping estraint (1) _towog_ bo_
19 Electrical invo_ers
20 AC power _ox
21 Sl_cecraft stom_o bo_t_rle$
Figure l-6. C/M Ecluip:ne_t and Stowage Bays
SPACECRAFT 01Z CON],'IGURATION
Mission Basic Date )2 Nov t966 _Change Date Page_ i-13/1-]4

i
, +X +Z
-Y-_ *Y ,
LGTI'ER EQUI i';AE_T BAY _L[B_ ,,, olh- ...... f
I ECS ¢_ponenls (re_) 28 Signal _ndit[onlng equipment 1 CO2 absorber ccatain_

2 Spocesult s_owage bog and sc_entiflc equipment stowage (r_t) 29 VHF mulllglexer 2 Waste management $}'s
3 Gas ¢hr_ologmph 3O Data wiring 3 C_nputer
_w attenuation :t_t (X-X ox_s) 4 Fl_ght qualification tape recorder 31 Fremodulollon processor 4 Vacuum cleaner c_i:'.
5 Scientific equipment _mpartmen$ A 32 VHF recovery beacon and VHF-AM tmnsmille_receiver 5 IMU compartme_l (retl
_thing stature c_li'_rlment
6 Display/attitude gy_o_ccele_eter (ECA) 33 Audio center 6 h_dlcal occessori_ kl
_rt_al measurement unit (re 0
7 Food slang e (S containers) 34 Central tlndng 7 Sex_ont arid telescop_
_t c_w c_ch (attenuated)
B Attitude gyro aF_d occeler_eter 35 TV epti_ stomata (ref) g Food slowage
ygen control panel
9 Rate gy_ 36 Pulse-codemoddlatioa (PCM) unit 2 telemark/equlpr_ent 9 Su_ival pr_isi_
dlcal kit (left couch)
10 Coupling and dlsp[ey pone] 37 VHF'FMtransmltterandHFtzanscelver 10 RCS pilch c_t_l eng_
e shock ottenuo_an _nels (remo_Gble)
.cesul 1] Sr pilot suit connec_or panel and electrical connector (ref) 38 pu]se-code modulation (PCM) unit I toiletry equil>ment 11 _V camera m_nt
t s row_ge bog _nd _oentific equipment stowage (_ef)
::il valv_
oxygen, water, and glycol equipment

12
13
14
Cobln
IMU
Lighting
olr
control
_eclreulati_
control
par,el
fan 0el) 39
40
4l
Sclentiflc
S-band
C-band
power
equip'neat
l_nspooder
amplifier
compartment C 12
13
14
Side
Rendezv_s
In_er
console
hatch
pene!s
w_ndow
coves
/ri
h_
15 Fo_ord access belch cove_ (ref) 42 CO 2 absorber container (ref) 15 Side wlodo_
16 P_tlanding ECS air _llet ducl 43 Food and work labia (in-flight t_l set) 16 Outer hatch cover
17 P_tlaoding _CS power cable 44 Digital up-data link
18 Fo_ard access hatch (ref) 45 Unified S-band equlp_nent
19 Sextant telescope eyepiece stowage 46 Fecal ¢onlsle_ _oosltl_ed)

20 Sextant and lelescope panel 47 ScienlH'ic equipmeat _mpa_tment B "
21 C_puter d_splay and conlrol Pa_l 48 Roll channel ECA
22 G&N control panel IMU 49 Data Package container (also on _tbeard couch beanB)
23 Su_ival p_ovisions (ref) 50 G&N c_puler
24 Clinical monitoring insteumeat set comportment 51 PHch channel _CA
25 Power se_a _sser.bly (PSA) 52 Auxiliary ECA

26 Data storage eaui_nen_ 53 Yaw chapel ECA
27 Towel storage
i1i:/_
:iI
1
I
I
I
!
t i
;I
i /"
a
÷x
1 -z--
./
7
J ::: ;i
i:il _i
I
t!:;!
;ji! i -_,_
-
,_-_ _,--_
_CT __-,-
,_.
- _=._ -,_.l-+v .
::!:j_
::/,4
I >_ i _4 I = '(,._ 'ia'll
I c>,t,,_,_(y % :. , it!!..:..
"L__JT__ "a_--j]7--I :":'" l ×"
ill 1 @
I ___S_
FORWAR D REFERENCE V I EW LEFT-HAND FOR!/7ARD EQUI PhlENT BAY ,L?!;E:
1 I
2
3
4
5
Oplles shrou_
LEB li_htln_ cont_l p_ne]¸
Fo:xJ reco_tltutlon
P_tl_ndl.g
Fo_d
dcvlce
ECS ai_ outlet duel
access botch cover
11
12
13
Crew occes_ hotel, inner window
Po_ord vle_llng o! _er4ezvous
wlnd6w (2 places)
Side window (2 places)
I
2
3
4
Inner hotch co,er
Outer hatch cover
Sid_ wlr.dow
Rendezv_s wlr_Jowho_si_
14 TV comera (launch _nd entry) 5 Side co_ole panei: (_fi)
6 _s)io_din_ £CS air inlet d_ct 15 Su_ivol provislons 6 l_in dlsptoy co_ole {tel)
1
7 Wate_ deliver y valw 16 TV c_,,,_ro n_unt (optlonai) 7 Cc.md) _t _nnector p_n¢l ond ele:t,iecl c_nn_c'c:
17 Meosuremen_ sy_em inst_men)atlon 8 Sr p_lot _u_t ccnneclor _,-el _d eIecl&_l c_ne_rc,_
8 Water dellvery unit
18 Apollo guldance c_pu)er novlgotlo_al 9 Pilot suit ¢on_ec)ol o_nel e;_l&_l _ec_or
9 Main dlsploy console (MDC p,inels
display keyboard IO Scientific equipment co_rrmer t o
I through 26)
I] Cabi_ olr reclrcutatlon f_:,
I0 Clew _ccess hatch actuator
]2 Fo_ard occe_ botch or egre_s tunnel {r_f_
(inn*r cove))
!1 13 Pe_tlcndlng ECS air inlet _uct (extetd _)
!I "
' _.l.o
I•
iii"
• ,:.:,:........ • .:,. . ....,

b )! SM2A-03-,SC01Z
!i!il APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
i iii
G ..... '_Ai INFORiviATION
i/!
!.1.2.6 Food and Water.
Food and water provisions, including water delivery and food prepara-
tion equipment, are available in the crew compartment LHEB and LEB_
(figure i-6) for the length of the mission. Food may be prepared _,
by adding water to plastic bags containing the dehydrated food and kneading
the mixture. Prepared food can be squeezed directly into the mouth, of an
astronaut. Hot or cold water is available at the potable water supply panel
F_ for food reconstitution. Chilled drinking water is supplied to the crew throug,h
a flexible hose from the water delivery unit. The potable water is a
by-product of the f2PS fuel ceils,

b::::: }
l.].g.7 ' \Vaste Management.
. _i!!i Waste rnanagemen1 provisions in the crew compartment RtlFEB and

AESB (figure 1-6) consist of equipment for collecting, sterilizing, and
storing human feeaI matter and personal hygiene wastes (such as used
cleansing pads, towels, etc.). Fecal matter and personal, hygiene wastes
are collected in polyethylene bags, disinfected, and stored in a vented area.
,i g_ 1.1.2.8
Urine
Survival
is expelled
Equipment.
overboard into space,
The survival kits stowed in the crew compartmentRHFEB (figure 11-6)

are available for the postlanding phase of the mission (land or water). The
nnajor items contained in each kit include 6 pounds of water, a desa]ter !dr,
a one-man life raft, radio transceiver, portable light, sunglasses, and a
machete. Life vests worn by the crew during lift-off and entry are stowed
inthe space suit stowage bag during the orbit phase of the mission, (See
figure 1-6.)
1.1.2.9 Aft Compartment.
The aft compartment (figure 1-3) is the area encompassed by the aft
portion of the crew compartment heat shield, aft heat shield, and aft portion
of the primary structure. This compartment contains 10 reaction control
engines, an impact attenuation structure, instrumentation, and storage tanks
for water, fuel, oxidizer, and gaseous helium. (Four crushable ribs, along
the S/C -Z axis, are provided as part of the impact attenuation structure to
absorb energy during a land impact. )
The aft heat shield, which encloses the large end of the C/M, is a
shallow spherically contoured assembly. It is made of the same type of
ma£erials as other C/M heat shields. I-_owever, the ablative material on
_ii! this heat shield has a greater thickness for the dissipation of heat during
entry. External provisions are made on this heat shield for connecting the
C/M to the S/hi.
SPACECRAFT 01Z CONFIGURATION
• :4 •
1966 Cha n _e Date Page
i!:I i_ Mission Basic Date 12 Nov 1--15
:!i
!!
i
SMZA-03-SC012
GENERAL !NFORMATION
J
%!
1,1.3 SERVICE MODULE.
The S/M is a cylindrical structure formed by l-inch-thick aluminum

4 honeycomb panels. Radial beams, from milled aluminum alloy plates,
separate the structure interior into six unequal sectors around a circular
center section. (See figure i-7. ) Equipment contained within the service
module is accessible through maintenance doors located strategically around
the exterior surface of the module. Specific items, such as flight control
system (SPS and RCS) and most of the S/C on-board consumables (and
storage tanks) contained in the S/M compartments, are listed in figure i-7.
Radial beam trusses on the forward portion of the S/M structure

(figure i-7) provide a means for securing the C/M to the S/M. Alternate
beams, one, three, arid five, have compression pads for supporting the C/M.
q Beams two, four, and six, have shear-compression pads, and tension ties.
A fiat center section in each tension tie incorporates redundant explosive
charges for S/M-C/M separation. These beams and. separation devices are
enclosed within a fairing (Z6 inches high and 13 feet in diameter) betv.,een the
C/M and S/M.
1.1.4 SPACECRAFT LEM ADAPTER.
The spacecraft LEM adapter (SLA) is a truncated cone which connects

the CSM to the S-IVY3 instrument unit on the launch vehicle. (See figure I--I. )
This adapter, constructed of eight Z-inch-thick aluminum panels, is 154inches
J in diameter at the forward end (C/M interf-_ce) arid Z60 inches at the aft end.
Separation of the spacecraft from the SEA is accomplished by means of
explosive charges which permit the four SLA forward pa{_els (above
iJi
station 583. 3) to disengage from the CSM and rotate outward 45 degrees from
vertical. The four aft panels remain attached to the S-IV]3 instrument unit.
For mission Z04A_ a cross-shaped stiffen(r is installed within the SLA in
place of a LEM. The S/M SPS nozzle extends into the SILA which also houses
an umbilical cable for connecting cb:c'.its b-t_._een the launch vehicle and the
i spacecraft.
1.1.5 SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS.
Data relating to the operational spacecraft systems and interface

information are presented in section g of this handbook.
1.2 LAUNCH VEHICLE CONFIGURATION.
A two-stage Saturn IB launch vehicle, consisting of an S-I]3 booster and

an S-IVB second stage, is scheduled to provide the required thrust for
inserting S/C 01Z into orbit (figure i-8.) An instrumentation unit, located
between the S-IV].% and the SEA, controls each of the two boost stages during
!i!
i flight. The total length of the Saturn IB launch vehicle, including the space.-
craft, is approximately 224 feet. An emergency detection system sequencer
display panel, in the C/M, enables the crew tomonitorlaunchvehicleengine
performance during lift-off. (Refer to the sequential systems in section 2.)
:i SI--_,CECR±_FT 012 CONFIGURATION---LAUNCH VEHICLE CONFIGURATION
..... _:_,)n ..... Basic Da_e 12 No_, 1966 C},_ e Date Page 1-16
-7
#ii SMZA-03-SC01Z
APOI_LO OPERATIOI_S I-IANDBOOK
GENERAL INFORIViATiON
SPS HELIUM TANKS
RADIAL. BEAM TRUSS FUEL TANK

SM JETTISON
(6 IDIZER TANK
CONTROL
TANK
SM JETTISON .
ER
_!_RCS PACKAGE SEQUENCER (2),
SUPPLY
TANKS (2)
If: _ (4 PLACES)
EPS SPACE
RADIATOR
ECS SPACE
"HELIUM
SERV!CING
PANEL
FUEL CELL
POWER PLANTS
H2 "fAN K
EPS SPACE RADIATQR

SECTOR 1
VIEW@
(RE F)
+z SECTOR 4
/
(SKIN PARTIALLY REMOVED
FOR CLARITY)
C/M sedors (top view)
1 and 4 are 50-degree sectors

2 and 5 are 70-degree sectors
3 and 6 are 60-degree suclors
SERVICE MODULE ITEMS
Sector 1 Sector 5
Electrical power system space radiator Environmental control system space radiator
Super-critical oxygen tank (two) Service propulsion system oxidizer tank
Super-critical hydrogen tank (two) Reaction control' system package (-Y axis)
Sector 2 Sector 6
Enviromnental control system space radiator Space radiator selection valve, (two)
Service propulsion system oxidizer tank Glycol shutoff valves (two)
Reaction control system package (+Y-axis) Reaction control system package (-Z axis)
Space radiator isolation valve (two) Service propulsion system fuel tank
Sector 3 Center section

Service propulsion system fuel tank Service propulsion system helium tank (two)
Reaction control system package (+Z-axis) Service propulsion system engine
Service propulsion syste_n helium tanks (t-_vo)
t_ Sector 4
Electrical power system space radia'tor

Fuel cell power plant (three)
H_lium servicing panel
_ili Reaction control system control unit
Electrical power system power control relay box
Service module jettison control battery (two)
Service module jettison controller sequencer {two)
Water supply tank (two)
SM-2A-643 E
Figure 1-7. Spacecraft 012 Service Module

!i1
SPACECRAFT 012 CONFIGURATION
Basic Date 12 Nov !966 Change Date

SMZA-03-SG0 ]
))
APOLLO OPERATIONS I-IATqDi]OOK
L
G_EN ER_.A L, INFOI<MATI_ON
[
[
;!
#
L
[
[
[,
1!
[
[
J/--I _'
i ADAPFF_.R
_L'._ ,_L .... 1 ,_.J. INSTRUt_Pff_-NF
UNll"
[
['_......1_
'/t
L_
224'
IS-IVB
[
f 4
SIAGE
[
I "r (
[
I.V g
:]
,? _._ S--I STAGE
I
;i
<i
;i
i [
r-_i-lY
i! [_ 1] [!i
J [:
[
:1
i sr-4 {,+ ;
:!
[
'i
il t:.
[
.t Figure I-8. Apollo Launch Vehicle (Satt_rn IB)
i
LAUNCH V]EHICLI; CONFIGURATION
:_ 1-18
i ,",1i s,< ton Basic I'_a*_
• :, ]Z Nov ' ]966 ""
,_ a,.ge
' Date ..................... Page ................. I
I
, [
SM2A-03-SC012
APOLLO OPERATIONS t4-ANDBOOK
GEN x.RA._, h,_ OK.,,I..T.O*.
1.Z.1 S-IB BOOSTER,

_i:!;5
_[!_
The S-IB booster (first stage) for Saturn IB is manufactured by the
Chrysler Corporation. This booster is 257 inches in diamater, 82 feet, in
:{
length, and is powered by eight Rocketdyne H-l engines. Each engine,
burning RP-i and liquid oxygen, produces 200,000 pounds of thrust for a
<:¸ill total stage thrust over l, 600,000 pounds.
1.2.2 S-IVB SECOND STAGE.

!i:i_i
<i The S-IVB second stage for Saturn IB is manufactured by the Douglas
Aircraft Company. This stage is 260 inches in diameter, 58 feet in length,
and is powered by a single Rocketdyne J-2 engine. The engine, burning
liquid hydrogen and oxygen, produces a" stage thrust of approximately
i _ !_I Z00,000 pounds. During flight, the J-2 engine uses three different mixture
ratios, resulting in values of thrust ranging from 190,000 to 230,000 pounds.
1.3 MISSION 204A WEIGHT STATUS.
q
N _'_ The NA<A-MSC is responsible for providing a
detailed weight status for Apollo mission 204A as
available in the MSC Reference Trajectory Document.
1.4 POSTLANDING AND RECOVERY.
iil/_ Information relating to postlanding recovery aids is provided under

:ill
¸9
sequential systems in section 2, Postlanding ventilation for the crew is
4 supplied through two vent valves in the forward access hatch cover. (See
figure i-4.) A handpump and flexible hose, stored under the right crew
d couch (figure ]-6), is used to obtain water from the sea for conversion to
!i{:i_ potable water. (Refer to crew equipment in section 6.) An Apollo Recovery
Operations Handbook w-ill provide a detailed description of recovery equip-
ment and rescue procedures.
'5: ,!_
:}!!:!_{
• Z:r_
LAUNCH VEHICLE CONFIGURAFION---XiISS!ON 204A IVEIGHT STATUS---

k{ POSTLANDING AND RECOVERY
M i s s ion Basic Date lZ Nov 1966 Change Date Page 1-19/1.-20
:t
.I SMZA-03--SC0 ] 2
APOLLO OPER.ATIONS HANDBOOK

U
SYSTEMS DATA
'(!
SECTION 2
<!iiI
SYSTEMS DATA
,:3
¸!i¸¸I INTRODUCTION.
Systems data include description of operations, cornponent descrip-

tion and design data, operational limitations and restrictions, and telemetry
1-neasurements. Subsection 2. l describes the overall spacecraft navigation,
guidance, and control requirements and the resultant systems interface.

Subsections 2. 2 through 2. lO present data grouped b_F spacecraft systems,
arranged in the followi_:g order: guidance and navigation, stabilizatiou and
71;i control, service propulsion, reaction control, electrical power, environ-

mental control, te]eco_-n_unications, sequential, and cautions and warnings.
D
Subsection 2. ii dea]s v.ith miscellaneous systems data.
D
D
:_:i!_ [_"'_ Mission Basic Date 1Z Nov 1966 Chan[e Date Page 2-1/Z._
L_
li ,_!i_?i!!_:!_
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Ci:,
SMZA-03-SC0!2
7 il
APOLLO OPEI-IATIONS !.IdNDBOOK
SYSTEMS I)ATA
ii:
:iii
SECTION 2
SUBSECTION Z. i
!:ii
_I
k(:i? GUIDANCE AND CONTROL
:?i!_
i ,_I
control initiates and terminates d_e thrust and rotational forces and force
moments as a function of the magn-'_tude of the change required. Guidapce
and control provides the following basic functions:
Attitude Control
o Guidance
Navigation
;iI Attitude control is a function assoc.{ated with spacecraft orientation

with respect to an inertial reference or a known coordinate system.
::i:i ;_4 Guidance is a function requiring a combination of attitude control with rate
stabilization and stccring commands for the purpose'of rnod_fyiag space-
/! craft trajectory via major velocity changes. Navigation determines
!i spacecraft position and velocity, and predicts future position.
To accomplish mission requirements, the. guidance a..ndnavigation,

stabilization and control, service propulsion, and reaction control systems,
iii1 plus the astronauts, are integrated into an automatic/manual closed loop
control system.
ii coasting,
Guidance
powered,
and control
and
activity
atmospheric.
is grouped
The primary
into three
control
profiles
loops
of flight:
involved
are illustrated in figures 2. 1-1 through 2. 1-4. Figure 2. 1-1 is an
abbreviated integration of all major equipments necessary to accomplish
'1 the activitie_ in all three flight profiles. Figures 2. 1-2 through 2. 1-4
:ij divide the equipment into the proper perspective for each profile.
;i represent
It must
coasting
me noted
flight
that
(CF)
in figure
functions.
2. l-l,
For
the loops
pov,'ered
are
flight
closed
(PF)
that
or
atmospheric flight (AF), open the coasting flight loops and close contacts
representing the desired loops.
i
:i
COASTING
accomplished
The
FLIGHT
guidance
through
and
the
control
basic
activities
functional
involved
loops shown
in coasting
in figure
flight
2. 1-2.
are
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL
':.__ li'-_ Mission Basic Date t2 Nov 19o6 Chauge D-at,_,_ ..... Page g. 1
SMZA-03-SC01Z g
APOLLO OPF_,t<ATIONS
HANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
[
• "El
These loops provide attitude reference, attitude control, attitude hold, and
automatic and manual maneuver capabilities necessary to accomplish the
several tasks involved during coasting flight. They are also the central
•<i reference and control loops required for all phases of flight.
J
A reference attitude frame is established by the G&N inertial meas- [
urement unit (IMU), and/or by the SCS body-mounted attitude gyros
(BMAGs), and attitude gyro coupling unit (AGCU). Inertial sensors sense
S/C motion contrary to the reference frame. The sensed attitude errors
and rates are conditioned through servo electronics and logic to initiate
countermotions via the reaction jet control (RCS) which nullifies the original
motion. The AGC inserts automatic control and maneuver commands into
the loop. The rotation, translation, and attitude impulse controls insert
_t manual conqmands into the loop. The flight director attitude indicator
{FDAI) is the S/C attitude visual display.
2.1.3 POWERED FLIGHT.

[
Powered flight is considered that which will use the S/M service
propulsion system (SP.S) engine to initiate a major velocity change.
Figure Z. 1-3 illustrates those basic loops necessary for the tasks invo].ved.
As shown, the loops are an extension of those required for coasting flight.
Added,
loops.
are
In
the
coasting
(SPS) engine
flight, all
on-off
attitude
thrust
control
logic
is
and
through
the SPS
the
gimbat
RCS.
control
Powered
[
flight, by the SPS engine, requires roll control through the RCS, and pitch
and yaw contro] by gimbaling the SPS engine nozzle. Primary control of
,7
thrusting is by the AGC. However, figure Z. 1-3 shows how various manual
controls can be used instead of or to backup automatic functions.
17 g.l.4 ATMOSPHERIC FLIGHT
Atmospheric flight is encountered during the entry phase of the

mission
Figure
during this phase.
at which
Z. i-4
time
illustrates
The central
the S/C
the basic
experiences
loops
loop is identical to that in figure Z. I-2.
required
aerodynamic
for control
forces.
of the S/C [
The main difference is that service module/command n_.odule (S/M-C/M)
separation
Another
has taken p]ace,
difference
and the command
is that the aerodynamic
module RCS system is used.
forces will stabilize the C/M in
[
pitch and yaw, and the entry g-level (lift recto-" control) will increase or
: :a decrease through roll control. Primary control is automatic, with manual
:: ,R
rotation control available, in event Of automatic control malfunctions.
For detailed operation of the several loops involved in guidance and

control,
subsection
refer
2. 2, and
to the descriptions
the stabilization
of the
and
guidance
control
and
system,
navigation
subsection
system,
Z. 3.
[
:÷i
:;2
!i
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL [
Z. I-Z
Mi s s _on Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 Change Date Page
iiii•_ii!ii:
i_i
SM2A-03-SC012
A PO I_,L(_OPERATIONS P_ANDP, OOK
C_
SYSTEMS DATA
DIREC1 COM/_NDSr ROTATION 1 _ _ rTRANSLAT ON]

__ -J rr_N'r_r_'. / | IMF ILSE I | CONTROL
t_
/ . CF+ -r -r P CF__ D,RECT F+ -r ' AERODYNAMIC
FORCES
THRUST
AF "
$CF ±
7- CF PF
_ ' '
/ I I
I _UL_L--}'
- / !
I ACCELERATIOiq
AND
T T -1- _r -_ j, COM,_0_I _J_ THRUST
PRO._ORT,ON._
COMMANDS/ I 7--PF L| T AF DIRECTION
" I l - _cE , OR
TORQUE
__ C/M B/M
RCS RCS
TO
-4_ E- -_j
CONTROL AND _CS ATTITUDE CONTROL S/M-C/M FORCE AND
kOTATION i S/C
REACTION
JET SELECTION LOOP ICE, PF, AF) JET CONIROL _'* DYNAMICS
_. LOGIC CIRCUITS
(RCS)
TO [0
AF ROTATIONJ
SUMMI NG
S _ SUMMING --_ k.... -_
CIRCUITS CIRCUITS _-4---
p
I
4
!i, PF FORCE
!:
--L PF
MTVC
ELECTRONICS
TO
(SCS)
TO
SPS ENG!NE
CONTROL
GIM_.AL
LOOP (PF)
)ii RoM1 ENGINE
GIMBAL
t
I
TORQUE J
I
MTVC
ELECTRONICS
.I
..4--
± RF
PF ..k ROLL
AF
-11-" RATE
TpITC H/'YAW
J RATES 1
BMAG FROM FROM TO
BACKUP ATTITUDE ROLL ATTITUDE J S/C ATTITUDE
RATE (BMAGS) RATE GYROS
(SCS) SCS GYRO (SCS)
FROM
TO
BMAGS S/C RATES
ATTITUDE REFERENCE (ARS), RATE
FROM
114ERTIAL SENSOR, D_SPLAY, GYROS
RATE
AND FEEDBACK LOOPS (SCS)
GYROS (CF, PF, AF)
CF
FROM TO ORBITAL RATE •
AGCU ARS _---I_--. LOCAL VERTICAL
(SCS)
4N
ATTITUDE CHANGES ....... _,_
I
VELOCITY CHANGES I
SM-2A-9_7
Figure Z. I-I. Integrated Flight Profile Functional Flow Diagram

i ¸ •_,_
..,::
:. _
_'!} 5{i-_aion Ba=ic _a_ "r_
_ .... 12 L_._,_
Nov iq66
" --.,._b _han-eg Date ..... ..... Page Z. 1 _,3/2',. 1-4
i:;ii_I_
L
Ji: •
PI T C H,"YAW
• THRUST OFF MANUAL ERROR
COMh_,NDS DIRECT DECOUPLING
(FCSM THRUST ON-OFF
NAVI
i GATI ON ROLL ERRORS
SENSING) COMMANDS •
• OPTICAL 4k-
_ SIGHTING PF
AITITUDE EPRORS
ANGLES
Ag
| F
...H_ STEERING
L L_ MANUAL
&V
MANUAL
THRUST
SETFINGS
COMMANDS
ON
SPS ENGINE
ON-OFF
VELOCITY
AND
S_NSING
FOkCE
' "1 AGC

TO
TEIRUST ON-OFF LOOP
PF
_JiDA.NCE AND (PF)
FROM COMMANDS (G&N)
/_ VIGATION CONTROL AGC
.!:_OFS
(CF,PF,AF)
FITCH
ATTITUDE AND
YAW '
1 CDU
SERVO STEERING COMMANDS
ELECTRONICS , i
AND CONTROL PF
CIRCUITS
] FROM
ATTITUDE
IMU
COMMANDS
ATTITUDE
• "_ERATION TO IMU SENSORS
RATING ATTITUDE
.! _RS (IMU) SENSORS
i
-I- AF
ATTITUDE
i VELOCITY
FDAI ERRORS
J CHANGES
:i_i_I
I
i
I ATTITUDE
CHANGES
ATTITUDE
Z (SCS) ATTITUDE
ATTITUDE
RATES
.i:i:ii
....... :.. ,. : - ,,,.. . _

!F::
:ii
i!:i3
•11
CF
PROGRAM SELECT/IN!TIATE
FROM NAVIGATIONS
OR UPLINK (MSFN)
L jg_:,
CF
TIME _ PF
PF
VELOCIY
C}-_ANGE
COASTING FLIGHT (CF)
POWERED FLIGIIT (e_-)
AIMOSPHERIC FLIGHT (,_,F)
!
1!
qi:, _
SMZ.A-03-SC0 !2
APOLEO OPt_qRATIONS HANDBOOI<
:i
SYSTEMS DATA
..ii
.:::_ J
RCS ATTITUDE CONTROL I

LOOP
DIRECT CONTROL I
I
i_!_il
ili ,_,,V,,NUAL
I
qSLATIOI'q -_--- CONTROl•
D!SABLE J
,_UAL
,_MANDS _[ TRANSLATION
(SCS) ] COMMANDS
MANUAL
'. ,i _
DISABLE
COMMANDS I
: iI
MOTION
SPACECRAFT
PULSE
MODULATOR
L__._J
l _
JET SELECTION
LOGIC , , DYNAMICS
-___.___J I (scs_ ! I
•I!L_
_TTITUDE REFERENCE,
_ISPLAY, AND FEEDBACK
INERTIAL
LOOPS
SENSOR,
RATE
GYROS
(SCS)
I
ORBITAL RATE
LOCAL VERTICAL
ATTITUDE CHANGES
SM-2A-944
Figure 2. i-2. Coasting Flight Profile Functional Flow Diagram
GUIDA_q_E AND CONTROL
Mission Basic Date I Z Nov ].966._Change Date Page,Z.l-5/Z,l-6

:,:¢
!3
ROTATION ----'_'_ CON-;ROLS

MANUAL [ ROTATION
COMMANDS (SCS)
MANUAL
ROTATION
COMMANDS
PROPORTIONAL
4-
I ATT'TUDE
I
"J"¢_1 AND LII_ITIF_G l" "_(
_ ATTIILIDE COMMANDS _
IL .j
_c_) j
DEADBAND
:i!
u
EDA_
[SCS_____
ATTITUDE _F
ALTITUDE ERRORS
ERROR _.
_!!:ii;ii ATTITUDE
RATES
TOTAl.
ATT.ODE
I_1 AGCU
AR.S ATTITUDEm_
ATTITUDE SENSORS | _"

EULER
(Bt_OS) L,-.
COMPUTER
scs j-'
!:-L_
!
r" _ A_T"O_ATIC
GUIDANCE
AND
I NAVIGATION CONTROL LOOP I
i, •
i
J LJO_N;/ I
1 -7_,_^T,O_
J SIGItTING
1
_..._ AN%ES
I
• F_',C,_,'t"5";_'J'*_
',_/;GATIONS
_LECT/INITIATE "-_'¢_ AOC ] I
|
NAVIGATION
AND
|
I !
I GUIDANCE
PROGRAMS
(G&N)
1
! i
I i
J
ATTITUDE
COMMANDS
i
I i
I
i! r-_T-_
! sew° _:|_ECTRON_CS
!....
| I AND CONTROL I Y
I/I_Ni I /
i
I MANUAL + / j !
I
!
I I
!
I IMU I
I AT11TUDE
SENSORS
ATTITUDE
I (G&N)
f
L. ,J
!
SMZ.A-03-SCO tg
'i
APOI_.CO OPlBRZTI()NS ItANDEL',OOK
SYST_ZMS DATA
DIRECT CONTROL LOOP J

,+
MANUAL j
I+!i DIRECT
,NUAL [ TRANSLATION
kI,IS!+ATION --'---I_ 1 CONTROL ULLAGE J

COMMAND
:! b'i _MMANDS [ (SCS) THRUSr
ACCELERATION
AND
5
THRUST
DIRECTION
_:,.#
OX
i TORQUE
/, 'F_EUOORATE
1 V_+_7--_
PULSE i 1 _ETSaECT!ON
j
4
}
MODUt.ATOR |---.-I_._
.....................................................
LOGIC (SCS) I
j
i
I S_NSORS
L._._s_
'L2_LJ 1L___J
G+MB_,L
POSIt
t _--
.!
ION
l
_4.
1
i
FORCE
1
1
+, ..... -_+
_+,_o_,c_;
,C=+;+_C
-_ SPS ENGINE GI/,/_3AL 1
I
(sos) I CONTROL
LOO,_
t i I
!
i [ 1
G,M+AL i EN+,NEl i
q >_..__
_---_I
. | CONTROL
FLECTRONICS
|
I--'-----_._I
+ j GIMBAL
COHTROL
i
_--
.!, TORQUE
{
[ G,++A,+ J
: :++
t _s+,J SENSORS
I
:i
GYROS
(SCS)
RATE R' P_ Y]"_
PlY
:ii!_
¸
ATTITUDE REFEPENCE, li',IERTIAL SENSOR,
DISPLAY, AND FEEDBACK LOOPS
_:!>,_i,__
"UDE CHANGES
'CITY CHANGES
SM-2-A-945
Figure 2. 1-3. Po-_ered Flight Profile Functional Flow Diagram
ission Basic Date 12z_LN°vl_966 Change Da.te ........... Page Z.+ Ij-T/_. ]$8+
_::_
•3
MANUAL [
CONTROLS
ROTATION "--_I
ROTATION 1
COMMANDS [ (SCS)
:!]. ACCELERATION
'_1 ANDVELOCml 'ROPORTIONAL

ACCELEROMETER
X-,AXIS I
SENSOR I _ I
MANUAL DIRECTl
J ATTITUDE I
THRUST ON-OFFJ RO L L ERRORS
COMMANDS DEADBAND [.
I--b[ AND • (SCS)

LIMITHG ,
!._ [
:;:._MANUAL THRUST ON
_ COMMANDS (SCS)
COMI_NDS
:: ":iJSI NG) I
J INTEGRATOR _'
1
GIM'3AL
POSITIOh
_---b,j CONTROL
;ii i L_ _sc_
i MANUAL "_T ....
i TRIM J
COMMANDS ,_
STEERING COMMANDS
SERVO
_--- " I ELEC1RONI
!,,TC.;'_AW i I...... [SSS!
....
j ERRORS
ATTITUDE !
COMMANDS
!
L_ ....
_:i i_"
m
FDAI (SCS)
ATTITUDE _'_
Lc-
ATTITUDE ERRORS
ERROR _
t ATTITUDE
I RATES
i TOTAL
[ ATTITUDE
PITCH/YAW
RATES
(_)_ R_F ITUDE

SENSORS
|_
I
ATT
(BMAGS) SCS
-- ALIGN
i i_:.
_
i_:iiii:
_ :_i:_
:q
:q
AUTOMATIC GUIDANCE AND
j NAVIGATION CONTROL LOOP

I-_ _
I i SETTING
7
/'
i
i ¸ :i "_i I I REM,_J i,_ !:
I l' (sos)
FROM NAVIGATIONS,
OR UPLINK (MSFN)
!T.ROST i
J AGC
IqAV!GATION IOFF
f AND i co,v_._,_D.:'.
"[ HRUST ON-OFF

TIME7 ---_-_ GUIDANCE
PROGRAMS
COMMANDS (G&N)
:i _ _
VELOCITY l,r_._ _ (G_N)
CHANGES .
k_ L ':CS'
STEERING
COMMANDS
| SERVO ELECTRON!CS I--.,-_ ......... --_\

[ AND CONTROL _, | _i " _<
:J I ....
!_!_.!.
II ! -'
ilI ATTITUDE
/
COMMANDS t
i
_,---
i
i
1
ACCELERATION ATTtTUDF | !
INTEGRATING SENSORS i.__ __._.___ ATTI'IUDE
SENSORS f .. ," I /
VELOCITY !
CHANGES l
1
i
SM2A-.03-SC01Z
APOLLO OPERATIONS HAND.BOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
P,CS ATTITUDE CONTROL

: 1 LOOP
DIRECT CO NI'ROL AERODYNAMIC
FORCES
::ii
.i I
ii W
I
MA N U_'g.
COMMANDS
DISABLE
I PULSE/ / JET SELECT!ON __ REACT!ON ROTAilON

.i "1 MODULATOR
l---_i LOG!C (SCS) JET CONTROL
REACTION
,t 1 (C/M RCS)
t !
ROTATION '_J
CE,. INERTIAL SENSOR,

:.DBAC K LOOPS
'ii N
ATTITUDE CHANGES
VELOCITY CHANGES
SM-2A-9,_3
Figure Z, i-4. Atmospheric Flight Profile Functional Flow Diagram
_ N GUIDANCE AND CONTROL
!_i_ _i_io_ Ba_ic Date 12 Nov 19_66 Change Date _ Page Z, 1-9/Z.l-10
:t
i
:7
I_O'[ATIO N _ CONT'_<OLS
I,@,I'4 U AL { ROTATION .
COMMANDS (SC_) ,I
d
1
g I
PITC H/*FAW
ERROR
j
PROPORTIONAL
i DECOU,LING l
I _' ATT_-b_'r_l l +
STEERING ERRO,_S I_._ DE,',D_AND L___JROU _RROR
+ ,_
T
[ L<s_c_
........
i -' __
'! FDAI
S"_C ( S_ '_'
ATTITUDE RE1
ill
,_]
ATT.UOE
ERROR
DISPLAY, AF
i RATES
i!I ! ATTITUDE
r--_"
i 101' AL B/v_,G
;i .......
---_i AT_,TODE BACKUP
RATE
I ARS I
.i!
AITITUDE EULER ATI ITUDE F
I AGCU SENSORS j_ "
COMPCrI'ER '_" REF
ATT
ALIC- N
(_m_GS)
SCS_
q ._
:t
AUTOMATIC GUIDANCE AND
NAVIGATION CONTROL LOOP
AGC
NAVIGATION
AND
GUIDANCE
PROGRAMS
(G&N)
VELOCITY
CttANGES
NAVI GATION
SIGHTING
ANGLES
iI
v
SERVO ELECTRONICS I-- "

ANDCO_T,_OL
/'-T
_°_N'I -- ]_l
J MANUAL
ATTITUDE
COMMANDS
IMU
ATTITUDE
INTEGRATING
SENSORS
SENSORS _ ATTITUDE 1
ACCELERATION [ (G&N)
(G&NI
1
L ._J
VELOCITY ATTITUDE
CHANGES CHANGES
SMZA-03-SC0 ] Z

•I
SYSTEMS DATA
I!77
SECTION Z
_:(i
i
SUBSECTION Z. Z
GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION SYSTEM (G&N)
i
./
INTRODUCTION. , ,
:! If:': 2.2.1
: _] i]
The guidance and navigation (G&N) system measures spacecraft
attitude and velocity, determines trajectory, controls spacecraft attitude,

controls the, thrust vector of the service propulsion engine, and provides
IN abort inforn:ation and display data. Primary determination of the spacecraft
:ii!N velocity
accomplished
and position,
by the
and
manned
computation
space flight
of the
network
trajectory
(MSFN).
parameters is
The G&N systen: consists of three subsystems as follows:
G Inertial subsystem (ISS)
Computer subsystem (CSS)

• Optics s'ubsystem (OSS)
:!] The inertial subsystem is con:posed of an inertial n'masurernent unit
(IMU), part of the power and servo assembly (PSA), part of the controls and
D displays,
an inertial
and three
reference
inertial
with a
coupling
gimbaled,
display units
three-degree-of-freedoln,
(CI)Us). The IMU
gyro
provides
stabilized stable'platform.
The computer subsystero, is composed of an Apo]!o g_._idance co_:pufer
(AGC), and two display and keyboard panels (DSKYs), which are part of the
i controts
controls
and displays.
information to
The
and
AGC
from
is
the
a digital
IbfU and
computer
optics, and
which
stores
processes
programs
and
and reference data.
The optics subsystem is composed of a scanning telescope (SCT), a
:I sextant
PSA, part
(SXT),
of the
drive
controls
motors
and
for positioning
displays, and
the
two
SCT
optics
and SXT,
CD'Us.
parts
The
of the
SCT and
SXT are used to determine the spacecraft position and attitude with relation
to stars and/or landmarks.
The three G&N subsystems are configured such that the CSS and OSS
may be operated independently. This allows continued use of the CSS and/or
OSS in the event of a malfunction in one of these subsystems or the ISS.
System power requirements and reference signals are provided by the poveer
o 2.2.2
and
the
breakers,
on the
FUNCTIONAL
servo
command
main
assembly
caution
module
display
and
DESCRIPTION.
(PSA).
lower
warning
console.
Major
equipment
indicators,
components
bay (figure
and
of the
one
Zo Z-l).
of the
syste:;q
Systenq
DSKYs
are located
are
circuit
located
in
The guidance and navigation system provides capabilities for the
following:
i [1 • Inertial velocity and position (state vector) computation
o Optical and inertial navigation measure:nents
GUIDANCE AND NA'VIGATiON SYSTEM
i _ Mission B:,sic Date 12 ,No,, 1966 Change Date ......... Page Z.Z-1
,4
.5
ASSEMBLY
:+I i Ir
IANNING
TELESCOPE
, COUPL!NG
DISPLAY UNITS
COUPLING i',i
DISPLAY UNITS ','
IREMENT
UNIT (IMU)
CONTROL
j- PANELS
>
_d
0
SPACE SE
NAVI GATI ON
t_
BASE
I 0
POWER SERVO co 0 co
>
ASSEMBLY (PSA) _ CO
J I GUIDANCE
Fu >
i ATTITUDE
IMPULSE
COMPUTER
CO
CC
< (AGC)
zg
'1
b-" U
q
© > CO 0
Ji:;!!_ > I
CO > >
c_
i, SiDE VIEW
t_ 0
0
N
b_
,"b
SM- 2.A-706 B
•..4 Figure Z. Z-I. G_:_xl Equipment Location

SYSTE-\IS DATA
e Spacecraft attitude measurement and control
• Generation of guidance commands during CS.kl-powered flight and
C/.KI atmospheric entry.
The G&.N system is initially activated and aligned clurin_ the prelaunch
phase. During the ascent phase, the system _h]easures velocit\ and attitude,
computes position, compares the actual spacecraft trajectory with a pre-
determined trajectory, and displays pertinent data. The flight crew uses
the disp!a)-ed information as an aid for decision to abort or continue the

mission. However, spacecraft control is maintained b\ the S-IVB guidance
until CS.NI/S-IVI5 separation, Upon separation, the G&_X- s\-stem assumes the
guidance aI_d ,navigation functions using the data acquired during ascent.
During; periods when onboard velocity and/or ,attitude change sensing
is not required, the iN.IU is placed in standby operation to conserve eloctrica!
power, The _-kG(} is used more exrensivel.y than the I_XIL-; however, it will
also be p_aced in standby operation to conserve electrical power. When the
guidance and navigation function is to be restored, the i_X_U and AGC are
reactivated, with the :\GC using the last co_rlputed ve!oeitv as the basis for
further velocity computations. INew positional data must be acquired from.
optical, sightings or MSFiN through telen_etry or voice communications.
Initial position and attitude informa.tiqn as well as periodic updating of

this information is made through use of the optics. This is accomplished
by the navigator making two or n-lore landmark and/or star sightings. The
sightings are made by acquiring the star-landmark with the SCT and/or SXT.
When the viewed object is centered, a :harP. command is initiated. The --\GO
reads the optics angles, !.%IU angles, and t_me, in conjunction with internal
pro£rams to determine the spacecraft position. This position information

and the spacecraft velocity are used to compute an estimated trajectory.
The actual trajectory is compared with previous t_'ajector 5 data to generate
the trajectory error, if any, for further reference. Optical measurerr, ents
are also used in aligning the [XiU to a specific reference orientation•
The IMU (figure Z. Z-Z) contains three inertial rate integrating gyros
(llff.IOs), three angular differentiating accelerometers (ADAs), and three
pulsed integrating pendulous accelerometers (P!P:\s). The TRIOs, PIP_ks,

and one ADA are mounted on the stable platform which is gimbaled to pro-
vide three degrees of freedom. The two remaining :\D:'_s are mounted on
the middle ginnbai. The stable platform inertial reference is maintained 15y
the IRIGs and ._i)As in conjunction with electronic stabilization loops. :\nv
displacement of the platform is sensed by the IRIOs which produce output
sig._als representative of the n_agnitude and direction of displacen_.ent. The

AD.,\s sense the displacement rate and produce output rate control signals
to maintain correct stabilization loop control response. The IRIG and .-\DA
signals are app)ied to servo amplifiers, which condition the signals to drive
gimbal torque motors. The gimbal torque motors then restore the i'nitia]
olatform orientation by driving the gimbals until the IIRIG signals are hulled.
:Z!
SM2A-03-SC01 g
SYSTEMS DATA
The PIPAs are orthogonally mounted and sense changes in spacecraft

4
velocity. An acceleration or deceleration results in output signals which

are representative of the magnitude anddirection of the velocity change.
The output signals are applied to the AGC which uses the information to
i!
)_
3
h}
update
with
AGC
respect
spacecraft
to provide
velocity
to the initial spacecraft
current velocity,
data. Continual
position
position,
updating
and
and
of velocity
trajectory,
trajectory information.
information,
enables the E
E
C_
The IMU also provides a space stabilized reference for spacecraft

attitude sensing and control. Attitude change sensing is accomplished by
monitoring the spacecraft attitude with reference to the stable platform.
Resolvers are mounted at the gimbal axes to provide signals representative
of the gimbal angles. Inertial CDUs contain resolvers which repeat the
platform attitude. Attitude monitoring is afforded by comparing d_e !.MU
resolver output signals with the CDU resolver signals. If the angles differ,
error signals are'generated and applied to the stabilization and control sys-
tem. If the attitude error is larger than the selected deadband limits, the
SCS fires the appropriate RCS engines. The spacecraft is rotated back to
the initial refererice attit1_de and the error signals are nulled (within
de adband limits). [
The AGC provides automatic execution of computer programs, auto-
iI matic
manual
contains
control
a two-part
control
memory
of
of
which
ISS
ISS
consists
and
and
OSS
OSS
modes,
modes
and,
and
in
computer
conjunction
of a large
displays.
with
non-erasable
the
The
DSKYs,
AGC
section
and a smaller erasable section. Non-erasable memory contains mission
and systen a programs and other predetermined data which are wired in
during assembly. Data readout from this section is non-destructive and
cannot be changed during operation. The erasable section of memory pro-
• _i
i
vides
telemetered
for data storage,
information.
retrieval,
Data
and
readout
operations
from this
Upon
section
measured
is
data
destructive,
and
[
permitting changes in stored data to be made as desired. Information
t_
within the memory may be called up for display on the two DSKYs. The
DSKYs enable the flight crew to enter data or instructions into the AGC,
request display of data from AGC memory, and offer an interrupt control
of AGC operation. The AGC timing section provides timing signals of
various
require
mitted to
frequencies
accurate
MSFN
or
through
for internal
synchronized
a "downlink"
use
timing.
and to
telemetry
Data
other onboard
within
function.
the
systems
AGC
Telemetered
is
which
trans- [
data is transmitted as a function of an AGC program or by request from
MSFN.
function
Data
controlled
within
by
the
MSFN.
AGC may
The
be
AGC
updated
performs
through
guidance
an "up!ink"
functions
telemetry
by
[
executing internal programs using predetermined trajectory parameters,
attitude angles from the inertial CDUs, velocity changes from the PIPAs,
and commands from the DSKYs (crew) to generate control commands.
The navigation function is performed by using stored star-landmark data,
optics angles from the optics CDUs, and velocity changes from the PIPAs
in the execution of navigation programs.
:!ii]
GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION SYSTEM
i_ Mission Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 " Chang._ Date Page Z. Z-4 !
]
SMZA-03-SC012
APOLLO OPE£<ATiONS HANDBOO]i
SYSTEMS DATA
i7!!
¸"_I
//
t
GIMBAL
SERVO
Z-ERROR SIGNAl_
_, i P_IDDLE
AMP
IMU/CDU E RRORI-
SIGNAL I
MIDDiE FROM
GIMBAL MIDDLE
INNER C-I&',BAL ..... _I
GIMBAL CDU
I ALIGN
COARSE
AMP t
TORQUE MOTOR DRIVE SIGNAL
AXIS _
' GIMBAL
FROM OUTER ____. COARSE
GIMBAL CDU
I ALIGN
OUTER
AMP
OUTER
GIMBAL
ADA 2 _MU/CDU
ERROR
SIGNAL
RATE STABILIZA]ION
SIGNAL
X-ERROR St.GNAL
| TORQUE MOTOR DRIVE SIGNAL
SM-2A-750A
Figure Z.2-2. G&N System Functional Block Diagram

_ROL SYSTEM SUPPORT GIMBAL (CASE) \
PITCH ATTITUDE
I i
' CORRECTION SIGNALS
i
OUTER
, GIMBAL _ "
;_ ii_¸ _ j " ,'_AcT,oN " "_ _" -

_:O_TRO, " _R _._ ---'
;_;ii!!
__ii_i!! I SYSTEM (INNER G IMBAL)
.....]__.s..
IOIM'_RESO''R
" / / \\ / /
/ AT11TUDE INDICATOR H / / 7_/
_°.ll . .
_o,,_,o_ ///
ROLL ATTITUDE _J " "
ECA ! S,GNA'S // /
-1 ///
' I k . YAW GIMBAL AL _ _ I PROPLILSIOI-,
SERVICE / ///
_
UXILIARY_'I I THRUST
ON/OFF
i s,..I
co....., .J / /
/7
/ /
_CA / |
i!_t __ _j COMMA.°S "i----- ..J //'/

(+)AND(-)Z WLOCmr
CHANGE
SIGNALS _______/ / /
<?
?i:
:;7
INNER GIMBAL
RESOLVER
S_GNAL
IER G IMBAL
i_UICDU
NCOW,
MAhdi SIC BODY PnCH ATTH UD_
i_
_ AND
ATTITUDE
OFFSET
ERROR
PITCH
SIGNAL
.ii!
COARSE
YAW/P IT C H
RESOLVER I (FUNCTIONS OF INNER
G TORQUE _ TE[,NARY AMP
ALIGi'¢,
(GIMBAL
Y-.IRI G TORQUE
MANDS ,_J. SV¢IICH AND AXES TO
NAV BASE
N
:INEMODE [ MODULE
CALIBRAT!ON j............. _"GENERAIOR AXES)
f)
MIDDLE GIM_AL
I_ESOLVER SIGNAL
AND MIDDLE GIMBAI.S)

_L[ GIMBAL
•
ii!i I COMMAND S._
D'G'TA'
,i_._!__ /
_ J
_
GIMBAL
POSITION |
! MIDDLE GIMBAL
COUPLIixlG
...... _'1 IMU/CDU
|
J
D',rFERENCE
SIGNAL
OFFSET
ATT!IUDE
YAW
ERROR SIGNAL k[
FI,
Cr_,_.IV_T_ | COMMAND j UI._rL_I | ]
............ / / UNIT J I
SHAFT ANGLE ] TO MIDDLE ill "
G_MBAL COARSE /
ALl (; N AMP
S/C BODY YAW ATTITUnE

G TO B'Q UE j TE R,qARY
MANDS J SWITCEI AND • Z-IRI G TORQUE 33" •FIXED ERROR__ SIG NAL
"¢_ • RESOLVER _.
GENERATOR TO OUTER A z
NINEMODE _°[ MODULE
CALIBRATION GIMBAL COARSE . . _' ....
f) _Ab_ A,'_:_ MIDDLE_ AND OU1'ER
ALIGN AMP .....
• ' /u(N _/_.
_ / GIMBALS)
(FUNCTIONS OF INNER,
OUTER GIMBAL ,_ AXES)
ATIITUD}! ERROR SIGNAL

ER G!MBAL RESOLVEi SIGNAL j S/C BODY ROLL
GIMBAL OUTER GIMBAL IMU/CO U _ _
DIGITAL/' ! POSITION _,_ COUPLING j DIFFERENCE
EO ]c
?ER
OM
MN
AD • D!SP LAY _ SIGNAL
/ unit / 16X-OFFSET ROLL ERROR SIGNAl (ENTRY MODE ONLY)
/_ SHAFT ANGLE
I
/13
_bWNLI NK
kTA
) MSFN I 1,ERNARY
X-IRIG TORQUE
"_ GENERATOR
CALIBKATION
$ TORQUE 6_I SWI1,CII AND
k,_ANDS MODULE
INE _ .......
_t MODE ONLY) SPS EF,_GINE ON/OFF COMMANDS

I
¸¸¸i¸!i
NOTES: 1, AGC inputs and outpu._s shown are

IMLI
present at various th'nesl depending
-upon mode of operallon, but not
concurrently.
2. These. components are physically

mounted on the IMU but illustrated
as _hown fol clarity.
t
i
I
:11 SHAF[ j
SHAFT ANGLE S_GNALS
...... OPTICS
COUPLING
•' ii_,
_
SHAFT DRIVE1 DISPLAY
SHAFT DRIVE SIGNAL _""
_____. UNn
DRIVE UPI.II',IK DATA FROI,/_ MSFN
SCANNING SHAET
i
SIGNAL
TELESCOPE
I
[......l'
AND SEXTANt
Ir A?OLLO '
! MANUAL
OPTICS DISPLAY AND GUIDAI'qCE
H A h!D MANUAl._ _._._ KEYBOARD COM/'/,_ N D S '_, COMPUTEI_

INPUTS
CONTRO LLER
2'o" _Lj
TRUNNION j (
J DRIVE
MANUALIMODE SIGNALS
TRUNNION _SIGNAL j
TRUi"_NION ANGLE SIGNALS (
ANGLE _._ ......
:9]'! I COUPLING I
%!:_j --'--'I I oPTiCSI-
DISPLAY/ i
TRUNNION DRIVE SIGNALS IMU
DRIVE SIGNAL
(+) AND (-) Y

,_ VELOCITY
(+) AND (-) X

ATTrI-UDE
&VELOCITY
!MPUISE
:Z::: CONTROL (+) AND (-) Z
& VELOCITY
¸¸2::¸:_ ¢..
I
"[HRUST COMMANDS
1"O REACTION
CONTROL SYSI'EM
H
VISUAL
SiGHIINGS
OF STA_S, _-
LANDMARKS
AN D I_Ok!ZOi_!
U APOLLO
SMfA-03-SC01
OPERATIONS
fi
HANDBOOI<
:9
2i SYSTENIS DATA
,', 71" t
The optics provide accurate star and landmark angular measure- <i:_i,:
¸
ments. Sightings are accomplished by the navigator using the SXT and
SCT. The optics are positioned by drive motors commanded by the optics
hand controller or manually using a universal tool, as desired. The,shaft
axes are para].lel, Trunnion axes may be operated in parallel or offset,

as desired. The SCT is a unity power instrument providing an approxi-
mate b0-degree field of view. It is used to make landmark sightings and
to acquire and center stars or landmarks prior to SXT use. The SXT
provides 28-power magnification with a 1.8-degree field of view. The

SXT has two lines of sight, enabling it to measure the included angle
between two objects. This requires two lines of sight which enable the
two viewed _,bjects to be superimposed. For a star-landmark sighting,
the landmark line of sight is centered.along the SXT shaft axis. The star
image is moved toward the landmark by rotating the shaft and trunnion
axes until the two viewed objects are superimposed. The shaft and
trunnion angles are repeated by the optic CDUs. When the navigator is
satisfied with image positions, he issues a mark command to the AGC.
The AGC reads the optics CDU angles, IbiU CDU angles, and til,-ne, and
computes the position of the spacecraft. The AGC ba'_tes the computation
on stored star and landmark data which n_ay also be used b'f the AGC to
request specific stars or landmarks for navigationa! sightings. Two or

more sightings, on two or more different stars, must be taken to perform
a complete position determination.
2.2.2.1 Operational Modes.
]'he G&N system is operated in six basic operational modes.
Selection of any one mode is accon-_plished manually by the flight crew or

automatically by the AGC. The basic modes are as follows:
o Monitor (initiated by SCS mode selection)
o Zero encode
o Coarse align
o Fine align
® Attitude control
e Entry
Ti_e system configuration necessary to operate in any of the modes is
established by relay switching.
The monitor mode is used at launch, ascent, and during orbit until
CSM/S-IVB separation, to provide flight path data for crew displays. The
coarse align, fine align, and zero encode modes are used to
align the IMU after standby periods or to acquire a new stable platform
orientation. The attitude control mode provides for spacecraft attitude
control and navigation computations to measure position and velocity. T.he
entry mode provides control of the spacecraft lift vector during entry
phase.
GUIDANCJ-I AND NAVIOATIOI< SYSTERI
,_ _ Mission Basic Date 12 Nov)966!_Cha.ng e Date ..... Page
: ;?i_l
,,41
!i!i_!
SM?,A-03-SC01Z
U
SYSTEMS DATA
The ISS and CSS will be operated in on-etandby cycles to conserve

7
electrical power. During standby operation, the ISS maintains IMU temper-
ature, and the CSS maintains AGC timing functions. The OSS is shut off
when not in use. Since standby operation time varies for each of the
subsystems, standby is not considered as basic mode.
2.2.2.1.1 Monitor Mo'de.
During prelaunch operations, the G&N system is aligned to the desired

launch reference attitude and gyro compasses to m_intain this attitude.
Approximately 3 minutes prior to launch, the gyro compassing is stopped
and the system becomes inertially referenced. Upon lift-off the AGC begins
7•i :_
monitoring the flight path angles by driving the inertial Coupling Display
Units (ICDUs) threugh programmed attitude changes. The ICDU angles are
compared with the IMU gimbal angles to produce fligh t p_.th error signals
which are displayed by the FDA.I error needles. Total spacecraft attitude,
with respect to the IMU orientation, is displayed by the FDAI ball.
(Prelaunch FDAI readings are 164. 76-degree roll, 58.30-degree pitch, and
9.69-'degree yaw, with respect to the navigation axis symbol. Display at
orbit insertion is 0-degree roll, 310.5-degree pitch, and 0-degree yaw,
assuming a 180-degree roll has been performed and launch pad 37 is used.)
iii:
>_ During boost prior to launch escape tower (LET) jettison, the AGC displays
the following:
REGISTER I - Inertial flight path a:_gle; inertial velocity with respect

to local horizontal ir. degrees.
i:!
i REGISTER 2. - Inertial velocity in ft per sec.
REGISTER 3 - Altitude above launch pad in nautical miles (NMs).
Upon receipt of LET jettison signals the displays change to the following:
REGISTER 1 - Predicted Gs for free-fall and entry at 60-degree

bank angle.
REGISTER 2 - Altitude of perigee above the mean equatorial radius

in NMs.
REGISTER 3 - Time of free--fall to 300, 000 ft above mean equatorial

radius in minutes and seconds.
This displayed data provides the flight crew with sufficient information to
make abort or continue decisions; however, if time is not critical, the
decision is made by the flight crew and N,ISFN jointly.
.?.
)i
GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION SYSTk-;M
Nii_,sion .......... Basic Date 12 Nov 1966_,_Chang e D,'_.te .................. ' Page 2. Z-8
SNifA-03-SC01 fi
APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDL%OOt<
S YST E.KLS DAT=\

4
2.2,2.1,2 Zero Encode _Xiode.
The zero encode mode enables correction of the CDU data stored in
AGC. This mode is used to ensure that the reference angles contained in
the CDU registers of the AGC correspond with the actual CDU angles. Tkis
is accomplished by driving the CDUs to zero, then clearing the AGC C DU
registers. This starts the AGC CDU registers at zero and enables the
registers to maintain correct CDU angles by counting pulses from d_.e CDU
digital encoders.
2.2.2.1.3 Coarse Align _Xlode.
The coarse align mode enables stable platform alignment to within
approximately 2 degrees of a desired platform orientation. Prerequisite

information to accomplish coarse alignment consists of the desired lJatfor:>
orientation and present spacecraft attitude.
The desired platform orientationangles are computed bv an align-
ment program executed by the AGC. The navigator detern".ines the space-
craft attitude immediately prior to coarse alignment b\ making two or
more sightings on stars or landmarks. Upon completion of the sightings,

the AGC reads the optic angles and co_-nputes the gimbal angles necessar.v
to attain the desired platform orientation. The AGC generates drive
signals to position the CDU resolvers to the required gimbal angles. The
I.NIU-CDU resolver error signals, generated by repositioning the CDUs,
are applied to the gimbal torque servo amps which drive the gimbai torque
motors to position the platform to the desired orientation.
The stable platform orientation will normally be such that the X-axis
lies along the spacecraft thrust vector during all powered phases, except
ascent, and along the spacecraft stability axis during entry..
2.2.2.'1.4 Fine Align hlocle
The fine align nnode completes stable platforn_ orientation to the
required degree of accuracy. The navigator nnakes two or more star
sightings, using on-board data and the optics to acquire the desired stars.
Upon receipt of the optic angles the AGC computes ti_e !.XIU angles neces-
sary to complete the alignment. In the fine align mode, the iXU angles are
repeated by the inertial CDUs which are monitored by the AGC to determine
the actual I).IL- orientation. The AGC generates torquip.g signals to cancel
any error between the actual I.XIU orientation and the desired orientation.
These torquing pulses are applied to the IRIG torquino coils. The il_IOs in
conjunction with the s_ab_izatlo_, loops, reposition the stable platforn _, until
the desired or[entation is attained. Upon ccmpletion of fine alignment, the
I.XIU/CDU resolver signals and the stabilization loop signals are at nulb.
The s\stem configuration required for fine al_-n._ mode also apolies
I..N[U resolver signals to the SCS as apparent attitude error signals. To
prevent these sitlnals from appearing as actual spacecraft attitude errors,

the SCS must be operated in an SCS mode which rejects G&:N derived _i ,nals
GUIDANCE AND 7<AVIGATION SYSTEZI
[:_ ZMission Basic Date 12 Nov i966 Chan_e Date Paf,,e Z, Z-q
:]
'7{
:Z
7:!"<! i{ :
SMZA-.03-SC.012
SYSTENiS DATA
2.2.2.1.5 Attitude Control Mode.

g
The attitude control mode provides spacecraft attitude change sensing,
generates error signals for spacecraft attitude control, velocity change

signals for updating AGC velocity information, and signals for timing SPS
engine thrust termination commands.
During spacecraft attitude control, the IMU gimbal resolvers sense any
displacement of the spacecraft with respect to the stable platform orientation
and produce corresponding error signals. The error signals are applied
directly to the SCS-FDAI ball for error display and to the inertial CDU
•/i resolvers. The INIU-CDU error signals are displayed on the IMU control
panel, resolved into spacecraft axes, and applied to the SCS. If the error
:
signals indicate an attitude error larger than the selected deadband,
appropriate RCS engines are fired and the desired spacecraft at-titude is
restored.
For delta V maneuvers, the G&N system provides attitude control,

velocity change sensin.g, and total velocity change control by generating
thrust termination commands. Prior to thrusting, the IMU is aligned so that
the stable platform X-axis is parallel to the thrust vector. The AGC deter-
mi;_es time-to-ignition and total velocity change desired, and performs mode
verification routines. At ignition time the AGC flashes the DSKY displays to
the crew for initiation of ignition (manual DSKY entry is required). DurSng
thrusting, the CDU alSplies attitude error sig,aals to the SCS. i%o11 error
signals are applied to the RCS engines; however, pitch and yaw error signals
are applied to _he SPS engine gimbals rather than ikCS engines. This
ensures alignment of the thrust vector through the spacecraft center-of-
i} gravit T and along the correct trajectory. The PIPAs on the stable platform
sense the velocity changes and apply proportional output signals to the AGC.
The AGC computes and updates spacecraft velocity, and counts down apreset
counter with the PIPA signals. When the counter reaches zero, a thrust
termination signal is generated and applied through the SCS electronics to
the SPS engine.
:i i!!
Z.Z.2.1.6 Entry.
The entry mode provides for generation of attitude error and steering
:_!i! signals, sensing of deceleration, and computation of velocity changes during
the entry phase of the mission. The steering signals provide for control of
g
::4
the spacecraft lift vector through the SCS, to inhibit excessive G-loadings
and heat buildup, and to control the flight path to enable landing at a pre-
:i 4 selected site. Attitude error signals are applied to the FDAi attitude error
i needles.
:i!
i
Entry confJgu-,'ation is similar to attitude co__trol with the exception.s

that the rol]. response time is reduced, one step of axis resolution is not
needed, and the AGC will produce steering signals to the SCS by driving the
roll CDU. From initiation of.entry mode u:_til 0. 05G sxvitching, roll, pitch,
i :'N
GUIDANCE AND NAViGATIO..N SYSTEM
2. 2-10
Basic D_te 12 Nov
<_ _ ........................ 1966 C'han
' g e Date ........
..... = .... Page
SMEA-03-SC012
SYSTEMS DATA
_f'::::: ::5,
t 7':. :.:
and va\v error signals provide attitude control. Upon 0.05G switching, the
pitch and va\v error signals provide display only. Prior to entry, the I.XIU
X-axis is aligned along the spacecraft entry velocity vecto'r. This ali,gnn_.ent
¢iil! eliminates the need for navigation base-to-spacecraft body axis resolution.
Deceleration is sensed primarib.- by the IN[U X-axis PIPA, although changes _
in l'iftvector orientation cause some lateral rno\-ement which is sensed by
the Y and/or Z PIPAs. The outer gimbal, or roll, IX resolver is connected
"If to the
error
loX
signal
resoh'er
and
in the ROLL
reducing the
CDU,
response
giving
time
a 16:1
of the
increase
roll channel.
in attitttde
The AGC
will produce stee1"ing signals by executing a programmed lift vector down
entry (to ensure capture), ]80-degree roll to lift vector up, then generate
_ii!ii,
ii_
_zr_ _ further steering signals with respect to O forces, heat buildup, and range
needed. These steering signals are routed to'the roll CDU where an IN[U-
CDU reso!ver error is generated and routed to the SCS for EDAI display
and/or RCS engine control. The entry may be perfor_ned manually with tke
pilot flying to the steerir.g signals as displayed on the 7DAI, or automatically
with the AGC steering signals routed to the rolIRCS engines for spacecraft
c ont r oi,
MAJOR CONiPONEXT/SU.BSYSTEM DESCRIPTION.
D Inertial SubsyStem.
The function of the inertial subsystem is to provide a space- stabilized

inertial rcference from which velocity changes _.nd attitude chan.ges can be
_ensed. It is composed of the inertial measurement unit (IMU), the navi__a-
tion base (_NB), parts of the power and servo assembly (PSA). parts of the
control and display panels and three coupling display units (CDUs).
[ 2.2.3.1.1 Navigation Base.
The navigation base (NB) is the rigid, Supporting structure v.-hich

mounts the IN'IU and optical instruments. The .NB is manufactured and
installed to close tolerances to provide accurate alignment of the equipmcnt
mounted on it. It also provides shock mounting for the !MU and optics.
2.2.3.1.2 Inertial kleasurement Unit.
The inertial measurement unit (IN4U) is the main unit of the inertial
bj subsystem. It is a three-degree-of-freedom stabilized platform assen__bh-,

containing three inertial reference integrating gyros (IRIGs), three pulsed
integrating pendulous accelerometers (PIPAs), and three angular differenti-
ating accelerorneters (ADAs). The stable membe.r itself is machined fron_.
a solid block of beryllium with holes bored for mountfng the PIDAs, iRIC-s,
and one of the three ADAs. Three gipnbal and six intergimbal assen_b!i'es,
which house torque motors and rcsol<'ers, are also partofthe!MU.assemUh,
together \vith preamplifiers and gimbal-n_ounted electronics. Figure Z. I-2
shows ho\v the IRIGs and the PIPAs are mounted re!ative to each other or.
the stable member (o_ inner gimbal). The three gimba! axes, about xvhich
each of tLe gimbals rotate, are also ._d_o,\-n.
GUIDANCE AXD NAVIGATIOX SYSTI£M
:i:i_ ._v,[ii!_ Mission B:_.sic Date 12 i<ov 1966 Chance Date Page z.2-!1
a
S?,/13A -03-SC01 fi
(ii_i APOLLO OF-'ERATI(DNS HANDtSOOt'I
5
SYSTEMS DATA
The stable platform attitude is maintained by the Ii_IGs, ADAs, stabi-

:;ii lization loop electronics, and gimbal torque motors. Any displacement of
:i the stable platform or gimbal an_les is sensed by the IRIGs and ADAs, which
generate error signals. IRiG error signals are resolved and amplified at
the IMU and applied to stabilization loop electronics. ADA-produced error
:!i signals are summed with the IRIG error signals. The resultant signal is
conditioned and applied to the gimbal torque motors, which restore the
desired attitude.
The stable platform provides a space-.referenced mount for three

P!PAs, which sense velocity changes. The PIPAs are mounted orthogonally
to sense the velocity changes along all three axes. Any translational force
<z
experienced by the spacecraft causes an acceleration or deceleration which
is sensed by one or more PIPAs. Each PIPA generates an output signal
_i!2!
i
proportional to the magnitude and direction of velocity change. This signal,
•3 in the form of a pulse train, is applied tc the AGC. The AGC will use the
signal to update the velocity information and also generate signals to torque
each PIPA ducosyn bac]-, to null.
The te_uperature of the IRiGs and PIPAs is maintained within required

limits during both standby and operating rhodes of the iMU. The IMU tem-
perature control system contains circuits to supply normal proportional
temperature control with the capability of backup or emergency control in
case of a proportional control malfunction. The proportional temperature
control circuit is the primary means of maintaining the IRIC- and PIPA
temperature and provides the .most accurate control. This type of controlis
available when either the proportional or auto-override mode is selected
with the IMU TEMP MODE selector switch. The purpose of the auto-
override mode is to provide autom:atic switching from that mode to ._
emergency control if there is a malfuncti'on in the proportional control
circ<_it. If a malfunction occurs in the proport_,na] mode, the switching to
emergency control must be performed manually. In the proportional mode,
the temperature is controlled by the proportional temperature cdntrol
bridge and is maintained at 135±0. 5°F. While in the emergency mode, it is
controlled by the mercury thermostat and is held within ±5°F.
The backup temperature control and indicator circuit is intended for

use
for this
in the
system are
event
three
the proportional
PIPA indicating sensors
control
(connected
fails.
in series)
The control sensing elements
and
[
six IRIG sensing elements (connected in series) in two separate bridges.
This system can maintain the temperature to within-+-l°F. In this mode of
•!¸17 operation, an alarm indication is not available to the astronaut because of
modifications to the temperature alarm amplifier circuit.
) 3
•2
3, i,3 Coupling
There
and Display
are five CDUs

Units.
mounted below the IMU control panel at the lower

[
equipment bay. Three CDUs function as part of the ISS, while the two
re-naining
described
CDUs function
in paragraph
with
Z. Z. 3. Z.
the OSS.
The
The
three
optic
inertial
CDUs
CDUs
(OCDUs)
(ICDUs)
are
are
I!
identical and may be interchanged. Display dials on the front panel of each
provide a 6-digit readout. Positioning of ti_e ICDUs is accomplished by the
AGC. Each ICDU contains a 1/4-speed, l/g-speed, 1-speed, and !6-speed
75
resoh'er,
angular
the
movements
fu._-ctions
of the
of which
resoh'ers
depend
are
upon
converted
the ISS mode
into
of
digital,
operation.
signals by
The
a
[
digital encoder, processed by encoder electronics, anql routed to AGC
:i!
registers \\hich maintain current ICDU angles for use as desired. The AGC
l
'-. "--_;- ................. Easic Date 12 Nov 1966 Chance [}ate pact e Z, Z-1Z ]
:!i
n SMZA-.03-SC012
APOLLO OPERATIONS I!ANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA [__7
cornmands CI)U movements by applying digital drive commands to dio_ital- t[.ii i'
to-analog converters. The drive signals are converted from di_<ilal to anaio<_[_,<
and applied to CDU motor drive amplifiers \vhich position the CDUs. -£he
l-speed and ]6-speed resoivers function as receivers of signals produced bv
l-speed and 16-speed resolvers mounted on the IMU. The I/Z-spee<_
resolvers are used to zero the CDUs and the i/4-speed resolvers are r,o_
use_d. The resolvers provide input signals to selector circuits which provideT<<
n_otor drive signals or spacecraft attitude error signals, dependino_ uuo,_
rnode of operation. The IMU outer giFnbal J-speed resolver signals are
applied to the roll CDU 16-speed resolver to increase roll control rates
during entry.
2.2.3.1.4 Power and Servo Assembly.
The power and servo assembly (PSA), located just below the display-
and control panel in the lower equipment bay', serves as a central n-_ounting
point for most of the GAN electronic units such as power supplies and
amplifiers. It also contains the backup e].ectronics used to supply timin__
pulses to the IMU in cas_ of an AGC timing malfunction. It consists of i0
removable trays mounted adjacent to each other and connected to a junction
box. The PSA trays utilize three wiring har'nesses to provide electrical
connection: one for module-to-module connection, another for module-t.o-
•junction box connection, and a third for module connection to a 38-pin
female test plug on the front of the PSA tray.
2.2.3.2 Optical Subsystern.
The optical subsystem is used for taking precise optical sightings on

celestial bodies and for taking fixes on landmarks. These sightings are used
for aligning the TMU and for determining tKe posit_on of the spacecraft. Tke
system includes the navigational base, t\vo of the five ,.,D<,=,
"_ _- parts .._
_ the
power and servo assembly, controls and displays, and the optics, v:hich
include the scanning telescope (SCT) and the sextant (SXT).
Z,2.3.2.1 Optics.
The optics consist of the SCT and the SXT mounted in two protr-_d!ng
tubular sections of the optical base assembly. The SCT and SXT shaft axes
are aligned parallel to each other and afford a common line-of-sight (LOS)
to selected targets. The trunnion axes may be parallel or the SCT axis may
be offset depending upon mode of operation.
The sextant is a highly accurate optical instrument capable of measur-

ing the included angle between two targets. Angular sightings of two targets •
are rnade through a fixed beam splitter and a movable mirror located in the
sextant head, The sextant lens provides 1.8-degree true field of viev: with
28X magnification. The movable mirror is capable of sighting a target to
57 degrees LOS from the shaft axis. The mechanical accuracy of the
trunnion axis is twice that of the LOS requirement due to mirror reflection
which doubles any angular displacement in trunnion axis.
The scanning telescope is sirnilar to a theodolite in its ability to "

accurately- measure elevation and azimuth angles of a single targq_ 'dsb_ Z an
established reference. The lenses provide 60-degree true field of _ie\v at
IX magnification. The telescope allowable LOS errors are 1 minute of arc
rms in elevation with maximum repeatability of 15 arc/seconds and
approximately 40 arc/seconds in shaft axis.
GUIDANCE AND :_.-_VIGA

"'_ " .... £IOE SYSTEM
SMZA-03-SC0 ].2
APOI_,LO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
4
SYSTEMS DATA
2.Z. 3. Z.Z Coupling D';.spiay U':its,
The function of the OCDUs is to position and repeat angles of the SCT and
SXT shaft and trunnion axes. The OCDUs are sirnilar to the ICDUs, but may
not be interchanged due to internal mechanical differences allowing higher
OCDU rates. Each OCDU has a 6-digit display readout and can be positioned
automatically by AGC command. CDU angles are converted to a digital
signal by a digital encoder, processed by encoder electronics, and routed to
an AGC register. AGC positioning commands are applied to a digital-to-
analog converter, converted to a representative analog sig_al, and applied
to.a motor drive amplifier in the SXT. Rcso!vers in the SXT function as g
transmitters to CDU reso].vers which receive the position signals and apply
the commanded angles to the CDU motor drive amp!ifiers to position the
CDU motor.
Trunnion CDU 1/4-speed a.nd 16-speed reso!vers function as receivers

and provide drive signals to the trunnion CDU motor. The SXT t_unnion
reso!vers which drive the CDU resolvers are 1-speed and 64-speed respec-
tively, pro)idip.g a 1:4 SXT trunnion to CDU trunnio_ ratio. Visual readouts
:<:,_
on the trunnion display dials are thus four times the trunnion angle and. two
times the star line-of-sight angle from zero position. The 1/Z-speed
9
resolver, in conjunction with the cosecant amplifier, provides --_ variable
gain computing resolver which is used in t:he RESOLVED mode of operation.
The l.-speed resolver is not used in the trunnion CDU.
Shaft CDU I/Z-speed and 16-speed resolvers function as receivers and

produce drive signals to the shaft CDU motor. SXT resolvers used as
transmitters are also i/Z-speed and 16-.speed resolvers, affording a i:i
ratio; thus, the display dials provide direct readouts of the shaft angles.
The l-speed resolver resolves polar coordSnates into rectangular coor-
dinates for the }<ESOLVED mode of operation. The i/4-speed resolver is
not used in the shaft CDU.
_, _° _° Operational Modes.
[
Optics positioning is accomplished automatically by the AGC or
manually by the crew. Overall mode control is establi'shed by crew selec-
tion of the ZERO OPTICS, MANUAL, or COMPUTER modes on the OPTICS
panel. L
.)_
ZERO OPTICS mode enables automatic drive of the SXT shaft and
trunnion motors
output signals to the input of the SXT
to zero.
motor
ThSs
drive amplifiers,
is accomplished
The drive
by applying the SXTresoFver
[
signals are applied to the CDU and SCT resolvers which follow the sxr shaft
and trunnion axes to zero. After 60 seconds, the AGC optics position
registers are cleared, This mode m_ay be selected by AGC program or [
manually.
MANUAL mode enables positioning control of the optics by manual

manipulation of the optics hand controller, The hand controller is mech-
anized such that, right-left movement generates shaft commands, and
up-down movement generates trunnion commands. Hand controller drive
rates are selected by the position of the CONTP, OLLER SPEED switch.
[
<i
GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATIOI< S _ _'% _.vl
2. Z-14
Mission Basic Date 12 Nov_1966 Change Date .......... Page
SX42A-03-SC012
_.i_ APOLLO OPERATIONS HA.NDBOOK
,% _ ,,'3'
SYSTEN,iS DATA
Positions HI, .XIED, and LO control the amplitude of the drive signal to the
hand controller. Hand controller drive signals are applied to the SXT
shaft and trunnion drive amplifiers through the CONTROLLER MODE switch
for selection of DIRECT or RESOLVED mode. in DIRIqCT mode, the_image
motion is presented in a polar coordinate reference frame; in RESOLVED
mode, the image motion is presented in a rectangular coordinate reference _'
frame.
In DIRECT mode, shaft comn_ands mox'e the image in a circular path

around the center of the field of view. Trunnion commands drive the image!
in a straight line across the center of the field of view. The angular
orientation of the trunnion comnzanded straight line movement is a function
of the shaft angle; therefore, direction of image n_ovement with respect
to the direction of hand controller mo,,'ement is also a funct{on of shaft
angle. The rate of image movement, for shaft commands, is a function
of trunnion angle, wherein increasing trunnion angles result in increasing
image movement rates.
In RESOLVED mode, shaft commands move the image left-right in

a straight line.. Trunnion commands move the image up--down in a straight
line. Image movement is in the same direction as hand controller move-
ment and the rat£ of movement is constant for varying angles.
In CO.X'IPUTER mode, the AGC positions the optics to a star or land-

mark determined by AGC programming. This mode is performed by an
AGC routine wl{ieh is called up automatically by various alignment pro--
grams. The targe_ star or landmark may be defined by AGC programming
or by the crew. if the target star or landmark is not selected by AGC
programming, the crew makes a DSKY entry defining either the latitude,
longitude, and altitude for a landmark or the star code for a star. The
AGC determines the spacecraft attitude by monitoring the ICDUs, and
computes the angles necessary to drive the optics to the desired target.
(If the angles necessary to acquire the target are beyond the capabilities
of the optics, the AGC flashes the DSKY displays.) When the necessary
angles are computed, the AGC displays the desired shaft and trunnion
angles on the DSIIY and initiates OCDU drive to these angles. When the
AGC has completed driving the CDUs, _he crew checks the DSKY-disp!ayed
angles against the 6-digit CDU displays and the SOT counters. The crew
then locates and identifies the target in the SCT, enables manual control,
and completes the sighting. The AGC can also perform zero optics
functions, if desired, by the AGC program.
The SCT trunnion may be operated in three alternate modes, with

respect to the SXT trunnion, as desired. The SLAVE TELESCOPE switch
enables crew selection of STAR LOS, EA!'_DMARK LOS 0 °, or OFFSET
25 ° . The STAR LOS position is normally used. In this position, the SCT
trunnion is slaved to the SXT trunnion. The: LA_D-XIAP, K LOS 0 ° position,
applies a fixed voltage to the SCT trunnion position loop causing it to null
at zero. This holds center of the SCT 60 o field of view parallel, to the
GUIDANCE AND NA_Z_G:_].IO,, SYST_NI
:] _ Mission Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 change D_.te Page 2,2-15
!
SMZA-03-SC01 Z
APOL, I.O OP;_'.L.A., _ONo HANDBOOI<.
v_
SYSTEMS DATA
SXT landmark line of sight. The OFFSET 25 "_ position applies a fixed
voltage to the SCT trunnion position loop, causing it to null at Z5 degrees
off-center. This holds the SCT field of view so that the SXT landmark line
of sight remains visible while sweeping the SCT shaft through 360 degrees,
of rotation, providing an approximate l l0-degree total field of view,
,i
Z.2. 3.3 C omoute {" Subsystem.

#,
The computer subsystem (CSS) consists of the Apollo guidance com- ' >ii
,! puter (AGC) and two display and keybo'ard papeis (DSKYs). The AGC and
one DSKY are located at the lower cquipmerA bay. The other DSKY is
located on the main display console. The AGC mounts one switch on the
front panel which applies partial or full power <o the computer to enable
standby or full operation of the CSS. All other :\GC controls and displays
are located on the DSIiYs. The keyboards on the DSKYs are smiliar;
however, tl_e displays on the DSKY in the lower equipment bay are more
extensive.
? 3.3.1 Apollo Guidance Computer.
The Apollo guidance computer (AGC) is a digital computer using a

:t tgvo-part rope core memory. (See figure Z. 2-3.) The AGC processes
2 various data to provide controi and computation functions. Input data is
received from the crew, ISS, OSS, MSFN, and other spacecraft systems
:i
This dita is processed by various programs to provide outputs to the
:• ¢ crew, :SSs OSS, MSFN, and other spacecraft systems in the form of
commands and displays. The control functions performed by the AGC
consist of the following:
:{;
e_ Align the IMU stable platform.
G Position the optics for ngvigation sightings.
e Command reaction control system engine firings to maintain

;i!
specific attitude.
Request initiation and command termination of service

propulsion engine firings.
Provide synchronization pulses to the central timing equipment.
o Command telemetry transmission to MSFN.
e Command ISS moding.

iii,_
.=
L_ Command OSS moding.
The reference data used to generate controls may be acquired externall or

generated within the AGC. initiation of the controls may be accomplished by
I the crew using the DSKYs, by MSFN via telemetry, or by an AGC program.
:i! Mis_;io:: Basic Date 1Z Nov 1966 Change [)ate._ ]Page 2. Z-16 t.
i: i
:1
SMZA-03*,SC01Z
SYSTEMS DATA
:7 e Central processor
o Memory
e Timing
Power S_JppIy. The power supply consists of two parts. Input to the power
supply is +Z8 vdc from the spacecraft main d-c bus. The two sections pro-
vide +13 vdc and +3 vdc. The +13-vdc output provides power to the DSKYs
and, in conjunction with the +3-vdc power, to the logic circuits. The
+3-vdc supply provides power to the timing section as well as to the logic
circuits. During standby mode of oper'ation, the +3-vdc section only is
operated; thus, power consumption is reduced by approximately 100 watts.
Input. The input section consists of four registers which enable inter-
c--oz_a_mnication between the AGC and the other G&N subsystems, the
stabilization and control sys'cem, the mission sequencer, the S-IVL guid-
a ance,
position
and N,ISFN.
in each
The
register
utilization
is assigned
of the registers
a specific task.
is such
For
that each
exan_ple,
bit
bit
[
_t positions i, Z, 3, 4, and 5 of input register 0 are assigned to receiving the
•:/I
five bit code
the various
generated
sources
when
are conditioned
a DSKY
by the
key is t_ressed.
input registers
Data
such
received
that,
from
when [
it is transferred into the logic circuits, the signal levels and timing are
correct. The data received by the four input registers are as follows:
Receives 5-bit code from the DSKYs,

Input 0 Register
block uplink signal from the UPTEL switch,
control sig'na!s from. the SCS mode control
panel, hnd mark commands from the MARK
pushbutton. Also monitors the signal from
the telemetry bit rate detecting circuits.
This register is formed by the Scaler A

Input 1 Register
regi'ster of the timing section which main.-
rains real time during standby operation,
and provides
time counters
update
when
information
full operation
to the
is
real L
resumed.
Receives Z00, 400, 800, and 1600 pps

Input Z Register
signals from the Scaler A section of the
timing
craft
section forming
real time counters
an extension
for use by other
systems which require timing
of the
space-
of this
[
order. Also receives discrete event signals
from the S-IVIB instrument unit, CM/SM
.-.w
separation signals from the master events
:::j sequence controller, failure signals from
the ISS, mode signals froi-n the SCS, and
parity fail signals. [

2. Z-18 _
}3a.,dc Date 12 Nov 1966 Cb.ange Date Page
t
]
b_iY
i
SMZA-03--SC0 12
'(i
APOLL, O OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
' •(i
-: ]! SYSTEMS DATA
! Input 3 Register Receives ISS mode signals from the ISS _ .. 5::::.
Bz_42
mode relays and mode signals from the OSS,
moni-tors the position of the TRANSFER
switch, and provides a logic OR gate fdr
33 DSKY relays.
Output. The output section consists of four registers wh.ch enable the
)kGC to communicate with the flight crew, ISS, OSS, and other spacecraft
systems. The utilization of the registers is similar to that used for the
input section (i.e., each bit position, or group of bit positions is assigned
r a specific
positions
task).
are as
The
follows:
tasks assigned to the various registers and bit
Output 0 Register Provides the transmission link from the

AGC to the DSKYs by control of 14 banks of
i relays which provide display of data and
routing of control signals to the ISS, OSS,
%
and SCS.
Output 1 "Register Receives internal AGC alarm, signals and

causes alarm indicators on the DSKYs to
illuminate. Receives KEY RLSE request
from an AGC program and causes the KEY
RLSE indicator to ill(u-ninate and flash until
the DSKY is released. Receives AGC signal
indicating improper DSKY operation and
1 causes the CHECK FALL. indicator to illu-.
g_
minate. Receives SPS engine firing signal
from an AGC program, causing the DSKY
iiii
i_,.iil
to flash a request for crew initiation of
engine firing. Receives SPS engine off
!_:!i command from an AGC program, removing
the engine on signal. Also provides signal
] to reset the error interrupt trap circuits,
identifies the type of word being transmitted
by downlink telemetry, and inhibits further
loading of telemetry words when the telem-
etry word rate exceeds 50 words per second.
Controls application of 3200 pps control
[
Output Z Register
pulses to the ISS and OSS.
Output 3 Register Serves as a spare register for the central.

processor when needed.
Output 4 Register Contains the next word to be transmitted by

downlink telemetry.
GUIDANCE AND NAVIGA'YlON SYSTEM
"_ Z. Z-!9
_! Mis:_ion Basic Date. ]Z biov .} 9£¢!_6
.... (2ha.nge Date ...... Page
]
i
.......... :........ ':.............. "........ ]........"...... ' :':" " 7 . " '7 ":::: ....... :"
S'M_:/-
"{ -03-SC0 IZ
SYSTEMS DATA
/
Central Processor. The central processor contains the logic circuits
and registers which perform the programs. Programs are executed by
i __}
performing instructions in a sequence controlled by the sequence genera-
:i{
tor. There are two basic types of instructions. The first is the machine
instruction which consists of regular, involuntary, and miscellaneous
[ instructions. Regular instructions are contained within the program and
are part'of the data words being processed. L_vo_luntary instructions are
performed as interrupts to the program and are generated externally to the
,.)
AGC.
second
Miscellaneous
basic
instructions
type
are
of instruction
used in the computer
is the' interpretive instructions
test only. The
and are a
:[
programmer convenience which are converted under program control to
{ machine instructions. The execution of the instructim_s is a function of
:i the sequence generator. The sequence generator combines basic timing
d pulses with the instruction portion oi a data word and performs lhe program
in the necessary sequence. Regular machine instructions are processed
:::i[ i_
by the sequence generator initiation of the instruction. The instruction.

will perform one or more subinstrucdon, the last of which will be a sub-
instruction to proceed to the next instruction. InvoIuntary instructions are
initiated by an interrupt from an externa! source, after which the instruc-
tion is performed in the same manner as a regular instruction. After
:? completion of the involuntary instruction, a "resume" command is executed

and the sequence generator returns to the program which was interrupted.
The central processor performs the data manipulation by adding, sub-
tracting, shifting, etc., within a group of central registers, adder, and
parity block. The functions of the registers are as follows:
J_
Accumulator. Stores the results of ari'khmetic

A Register
processing.
LP Register Stores the least significant portions of the

product of a multiply instruction.
13 Register Used to complement (by reading the reset: side

of the register),
a buffer.
as temporary storage, and as [
Z Register Program counter. Contains address of next
instruction. Incremented by one as each instruc-
tion is perforrned. (Instructions are usually
stored in memory sequentially. )
If transfer control occurs the cortents of Z are

Q Register
read into and stored in Q until interrupt is com-
pleted. Enables interrupted program to restart

at the proper instruction. Also used in division.
Stores remainder in complemented form.
<iiiii_!i_
Input 0, 1, Z, 3 Refer to Input section description.
Output 0_ I, 2, 3 Refer to Output section description.
!_ii_i
¸
: ii}
Mission Basic Date 12 Nov1966 Change Date Page Z.2-Z0 [

":_ I
SMfiA-03_SC01 fi
AInOLLO OPER_ATIONS HANDBOOK
"]
SYSTEMS DATA
!I U
:i
G l-_egiste r Provides access to and fron_ menlorv. Shifting, _*i:

under program control, takes place in this G_.,_:
register. Parity bit is removed and restored
in this register.
D S Register Contains
memory.
address
If word
of word
is in fixed
to be called
memor\,
from
this
selects word in conjunction with BANK
register.
BANK Register Selects bank in fixed memory. Operates in
• b7 ,_
d conjunction
Stores 4 bi_ order

with S register.
code of instruction word.

SQ Register
B X, Y, U Registers These
to be added
registers
are
form
placed
the adder.
in X and Y.
Two
The
numbers
result
is stored in U.
Parity Circuit The" parity circuit checks the parity of words

corrAng from memory to be Odd. If parity is
not correct, this circuit generates a parity
alar_n. Words being returned to memory are
given the proper parity bit by this circuit.
ili_
I
Data flow within the central processor is initiated by an instruction.
A data word is brought from memory to the O register. The G register
U
provides temporary storage of the word unti._,it is needed. If the word
came from erasable memory, it will usually be written back into the same
location during the same memory cycle time it is transferred to the G
register. (This is not necessary for words from fixed memory, as
readout is not destructive.) The word is then routed to the parity circuits
for a parity check and to have the parity bit removed. The sequence
generator next controls the transfer of the data word to the other registers
_or processing. If the result of the processing is to be written back into
memory, the word is transferred back into the O register, the parity bit
is added, and the word transferred back to memory. If the processing
consists of arithmetic functions, it is performed in the adder (X, Y, and
U registers). The AGC has the capability to add only; therefore, sub-
traction, multiplication, and division are performed by complementing
and/or shifting, then adding.
Memory. The AGC memory consists of two sections. The largest section
'is the fixed memory. This is a rope core type having a capability of
24, 576 sixteen bit words. Readout is non-destructive and the data con-
tained cannot be changed. All pern_anent, pre-determined data, such as.
D programs,
contained
tablesl
in this
constants,
section.
star
Addressing
and landmark
the data
angles,
contained
etc.
in the
, are
fix'ed
N
Z. 2-Z]
Basic: Date 12 .'No,,, 1966 Change Date _,__ Pa g e
Mission
SM2A-03-SC01Z
J APOLLO OPERATIONSHANDBOOK
SYSTENiS DAT A
section is accomplished by the S and BANK registers. A smaller erasable

section provides temporary storage for transient data. Erasable men_ory
is a coincident-current core array with a capacity of 10Z4 sixteen bit words.
:i¸ Readout is destructive so if data is to be retained, it is necessary to write
the data back into the location when it is read out. Addressing the data
contained in erasable memory is done by the S register.
Timing.
operations
The
and timing
section is divided
timing
pulses
section generates
for other spacecraft
into the following functional
systems.
groups:
the synchronization pulses
The
for AGC
timing E
Clock Divider This group contains the basic clock
oscillator which has a 2. 048 mc frequency
divided to time various AGC logic functions
and certain outputs, clock the time pulse
i:.![ generator, and driveScaler A.
Scalers A and B Scaler A contains 17 binary dividers pro-
ducing signals of various frequencies used

within the AGC logic, as reference to the
PSA, and to drive Scaler B. Scaler IB
contains 16 binary dividers producing
timing signals to the Input l register for
maintaining real time when the AGC is in
standby.
Scaler> A and B are used in conjunction

,;v_tn the Inl:,_._ 0 register, _ _' , _,,_
TIME g counters to provide real time.
Time Pulse Produces 12 basic timing pulses which

i
Generator define action times. These pulses are
used to control internal sequencing of
data processing.
Memory Pulse This group provides timing pulses to fixed

Generator and erasable memory to synchronize read
and write operations.
Start-Stop Logic The start-stop logic generates three

commands. A monitor stop command
inhibits the time pulse generator and s_ops
AGC data word flow. A monitor start
command generates the third signal which
is a clear command to the sequence
_i_¸ generator.
2. Z-Z2
.k:_'._sion Basic Date 12 Nov 1966Chang e Date ........... Page
SN'IZA--03-SC012
APOLLO OPERATIONS HA:ql-)BOOK

21:
SYSTEMS DATA
2.3.3•3.2 Display ancl Keyboard. L_il::i

!:!_
:ii_i! I •
:3 The DSKYs facilitate intercommunication between the flloht crew and
the AGC. (See figure 2.l-4).) The DSI(Ys operate in parallel, xvith the main
Ji!l
1 display
in
sole
their
DSKY
console
couches.
are
DSKY
COMPUTER.
The
providing
two condition
FAIL,
AGC
which
display
lights
is
provided
and
a gross
control
at
AGC
the
while
main
failure
the c_ew
display
indicator.
are
con*
ii! and KEY RLSE, which is a request to the crew to release the DSKY circuit.s
ii iiiiii 1 to
UPTEL
internal
switch
AGC
which
program
enables
use
the
The
AGC
main
to
display
accept or
console
block
DSKY
telemetered
also has
data
an
!
from MSFN. The DSKY at the lower e_tuipment bay contains the remainder
1 of
TRAP,
RLSE.
the co_dition
TM
All
FAIL,
the
lights:
COUNTER
condition
PR.OG
lights
ALM,
FAIL,
except
RUPT
SCALER
KEY
LOCK,
RLSE
FAIL,
are
PARITY
CHECK
failure
FAIL,
FAIL
indicators.
TC
and KEY
(KEY RLSE is a request for the crew to release the DSKY circuits to
1 internal
button
AGC
which
program
is wired
use.)
to the
This
alarm
DSKY
relays
also has
to provide
a TEST
a ch_ck
ALARM
of the
pusL-
warning
lights. The electrolurninesce_t displays are identical on each DSKY and
1 ahvays
by the
display
BRIGHTNESS
identical data.
thumbwheels.
The intensity of these displ&ys is controlled
The exchange of data between the flight crew and the AGC is usually
initiated by crew action; however, it can also be initiated by internal
computer programs. The exchanged information is processed by the
DSKY program. This program allows the followin'g four different modes
of operation:
Displa;, of Internal Data_Both a one-shot display and a periodi-

cally updating display (called monitor) are provided.
Loading External Data--As each numerical character is entered,

it is displayed in the appropriate display panel location.
Program Calling and Control--The DSKY is used to initiate a

class of routines which are concerned with neither leading nor
display• Certain routines required instructions from the operator
to determine whether to stop or continue at a given point.
e Changing Major lVfode--The initiation of large scale mission phases

can be commanded by the operator.
The data involved in both loading and display can be presented in

either octal or decimal form as the operator indicates. If decimal form
is chosen, the appropriate scale factors are supplied by the program.
Decimal eutries are indicated by entering a sign (+, -).
Keyboard Operation. The basic language of communication between the

operator and the AGC is a pair of words known as verb and noun.. Verb
and noun codes are defined in figures 2.2-5 and Z.Z-6, respectively. Fach
_ GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION SYSTEM
_- [_ Mission Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 Change Date ..... Page z. 2-23
L;
! SMZA-03-SC01Z
b:
!:
APOLLO OPERATIONS HAND]3OOK
(!
_!ii SYSTEMS DATA

2
:t i
_T
7 ii
:i
'I
0
@
---.oo.F.... ]
AL_
____I
,---=
ROPT
l LOCK
L.__--_
I
PARTY
FAIL
I
J I
I t
t
L
L
_---"
I
I FAIL
___--I
TC
IR2,P
....
IM
J
I
l I FAIL
L-----J
I ,
I
ICOUNTER
I
I
FAIL
L----J
F,ZL7;2
CHZCK
FAIL
i
I
I
t
1 L
L____ .J k___--J L------I
i-------I r------l I- ..... 1
I 1.......
I eLSE i t I
L--_-u L..... l L ..... J
F
4.
CO,oP
F_IL
_
I
i
L
KEY
RLSE
....
i
I
J
[
ACTIVITY P{OGD.M
ii_!! u p TEL BRLC, HT NESS
..... IC ...... I "'_ --'I

,E._
V_B NOUt'_
(t
[i
'%
@
--- R C, S _"
:[ LL_=.d-_____
L
REGISTER 2
![
.2
REGISTER I
REGISIER 3
:t
l+ /e jL/.q Ii
[-I 2 -2q _q]
REOISTE_ 3
O @
L# --
[
/:
L_
"! 0 '_/
©
• (a/
• /j BRIGHTNESS @
MAIN DISPLAY CONSOLE KEY TEST I ERROR l
DSKY
0 I F- 2
I
LOWER EQUI PMENT BAY
DSKY
:a [
t_
:t
SM-2A-8;'4
[
iii/i
Figure 2. g-4. Display and Keyboard Panels
.,! L
s, 2-24 ]
]',_it:c;{-OI1 BASIC Date 12 Nov ]96(h_, Cha, nge Dal, e,,.___. Page _' i
t
2
5_
¢!'!_
SM2A-03-5C01 _
APOLLO OI_ERATION S tiANDBOOK
%?,,
SYSTEMS DATA
of these
indicates
is represented
what action is to be
by a two-character
taken (operation);
octal
the
nun]be1".
noun code
The verb
indicates
code
to
L •: 4: ;*i::::::
what action is applied (operand). Typicalverbsare those for disp]ayi'ng and

loading. Nouns usual!y refer to a group of erasable registers within the
computer memory, The PP_OGIKAM, VERB, and NOUN displays provide
two digit numbers which are coded octal numbers describing the action
being performed. The REGISTER I, 2, and 3 displays provide display of ,
the contents of registers or nqemory locations. These displays are
!%
iU numbers
octal numbers
which are
if no
read
sign
as decimal
is used. The
numbers
REGISTEP_
if a sign
displays
(+, -) is present
operate uncier
and
program control unless the contents of a specific register or memory

location is desired. The crew may request display of the conteqts of a
specific register or memory location by commanding the display from the

keyboard. The only other displays are the ACTIVITY lights \_hich indicate
whether the computer is computing or accepting telemetry from MSFN.
The keyboard provides 18 keys which, when pressed, generate a

five bit signal representative of the key pressed. The +, -, and 0-9 keys
are used for numerical entries, while the CLEAR, ENTER, VERB, NOUN,
KEY RELEASE, and ERROR RESET keys provide instructions. The TEST
ii • ALARRi
warning
display
key
indicator
console
is wired
DSKY
lights
to
UPTEL
the
with
alarm
the
switch
relays
exception
enables
and
of
provides
SCALER
or inhibits
a check
FAIL.
the
of
The
acceptance
the
main
of telemetry from 3/[SFN. The function of each of the keys .is as follows:
jz;_
0-9 Enter numericz] data, addresses, and
action codes.
VERB Commands AGC to accept the next two

numbers as verb code data. ,Verb display
is blanked until numbers are entered.
NOUN Commands AGC to accept the next two

numbers as noun code data. Noun display
is blanked until numbers are entered.
ENTER Instructs AGC to accept keyed-in data as

completed and initiate operation specified
by data word.
CLEAR Enters all zeros in data register being

loaded. Each successive pressing of this
i{D KEY RLSE

key
Release
use
clears
by
the
the
the
AGC
DSKY
next
program
higher
circuits
being
register.
and displays
exec'Ated.
for
ERROR RESET Momentarily resets AGC failure lights.

!i:i:_
..')! e_N Mission Basic Date 12 Nov 19.66 Change Date ......... . Page Z. Z-Z5
!!
t1
'k
SMZA..03-.SC01Z '
APOLLO OPFRATIONS ItANDBOOK

'i
5 SYSTEMS DATA v_
Denotes sign of data to follow. Deuotes
,/>
(+) and -.)
that following data is decimal.
B
>i
TEST ALARM Sets relays to illuminate LEB DSKY con-
{4 dition lights (except SCALER FAIL) to
4
} ensure proper operation. (LEB DSKY

only. )
E
}
UPTEL Sets AGC input registers to accept or

inhibit telemetered da_a from MSFN. (MDC
d
i
DSKY only. )
z_
BRIGHTNESS Provides control of intensity of electro-

lumine s cent dis p!ay s.
:5 4
The lower equipment bayDSNY provides nine condition lights of which

?:i
eight are failure indicators and the remaining light a request for action.
The function of each is as follows:
PROG ALM The AGC program being executed has

i detected an error.
COUNTER FAIL, Detected

Either interrupt
failure in
or
input
circuitry
timing
failed.
pulses.
Inter-
[
rupt failure is denoted by RUPT LOCK
)
failure indicator illumination.
:}:!q
::{i
Intcrrupt failed to occur or was not com-
[
pleted within specified time.
<;ili_ TC TRAP Transfer control instruction has not occurred, .[i

or has occurred but was not completed within
::q
'1
SCALER FAIL
a specified
Failure detected
time.
in AGC timing section.

E
:i
PARITY FAIL Parity
memory.
failure detected in data read from
[
FAIL Telemetry word rate to MSFN either too
[
TM
high or too low. Telemetry word rate from
MSFN too high or incorrect transmission
of data.
_i!i [!:
CHECK FAiL Attempted illegal DSKY operation. Normally [
;% operator error.
KEY RLSE Flashes to indicate AGC program in opera-

[
tion requires DSKY circuitry to continue.
} [
GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION SYSTI{M
Z. Z-Z6
•{(:i .k_ission ......... Basic Date i2 Nov l°,6b2, Change Date. • Page
W SMZA-03-SC01Z
APOLLO OPERATIONS I.{AR'DBOOK
]
7 SYSTENiS DATA
ii
I :_i/ili
The standard procedure for the execution of keyboard operations
consists of a sequence of seven key depressions"
VERB V 2 V] NOUN N 2 N1 ENTER
Pressing the VERB key blanks the two verb lights on the DSKY and clears
the verb code register in the AGC. The next two numerical inputs are
interpreted as the verb code, in octal form. Each of these characters
is displayed by the verb lights as it is inserted. The NOUN key operates
similarly with the DSKY noun lights and AGC noun code register. Pressing_
the ENTER key initiates the program indicated by the verb-noun com-
bination displayed on the DSKY. Thus, it is not necessary to follow a
standard procedure in keying verb-noun codes into the DSKY. it can be
done in reverse order, if desired, or a previously inserted verb or noun
can be used without rekeying it. No action is taken by the AGC in initia_ing
the verb-noun-defined program until the ENTER key is actuated. If an
error is noticed in eitLer the verb code or noun code prior to actuation of
the ENTER key, it can be corrected simply by pressing the corresponding
VERB or NOUN key and inserting the proper code. The ENTER key should
not be actuated until it has been verified that the correct verb and noun
codes are displayed.
•If the selected verb-noun combination requires data to be loaded by

the operator, the VERB and NOUN lights start flashing on and off (about
once per second) after the ENTER key is pressed. Data is loaded in fiVe-
character words and, as it is keyed in, it is displayed character-A_y -
character in one of the five-position data display registers, REGISTER l,
REGISTE]{ Z, or REGISTER 3. Numerical data is assumed to be octal
unless the five-character data word is preceded by a plus or minus s_gn,
in which case it is considered to be decimal. Decimal data must be loaded
in full five-nunneral character words (no zeros may be left out); octal data
may be loaded with high order zeros left out. If decin-_al is used for any
component of a _<qu!ticomponent load verb, it nqust be used for all con_-
ponents of that verb. In other words, Ho mixing of octal and decimal data
is permitted for different co_wponents of the same load verb. The Eb_TER
key n_ust be pressed after each data word. This tells the program that the
numerical word being keyed in is con]plete. The on-off flashing of the
VERB-NOUN lights terminates after the last ENTER key actuation of a
loading sequence.
The CLEAR key is used to rerqove errors in loading data as it is

displayed in REGISTER ], REGISTER Z, or REGISTER 3. It does nothing
to the PROGRAM, NOUN, or VERB lights. (The NOUN lights are blanked
by the NOUN lfey, the VERB lights by the VERB key.) For single-
component load verbs or "machine address to be specified" nouns, the
CLEAR key depression performs the clearing function on the particular
register being loaded, provided that the CLEAR key is depressed before
the ENTER key. Once the ENTER key is depressed, the CLEAR key does
nothing. The only way to correct an error after the data is entered for
GUIDA!",_CE AND iN AVIGA'ilON SYSTEM
Z. Z-27
" __,liarl_ e Date Page
Mission Basic Date 12 b!ov 1966 p,
I%
SM2A-03-SC01Z
SYSTEMS DATA
a single-component load verb is to begin the load verb again. For two-
or three-component load verbs, there is a CLEAR backing-up feature.
The first depression of the CLEAR key clears whichever register is being
loaded. (The CLEAR key may be pressed after any character, but before
its entry.) Consecutive CLEAR key actuations clear the data display
register above the current one until REGISTER 1 is cleared. Any attempt
to back up (clear) beyond REGISTER 1 is simply ignored. The CLEAR
backing up function operates only on data pertinent to the load verb which
initiated the loading sequence. For example, if the initiating load verb
Were a "write second component into" type only, no backing up action
would be possible.
The numerical keys, the CLEAR key, and the sign keys are rejected
if depressed after completion (final entry) of a data display or data load
verb. At such time, on!y the VERB, NOUN, ENTER, ERROR RESET, or
KEY RELEASE inputs are accepted. Thus, the data keys are accepted
only after the control kcys have instructed the program to accept them.
Similsrly, the + and - keys are accepted only before the first numerical
character of REGISTER !, REGISTER g, or REGISTER 3 is keyed in and
at no other time. The 8 or 9 key is accepted only while loading a data
word which is preceded by a + or - sign.
The DSKY can also be used by internal computer programs for

/]i subroutines. However, any operator keyboard.action (excep; ERROR
RESET) inhibits DSKY use by internal routines. The operator retains
!i control of the DSKY until he wishes to release it. Thus, he is assured
that the data he wishes to observe will not be replac,zd by internally
initiatad data displays. In general, it is recommended that the operator
release the DSKY for internal use when he has temporarily finished with
it. This is done by pressing the KEY RELEASE key.
Verb-Noun Formats. Thc verb-noun codes are defined in figure.s 2. Z-5 and
:ii•!_ Z.2-6. A noun code may refer to a device, a group of computer registers,
or a group of counter registers, or it may simply serve to convey informa-
tion without referring to any particular computer register. The noun is
made up of 1, 2, or 3 components, each component being entered sep-
arately as requestedby the verb code, As each component is keyed, it is
displayed on the display panel with component 1 displayed in REGISTER 1,
component Z in REGISTER 2, and component3 in REGISTER 3. There are
two classes of nouns: normal and mixed. Normal nouns (codes 01 through
54) are those whose component members refer to computer registers which
have consecutive addresses and use the same scale factor when converted
to decimal. Mixed nouns (codes 55 through 77) are those whose component
members refer to nonconsecutive addresses or whose component members
require different •scale factors when. converted to decimal., or both.
A verb code indicates what action is to be taken. It also determines

:: i!
it which component member of the noun group is to be acted upon, For

Z)
;jli
Z, 7.-28 [
Mission Basic Date 12 Nov _._2:_'_...
lq66 ('han._e s Oate" ....... ..... Page
i
SMZA-03-SC01 Z

J
!:i:ili_
SYSTEXIS DATA
[ ,,
example, there are five different load verbs. Verb 2] is required for
loading the first component of the selected noun; verb 22 _oads the second
component; verb 23 loads the third component; verb 24 loads the first and
second component; and verb 25 loads all three components. A simibar
component format is used in the display and monitor verbs. ]_-here are two
general classes of verbs: standard and extended. The standard verbs
(c(%des 0] through 37) deal mainly with loading, displaying, and monitoring.
data. The extended verbs (codes 40 through 77) are principall}, concerned
with calling up internal progran)s whose function is system testing and
!
i!!i operation.
\Vhenever data is to be loaded by the operator, the VERB and XOUX

lights flash, the appropriate data d{spiay register is blanked, and the
internal computer storage register is cleared in anticipation of data load-
ing. As each numerical character is keyed in, it is displayed in the proper
display register. Each data display register can handle only five numerical
characters at a time (not including sign). If an attempt is made to ke\ in
more than five numerical characters at a time, the sixth and subsequ¢nt
characters are simply rejected but they do appear in the display register.
The + and - keys are accepted prior to inserting the first numerical
character of REGISTER•I, REGISTER Z, or REGISTER 3; if keyed in at
any other time, the signs are reiected. If the 8 or 9 key is actuated At
any time other than while loading a data word preceded by a + or - sign,
it is rejected and the CHECK FAIL light goes on.
The normal use of the flash is with a load verb. However, there are
two special cases when the flash is used with verbs other than load verbs.
O Xiachine Address to be Specified--There is a class of nouns

available to allow any machine address to be used; these are
called "machine acldress to be specified" nouns. When the
"ENTER", which causes the verb-noun combination to be
executed, senses a noun of this type the flash is immediately
turned on. The verb code is left unchanged. The operator
should load the complete machine address of interest (five-
character octal). This is displayed in REGISTER 3 as it is
keyed in. If an error is made in loading the address, the
CLEAR key may be used to remove it. Pressing the ENTER
key causes execution of the verb to continue.
Change Major Mode---To change major mode, the sequence is

VERB 37 ENTER. This causes the noun display register to be
blanked and the verb code to be flashed. The two-character
octal major mode code should then be loaded. For verification
purposes, it is displayed as it is loaded in the noun display
register. The entry causes the flash to be turned off, a.request
for the new major mode to be entered, and a new major mode
code to be displayed in the PROGRAM d_splay register.
GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION SYSTE_i
'_ _ Z 2-Z9
_ Mission Basic Date 12 ,Nov 1966.... Change_
_ _ Oa_e ....... ,_ .... Page "
........ " ?{i!:? " '::I:T ' "" " "": " ): '" .... ii!i!_ ' i: - ' ii : ":':! ii:ii!i -' ':::{7' ::i: ':i::::::i: . :?
:]
SMZA-03-SC0 !Z
r
APOLLO OPE!ZATIONS HANDBOOK
:<%i
i SYSTEMS DATA
t ;
V e r b
Remarks
Description
,i Code
%1
Verb codes 01 through 37 denote
standard ve rhs.
Performs octal display of data on REGISTER 1.

01 Display 1st component of
5:hi
7i
hill1
02
03
Di__play
Display
2nd
3rd
component
component
of
of
Performs
Performs
octal
octal
6isplay
display
of
of
data
data
on
on
REGISTER
REGISTER
1.
l.
,li
Performs octal display of data on REGISTER 1 and REGISTER 2.
0 ,i Display 1st and grid
<!
O5
components
Display 1st,
of
2nd, and 3rd

Performs octal display of data on REGISTER 1, REGISTER 2. AND REGISTER 3.
[
co_ porierit of
O6 Display all corriponent(s) ot

Performs decimal display of data on appropriate registers. The scale factors, types g
of scale factor routines, and component inforrnation are stored within the machine
for each noun which it is required to display in decimal.

g_
Performs a doublc precision decimal display of data on REGISTER 1 and REGISTER 2.
O7 DP decimal display
It does no scale factoring, it merely performs a 10-character, fractional decimal
conversion of two consecutive, erasable registers, using REGISTER 1 and REGIS-
;3d TER 2. The sign is placed m the REGISTER I sign position wi_h the REGISTER 2
sign position remaining blank. It cannot be used with mixed nouns. Its intended use
is primarily with "macbhm address to be specified" nouns.

3 t?
g
Enters request to "waitlist routine" for any machine address with delay involved.
10 Enter request to waitlist
This verb assumes that the desired number of 10-miliisecond units of delay has
{Used only during ground
been loaded into the low o_der bits of the prio/delay register {noun 26)'. This verb
checkout. )
is used with the "machine address to be specified" noun. The complete address of
iv
the des'red location is then keyed in. {Refer to "Machine address to be specified"
in paragraph on Verb/Noun Formats. ) I4:

|E
Performs octal displ_y of updated data every i/2 second on REGISTER i.
.....:!!! Ii Nlonitor l st _:ornpcnent
12
13
Monitor
.Monitor
2nd
3rd
component
comporient
of
of
Performs
Performs
octal
octaldisplay
display of
of
updated
updated
data
data
every
every
1/2
I/2
second
second
on
on
REGISTER
REGISTER
I.
I.
f
Performs octal display of updated data every I/2 second on REGISTER I and
14 Monitor I st and 2rid
component of
REGISTER 2.
[
Performs octal display of updated data every I/Z second on REGISTER 1,
15 Monitor 1st, 2nd, and
REGISTER 2, and REGISTER 3.
3rd component of
Performs decimal display of updated data every 1/2 second on appropriate registers.
16 Monitor all components(s)
of
Performs double precision display of decimal data on REGISTER 1 and REGISTEI', 2.

17 .Monitor DP decimal
No scale factoring is performed. Provides 10-character, fractional decimal con-
version
position
Enters
of
of
request
two
REGISTER
consecutive
to executive
1.
erasable
REGISTER
routine
registers.
for
2 sign
any
bit
machine
The
is blank.
sign
address
is ptaced
with
in
priority
the sign-bit
involved.
[
2O Enter request to executive
This verb assumes that the desired priority has been loaded inlo bits !0-14 of the
(Used only during ground
N
pr{o/delay register {noun 26). This verb is used with the noun, "machine address
checkout, )
to be specified". The complete address of the desired locatmn is then keyed m. [
(Refer: to "Machine address to be specified" in paragraph on Verb/Noun Formats.} [_
. i_il
_
<!{ 21 Write 1st component into Performs data loading. Octal quantities are unsigned. Decimal quantities are
preceded by + or - sign, Data is displayed on REGISTER I.

i
Figure Z.2-5. Verb Li.st (Sheet t of 3) g
C;UIDANCFI AND NAVIGATION SYSTEM
Page 2. 2-30 [
..',i 1 ._s _on ........ .... Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 Char_g e Date
r
L.
SMZA-03-SC01 fi
5! APOLLO OPERATIONS }-tA.NDiBOOt'-:
SYSTF.MS DATA
\e r :_
]Remarks
Code Descr,pHon
ii 22 Wr:2e 2Ild coI:2ponent llltO Performs
preceded by
data
* or
loading.
- sign.
Octai
Data
Octal
quantlties
is
quantitids
displayed
are
are
on
unsigned.
REGISTKR
unsigned.
Decimal
Decimal
2.
quantities
quantities
are
are
Wr'.te 3rd component into Performs data loading.
preceded by + or - sign. Data is displayed on REGISTER 3.
(1 24 Write
c oP,_ poise
1st
nt
and
into
2nd Performs
preceded by
data
+ or
loading.
- sign.
Octal
Data
quantities
is displayed
are
on
unsigned.
REGISTER
Decimal
1 and
quantities
tR_GISTER
are
2.
Write ist, 2nd, and 3rd Performs data loading. Octal quantities are unsigned. Decimal quantities are
i c oP._ pone nt into preceded by + or - sign. Data is displaTed on REGISTER 1, REGISTER 2, and
REGISTER 3.
(Spare)
27 (Spare)
(Spare)
Bank Dis pla,: This verb is included to permit displaying the contents of fixed memory in any bank.
Its intended use is for checking program ropes and the BANK position of program
ropes.
(Spare)
3? Proceed w'ithout data Informs routine requesting data to be loaded that the operator chooses not to load
fresh data. but wishes the routine to contine as best it can with old data. Final
decision for what action should be taken is left to requesting routine.
Te rnltnate Informs routine requesting data to be loaded that the operator chooses not to load
fresh data and wishes the routine to terminate. Final decision for what action should
be 'taken is left to requesting routine. If monitor is on, it is turned off.
(Spare)
5_ Fresh start Initializes the program control software and the keyboard and display system program.
Change major mode to Change to new major mode. (Refer to "Change major mode" in paragraph on Verb-
Noun Formats. )
NOT[_
Verb codes 40 through 77 denote

extended verbs.
Zero .Must be used with noun 20 {ICDU) or noun 55 (OCDU) only. Sets the CDU registers to
zero.
Coarse align I.XIU _Must be used with noun 20 {ICDU} or noun 55 {OCDU) only.
42 Fine align I_MU Calls up programs that perform the indicated G&N system procedures.
43 Lock I.MU Calls up programs that perform the indicated G&N system procedures.
Set I3.1U to ATTITUDI-2 Calls up programs that perform the indicated GkN. system procedures.
CONTROL
Set I.XIU ENTRY Calls up programs that perform the indicated Glen system procedures.
Return IXIU to coarse Calls up programs that perform the indicated G&N system procedures,
align
B
Figure Z.2-5. Verb List (Sheet 2 of 3)
D GUIDANCtE -\ND NAVIGATION SYSTEM
':(_ _; Mission Basic: Date 12 Nov. ]966___Chang e Date Page g.Z.-31

Sh.,IZA_03-SG0 i Z _2
APOLLO OPI[H_ATIONS i-IA_DBOOK
[: [
SYSTEMS DATA
1
l_.ernarks
Verb ! DescmptLon
47 (Spare}
This verb is used only by internal rountines that wish the operator to perform a
r_0 / Please perform
:i certain task. It should never be keyed in by the operator. It is usually used with
noun 25, "checklist. " The coded number for the checklist item to be performed is
displayed in REGISTIEI_ 1 by the requesting routine.
This verb is used only by internal routines that request the operator to "mark". It
Please mark
51
should never be key'ed i_ by the operator. It is usually used with noun 30, "star
numbers". The numbers of the stars to be marked are displayed in I_.EGISTER 1,
REGISTIgR 2, and RI;2GISTER 3 by the requesting routine. The operator should indi-
cate completion of each valid nnark by prec-sing the MARK button. He should never
press ENTEK with verb 51.
ii:i:
Rejects "mark" and returns to verb 51, Must be entered within 2.0 :;econds of
5Z Mark reject
pressing MARK button.
Calls up programs that perform the indicated Gg:N :wstem procedures. Used only
53 Free
with noun 20 (ICDU) or noun 55 (OCDU).
Calls up programs that perform the indicated Gg.N system procedures.

54 Pulse torque gyros
55 Align time
56 IDerform BANK sum
57 System test {Used only
! during ground checkout. }

;i
60 Prepare for standby
61 Recover from standby
62 (Spare)
63 (Spare)
64 Calculate orbital
paranaete rs
05 Calculate time of arrival
at longitude
66 Calculate latitude and
longitude at specified time
67 Calculate maximum
declination and tittle of
arrival
3
70 (Spare)
7! (Spare)
72 (Spare)
73 fleturn to Earth ailTl

•I point update
74 Orbit change aim point
update
75 Manual lift-off fo_ flights

t
7t, 1R, V. T. denotes position, velocity, and tirne.
R. V.T. update (state
vector)
77 (St.'a re)
Figure Z. 2-.5. Verb List (Sheet 3 of 3)
,!
GUIDANCIE AND !'qAVIGAT!O.N SYSTF. M
, _. Z. Z-_32
on .............. Ba.qic Date 12 I'_o',' _966 t.t-tange Date ........................... Page .......................
SM2A-03-SC012
APOLLO OPEP.ATIONS HANDBOOK
M SYSTEMS DATA
_:: :::1%
I
'i Noun
N o _n
Code Scale _Units
Scale / Units Description
Code Description
_O_E 22 Ne,a, angles h

_OT_
X-REGISTER ! XXX. XX deart'es
;t Y-REGISTER Z XXX. XX%earees
! Noun
54 denote
codes Ol
normal
through
nouns.
In
coluFnn:
Scale/Units
Z-REGISTER 3 NXX XX degrees
]
23 Delta angles h
X = significant
X-REGISTER 1 XXX. XX de.rees
digit
Y-REGISTER 2 NXX XX degrees
L if! 0 = zero
Z-REGISTER 3 XXX. XX de_rees
(always)
B = blank.
24 Delta time for AGC clock:
REGISTER 1 00XXX. hours

XXXXX
•4 Ol Specify machine address
REGISTER 2 000XX. minutes
REGISTER 3 0XX. XX. seconds

O2 XXXXX.
Specify machine address
25 Checkli st (Used only v:ith XXXXX.

/":-i *" O3 (Spare)
verb 50, "Please perform".)
i O4 (Spare)
Checklist code numbers (Appear
in REGISTER 1. )
O5 Angular error XXX. XX degrees
00001 SCS mode to G&:N

06 Pitch angle XXX. XX degrees
attitude contr ol
:k00001
Heads up-down
0000g SGS mode to G&N
Delta V
•i O? Change
mode (Used
of program
only with
or major
verb 50,
00003 SCS mode to G&N entr,
"Please perform". )
I0 0000,4 SCS mode to monitor

(Spare)
00007 Manual attitude

II Engine on enable (Used only with
lnaneuve r
verb 50, "Please perform".)
Delta V allowable XXXXX. ft/scc 00011 Automatic optics

12
positioning
Delta V tailoff XXXXX. ft/sec

00012 Target data entry
13 Delta V measured (Vector XXXXX. It/see

00013 Switch OSS to computer
magnitude. )
control
14 XXXXX. ft/sec
Delta V counter setting.
00014 Fine align check
15 Increment address (Used only Octal only

00015 Perform star
during ground checkout. }
acquisition
16 AGC clock time:

00031 Engine on
REGISTER 2 000XX. mim_tes

00035 Prepare AGG for
REGISTER 3 0XX. XX seconds
thrusting
17 (Spare)
00036 Thrust terminate
20 ICDUs:
00041 G/M-5/M separation
X-REGISTER 1 XXX. XX degrees
Y-REGISTER 2 XXX. XX degrees

XXXXX.
!i:_ Z-REGISTER 3 XXX. XX degrees
26 Prio/delay (Used only during
ground checkout. )
21 PIPA counters:
27 Self test ON-OFF switch XXXXX.
X- REGISTER 1 XXXXX. pulses
<i! Y-REGISTER Z XXXXX. pulses

30 Star number XXXXX.
Z-REGISTER 3 XXXXX. pulses
D
Figure 2.2-6. Noun List (Sheet 1 of 3)
B
[_J: 12 Nov 1966 Chanc, e Date Page g. Z-33

,_?:I Mission Basic Date
]
:...... .......... _:::........ ............. ::!_:i
.......... : : ........ :: .......... ' !: ;ii:i :i_:_::i::!_C i:.... _:i: _:::_: : :::_
SMZ/', -03-SC01Z
: )
SYSTEMS DATA
Scale/Units
Scale/Units
Code Description Description
register code
Perigee altitude
XXXX. X nautical
NO_g miles
REGISTER 1
q
Error codes are defined Octal only
Apogee altitude
XXXX. X nautical
in paragraph 2.2.2.3.3. REGISTER 2
mil.-s
Self-test diagnosis
REGISTER 2 Octal only XXBXX. minutes,
Free-fall time
secolids
REGISTER 3
Self-test diagnosis
REGISTER 3 Octal only 44 Latitude
REGISTER 1 XXX. XX degrees
32 Decision time (Used only during
ground checkout. ) Longitude

?4
3 R EGISTIi:R 2 XXX. XX degrees
33 Ephemer s time (Used onlyduring

L_
Altitude (Above mean equatoriaI
ground checkout. )
radius. )
REGISTER 3 XXXX. X nautical

34 Event time:
[i:i_ REGISTER I 00NXX. hours mile,,
000XX. minutes
REGISTER 7'
:i• bi,_i
35 Delta
REGISTER
event tirne:
3 0XX.
00XXX.
XX seconds
°hours
45 Perigee
• REGISTER
altitude
1
XXXX. X degrees
E
REGISTER 1 Apogee altitude
000XX. minutes REGISTER 2 XXXX.X degrees
REGISTER 2
REGISTER 3 0XX. XX seconds F'

Delta velocity required
XXXXX. ft/sec t2t.
36 Delta event time (Display only.) REGISTER 3
:Ti!i 46 Time to event
REGISTER 1 XXBXX. minutes,

37 (Spare)
!i XXBXX.seconds minutes, seconds
Gamma {inertial flight path
angle. ) Velocity to be gained

REGISTER 1 XXX. XX degrees REGISTER 2 XXXXX. it/see
Inertial veloci W Perigee altitude

REGISTER 2 XXXXX. ft/sec REGISTER 3 XXXX. X nautical
miles
Altitude above launch pad
REGISTER 3 XXXX,
miles
X nautical 47 Flight
REGISTER
path angle
1 XXX. XX degrees [
[ii 41 Maximum acceleration Miss distance
:i:[;_ XXXX. X nautical
REGISTER 1 XXXX. X g's
miles
• _%!tl
I REGISTER 2
Perigee altitude
REGISTER Z XXXX.X nautical 5O
7, Time to event
miles XXBXX. minutes.
REGISTER 1 seconds
Free-fall time
REGISTER 3 XXBXX. minutes, Delta time of burn
seconds REGISTER 2 XXBXX. minutes,
seconds
,12 Miss distance

XXXX. X nautical 51 Time to event
REGISTER 1
REGISTEP 1 XXBXX. minutes,
miles
seconds
Velocity to be gained
REGISTER 2 XXXX. X nautical
2 I Perigee
:Free-fall
a!:itude
time
miles
I N' easured
REGISTER
spacecraft
velocity
X-axis
2
change along
XXXXX. ft/sec
[
[ R EG IS TI'I R 3 XXBXX minutes, XXXXX ft)sec
seconds REGISTER 3
Fig re 2.2-6. Noun List (Sheet 2 of 3)

k
Z. 2-34
Li:_;.'._on Basic Date !Z
........................
Nov 1966 Caange Date •
Page
J! SM2A-03-SC012
i
1 APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA pW::_:!i::

[/ i:i!
oun L2
G Cod<,
2< o t_:t
52
t
:me to event
Description Scale/Units o
;3 tLatitude
Description Scale/Units
REGISTKR 1 XXBXX. minutes, XX. XXX d_egrees
seconds I REGISTER 1
;!
Longitude/2
J
Velocit,:- to be gained XX.XXX degrees
XXXXX. ft/sec I REGISTER 2
R£GISX ER 2
Altitude
Free-fall time REGISTER 3 XXX.XX nautical
REGISTER 3 XXBXX, minutes, miles
seconds
64 (Spare)
53 kIaximum acceleration
REGISTER 1 XXXX. X g' s

65 Sarnpled time (Fetched in
interrupt. )
:Free-fall time
REGISTER 2 XXBXX. minutes
000XX. minutes
i_iI seconds
REGISTER
REGISTER
Z
3 0XX. XX seconds
54 Commanded roll angle

66 System test results (Used only
REGIS] KR 1 XXX. XX degrees
during ground checkout. )
Present acceleration
67 Delta gyro angles: (Used only
REGISTER 2 XXXX. X g's
during ground checkout. )

['a@T_
X -IRIG
Noun codes 55 through
77 denote mixed nouns. REGISTER 1 XX. XXX degrees
55 OCDUs: Y -IRIG
X (Shaft angles} REGISTER 2 XX. MXX degrees
REGISTER 1 XXX.XX degrees
Z -IRIG
Y (Trunnion angles}
REGISTER 3 XX. XXX degrees
REGISTER 2 XX. XXX degrees
B 56 Uncalled
X {Shaft
mark
angles}
data; 70 Pitch
i .e.
2, _t2
trim
,_ Tqq_
.... R l XXX. XX degrees
REGISTER 1 XXX.XX degrees

Yaw trim
Y (Trunnion angles} REGISTER 2 XXX. XX degrees
/! REGISTER 2 XX. XXX degrees
Delta velocity tailoff

57 New angles-OCDUs: REGISTER 3 ' XXXXX. It/see
X (Shaft angles}
REGISTER 1 XXX. XX degrees 71 (Spare}
Y {Trunnion angles} 72 Delta position (Used only during

REGISTER 2 XX. XXX degrees ground checkout. )
60 IMU mode status (Used only Octal only 23 Delta velocity (Used only during
during ground checkout. } ground checkout. )
61 Target: (Used only during 74 (Spare}

ground checkout. )
75 Delta position magnitude

Azimuth REGISTER l XXXX. X nautical
XXX. XX degrees
miles
REGISTER 1
_' ._-l!o:;
Delta velocity magnitude
: - _ "ER g XX. XXX degrees
REGISTER 2 XXXXX. ft/sec
D 62 Delta
Miss
veloc
R E GLS'I'ER
dlsta-ce
.ty insertion
1 XXXXX. ft/sec Measuremen!
REGISTER
angle
3
deviation
XXX. XX degrees
R EC,_.. JR 2 XXXX.X nautical 76 R-position (Used only during
miles ground checkout. )
77
Free-fall time \'-velocity (Used only during
REGISTER 3 XXBXX. minutes ground checkout. }
seconds
;I
+._
D Figure Z.Z-6. Noun List (Sheet 3 of 3)
Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 Change Date

%i ,_ Nlission Page 2. 2- 35
:!
i!:i!!
iI
SNI2A-03 c
-oCb 12
) APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
i
SYSTEMS DATA E
The flash is turned off by any of the following events:
83]
o Final entry of a load sequence

:::::{f
Entry of verb "proceed without data" (33)
[J!
Entry of verb "terminate" (34).
<ii!i!:
It is important to conclude every load verb by one of the aforementioned
?Z:i!i?,
7
three,
computer.
especially if the load
If an internally
was
initiated
initiated by program
l.oad is not concluded
action
validly,
within the
the pro-
E
gram that initiated it may never be recalled. The "proceed without data"
verb is used to indicate that the operator is unable to, or does not wish to,
supply the data requested, but wants the initiating program to continue as
best it can with old data. The "terminate" verb is used to indicate that the
operator chooses not to load the requested data and also wants to terminate
the requesting routine.
[:
2.2.3.3.3 Error Codes.
Error code numbers appear in'REGISTER 1 with noun 31.
OSS Errors
00101 Optics mode control switched from ZERO OPTICS before end of 30 seconds.
00102 AGC unable to achieve desired optics mode.
00103 Function not valid for SC 0!Z.
00104 No vacant area available for marks.
00105 internal mark request whi]e mark s'y stem is busy.
:. D 00106 Function not valid for SC 012.
00107
00110
Mark
Mark
reject
reject
while
with all
mark system
requested
is
marks
not in use.
accepted or no marks since initiating
[
last mark reject.
..:,] 00120 Too many marks.
::4
'4
?¢ ISS Errors
': i_ 00201 Zero encode ended before end of 30 second wait.

OOZOX AGC unable to achieve desired ISS mode.
(t
00203 No ISS mode indicated to AGC.
00204 ISS mode changed while TRANSFER switch is in COMPUTER position, but
AGE did not command mode change.
:: t_
Procedural Difficulties
J
":ii
i 00401 Desired gimbal angles will produce gimbal lock. (Middle gimbal angle [
greater than 60 ° .)
O0402 Star out of field of view,
<i
:i{{ 00.103 Same as 00402.
[
4 0040-t
I:
IMU orientation unknown.
4
00405 SCS mode monitor, failure,
[
i I
GUIDANCE AND NA\rlGATION SYSTEM
Z. Z-36
!'_,!;_ion Basic Date ].2 Nov _'Z.66 - Change Date .... Page
SM2A-03-SC0 i2
APOLLO OPERATIONS HA.NDBOOK

7!
]
.: ]
SYSTEMS DATA
0040o Navigation program busy.

00407 .Navigation program needed internally.
00410 AGC update not allowed.
AGC Hardware Malfunctions
<ii0! Unused interrupt (RUPT Z) occurred

0110Z AGC self-test error.
01103 Unused count, compare, and skip (CCS) branch executed.
01104 C-relay failed during C-relay test.
01105 Star search failure.
0].106 IMU orientation no good for entry.
List Overflows
01Z01 Executive overflow-no vacant areas,*

0IZ02 Executive overflow-no core sets, ;:-"
0]203 \Vaitlist overflow-too many tasks. <-_
01204 Same as 01Z03.<-_
01205 Master control overflow-too n%any jobs waiting. _:-"
01206 DSKY waiting line overflow. _:-"
01207 No vacant area for marks.-",-"
01210 Something already waiting in IMU stall.*
Interpreter Errors
01301 Arccos-arcsin input angle too large.-*

0130Z Square root called _or with a negative argument.*
Display Alarms
01401 VG increasing-loss of control.

01402 Delta V too low-engine not on.
DSKY Program Errors
01501 Check fail alarm during internal use. ':'-
*These alarms are "aborts" and define alarms which initiate a restart of the AGC
program which was in progress when the alarm appeared.
i] GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION SYSTEM
_:_ Mission Basic Date 12 l_ov 1966 C'_ange Date Pa_,e Z. 2-37
i
,]
•.: .. .,, ..f,. -_.... . ...... : .... ,.... • -:. :: . .:.. ..:::... -,, : . ,.......[......... ...... :: :: . .
SMZA-03-SCO 12
APOLLO OPEF<ATIONS HANDBOOK
SYSTEX,IS DATA
2.2.3.3.4 AGC Programs.
The following list of AGC programs defines the programs and routines
applicable to SC-01Z. The AGC programs provide the major modes of G&_q
system operation. The routines consist of a specific sequence of operations
which are )erformed by more than one program and/or other routine.
Contains
Program
Title Routines
Number
00 AGC Idling
%
0l Pr elaunch Initia]i zation
0Z Gyro Compassing
03 Optical Azimuth Verification

:kii
04 Inertial Reference
O5 G&N Startup
O6 O&N Power Down [

51!
07 Systems Test (]Limited in-flight use.)
ll Pre-LET Jettison
_t
1Z Post- LET Jettison R 24, R 34
17 LET Abort
4
Z2 Landrnark Tracking R 27, R 28 [.:
23 Star/Landrnark Navigation Measurement

;ii
%
24 Ground Track Determination
Z7 AGC Update
2,
31 Orbit Change (Prethrust) R I, R Zl, R 35
[
71
3Z
33
Return
SPS
to Earth
Minin_um
(Prethrust)
Impulse (Prethrust)
R
R
l, R
I, R
21,
21,
R
R
36
31,
[
R33
41 Orbit Change R 2, R 22, R 24,

R 31, R 34,R 37
i:
GUiDAR[CE AND i'qAVIf]ATIOR* SYSTEM
!.'_-_.:c,:- }3asic Date 12 Nov i966 ..... Change Date ..... Page fi, Z-38 [[
k
i
SEI2:\-03-SC01 fi
APOLLO OPERATIO.NS HAXDBOOt<
v,:
SYSTI<MS DATA
/;
Conta ins
Program
,.. .Nmnbe r Title Routine s
:./ii_ii
42 Return to }Earth R 2, Ik 22, R 24,
iiii!.:.
!;b_
i R 31, R 34, la 37
43 SPS Mirlin_unq Impulse R 2, R 31, R 34,

R 37
; i!)_
- <_I 5! iMU Orientation Determination R 27, R 29
52 S-IVB/IMU Align R 4, R 25, R 27,

R 28, R 29, R 30
53 CSM/IMU Align R i, P, 4, R 21,

R 25, R 27, R 28,
R 29, R 3O
54 IMU Realignment R 27, R 29, R 30
(!!
ii'i 61 Maneuver To CM/SM Separation Attitude RI, R2I
62 CM/SM Separation And Pre-Entry R3, R21

h b
Maneuver .
63 Initialization
iii:)_ 64 Post 0.05G
67 Final Phase
B 71 First Abort Burn R 2,4
Routine Contains
Number Title Routine s
R 22
D Attitude
Thrust
Control
Control
Mode
Mode
Check
Check R 1, R 21, R 22
B Entry Control Mode Check I-<22
Fine Alignment R 25, R 27, R 28,

R 29, R 30
i!
i D 21 Attitude Maneuver
iii
22 SCS Discrete Mouitor
24 Delta V Monitor R 38
D
:_ Mission Basic Date ..............

12 Nov 1966 Ch-_n_*e=
a Date_ Page 2.2-39
SMZA-03--SC012
APOLLO OPERATIONS IIANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
Contains
Routine
Title Routines
i'<umbe r
J 25 Coarse Alignnae nt
27 Sighting Mark
28 Auto Optics Positioning
-i 29 Star Data Test
3O Gyro Torquing
31 Backup Delta V Counter
33 Prethrust SPS Minimum Impulse Data

•I
Load
34 Orbit Parameter Display
35 Prethrust Orbit Change Data Lead
36 Prethrust Return to Earth Data Load

i
37 SPS Engine Ignition
!I
38 SPS Engine Thrust Fail
• •j
2.2.4 PERFORMANCE AND DESIGN DATA.
(TBD)
[
OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS.
[
S/C Attitude.
The S/C should not be maneuvered to an attitude which will align the
inner circle of either red area on the FDAI ball under the navigation axis
marker. Failure to avoid this condition can result in IMU gimbal lock.
• •:•
.j Specifically, the following maneuvers should be avoided:
e Yaw maneuver greater than ±75 degrees when roll angle is

0 degree or 180 degrees.
o Pitch maneuver greater than +43 degrees or -i08 degrees when

roll angle is m90 degrees.
::::_
• , : '. _- ._ ]O1] Basic Date. 12 bJov l?66_.Change Date, Page 2.2-40

¢"_ \-03-SC012
APOLLO OPERATIONS ttANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
9 ? .,_., ") IMU Operation.
• The AGC must be ON before tl_e iMU is placed in operation by
engaging the IMU circuit breakers.
e The AGC must be ON or in STANDBY before the IMU is placed
, in standby mode.
e Allow 15 seconds for the stabilization loops to completely
stabilize the platform after 'applying operating power, i.e,, after
engaging the IMU circuit breakers.
• The IMU must be in full operation for at least i hour before valid
operation of the inertial, components can be assumed.
e The inertial components will suffer a loss of calibration if the
temperature falls oelow !Z0°F ' or exceeds 140°P. Damage will

occur if the temperature fails below 40°For exceeds 160°F.
Do not operate the IMU such that the middle gimba! angle reaches
or exceeds 70 degrees.
2.2.5.3 Optics Operation.
e Do not slew the SXT or SCT into the mechanical stops.
• Do not drive the ZX TRUNNION CDU in excess of 180 degrees as
read on the CDU display dials. Insure that this display dial
indicates less than 180 degrees before engaging the ZERO
OPTICS rnode of operation.
Z.Z.6 TELEMETRY MEAS UREMEI'(ITS .
The following is a complete list of all G&N system telemetry data that
is monitored by flight controllers and ground support personnel. The ].ast

column contains the name and type of S/C crew display. The displayutilizes
the same pickoff or signal source as telemetry, unless a separate measure-

ment number is included in the display column.
An asterisk (_:-')
by the measurement number denotes information which
is not available for recording or telemetry transmission during PCM low
bit rate operation.
Nomi nal
Measurement Sensor Operating
._un_be r Description Range Range Crew Display
CG 000! V Computer digital data +4/+!32 vdc _one
40 bits
CG 1101 V --28 VDC supply -30/0 vdc -28 wlc None
GUIDANCE AN]) NAVIGA.TION SYSTEM
2.2-41
Mission Basic Date lfi Nov 1966 Chanqe Date Pa_e
SMZA ':_ - - " lZ
-0o-5<_0
.i
'!i APOLL, O OPFRATIONS HR.NDBOOK
SYSTEIviS DATA
Nominal
Sensor Ope rating
<:. { •
.-.._
_(, [i S U 1"CI]'I e l'I[
Description Range Range Crew Display

Nurnbc r
:. %!
2. 5 VDC TM bias TBD -28 vdc None

CG 1110 V
:!i
IMU +28 vdc operate Event None
CG 1503 X
i]
: ,J! IMU +28 vdc standby Event None

CG ]513 X
:?::!_
AGC +28 vdc Eve nt None
CG 1523 X
Eve nt None
CG ] 533 X Optics +2.8 vdc
>A
TBD None
CG 2110 V IGA torque motor
ii:_iiiii_
<i:<} input
'::CG 2112 V IGA 1X res output TBD None
:_i!l sine in phase
: i/__ None
;::CG 2113 V IGA 1X res output cos TBD
C_
in phase
<:CG 2117 V IGA serve error in 010.. 5 vrms None
phase
CG 2140 V MGA torque motor TBD None

:!il :{
input
#CG 2!42 V MGA 1X res output TBD None

/ii_
sine in phase
CG 2143 V MGA 1X res output TBD None
cos in phase
*CO 2147 V MGA serve error in 0/0.5 vrms None
phase
CG 2170 V OGA torque motor TBD None
input
*CG 2172 V OGA 1X res output TBD None
sine in phase
:::CG 2173 V OGA 1X res output TBD

cos in phase
:1CG Z 177 V OGA serve error in 0/0. 5 vrms None
phase
._i ¸ GUIDANCE ANY.) NAVIGATION SYSTEM
_"iSSiop.',. Basic Date iZ Nov 1.966 Change Date ................. Page 2,2-,t2
SMfiA-03-SC0 ! fi
i< !{
• L:t
A, APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
, ii
}d
d
-]YS'I'EA'iS DA TA
>,ominal /ii:;::i*:4::
_lU & SLI r el 11(,Ylt
Sensor Operating
::.:_ Nun,.be r Description Range Range Crew Display
_ :<.::_
:_:!]
<:CC- 2206 V !GA CDU IX res 0/0.2 vrms ,None
;i error in pliase
•• >1
:::CG 2236 V MGA CDU 1X res 0/0.2 vrms None
error in phase
::u 1
:::CG 2266 V OGA CDU IX res 0/0.2 vrms None

ii_ii!l error in phase
iiI
CG 2300 T TI3D +126.0°F/ None
PIPA temp
+134. 0°F
D C.;G 230t T IRIG ternp TBD +129.

+137.
5 _'F/
5°F
None
B CG 2302 C IMU heater current 0/+5 amps 0/+2 alTlpS None
/<_i!i
iI CG 2303 C IMU blower current 0/+5 amps 0/+1 an_p None
!I
]3
<'-CG 3102 V SXT
drive
trun
in
motor
phase
TBD None
-':-'CG 311fi V SXT shaft motor TBD None
drive in pl,.ase
*CG 3133 V SCT trun motor TBD None

drive
::_CG 3141 V Trun CDU 16X res TBD None
!!% error in phase
::-'CG 3200 V Trun CDU lnotor TBD None

drive in phase
<_CG 3220 V CDU motor drive TBD None

RMS
<-'CG 4300 T AGC temp n_onitor TBD None
CG 5000 X PIPA fail Event ACCEL FAIL, GE:N

ACCEL FAIL C&-W
lights (Z).
CG 5001 X IMU _aA Eve nt IMU FAIl, C&:W lights

(2),
Mission Basic Date " 12 Nov 19{o6 (;hange ]3ate ....... Page Z. 2-.13
)z
SMEA-03-SC01Z
F
>hi SYSTEMS DATA
Nominal
Sensor • Operating
_,.[ca
su rcn]ent
Description Range Range Crew Display
Number
CG 5002 X CDU fail Event CDU

(z)
FAIL C&W lights
E
i!_!%! Event GIMBAL LOCK, GMBL
Gimbal lock warning
CG 5003 X
LOCK C&W lights (2).
E
Error detect Event PGNS, G&N ERROR
CG 5005 X
C&W lights (Z).
IMU temp light Event IMU TEMP C&W lights

CG 5OO6 X
•';4
(Z).
)!ii!
F
Event ZERO E1NCODER,
CO 5OO7 X Zero encode light
ZERO ENG. C&W
CG 5008 X IMU delay light Event

lights
IMU DELAY.
(2).
C&W
[
-: :4 light,
CG 5020 X AGC alarm i Event PROG ALM, COMB

::I
(Program) FAIL' (DSKY lights).
CD 5021 X ACC alarm 2 Event COMP DSKY lights (2).

[
(AGC activity)
CG 5022 X AGC alarm 3 (TM) Event TM FAIL, COMP

:3
FAIL. (DSKY lights).
CG 5023 X AGC alarm 4 (prog Event CHECK FAIL, COMP
ck fail) FAIL. (DSKY lights).

_z_
CG 5024 X AGC alarm 5 Event SCALER FAIL, COMP

ii{ FAIL. (DSKY lights).
(scaler fail)
X
CG 5025 X AGC alarm 6 Eve nt PARITY FAIL, COMP
(parity fail) FAIL. (DSKY lights).
CG 5026 X AGC alarm 7 Event COUNTER FAIL,
(counter fail) COMI ° FAIL. (DSKY

lights).
CG 5027 X AGC alarm 8 (key Event KEY RLSE (DSKY

. :) release) lights) (Z).
CG 5O28 X AGC alarm 9 (rupt Event RUPT LOCK, COMP
lock) FAIl,. (DSKY lights).
"!
.,._ _:._ i o:" ......... Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 Change Date ...... Page 2 2-44 [
t
i
SM2A-03-SC012
APOLLO OPEK-\TiONS }4ANDBOOI<
SYSTEMS DATA
Nominal
!,
Sensor Ope rating

.x, lca su r ¢i_]0 nt
Crew Display
Range Range
Num be r Descrip_i,_n
ii
TC TRAP, COMG
AGC alarm 10 (TC; Event
:] CG 5029 X
ii:j
J
B trap)
FAIL.
AGC PWR
(DSKY
FAIL
lights).
Event
: .. ,j GG 5030 X Computer power fail
(DSKY lights) (2).
light
T B D None
]
:: <i
::_cG 6000 p iMU pressure
None
T]3D
<_CG 6020 T PSA temp I tray 3
T]3D Norm
-':-'CG 6021 T PSA temp Z tray Z
TBD None
::-'GG 6022 T PSA temp 3 tray 4
2.2.7 G&N POWER CONSUMPTION.
The optics are only powered up when a star or landmark sighting is
required. The subsystems power leve}s are as follows:
Control Power Reqmt's

Description
325.0 watts (de)

CB 59 and58
IMU--opera.te
CB 61 an',] 60 61-7 watts (de)
standby
C13 57 and 56 115.0 watts (dc)

AGC--operate
AGC Mode Switch 15.0 watts (de)
standby
GB 55 and 54 124.4 watts (de)

Optics --operate
14.4 watts (de)
Controls and displays GB 93 and 62

and Switch No. 7
10.0 watts (de)
AGC only
10-7 watts (dc)
AGC and IMU
18-7 watts (de)
Full G&:N operation
iil 7-0 watts (de)
Minimum power consumption is 76.7 watts (de) when AGC and IMU are in
the standby mode.
b"J
2, 2-45
. .,.::,< • 12 .Nov 1966_Change Date ]Page
:,[_\! Mission ]3as_c Date
z_
5a
{
!
SMEA-03-SC01 Z
APOLLO OPEAATIONS HANDBOOK

i
S Y S T]{ivIS DATA
!
INTERFACE SIGNALS.
i Z.2.8
The following list p_ovides the signal, source, and description of the
<!
interface signals.
Signal Name [.....

7
, Source Description
q
Stabilization and Control System _/_c'q_o, and G&N System, Interface
E
AGC Provides pulse train that lasts as long as the engine
En{g ins c)n-.off
(Apollo is required I:o fire. The time at which the signal
7¸:
guidanc e ter_dnates takes into .accouni: electronic delays
:.% 4 con's, puts r) within the SCS and tail-off characteristics of the
engines,
i ii!
Discrete signal AGC Provides continuous guise train to the SCS to be
carrier s'witched back to the ,AGC.
G&N system attitude SCS Provides power to an attitude cont_o! switch on the
control (or SCS G&lq system.

attitude control)
Minimum irnpulse G&N ]Disables all three attitude channels simultaneously
enable system and supplies voltages to an attitude control switch

on the G&N system..
_t .
,q Minin<turn irnpulse+ SGS Provides six signals to the G&-,,,' syste:_. :._o_:
....1 ) _9..I !t
and- pitch, yaw, and controller ope ratio:,a.

roll
Minimum impul se G&N Provides the-capability to initiate spacecraft attitude
pitch, yaw, and roll system changes in the G&N system attitude control mode or
the SCS attitude control r6,ode. These changes will
be initiated by discrete minimum impulses. x
Pitch error body offset G&N Provides pitch attitude error signal to the SCS.
and body axis system
Yaw error body offset G&N Provides yaw attitude error signal to the SCS during
a:,:is system G&N system entry mode.
',3
Yam, error body axis Provides yaw attitude error signal to the SCS during
normal G&N system operating modes.
.Roll error body offset G&N Provides roll attitude error signal to the SCS during
i!
a:.,i s systen_ G&N system entry mode.
{{
Roll error body axis G&N Provides roll attitude error signal to the SCS during
}
syste_n normal G&N system operating modes.
GU].DANCE .AND NAVIGATION SYSTEM
• _l, B h tOI%, Basic Date !Z Nov 19j)6 Change Data ............................... Page 2,. 2-46
(i
;ii;]
_J
SMZA-.03--SC012

i
%1] SYSTEMS DATA
il :!<
Signal Name Source Description
G&N Provides an 800 cps, synchronous, in-phase voltage

!kiU 28V 800 cps
(demodulator reference system from the G&N system.

<i
G&N Provides total attitude signals to the SCS.
I.XIU sin AIG IX,
IMU cos AIG 1X, system
.I
IMU sin AMG IX',
i .:!!I IMU cos AMG IX,
U IR.fU sin AOG IX, and
IMU cos AOO 1X
Electrical Power System (EPS) and G&N System Interface

:: 1
+28 vdc AGC bus A and EPS Provides power to the'AGC.
bus B
,.:!
-!28 vdc optics bus A EPS Provides power to the optics subsystem.
and bus B
<¸_;
;I
:2
!:!::j
+28 vdc IMU bus A EPS Provides power to the IMU.
and bus B
+Z8 vdc standby bus A EPS Provides IMU temperature control power.
iIi_
and bus B
3
llSv 400 cps EPS Provides power for all G&N system 6-volt lamps
:[
Communication and Instrumentation System and G&N System Interface
AGC Synchronizes data transferred from the AGC to the

Ii DLNK sync
..:,, communications and instru_tc)entation system.
/ </I
!:::
J
AGC Permits two AGC words to be transferred from the
%!i_'
. i
,! AGC to the com_unications and instrumentation
_] DLNK end
system. Stops the AGC and the transmission of
t( 1
data from the AGC to the communications and
instrumentation system.
]
DLNK start AGC Provides pulse signal that occurs at the beginning
/_i
-I
of every data transmission to the communications
and instrumentation system. Sets flip-flop in AGC
that enables 5-stage downlink counter.
AGC, Initiates by ])I_,NK start, stopped by DLNK end, and

_ DLNK data consists of a 40 bit telemetry word (two AGC words
and an 8 bit telemetry word order code).
ii U LNK 1
AGC Transmitted to the uplink counter in the AGC.
Adds one to uplink counter and shifts the counter

one increment.
...._
GUIDANCE A,_.,
Tlr_ NAVIGATION SYSTEM
i_l Mission Basic DatelZ_[o21196 _ ....Change Date ......... Page 2..Z-47
.......... ,..:,:.,. ,..., ,..,, ,.., ,- , ,.,. ..., .,,, . ., :..: .... : . • ,..: :, :.
J SMZA-03-SC0 iZ [
SYSTEMS DATA
:<.,
Description
.blgna, Name Source
Transmitted to the uplink counter in the AGC.

i" ! _.'< 1< 0 AGC
k__ Shifts up!ink counter one increment.
•:ii [
[
.[
a
[
[
[
[
<6
i:i-!
[
[
[
Basic Date 12 Nov 1966____Chanf,

e_ _ Date Page
t. Z-48
S/viZA - 0 3 - SfJ0 1 2,
]>.i:
SYSTEMS DATA
SECTION Z
SUBSECTION Z. 3
STABILIZATION AND CONTROL, SYSTEM (SCS)
Z.3.1 INTRODUCTION.
i_
I
The stabilization and control system (SCS) provides a capability for
controlling rotation, translation, and thrust vector forces with additional
:!ii_i D capability of rate stabilization.
The SCS is divided into three bas{c subsystems: attitude reference,

attitude contro], and thrust vector conl.rol. These subsystems contain the
? elements
control,
which
and thrust
provide
vector
for manual
control,
attitude
plus manual
control,
backup
automatic
provisions
attitude
for all
<il automatic functions,
:iil :::il
The subsystdm/control capability allows the free selection of several
modes of operation which fall within the boundaries of three entirely
D different
environment),
environment),
flight control
powered
and
profiles.
flight (atmospheric
atmospheric
These
flight (entry
include coasting
- ascent,
- unpov_ered).
and
flight (earth
earth orbital
orbital
Spacecraft displays provide a capability for monitoring S/C attitude,

S/C rates, attitude errors, cautions, and warnings. Controls provide
switch arrangements for commanding modes, commar.ding inpuLs to change
operating status and to permit manual override to all automatic functions.
The SCS interfaces with the following S/C systems (See figure Z. 3-!).
D o Teleconqmunications System (T/C)
Provides clock reference frequency for measurement of changes in
D S/C
Receives
velocity
all down-link telemetry from SCS

>
D Provides up-data position information via AGC or voice
Electrical Power System (EPS)
Provides primary power for SCS operation
e Environmental Control System (ECS)
D Transfers heat Irom SCS electronics
....
il STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM
_{,".'_} Mi.sslon Basic Date 1Z Nov 196__ Chang e Date Page 2. 3-I
i!
i_ : _:i .......... < :_!i?_ _: _' :::::_ : : : _ :7_ ::::::_:_:'

]
SMZA-03-SG0 ! Z
APOI.,LO OPER-A-TIO1NTS HANDBOOI(

L_
[:!
S Y S T]£MS !)ATA
z
(
UP'DOWN DATA
LINK
TELEMETRY MEASUREMENTS
LF-Z--]__
L_q__
_'Z_ i " ATTITUDE ERRORS

> I
GUIDANC , SPS ON-OFF |
AND J
NA'_'iGAIION
i SYSTEM ] SPS THRUST ON-_)FF ............................

7-] SPS
SPS GIMB&L COMM&NDS '_ t

'I'TOTA L
i TT!TUDE
RCS AUTO ON-OFF
]i> STABILIZATION
AND
CONTROL
i,c l
l ! . _rSWITCH COMMANDS SYSTEM
COOLING | I
i j
I......
i
TP,ANSLATION j TRANSLATION
->
I
COMMANDS
i
i PROPORTIONAL
°sw,,cH,No
Lij
l ROTATION 1
I CONTRO_ I ROTATION
COMMANDS FUNCTIONS
d
{. L-----. r, J
D!RECT RCS ROTATION COMMANDS
SM-2A-676D [
l'_igure Z.3-!. SGS Functional Interface
• STABtLIZATIOb] AND CONTELOL SYST_E]v[
'_:'-' '.,:n Basic Date 1g >,_ov 1966 Chap.g e Date, Page ._,_?._.J_-=2_, !:
L
5
!i!_ +<¸¸¸¸4
APOLLO OPEItATION,q HANDBOOK
• _c _" q DATA
Sequential Events Control System (SECS)
Provides abort switching function
By switch control in SCS, initiates abort and enables control fur_ctions

in SCS
Guidance and Navigation System (G&N)
Provides roll, pitch, and yaw total attitude inputs to SCS
Provides attitude error signals
Provides thrust on/off command for SPS engine
Provides steering commands to TVG during G&N AV
o Propulsion Systems (SPS, RCS).
The service propulsion system generates internal forces for large

velocity changes
The reaction control system generates the internal forces required

for rotation, and translation.
A detailed description and function of the SCS controls and displays

referred to Js provided in section 3.
Z.3. Z FUNCTIONAL DESCP_IPTION.
The functional description of the SCS covers the major areas of

control capabilities, Apollo reference axes, and subsystem description.
2.3.2.1 Control Capabilities.
Control capability exists for tl{e manual attitude control, automatic

attitude control, and thrust vector control functions. The following
paragraphs provide a brief discussion of each control function.
Z.3. Z.I.I Manual Attitude Control.
k4anually commanded inputs converted to electrical signals, directly

or indirectly, cause the propulsion systems to _<naneuver the spacecraft to
a desired attitude and/or change the flight path (trajectory) of the space-
craft. ManUal controls include two independent rotation controllers
(figure Z. 3-8), two trans]ation controllers (figure Z. 3-8), and an arrange-

,_qent of panel-mounted controls and displazs.
STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM
[_!._ Mission Basic Date 12 Nov !_966 _Change Date ..... Page_. _Ji .......
L_ SMZA-03-SG01 Z
?i.' APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
' /i
SYSTI£MS DATA
7
The rotation controllers command discrete on-off signals for the

'i
')
reaction control system to initiate angular rotations about the S/C X-, Y-,
and Z- axes or combinations of these axes. The X-, Y-, and Z.-axes are
WT:i:_
synonomous with the S/G geometric coordinate system of roll (qb), pitch (0),
f4d
and yaw (_), respectively. (See figure Z.3-Z.) These commands are
primarily used for S/C attitude (orient__tion) control. The translation

i.i ¸
controllers, when operated, command signals for the reaction, control
system to initiate translations (acceleration) along the S/C X-, Y-., and Z-
axes or combinations oi these axes. These comrnands for the ASZ04A
i¸ :?
mission are primarily initiated to perform ullage maneuvers prior to SPS

•
< i!
3,
thrusting. Pane]-mounted switches are used for attitude set control _7
functions, application of electrical power, evaluating system status, and
selection of operating modes,
The displays provide indications of _otal attitude, attitude errors,
angular rates, and caution and warnings.

:_:: 1 7f
2 3.° i Z Automatic Attitude Control.

[
Automatic attitude _.ontrol is a capability whereby attitude errors and
rotational rates are sensed by gyroscopic devices which, in association

Wi,
i:_ [
_7 -Z QUA D S/_RCS EN_JNES
I
I
A _,_ POWER SOURCE MAIN BUS A
[-!
.\ o ,OWE, O. E k
_ii'_ _ , ¢_\ \ n _I_, p,c_ E_'o' .XE_
/-IqW _ ,_,,I " i \ - f-c-_-._ /

+×-(--__2-_
'_dr/ I ,,_-_" / ,;e_,.-W-_/ _,E_ _ ,OWE_SOU_CE_,_
: i!!_ -Y l0 -- -
:• "4
...... C'"ON ,',Xi_ QUAD "-_i' ,

[
:;7
1_!.7-r?(
[:
......... I_BODY C
':-'
_ ,.
it
', C
./"
_ ....
i
_x\C(Sq_
]yg
\
/_\_ X
3_o//
"_"" , _'--_.l
330 "
COORDINATES NOTE: Wheil operating
<Oil AOp_l_llorl),
bu_ for oll engines
C/M or N.,"M RC5
p.........cc_lmondedi$n_oin
by
[
without pioporllonol rote (engine dl,ect
+ZB SM-2A-78 IC
,7 Figure Z.3-Z. G/M-S/M-RCS Engine Location/Apollo

::iii}
:I
Reference Z,_xes
[
STABILIZATJON AND GON'flt.OL SYSTEM
% #
13asic Date 12 Nov
......... 1966 ...
L.nange ])ate ............
(3
qt
i Eq APOLLO
SMZA-03-SC0
OPERATIONS
!2
HANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
with electronic and logic circuits, automatically induce the propulsion
systems to maintain a desired inertially fixed attitude. Translatio_

capability is not an automatic control function.
Two methods of automatic attitude cop.trol are available. One method !:: i!
reqhires the use of con_ponents of the SCS to establish desired attitude

references, and for sensing attitude changes and rates of change. Three
orthagonally mounted rate gyros sense angular rates about the S/C X-, v_ ,
and Z-axes. Body-mounted attithde gyros (BMAGS) and attitude gyro
coupling unit (AGCU) establish attitude reference and determines attitude

error. The attitude error signals and rate gyro signals _>e electronically
conditioned and subsequently provide a rate-damped automatic attitude hold
with respect to an inertially fixed attitude. The attitude is held with drift
rates kept within acceptable limits (deadba_d) for the three axes. A
maximum or mini_num deadband may be selected by the ATT DEADI%A?,-D
switch on the SCS control pane], {E4DC-8). Maximum electrical deadband

a]]ows drift limits of ±4.2 degrees from reference attitude. Niinin_un_l
electrical deadband is ±0. Z degree fro_-n refe'rence attitude.
When a manual maneuver is initiated, the automatic attitude control
function is interrupted. When the man,_al maneuver ceases, the automatic
attitude control function is reinstated and the new attitude will be the new
inertial attitude.
The other method of automatic attitude control incorporates
components of the G&N system; whereby, the combined G[_N/SCS systc_-_s

establish attitude references, and sense attitude change and rate of change.
In addition, the Apollo guidance computer (AGC) can be commanded through
the computer keyboard to automatically establish new attitude references

and maintain attitude hold at the new reference. \Vhen this is done,
attitude change data is taken" from on-board charts or received via the
manned space flight network (MSFN).
The inertial measurement unit (IMU) in the G&N system provides the
inertial reference and senses attitude errors. The rate gyros in the SCS
determine the rates of change. The attitude error signals sensed by the
IMU and SCS rate gyro signals are electronically condition.ed and subse-
quently provide a rate-damped automatic attitude control with respect to

the IMU inertially fixed reference. Again, drift rates about the three S/C
axes are held within acceptable limits.
Manual maneuvers can also be performed when using G&N attitude
control, providing proper switch configuration is established. The auto-

matte hold function is interrupted until the manual maneuver ceases, at
which tirne the automatic function continues to hold at the new inertial
attitude. Inputs to tt_e AGC via the computer keyboard can commay_d the
AGC to realign the IMU to a selected inertial reference. The S/C car, then
be automatically maneuvered to and be maintain.ed at the uew attitude.
I [:-_ Mission Basic Date 1Z Nov 19o Chan_e Date Page Z. ' %
SIVIZA-03-,SC01Z
APOLLO OPERATIO]NS ]IANDBOOI<.
<
i5
When automatic attitude control fanctions are in process, disp].ays
i
are required only for monitoring and comparing attitude with external or
)! known references, and for indications of systems failures.
2.3, Z. I. 3 Thrust Vector Control°
Thrust vector control (TVC), primarily, accomplishes three main

objectives. The first objective is to either, manua!ly or automatically
initiate thrusting of the SPS engine when large velocity changes are
¸¸ill,!
required. The second is to control the thrust vector of the SPS engine such
?
?
that the veckor force iS essentially maintained through the S/C center of
i
gravity (c, g.) in the direction of the velocity correction. The third objective
:[! requires the. automatic, with map.ual backup, termination of SPS thrusting
i when a required velocity change has been attained.
:, When SPS thrusting occurs, th.rust vector control, uses the same basic
,} commands that are used for the attitude control fur, or]on, plus additional.
:{ commands to control the SPS pitch and yaw gimba] sctuators. This combi.-
"',!
nation establishes the three-_axes att.itude control and stability while
:¢ thrusting. The commands to the pitch and yaw gimbal actuators will hold
!! the SPS thrust vector through the S/C c.g. in the direction of velocity
correction, and roll attitude is maintained by the roll attitude control
circuits and the RCS roll engines.
??
¢
•£ There a_:e three methods, or modes, of thrust vector controh ,_N
15
delta V, SCS delta V, and manualthrast vector control (MTVC). G&N

delta V is the primary mode of control for velocity changes. The G&N
:? system inserts comrnands into the SPS gimbat servo circuits to control the
thrust vector and to automatica!ly initiate SPS thrusting. The G&N/SCS
attitude control sensors and electronics perform the remainder of the
control functions.
:}
The SCS delta V is normally used as a backup system in the event of
4 G&N fai].ure. When in O&Ix_ mode of operation, the SCS BMAG/AGCU loop
:}
is aligned to the IMU reference attitude and, therefore, follows the attitude
f
changes sensed by the IMU prior to selecting the AV mode. After selecting
::i!
a &V mode, the BMAG/AGCU loop is opened. In the event of G&N failure : [
t!
or IMU failure, a transfer to SCS delta V will allow continuation of the
)i-
.,I
velocity change using attitude error signal inputs originating from the
-9
BMAGS. For SCS delta V, there are no major differences in operation
'l of the gimbal servo loop and the rate loops,
.}
Mar_ual thrust \_ector control is a control function utilizing panel-
mounted controls, translation controls, and rotation controls. IvITVC is
primarily used to limit excessive rate changes that may be created by
malfunctions in the SCS oz" G&N systerns. Manipulation of the controls
allows velocity changes by the selection of redundant electronics and
redundant actuator motors to control gimbal action.
!:ii_
STABILIZATION AND CONTItOL SYSTEM

i
J ,,_ __ ,':;: c,,, .................. Basic r_at <
I_ Z 2
ta
................................
_cv ]960 Ch"- [ [ l [ g
c Date
z . -- ............................. Page ......Z, 3--6 [
:i
i
h4
bj_ SMZA-03-SC01 fi
! :i
APOLLO OPERATIONS HAND I3OOII
4
SYSTEMS DATA
[':!l Displays allow monitoring the character of a delta V, monitoring
system performance, and detecting system malfunctions.
i:i:?_ 2.3. fi.2 Apollo Reference Axes.
In Apollo, there are two sets of axes, or coordinates, which are used
for _-neasuring changes an S/C attitude. (See figure Z.3-Z.) One set of
coordinates represent the geometric axes of the S/C and are the body axes "
ffii_t XB' YB' and Z B. The other set of coordinates represent the geometric ,
axes of the IMU-optic base or nai*igations base. They are the navigations
axes X N, YN' and Z N. The inertial sensors are mounted and aligned
relative to these two sets of coordinates. The BMAG roll, pitch, arid y_*w
gyros are aligned to the S/C body axes and the IMU is aligned to the
navigations axis.
Z.3. Z.Z.I Body Axes.
As shown in figure Z. 3-Z, the longitudinal (X B) axis passes through
1 the
command
geometric
module;
center
-X
of
B is
the
the
S/C.
opposite.
The +X B
Looking
is' toward
in the
the apex
direction
of the
of the
apex, the +YB-axis is to the right; YB is to the left, The i-Z]3 is in the
direction of the footrest of the center couch and -Z}3 is to,,va±'d the headrest
of the center couch. The S/C e.g. is included in the plane formed by the
X B- and ZB-axes.
:!1 A ÷ roll rotation is a clockwi:se rotation about tl-_e X--axis, looking fro:n
-X to +X; a + pitch rotation is a clockwise rotation about the Y-axis, ]ooking
from -Y to +Y; and a + yam, rotation is a clockwise rotation about the Y..a:<is,
looking from -Z to -]Z.
2.3.2. Z.Z Navigations Axes.
The navigations axes are rotated ÷33 degrees in pitch about the YB-
axis. The XN-axis is parallel to the side of the S/C; the YN-axis is
parallel to the YB-axis; and the ZN--axis is normal to the side of the S/C
and is rotated +33 degrees in pitch about the YN-axis. The ZiB-axis lies in
the same plane as the XN-axis. The _XN-, ±YN-' and±ZN-axes point in
the same relative directions as the body axes. The IMU +X-, iY-, and
+Z-axes are aligned to the +X N- and ÷ZN-axes.
Z.3. Z.Z.3 Optics Base Axes.
A line-of.-sight telescope and sextant, mounted on the optics base,
are used in conjunction with the G&N system to determine S/C inertial
attitude and position. The optics base axe. s are measured in terms of the
shaft and trunnion angles of the telescope and sextant. The shaft a>-es of
the two are parallel to the ZN-axis and trunnion axes are parallel to the:
YN-axis.
•_ • 2
iMi_sion Basic Date 1Z Nov 1966 Change Date ...... Page__,_ ........
SMZA-03-SC0 Ig
APOLLO OPERATIONS IIANDBOOI<
F
I:T!
SYSTEMS _3
x..x-_TA
Subsystems.
•:i z.3. z.3
,] The attitude reference, attitude control, and thrust vector control
subsystems are described in the following paragraphs. The description
covers
association
the purpose
with other
and functions
systems.
of each
Figures
subsystem,
Z.3-3 and
and
Z.3-4,
the integrated
provide simpli-
F
:!
z
fied block, and flow diagrams of the three subsystems and figure Z.3-5
shows the switching logic and functions which affect the three subsystems.
-_ 2.3.2.3.1 Attitude Reference Subsystem.

E
ii
The purpose of the attitude reference subsysl:em (figures Z.3-4 and
Z.3-5) is to relate the S/G attitude in terms of its geome_:ric X, Y, and Z
_i!i!
2<
coordinate system to an arbitrarily chosen coordinate system with a fixed
reference f_arne. The relation between the two coordinate systems repre-
sents inertial attitude and is presented to the astronauts by visual display. [
Visual observation of inertial attitude is necessary to perform manual
maneuvers or for monitoring automadc operations. The flight director
1 attitude indicator (FDA!), located on the S/G main display conso].e, displays
;!
the information required for the manual and auto_c:atic operations. The
information displayed includes S/C total attitude, attitude error in three
:ii
axes, and rotational rates in three axes. The information displayed by the
:i
FDAI is obtained from either the G&N system or the SGS.
There are two attitude references associated with the attitude

reference subsystem: primary and backup. The primary reference is [
J obtained through the mechanization of subsystems within the (]_lq system.
The backup reference is mechanized within the SCS. Each of the attitude
reference loops contain three basic elements: a computer, an inertia].
:ii reference device, and a visual display.
Attitude Reference/G&N_ To obtain an inertia], reference using the [•

) -._ [
G&N system, the astronauts, the G&N optics subsystem, the inertial and
computer subsystems, and the MSFN are integrated to forrn a closed loop
system.
The G&N system is used to determine inertial attitude and position

and initiates alignment of the stable element of the IMU to the desired
inertial reference initially established by optical sightings.
I
iI After IMU alignment, the IMU in conjunction with the AGC can
t
provide inertial-referenced attitude hold and, if required, inertial-

referenced velocity changes. Translational velocities are sensed by
accelerometers mounted on the IMU stable e!e_nent. The A(]G processes
the accelerometer signals to update velocity and change information for
TVG functions.
In addition to the optical alignment of the IMU, the astronauts can use
the computer subsystem to establish ]MU alignment.
STABILIZATION AND GONTROL SYSTEM
}.: ..... :,.)n Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 Ch_p_e Date Page Z_3-8
4
SIviZA -03-SG012
¢ A]POLLO OI_EI<ATIONS HANDBOOK

4]
SYSTEMS DATA
q
LOGIC INPUT
"_'_ A UX 1_--- G&NIN PUTS
_ _%__j_-- i_¸ . !:_

J I
[i_:i!::
_:_:!?
,i
[ L
-F"
SPS ENGINE ON,/OFF SIGNALS
ERPOR
D [_PACT E " _ V ltqC RE ME NTS
,!i!
POLL, PO1ATION &
1---1 I
rRANS r
I
ACCEL LOOP
AUTO COILS
_i
------¢ D/AGAA ECA
I ANO AGAA . BM_,G I
PEED_CK
POSITION
i!1 YAW
ECA'S
SWITCHING
LOOP
BMAG
OUTPUTS
COMM'H'JDS TO 1_ '
SCS CONTROL SIGNALS
PANEL
i LOGIC _J-- J0....
[ULER
ERf_OR
SPS GIMBAL
[ GPI
j PORI[ION
SPS G ffV,_AL I.I I • IO ROLl
SPS
SOLENOIDS
I
I ------_" RCS
e
--"_i ROLL
PITCH
" i
S/C ROTATIONAL
.----D- CLUTCtIES
j,_PuTsTO RGP
RATES
YAW CONTROL PITCH
ECA'S
TP_NSLA_!ON
.',WANDS
TRANS ---- RAT_ FEEDBACK { POSITION _
_" AND PAIE
_LAGE CONTROL SWDCHING LOGIC
i [ MESC RANSLATION _'O_'RO L '' • FEEDBACK
EULEP
ERROR
3 &V_G CI UICH
"_ DIRECT COILS
CONT TRANSDUCER OUTPUTS CONTROL
POI ROTATION CONTROL _'I _"
:j
G&N iNPUTS -{_l
"- CONTROL SURSYST[M

THRUSY _/ECTOR CONTROL SU,_SYbTEM
SM-2A-935R LOOP
Figure Z.3-3. SGS Functional ]31ock Diagram
STA!%ILIZATION AND CON'I'I_.OL SYSTI£M
Mission Basic Date Ig Nov ....1966 Chan_c[4 D_te_ _ ......... Page _._,___c_J.Z_5-]_O
]
-!!
,MU J
1
ATTITUDE SET/AGCU
EULER RESOLVER COMPARISON
).
CLOSED i AO_ I J I ,_RULSE
G&N
CRROR CLOSED / "_ j j CONTROL
SCS L / PANEL J
MODES
r INE'rIALq
L_._2u
i
,_ NAV ATTITUDE NAV

_:_ AXES SET AXES
TORQUING NAV ATTITUDE [OTAL
i_ AXES ERROR • K'[TITUDE
..it ERROR
SWITCI riNG
LOGIC
L_
SIGNALS
_--] / l-- S'/c6-NGuLAR

vE'°c_---- _J /
I I I-- R,>A,
C,,M_L
_R,VE
_,_..._S _I I . ..... ..2.:, S_F;CHING L
RC,A
t............ _ _/AOAA
ECA __OT.._,o_A_ RATE_--I RDA, I
___CS PANkLCONTRO] INPUTS
_ RRO_O_T_
CDU ATTITUDE ERROR R[_c)TAT I0 N 't ROIAT!O!'.

ONTROL D_DIRECTROTA
BODY AXES BODY AX_!S

ATTITUD _- GYRO TOROUIt IG
ERRORS/OR
:I BACKUP RATE
CONTROL "_K,kNSI ATION

MODES "Q----_ CONTROL OUTPUT FG_
j ] TR;kNSL ATIC
I
:I
] BREAKOUT
:ii ROTATION
CON _ROL STEERINC"

_ SCS CONTROL
PANEL
INDICATOR
I /_. V DIRECT ULLS
COMMANDS ......
ATTITUDE REFERENCE SU_SY3T[M

d
0
o
• °
AGCU
"/OIAL ANGLE
• o,M_L / _7------7
RESOLVEk XMI ['1ER BLSOL'ER
CONTOL
i
.
+ i
rl. ' h:/
#
4 .039. _ . --'-
..... I BODY TO
1 ' LD L=_ '--_v" [ co_vE.,ON

1
,1
:',t 7
-%-- I ---
:xc.......! k.2q.)l_4___,.L.A.,, ,F-E_,=o
• _-LhZ_J I L _.::__!_._,o_
I_D 4,J K_ 7 RESOLVER XMIiTER FESOi_ER
CON_OL
i " ,d:i,?_Z,ON I_'O"A_OLVd

sIGrL'5-[
_-.E._
.LOL_VE
RI ,_+
_ii!I
--] IKh, l ', r CON,_,_" ,I
1 /<- .... ---t ( "_ / I'_-----I LOGIC k.1
-_
/ 1"<_-->// i [ _+ /
t
/ L_--._.J I _D_---- "
.%v I / "_,_0_ '°"L_o_-.-_4T_h'-T
.-o
:ONVEP,-
I _ T'_+ I SM
]i
SIGN I r-_--m I ------_
I ---l_d , F CONT_O_
/ I I I _ )/<_t---'1 _OGIC 14---------
/m--------F--I _ I _ L eo j
I _ L=____.I I FDA_--F----'----"
--_"_'_ I SIGNAL RESOLVER I _j_-_,_J _ ^ 'T_,'_ . ,_,
1 _xc.... _ --Ft_ ,,_-.,3,' EU_._

] i -"l_Ve_'J' L _,o:J .,o_
PESOLVER XMITTER I FDAI
{ co_,_I_---- I
fl
_illI FDAI |
OGAI_
4b, '-+I_T-A - _+
't._-c.Z/__d-- -_
e
SM ATTITUDE REFERENCE FUNCrlONAL CO'4TROL LOOP
_iI i
::]
+iiiliL
i :
iJ
•:}
;]
+
I
:_ i_
::"-','.' ". _T:::::: :::: :::: :::::::::: --:_ ,:, -,-!7,'::::::+-_::,_:-,: ........... :-:t-_T= , .,+:::.-: ....... ":- ::- - :: ............. :'--: .... 7' _ ........ :--m +,: ,, ..... ::,, f-:: -,+. .....
x
_4
0
0
<
<
0
0
_a
0
<
ii;
!!i_
:t::_
, !i
L____--_, i I --
7;T;, o0. ..... ,,j--

KI2 ....................
'° 1i /looJI rRoA<s_s>

I I oY_o i _YRO I
q
CYR_' I<'/------tO"ROS_R_
/o%_%7X
/
_.:i
i
/ ! h ..... ; ..... I..... ._1 _1
• _= _ _.__L_---:-- --F-----4....... -:- '

,RE-.I ..... :_----P----------------:
:- -- :...... _----
• - -q--------4------------ _L_ ____1__-+ROLL
/ _<I"_S
_OLL
"I_- ROLL I G&N ALTITUDE ERRORS
PITCH
.! TO
PI]CH
ACS ROLL
CHANNELS
AND
qb> ROLL ] [
I ..............
•
_ PITCH
i
B/U RATES
_OI I AiqD PITCH
_,hCAG ATTiIUD£
"fO ACS
CHANNELS
[RROkS O1_
----j,--
::i!t r-!Tt,% MTVC
KllA RTOUT
I KII
MTVC PITCH RATES I,
"_ 10 PI'I'CH TVC CHANN[L
;Ll-i
--'. .........
li
.... . --q
!
' I I
I
I
I - G&N ATI IU
R_
!
I B_AG ATTITUDE ERRO?S 0" i
':eDI
G&N 1H,RUS1 ON/OFF SIGNAL (PULRE fP, AIN) lO Si i
[!.
=:::
I
I
)/AGAA ECA (SCS)
K4
4k
AGCU
CAGED
R, I'
KS
•I h EDDY TO I L_¢,
NAV AXES .....
41- CONV
_II.
AGCU
ALIGN
i ERR AGAA
K6 ----_-. ---I I -A---- --

H'
._ ,-'..I.... __.c__
II
.... ---,_ --.u--L-
l}
J
p/Y ERR I
G&N --_
,
P_ Y ERR
• K8 K8 F__ _ ,
o I/ \_,::_-_, _!
_7,._,,,'-'__W.';<+
i;, " AND .
0.1+ / _.s_-" ! / / /
R, P, YATT
i ....... - ....
II FA,'i_,....... I I I ----I-
I o.L
L_J
-r_G_I_ _ _°<_'<Aw".,._.
t SO_iVER ATTITUDE _lIJI_
L_..=] L__] .,o,

TOTAL ANGLE
........ J !
@_i__ _
. . .... _. ,
i ' I " L _T ...... _

_ .L_____°'_I I:_ _'jU _,.
---{ _I_ _i
l i
:::::
i?;
£:
l
SM2A-03-SC0i2
APOLLO OPERATIONS II_IqDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
":!i
4
cmo_x c: _gx cm _x
/ , ,/ _//_//// ' i!iTi
i
._w/+x +yA - -yAw
OU_
i ON/O_F ,x
0,_?!
...... _,/
J r AUIO COILS (kCS)
1
yAW CHANNEL 5/)4 I
:!iM_ I .P_ 1
J
_NO. S
t W';
:ii P,,m_ SOS _NTRM I J-._L_
LK,
_
'i
I INTEG_A_EF,
MINIMUM
h'IGD_
I _PULSE CO
FUNCTIONS
b;TRCL J
_
I I
=
::i
i I
+YAW I
I
I
I_'-I _ -YAW I
_L_ _ -x
I I C/M J
J DmECT OLLAG_
J I• _._ -Y_W
[ _TGTF_Z_
_.:_ L___ I ....

t i l YAW CHANNEl.
!:1i_
•iJ iJ ,®
O&N OR YAW e_._KO INPUT
I I
TO 8" A_TITUDE LIMli{_
.<D TO
IVC
SU_-
I I I i NO'6
ROTATION CONTROL yAW
•i D_eF_C[
...............
I
I
I 'I
i
J
! --L_
I ,_ NO.6
COM,VANO Io MTvC
KZ)
sHI
....
tOOlC _tO. _.3-_
i !1
I I
_ U .... s/_
..... _ ,-_----_. _ I Z,
..... _____ _ ,' _ I_
I
;il Rcs
• "' '
I
,
I !
I
i
L_"°'s
I-_" q_ THRUST
ON/'O_F
L- _ cM, , --K-.T---TLj .... LOGIC
"" _ vac-_ 1 I I TO $_
A ......
,_I , ..... AND
ACCEL
I ....... / ,[q-H--" II Z" II

-_
rig
SNI
_._-4
4
L_S A_O_T " _ v_-
I
I
I Figure Z.3-4. SGS l_'unctJonal Flow Diagram (Sheet Z of 4)
STABILIZA TION AND CONTIIOL SYSTEM
i Mission Basic Date 12 iNov 196_6 Change Date Page.._J____.3_14
:i
J I
:3
iLL_,
"{:!_
/'4
%!
r_
,I
:i
i,! !
:Li
L_
SMZA-03-SC01Z
APOLLO OPERA'T!OI'!S I{ANDBOO}¢
SYST_MS DATA
,, ;: •7:•¸¸
I YTV DIFF '_

I CLUTC_ VOLTS I
\ COM_ /
\--_ _-_--_
GIMS/kL ]
ACfUA'_OR
l_ -- , ! _ _[ CLUTCH | |
| "_",,. r-- .... -_7----_[-q _x.r_N_;_o._|--I
') b' L -" .... i-_is_._£-N_,_

_,-_o
i
• I -_ II [ ,,,_w_os '_
--- l -I\
, -- .... _L_h_.No._ .... T-- : _._A_ , I "_Z'_c_D''°

i / / , ____J yaw GiM_
"k ,.,L _ .... ] ......... 2-- ANGLE INDICATOR
S S k I
I ---" b_--°m_ ° "_ F _. I____ -_ I ! _ _ #

I _ /
I
----I RETRACT NO 2 " II _-
_( _'2_" _:_,:l SERVO_'_" S_R

'{__?O NO.1"4
. 2 ! "_" _ //_--=- _ 'Ill
2r-
T "bf "-----------__/_xT_N_ _-_o._F'-q I
:i SM-2A-1037C
Figure Z.3-4. SGS Functional Flow Diagram (Sheet 3 of 4)
STABILIZATION AND CONTROL, S_LSTEM
I Z Nov 1966 Page Z. 3-[5/.2-: 3-!6

_Ais s_on Basic Date Change Date ....
]
j :]:;iI
.:?!.i_
: i
K30
ENG
IGN
- 20V
A THRUST VECTOR CONTROL SLIBSYSTEM
, t(28
SYS GRD CK
f DMOD
-2o
TRIM POT
A[ YAW
G,M_L
NO. 2
:_.20
VDC
.]
ii .....
:-|
• / I/_lJ
e/4777
.o7 o7
?/_o/
MAJOR MODE
iliil SCS _V
r_ BMAG YA _,
INTEGRATED MODE FUNCTIONS
ENGINE IGNITION
SYSTEM GRD CHECK
MTVC ENGAGE
TVC MONITOR
TVC NO; 1OFF
c) G&N OR 'f
FROM
FIG 2.3-4_
SHT 2
O r;EMODUL,
NOTE:
1. For SwHch_ng Logic

Details, See Figure
2.3-5, Shts 3 & 4
2. ForZ'_Codes, See
Figure 2.3-9
:!iil
1 _..Q EOI'ATIO_
FROM
FIG 2,3-4 MTVC bkT
SHT I
]
8
i:i] ii!
_¸
_!!I
SMZA-03-SC01Z
U
APOLLO Ot°EE<A .27-O7'7S I-£ANDBOOK
t'7'_
SYSCF]E?..{S DATA
L_
NO_'IVAL/OFFI'_ q I SPS ENGI;,_E 1

i:':J DIRECT O_2
COILS
SWITCN _ l
<!!i
]
!_ 12 z I
7!,_
g_+28 VDC MNA.---_._ _"i'- _ Z, _1
I J AND
NO. 2
I
!:i:j ._ N O R/,.,V:L i
I U I I I
_,_ _ t_, DIRECT ON ! 'f-- 1 ! I
:'_k! i
..... -o.-,, NO. 3
,9, +_8vDc ]
L _-t-_._
_ MNB _ _ NO. 4
iIQ . w m ,
::m\
;OLENOID
VgR OUT
I0. 1 __/ --_- .. ----_ L) -L__P. To MOOE
iil;i
] ISOL"-_ I Y----- "_ ------'--_" I _ ENGINEIGNITION LOGIC
/[ I I/
_ T-mJ
i:iiil
1
i']
/ .,----._
,-_
Isol"-.. I s_sSOLE.O,D
_,
FDAI ---I OVR'>-- .... --.a------- -- - -- "l DRIVE_
our }
B_dGHTNESS I AMPL_/* ..... i NO. 2 1 ..
17 CONTROL
'*c-_n.
/i
i DVR i _ Kuu
'_
TH_US'r .......... OaN_V -----I%_%-I'----
o !
' 3o_ _ ....... --T;]-;_-;-
' / '''_O<tENGFCsMIM22[tTFUNCTIONSIGNITION _--¢'<-::=

? '-_i_'--
] NOTES:
1. For De!la Codes _r_

See Fig. 2.3-9.
SPS THRUST ON/OFF LOGIC AND 2. For Switching Logic

ACCELEROMETER ELECTROI41CS Details, See Fig. 2.3-5, Sht 4.
SM-2A-1038C
Figure Z. 3-4. SCS Function_'l Fl.ow Diagram (Sheet 4 of 4)
S'rABILIZA'I'ION AND CONTROL SYSTEM
;7 t._ Mission_ Basic Date 1Z Nov 1966

.... Change Date ...............
° Page Z.3-17/Z.3-18
,<
1
..... <!:: : i i:{:,_i

:,
i
r
I
1
i
i
1]NY_ AVldSI(I A_
4
[idi_
¢ ";_
.i
7i::i:] r _v SETswlr(
L_,usv
:_iii_iill
I:_ l T,RUST
SWITCH O, "_.7"
_..._ b e _i
%¸!':!{ IVC NO, 1

POWER SW!TCH
1B z,_ wc--_/_-,_*--_
r _ _ .....
d:--l--
FROM [@ +X TRANSLATION
FIG. 2.3-4 _
-5
SHT 2 [@ DIRECTULLAGE
G&N THRUST
FROM _G&N THRUST ON/OFF ON/OFF

FIG 2 3-4 ....... _" _-
(AC) I PULSE TRAIN I(DC)
SdT'l " _ (PULSE TRAIN) J (PULSE IRAINAND CONVER1 ER ,_
" J DSKY ENTRY KEY)

q
!i:!
\ _:Cour /
SHT I [R
:,!i!i
L
:i
SMfiA.-03--SC012
[!
APOLLO OPER.ATIO Y_rSI-IA]<DBOOY.
oYo r s.,.'.._ DATA
d; ROTATION CONTROL BREAKOUT SW!TCI4ES CSS _7
T A V MTVC ENGAGE _
L
:1 2.3-.4 SHT 2 I TPd_.NSLATION CONTROL CW SWITCH T SWITCH Ax.__/ F
:{ FROM FIG.
o!i' LI<:
U
;!
J [ o Av , G&N COr,nROt
S.v
O&NATTnUDE _
QFF
i
SCS A V
: 4 Io _v Y
q
OFFI Sv_TiCH SCS

Li
:5 • L. _.?,._R_! LOCALV_U,CALP
::!lit ..... i _,_-.... ,---- sg } CONTROL --
<:!iiii .... :r . ATT DFADBAND

i:i!:!]
I_____ Sw!_CH /¢dNIMUM
ATTITUDEMONITOR/ ,_____._.___u. Mq_.r'' Z_f" n :'"'::b _,
ENTRY SWITCH "_<_ i !
-L,®;;....
ATTITUDE
MONITOR
°'MONITOR
K
G&N ENTRY
SWITCH /Wf_% _---- .... .05G ENIRY
j SWITCH
G&N/SCS 1
7! G&N _ .05G
:1!_i] 28 VDC e-:- .0")G MA N L!AI.
U ,-_ _;.,:sc--[ " I

/ .... % _,
N ,
; ®'I#
2 i %_ ATTITUDE
q D MONITOR
ENTRY
5C5 ENTRY
FDAI
sH_. :_. i@]!

<,i!ili H_ A 4-28 VDC %}
4 RATF GYRO L.;
SWITCHES
OFF
i, D ':I_.............
U U _ - "_'_-_ ,
ROLL P,,/U RATE
"¢_4 BMAG
PITCi4 B/U PATE

, _:iI
Z/_ ----t .... -_ NORMAL -fi
NOTE: For delta codes A, / BMAG
see Fig 2.3-9 /
L..____.-_ NORt.,'b% _'_I. _1' B "IN RATE
h
4
] BMAG
SCS MODE
N SWITCI4ES
sM- 2A-I O'_gB
Figure g. 3.-5. SCS Switching Logic (Sheet 1 of 4)
STAbiLIZAT].OI_ A]TqD CO:<']:ROi; SYST]£Si
:] ]3as[c Date ]Z Nov 1966 Change Date Page Z.3-19/g. 3-ZO

i Mission
:i
SMZA--03-SC01Z
A PO LLO OPEP_ATIONS t-LANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
MONITOR YAW B/U P_,TE _.
G&NATTCONT] • I RO_"b_ -" "-----I \ _ F._ ROLl B/U I'_.
_ff'x_- 1 F----7 _i/. I°)----I _-J&_-"-----_ K0 c RA1E r-I.,A__

RIT.H B/U_,ATE L.l I÷ ] I._l _ .... "{ - r---------.l--J, '1 -7 KI2-A
_J .L
............. .-------I.../ "J_ _ Kll $ PITCH I PITCH I v 4 _OLL
- i_wc_j WURT I ";2,?/_ _T
= RT I _' _ /1
.05G MANUAL t[ ;
i_ •
ATT SET ----+----- + _ K9-A
ROLL B/U RT ROLL
j G&N ENTRY
-..-____
--_--'
i qi_ ! _-_
ERR
AGAA
, ' ........-----_ __.r <,, I _7"A,,I _%<1 _ RE_':c"
¢.---
= _ _jvc _>JB/URTI _'EI r_ _L
------4_ I _ , ouT / d+)----_ =,_<
•
P.TC.
o,uR, ___J_
, -i+i--__ '19;&
K!I
..... _ J _j _RR
MTVC
RT
T .... --_ ± T _,vc2 _/oRT
m
OUT OUT
+28 VDC
A.+28 VDC ---- SELF (ST)
lEST
-L,, _.ff
FDAI
+28 VDC ALIGN
ATTITUDE
F[A!
7DC SET SW K4
AI IGI ,I
_, AGCU
_>_------"<-r------q [ _- i '°t-
_:_'
W% ..... "
RO&N
ERR/AOCU$_--"
AGCU
-_ K6
I K1 B
RATE
l I÷L-LI
Ib.._ RT
U_.U ___ EGF&RNK8

P.Y
DISCRE1E
-_ TO AGC _" S.F. MONITOR
]G_N
ATT,mO_
._O.___ ALIGN
-----I______ 'I r' J ATT'ITCH'_,N

""
MONITO_ r _--__-J
_.R_N
K7 T_" __9_ _G&N
v .|"
O_NENTRY _I V!I---_T---<-_
1h SiN$_os< _3
_N ROLL,
COS RELAYS ATTITUDE REI'ERENCE SUBSYSTEM
£ ,%IT_cu SWITCHING LOG C
tt 4 Y/PRY
NOTE: For delta ,_ codes, "
7_77_-FsYb_ T5 sF see Fig. 2.3-9
.05G MANUAL ,_
G&N ENTRY
G&N AIIITUDE CON[
MONITOR
MIN IMPATT CONT
CSS.__
I
SM- 2_.-,_ 050A
Figure 2.3-5. SCS Switching Logic Sheet 2 of 4)
S'.['ABZLIZAT!Ob,_ AND CONTItOL SYST1CM
Mission. Basic Date IZ Nov 1966 ...... Change Date ................ Page Z. 3-Z 1/..L:__rjL2
:7!•! : _ •7; '" • "

MTVC ENGAGE
F
ROLL B/U RATE
PITCEI B/U RA.TE
YAW B/LI RATE
LOCAL VERTICAl.
P
t
L FROM FIG.
2.3-5 SHT I
MONITOR
K
L
G&N _ V
M
G&N BNIRY
...... J,-
_1__ I
T
SELF TESi-
ST
MIN IMP AfT COi'iT

FROM FIG 2.3-5 SHI 3 (L+R)U
CSS
V
SCS AI"TITUDE CONTROL

CHANNEL ENABLE R
Pt';Ctt AXIS ENGAGED
(SWIICH, PIICH CHANNEL) C
YAW AXIS ENGAGED
FROM FIG 2.3--4 SHE 2 D
CHANNEL ENABLE J A
SWITCEIES,
CHANNEL
BOLL
/ B
B&D
A&C
ROLL
[tOLL
AXIS
AXIS
ENGAGED
ENGAGr-D i|,,_].9
-----
APOLLO OPlBt<ATIONS t-!_ANDBOOK
SYST_EM.S DATA
SCS ENTRY r_
K16
ENT
GAIN F757
K;;
TROL 7
L1 DISCRETES
MODE
TO
_'-J AGC
G&N ,5 V
G&N ATT CON/ ] '_._________ KIT
G&N ENTRY G&N ATT IN
o.o5 e _N___ K14

R-Y
RT
CPLG
1. _,_NUALPh
SCS ATT \ _CS ENTRY '_ K20
" _ j_f----_.
MODE/I MODE /
/
/ MODE I RJC
CONTROL / \ CONTROl. / ATT LIMIT
CYCLE
SW
MODE
DISCRETES
TO
L,M,171
cYc,E
SWITCH
LIMIT _ rF
, 2i . kr AGC CYCLE '_
SCS ATT CONT p_ K18 l

._.. OFF
AIT
A GAA j
IN CSS I'_
K22
2.3-4 S.T3 ___
SCSz_V PSUEDO
<29
MODE
C_-F
_. (
TRANSLATION FROM PITCH LOGIC
RT 40
TO FIG. 2.3-5
SHT 2
1.4-7) U TItANS'[_7 _O_-M- -RO--'_L_'_ ]
G&N ATT IN
+28 VDC
G&N ATT
IMP ENABLE G&N MIN
SWITCH
(u) _. IMP
K21 NOTE:
ENABLE See Fig. 2.3-4, Sht 3 For
K23, K24, and K25.
K26 A
AUTO rot delta/__._ codes

CONT see Fig. 2.3-9
INTER ENG
IGN
ATTITUDE CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
)GIC- J_ ¢4 ---'--I F--------_.-) K30
SEC / SWITCItlNG LOGIC
ELAY / K29 _ ENG I K27 YAW CHANNEL (TYPICAL)
_OF_LL.J SCS ,_ IGN
v [
MODE _----_
SM-*2A-1051B
Figure Z.3-5. SCS Switching Logic (Sheet 3 of 4)
STABILIZATION AND CONTI_OL SYSTEN{
Mission. Basic Date IZ Nov 1966 .... Change Date ..... Page _ Z-3.2,3/[g,_3:oZ4
SCS ENTRY
G&N ENTRY
N
I t'
YAW B/U RT
I h K15
IN
MINIMUM DEADBAND
K19
D--B
,_-,",_CHG
• G&N 4 V
M ___.ql:__
G&N ATTITUDE CONTI_OL
L
FROM
SCS
0.05G /Wqq U._,L
MODE n __ L_
SWITCHES CSS
FIG. 2.3-5 V
SHT I
SCS lOCAl ',,_RT CA.

I
!
SCS ATTITUDE CONTROL

R
scs _ v
s
YAW D!RECT S',_
• FROM FIG. 23. -,_[ YAW DI_CT S,'

SHT 2 | DIRECT bLL._ G!
L
l, FROM FIG. 2.3-4 EiqGh',_E 1

SHT 4
SEE FIG., 2.3-9
f
,!
r"
SMZA-03-SC012
.,i
4 APOLLO Oi_EP,-ATIONS t-IANDBOOX
7
4
3 SYSTEMS DATA
<i
FROM MTVC ENGAGE iZi[,_i::
::7'_:
FIG. 2-14
SHT I
K.,]
MTVC
ENGAGE
K33 K34
!::i i]
SERX¢ONO. 2
!! SERVO NO. i
DISENGAGE ENGAGE
TVC MONITOR
(OVER-UNDER CURRENT
1'
OR TVC
NO. 1 OFF
IVC
ELECTRICAL
TRANS
K32
+28VDC APPLIED AT TP-CH1035V

/:ii:
i 1
SYSTEM
GROUND
CHECK
K28
!_!i
!
D FROM
FIG. 2-14
SCS ENTRY
G&N ENTRY ,_
SHT I
D EN'[RY
" K35
NOTE: See Fig. 2-13 Sht 5 for relays K36, K37, & K38.
SM-2A-1052
Figure Z.3-5. SCS Switching Logic (Sheet 4 of 4)
]
B STA]31LIZATION ANL "D COb,KUROL SYSTEM
i_i!_l. Mission Basic Date 1g Nov 1966 __Change Date Page Z.3-Z5
. ,,: _._
ii
SMZA-03-SQ01Z t<i
_i:t{
g
SYSTE}_-S DATA
i:i[_
Inertial reference data may also be received by the astronauts via the
MSFN voice link for AGC updating and/or for IMU alignment. With the com-
puter subsystem in the G&N loop, automatic ma_)euvers and/or G_N-

controlled velocity changes are possible.
S
:{
The FDAI receives total att{tude and attitude error information from
j:
3
the G&N system. The FDAIindicates S/C total attitude (S/C reference
J
f[ attitude) and attitude error. Total attitude represents the gimbal angles of
,i
the IMU; and attitude error is the difference between the IMU gimbal angles
and the desired attitude. The desired attitude is obtained by maneuvering
the S/C either manually or automatically in the directions that null out the
[i indicated errors, This establishes S/C attitude to the desired inertial
reference. The FDAI also displays rotational rates obtained from the SCS
rate gyros. The SCS rate gyros supply rate information for all G&N and
SCS control and display functions.

i]
In G&N modes, the FDAlbali is contimlous!y controlled by signals
2 ¢
from the IMU gimbal angle resolvers. In SCS modes, the ball is controlled
:9
by the AGCU total angle resolvers_ AGCU signals are applied to the bali
only during manually initiated attitude changes (assuming none of the BMAGs
ii-!_ are rate caged) and in the SCS entry mode after 0.05 G switching. Atallother
times, the ball remains stationary, The ball is always driven with reference
' J
to the IMU axes with the AGCU providing the conversion for the ]3MAGS from
body axes to IMU axes.

: i_
!
Attitude Reference/SCS. If the IMU cannot be used for attitude refer-
ence, a backup or strapdown attitude reference comprised of assemblies

,} contained within the SCS will. provide inertial attitude reference. The
:[!
strapdown reference is mechanized within the following:
Attitude Oyro Accelerometer Assembly (AGAA)
Contains the body.-imounted attitude gyros (BMAGS), X-axis acceler-
ometer, and self-contained electronics. Provides attitude error signals

for the attitude control subsystem, AGCU, and FDAI. The BMAGS are also
a source for backup rate signals, if required.
Rate Gyro Assembly (RGA}
Provides angular rate signals to the attitude control (ACS) subsystems
and to the FDAI.
Attitude Set/Gimbal Position Indicator (AS/GPI)

8
i! attitudes
The
and
AS section
align the
provides
ARS to
a
those
capability
attitudes,
to set
The
in desired
GPI section
reference
allows the
1 astronauts to manually position the SPS engine gimbals to a trim position
prior to a delta V maneuver.
i .......
SMZA-03-SC01Z
j '
! APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
SYSTENIS DATA
Display/Attitude Oyro Acceleromcter Assembly Electronic Control

Assembly (D/AGAAECA)
]
i AGAA section: Contains
and to
electronics
interface with
required
th e AGCU
to operate the IBMAGS ,17!
DEGA section: Provides the interface electronics between all sensors"
and corresponding displays

•i
]
•_ Auxiliary Electronic Control Assembly (AECA)
AGCU section: Performs the mathematical computations and contains

the transformation matrices required to display
attitude and attitude errors of the S/C. The AGCU is
the primary control device for the SCS ARS.
The remainder of the AECA contains circuitry for the
SPS engine thrust ON/O]PF control function.
! Flight Director Attitude Indicator (FDA!)
The FDAI (fig'_re .Z. 3-1Z) provides the •visual displays for S/C attitude;
included is total attitude readout (FDAI ball) gimbaled in three axes:
roll, pitch, and yaw.
il ,I_ Pitch and yaw total attitude is rea_ from either the body axes index
•(") or the navigation axes index (©). The indices are fixed to the
instrument faceplate. I<oll is indicated by a roll bUg (indicator needle
driven by the roll gimbal through a gear mechanism). Roll attitude is

read by comparing the roll bug position with reference to a scaled
bezel ring about the instrument periphery.
Attitude errors are indicated by three fly-to needles.
Angular rates are indicated by three fly-to needles.

!i
i
A + roll rate or + roll error will cause those needles to deflect left.
_iii
1
A - roll rate or - roll error will cause the needles to deflect right.
A + pitch rate or + pitch error will cause those needles to deflect

down. A - pitch rate or - pitch error will cause the needles to
deflect up.
L<j
!!::_
The yaw rate and error needles deflect in the same directions as the
roll needles.
•!! To correct the error, the S/C is automatically or manually r'otated
in the direction of needle deflection.
STAY3ILIZATION AND GON_I'ROL SY oU.E,
Basic Date ].Z Nov .J9__66 Change Date

'i _ Mission Page ______3<Z7 .....
1
3
>:.<>
'i!
SMEA-03--SC01Z
ii
APOLLO OPEI<ATIONS t-t.ANDBOOI(
SYSTEMS DATA
The SCS attitude reference subsystem is mechanized such that it is

used primarily for monitoring S/C attitude. Consequently, automatic
maneuvering is not possible when SCS modes of operation are selected.
However, by using the FDAI as a monitor and by proper selection of con--
trols, precision manual maneuvers can be performed.
J
The subsystem, acting as a strapdown reference, will supply all of
the attitude data normally available from the IMUo These data are subse-
quently applied to lhe FDAI for presentation of S/C attitude. The IMU is a
three-gimbal platform and therefore will achieve a gimbal lock condition.
The rniddle and outer gimbals become parallel and the output is not pre-
dictable. The AGCU has a similar function, which creates an effective girn-
hal lock. This occurs in both systems for a 90-degree yaw displacement
with respect to "the navigation base. The t;'DAI and yaw attitude set control
provides markings that will serve as a warning prior to achb_ving a girnbal-
lock condition.
i :..:<a
Basically, the bodv-mom_ted atti£ud_e gyros (I3MACS), attitude gyro
::h coupling unit (_AGCU), and the IFDAI are the primary inertial sensing, com-
puting, and display elements of the strapdown system. Attitude errors in
roll, pitch, and yaw body axes are sensed by the bod'/-n-_ou_ted attitude
gyros. The error signa]s are conditioned and subsequently directed to the
FDAI for display of totgl attitude and attitude error. The major part of the
conditioning takes place in the AGCU which provides signal inpui_s to the
FDAI comparable to that of the IMU.
primary
The AGCU
control or computing device
section of the an=iliary
for tl_e SCS attitude _;eference subsys-.
electronic control assembly is the E
tern. It performs n_ost of the inertial refe_'ence computations and performs
the _nathern.atical conversions and transform'nation, s required to display total
d
attitude and attitude error. The attitude gyro torquing loop, that the AGGU
eiectrornechanicai ele:men_s are a pa_t o[, perform the following:
•i_ii
Generate
attitude
a pulse train that is equivalent to the total change in S/C
E
Provide two-direction.al control of resolver shaft angles
]j!
Provide torquing current for the attitude gyros [
Provide forward and reverse conversion of tyro and attitude set
error signals to appropriate axes representation for ]7'DAI display,
and for gyro torquing.
The SCS rate gyros sense vehicle angular Velocity, and supply angular
rate signals to the system for rate stabilization and to the FDAI rate indica-
tors.
rate
The proper
condition,
selection
and provide
of sv¢itches wil] place the BMAGS
rate signals to the FDAI rate
in a backup-
indicators. When-
L
ever manual thrust vector control is selected, the _3MAGS will automatically
be placed in the backup-rate condition.
,: q
Attitude Reference Control. After a maneuver or a series of maneu-
vers, the STC attitude (body axes) is, each time, different with respect to
the inertial reference frame. Therefore, the requirement exists for a
method of resolving the ra_ations about the different body a__es, and
q{
STAI31IAZATION AND CONTROL S-YSTIP_b[

J '
._ MissK.m Basic Date IZ Nov 1966 Chan_e Date PaFe v 3-.28
SMZA-03-SC012
AFOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
,7-̧ !
SYSTEMS DATA
establish a relationship between tile body axes and the axes of the fixed
i , '{
- {_eference frame. This relationship is established through an Euler angle
.•. _.
i - f_ ::ansformation process obtained from either the lh_U (stable element)_or
i
{.i$_estrapdown attitude reference subsystem. The Euler angle, then, is the
•_ F__
• resolved difference between the S/C body axes coordinates and the coordi-
• ]
hate's of the fixed inertial reference. The Euler angle attitude of the S/C,
as displayed on the FDAI, is with respect to the coordinates of the fixed

reference frame.
The conversion from body axes to Euler angle readout on the FDAI,
basically, consists of a forward transformation and a reverse transforma-
{ ] tion. (See figure Z.3-3.) The forwa_;d transformation is essentially body-

_-- - .• % i, ," • •_i_
I to-navigation axes conversion, then navigationaxes-to-Euler angle trans-
formation by resolvers in the AGCU. The reso].vers and gimbal servos in
the I_'DAI position the total attitude displays, resulting from the Euler
errors. The reverse transformation is essentially Euler angle-to-naviga-

tion axes transformation by resolvers in the AGCU, then navigation-to-body
axes conversion for signal application to the attitude gyro torquing ampli-
fiers. After amplification, the signals are demodulated and applied to the
gyro torquing coils which torque the gyros to null the original error.
After initial alignment to the IMU reference, the BMAG/AGCU loop

i! Lt is opened by relay action and further positioning of the FDAI ball is pre-
:1
vented, However, if the rotation control, for example, is displaced, the
loop will be closed and th.e FDAI ball will fol]ow S/C motion until the con-
trol is neutralized. The BMAG/AGCU loop will open and the ball will again
L be stadonary. If in G&N mode, the ]TDAI beAl is always coupled to repre-

sent and follow !MU gimbal angles.
i difference
error
Attitude
is
between
referenced
Errors.
actual
to the
The
S/C
S/C
FDAI
attitude
body
attitude
axes
and
error
the
in all
indicators
inertial
modes
reference.
of operation,
represent
The
the
except
for G&N entry mode.
Signals that position the attitude error indicator of the FDAI come
from three possible sources. (See figures Z.3-3 and Z.3-4. ) In SCS modes,
either the BMAGS or the AGCU provide body axes error signals to the error
indicator meter movements. AGCU signals are applied when ATT SET is
selected on the attitude set section of the AS/GPI. This applies the body
axes equivalent of the difference between the attitude set resoIver shaf[ and
the AGCU resolver shaft.
When ATT SET is not selected, the outputs of the three BMAGS are
applied to the attitude error meter movements of the FDAI. Whether

from the BMAC]S or the AGCU, the error signals are directed to the metor
:n •
i. ..
.::.__ STABILIZATION AND COl,Yf'ttog SYSTEM
! t>_ Mission Basic Date IZ Nov ]__9__._Change Date ...... Page _.2_:,,?_0
.ii
SMZA - 03 - oc#_..0_IZ
A. POI_,LO OPERATION'S HANDBOOK

'i
(,:'<
c_cq"_PMS DATA
movements through scaling, range adjust, demodulator, and amplifier

"!i circuits. The following chart provides mode versus full-scale error indi-
cations as read on the FDAI.
<: Mode 1_.o 11 Yaw
Monitor _:Z5 ° :LI5 _15 °
SGS and G&.N Entry _Z5 ° :kS° ' °

{
All other modes :_5° ±5° j _:5°
When G&N modes are selected, the error signals are directed to the
FD.AI via the inertial coupling disp!_y units (GF)Us) and the attitude refer-
_.
ence conversion circuitry, The roll and yaw channel signals are referenced
to either the navigation base axes or the S/G body axes. Conversion in the
pitch channel is not required. The capabilit? to reference the roll and yaw
i
channel sigr,ais to either the navigation base of S/G body axes.is required
4 go facilitate roll and yaw channel cross-coupling control, q-'his is required
when G&N entry maneuvers are performed; in which case_ reference is
:I
to the n_vigation base axes°
Rates. The following chart provides mode versus full-scale rate

indications as read on the FIDAI:
! Modes Roll Pitch a'w
-&Z5 °/sec _5 °/sec _:5 °/sec

SGS Entry
• r
,i
G&N Entry
]
:i
SGS LGL Vert or
±l°/sec _I °/sec _.I°/sec
SGS ATT Cont or
:!
G&N ATT Gent
, o
-_5 ° /sec +5 ° /sec :=5 /sec
SGS and G&N V
SGS Attitude Reference Al_i_nment. Alignment of the attitude refer-

ence subsystem is performed by comparing the outputs of the total attitude
set resolvers in the AGGU with the attitude set resolvers of the AS/GDi.
.]
The attitude set resoiver shaft can be positioned by using the attitude set
dials (thumbwheels) on the front of the AS/Gi_I. The dials indicate Euler
angle of the attitude set resolver shaft, and the output of the resolver is
h<i the Euler angle difference between the attitude set reso].vers and the total
attitude resolvers in the AGCU.
'z
:j
-j
STABHJ.ZA'FIOIq AND GONTR.OL SYSTEM _'
.'i Lli,,,..ior.,_ ....... _--__ Basic Dat _' j___N.c!y_j,..9o_ 6. .... Change Date.. Page .,___.Z 3-30.............. _'._:
........ . r ,> .:: :..... : :. I

.
>il
SMZA-03--SC0 12
APO]LLO OPEI<ATIONS Ia/ANDI3OOK
SYSTEMS DATA
,{
When the FDAI ALIGN switch oi_ the AS/GPI panel is pressed, the
AGCU resolvers will align to the _ttitude set resolvers. ]Euler-to-
navigation axes transformation, and navigation axes-to-body axes
i<ii conversion takes place for the FI)AI attitude error display functions. In
U SCS control
indicated on the FDAI
modes, the attitudes
with respect
indicated on the attitude
to the navigation axes
set dials
symbol and
will be
the
roll index.
2.3. g.3. Z Attitude Control Subsystem.
The attitude control subsystem (ACS) (figures 2. 3-4 and Z. 3-5),

essentially, provides the means for controlling spacecraft n:lotion. Control
is eitLer manual or alutomatic whe__._us[ng controlled inputs from the G&N
system. Spacecraft motion, other than drift, is initiated d_rough the use of
the S/M RCS jets prior to C/M-S/M separation.. After separation (ent#y),
the C/M fIGS jets are used. An attitude control logic chart is presented in
figure Z. 3-6.
There are four types of controls that the ACS contends with which to
satisfy missior± requirements. (See figures 2. 3-4 and g. 3-_7.) These are
rotation, translation, attitude hold, and rate damping only. Rotational
motion is required to establish navigational sightings with the G&N optics,
subsystem telescope and sextant for S/C alignmer, t prior to a veloci_y
change for TVC functions, for antenna orientation_ for T/C transmission
and reception, And for lift vector control (roll control plus pitch and yaw
!J rate stabilization) during entry.
Translation control for the ASZ04A mission is required for the

ullage function prior to SPS engine ignition.
Holding attitude (attitude hold) to a fixed reference (established by

the ARS) is necessary for navigational sightings, preparing for a velocity
change and ullage maneuvers. After establishing attitude hold, the S/C
mo_ion involved is the amount of drift tha_ the S/C _s allowed to rotate
about its axes. The drift is limited to a selectable minimum or maximum
B deadband
Rate
about
damping
all three
only
axes.
provides rate stabilization during enImy or in the

event of an abort prior to launch escape system (LES) jettison. The
motions involved here are the finite firings of the RCS jets when rotational
rates exceed certain limits. The RCS jet firings will decrease the rates
to within predetermined limits. The rates are limited to 0. Z degree/see
for all modes, except SCS and Gg_N entry modes when the rates are
ii increased to Z degrees/second.
The ACS includes the roll, pitch, and yaw electronic control assem-
blies (ECAs), the delta V indicator, attitude impulse section of the G&N
optics control panel and, in addition, utilizes all of the physical elements
and functions of the attitude refere_ce subsystem.
.]
STAI3ILIZ,,XTION AND CONTi.<OL SYSTEM
_ is s io n B a ._ie Da te ]:,Zj'_
9v o19666 ....C h :in g e D a t e .......................
mag e. "g,-._
L 3_!
..........
I
SMZA-03-SCO! Z
:[, ! APOLLO OPERATIONS I-{AND]_OOK

>!
SYSTEMS DATA
J_
-- " - R ....
• i] r , S/M RCS ENGINF; !f C/M RCS ENGINES
i:!
g
i__b--d_mt=tm--_--1-7--1--VT-F
I--
-7_I--I
_l_J_J.
'ii _i| P"CHDOWN
i i nl,ct
II:H:_-I---_t----L
-_<.--
_-- 7-- --_-
--i_[]:qi]_-_-
-_.....
,, #--k- - Z u o
qlii[_
iii:]>-
..... _-7--F_--_---
ii]7 ,× -r-Tr-<-d__t_,_ H_
::ili7 i' N!
_S: +Y
h
_ ZTAIZ _-2 APPLICABLE TO I l
i A_
i_',l
II;_1_ ..z
-Y
+z
ZZ.r-r
UANEUVt:SNOT]_J,_!
il i SCS
ClRCUII
BREAKERS m PITCH ROlL ROLL PITCH RAO&I_L YAW Dr ![<i"w
,- __IX°LLI
Tir, ___L_LZ_I_._L
.mw
4
B&D IIpITGI41YAWiBS. fPITC,IIYAWl ...
I[ SCS
PITCH CHANNEL
AND YAW
][........
.... L_ Roll ROLL]
....I.... 1...... " !,_OLL "_°LL
I ____ JL__I___L__I2 2L.
l[ SWITCHES _L
CIRCUIT BREAKER TABULATION IS APPLIC,_BLE TO RCS ENGINES
AWOMATIC COIL OPERATION ONLY. FOR MANUAL DIRECT

?
COIL OPERATION, POWER IS APPLIED FROM SCS DIRECT COb'IT
b
CIRCUIT gREAKERS MN A OR MN B BY ACTUATION OF THE
PILOTS OR CO-PILOTS HAND CONTROLLER, RESPECTIVELY.

L
r4
.,%
NOTES: 1. Combinations
simultaneous
jet selection
of
firing
logic
translation
of
circuit
identical
and
design.
rolatlon
S/M RCS
maneuvers
er,glnes
r_-.7uirlng
is proh!blted
lhe
by E
/i 2. Minimum impulse operation is accomplished in the roll axis by two
, i!t] eng'.,nr¢s
ROLL
breaker;
pulling
only.
CHANNEL
one
or setting
A&C
Remaining
switch
ROLL
the B&D
to
engines
circuit
OFF
ROLL
and
are
breaker.
disabled
pulling
CHANNEL
one
by
switch
setting
B&D ROLL
to OFF
the A&C
circuit
ard
E
3_
a
3. Fuel conservation and/or consumption balance behveen quads may
be accomplished by using ,_pplicoble SCS CHAI"JNEL ._witct-,es and

I
e circuit breakers to select single-engine opemtlon in each direction.
.]
SM-2A-782D
Figure g. 3-6. SCS Attitude Control Logic Chart

•i:!! [
']
STAt3ILIZATION AND CONTROI. o]..

<"_R '"I I_.,M
_*
Z. 3-3Z
Basic ]Date 12. Nov 19_%6_Change Date_.. Page
b
SMZA-03-SC012
SYSTEMS DATA
ROLL ECA
id
i£.-_
:_UA_UAI N G SWITCHING
• 2-
:!
• }
I_ voc>--_--_o -!-1
TRANSLATION I
L CONTROL 1
I _+vl
28 VOC
] t CONIRO[ i
>.q
i i-I
f_
SM-2A-718D
Figure 2,3-7. Jet Selection Logic Functional Flow Diagram
J STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM
Mission Basic Date 12 Nov 196Change Date__ Page 2.3-33_/Z.3-34
-i•!
.:.: .... . ..:.::: ........2 :::.: • . . ..2 , .. :.::: :_"

4
:I
; ii
::I
L!
L i:i11?::+ FT,T_'_,To_o-q
I------- " ....
I RATE
SIGNAL
PICKOFF
j [ ' _ , PITC-+"
E
L.....++Jl/ r-..
I T_>,NSDUC_I i l l// I
I t+--_++-+L-.+_ _,.
, - 7L-A.+Z-.--q Io_,,D_,,2J
_,T+,
+,+,..+;I aI '".K,+ I>+,_"--+"
I SIG+EN I,"" _.I
J " AMPL "
t . JJ I [
@ L_I__ ....
ATTITUDE SIGNAL J
D
FROM O&N >------
F_
• " ° _'-+_-2
FE'' --,.---+%+o.+,'-.-
I _I!!L_I-I i!_"
I -_11 / "
• YAW ll'--t
. -J ---_" 5_,:,:"#
L" -'Z_-2"NsLuc_--
--J ; lJ _,/"
I I I
YAWB_MC.G b.._--=+J
[ mo GEN . K;s +ATP"_.
! W
L. I[ ""
ATTITUDE SIGNAL. _"J ................
FROM G&N "

SMZA-03-SC01 Z
APOLLO OPERATIO]'qS HANDt3OOt<
(! S YS T IE h4S )9 A. TA
The attitude control subsyste:a_ electronics is contained within the
roll, pitch, and yaw ECAs. The ECAs accept the manual and automatic
inputs, conditions them, and directs on-off electrical command signajs

through jet selection logic to appropriate.
. automatic (normal) coils of the _ 7_'
,t :[:!:i_
RCS jets The output of the jet selection logic will be either a time- _ _: ,
modulated signs! or a steady-state +Z0-vdc signal. _!is,,,

_(.[!
There are basically two types of inputs to the attitude control sub-
system: manual and inertial sensor (.AGA.A, iIGA, fir|U). Manual inputs ara
pro_d.ded by the rotation and translation controls, switches on the SCS
control panel, attitude _rnpulse switch on the attitude in,pulse section of

the G&N optics control panel, and th.e direc[ ullage switch on the delta V
display panel. These cc.n.trols can be used for re_anua] ullage maneuvers or
as abackup during automatic delta V functions. The attitude impulse switch
commands inputs to th_ ACS and subsequent!y to the RCS jets for small
anguJ ar accelerations.
The inertial sensor inputs are provided by tl_e AGAA, IlGA, and the
IMU via the G&N system. The AGA.A (]3MAG) and rate gyroi-" (RGA) inputs
are used for attitude h.old, rate s_u.bi!ization_ and manual rotation control.
The IMU inputs provide G&N attitude hold and command rate signals for
',) _nanua] or automatic rotational maneuvers.
11I i] Rotation Maneuvers. Rotation rnaneuvers can be performed by using
four different types of manual controls or automatically by using the G&N
eom_.uter subsystem. Manual roi:_A:ion n_aneuvers are accomplished by

using [he rotation con_roi_ commonly called con_roi stick steeri:ag (CSS):
direct or emergency control which is a function o{ the rotation control,
attitude impulse control; and positio_ing of the inertia] CDUs. Automatic

n_aneuvers result frown s.stronaut inputs to the AGC via. the DSHY. The
AGC, according to con_puter program, auton_atica.ily positions the CDUs

and will con]n_and S/C n%otion to the progranu_ed attitude.
Normal CSS is a proportional manual function and is available at any

time in all operational modes. The n_aximun_ CSS propertioi_al rates that
I! can be con]_anded are as follows:
19 degrees per second (roll axis) entry n_ode

5 degrees per second (pitch and yaw axes) entry mode
0.79 degree per second (all axes) all. other triodes.
Even though CSS commands greater rates, the SCS dectronics will
limit the rates to those values given. Proportional control [s obtained by
,!!)]
3
using
rotation
the rate
contro].,
gyro
CSS
output to
proportional
cancel the
co_nnnands
output of a
are
transducer
ahvays directed
within
to
the
the
i
auto_natic solenoid coils of the RCS engines,
>1
{ kiii
F::i
STA.18!LIZ.ATION A>ID CON Y_£OI_, S ._ o __ EM
'_{ {:,_ l'_4iss_en Das[c Date 1Z i_ov !!6!___Ch;_ng e Datz ]-'age Z. 3-35
SM2A-03-SC01 g

i r7_
SYSTEMS DATA
When the rotation control (stick) is displaced, a transducer within
the stick wi!! command a rotation proportional to the amount of stick
displaceme:i,.t. The rotational rates are limited to predetermined values,

%1{ depending o.n the operational mode.
When in SCS attitude control, mode and as the stick is displaced
approximately Z. 5 degrees from neutral, breakout switches within the

:]
stick close causing the BlviAG a_d the A GCU to become closed loop. It
also.inhibits BMAG error signals to the SCS electronics. As the S/C
rotates, the AGCU applies torquing current to the BNIAG torquer coils.
E
:!i The gyros, then, are torqued at a rate proportional to the magnitude of
4
BMAG error, keeping attitude error at approximately zero. Thus, the
AGCU will follow S/C motion and establish a new attitude reference when
the stick is returned to neutral.
E
:!)
i::_
When in G&N attitude control mode, a G_lq SYNC switcl_ must be
energized to enable the attitude hold function when the control stick is
returned to neutral. The C,_N sync function provides IMU/CDU closed
loop
the
operation
maneuver.
which
Consequently,
keeps attitude
the
errors
S/.C will
at approxi_nately
hold the new attitude
zero during
when tile
B
stick is returned to neutral. If G&N sync is not enabled, the S/C will
return to the attitude established before stick displacement.
NOTE For the ASZ04A n_ission the G&N SYNC switch will remain
!i
OFF for the entire mission.

i:! F:
,] The computer program will control the actual n_aneuver rate, but
the SCS will limit the maximum. The rnax.imun_ _-,on-entry rnaneuver rate
i:i
4
is 10°/second and entry ma_euver rate is 17°/second in all axes.
E
Direct rotation control is a nonproportional function whereby initiated
commands are applied directly to the RCS direct coils. To accomplish
direct rotation, the DIRECT RCS/OFF switch (MDC-8) is set to DIRECT
RCS; the SCS-CHANNEL switches (MDC-8) a.re set to OFF; if high rates
are to be maintained, and the control stick is rotated about the desired axis
i!ill or
and
axes
applies
to hardstops.
a direct
Just
command
prior
to the
to engaging
RCS direct
the hardstops,
coils. Rate
a switch,
feedback
closes
is not B
used to cancel stick movement. The breakout switches, however, close
_:i!)
t
[
the BMAG/AGCU loop, and attitude error output to the SCS electronics is
inhibited. With proper control and sv,'itch configuration, direct control is
available at any time.

i),
i_ii}
!
,I capability
Attitude
The attitude
for
impulse
commanding
impulse
control
control
low-rotational
is available
(G_zN
only
optics
rates
it, SCS
control,
about
or G&N
all
panel)
three
attitude
provides
axes.
control
the
I
:?:!.!;_i
modes a_d is used primarily for precise attitude maneuvers during naviga-
tional
a switch
or star
closure
sighting
in the
periods.
control
After
and an
the
RC
control
network
is enabled
combination
and displaced,•
generate one
[
:i!
STABILIZATION AND CONTROl, SYSTER{
Page Zo 3-36 [i
X-ii s s ion Basic Date. IZ Nov 196__6 ._ Change Date
4
SNIZA-03-SCO 12
APOLL,O OPERATIONS i-t.,%BIDBOOiq

J
SYSTEMS ]DATA
2
pulse, which is applied to the RCS jet selection logic. One pulse is
generated for each attitude impulse switch closure (control displacement),
:ii
It is not a proportional control and attitude hold is not available when the
control is returned to neutral, When the control is enabled, relay action _'_
removes all rate, attitude error, and rotation control inputs to the SCS
electronics. _:_
ij
Automatic positioning of the CDUs is accomplished by using the
DSI<Y. This method of control is primarily used during G&N entry.
Translation ManeUvers. There are three methods of initiating trans-
lation maneuvers: normal• translations, using the translation control;
direct ullage, using the direct ullage buLton on the delta V control panel;
and separation ullage, using the translation control.
Trar, slation commands are nag proportional; operation is through
switcll closure only and is available during all modes o:[ operation prior to
C/M-S/b{ separation. During normal translation, switch closures within
the translation control provide cornn-_ands to the jet selection logic which
::)! fire the appropriate jets for the desired direction of translation. The
corn_mands are directed to the auton_atie RCS engine coils. A primary
function of normal translation is the ullage maneuver, which is necessary
in preparadon for a velocity change. Ullage Fnaneuvers require translation
along the +X-axis.
]3irect ullage is accon_plished by using dm DIRECT ULLAGE push-

button en the delta. V control pane!. When pressed, switcl- closures
eo_m_mand the appropriate direct ]%CS coils to initiate translation along the
+X-axis. Direct ullage is available at any time prior to C/___4-S/h4.

separation. Upon C/IvJ.-S/M separation, the direct ullage function to the
C/Wi pitch and yaw direct coils is inhibited by deadfacing. It is primarily
a backup operation in the event of normal trans].ation failure. Ullage will

continue as long as the DIRECT ULLAGE pushbugton is pressed.
:i! lation
The
control
separation
into a detent
ullage function
position.
requires
Ullage
a CCW
commands
rotation
are
of
directed
the trans-
to the
direct RCS coils. The separation ul]age maneuver is performed when
SPS aborts are necessary or when S-!VB separation is required. If the
LES has been jettisoned, the signal from the translation control in CCW
'iJ detent will command the sequential events control system (SECS) to
sequence the separation ullage and consequent separation from the S-IVI?,.
If the LES is attached to the S/C, the same command will initiate a LES
abort.
] !iI into a
In
detent
G&N and
generates
SCS rncdes:
a CSS
a
logic
clockwise
signal
rotation
_hat inhibits
of the
attitude
translation
gyro
control
signals
from the SCS electronics, and provides BMAG/AGCU closed loop oi)eration.
It also initiates m_4nual thtust vector control (MTVC).
;1 /
[i
STABILIZATION AND CONTROl., SYSTEhl
Mission Basic D_tte lZ J<o",,- 1966 Chant,-. D_te Pa _,_e 2.. 3 - 37

SMZA-03--SC0 iZ
<i
APOLL, O OPERATIONS HANDBOOK

d
S YoT-,Mo DATA
The CW rotation enables capability for manual roll control by the
rotation controller during G&N entry. This is normally an automatic
function of the G&N system and entry program.
Attitude Hold. Attitude hold is a capability of the ACS to hold S/C

1 attitude within selected deadband limits of a fixed reference attitude. The
deadband (amount S/C is allowed to drift either side of reference attitude)
is selected by setting the ATT DEADBAND switch on MDC8 to either MAX
]: .{
or MIN. In the G&N or SCS entry modes, however, the deadband will be
maxiiYmm regardless of deadband switch position.
The ACS accomplishes attitude hold by inputting summed attitude
error and rate gyro signals to the jet selectio1_ logic, which will turn on
appropriate jets to keep the S/C within the selected deadband. The attitude
error
is
signal
summed
is conditioned
at the input of a
by a deadband
sm_-_ming amplifier
circuit
with
and
the
rate
rate
limiter
gyro
before
signal.
it
L
When the summed input to the s.rnplifier is greater than its threshold, the
amplifier
The
deadband
lower
will
the
limits.
cause
angular
As
a switching
rates;
a_gular
the
rates
an_plifier
close}
increase,
the
to pulse
S/C
the
is
summed
the
allowed
jet selection
to drift
error/rate
logic.
[o the E
signal increases in magnitude proportionate to time. Therefore, the sooner
u i
-!
the
fire,
threshold
damping
of the
the
summing
oscillation.
amplifier _s reached_ the sooner the jets will
E
A limit cycle swftch on iVLDC8 can be used to,provide tim.e rnodulated
pulses to the jet selection logic. Limit cycle is primarily used for fuel L
conservation purposes. The limit cycle swi£ch ei_.__bles a psuedo rate _ -_
back c{rcuit at the output of the switching annplifier previously discussed.
-!
The psuedo rate, and consequently the time-n_odu/ated pulses, is a function
of signal magnitude at the switching amplifier input. For large signal
inputs, the output pulses will cause the RCS jets to pulse at a higher
frequency
widths and
and for
frequency
longer periods.
decrease
As
proportionately
the error
until
decreases:
the error
the pulse
is hulled. E
,,!
The psuedo rate loop is normally used at all times (limit cycle on)
when an inertia], attitude is being maintained.

•.¢
k_
Attitude hold is available at all times in three axes, except during

!
monitor
G&N
Yaw
entry
and
mode
pitch
after
and
0.05
attitude
SCS
G
entry
switching,
hold
mode
is inhibited.
after
roll attitude
the 0.05
hold
G switching.
is still enabled.
During
E
f
Rate Dampin$i__0n_z In addition, to. attitude control and maneuvering

capabilities, the ACS provides a rate damping only capability. Although
rate damping is a normal function during a_:titude control modes, rate
damping can be used to limit S/C rotational rates (rate stabilization) when
attitude hold is not being used. Normally, when S/C rotational rates
exceed 0. Z degree per second in any axis, the rate gyros or the Bk4J_G in
STA}3iLIZATION AND CONTRO L, SYSTEM
Z. 3-38
)'A:t;._;ion ................ Basic Date.lZ,.}'7 °. v 196.6___ Change Date. Page
4
l'i !i APOLLO
SMZA-03-SC012
OPERATIONS ]{A]._DBOOt(
:i
3 SYSTEMS D.A 7'A
ii
backup rate sense the angular acce]ezations. The signals, conditioned
ii!i
i via the
applied
roll, pitch,
to applicable
and
RCS
yaw ECAs
engines
and
to keep
through
the S/C
jet selection
rates within
logic,
the
are
3
0. Z-degree-per-second rate deadband. If in SCS or GSzN entry mode,_ __-!!!
the rate d.eadband is increased to Z degrees per second. Rate stabilization, .i<
i [d in addition to the attitude cozitrol functions, is available when any of the _ii_.:.._::ii:_
folidwing condition s exi,_ t:
Selection of monitor :node after S--IVI3 separation

Selection of monitor mode for LES aborts
Clockwise rotation of translation control after S-IVB separation
_ SCS entry mode after 0.05 G switching
GSzN entry mode after 0.05 G sh, itching (pitch. and yaw axes only},
Z. 3. Z. 3.3 Thrust Vector Control Subsystem.
!] The purpose of the thrust vector control (T_VC) subsystem (figures

Z. 3-4 and Z. 3-5) is to align, or position the gimbaled SPS engine to a trim
position prior to SPS thru_tin.g ann maintain ti_is trim durh_g the accelera-
tion period. The S/C experiences a changing ce_%ter of gravity (c.g. }
caused by the consum.ption of fuel and oxidizer a,ar_.ng acceleration. The
i} {
TVC subsystem maintains the S}°S engin.e thrust vector through the c. g.
51!7{
• La
and
desired
holds S/C
direction.
attitude so that the thrust vector
This
will remain
compensa'_tes
in the
for undesirable forces that affect
{ S/C stability because of the shifti>,.gc.g. Thrust. vector centre], in addi-
tion. to the TVC subsysten% utilize e_the functions of the GhN cystem, the
,_ _,, _:_
j i!ij prooulsJon svstex_s and the SCS attitude reference and at_itu_,e control
,
{ a
subsystems.
The TVC subsystem essenti_l]y con.trols the SPS engine gimbals, and
.t Li!
consequently the thrust vector, by energizing the gimba.! actuators; one for
,{
,{ pitch an.d one for yaw.
The nori_al method for controlling thrust is through the G_N delta V
g " -_: th e
mode. This provides the most accurate control. The accelerome_e_., on
IMU stable element and the AGC provide steerSng comm_.nas to the SPS
engine giml_als and continuous trajectory corrections to compensate for

undesired accelerations. The AGC also corn_ pensates :for the near-body
orbital and gravity affects on the S/C. So, the actual versus required
velocity change will result in a curved trajectory.
Normal!f, bothG&N delta V and SCS delta V modes operate by dri.ving

_(:!{
No. ! and No. Z serve electronics. If a failure occurs in No. 1, an auto-•
matic switchover to drive No. 2 serve electronics and No. Z gimba! motor
will occur. Or, No. Z will drive if No. i is switched off or if manual thrust
{{
vector control is initiated.
::>l _ij
P
3-39
Mission Basic .... (,nan>'.. Date ........................
]')r_i'('-'.J_4"--.,_f2![..-]'--gJ)--X Page
<i
SMZA-03-SC01Z
/! APOLLO OiDERATiONS HANDBOOK
_yo_fE..c, DATA
ii
position
A zT_anual method
of the SPS engine
of thrust
gimbal.
vector
When
control
operating
is provided
manually,
to control
inputs
the
from
E
the rotation control, translation control, and the BM_A_Gs are directed to
redundant servo electronics No. Z and the No. Z gimbai actuator motor.
The nominal authority from either rotation controller is _6 degrees of SPS
gimbal engine deflection.
The gimbal position display section of the AS/GPI panel, the delta V
display, SCS control panel, rotation control, translation control, and the
SPS switches on MDC-3 are the principle controls and displays associated
with TVC. They provide the capability for control and monitoring of
system perforrnance.
Thrust Vector Control. When G&Ndelta. V rhode is selected, auto-

matic thrust on-off, attitude, and ste.ering con_rnands initiate in the G&N
h
system. However, before the ullage maneuver and thrust-on, the g_n_bal
position trim control thun_.bwheels on the AS/GPI are used to position the
engine gimb_!s. The engine position is verified on the AS/OPI visual dis-
play. The gimbals are aligned such that, at the mo._._ent of thrust-on, the
thrust vector will be through the S/C c.g. This is necessary before any
delta V to prevent undesirable rotational movements about the c. g. when
thrusting begins.
In addition to initial positioning of the gimbals, the amount of accel-

eration required for the velocity change less tailoff is set into the delta V
%
remaining counter on the delta Vdisplay. This allows the crew a method of
'i monitoring delta V remaining and, when in SCS._V n_ode, pr(_des auto-
marie thrust-off capability. A coincidence switch in d_e delta ¥ display
will,
the
by
_V
inhibiting
remaining
the thrust
counter
on logic,
indicates zero.
automatically
The
terminate
acceleron_eter
thrust
in the AGAA
when
I
senses +i acceleration., and supplies acceleration signals to tbT_ing and out-
put logic which subsequently drives the delta V remaining potentiometer
to zero. The accelerometer thrushold is 1 × 10 -4 g, but the AV counter will
only step once for each 0. Z5 +t/sec velocity change.
NOTE it is possible, but not recommended, to have SPS engine

ignition without ullaging when in SCS zXV mode.
• . $'_
Prior to SPS ignition, the G_N system inputs attitude error informa-
tion to the ACS
Attitude errors
to hold
from the
the S/C
G&N
at a constant
system and rate
attitude in all three
information frorn
axes.
the SCS
[
rate gyros are also applied to the SPS gimbal servo loops. Upon engine
ignition, the combined attitude error and rate gyro inputs, conditioned by
the servo electronics, reposition the gimbals as necessary to rotate the
S/C to compensate for c.g. shift. The girnbal position is also modified by
steering commands from the AGC so that the thrust vector will point in
the right direction for the curved trajectory.
STA]BILIZATION AND CONTROL SYS'fEIvi
2 • _-40
J
Basic Date 12 Nov !966 Change Date Ps ge
![]
:I
SMZA-03-o<,< c "¸'-" F] 1Z
APOLLO OPERATIONS !-IA_qDBOOI<
S YS T E MS D A T-t,
The BMA.G/AGCU loop remains open and follows IMU changes so that
the SCS will have the same inertial reference in the event a switch0ver to
)l SCS deita V mode is necessary.
Normally, G&N delta V mode utilizes the primary gimbal serve and , t: ')i'
actuator motor No. 1. If the gimbal motor switches on MDC-3 are acti-
vated, a TVC monitor signal generator (over-undercurrer:t sensor) in the
actuator will sense a failure of motor No. 1. If motor No. 1 fails, the
/i El
]
sensor will automatically cause a switchcver to motor No. Z in the
L_
actuator. Since the No. g serve electronics are driven simultaneously
with No. l, an interruption during the velocity change will not occur. Motor
No. Z a!so contains a TVC monitor signal generator, but is' not used. In
the event of motor No. g failure, causj.ng an excessive curr.ent drain on
;i the d-c bus, a 70-ampere circuit breaker in the line will disconnect the
:! motor from the d-c supply bus. Motor ,_o. Z has no switcbover or warning
light capability.
In SCS delta V mode, the gin-_bai serve loops fu:.'mtion the same as in
G&N delta V mode. Attitude error information, however, is derived from
the BIVLAGS. The rate loop is identical, unless in backup rate condition.
SCS delta V wiit not function if the BMAGS are required for backup ra1:e
because of the loss of attitude error information.
SCS delta V keeps the thrust vector through the c. g. by first com-
paring the trim. position commands set by the timbal position thumb-
l-:'a wheels a_d the position, tral._sducer feedback signals. The difference,
combined with attitude error information from the BMAGs, conditions the
3 serve electronics to energize the actuator clutches.
!' Except for mode selection and thrust-on requiremen.ts_ the san_("
J_
!:i prerequisites for thrust-on, and the control and display functions are the
same as for G&N delta V. The SCS system does not provide automatic
thrust-on. A thrust-on switch on the delta V display provides the thrustJon
corn:nand for SCS delta V _od.e. Thrust-off, however, is auton_atic by
:?1 closing of the coincidence switch. A. NORB4AL-OFF-DIRECT--ON switch
on the delta V display is also provided for manual thrust-on and serves as
a manual backup for all automatic thrust-off con_mands.
If the translation controller cannot be used for the u!]age n_aneu_,er

prior to thrust-on, a DIRECT ULL.AGE switch on the delta V display pro-
vides a manual backup to initiate u.lage.
A. manual delta V can be performed, providing a delta V mode has

been selected and the t_,'a.nslationcontrol is rotated CW into detent. This
ten, eves all norn_al i?_.puts into the TVC serve loops, al]o\vs connmanded
inputs fron_ the rotation control, aud rate data from the I_,]vI.iGsin back(q)-
rate condition, into the redundant No. Z serve electronics and n_otor 9_o. Z
of the gi_<qbal actp.ators. This provides rate-stabilized manual control of the
thrust vector. Thrust-on is initiated by the momentary thrust-0n switch
located on the delta V display.
:!i N
S TA]B!
b_. !£H.Z A TiO AND CONTROL S"c_.,.._
'1".m_-h
'_
Z. 3-41
Mission ................. Basic )Date 1,Z Nov 1966 (\handle DaL% Pa ge
q
SMZA-03-SC01Z
SYSTEMS r)ATA
U
The rotation control must be held to a given displacement to control

the ginnbals about the initial trim position established by the settings of the
AS/GPI. The GPI provides the only indication of the position of the gimbal
angles with respect to the S/C body axes.
2.3.3 FLIGHT CONTROL PROFILES.
There are three basic flight control profiles associated with mission
ASZ04A. These include powered fligi_t, coasting flight_ and entry. Within
6
these profiles, various modes of operation are established either within the
3
atmosphere or in earth orbital environ_nent. 13ecause of the division of
ii!i:i
powered flight, i.e., ascent and earth orbital environment_ the description
is divided as follows:
Ascent (including aborts)

:j Coasting flight (earth orbital}
Powered flight (earth orbital)
E_try (nonpowered atmospheric fligi_t).
kt
)! As the various operational modes are discussed, reference will be

made to figures Z. 3-4, Z. 3-5, and 2. 3-6. A typical control channel yaw
is shown in figure Z. 3-4, sheet Z; therefore, differences not typical to the
•: •i!¸ yaw chan_el will be clarified.
It shouid be noted that relays in figure.s Z. 3-4, Z. 3-5, and Z. 3.-7 are
not relays of the actual system by number. However, the relay r_omencla-
ture is system oriented and n_ay be cross.-refcrcnccd by using the foiiowk_g
chart.
S _
_j.D System
Fig. 2. 3--4, 2. 3-5,
Function Relay
Z.3-7 Relays
i;i Z4AI4K3
k_
K1 ORBIT RATE
FDAI ALIGN Z4AI4KI
K2
24AI4KZ
G&N ROLL, PITCH, YAW Z ZA 16A 3K4

K3
ATT SIN AND COS ZZAI6AgK6
ZZAI7AgK4
22AITAgK6
ZZAIgAgK4
ZZA!8AgK6
AGCU CAGED ZZA8Ki

;ii K4
2ZA8KZ
ZZA8K4
Z2A8K5
K5 AG CU ALIGN ZZAgK6
i! 2ZA8K7
:7
]
STABILIZATION AND CONTROL ,_YS_t']h4
................................................
13asic Date IZ Nov 1966 Change l_,a_
"_ _c ;,......................... Page Z. 3.-4Z
...........................
:<
SM2A.-03-SC012.
-}!] APOL]X) OIKCRATIONS HANDBOOK
- [ ?!_
SYSTEMS DATA
:.I
r."_o. -'_3-4,
Z. 3-7 Relays
Z._a-5,
[ Function
SCS System
Relay
[{ST[::
111:5
,3
D 1<6 AGCU P/Y ERROR ZIA3K2
i}.,
R G&N ERR/A.GCU INll 2ZA3K3

K7
G&N P ERR ZOA3K3
1 Lii i Y ERR GhN BODY ZIA3K3 !

ZZAZOA3KI
K8 G&NP, Y_ ERR S.E.
ZZAZ1A3K!
:!
ROLL_ PITCH, YAW ERR ZZAZOA3K4
K9
AGAA 22AZIA3K4
• :<,a
MONITOR + G&.N .&V + GhN 22AZ3A. 3K2
ATT CONTR [ G&N ENTRY
ii:ii
q, 05G MANU/_L + _,5]
YAW B/U RATE
K10 ROIJL, PITCH, YAW, B/U ZZA9KI
RATE ZZA9]<Z
!:i ?i
ZZA13K1
ZZA13KZ
ZZAI!Ki
ZZAI ii<2
KIi IvlTVC RT OUT ZZA9K3

ZZAI l}i3
ZZA 1 ZK 3
KI Z ROLL, Pii Ci!, YAW

;! RATE ZZAZOA.3
ZZAZ]A3K
! :j KI3 Y/P RT SF 2ZAZZA3
KI4 R-Y RT CPLG Z3AI IK2
K15 RT IN TRANS Z3AI9KI

,?
;i_il f Z3AI9K]
19AZ6K ]
i!il KI6 EN 7} GAIN Z3AISKI
;1[
23A15KZ
23A17KZ
KI7 G &N A'r T IN 23At9KZ
KI8 AGA.A ATT IN Z3A19K3

Z3A15K3
i_i:!
1 KI9 D-B CHG
KZ0 RJC ATT SW Z3A1 !K1
{t K21 G&N MIN IMP ENABLE Z3A13K
KZZ PSU]ItDO RT CO Z3A] 3K
KZ3 RCS LATCtt!NG RELAY MESC Z19

={:
:i ARMFD
1
(frET DVRS ENABLED)
SAFE
(JET DVRS DISABLED)
ii{t tIZ4. 1.8 SEC LATC]I MESC Z8
}$i?_
:] [
STABIJdZATION AND C()NTROL SYSTEM
! !:,_
Li
SM2A-03-SC012
APOLLO OPEIKATIONS HAND130Ot<
SYSTEMS DATA
:<
SCS System k_
Relay
Fig. Z. 3-4, Z.3-5, Function
Z. 3-7 Relays
MESC ZIg
MAIN DEPLOY g3Al IK 3
fig5
AUTO CONT INTER Z3AZIKZ
KZ6
ENG IGN Z3AZIK3
KZ7
SYS GRD CK Z3AZIKI
KZ8
SCS AV MODE Z3AZ7I< i
KZ9
ENG IGN Z3AI8KZ
K30 &,:ai
MTVC ENGAGE Z3AZ5K 1
K31
TVC ELEC TRANS Z3AI4K]
K3Z , ,g
1433
K34
SERVO
SERVO
NO.
NO.
1 DISENGAGE
Z ENGAGE
Z3AISKI
ZZASKg
L?
.i
ENTRY ZZAZ _--_%

31<_6
K35
AV INI-i ZZAZOA3Ko O
K36 1_,
TPtRUST ON LAMP
K38
Z.3._.l Ascent.
(!
During the ascent phase, capability exists for monitoring boost
mode with all subsysiems active,
vehicle stability. The SCS is in a n_onitOrol purposes for the f!rst 61 seC
but supplies no active cornn_ands for contr
- A_ _ ;l{ght After 61 seconds, if aborts are required, the SCS will be
used to supply signals for S/C stab11).zaclon and con:_ ....
k_
3
•!i v3.31, i Monitor Mode.
<! The monitor mode provides the capability of monitoring deviations

from prograrnrned launch vehicle attitude prior to S-IB separation and
CSM attitude after S-IVB separation. The S--IVB utilizes a different gu id'-
ance technique and monitoring C/M instruments relative to S-IVB operation
provides no useful purpose. Monitor mode alsoprovides rate stabilization,
when required, any time during the rnissiono
Normal Ascent. At time of launch, RCS )atching relays in the SECS system
will be open to inhibit cornn_ands to the RCS jets. Relays K4 and K5 will be
closed, providing BMAG/AGCU closed loop. The FDAI will be fo].iowing
IMU gimbal angle changes. The rnotor odriven switch 5 (figure Z. 3-7) is
set to the
C/M-S/M
S/M
switch
position when
on MIDC
the
- 16 is set
RFJACTON
to S/M.
CONTROL S _ZS-'rRANs
E
Total• attitude and attitude error signals from the iMU and inertial
i!:<_
CDU (figure Z. 3-4, sheet 1) are applied to the FDAI through relays K3,
M
;/!
KT, and KS, respectively. Attitude error signals represent deviations
from the trajectory for the first stage booster only. The SCS rate gyros
apply attitude rates to the SCS electronics directly and to the FD.Ai via Y;
r ela1_ KIZ.
:!
g!
STA]311SV.ATION AND CONTROL S'fSTEM p,
•i Fage Z. 3-.44 ..... _i_

:_ '-/ .:'._ion Basic Date.. IZ Nov !9(,6 C.har_ge Date ...........................
;{
{
.......... : .: . 4 - ....
i APOL)LO
SM?,A-03-SC0]
OPERATIO]qS
Z
I-!ANDBOOK
S YSTE_/_S DATA
The X-axis _ccelerometer will be active, but its output will be used
i¸9
only if an abort delta V is required. The TVC subsystem is activated to
hold the SPS engine thrust vector through the e.g. 5n the event of an SPS
] abort, and _o keep the nozzle centered and stationary within the adapter.
The SPS engine gimbals are aligned to null offset (pitch +0.4 degrees and
if!i! yaw +3.6 degrees) prior to launch. Quiecsent current o:_ the gimbal
motor clutches maintains these angles during ascent.
': '{_I
LES Abort. If an LES abort is initiated (61 seconds or more after lift-off)
requiring SCS operadon, the SCS is enabled one second after LES ignition.
The SCS is enabled by the arming of the RCS latching relays in the SECS,
and the S/M-C/iX.,[transfer switch will be driven to the C/M position. The
RCS latching relay will open by the operation of a barometric switch at
approximately Z4,000 feet during descent and will disable active commands
-j
Im to the C/Ni RCS. Besides rate stabilization, specific comrn-_nd inputs to
q
the SCS above Z4,000 feet will depend on altitude a_-_dother factors.
SPS Abort. An SPS abort would be initiated after the LES jettison. The
translation control is rotated CCW into detent and "d_e switch closure will
cause the MESC" to command a +X translation (separation ullage) via the
direct coils of the S/M RCS. The direct coils are activated through the
RCS transfer switch.
Before separation from the S-IVB, a de]is V h_ode must be selected.

For an SPS abort, alignment of the SPS engine gimbals is not required
since d_e/ we_e prese¢ prior to launch and _o propellant has been consumed
A+ _ .... _,+_,_ _,or + can. h_ ._s.de _o e_r_J_ orbit or to a downrange
landing site.
LJ Z. 3.3. Z Coasting Flight (Earth Orbital).
L. The coasting flight profile ranges from a free-drift configuration

(no control) to monitor mode (passive) to attitude hold (active control).
The following paragraphs describe the various modes re].ative _:othe earth
or bits! envir onto ont.
2.3.3.2.1 G& N Attitude Contr o1..
GS_N attitude control will provide inertially stabilized attitude by

i utilizing the attitude reference and attitude control subsystems. Attitude
data is obtained from _he inertially referenced IMU. Relays K4 and !<5
i provide
the AGCU
BM/_G/AGCU
will have the
closed
same
].oop so that if SCS
reference as the IMU
attitude
for
control
control, and
is selected
display
purposes.
] Attitude errors frmn the inertia] CDU through relays K7 and }<8 a_.'e
applied to the .FDAI and SCS electronics for attitude error display, and to
provide attitude corrections. The errors from the CDU are the difference
between the IMU girnbal angles and the corn:_.anded output of theAGC.
Total attitude from the IMU is applied to the FDAI via relay Ii3. The
STAI%iLIZA.TIC'N .AND CONTROl, SYST]EM
Z. 3-45
13a s5 c Date._li-'_ Noy_[_9_6_6.___Cha_,ge Date_ Page
.<i Mission
SMZA --03-SC0].Z
APOLLO OPEI[ATIONS }-iANDBOOK
,F SYSTEMS DATA
attitude rates from the SCS rate gyro and relay KIZ will drive the FDAI rate
indicator at a scale range of :kl degree/second.
;!i The maximum deadband limit is normally set for G&N attitude control. _
If navigation sightings are required; the minimum deadband may be

<!]
selected. The G&N system and SCS attitude control subsystem will main-
tain attitude within the selected deadba.nd limits.
%J
Maneuvering_: Automatic maneuvers may be executed by inserting

commands into the AGC via the DSI<Y. The S/C will automatically maneuve_
to the computer.-commanded attitude. The SCS will follow the attitude error
signal inputs from the C_U in response to AGC inputs for maneuvering to
the commanded attitude. Manual maneuvers can be co_-nmanded with or
without attitude hold.
f,
;:t
}
In G&N mode, relay I<18 (figure Z. 3--7) is open. Relay KI7 is closed.
Relay KI8 inhibits BMAG inputs and allows O&bI attitude error signals into
the jet selection logic for the attilude hold function. [When the rotation con-
trol is displaced, the breakout switches open K17, inhibiting GhN signals
>] and allowing proportional command (rotation control plus rate gyro)
signals into the jet selection logic_ \Vhen the control is returned to neutral,
relay KI7 closes and the G&N attitude hold function is restored, provided
G&N sync is active.
{:i{{
Translation in all axes can be commanded by the tra.ns!ation control.
As shown in figure 2. 3-5, switch closures, within tl,._control apply con_-
m_,n)d signals _.re_,t_y
_' - ' to the jet selection logic _>,_,4
............._-b_,_o-_l_r>
: ........ .. to l:be
e auto RCS coils. Attitude hold is a normal function when translations are
initiated, using the trans].ation control.
g
'4 The direct ullage switch on th 9 delta V display is a backup for +X
] translations. When this switch is activated, the signal is applied directly
to the RCS direct coils. Attitude hold is not a function of direct _d]age.
Attitude impulse control (panel 105, LEB) is a manual control

;I
?! capability for G&N and SCS attitude control modes only. Each displacement
! of the attitude impulse control (figure Z. 13-4, sheet 3) provides an output
i attitude
The pulses
impulse
command
command
body
to two
angular
RCS
rates
engines for
of approxi_nately
a duration
3 arc
of 18_-4 ms.
rain/see.
2,°3.3.2.2 G&N Local Vertical.
The G&N local vertical mode is an extension of O&N attitude control.

The purpose of this mode of operation is to accurately maintain the S/C
]<-axis at a fixed angle with respect to the local vertical (relative to the
earth surface) while maintaining the S/C Y-axis normal to the orbital plane.
Li The O&N local vertical mode is an AGC-comrnanded function. A computer
program (not available for ASZ04A mission) is called by the astronaut by

DSI<Y entry. After IMU alignment, with the s/C X-axis in the 8irection of
the desired orbital path, the computer program provides an orbit rate
.< Z° 3-46
Basic .'Oa_e 12 Nov. 19.6(, Cl_ange Date Page
]
I
SMZA-03-SC0I 2
(I
APOLLO OP}EI<ATIONS ]-t &-.I_Q!)I3OO!<
( !_!:3
S_S_ r r, ElvIS DATA
source to command torquing of the IMU at a rate that wil] maintain the local
vertical attitude. This mode may be used to make navigational sightings of
earth landmarks by keeping the G&N optics within the area of the earth
i
surface.
:i [11 _[.i b i:
L :
: < Z.3.3 Z. 3 SCS Attitude Control.
SCS attitude control mode will hold the S/C at an inertial-referenced
, [j attitude and will limit S/C drift to the selected deadband limits, normally,
15 degrees in earth orbit. If SCS attitude control is selected after a G&N

at:titude control function, the attitude reference subsystem is aligned to the
[i{,t_ IMU (/_MAG/AGCU closed loop). If not, an FDAI/AGCU align function, is
:i L,,J required.
When SCS attitude control is selected, G&N inputs are removed from
iii:_
! the FD_.! and SCS electronics. The following relay contacts (figure Z. 3--4,
::i sheet Z) are ac_ivated to supply SCS-generatedcomn-_ands for display and
co_.tr o! purposes.
::ii:))
Relay Ii4 open--lZDAI ball stationary
Relay K]Z--Applies body rates to FDAI
Relay K3 closed to AGCU--AppIies attitude errors to FDAI
Re]ay KllB--App_ies attitude errors to SCS electronics

|
F!0AI/AGCU AIJ.__: If the AGCU has not been aligned to the IMU or if a
new attitude reference is desire@ w]_ile in SCS attitude control mode, the
ast_'onsut w_]! determine S/C attitude from star sightin_s or from the
!i
MS]_'N. Inertial angles are dialed ir_to the AS/GPI with the ATTITUDE SET
dials and the I_DAI ALIGN pushbutto:_ is pressed. Relay KZ closes and the
AGCU and FDAI ball will drive to the selected attitude.
: )! Manual Maneuvers. After AGCU reference has _oeen established, the S/C
can be maneuvered i:o the desired attitude reference by flying out the
errors, using CSS. The ATT SET/OFiF switch is activated, relay 1(Z3 is
activated, _he RCS latching relays are closed to the S/M RCS, relays K6
and _K9 close, and I(Z0 will open. Attitude error, equal to the difference
between __TTITUDE SET dial position and AGCU resolver shaft position,
is then applied to the FDAI from the AGCU through I(6. Attitude error
from the ]3M_G is removed from the IPDAi when I_9 activates. When the
rotation control is moved out of detent, CSS commar_ds are applied through
the A.CS to t_e jet selection logic and auto coils of the RCS engines. At
the same time, relays 1(4: and K5 close providing BMAG/AGCU closed loop.
The BM_(]s follow S/C rotation and repositions the FDAi ball. When the
E? rotation
relays 1(4
control
and I(5
is returned
open, and
to
the
neutral,
new attitude
tl_e BMAG/AGCU
will hold
loop
\_,ithin the
is opened,
selected
1 d eadband.
STABII,IZATION AND CON'Tt_OL SYSTEM
2. 3-47
Page
i [S{i ]',iiss ion 13a s fc :lDate
SMZA-03-SC01 Z

<!i n
-i 11
SYSTEMS DATA
!%!i
When the ATT SET/OFF switch is OFF, relays K6andK9 de-energize
and attitude error signals from the BM_Gs are now applied to the FDAI and
ACS. If further attitude changes are desired, they can be accomplished by
using CSS. The BM_AG/AGCU loop will be closed, and opened when the rots-
J tion control, is returned to neutral. The attitude error needles will indicate
the difference between the AGCU and the S/C attitude. The error needles
are fty-to needles and will be at full scale if the error is greater than
5 degrees. To fly out the error, the astronaut must fly-to the needles or
use the FDAI ball markings until the needles come off full scale, and then
fly-to the needle to null the remaining error.
] Free Drift. Free drift is normally used duringextended periods of time

_,hen power and RCS propellant conservation is desired. Free drift can be
established in either attitude control mode by plS.cing the SCS CI-L%NNEL
switches to OFF, inhibiting all command signals to the RCS auto coils.
;ii
With an. SCS attitude mode selected and an SCS CHANNEL switch to OFI_"
(PITCH or YAW or A&C ROLL a_sd ]3&D ROLL), relay action closes the
BMAG/AGCU loop and updates the ARS while drifting. However, if one
BMAG is placed, in backup rate and a channel switch is off, relay action
rat e cages the rernaining.BMAGs and opens the BMAG/AGCU loop, thus,
preventing the ARS from being updated.
2.3.3.2.4 SCS Local Vertical.

E
SCS local vertical mode is an extension of SCS a'gtitude control. Its
purpose is to maintain S/C attitude with respect to the local vertical. When
;I the LCL VERT/OFF switch on M_DC-8 is set to LCIb VERT, relay ]il e__er-
gizes and an orbit rate source with a preset level is applied to the ]3NiAG/
'2 AGCU servo loop. At present, the preset level established for the orbit
rate source is most accurate for a 100-r, mi circular orbit and will maintain
the attitude reference system at the local vertical wifh torque rates of
Z46 degrees/hour,
attitude
XZ
when
plane is parallel
the
to
or 4. 1 degrees/minute.
AGCU is aligned
the
to
orbital plane
represent
It will
at the time
S/C
maintain
attitude
LCL VERT
an approximate
when
is selected.
the S/C [
J_ All three RCS channels must be enabled for the local vertical mode.
Modifications of the local vertical attitude can be made using CSS. The
transl.atior_ control is also active and available during this mode of operation
Z.3.3.3 Powered
Powered
Flight (Earth
i,_g t includes
Orbital).
those modes that provide the capability for

[
velocity changes using the SPS engine. Included in the following discussion
are the G&N delta V, SCS delta V, and the manual delta V modes.
[
g. 3. 3. 3. 1 G&N Delta V.
'i}
G&N delta V mode is the normal method for velocity changes. Prior [
{
to engine ignition, however, G&N attitude control mode must be cstahlished.
i
] STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM
"_':_,i_):, Basic Date 1Z Nov 1966 Change Date ]-_a_,.e Z. 3-48 [

4
SMZA-03-,. S C012
AY'OLLO OPIEt<ATIOiX_S HANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
•_ L;_-
_
System relays apply the foi]owing (G&N/SCS switch on MDC-8 set to G&N
and ATTITUD][;/IviONITOR/ENTRY switch set to ATTTTUDE (figure Z. 3-5,
sheet l) )"
¢'i
i:i
J
D Relay
Relay
}<7 and
l<9--Attitude
K8--Attitude
error
error
fro,-n CDUs
from CDUs
to SCS
to FDAI
electronics
_{.:::
_r _.
I!2,,ii:_
o Relay I<3- Total attitude from IMU to FDAI ball
Body rates to ]FDAI and SCS electronics

t
e RCS latching relay in MESC closed to RCS system
The FCSM-SCS-RESET/OVEI_.I<IDE and G&N-RESET/OVERRI]DE
switches on M.DC-Z may be se_ to SCS and G&N positions. These switches
provide an automatic monitoring of SPS engine combustion performance.

If rough combustion occurs, the SPS ROUGH ECO warning light on MDC-10
D will
resetting
light and
the
engir_.e
FCSM
thrust
switches
will
and
terminate.
then setting
A restart
them back
can be
to SCS
made
and
by
G&N.
j Or, the monitor can be bypassed by setting theFCSM switc._es to

RF.SET/OVERRIDE.
D Attitude in'formation from the IMU is displayed on the EDAI bali.
Attitude errors from the CDUs are also applied to the I:']DA! (±5-degree
scale) and are used by the SCS to control attitude in response to _._,_,
corn
mands, l_otationai rates are displayed by the FDAI rate indicators with a
scale range of _:5 degrees/second. The computer-c'ontrolled velocity
change will be monitored on the delta V d_splay. The required velocity
less tailoff will be set into the delta V display by d_e Z\V SET switch, using
U ve]ocJ/y J.nforn__ation obtained frem the O&b T system or MS!_'N. L_,.nin-,um
deadband is set on MDC..8: the girnbal motor switches, and the inject
i!iii! pre-va].ve switches on N4_DC-3 are activated.. The SPS gi_mbal trin_ angles
are determined, set into the AS/OPI by the giznbal position thunnbwheels,
and gimbal position verified on the GPI. The NORMAL/OFF/DIR 'ECT
; i)!
switch on the delta V display is set to nor_nal.
Approximately 15 seconds prior to ignition, after the digital event

timer (ivLDC-5 and 8) has been set for countdown, the astronaut •will com-
mand a +X ullage using the translation con.trol. A.t T : 0, the AGC will
command a signal through the thrust on-off logic and enable the solenoid
drivers of the TVC subsystem. The so].enoid drivers wii]. then activate the
SPS engine ignition coils and SPS thrusting will occur. The ]amp portion of
D the THI<UST
automatic computer
ON switch
command.
on the delta V display will light, verifyir.g the
System delay (AUTO CONT INTER) logic will terminate the RCS
ullage approxhnately one second after SPS ignition. The compuier will
command pitch and yaw attitude of the SPS gimbals via the TVC to control
ii the
the
thrust
rnaneuvc
vector.
r.
Roll commands \rill be applicd to the roll RCS during
B
STAI3ILIZ.'kTION AND CONTROL S%o.[E,,
Missicn ............. }3asic Date .................

iZ Nov !966 ChanL,_e Date Page Z. 3..49
.!
J
C:
i:!%
SM2A-03-SC012
APOLLO O_E! _-ATI'ONS HANDBOOK
SYS i E_vlS DAT A

<t
•<;! !_
When the delta V remaining counter indicates zero, thrusting will F
terminate and the THRUST ON light will go out. The NORMAL/OFF/
:521
DIRECT ON switch will be set to OEF and the SPS motor switches, inject
pre-valves, and the TVC electronics will be de-activated. Approximately
•!i one second after thrust terminates, pitch and yaw control i.s transferred
back to the SCS for the attitude control function.
•+ •,_
If a malfm_ction occurs during the maneuver, a switchover to SCS

delta V will allow continuation of the velocity change. If there is no response
from the translation control at ullage initiation, the DIRECT ULLAGE
pushbutton on the delta V display may be used. for the ullage maneuver prior
to ignition of the SPS engine. Also, if au.tometic thrust-on does notocc_:,r at
T = 0_ the THRUST ON pushbutton on the delta V display wil] provide engine
ignition.
:ii! 2.3.3.3.2 SCS Delta V.
i1 SCS delta V mode is a prh-nary backup for the G&ixl delta• V. Pre-
liminary to engine ignition, SCS attitade control is established by setting
the G&N/SCS switch on MDC-8 to SCS° After SPS engine ignition, the SCS
uses S/M RCS roll jets to maintain roll attitude and applies commands to
the SPS engine gimbals to control the thrust vector. Relays in figu,"e Z. 3--4
apply the following (RCS latching relay in the SECS is closed to the S/M RCS
throughout the nqaneuver):
Relays 149 and Kl0--Attitude errors from BlviAGs to FDAI

Relay l<llB--Attitude errors fron-_ BMAC.s to SCS elect:<onics
Relays K4 and I<5 open--l,'DAI ball stationary
o body rates to IPDAI and SCS electronics (RGA).
<:i:-_
The control and display activation p¢'ocess that was performed for the
G&N delta V will be performed for SCS delta V. The major differences.are
iii as follows:
i_ii(,
i,
Control of attitude and the thrust vector is through the SCS.
At T = 0_ ignition is initiated manually by pressing the TI-IRUST ON

pushbutton on the delta V display.
Thrust is terminated automatically when the ZXV remaining counter

i<i
(delta V pot,) indicates zero.
As in the G&N delta V mode, if the required command responses to
not occur, the same backup controls can be used to perform the delta V.
STABILIZATION A ]'_D CON .t I O_., .S .v. STI'-2M
:i Mi,_;ic;n Basic Date iZ Nov 1966 Change Date .... Page 2.0-50
4
:J
SMZA.-03-SC01Z
APOLLO OPigRATIOIqS !tANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
!
{4a
In SCS delta. V mode, if engine ignition does not occur when the THRUST ON
switch is pressed, the NORMAL/OFF/DIRECT ON switch can be set to
'i DIRECT ON. This applies a command signal directly to the SPS engine _._ ....
: '.i ?! ignition coils and will initiate thrusting. The NORMALOFF DII<EC_F ON ii!
switch must be set to OFF to terminate engine thrust. _ !..
""
:1
Manual Delta. V (MTVC).
U
2.3.3.3.3
A manual delta V will be perfor_ned only as a backup to a G&N or SC_

d delta V. Manual thrust vecto-_ control is initiated by a CW rotation of the
:!i translation control i=to detent. At this time, relays I_14 and tZ5 will close,
i providing ra'te caging of all three BMAGs; and relays IZl0 and Xil12- will
open removing rate gyz'o ox:tputs frm-A the FDA.I and SCS electronics. The
rate-caged BIvLAGs through relay and t_IZ will switch _MAG backup-rate
signals into the SCS electronics.
:iiii!..'l
In the G&N and SCS delta V modes, TVC servo electronics No. 1 and
B SPS
.K3Z,
gimbal
K33,
drive
and. K34
motor
activate.
No. I was
This
used.
closes
When
the servo
MTVC
loop
is initiated,
for commanding
relays
)i
i SPS gimbal drive motor No. Z.
: i
Gi_bal tx.-;.mcommands are applied through re!z.y K31. When the
rotation control J.s moved out of detent, pitch &_d yaw commands are
applied to motor No. 2,through.relay I_3]. and gin_bal position feedbaclc is
:n
through r elayl(3Z.
]
The sun_nation of backup zate and proportional CSS commands ir_;_o
the TVC provides a rate-dan_ped manual co__trol of the engine gimbals.
The astronaut must keep the rota.tion control at a given displace_w_ent to
::ij:_
keep the thrust vector through the e.g. and to fly the correct trajectory.
: !
If CW switches of the translation control are engaged while in G&N
delta V, G&N attitude contro]., or G&N entry mode, attitude errors are _)ot
1 removed from the FDAI. This allows the astronaut to monitor and, if
necessary, fly a G&N programmed maneuver using CSS.
Z. 3.3.4 Entry.
i1
The entry profile consists of the various n_.ethods of controlling the
S/C for the entry phase of the mission. The entry mode is normally
selected after S/M-C/M separation. At separation, the motor-driven RCS
transfer switches are closed to the C/Ivl RCS.
Z. 3.3.4. 1 G&N Entry.
G&N manual mode is the primary method of control for entry inte the
?I
it atmosphe.re for the ASZ04A mission. A.ul:omatic entry may be us'ed in lieu
of GS_N manual mode.
STAI%ILIZAT1ON AND CONTROL SYSTEM
Z.3-51
Page
Mission ................... _,asic ]-)ate 1Z Nov 196{) C};ange Daie
;i_i!
SMZA-03-SC0 IZ
SYSTEMS DATA
G&N Manual. This is normally a backup for the G&N entry automatic
mode. The translation control is rotated CW into detent. This removes
4
inertial CDU attitude errors from the SCS electronics. Normally, the
astronauts will call up the entry program via the DSKY shortly after :
S/M-C/M separation.
The entry angle, required pullout angle, and other required entry
G!:
data is presented on the computer displays. The astronaut can manually
perform a controlled g-level entry by using CSS to fly out the commanded
attitude errors displayed on the FDAI. The BIvLA.G/AGCU has been closed
2 ,.
loop for backup reference in case switchover is necessary.
After .05 g: aerodynamic forces build up sufficiently to stabilize the

S/C in the pitch and yaw axes. At this time, CSS will be effective in the
roll channel only. The SCS will rate-.damp the pitch and yaw channels, and
h.
the astronauts will have steerzng capability by using roll CSS to control the
lift vector.
Automatic Entr_: The FDAI rate display seale range changes to 'J:25degrees/
second in roll, and 15 degrees/second in pitch and yaw. Deadband is
maximum. The rate deadband is ±Z degrees/sec.
Prior to . 05 G switching, attitude error from the inertial COUs is

applied to the FDAI error indicator through relays K7 and I_8, and to the
SCS electronics through relay K9. The R.GA applies rate gyro body rates
to the FDAI and SGS electronics. Relay K3 applies total, attitude to the
FDA.I bail.
ilii
At .05 g, the . 05 G ENTRY/OFF switch on MfDC-8 is se_ to .05 O
ENTRY. The SCS pitch and yaw channels perform rate stabilization only.
The roll channel is still subject to computer-controlled roll commands.
The AGC will fly the S/C according £o a pre-es£ablished entry program°
2.3.3.4.2 SCS Entry.
The SCS entry mode is a primary backup to G&N entry mode. When
selected, total attitude information to the FDAI is supplied throughout the
entry. Prior to .05 g, the BMAGs apply attitude errors to the ]FDAI and
SCS electronics through relays 1<3 and K9. After . 05 g, relays K3 and li9
remove attitude errors from the FDAI and SCS electronics. Relays I<4 and
4_
K5 close, providing ]3MF_G/AGCU closed loop. For the remainder of entry,

attitude errors are not displayed. There is no attitude hold capability.
2:::,
...., The rate gyros, however, provide rate signals for rate stabilization. The
SCS electronics increase rates to a Z--degree/second rate deadband. The
FDAI displays total attitude. The astronauts will initiate the necessary
comn_ands using CSS to fly a controlled g-level entry. After aerodynan%ics
stability in pitch and yaw, steering capability will be in the roll channel
only.
o
i ._,_i_.-:ion Basic Date 1_ Nov 1966 Chang.e Date ......... Page Z. 3.-52 i
,!
!
4
SMZA-03-SC0 l 2
'1 APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK

5_
K_ SYSTEIV o DATA
i
If, after . 05 g, it is necessary to place a BMAG in backup rate, only
the BMAG selected by the rate gyro select switch will have _ts inputs in the
SCS for rate stabilization. When backup rate is selected, relays K9, K!0,
KIZ, and-Kl-5 activate, providing backup rate to the FDAI and SCS else- _i:-_"_
J
tronics. Loss of FDAI ball reference will occur. Relay K1Z removes rate _t :
:i • /i
gyro output from the FDAI and SCS electronics. The astronauts will control [_.a_
the lift vector with the CSS roll cha_mel, if they wish to d-crease the g
::ili? level, they will roll the S/C to keep the lift vectorup, if they wish to
increase the g level, they will roll the S/C so that the lift vector is down. ,
'i:i Z.3.4 M_JOR COMPONENT/SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION.
_f3
The SCS consists of the following major components: .
¢ Rate gyro assembly (RGA)
a_
e Attitude gyro accelerome_er assembly (AGAA)
] Pitch electronic control assernbly (pitch ECA)
:it ¢_ Roll electronic control assembly (roll ECA)
e Yaw electrop_ic control assembly (ya\_ ECA)
Amxiliary electronic control, assembly (aux ECA)
U
_. Disp].ay a._._d attitude gyro acceleron_-etcr assen_b!y electronic
control assembly (DISPLAY-AGAA ECA)
:i
e Rotation control
e Translation control
;1 Flight director attitude indicator FDAi)
iii Attitude set/gimbal position indicator (AS/GPI)
:! e Velocity change indicator (2xV display).
Z. __° 4.1 Rate Gyro Assembly,
il The rate gyro assemb!y contain.s three idenLical rate gyros, nnounted
:l
:: s: orthogonally along the spacecraft body axes, and assocSated tyro elec-
tronics. No provision is made for heaters or temperature control of the
gyros. Each gyro is a singie-axis unit, with the input axis determinedby
the gyro mounting fixture. Self-test capabilities are provided by torquing
coils which enable the gyro to be displaced at a known rate and by' spin
motor rotation detection circuits which allow monitoring of the gyro spin
motor speed, All self-test circuits are completely isolated frown opera-
:;3
tional circuits to prevent a failure in the fornner from affecting gyro
STA.BIL!ZATION._dND CONTROL SYSTEM
Page Z. 3-53
_;•i:
i Mi s s i on Basic: Date 12 Nov 1966 Change Date
:!
V!
SMZA-03-SC012
APOLEO OPERATIONS I-tAI'q'DBOOK

.)i
S YSTEN._S DATA
operation. The gyro outputs are used by the SCS as primary damping or
stabilization signals and, in addition, as negative feedback to null rotational
171 control commands and provide a proportional maneuver rate capability.
The rate gyros also provide an indication on the FDAI of the rate-of-
< attitude change in pitch, roll, and yaw axes, An attitude change about any
,!
:i,! of the axes results in an outpuc signal which is representative of the rate
/;
of displacement.
Each miniature rate gyro assemb'ly consists of a spin motor, damping

:!
system, gimbal assembly, quadrilever spring, and self-check circuitry.
The gyro spin motor is a 400-cps 3-phase synchronous hysteresis motor
powered by Z6 vo]ts ac. ]7.
he r,;aximum time allowed for the gyro to come
:ii_i up to operating speed is 17 seconds. Damping is accomplished by- positive
..... ,ii displacement of the damping fluid through temperature-controlled orifices.
The quadril.ever spring provides the torsional restraint required by the
gyro, together with radial su,:port for the gimbal assemb!y. Some
:i!{
important rate gyro characteristics are as ioiluws:
iii!i 30°/see
Full-scale range
Input range (to limit stop) 30°/sec
Maximum r ate without da nnag e 600 c / s ec
! [
Z. 3.4. Z Attitude Gyro Accelerometer Assembly.
The attitude gyvo acceleroD3eter agsembly cot&rains three body-

• !i_i mounted attJtu.de <__vros (BMAGs) and art accelerometer. Electronic control
circuits for the gyros and accelerometer are contained in the display and
attitude gyro accelerorneter assembly electronic control assembly.
[
Z. 3.4. Z. 1 Body-Mounted Attitude Gyros.
The three BMAGs are identical units, m.ounted orthogonally along the
spacecraft body axes, to sense attitude displacement a].ong the pitch, roll, I
and yaw axes. Each gyro is a single-axis unit, with the input axis deter-
mined by the physical mounting in the S/C. A spin motor detection circuit
is included in each gyro to allow monitoring of gyro spin _,motor speed.
This will be telemetered data only.
The BNaJkGs provide information denoting the angular displacement

of the spacecraft from a preset attitude. They are initially set to a specific
•: 3 space-stabilized orientation; thereafter, any displace_mnt from this initial
i!I setting
angular
results
displacement.
in output
The
signals
output
which
signals
are representative
are used
of the
to F.roduce
amount
attitude
of
error signals for an attitude-bold mode or for display on the flight director
attitude indicator. The outputs may also be applied to tl_e attitude gyro
!i coupler unit (AGCU) for attitude change storage and for conversion to
inertial measure_nent unit (IMU) axes. i,'v[[]
axes differ from the spacecraft
body axes. The AGCU and }3MAGs are used as a substitute or backup
inertial reference unit for the IMU during the periods when the IMU is
STA, BIL,IZATION AND CONTRO]_ SYST]_]M

!
] Nil:_,'_ion Basic Date !Z Nov 1966 Change Date Page Z.3.-54

<i
_.
SMZA-03-SG0 12
7
<I APOLLO OPERATIONS I{ANDBOOK
I/
!i!
_i SYSTEMS DATA
turned off or has malfunctioned. The Bh&AGs can also be used to produce
:7i attitude rate-of'change information, as backup for the rate gyros.
!:_ _ :71 ']7he ]BMAGs are single-degree-of-freedom, miniature integrating [ii:.

gyros contained in electrically heated individual packages. The heater wi]! _ !i .
k nna'intain individual BI_AG ternperature at 170±Z°F. Degraded gyro opera- _.
tion will result if this temperature is not maintained. The gyro spin 171otor's
are 3-phase g4,000-rp_T_ synchronous devices, powered by 13.6volts 400ups
from a supply in the attitude gyro accelerometer package electronic contro_
assembly. With C/M temperature at 80°F and the mounting plate tempera-
ture at 55°_ ', the _naximu_ time aliowcd for the B_f_..G to reach operating
E;J limits is 40 r_inutes. .A,few gy;:o characteristics are listed as fo].lows.

d
Acceleration sensitive drift 4 deg/hr
Maximum self-torquing rate Z5 deg/sec
_Viaxirnu _ attitu4',
e r an g e ig0 deg
ZO ° sec roll, 5 ° sec pitch and yaw
AGCU coup].ed torquin.g ],imJts
Z.3.4. Z.Z Acce!ero]_eter.

:,'_i
B
The acce!erometer is _T;ou_ted along the spacecraft ]<-axis to sense
velocity changes alo___gthis axis. It is a pendulous-type acceleronneter with
electronic null _,nd balance. 7he temperature is n-_air_tained at ].701Z°F
i! ..... under norrnal opP,rating conditions. A signal output is ger.erated by a

velocity change along the X-axis.- This velociLy change causes the pendulous
: l?t n<_ass to n3.ove, resulting in a cha:.zge of coupling between the primary and
._1 t::.:;4
secondary windirtgs.of a sign.m,ige.t_erator. This results in an output £_ ....i
which is demodulat_(z and a_mp]if4ed to provide accelerador_ informatio_ J.n
the form of digital signals %o a counter in the delta Y display (paragraph
Z. 3.4.. i0). The pen@ulous mass is returned to null by the bal;=_ncin.g action
of the electronic cagiD, g si@[_al when the velocity change ceases.
Pitch., Roll, and Yaw Electronic _ontrol Assen-_blies.

U Z. 3.4.3
I The pitch., yaw, and roll electronic control assemblies (ECAs) ale
1 nearly ._dentical, with s].ight differences due to different requirements for

,4 each axis. The ECAs provide the circui%ry for input control signal process-
ing and SCS mode control and configuration. Input con.trol signals consist
of attitude error signals from the SCS BM_AGs and from the G$zN systezm,
,.':,] minimum impulse con_mands, r:_te gyro angular signals, translation and
rotation control commands, service propulsion er.,gine g_mbal position
commands, and SPS engine gimbal rate and position feedback signals biode
control inputs are received from switches on panel 8 of the main display
'!i F1d console (MDC). These ir_put signals are applied to logic-controlled relays
which er_ab!e circuit configurations corresponding to the desired mode,
ECA output signals consist of reaction jet fzring commands and SPS timbal
position commands. The reaction jet con_mands are generated in the jet
selection logic portions of the ECAs. Preignition SPS engine gimbai
position commands are generated manually at the AS/GPI by thumbwheels
which provide input signals to the gi_b_l control circuits. Post-ignition
_ Ii-
j
STA]_ILIZATION AND uON
..... I _._O_,
_ SYSTEM
_;_ Z. 3 .- 55
'_ ":_] R_si,': r'_e 12 Nov 1966 C:_e_ge ]:)_Jte ..................... ]Page ......................
!
U>,
ild
SMZA-03-SC01Z
SYSTEMS DATA.
gimbal control is provided by automatic thrust vector control(TVC) circuitry
in the pitch and yaw ECAs.
Auxiliary Electronic Control Assembly.

i<i! "} 3 4.4
j The avuxi!iary electronic control assembly contains the attitude gyro
coupling unit and service propulsion system thrust on-off command circuitry.
TheAGCU portion of the auxiliary ECA receives ]BMAG signals from the
DISPLAY-AGAA ECA and processes the data for display on the FDAI. It
!4
also transforms attitude set dial signals to bod 7 axes. The SPS engine
on-off control circuitrs_ in the AUX ECA receives m_gine on-off commands
if' % from the GhN. system or the SCS. These cornmands are conditioned and
%5
applied to the S]?S engine solenoid valves,
Z. 3.4. 5 Display and Attitude Gyro Accelero_r_eter Assembly Electronic Control
Assernb]y.
5 control
The
assen%bly
display and
provides
attitude
the
gyro acceleronxeter
electronic circuitry
assernb].y
required
electronic
to control and
L
power the displays, ]3MAGs, and aceeleron_eter. The DISPLAY ECA
portion consists of the circuitry necessary to receive and condition the
following:
o Attitude error signals fro_x the GhN systen_ or the BIv_.Gs to the
FDAI a%titude errox indicators
<
o Attitude rate-of-change signals from the rate gyros or Bh4AGs to
the FDAI attitude rate indicators
>i
:i
Feedback signals from the SPS engine gimbals to the gimbal position
indicator s
i<i Acce]erometer signals from the AGAA to the delta Vdisplay
integrator.
F
a The AGAA ECA portion consists of circuitry necessary to accomplish
i
the following:
Accept and condition BlvIAG inputs for the AGCU
Accept and co_3dition AGCU torquing commands to the 13MAGs
Control BIvIAG and accelerorneter temperature controls
e Control and condition the accelerometer rebatance loop and inputs
to the integrator
t
Supply reference voltages to the ]5MAGs and accelerometer
_ Condition the BM_AG and accelerometer outputs to telemetry.

l
STA]3iLIZAT1ON AND CONTROL SYSTEM
Z. 3 - 56 i
.).,1_s_si{)n Basic Date _9_, _,
:_ov 196o ..... Change Date.. Page [
SM£A-0 3-SC0 13
U APOLLO Ot"I!3RA_[ 'IONS HANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
[![:[[_ 2.3.4.6 Rotation Controls.
Two identieal rotation controls are provided to enable manual

command ofthespacecraft attitude ( figure 2. 3-8). Each control• is a control
stick containing breakout switches and transducers (figure Z. 3-9) which [i̧ :/i
apply control signals to the reaction jet selection logic circuitry in the
pitch, yaw, and roll ]ECAs. When the stick is moved, the breakout
<i ! switches close the loop between the BMAGs and AGCU, and control
signals from the pitch, yaw, and roll transducers are applied to the
appropriate conf.rol ECAs. Proportional response to the control stick
movement is provided by rate gyro feedback to the ECA electronics
(figure Z. 3-10). The reaction jet solenoids can also be controlled via the
direct application of control voltages from switches in the controller.
The latter method, requiring use of the DIRECT MODE switch on MDC-8,
;t
D does
the
in the
not
stick
other
provide
commanding
axes
proportional
are
a. rotation
ac_:ive.
response.
about one
With
axis,
the
the
direct
rate
mode
damping
enabled
circuits
and
_i:__
Provision. is made to mount the controls at four different locations in

the C/NI: the right armrest of the ].eftcrew couch, both armrests of the
right crew couch, and at the navigation station in the lower equipment bay.
Normally, one control is attached to the left crew couch mount and the
U other
of both
is used
controls
at any
is possible
of tlie other
bug
three
not advised;
locations.
however,
Simultaneous
each control
operation
has a
locking device to prevent inadvertent operation.
U Z. 3.4.7 Translation Controls.
Two identical translation controls are provided to enable manual com-

mand of spacecraft translational maneuvers. (See figure Z. 3-8.) Each
control is a T--hand]e type control stick containing switches, which apply
•_i:_i_
1 control signals to the reaction jet selection logic circuitry in the pitch, yaw,
and roll ECSs (figure Z. 3-11). The reaction jets are activated in groups
of two or four, depending upon the direction of desired translation. Left--
right and up-down translations are accomplished by firing two reaction
iI control jets with the same direction of thrust. _Forward and reverse trans-
lations are accompiished by firing the four forward thrusting or four rear-
ward thrusting reaction control jets. The translation maneuver commanded
is in direct response to the direction in which the T-handle is moved.
The primary control has switches which initiate a spacecraft abort if

the T-handle is rotated counterclockwise. Both controls have switches
which enable manual thrust vector control and disable automatic attitude
control if the T-handle is rotated clockwise. Each control has a lockin.g
device to prevent inadvertent operation of the translation control.
3 Both controls are mounted in the C/M on the left armrest of the crew
couch. The primary control is identified with yellow stripes and. is the
only one provided \yith abort switching capability.
STA]31LIZATIONAN]) CONTP, OL SS"STEM
Z, 3-57
Mission Basic Date lZ Nov i966 Change Date .......... P r_ g e
SMZA"03-SC01Z
APOLLO OPERATIONS}I.ANDBOOK
SYSTEMSDATA ::i:![
PUSH TO TALK SWITCH f

\
\
\
\
W
/
/,f-Z / \
{
/ !
! X
f
.+X
/
t,.
:f
I +Z
\
-]
[
i
! MTVC ENABLE AN!D/OR i
_m
AUTO ATT COFITROL DISABLE
!::!_
08°) 2"
I
_k_a ¸ . _J
:i /
i
)
.¢,Y
2
PITCH ROLL
! TRANBL_,TION_ONTROL
h_
• \
÷
'il
+ YAW
,,ii
{
:iiii_
:.>,
: _I
<:i t
>{
SM- 2z'-,-674A
;i ROTATION CONTROL
Figure Z, 3-8. Rotation and Translation Controls
S']?ABILIZY_TtON AND CONTROL, SYSTF, M
Mission Basic Date 12 }'_ov ]96(, Change ]_)ate ...... Page Z.3--58
SMZA --0 3- $6!) i 2,
APOLL.O OPICRATIONS NANDBOOK
b_ sYsTEMS D/:\ TA
[)]
i i>a
J ROTATION CONTROLLER ---'] ,LZ:

f < 26 VAC 400 CPS FROM PIiCH ECA OR YAW ECA
PROPORTIONAL RATE COMMANDS TO PITCH ECA

bJ
TRANSDUCER F
,{ PROPORTIONAL _J_iE COMMANDS TO ROLL ECA

ROLL
"iRANSD UCER
YAW PROPORTIONAL RATE COMMANDS TO YAW ECA
TRANSDUCER
:l DIRECT RCS
•,j
(MDC 8) 28 VDC FROM
it , .4.----- -.---_h>-.- __DC MAIN BUS A
-.S_ ..... OR DC MAIN BUS B
OFF (SEE NOTES)
DIRECT SWITCHES
PI[CH .
........ _/'%._
q
?_
I ';'l RO!.!
t °IREc] cO'W'_ANDs
pCR ENGINES DIRECT
TO
COILS
•i i - _.j
]
:i i +l>l
J
J - "l,_t YAW
[i I
I 28 VDC FROM
BREAKOLIT SWITCIIES
d
( DC MAIN _US A OR
•!1 DC MAIN BUS B
BREAKOUT SIGNAL TO
PI'fCH, ROLL AND YAW ECA

!:H J
,,
i_hl
CASE GROL!N D
kl
NOTES: I . DC main bu.: _ sup'piles power to di,eci
swilches in rotation conhol No. I.
<i 2. DC rodin bu_ B supplies power to direct
-:witches in _otatlon conho[ No. 2.
SM-2A-71iB
:i
Figure Z. 3-9. Rotation Control Schematic
STABILIZATION AND CON

_ ""
J_ RO,_
"* SYSTEM
g. 3-59
Mfs.sion Basic Date iZ Nov 19&& Chap, E_.e Date Page
,,::::,
{!!!<
obiZA-03-_,_J01Z
APOLLO OPT_RA.TIONS PIANDBOOK
If! :)
SYSTEMS DATA
32[ . DIRECT SWITCH ,_
ROLL MOTIONS 30!- ACTUATION -_-.-- .... J/
J OUTOF /_ /
2s L son STOP -------'_ I_ HARD
! I .o,
5!
%!
FOrCE-
INCH-POUNDS
,6 - SOFT
STO,_
;4 _
r
I0 "_'_'_ " BRFAKOUT SWITCH °
___._L____L J L___ _J__L____-L___--L L 1 .... L_--~-J

{ I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
DISPLACEMENT- DEGREES
• ] [•!_ ROTATION CONIROL -- STICK DISPLACEMENTS VS 9ORCES
18
MECHANICAL
YAW MOTIONS LIMIT
16
ii!]
14 (16u_.-_
12 //_DIIECT SWITCH
FORCE _,._ ACTUATI ON .,...,_o

INCH-POUNDS / (12 DEGREES) ""_
10
)
{ J / _" BREAKOUT SWITCEI
•<
f 6 [- _ (8 IN.-LB, 3.25 DEGREES)
o -'--f I i-----_ _ _---_

8 9 '
10 _
11 12 13
DISP[.ACEMENT- DEGREES
ROTATION CONTROL - STICK DISPLACEMENTS VS FORCES
PITCH MOTIONS LMEC__AN'CAL ._
[
24-
.t
22
..._
•I FORCE - 2O
INCH-POUNDS ECT SW1TCH
3
12
/ ACTUATION _ J
- (12 DEGREES) f
10
8 BREAKOU, SWITCH _.
6 r.// (10 IN.-LB, 3.2 DEGRE,_S)

/
._.__j______J___.__J I. J L_ ] J.... L_.__
11 12 13
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 )0
DISPLACEMENT- DEGREES
ROTATION CONTROL- STICK D!SPLACEMENTS 'v'S FORCES SM- 2"Y_-675
Figure Z. 3-i0. B.otation Control Charts
STABiLIZA'fION AND CONTROL SYSTEM

Z 3-60 [;
h_is._s:.on Basic Date 1Z No'." 19% .... Change Da.te Page [:
:ii!iii_ SMZA-03-SC01Z
APO I.,LO OP1EIZATiONS i-IAI'TDBOOK
SYS%_EivIS DATA
I, I
TRANSLATIONCONTROLLER • 28 VDC FROM

\ PC MAma SUSA OR
DC MAIN BUSB
:]
I ABORT IN IT!ATE
SWITCHES (CCW) ABORTINITIATION SIGNAL
_".1"OMISSION SEQUENCERA
.i
L 4-I
I ABORT INITIATION SIGNAL
ii I TO MISSION SEQUENCERB
i:]
1,I MOTOR DRIVEN SWITCH
(LOCATED li',l S/M, CLOSED
AFTLRS/M SEP,aR/_1"!ON FROM SIVB)
:5:
\ 28 VDC FROM
DC MAliq BUSA OR
N...._ +X DC MAIN BUSB
'i_i!tL_
-X
] N
-t-g
!i! %
} Tp_*_NSLATIONCOMMANDS
-y
TO S/M RCSENG!NES
]
+z
,]
N_ -z
i:!:,_
IAAblUAL IVC EI'xlABL-_
SWITCH(CV/)
( L)C MAIN BUS A OR
DC MAIN BUSg
,"- TO PITCH, YAW & ROLl.
ECA
;ii < 28 VDC
- PUSHTO
JA I'ALK
.... COMMUNICATIONS
SM-2A--710B
g_
Figure Z° 3-11. Translation Control Schematic
: ii
!i S 2.3.4.8 Flight Director Attitude Indicator.

i]
The flight director attitude indicator, located on B&DC-4, provides.
:. 3
attitude, attitude error, and attitude rate-of-change display information.
(See figure g. 3-1Z.) The FDA! Jndica'ces attitude rate of change arm attitude
'1
error on indicators and spacecraft attitude on a 3 degree-of-freedom,
inerdaily referenced ball and roll indicator. The roll rate display is
located acros,,s the top of the FDAI. The pitch rate d.Jsplay is located along
I] the right side of the FDAI. The _raw rate display is located across the •
bottom of the FDAI. The attitude error displays are poi;_ters which move
across the face of the bal].. The rate a_.d error displays are fly-t() displays.
I
The roll attitude i)ointer is located at the top and point_7 down towards the
cen.ter of the ball. The pitch attitude pointer is located at the right and
:{
N poin.ts ]eft toward the center of the hall.. .The yaw pointer is located at the
STABILIZATION AND ,,ON

r'('" T" i.,,-,O1_
"r_ " SYSTEM
2.3-61
!:iq Mission._ Ba.s5.c Date 1Z Nov 1966 Char:ge Date .................... ]Page
-<
•!i SMZA-0._...oC01Z %2
•! APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK

[,:&
SYSTEMS _r A
D.4.]7..
ROLl. PATE ATTITUDE
DISPLAY E[tROR DISPLAY

c/:i
>:i
, ROLL POINTER qAVIGAIION

AXIS ,9_k RF, E R
<::i]
/ili
/i̧
TCH RATE
DISPLAY
•• iii! TCH AI"IITIJDE
ERROR D'SP[.AY L
AT[ITUDE BALL" }DY AXIS
/v'dkRKER
•i <
/if
YAW RATE
} DISPLAY
YAW ATTITUDE
ERROR DIS[
_
:/_i! {<
:{
NOTE: On this illustratio°, the a_titude b_ll
display is read with reference to the SM-2A-?'26C

:j
navigation axls m_rker.
}i
:]
,] Figure Z.Z-IZ. Flight Director Attitude Indicator
bottom and points up toward the center of the ball. The FDAI is located in
Z:; the center of the display. The ball face is marked in degrees of pitch and
yaw and is referenced to the IMU axes. Two reference markers are located
on the face of the display to indicate attitude in reference to either space-
craft body axes or IMU (navigation) axes The body axes marker is on the
lower face of the display. Tl_e IMU or navigation axes marker is located on
i the upper face of the display. }.lollattitude is the IMU reference and is
indicated by the roll indicator (bug) which travels arour_d the circumference
i:! of the ball. Roll attitude zero reference is located at the top of the ball.
I FDAI display operation will vary, depe,_ding upon mode. The rate
display is operative at all times. Each rate indicator has a calibra.ted dis-
i
play scale, with the range of the scale dependent upon the mode selected.
Maximum full.-scale deflection will be as indicated in the following tabulation.
J< ]
STA.BILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTIEM
_,as'£c Date I Z Nov 1966 ....... Change Dai'{_. Pa g e ._.¢....__62.----

t b 2!_ SMZA-03--SC012.
.APOLL, O OPERA'rIO NS i-:IAI'_I)t3OOK

:i
SYSTEMS DATA
!
i:%] Full-Scale Deflection
_5
,i
<]
Delta
Entry modes
All_ other modes
V
and
modes
Mode
monitor mode
! Pitch
_5°/scc
±5°/sec
-21 °/sec
_5°/sec
Roll
_Z5°/sec
±l°/sec
Yaw
±5°/sec
_5°/s_c
_!°/sec
'G,'_
The attitude error display function depends upon mode. During atti-
tude hold modes, the attitude error pointers display attitude changes within
the selected deadband. The maxim,am deadband will allow approximately
t_'.,,e4 ±5 degrees of spacecraft movement i_ any axis, which is equivalent to full-.
scale deflection for the attitude error poir_ters. This results in easily
_J discernible pointer movement. The minimum deadband allows approxi-
%i mately • 0. 5 degrees of spacecraft m_)vement in any axis, which results in
[<q very little pointer _.ovement. In SCS control modes, the attitude error
signals are derived from the Bi_kGs or AGCU. The AGCU alone provides
;1 the driviug signals oL, ly when used it'. conjunction with the ATT SET switch
/:i
for a dialed attitude chance. In G&.N mo.ies, the attitude error signals are
derived from the G&N coupling display units (CDUs). Full--scale deflection
varies depending upon the mode selected, as in.dicated by the following
tabulation.
)
,jl
I Ful] -ScaJe Deflection
Pitch Roll Yaw

iI
±25 ° ±5 °
Entry modes ±5°
[ ±2.5 ° +15 °
Monitor • Mode
mode ".t<
-.15 {}
±50 , ±5 °
.All other modes ±5°
The gimbaled attitude ball is colored half gray anti half black, with
ii£i the line of separation, at the 0-degree to 180-degree pitch angle. This
two-color scheme permits rapid recognition of the specific pitch
J
hemisphere being displayed.. There are two concentric circles located at
90-degree yaw/0-degree pi_eh and 270-degree yaw/0-degree pitch. The
inn.er circles are solid, red 30-degree circles which represent the base of
N a cone wid; th.e apex at the center of the.ball. This area denotes possible
)1 IMU gimbal lock. The outer circles enclose a red 40-degree circle which
also represents the base of a cone with the apex at the center of the ball.
'3
/I
G This
read
area
against
denotes
one of two
attitudes
reference marks,
which
depending
result
upon
in
the mode
AGCU inaccuracy.
of
The bail is
operation. The IMU axes reference mark is the upper marker (0) which.
indicates spacecraft attitude in pitch and yaw axes with reference to the
IMU gimbals or stabi]i_.y axes. The bod 7 axes marker is the lov,,er marker
(V-) which indicates spaqecraft attitude with reference to the body axes.
i)! The included angle between the markers is 3Z oeg_ees.
.... The roll indicator
is referenced to the zero mark e.n _he periphery of the ball display face in
i !iii! all. operational.modes, in SCS modes, the ball is driven only during
manual maneuvers, during 1PDAI alignment, and after 0.05 g is sensed
during entry. Durir_g these functions, the ball is driven by signals
received from the AGCU. In G&N modes, the ball displays IMU gimbal.
:[[i! angles. Figure Z. 3-t3 provides a tabular listing of the various FDA.I
display configurations.
T_
STABILIZATION AND CONTROI_ SYSTEM
hdissio_2 .............. Bas_.c . Date __Z Nov 196.'o Cha_g e Date Pa_e ....Z_=3£k?............
, +, • /i:-
.....................
L.!.:,, .............
)
)
? Y>
4i :;

MODES
_0
Ball driven only during
Total Attitude Before 0.05 Os, ball driven Bali driven only daring
manual :naneuver or 9"DAI
I maneuver
Ball driven oronly
FDAI during manual
alignment. 0
manual maneuver or
(Ball) only during manual maneuver alignment. U
FDAI al gnmcnt.
or FDAI
Gs drlven
alignment; after 0.05
continuously.
t_
[ BMAGs
O
5MAGs
BMAGs
BMAG$ p, y, & _G_5 ° max deflection.
•:5;:: Attitude p, y, & P_5 _ max eel!action
::_ _ >-2 P h Y±5" max de!iection; p, y, & R-*5 ° m_:< deflection.
....
ili : Errors
R±Zb" max deflection.
Rate gyros (B_& (is when Rate gyros (BMA_s when i backup
Rate gyrosr_te (BMAGs when
:_ .o O Attitude Rate gycos (BMAGs _hen
backup rate switch actuated). backup switch actuated).
'_witch activated).
i P, Y, & R±i°/sec deflection.
Rate Errors backup rate switch actuated). p, y, & i<_l°/sec deflection.
_, v, & R±5o/sec deflection.
p & ° 5_/sec deflection.
R Zb_/sec defiectlon. I Do
AOCU roll angle AGCU roll angle o_ _ .
Roll Bug AGCU roll angle AOCU roll angle v. 6_
2
7> c,s o
i m O
{ _ T8
0
G&N
ts
0
F LiC HT T
Ge<N I Monitor 0
.(
CONTROL
MODES ! G g_ I',T Entry
OhN A _f /_ tt!tude Ccntrq!
?
Ball repeats IMU position
rep,:ats
{ Ball repeats IMU position.
Ball repeats !_ZU position.
Ga!l !MU position.
(Bail)
CDU P. Y, g" R ±5 ° max GDU P, Y ±15°, & R±25° max
CDU P, Y, & P,_5 _ max defiection_
CDU P, y, _:5° max deflection. deflection.
Attitude
T e t_! At<itude ] defiection.
Rd:Zb" max deflection.
Er ro."s
Rate gyros (BMAGs when
i ! .,\ttltude I Rate
backup
gyros
rat'--
lo & y.5°/sec
(BMAGs
switch
when
actuated).
deflection.
Rate
backvp
p. y,
gyros (BMAGs
rate switch
& p_ 5°/see
when
actv_ated).
deflection.
backup
p, y,
rate switch
& F, _°/sec
actuated},
deflection.
I
backup
Rate
p,
rate
y, gyros
switch
(BMAGs
& R 5°/see
actuatud).
when
deflection.
Rate Errors I
R_Z5 _/see deflection.
! IMU roll angle
i IMU roll angle
LMU roll angle IMU roll angle I
@ Xoli Bug
L--......... --/-
:S
•= !<
!_o -
i
Figure 2. 3-13. FDAI Display Configuration
.....
i
:i!i
}:i
(
%'!i __ SMZA-03--SC0 ]Z
A PO LLO O]PE]RATIOIqS IiANDBOOI<
il"> :::<
, i! i:.-_ii SYSTEMS DAT.A
!!-¸¸,¸•¸i
Z.3.4.9 Attitude Set/Gimbal Position Indicator.
J
The attitude set/gimbal position indicator (AS-GPI) provides two
/ separate functions. The attitude set portion enables FDAI-.AGCU align-
ment and provides a reference for a.cquiring new attitudes. The glrnbal ,if<
/!i "i position display portion provides positioning control of the SPS engine
i gimbal angles and displays gimbal position. The attitude set portion pro- -
vides a comparison of the angle between the attitude displayed on the
ATTITUDE SET indicators and the position of d_e AGCU resolver shaft. It'.
also provides control of ti_e inputs to the FDA.i a_titude error pointers and
aligns the FDAI to the attitude indicated on the ATTITUDE SET indicators.
The ittitude set function is controlled by n_anual operation of the thun_b -
wheels. The desired position is di_l_d by a thun-J_wheel, with the display
providing _dsua]. i_dication of the position se]_ected by the thu_bwheel. The
e.ttitude display may be used to align the FDAI-AGCU or to indicate a new
attitude for th.e spacecraft. To accomplish FI)AI-AGCU _lignrnent, the
desired position is se[_ on the attitude set display. The IZL)AI ALIGN push-
b, button is then pressed. This provides a signal which drives the AGCU
stepper motor.and control logic to position the AG.CU reso]ver shaft. The
stepper motor dxives the shaft to the d
comrnan,ec_ position, resulting in an
output from an angle generator to the FDAI ball, driving the ball to the
commanded position. To manually maneuver the spacecraft to a pre-
determined attitude, the display is set to the desired attitude and the ATT
SET switch is -01aced to ATT SET. The output signal is app]Jed'to the .
_!!,1 attitude error'display pointers on the FDA), providing a manual maneuver
indication to the space crew. The display configuration is a fly-to type,
with the crew ma.nuaiiy maneuvering the sp_-cecraft tow_,_rd the p(,i:,__e_.s.
(The pointers will peg if the new attitude is in excess of 5 degrees from
the origir)al attitude, )
The SPS engine gimbal position display allows positioning of the

gimbals and provides indication of gimbal position. Two thumbwheels
C
enable the pitch and yaw engine gimbals to be positioned prior to oP_.
engine firing. Th.e gimbals position the engine to an attitude which ensures
i!!_l
that the SPS engine thrust vector is through the spacecraft center of gravity.
[] Movement of the thumbwheels results in the. generation of control signals
which engage the SPS gimbal ring torque motor magnetic clutches. Clutch
engagement connects the gimbal torque motor and gear train to move the
gimbal ring. Position transducers send a signal to the gimbal positio-_
:-,jJ displays to indicate the angle of the gimbah The yaw gimba! position scale
is graduated in increments of one-half degree from -5 degrees to +13
degrees. Center is located at the +4-degree position due to an inherent
offset in the ya_ center of gravity. The pitch gimbal position scale is
graduated in increments of one.-half degree from -9 degrees to +9 degrees,
with the center position at 0 degrees.
•:ii
.:_ ).A]JILIZATiON AND CONTROL SYSTEM
<_' _':{ _Sasic Date 12 tNov 1:)6o<' Cb_nge Date ....... Page .... 2_3-65
::::v:: [C_ h,i i s s i o n. -........... --
!
!i!ili
SMZA-03-SC01Z
<! APOLLO OPE]IATIONS HANDBOOK
SYSTEM_ DATA
L_
_; 3.4. i0 Velocity Change Indicator.
The delta V display provides control and display of spacecraft

velocity changes. The display portion of the panel consists of the _NV
REMAINI, NG indicator, which is a five-digit display. The digital display
is set by the variable speed _,V SET switch. Three panel switches control
q
the SPS and RCS engine firing commands. The DIRECT ULLAGE switch
i,!i is a pushbutton, momentary-contact switch which, when depressed
zLi_ energizes the direct coils of the +X reaction jet solenoids. It serves as a
backup for the translation control, which is used under normal conditions F
for +X translations for SPS fuel settling (ullage). The THRUST ON switch
is an JIluminate8 pushbutton, nqorr_entary-contact switch which is used to
fire the SPS engine in the SCS delta V _node. The switch is enabled when
/!
the SPS THRUST switch is in the NORMAL posFdon. The pitch and yaw
4
RCS control and firing circuits are inhibite8 during SPS engine firing.
After ignition, the SPS engine continues to fire until the ZYV REMAINING
display counts down to zero. The TI-IIKUST ON switch is also used to back
up the Apollo guidance computer firing commands in the G_kN delta V mode
in the event of an AGC failure. The SPS THI<UST sv_itch provides overall
control of SPS engine firing. The NORMA.L position enables normal engine
firing sequences. The OFF position provides a positive off command as
backup in case of a malfunction. The DIRECT ON position pro_ddes a
positive firing command to the SPS engine.
The AV SET switch sets up the ._V ilEMAINiNG display and logic
'i!
3 circuits prior to delta V maneuvers. P_'ess]ng the upper ,_;cction of the
AV switch sets up logic circuitry which causes a slew motor to drive d_e
_V REMAINING display in the positive direction (incrc, asing velocity).
Pressing the lower section of the switch drives the display in the negative
direction (decreasing velocity). .The switch has two sets of contacts in
L_
both the upper and lower positions. Pressing the switch lightly engages
the first set of contacts, which results in a signal that will drive the
display at a rate of two feet per second. Pressing the switch harder
(past an easily felt hard/soft point) engages the second set of contacts,
which results in the display being driven at a rate of 64 feet per second.
As the display is driven to the desired velocity, the _ntegrator and logic
circuit is set to a logical value equal to the desired change. The trans-
lation con-_mand signal energizes a relay which applies the output of the
AGAA accelerometer to the integrator and logic circuit, which compares
the desired velocity incremeni: with the actual velocity change received
from the accelerometer. When the actual velocity change equals the value
set, the ZXV REMAINING counter sends a signal to a coincidence detector
• B
logic circuit which, in turn, transmits a stop firing command to the thrust
control logic. AJthough this causes the SPS engine to stop firing, so.me
]
thrusting continues as a result of the tail-off inherent to the engine The
Z_V I%E!vIAINiNG display continues to count past zero (i.e., 99999, 99998,
iJ 99997, etc.) until no further acceleration is felt. Tail-off effects will be

ii<!_ calculated prior to f]ight'and compensated for by the crew when the d_spia},
.j
is being set up for delta V maneuvers.
ii<;
STA]31L!ZATION AND CObTR.OL SYSTE_v!
]di'.{_;ion Basic Date ].v Nov 1966 Change ]Date ............. PaKe--_:_-iJ_ 66 _[
<i " ---- ............ _<
{
,i [!:ii
SM2A-03-sc0 I!
:] APQ]bLO QPE:RAT!ONS HANDBOOK
SYS _ 1'_.h,_S 13_%TA
Z. 3.4. II Electrical Power Distribution.
i:I
See {igures Z.% 14 and g 3-15
_4
I 1<]
2.3.5 PERFOt{M-_NCE AND DESIGN P ^'_' _ , i!ii
Figure Z. 3-16 contains the latest available power consumption data for
hi the Block I SCS. The translation controls were not included in the SCS
component breakdown because they do not dissipate a significant amount of,
:{
power within themselves.
The X-axis acce!erometer is a servo-re?;ala.nced pendulous

ii
accelerometer. Some of the accelerometer design characteristics are as
follows.
]
,c
Op erati._tg ra:zge O. OOl gto Z g
_ Threshold 1 x ].0-4 g (max)
Null torque
] x !0..4g (max)
50 n:illivolts / _m.i!!irad
ii:i Signal generator sensitivity
Signal generator null mr (m_x)
;I The body-•mounted attitude gyros are single-degree-of-freedom gyros.

(! Some of the gyro design characteristics are as follows.
Acceleration sensitive drift 4 deglh_/g

Random drift 0.05 deg/hr
}_axirnun= "_orquJng rate Z5 deg/sec

]_iaxi_mun_ input attitude .-hZ0deg
! [? Gyro threshold 0.0Z deg/hr
:i I. 15 mil!ivolts/millirad
Oyro transfer function
3. 5 n-;.il!_:vo]1:s
Signal generator null
Excitation frequency 400+0. 01% cps
The rate gyros are single-axis miniature gyros. Some of the gyro
design characteristics are as follows.

I
Full-.scale range 30°/sec
"t 30°/see
Input range (to iin_it stop)
Maximum rate without damage 600°/sec
Excitation fr equency 400'.-0.01% cps

Threshold O. OZ°/sec
3
OPERATIONAL L,IbIITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS.
i_, S/C Attitude Change.
It is recommended that vehicle attitude change be held to rr_aximum

rates of less than Z0 degrees per second roll and 5 degrees per second in
pitch and yaw to prevent possible loss of attitude reference. Because of
the AGCU digital logic, £he stepping motor can be stepped at a maxin_urn
STABILIZATION AND COb,TTi_,OL SYSTEM.,.
:i
iiii
i
t- _; Mission
Basic
....... [)ate 1Z Nov 1966 ('1- -_,,_e,_'_--Date .....................
........ ]:'a_e _ 3-.67
iii
:::::2'
I
SM2A-03-SCOIZ
APOI.LO OPEt[ATIONS It.ANDI3OOK

/!
:•!
SYSTE_IS DATA
A
PARTIAL
POWER SCS
SW
ACI (AC2) PARTIAL SCS
DC MAIN
• DISPLAY AGAP ECA POWER SW
BUS A
PITCH ECA AC1 (AC2,
tDC MAIN
_,______ [ YAW EC A ,_---- --,_----_'-----" -- BUS Bi
= ROLL ECA O_F
GROUP I
AC BUS NO. 1 (AC BUS NO. 2_ "-- _..._,__.___ ,] C U X I L IA RY EC_.
o
115 VAC 115 VAC)
OFF SCS CONTROl. PANELI
pHASE
RATE GYRO (SCS/G&N SWIIC H) J "_"
,_..._--_,-._-----_ GROUP I
!i!i
:! A AC} (AC2) POWER SW
•_(_ I ACl (AC2) TVC 1

I:i!
_T "_-'---_ _I POWER
• i
L_ "--"---'-_ .'.---_
IP_'TEe'
i---_,---_,_ . GYRO PACKAGE • ACI (AC2) __
,_i9. _ |DISPLAY AGAP ECA _
-.---p _._,.___._ j _ O_:i.

i_ii!i!
° R_TC,_ECA
t 1 " " I t.:/:,
,,+:
OFF YAW ECA _ ¢: ......... _,'_A--___--
Z_ ! :i
i
ROL_
EtAj I RCS
LATCH,'_G
[ DIRECT CaNT [ i
j RELAY _J MNA(B) ! :!:
I /_ AV DISPLAY PANEL I " NOTE
!i/i J
J
/
J AC]
_
TVC
POWER
1
(AC2)
SW
SCS
(DIRECT
CONTROL
MODE
SCS CONTRO[
PANEL}'
SW) J
_l
<_ "
z_YAW [:::1
i:,i! l..m.__ PANEl. (YAW _ "_-
i _-"-'-_ 1 CHANNEl. SW)J !ii¢

B&D ROLL ! ]
_--'-_ t PITCH ECAI NOT_ i
, IYAW ECA/ " MN A (_) ! i.
_-..____.J sc_CO'_'TROL
I 7-, J :i
o PANEL (8&D ROLL_'
OFF CHANNEL SW) .
i
BI_-_ G
POWER SW ti [:,k,
:i AC_
° ',
(AC2)
/
A
ROLL ECA /
I'!
"--'_] IDISPLAY AGAP ECA
o_ ''°-'---b _ YAVV ECA NOTE I
! A&C ROLL
--_.] l PITCH EC_,
---_>----_ ) f i
MN A (B) :_
O_FF " SCS CONTROL
ROTATION PANEL (A&C ROLL_
CONTROL //_\ CEIANNEL SW) J

POWER SW Z-J-C._.
1 (2) ROLL ECA
i _ YAW ECA _ NOTE 1

DOFF PITCH ECA PITCH !i: 1
MN A B)
? TVC 2 ._
P...... W SCS CONTROL PANEL/ •o o
UW't: K b A ' W <S
AC1 (AC2) (PITCH CH NIxEL S. )] /_ TVC 2 POWER
-_--,--_---._'_ Z.£_k sw AC_ (AC_)

_------o o--..... ;_ :q
GROUP 2 _ '1
_.1 IDISPLAY AGAP ECA
. _i!
i 0,
_
_
YAW
PITCH
ECA
ECA} NOTE1 OFF
t:•z
NOTES: 1 . D-C
units
power
through
is opplled
partial
to these
SCS power
'LOT,%O ffONAL
j
swhc% as shown il.J upper right TRANSLATIONAL CONTROLLER <_----------e-_
port of diagram.
:i 2. Contacts close after S-IVB separation SM-2A-712A

or f. lgh-ohhude cbo_t.
••4
_igure Z. 3-14. SCS Power Distribution

:%
STAlJILIZ _k'FION AND CON'FIIOL, SYST]XM
.Basic ][)ate ]Z Nov 19(_6...... Change Date°

?
' :,-t,.:.,.,,-.:_.-:--_-.:?...:...::= T.._,;_.-: :.,_-..,i;:._.,,t:._,!.-.: _ _. _;-_ ,::- _:::.::

: :'- T ;=" :TT
..... :" "_:'-r'TT'_"'_ ............:'::::: ...... :
i
SMZ.A.o0 3--SC0 !2
i APOLLO O]_ER-ATIO NS HANDD.OOI<
:::h_
SYSTENiS DATA
F_
RECUIRED SCS POWER SWITCHES
i SYSTE._, CAPABILITIES
PARTIAL RATE I ROTATI ON TVC 2
<, SCS GYRO BMAG | CONTROL TVC i POWER
POWER POWER POWER .k POWER POWER
_ACKUP RATE k
Ci CHANNEl. ENABLE
.1
,_DIRECT ROTATION CON] ROL
,! o<9
,! _-£,TTITUDE IMPULSE
_&N SYNC
° I
!L&NSLAT!OF O
AV SE_
J
_NGI_E
iOHIT_ON _ <0
-t
4
DIRECT ULLAGE
I'HRUST VECTOR CONTROL _ C_

,Q-')
]__:
I
0
MANUAL !HRUST VECTOR CONTROL
:!
ATTITUDE HOLD
RATE DAMPI iqG

.................. [;......i .......gh:<
J i-
1
J,................................
F,_Dfl AL_ G/j_ .........................
LI RATE INDICATORS VALID

O if ®('h I I
BALI 8 ROL.L BUG DR'.VEN
L
ii
I li NOTES: 1. If backup rate has been selected in an 7 axis. !f backup rote has been
,i1
selected in all 3 axes, IV_,IE GYRO POWER need not be on.
2. PARTIAL SCS POWER must be on if" AV switch is at NePal,At. However,

SPS engln_ can be turned on when all power swltche:s are off, by placing
AV switch to DIRECT ON.
:1
3. /'VC 2 POWER switch must be on if manual TVC is engaged.
:] r " &. 4. SCS AV mode oniy. However, in G&N 5V _node, BMAG POWER must
:I[J b_ on if backup rate has been seJected in any axis. It backup rote has
buen selectc<_ in all three axes, PATE GYRO POWLP, switch is set :o OFF.
t
i
5. SCS. modes onlyl also G&N modes if backup r,,te has been selecied ]n any axis.
!1 :;i
[-_?
6, SCS me,de_ o,]y; if backup rate ba_ not been ._elee_ed.
q
7. RATE GYRO POV'!ER s_.itch may b_ set !o OFF {of extende'J per;eds of
attitude hold.
?[:.3
8. FDAI ALIGb', and G&N mode_ only.
! SM- 2.A-90,vk
1 Figu):c Z. 3-i5. SCS l_ower vs System C&p_.bi].ity
STAI%IL.IZA%']LON A.ND CONkrt<o]_, SYSTEM
]vlission. F,a_-_ic _%utc IZ Nov ].960 Cba,,_ l)n_, p}kZe Z .%-6.-9

;i!i
.tdf
SMZA--03-SC0 1 2.
APO[,!..O OF>]']RATIO NS t-IAND]T¢OOK

i ?-:
i
SYST_h4S D.ATA
1
SYS'_EM'STEADY-$T_TE POWER CONSUMPTION"\VATIS (SO-l) I
........ --T----GT_,_'_-f----RCTT__nu_ F O_NENTRY +l

_" _--'_ MODE
MONITOR
i IS','-q,C ,%0-CPT----I--
---| ---'(
li5
.................
VAC 4OO CRS |
_ ...........
'15
"
W,C f00X-:[:%_._!
_-
_S
-----
VAC 40O a+
t,<
_!
"_
L
,--7_.--T:--r_-Tr_,:-l--_,-l-:;]--[ _WEcTo-c-l_;ik-T-,_--j-¢c ] DC | r,_A j,/,_ I ¢-c I DC [
SV, ,TCH "_
.Z_.-J "Z_+L_" .__,::-l-_'" c+',%: " -....."-"-:'_--;W'_t ...............................
PARTIAL SCS PWR (1)
POWER FACIOR
o._,1o.+,qo.9,
I i o.+qo._9,o.+_
I !o.,+t o.++1
o.+l _°"_ ...._ _ i
FDAI
i POWER FACTOR
RGA POWER
*'o._J ^'_ ^ 991 [ 0.981 0 85 I 0 99l/'0 9nl "0 8'_i *0 991 I 0.ggl 0.SSl 0.991 t
POWER FACTOR u.y_ u._ l u.............. 1 ___J. " ...... t ........
ROT. CONT POWER
o'921
.............. .............. .....
J
!......
/
!...... | o.,,
.2
-1--1
POWER FACTOR •• __I_________:_q
/ ' " .................
I .... .,.q............ _--
TVC S\'V NO.i
POWER FACTOR 0.96; 0 85 0.86| [ 0.96j 0.86, 0.86 I 0.96 0.861 0.861 / '. 61 . / s._l
:! TVC S¢/ NO. 2

POWER FACTOR 1'0'7s/ 0"STl 0:S3 [0]_51 0.ST/ 0._3| I 0.751 0.57l 0.6Sl 4 °:f_-L04-_-TL°--6-a|--J
,i BbVkG POV/E R
POWER FACTOR 0 99/ 0 _l 0._0[ |0._,_ 0 M o.so+ J,o,99t*o.zq*o.,o

....... /0._91 0._+1o.+oj
:i CON] PANEL INPIIT (t) ......
t......i---_r_,w?
....1......I-i -_; Y-T [_:_-_1------T,--1---I-++._3
_.J_ _L._LI_/ !__.L L L ___.L+._L+_L_s ........
Lo,._
i
SYSTEM STEADY-STATE POVTER CONSUMPTION-WATTS (SO-i) (CONTINUED)
f SCS ENTRY [ G&b-t z_V 1 SCS ,_',,' ---LOCAL VERTLC_-,L

f_"_" MODE
{i:!
u _Zcq_-_:r's J i_s-v-£c,+%
cPs _ _ s VAC.;-oZ
cr's --.s -,_,o3 cPs
I" SWITCI4 "_
[ ¢' ,q_¢S I fC DC -_:-r--x.:--1%,7;:
..... BT--_-%?;--F-S_c-:q-i_- .;.,Z
.... V?-%i-T]--oc-
I _.,,_-J ........ , ........ .Z"-_49 J-.z-_'+-£_s_+_.-:--d++_2 +.}._./o_++-'++-';-'-
..... _-: ..... '+-+"'_Lt...............
PARTIAL SCS PWR (t)
4 POWER FACTOR
I °"i °91°9t l o.._,.I
o._+_
o.9,1 I o.+lo.++_
o.,,, o.+,,_
o._+_
o.+_
FDAI
POWER FACTOR
RGA POWER _.-7

--_._,,.+f I _.8-+.8 __ q _._
........
1 +.,1-+,+-1
-_., _.q_Tr,,.q "1............. j- -- _ .....
i:!
POWER FACTOR 0.+,0.+_,
_ ,-s0_+ oe4
6 ----
0.,I_ I °91o•+%0.tl___d
s.,s/
o.+_l-u+'
s.6
0.99_
ROT. CONT POWER
i POWER FACTOR
TVC SW NO. 1 1,+.4_-_1._

_,+._ _1--_-1 __-I_ _.,+._
I+._%, %.s%.,,-1-
_._-q-i.qu+
POWER FACTOR / o.9+ o._i °._+t 0.gd 0._610._+1/*0.96j *0.+4*0._61 I o._o:_tL_.._
TVC SW NO. 2
POWER FACTOR
g t.,_, G POWER
,6., +._,,.o,6;._-_f,-t_.x--_.oi-6_.-3-!
6.--rl-_-1-
T-o-_
_T-d-._-._
,-1-_:_i
-_++_-]-
l
POWER
C01,1"[
FAC]OR
PANEL INPUT (1) l......

I 0.9_
J
0.Tq 0.80j
L+J-,-___
....'.... ,,++,-,,++,,'
--
L....
0.991 0 7,_ 0 80[_
"" _ _ .....
J .......
""
_L. ..............
.....
0" 99i 0.18[ 0.80[
_ I_ZTZZJ_Z" "+. ....
il__=,,k
| ..... ,,J.....
|
I 0.991 0.78l 0.80!.....
J_---._-q-
i !
_......
L _
|
_,
iii_i
NOTES:
] 4. Lh_e losses and inveder efficlencies not con +
1. Power measurements made in each mode.
sldeled.
* 2. Power consumption assumed same _n each mode.
5. AH values hldlooh;d are in watts.
Asterisk indlcr4es mode [n which meesurement
6. Figure does not Mclude energ[zh_g RCS englnes
:i wos made,
for maneuvers,
3, Measuremen!s made whh SPS engine off. (Two
soleno;ds and 2 reloys.)
SM-2A+754D
Power Consumption Data

]Figure Z+3,-16. SCS Steady-State
STAt3ii_iZATtON AND CONT![C)I. SYSTEM

qi
)!
Mission t?,aslc Date 1Z Nov l_6............
6.. Cbar_Je,.
g. Date_ ......... ......... paSe .... _;.,__
...................
_-70
SMZA-()3,-SC0 t2
I APOLLO OPER.A'fIONS .VANDBOOK

]
::i_a _S'I ]LI,,_S DATA
"i i
rate el i00 steps per second in roll ai_d Z5 steps per second in pitch and
!j
yaw. This is equivalent £o gyro torquing rates of Z0 degrees per second in
q roll and 5 degrees per second in pitch and yaw. Therefore, if vehicle rates
exceed die gyro torquing rates, the Stepping motor will lag behind the :!i
C'=:
vehicle rates. Under this condition, the BM_AG-AGCU loop may not be _. able
'! L;:i
to maintain the SCS attitude reference. _i_,._
....
, Z. 3.7 TELEMETRY MEASUREMENTS.

_ 3
The following is a complete listing of all SCS telemetry data that is

t_
monitored by ilight controllers and ground support personnel. The last
!FI co!unm contains the na_ne and t3qoe of S/C crew display• The display
ut_iizes the sa._z-_.e

pickup or sfgnal source as telemetry, unless a separate
i
measurement number is included in the:display column.
! {i11 An asterisk (*) by the rne_:,surement number denotes ip_forlnati.on

which _.s
• nol av_._.ila.Lie for
_ .recording or te].enlet_y transn_is .;ion during Or,,..
._ k__av].
low.-bit rate operatiort.

! !i:ii
Figure Z. 3-4, sheet Z, identifies telemetry measurerr, ents for the SCS
i yaw channel. !dentica] rneasure_nents in the following l_.sc, relative to Z]_e
3
rol} and pitch cham_-e]s, are taken from the seine circuit jcnctions as for
the yaw channe].,
Y..................................
-] ................ 7--7
Measuren'ent ge_ , _ l<a_ _ I C_
:' I<_ Number Description ...... _so" _ge "ew Di.';p] ay
:i:I _ :_
": CH 0024 V Pitch re.is FDA.[
Zero/+5 VRMS F.DAi

-':" Cit 00Z5 V Pitch rate n_.anual rotation control
i?:J!
-6/+6 vdc None
* CH 0034 V
:;!t [;)_ ]Pitch pos feedback in
PTV diff clutch vo]ts eom.b T ][; D None
':-" CH 0047 V
-6. Z to +6 Z vdc FDAi
CH 0050 V Pitch rate error an%p out
TBD None
CH 0067 V Pitch integrator/art error summing
. q i !q * CH 0074 V IviTVC pitch rate Tt3D None
Zero/+10 VRMS FDAI

CH 0075 V Pitch SCS art error
Off/on event None
-':-"CI-] 0087 X 4- Pitch/+X solenoid driver out
, I::a -",_ CH 0088 X - Pitch/+i solenoid driver out Off/on event None
* CH 0089 X + Pitch/-X solenoid dx-iver out Off/on event None
- Pitch/-X solenoid driver out Off/on event None

* CH 0090 X
CH 0100 X G- N' DV nnode control Event None
CH 0101 X G-N DV art mode control Off/on event None
CH 010Z X _-r "_ C Oiitl: O1 Off/on event None

G-N entry o.>.o_.!:
C1.-t 0 103 X Monitor mode control Off/on event None
ii L!
i?] ':_"
CH 10Z4 V %flw rate -30 to +30°/see FDA!
-",_ CH i0Z5 V Yaw manual rotation control Zero/+5 VRMS FDAI

: !
;',_ CIt 1034 H -8.5/+8.5 vdc None
1 %fa.w po_,_ feedback in
-",-"CH 1047 V ¥TV diff clutch vo!_s comb .-85 to 4-85 MA.DC None
Ct-] 1050 V •-6. Z to +6. Z _d.c FDAI

Yaw rate error amp out
r_ CH 1067 V _-Z. 5 ,.'.:o +2. 5 vdc None
Y integrator/art error sunaming
_'," CH 1074 V TBD None
MTVC yaw rate
:;,? ....
STA.BILiZAT!ON AND CON'fROL SYSTEM
:!
1
:_'_" 'u Ba ic Date 1g Nov t)(-:l.o ...... Change Date Page

SMZA-03-SC01Z
i
i APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
!i7
,!
SYSTEMS DA[I:A
L
(i
Mea sur ement

Sensor Range Crew Display
Number D e sc r iption
4
]b'DAI
] CH 1075 V V yaw SCS art error
Zero/+10 VRMS
None
Off/on event
_',-" CH 1087 X + Yaw/+X solenoid driver out
Off/on event None
il -':< CH 1088 X - Yaw/+X solenoid driver out
None
Off/on event
:i -':-" CH i089 X + Yaw/-X solenoid driver out
None
t
{
4 ,:-" CH
CH
1090
1100
X
X
- Yaw/-X
SCS DV mode
solenoid
control
driver out Off/on
Event
Event
event
None
None
E
CH 1101 X SCS art mode control
J£vent None
il CH 110Z X SCS entry mode control
¢ Event No,q e
Q CH 1103 X SCS local vertical mode control
i Event None
CH ]104 X MTVC mode control
0to 5 vdc None
•",-"CH Z015 V Combined AG SMRD
TBD FDA.I
! ::-" CH Z0Z4 V Roll rate
Zero/+5 VRMS F])AI
,:-" Ctt 2025 V Roll man rotation control out
iJ -0 to +5 vdc None
-':-"
CH ZOZ6 V Combined RG SM_RD
,ili] AGAP
0 to +5 vdc
",-" CH Z030 T Combined attitude gyro temp
TEMP
LIGHT
-6. Z to 4"6. Z vdc FDAI

CH Z050 V Roll rate error amp out
•-Z5/+Z5 vdc None
-':'-
CH Z070 V Roll attitude error amp out
FDAI
Roll SCS att error Zero/10 VRMS
CH Z075 V
Event None
:',-" CH Z087 X + Roll/+Z solenoid driver out
Event Nor,' e
• Ch Z088 X - RolI/-Z solenoid driver out
J"_2vent None
::_ Gh Z089 X + Roll/-Z solenoid driver out
Noli e
Event
':-" CH 2090 X - RolI/--Z solenoid driver out
None
,',-" CH Z091 X + RoII/'}'Y solenoid driver out
'!! ::_ CH Z09Z X - Ro]I/+Y solenoid driver out Event Non e
t Event None
-",-"CH Z093 X + Roli/-Y solenoid driver out
Event None
ii - Roll/-Y solenoid driver out
• CH Z094 X
Event None
CH 3185 X • 05 g Manual switch
-3 to +13 KFPS ZxV
,',-" CH 3186 V DV remaining pot cut
<] Counter
!
-IZ to +IZ VRMS None
!! Resolver sin out pitch att
CH 4 100 H
-IZ to +]Z VRMS None
iiil CH 4101 H Resolver cos out pitch art
-IZ to +IZ VKMS None
CH 410Z H Resolver sin out yaw art
- IZ to +!Z VR.MS None
CH 4 103 H Resolver cos out yaw art
-1Z to +IZ VRMS None
CH 4 104 H Resolver sir. out roll art
-1Z to +IZ VRMS None
i! CH 4 105 H Reso!ver cos out roll art
Event None
",_ CH 4 320 X SPS solenoid driver out 1
[:! Event None
-':" CH 43Z1 X SPS solenoid driver out Z
Event Delta V
! CG 0001 V Computer digital data 40 bits
]Display
]
/j
i]
'?
")
ST.A..BILIZATION AND CONTR.OL SYSTEM
Page ....
Z_L1:..Z,...........
- • 9
Mission Basic Date_).Z_2_°_X__2.6-k---Cha;_ge Date:_
f,,t
b :{:
ShiZA-03-.SC0 ifi
il
::!
APOLI.O Ot:'ERA'FIONS iIAN])5001<
% :;!
SYS'£EE[S DATA
I::<!
4
SECTION Z
! i q
SUBSECTION Z°4
iS
]
SERVICE PROPULaIDN SYST£N{ (SPS)
1 2,4.1 FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTK)N.
The service propul.sion subsystem provides the major in-_pu!se for all
," t_;l
major velocity chemges (A\r's) ti_roughout a mission, plus the S/Ni abort
I after the launch escape tower is jettisoned. To perform this function, the
! F7
susbystem incorporates a helim_ pressurization systen_, a prope]].ant feed
system, a propellant gauging and utilization systen_ and a rocket engine.
The oxidizer is nitrogen tetroxide, and the A_el is a blended hydrazine
i rs • ,- '- 50°/0uasyr:.;metr]ca.i
(approxln_a_e_/ di]ncthyl hydrazine and 5_,{
_c'_anhydrous
]
[ii hydrazine). The pressurizing gas is helium. The subsystem incorporates
displays and sensing devices to permit ground-based stations and the crew
! to monitor its operation.
:q
? :S A functional flow diagram is contained in figure Z,4-].
'i
The heliwn pressure is directed to the be]ium pressurizing valves

l:d
which isolate vhe he]imm d_,_r_n_ nonthrusting _;eriods or aNows the he]iun_
to p.essu;'_ze_
<< _ the fuel and o,.;d_zr,,-.................
tanks 6t,,'_,,,.._ thrusting periods ..... _m,r,
;i
helium pressure is reduced at the pressure regulators
• to a desired _vork-;n(_
o
pressure° The regulated heliun-_ pressure is directed th:,:ough checR valves

th7_t per:-nit heliu_n flow in the domrnsIrea:,y_ direction when the pressurizing
valves are open, and prevent a reverse flow c,f propelisnts during non-
thrusting periods, The heat exchangers transfer ]-,catfroni the propellants
to the he,liun', gas to reduce any pressure excursions that n_:ay result fron-_ a
:1 temperature differenlJai ])eiween the he]iuYn gas a.nd propel.]ants in the tanks.
The relief va].ves maintain the structural integrity of the propellant tank
i i:,J
]
systems if an excessive pressure rise occurs.
The total propellant supply is contained within four similar t-mRs:

q
1
an oxidizer storage tank, oxidizer surnp tank, fuel storage tank, and fuel
sump tanks. The storage and sump tanks for each propellant systen_ are
:: 8 connecte.d in series by a single transfer ]ineo The regula.tcd heliun_ enters
4
into the fuel and oxidizer storage tank, press_:ci'4ing the storage tank
propellants, and forces the propellant to an outlet in the storage tan]< which
is directed tl_rough a transfer line into the respective sump tank standpipe,
pressurizing the prope]lants in the sunup tank° The prope]]ant in the sUreR
tan]%is directed to the exit end into a propellant retention reservoir,
retaining sufJicient propellants at the tank outlets to pern]it engine restart
::;5 capability in a zero g condition, 'Fhe propellants exit fron] the respccd.te
}I sump tanks i,]to a single line to the heat exchanger.
!
SER.VICE PROPULSION S.•V o- ip hA:
,_1.......
': : Mission Basic Dat_ ]g No\, 1966 Chan£.,:: Date. ............................. Page ...................................
iG
{
.{
i<
,':;MBA- 0 _ -b,._0
<! APOLLO OPERATIONS HA_Dt3OOI<
L:
It ::
. i
S Y S T E IriS DA T A
A propellant uti]ization valve is installed in the oxidizer line, and

is powered only during SPS thrusting periods° The propellant utilization
.!]
valve aids in maintaining the cen_er of mass in a relatively confined area. in
the Y - Z plane, in addition to simultaneous propellant depletion. The
<iI
oxidizer supply and fuel supply are connected from the surnp tank to the
E
engine interf_ce flange.
:Ji
The propellants flow from the prope].lant surnp tank feed through their
1:9
respective plumbing to the main pr°pellant orifices and filters to the
:J
J! bipropellant valve. The bipzopel!ant valve assembly contains the main
v_
propellant valves that are T_meumatically controlled and alJows the propellant
valves to distribute the propellant's to the engine injector during thrusting
periods, or isolates the propellants from the inj_zci:or d_ring nonthrusting
periods.
The engine injector distribu!es the propel!ants _hrough orifices in the

face of the injector \vhere the fuel and oxidizer impinge upon each other,
atomize, and ignite due to hypergo]ic ignition.
}i
9
The ablative combustion chan_ber absorbs the heat generated wiihin
the chamber. The nozzle extension is attached to the ablative eharnber and
radiates to space°
:il The engine assemb]y is mounted to the si:ructure of the service module
and is gimbaled to germit thrust vector alighrnent t:hro_gh the center of mass_
prior _o t_r_st initia.ti_onand thrust vector control during a thrusting period.
A flight combustion stability monitor system is employed to monitor the
J engine for instability during thrusting periods.
, {
Propellant quantity is measured by two separate sensing systems:

prirnary and auxiliary° The sensing isyste;ns are powered only during
thrust-on periods due to the capacitance and point sensor measuring
techniques. The linearity would not provide accurate indications during the
zero g SPS nonthrusting periods°
I
The control of the subsystem is automatic with provisions for manual
override.
Z.4. Z MAYOR COMPONENT/SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION.
Z.4oZ.1 Pressurization Subsystem°
!i i, The pressurization subsystem consists of two helium tanks, two

/,I helium pressurizing valves, two dual. pressure regulator assemblies, tv,,o
dual check valve assemblies, two pressure relief valves, and two heat
I exchangers° The critical components are redundant to increase reliability..
SERVICE PROPULSION SYST .Ebi
:I
Page Z. 4-Z
i!:ill
i!
ii ..........
SMZA-03-SC01Z
I_ ,_ APOLLO OPEIiATIONS IL%NDBOOK

,_ _._,_i
_:_
S YST ]3,MS DATA
:.:<
_i_
_iiI!%
iI t_ %
L:I:I
LE_m
iFigure 2.4-,I. SPS Functional ]F]ovz ]Diagram
SEI{VIC]S PItOY_ULSIO]N SYSTEI_4
]viiss_.on Basic Da_c IZ Nov ]966 Change Date _age ..Z_uj,_Jj_,j_:_,

!
:I
t ,' I
i
O×IDIZER I
:il
?i:!:_
i BALL VALVE
i (7 PLACES)
J
_t
,f
:o:-:,
b':......
_ i -L3--__--4- !;'71"
..... T'L _:"7" ,'_%V;'i :;'_ 7 ;-9
::..... 4_......... ._-_ ............ _
• % _-L:-:;i. _ '7_:-% .... ;.!::-:/ "-,-i:i:[.:_q.:T'
i _ ,-'j, i _ J i
sflii ]V)iblti_ 3"/A';II • _ 1 ..................... I ............ 1 .............. _..... _
_V ......,;- ......... _- . J. _ I _. 1
z_ ,_..... _........ -'.'_

............... _-:?',-:':'-:_
...............
........ _'-_...... Ji- -_,i<j_
L
-,-I_
_, _o
........_-.... _:_,-,<,-_
......7........... -7.......... 7
i::i_i
L
<r,,_ )A-( %--'_c-,0 i ,'_
!ii:
<i
A1oOLi,O C)PEt<ATIOIq_S liANDP_OOI_
<.q
SYST]_:MS DATA
L::i
g.4.2.1,] He].ium Tanks o

i <l
The two helium supply spherical pressure vessel.s are located in the
,i center section of the service module.

• g:9
2.4. Z.l.Z Helium Pressurizing Valves.
i These two continuous duty solenoid-operated valves are normally

t f e_'eJ u-, :;_' <
closed to the helium supply pressure. The valves are energized open and
:i spring-loaded closed. When the helium switches on panel Z0 are in the

AUTO position, the valves are energized and de-energized by the thrust
ON-OFF signal. The valves n_ay be manually controlled by the crew:
] _,;1! utilizing the ON and OFF position of the helium swi.tches. Each valve is
controlled individually by a separate switch on.panel g0o
Each valve contains a position switch which controls a position

i ]
indicator above each switch, on panel Z0o V(hen.a valve is closed, the posi-
q
J tion switch is open and the indicetor is gray (same color as the panel)°
\Vhen a valve is open, the position switch is closed a.nd the indicator has
i!%i diagonal lines, indicating the va]ve is open°
]
i In the event of a failure in the automatic mode of operation, the trey:
ro.anually enables the pressurizing v_b,re or valves on pane]. Z0. In the e\'erR
!
! i:e of a prob].en] with one of the regulating units, the crew manually isolates the
required pressurizing valve.
::i
Z.4. Z.I.3 Pressure l<egulator Assemblies.
:i Pressure regulation is accomp].ished by two pressure regulating units

in parallel, downstream of each helium pressurizing \:alve_ Each regulator
unit contains a primary and secon.d_ry regulator in series, and a pressure
surge damper installed on the inlet to each regulating uniL
ii
i "ii[._ The primary regulator is normal]._" the controlling regulator, while the
'I secondary is normally open during a dynamic flow co_,dition. The second-
, 1
: j
ary regulator will not become a controlling regu].ator until t]).eprimary,
due to a problem, allows a higher pressure than normal, and al]ov:s the
i U secondary regulator to function and become the controlling regulator° All
i regulator pressures are in reference to a bellows assembly that is vented
to ambient.
i :' One of the regulating units incorporated in one of the para!]el paths
:t
is considered the working regulator. '£he regulating unit in the rer_,aining
parallel pat h is normally locked up _::hen the syste._zn is dynamic. The
regulator that is norn-_a].ly locked up would not function until !he normal
? regulator allowed the regulated helium pressure to decrease, due to a
!i?1 problem,
functioning
and allow
regulator.
the normally locked-up regulator to become ti_e
1:! _:fd
_' !2J SERVICE PROPULSION SYSTEM
i!
Mission 13asic Date ]Z ?_ov ]966 Cha_ge Date Page Z_4-5

::::_
SMZA-03-SC0 !Z
J
APOILL, O OPERAT.rONS ItANDI%OOK
h_ SYST Eh,J._: DATA
Z.4,,Z_ 1.4 Check Valve Assemblies.

:_H
Each assembly contains four independent check valves connected in a
series-parallel configuration which provides added redundancy. The check
:!
valves will not open until there is a 4-psi pressure differential between the
[:i
/'i check valve assembly inlet and outlet lines°
Helium Pressure Relief Valves°

2.4.2.1.5
The pressure relief valves consist of a relief valve, a burst diaphragm,
and a filter.
-/£,'
In this event_ ¢.xcessive b.elium ard/o:c propellant vapor ruptures the
bu_ _ di_phrag_n and the fi.lter ,'fi]Jer is t:o be a nonfragmentation type) filters
-! any fra_rnentationo The re]ief valve opens and -v<;nts the _.pplicable system
h_ to space_ _nd will clos4 and reseal after the excessive pressure has _:eturned [;if
to i:he operating-level. The burst dia.phra.gn:_ provide9 .s.more positive seal
of heiium th_n a. relief valve. The. fi][ter prevents any Iragmen.ts f)'on_ the
diaphragm frorn e:ate:¢ing the relief valve seat,,

A_
A pressure bleed device is incorporated betwc;e_ the burst diaphragm

and relief valve. The bleed valve vents the cavity between the burst dia--
phragn_ _nd relief valve in th.e event of any ].eakage froztn the diaphrag.,_n.
The bleed device is norrna!ly open and \viii close when the pressure increases
up to a predetermined pressure.
Z.4. Z. 1.6 Heat ]<xchanger s,
Each unit is a line-mounted, counterf!ov_ heat exchanger consisting

4
of a portion of the helium press_).rization li_e, coiled hel_caily within an [:
enlarged, section Of the propellant supply line. This arrange_ent causes

the helium gas, flowing through the coiled li_..e, to approach the te_-nperature
of the propelk_nto
:]
Zo4,, Z,Z Propellant Subsystem°
,t
This subsystem consists of two fuel tanks (storage a.nd sump)_ two
i oxidizer tanks (storage and surnp), prope]lant feed iirtes, and bipropeilant
va]ve a s s e.nqbly,
J
!i Zo4. Z.Z.I Rropel!ant T_.nks.
iii domed
The total
cylindrical
propellant
tanks within
supply
the
is contained
_:ervice
within
mod_leo
four
The
hemispherical-
storage tanks _re
pressurized from the heliuvn supply, and an outie i: transfers the propellant
and/or he]lure gas fron_ the storage tanks through their respective transfer
i! lines to the sump tanks. A standpipe, i.u the sump tanks_ allows the pro-
pella_.t aDd/or helium gas from the r_torage tanks to pressurize the _ sump
tanks° Thus, the propellants in the surnp tanks are direcled in the retention
!'! reservoirs, to the outlet, and then to the engine°
S E RVI C E] 1) RO _ U LS iOIq S Y S"f E M
,_ _._, ]2 Nov 1966 C'har_,'_ ]Date ................... Pa_,e
'i
:f
SM2A-03-SC012
APOLI,O OPli]RATIObIS I-{ANDBOOI<
.,,.
,,
S YST]).]MS DATA
[:!i[_ The retention reservoirs are installed in the exit end of the sunup
[::a tanks only. The unnbreila propellant retention screens retain a clusntity
of propellant in the exit end of the sump tanks, in addition to retaining
)1 propellant within the retention reservoir can and in the plun_bing from _he
[!'71
sump tank outlet to the bipropellant valve of the SPS engine during z4ro g
conditions. An ullage maneuver must be performed prior to a thrust-on
signal to the SPS engine by the S/M RCS. The ullage n_aneuver is per-
T_ formed to ensure that no gases are retained below or aft of the retention
't screens, in addition to settling the propellants and ensuring that the
retention screens are not da_magedo
Z,4. Z.Z.Z Tank Propellant Feed Lines.

]
The propellant feed lines have flexible bellows a.ssernblies _nstailed
.:{
to permit alignment of the tank feed plumbing to the engine interface.
plumbing.
Z,4. Z.3 _ipropellant Valve Assembly,
,!i
The bipropellant valve _ssembly consists of two gaseous nitrogen
(GNZ) pressure vessels_ two injector prevaives, two ON Z regulators, two
z
;i GNZ relief valves, four solenoid control valves, four actuators, and
eight propellant ball valves.
Z.4,2.3o] _aseous Nitrogen (ON Z) Pressure Xfessels.

E?
[:i TwoGN Z tanks are mounted on the bipropeiiant valve assen_bly (:hat
,1
supply pressure to the injector prevalves_ O__,e C_Z [,_,._k
is !_ I],_:L,ri_a_ y
:! pneu_:natic control system A and the renqaining C_NZ tank is in the secondary
i pneumatic control systen_ lB,
2.4. Zo3.Z Injector Prevalves.

i!i
d The injector prevalves are two-position solenoid-operated valves,
one for each pneu._T_atic control systen_ and identified as A and _. "ll-,e
valve is energized open and spring-loaded closed. The injector prev_]vc:
is opened upon command from the crew, panel 3, prior to an engine
i
t thrusting period. The injector prevalves energized open allows GN Z
supply tank pressure to flow to an orifice and on into the regula.tor..
Z,4. Z.3.3 ON 2 Pressure Regulators.

ii
!
A single-stage regulator is instal.led in each pnemna_c' control
system betvzcen the injector preva]ves and the solenoid control valves. The
ii
t regulator reduces the supply ON Z pressure to a desired working pressure,
[1
SERVICE I_]iOPULSION S Fo ± t,,'
P _ - •/
[ii::] Mission Basic ]Date IZ Nov ]966 Chan_e Date ............ Pape
SMZA-03-SC012
APOLLO OPE;]{ATIONS HANDBOOI{
S YSTEh4.S I)A'fA
2.4. Z.3.4 GN Z Relief Valves.
A pressure relief valve is installed in each pneumatic control system,

?ii downstream of the GN Z pressure regulators, to limit the pressure applied
to the solenoid control valves in the event a GN Z pressure regulator mal-
functioned open. The orifice, between the injector prevalve and regu!ator,
is installed to restrict the flow and allow the relief valve to relieve the
pre.ssure in event the regulator fails to open, preventing any damage to the
solenoid control valves and/o_: actuators.
.j Z.4. Z.3°5 GN Z Solenoid Control Valves.

?,"
Four solenoid-opera{ted, three-way, two-position control vaiw_s are

utilized for actuator control. Two solenoid control valves are located
d downstream of the C}N Z regulators in each pneumatic control system. The
two solenoid control valves in the primary system are identified in l and Z,
and the two in the secondary system are identified as 3 and 4o ]?he two
solenoid control valves i_. the primary system control the actuator and ball
:! valves l and Z. The two solenoid con.trol valves in the secondary system
control the actuator and ball valves 3 and 4o The SPS thrust ON-OFi _'com-
mand controls the energizing or de-energizing of all four solenoid control
valves.
i
Z.4. Z.3.6 GN Z ]Ball Valve Actuators,
I
Four piston-type, pneumatically operated actuators are utilized to

control the ei._ht propel!emt ball val\,,_o .Eat], actuator piston is n_echan.
'I ically connected to a pair of propellant ba].] valves; one fuel and or]e
oxidizer. V'/hen the solenoid control valves are opened, pneun-_atic pres-
sure is applied to the opening side of the aetuators_ ']['hespring pressure,
on the closing side, is overcome and the actuator piston moves. U'tilizing
a rack and pinion gear, linear motion of the actualor connecting arm is
converted into rotary motion, \vhich opens the propellant bali valves.
When the engine firing signal is removed from tn_ solenoid control valves,
the solenoid control valves close removing pneu_natic pressure source
from the opening side of the actuators, The actuator c].osing side spring
pressure hove forces the actuator piston to nqove in the opposite direction,
J causing the propellant ba].l valves to close. The piston rnoven]ent forces
the rernaining OsN Z, on the opening side of the actuator, back through the
solenoid control valves where th(.'yare vented overboard°
2.4.2.3.7 Bipropellant Valves°
The eight propellant ball valves are used to distribute fuel and
oxidizer to the engine injector assen:blyo Four iin.ked pairs, each pair
consisting of one fuel and one oxidizer ball vah'e con_rolled by a single
j actuator, are arranged in a serJes-para!].el configuration. The parallel
arrangement provides redundancy to ensure engine ignition, and the
series arrangement to' ensure thrust termination. When the actuators
r_
_.n:vVICiF_ PIhOPULSION SYSTEN{.
2.4- 8
biis_ion Basic Date 1Z Nov 1966 Chant',e- Date ........................ i_age ................... :....
• ' ........... "_' : '7":<,:> _:'v •............ " _" ,: _17{::7

_r !7
''_ 7_ : :m:='tT: 5 ':>:<-:Tv:_!>!}! ......... _! :::':#'<< >::--":"[!'> .......... !E!!>_=" ........ _', ::_":}:iFi :" :_ :.' _' _:f '[ :"=° "_:}7! : ......... ......... _ : ...... :': i,:_ 7<'>::<,<:
SMZA.-03-SC012
APOLI.,O OPE, RATIONS ttANDBOO]£
_:::
Q SYSTEMS ]DATA
are opened, each propellant ball valve is rotated, thereby aligning the ball
to a position that allows propellants to flow to th.e engine injector assembly.
The mechanical arrangement is such that the o),-idizer ball valves n]aintain
i
an 8-degree lead over the fuel ball valves upon opening, which results in
smoother engine starting transients. Each pair of propel!ant valves
•i incorporates a potentiometer drive gear and housing. Each housing conca;.ns

2_
two potentiometers that are mechanicallf driven: one provides an electrical
:_ [:/1 signal converted into a visual indication of va]ve position of panel 20, and
the remaining provides a signal to telemetry.
]
i!il,
2.4.2.3.8 Engine Propellant Lines.
ii] i-,_
i U Integral propellant lines are utilized, on the engine_ to route each
J propellant fronn the interface po]nts in the gimba], plane area to the pro-
::i [? pel]ant engine gimb_}]_ng, orifices for adjustn-_ent of oxidizer/fuel ratio,

and screens for keeping particle contanninants fro±_ entering the en.g]ne.
: ._
2.4.2.4 Engine Injector.
The injector is bolted to the ablative thrust chamber attach pad°
Propellant distribution to the injector orifices, on the combustion face of
:l [be injector, is accon_plished througl _, concentric annuli machined in the
] _ face of the injector assembly and covered by concentric closeout ri_:,gs.

1
Propellant distribution to the annuli is aCcom.plished through alternate
d radial, manifolds we].ded to the backside of the knjector body° The ]_)jec--
_ .£:q tot is regenerative]y cooled and baff]ed to :_rovide combustion stabilit:v.
']7he fuel and oxidizer orifices i_T;.pinge upon each other, aton_ize, and
I
ignite due to hypergolic reaction.
Z.4. Z05 Ablative Combustion Chamber.
The ablative combustion chamber materiil extends from the injector

!I attach pad to the nozzle extension attach pad. The ablative material
consists of a liner, a layer of insulation_ integral metal attach flanges for
mounting the in_jector and nozzle extension, and structural outer reinforce-
ment. The only restriction on a restart is dependent upon the SPS WALL
TEMP HI caution and warning light, on panel i], monitoring the outside
wall temperature at the throat°
:;l
Z.4.2_6 Nozzle Extension.
:iiiJ The bell-contoured, nozzle extension is bolted to the ablative thrust
] chamber exit area. The nozzle extension is radiant-cooled and contains an
external stiffener to provide additional strength.
2fl
z .' - }
?'i Z.4. Z.7 l#ligh[ Combustion Stability Moh_.t(1 (FCSM)0
j e_
The FCSM ia an accelerometer package, mounted to the SoS engb_e
injector, to monitor the engine for vibration buildup characteristic of

combustion instability.
: !
[::i
",' 4 - 9
.... _ ......._'" _''_':"" ........... _"........................

"........................ -':{ _* ...... T........ U:'" "'-_ .........._'_" ""'-; _ "-;-']!i': " " ' '":" .........:!:!i_, -- ,-r, ........, ............ ......... ,".
....... 1:7....... [':P":..... _'........
[i:
SMZA-.03-SC0 ] 2.
A i--sO ]b]%O O]-; I'?.!CA TiC' N _ } LA I',,T]"_BO()i<
S YSTI2]'dS DA.TA k_
The three accelero _ncters provide signals into an ]FCS_.4 box assembly
which an-_.plifies it and, when the vibration g_-!eve], exceeds ].80 gts peal< to i,.h,
peak for 70_Z0 millSseconds_ a level, detector triggers a power switch gating
po\ve_ ° to the sun_n_ing logic° The stability monitor wSil monitor only in a
c.:
frequency range m']_ere instability _:vou]d occur (approxirnate].y 600 to 5000 L
cycles per second)°
q.
The summing logic, if there are two or more rough co_Ttbustion
signals received from the norrna].ly closed contacts, will open removing
power frown the G&Iq and SCS driver logic; and will close the normally open
contacts providing a ground to the SPS ROUGH EGO caution and warning
light, on pa_4e! ]0, informing the crew the SPS engine was shut down due to
combustion i_ s [_.bili ty ,.
The FCSM. trigger circuits will provide power to the voting logic
17
relays continuo_s!_; onc_ unstable con_bustion is ,_ensed; and power re_<nains b :
applied to t};e voting ].og_c z'e]_.ys even though the engi_oe is shut down,
unstable co_r_bust].on is no longer sensed, an(:] the Sins R.OUG_{ EGO restrains
liiLll_] !naLt_< ,
When the e.ngine is shut down to unstedble co_nbustion and t,o remove
power f_:on_ the -¢oting logic rel;-_ys, the crew,vou]d place s.ny on:" of the i"
fol]owins: s\vitcbes to the position indicated to reset the ]fGS]_A voting Ic)gic:
ao AU'I_O_OV],]R.R]TD]_J switches l:o O\rl;J_t<ID]E,
b. AV switch to O]Ft:'o
c. A'.UT]I_(JDi_.,h,iOiN]I'[UO]?_..1EI',_T_LY _\,.;Stcb to cithe_ MOi'qJ.']7OI-1 or
];3NTR.Yo
d, 905i',4 SOS and C_6.,.iqswitche_{ to R]:]S]_T/©",r]41<IIIDEo
\¥ben
.... tl,e FCSM is reset_ the ;:,]-,n
_ _" ROUGI-I ]_](;O light
... on pa>el ].0 will
not he il].u_nin._.ted,
The ]ZGS]ET/ O_; _"_

.E, :,...c,._.Dlb'" s\vitebes , on p_.nel Z, provide a t'vps.ss
capability of the ]FCSM systerno With the ]FCSM _[<E]SG'!'/OVEI<Ji]IDE

]
s\vit:c]:es_ on panel Z_ in the ILES]CT/O\zERRIDE position, power is no_:
provided to the IPCSIv! box and sum_-.ning logic assen*_b].ies rendering the
EGSbi inope:cative &s well as the SPS !<OUGI[[ EGO caution and \yarning
light on panel ]0° If unstable combustion occurs, the engine continues to

4
thrust,
;i The FCSM box assembly and sunm_ing logic assembly receives Dower
from tbc SGS th_:ough the following s\vitches;

a. Mode select switch to G-man or SCS rnode._ panel S.
b, AT'flTUD_]-h,IONI'.f'OIi-]E!'qTIR..Y switch to .A']'TITU]DE, panel 8,.
c. z%.'V switch t:o hV _osit_on, p<-_nc] 8,

do FCSM G&N: RESETIO'_r]{]RI<I]Dk] s\v;.tch t:o G-&IN position, panel Z,
e,, Z'C;S.td SGS_ RESET/C)VI!]R;LID]'] switch t:o SGS posit!or:, panel Z
13 _ r, i. <: :-,. _.,e ............................

] Z boy ]966 c'_--,,,_,,, ].._,..c ........................... -- fake ...................................
M 5s s i o n ....................... .... :.,. ....... _-,_ '_-" Z. 4 - ] 0
SMZA.-03-SC'012
AF}OLLO OPERATIONS HANDI3OOK
SYSTEMS DATA
Z.4. Z.8 SPS Electrical Heaters.
Twenty-six electrical, strip heaters are enqployed on the propellant

line brackets, fuel and oxidizer h.eat exchangers, propelhq.nt utilization
::7{ valve, bipropeilant valve assembly, and the injector tubes. These elec-
tircal strip heaters are enqployed to control the temperature of the ea_tire
aft bulkhead and engine areas thus the propellants.
{ The strip heaters are controlled as a normal n_anual function of the

crew, on panel 19 (figure Z.4.-Z), utilizing the SIPS HEAT.CI-t switch. The
i i::i crew will place the switch to position A or ]3 when the propellant temper- F_:,.
ature indicator_ on panel Z0_ reads -° 40°F (].ower red line indication) which_ _
E
is equivalent to a propellant temperature of +40°F_ The propellant ternper_- i

ature readout J s derived fron] the engine fuel-feed line measurement _._,:._:
(figure Z.4-1)o The crew will place the SI°S t-]EATER switch to OFF when
1
l_ i?
the p_:ope!lant temperature indicator, on par_el Z0, reads 1-80"]?" (upper red
i line indication) which is equivalent to k prope]l.ant temperature of q 1Z0°i:',,
,i Propella.nt Temperature Comparison
i_rope[iant Ten:perature Indicator Reading _i p
, ••i̧
0ot_ 0--7i7ol-- o-7
o. I <_I+7°2 2°_-°'_2:e 00
Equivalent Temperature °F
+0 ......
]t+1333 qZ667'4.,!e,T--r +53.34 _ +66.67
..... +80 b106_67
+93.345160!.,.175.341, +120 +133.34 +146.6'1 ' +186.67
|
/!
kJ When the SIPS HEATER switch is placed t-o position A, all 26 heatJr_g
J IA elements (A) will receive Z8 vdc. When the SIPS HEATER switch is p]aeed to
position 13, all. Z6 heating elemer_ts (k_) wil]. _'eceive Z_ vdc. 'I'he O]:'F posi--
tion of the SPS MEAT?'R switch removes all electrical power from the SIPS
124_
heating elements.
-?iI 2°4.2.9 Thrust Mount A sse_blies.
The thrust n_ount s.ssennbly consists of a ghnbal ring, engine-to-

/i
lJ vehicle
supports.
mounting
The
pads_
thrust
and
structure
gimbal
is
ring-to-combustion
capable of providing
chamber
J:8o 5 degrees
assembly
inclination about the Z-axis and ±7.5 degrees about the Y-axis.
Z.4. Z.9.1 Ginnbal Actuator°
']:hrust vector control of the service propulsion engine is achieved by

dual- , servo- , electro-mechanical actuators° The gL<nbal actuators are
F_ capable of providing control around the Z-Z axis (yaw) of 7 (+l/Z, -0)
degrees in. either di_ectior,_ fr01:q a +4-degree null offset, and around the
Y-Y axis (pitch) of 6(+I/Z, -0) degrees ill either direction from a zero-
degree null offset. The res.son for the 4-degree offset to the +Y axis is
due to the offset center of mass in the spacec_'aft.
IB@,ch actuator assembly (figure Zo 4-3) consists o_ four elect_'on_c_gn}_tJc

particle clutches_ two d-c motors, a bull gear, jackscrew and ram, ba]:l
nut, four linear position transducers, and tv/o velocity generators_ The
act._.ator assembly is a sealed unit and enclose those portions protruding
from the main housing.
r,
• "2c_
:! SEI<VICF PR.OI_ULS!ON SYSTEM
Mission ]3as[c !3ate ].Z Nov 1066 Chin e Date ....... Ipage 2.4- i]
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SMZA-03-o£. ''_0 IZ
APO]LLO OPE]IiATIONS I-{ANDI3OO;_

]
• :_ i J SYST1EMS DATA
f:::i! CASE I
!;:.!
PRESSURIZING
IFITI-ING_ [I
:: !
•71
] Li
POSITION
TRANSDUCER _ l
:_:: .-I
(2 PLACES} i:q
4i
l
PRESSURE
iNDICATOR
\
t
EXIEND AND
J, RETRACTCt.UTCHES" IMBAL DRIVE
c_ (2 PEACES) MOTOR{2 PLACES
t4
!;!i P-IOITB k ,_
:;iJ
il _i_:
Figure Z,4-3. SPS Electro-Mechanical Gimbal Actuator
tq
One motor and _ pair of cl.utches (extend a_.dretract) are identified
,!
as system No° 1_ and the remaining motor and pair of clutches (extend and
retract) are identified as system lqo. Z within the specific actuator°
I? An over and undercurrent relay is emp].oyed for each prima.ry gimbal
motor- (figure Z.4-4), and is controlled individually })y a switch on panel 3.
When the prirnary GIM_A]_, XdO']7OIZS switches are placed to the START
position, power is applied to the motor-driven switch within the over and
undercurrent relay of the primaries. The motor switch then supplies power
,] from the main bus A to the gin-tbal motor. When the switch is release, d_ it
i iI spring-loads
sensing
to the ON
circuitry
]?osition which
of the primary
activates
relay which
the over and undG'rcu_rrent
monitors the ct_rrent to the
[::} gimbal rnotoro
The over and under current z'elay of the p±'in_aries are utilized bo
monitor the current to the girr_ba! motor due to the variab1_e current flow
to the gimba] motor that is dependent upon the gimba], angle change required.
ii<i
SEt-i\rTc_ PI1.O!nuLS!oN SYS'i'_M
") A ] 9
Miss ion. Basic Date, IZ Nov 1966 Chang e Date° pa g e ..... %:.1L[_-_.'--......
fi
SMZA.-05-SC0] Z
APO ]_,LOO P ]-£

l<A %' IO b!S !-{i b]D B OOi{
SYSTEMS ]DATA
[]sing No_ l ya\v system as an exal_n,p].e, and _.dentifying the upper

nzotor and clutches in figure Z.4-3 as system No. l, the operation of the
current monitoring systen_ is as re]lore, s:

a. If the relay senses an over or undercurrent to gin_ba[ n-Jotol _ No, i,
the monitor circuitry within the relay will drive the n_otor-driven switch,
removing po\ver from gimbal motor No, 1,

b. Simultaneously, a fail sense signal is sent from the relay, tb.e SGS,
\vhich opens relay KI3 removing inputs from the 9[o. ] c].utches and closes
relay ]if4 applying inputs to the Nee Z clutches \vithin the same actuator]
and the top contact of I<IZ opens and the bottom contact of ll]Z closes for
TVC monitor.
c. S_n_ultaneously a sign_l is sent _o ilhnni_ste a caution and warnin Z
light on panel ]l, to indicate the pr-]n]ary gimba[ n-_otor has f_iled.
:i
The prin_ary s\vitches on panel 3 arc then placed in the OFF position,
]
i [{orrnatl_y the O_'F position is used to sh_._t <]own the Zi_ba]. n_otors upon
]he cornp!etion of a thrusting period,
The No, Z systems en_p].oy a 70--amp circuit breaher that is located

in the service module nest the SIftS po_'er distribution box°
3
Using No. Z ya-_ system as an example (figure Z.4-4)_ the operation
of the current monitoring syster_ is as followst

a. When the secondary GII\.iBAL MOTOI<S s_vitches are placed to the
START position, power is applied to the n-_otor-driyen s_vitch within the

over and u_dercurre_t relay of the secondaries° The motor s_vitch then
4 supplies po\ver fro_.n the n-_ain bus _ through the 70-an_p circuit breaker,
and through the. motor-driven sv,,iteh to the sccond_,.ry gi_-nbal _notor.

b. When the secondary switch is released, it spring-loads to the O_7
position _vhich performs no functions on the secondaries°

co The 70-.amp circuit breaker wiU monitor the current to the secondary
ghnbal motor; and if a cup'rent of 70 arnps is sensed, the circuit breaker in

the service n_edule \rill remove po\ver fro_.<n,the second_._:y gimbal rnotor,.
id
d. There is no fail sense signs.] sent to the stabilization _nd control
system, and no illumination of the caut._on and warning light on panel Ii from
the secondary system.
e. If the No. Z systen_ has failed due to an overcurrent, the circuit
9 breaker removes po\ver from girnbal motor No,. Z only_ and that specific
actuator is inoperative if the No° i system has previously failed.
The secondary s\vitches on panel 3 are then placed to OFF position,,.
Norn_a].ly, the OFF position is used to shut dom, n the gin-_bal motors upon the
• j co,op!at]on of a thm'usting per].odo
The clutches are of a :_nagnetic partic].e type° The girnbal _-notor drive
/]
gear meshes \vith the gear on the clutch housing° The ge;Irs on each
clutch housing.: n_esb and as _ result_ the clutch housings eounterrotateo
:i
The current input is appl_ed to the electro-magnet n-_ouni:ed to the rotating
_ii!i clutch housing fron_ the stabi]{zstion control systen'_ or _n the guidance and
navigation system through the stabilization control system. A quiescent
'_v"
S_,]<\", f __t,K,
_ _ PROI_ULS!O]q , C_
S vo''"'- ....
Z,IV].
Z. 4..- ].4 ',

Ina g e ...................... I
h,]ission Basi,_ _-_-_ lZ ]qov ]906 Ch<_)_e ]9atc_
SMZA-03-SG0k2.
APOLLO O]:)FZ<A
TIONSi !A.ND__]
007£
o3. o _.EMo DATA
SM I CM CAUTION
WARNING
AND
vo
OVER UND,.,, PANELII
CURRENT RELAY
YAW
. GIMBAL
DR FAIL
[ ...........
ovEFu_iYE_ i
CM 9'4 i t CURRENF [ra-
MWC
Ii i_
ENGAGE OR [_,::J < :.
FA ILSENSE MAIN
BUS A
.....
-4 H- ----[ CLUTCH
EXIEND j il ......
:--![
.....
]
4,_,,_F_o FJ
Kt3
I 45--i--'6 ........... .,,..,_.<.F---
T0 KI2, _" at" "-_ , 1 "BAIT

K_31 - , , I _uS_
......
Ik-i ZT] i C.-L., I<13,1<t4 t Lx , -I lI.... S]_ RTv
I
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/
x_
f "-
-./v,_ •
t "_
[ cLuIc., ] SM NEG SENSE [ /_._1
FAIL _]_ .............. _- --r-_-_--._,,ON i s_----_,----o _---4<_ [
i<i-.-J
U'\,,
I BUS J J'f'YAW _0 I P_NE 25
VELOCIIY I t
l Off G IMBAL
R.OTOR
SWITCH
O Ih1'.-b'q_
MOTOR
CONTROL
DEAD PANEL 3 YAW NO. i
q GENERAIOR ! FACE
SM CM
[ POSITION [ _ ................................
;F- ,F --L2t.EL-J _ f
............
KI3 :i
..... T.-= i
, 1_-_ POS ] ON. _____.II____}___IAB'_>_____ j COMPENSATOR
[ fEED
'_,',_,,i
H) l_,
,:._f'-t
-
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] I i
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SM SM I CM
70 AMP MA IN
c_ _ .... I BusB
KI4 I [ ...... i
.>< .............q , F_
° °---+ ....._q-'-_-I _ t:ZJ PA,E_=_
K]4
MTVC
ENGAGE OR
I REI"A
t 1
---L CLUF.
!
GIMBAL
l
I
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|
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#'_(
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ON
START '_'_
----I_"
_AW.
, .........
',' N.Z
'O"
GIMBAL MOTOR
CONTROL YAW NO. 2
fz_.
] '} ......
BAIT
BUS B
%.
r-_'.
b,_I
_
'
BUS L ,<,LAY I [ I u,, SWITCH PANEL

FAIL SENSE ACI UAIOR I
FACE
CM SM I DEAD
SM-ZA- 1079
I?igure Z°,i-4, SPS Yaw Girnbal Actuator £,4otor and Clutch Control
SELIVICE " >]:LO_:<) U] .......

_- q,_ U c,-.#c.mr-,_,.
"]h.-1 ,-_. ,>. _ ......
• " , l .... ? Z "q I P / ]

lv_l s s ion ]_a.s] c ]Date ] Z No]_._gQ2,_..Chanz e Date ........................ Page _t. :'..,L:]L;LL.,'.<:,,,].[_J
"zL._f
"4"
_" f" MTVC
AND
SOS
IN PUTS ,_ "<_>" t, I L , Kt0 ---
EN,_I NE _. _,, -'C"
mNrr!o_,, i............ --7
...... i I POSIT!ON/_ /
TVC NO. 1
POWER
SWITCH
{ -_'Jvu''-!' i ' LIr_''TER _ _ I
PANEL24
+ 20 VDC --J / ¢_
I I_!(: _!°..
TO SOS
tar rr,l_ _ ;-,
PANEl_6 [
POSIT;ON
l::_t_/::!:i......I f"-
THUMBWI4EEL_'T_"'_"°'_'/ ROTAI ION CONTROl:
_"-"_" I AND RAI'E CAGE
I BMACS,'toUrS 4_
/ _'Tvc .L
r -20 VDC "-'-_ I _ _ _ _'_.-
TVC NO. 2 / I [ ._'%. I_._. _NGAGE "_" I<lt
POWER l _"_-J--°--_,'4"-
X'_....... i_)c'>
..... II..... _----- '
swncH
PANEL 24
/_. 4-20 VDC- _" ',_.J ,b,.'_ KI_
K9 CONIROLLED BY SPS THRUSTON-OFF LOGIC L___.J_:<_

KI0, KIt, KI2, KI3 AND K14 SHOWN PRIOR IO GIMBAL I_'_OTOR
_ART
IF THE OVERAND UNDER CURRENT RELAYFOR YAW GI{_BAI .............

Z
MOTOR NO. ] SENSESAN OVER OR UNDER CURi{ENi, THE
RELAY SIGNAL OPENSK]3 IO CLUTCHES.K13 TOP COglACT
OPENSLOWERCLOSESFORT1fv_,K13 CLOSESTO CLUTCIIES,
KI2 TOP CONTAC[ OPENS,LOWERCLOSES.
KIO, K11, I._i3 and KI4 ARE AI.SO COi'Y,ROI LEO BY CLOCKWISE
ROTATION OF TRANSLATION CONTROLWITH DELTAV MOr)E SELECTED
REFEPREDTO AS MANUAl_ TIIRUST VECTORCONTELOL
_q SMZA-- 0 3--SG0 1 "_-
APOL, ILO OPERATIONS N_NDBO

" e_ O . I<"
,:__ S • J.,MS DATA
Y,!
7"_? current is applied to the electro-magnet of the extend and retract clutches
N when the thrust vector POWER switches, on panel 24, are on, which
prevents the engine from n-_oving during the boost phase of the mission with
the gimbal n_otors OF_'. A Z46 foot-pound force would be required o_ the
_:::
engine to overcon_e the quiescent current (equivalent to 1.53 g) in the
} clutches. The gimb, a! motors will be turned on, prior to jettisoning the
launch escape tower, to support the SPS abort criteria after the launch
escape tower has been jettisoned, and will be turned OFF as soon a.s possible.
to reduce the heat _oblen._ that occurs due to the gin_bal motors drivino the
clutch housings. \Vith quiescent current applied, it creates a friction force ' ,:
in the clu.tch housing that creates heat, which if a!.lowed to rise to a high 1 "
temperature the eleetro-magnet would loose its n_agnetism capabi]ity; thus ;_'_:_
[i:i rendering that set of clutches inoperative_ This problem occurs only during
boost, not during t],.enormal SRS bur__s.

H_
Prior to any thrusting periods the th,ambwheels on panel 6 can be used
to position the enginea The thrust-on signal rr_ay be provided by the G&.N
i
through the SCS, o;: by SCS onlyo In either rr_dde the current input required
t
(to maintain '<he engine thrust vector through the center of mass) to the
tbi. clutches will increase above the quiescent current which increases the
current in the electro--magnets that are rotating with the clutch housings.
The dry powder magnetic particles have the ability to become magnetized
very readily as well as becoming demagnetized as readily° The n_agneti.e

i ii;:_2 particles increase the friction force between the rotating houz, ing and the
flywheel, causing the f]ywheel to rotate. The flywheel arrangement is

attached to the clutch output shaft allowing the dutch shaft to drive the bull
gear, The BL,1]. gea._ .... : ...... a bs.]! nut --'*-":_> -_i .... we .%."tuaior jack--
? Lai_]
i to an extend or retract position, depending upon which clutch housing
electro-magnet the current input is supplied to° The larger the excitation,
current, the higher the clutch shaft rotation rate,

K_
1 Meshed with the hal! nut pinion gear are tv,,o rate transducers of the
tachometer type° W]._en the ball p,ut is rotated, the rate transducer supplies
i r:Ii i
.f
a feedback into the sumrning network of the !-]_rust vector control logic to
control the driving rates of the jackscre',,v (acting as a dynanqic brake to

21
:1 prevent ove." or under'correcting), one transducer for each syst,ern.
!
The jackscrew contains four posit5on transducers_ all arrange<] for
linear motion and all connected to a single yoke. One of the position trans-
ducers is used to provide a feedback to the sun_n_ing network of transdnc.er

feedback° The two feedbacks to the sustaining network reduce the output
curre_t to the clutch, resulting in a proportional rate change to the desired

ii
gimbal angle position and returns to a quiescent current.
One position transducer provides a signal to the visual display on

J panel 6o One of the position transducers providesafeedbackto the rcduizdant
i summing network of the thrust vector logic for the redundant clutches. The
rezp. ai_-,'ingposition transducer is not presently utilizedo
_i i: 1
,:_EAVICE I>I/OPU LSI.ON ,oc'vc'P>_sA_,_
.,...,_,
g. 4:- ! 7
{!!:!_ Pa _*e
El is s :,o_ Ba s ic Date ,..!.Z J_c2__,_._ 2.(!._,_ Chang e Dal.e
SMP.:A-03"SC01 Z
APOLL,O OPEI<ATIONS HAN'DI_OOI<
!
/ S YS T EMS 1DA'C A i!ii_
}
The spacccraft desired itaodon, thumbwheel positioning_ engine nozzle

!
position., thrust vector position, gimbal position display indicator and actu-
ator ram move_ent is identified in figure Z. 4-.5.
:!
A snubbing dev._ce provides a hard stop for an additional l-degree

,! travel beyond the, norrna.l gimoal !im_ts.
! bianual th.rust vector control, may be obtained by the crew placing the
translation cont_oi clockwise° This will open contacts KI0 and KI3 and
close contacts Kli and Ki4, a].lowing the rotation control to provide the
crew with manual thrust vector controi_ ]!Z
Zo4.Z,]0 pro___pe]ltant
- "_ " _ ....... UtJ!_za.tion
LI_- -- and Garaging
....................................................... Subsystem (PUGS).
i Tl_e subsysteFn consists of eight propell.anc quantity sensors, a pro--
pellanfi utilization valve, a cent:tel ur:dt, and a 4ispl_y unit (figures Z,4-6
and Z, 4- 7),.
Z,4.2. 10o]. Quantity Sensing, Con_puting, and Indicating System°

'!
Propellant quantity is measured by two separate sensing systems:

_7
prhnary and auxiliary° The prinaary qu&nti_y sensors are cylindrical

I ce.pacita.nce probes, znounted axially in. each tank° !n the oxidizer t%nks_
,/
the probes consist of a p:_ir of concen!:ric electrodes with oxidizer used as
:i
the dielectric° In the fuel tanks, a pyrex glass probe, coated with silver
:::::
on the inside_ is used as one conductor of tl_e c.apaci_o_ l_'uel on the out-
side of i.}._e
pt-oL< it tLe ,Ahem: conductor_ _hs pyre:: _!ass itself fern, s the
dielectric, The auxiliary system utilizes point sensors mounted _-_tintervals
along the prirna.ry probes i:o provide a step function i_npedance change
when the liquid ]eve] passes their location centerlineo
P,'imary propellant measurement is accomplished by the probes

A)I
capacitance being a linear function of propeliant height°
Auxiliary propellant m.easurement is accompl.ished by locating the
propellant level with point sensors, Each point sensor consists of con--
centric metal rings, seven in the storage tanks and eight in the sump tanks.
The rings present a variable impedance, depending on whetber they are

covered or uncovered by the propcl].a,_zts0 When the propellants are between
point sensors, the propellants remainin/_ are inlegrated by a rate flow

generator which integrates the serves at a _ate proportional to the normal
/! flow rate of the fuel and oxidiz¢r_ A n_ode selector senses when the pro-
F
pellant crosses a sensor and cha.nges the auxiliary serves from the flow
rate gene_'ator mode tO the position mode, the system moves to the location
J specified by the digital-to.,.analog converter for 3/4 second to correct for
J
any differ(race, The system then returns to the flow rate gen.erator :_ode
until the next point sensor is reached, Figures Z. 4-8 z_nd Z, 4-9 illustrate
4 point sensor locations th<it are covered by propellants° The nonsequentia_
pattern detector function_ to detect fa.].sc or fau].ty sensor s_gnaiso If a

sensor has f_{i!e d, the infornqation from that sensor is blocked froFn the
svstez_., pr(-:ventin Z disr_._])tion of svstcn] co_r:putatiOno
SI_RVICE P[<OPULSION S'YSTEIg
' _ ..... 12 No,_ 1t;66 Ct-.:¢,-_K. - D_,te ............................. Paze Zo4--18

rr_
G_Fv_BAIPOS ilONl
THUMB wM_, ., _ _ \ T _ _
ENGi NE NOZZLE TNE THRUbT 7EC:O_, ' " ," ,"' '"_
"
,_,"_ _ ACTUATOR
SfC MOTION D,_. _K,-D POSITIONED
MOVES TOWARDS
BY THE CREW ON PANE[. ASSEk'IBLY _.-,......... r I PAN,:_LAS_'_SLY | RAM
THE ,.uw_u_ m_ i 6 MOVES TO A i
TJ 6TOA >
__i
P,, c.q + NU...... AL (UP) + Z AXIS OFTHE S/C - Z AXiS OF THE S/C ! + NUMERAL P_TCH EXIENDS 0
F_ SIC NOSE DOWN (P!TCH)
!
_¢,_.SIC - NUF'_%RAL _ PITCH RETRACTS Y
iP-:' SIC NOSE UP (P_TCH) NUMERAL (DOWN) - Z AX_S OF THE S/C + Z AXIS OF "'_ I ©
I=
-:.&
io< SIC RIGHT (YAW) - NUMERAL (RIGHT) + Y AXiS OFTHE SIC - NU,_,,.E
RAL YAW RETRACTS 1
E,Q
,
+ NUMERAL (LEFT) ' Y AX_S OF TIdESIC + Y AXiS OF THE SIC i + NUMERAL
SIC [.EFT (YAW)
Ic-. ? L .... J y..,.
i C
L
L1
• :-:.:- THE ACTUATOR NULL POSITION IN YAW IS 4 ° 'OFFSETFROt'?,
THE SIC X AXiS DUE TO > z c_
0 THE ENGINE MOUNTING ?ADS IN THE SERVICE#_ ODU_L BEI,,,GCANTED (BLOCK i VEHICLES)
(9 :4 >
TP,
E THRUST VECTOR IS 4° TOTHE -"YAXIS OF THE SIC AND TileENGINE NOZZLE
rl
IS 4° TO THE -Y AXIS OF THE SiC.
[i r-:-
AS A RESULT THE GIMBAL POSiT!O:",! iNDiCATOR 0[4 PANEL ASS£'v'_BLY.6WILL
'_ NUL,- POSitION. 0
_NDICATE A +4° 1,,_,r.._,_HE
,,u.'-,_ _- ACTUATORS ARE iN TiiL ....
0
'i TO PARALLEL THE THRUST VECTOR At.;D THE ENGINE NOZZLE WiTH THE X AXIS OF
THE S/C, THE YAW THUMB WHEEL OX PANEL ASSEMBLY 6 I\;_UST BE POS ITIONED
"?i TO 0° AND AS A RESULT THE YAW POSIT!ON INDICATOR ON PANEL ASSEMBLY
6 WiLL INDICATE 0%
iN THIS CASE, THE YAW ACTUATOR IS NO LONGER 1N !TS NULL
POS!TiON IN RESPECTTO THE GFVIBAL R!NG.
/:
THE THRUST VECTOR AND THE ENGINE NOZZLE ARE NOW PARALLEL
,-,4
TO THE X AXIS OF THE SIC
THE ACTUATOR NULL POSITION iN PITCE IS 0° {BLOCK I VEHICLES).
q
::!iI
5
b!
t :[;'igt_ _'e Z. ,i -. 5.
di
:i
!
} SMZA-03.-SC0] Z
]
APOI.,I,O OI-_EP_ ATt()IqS HAIqDt;OOI_
]
SYSTEMS DATA
........................... [- ......................................................................................... - ...................
When a TIffI<UST--ON signal is provided with the S_I;NSOR select switch
in the PRIMAi_Y or NORlvlAL position, the crew display digital readouts,

i and unbalance display will not change for 4.5_I.0 seconds to allow for
i
prope]!ant settling, I£owever, TLM will receive the same signal as upon _!:
(!
completion of the last firing after approximately one second of SPS TIIP_UST-
ONe
When the THIIUST-ON signal is provided wfth the SENSOR select
switchin AUXiLIAIiY position, the crew display digital readouts and TLM
wi].l receive a change in .infor-_nstio n inn_edi_,te!y which is generated from
a flow rate integrator that simulates the r_on_inal flow rate and transmits [:][_
this as quantit_ inforn_adon go the crew displays and TL, Mo The crew
digital readouts, unbalance display, and 'FLM will not be updated to the
propellant f1'o_ a pofn.t sensor for 4oSJ=lo0 seconds alter THRUST-ONe

11
When the TJ:iRUS'F-ON sigt_al is provided plus .i_5:i_l.,0 scco_._ds, -: a. point
sensor is uncovered the crew digits] reado_ts, u_baLance disp]ay, and T]_,M
.!
will be updated fie the propellant ren_-_ining at that point sensor. The time
delay of 4. 5:hi00 seconds is to the point sensor sys[.er):_ and not to the !;)<
auxiliary fuel and oxidizer serves, and is to a!].ow for propei!anl settling°
_2
}
Any deviation fron_ the nominal oxidizer to fv,.el ratio (Z:I by re.ass) ks
displayed in. pounds by the UNBALANC ]_; indicatoc_. 'i'hc upper half of the
_ndicator is marked I{WC, and the lower half is rnarl<ed DEC to idc.ntify the
required change in oxidizer flow tale to correct an.y_utabalance condition°
< When the SENSOR. select switch is in the N©IIk_.iL position, the f:
outputs of both senso_ systenus are continually compazed in the cornparator
netwo_"k_ If a discrepancy occurs betwcor, t,.,tal pr_._n}).ry and total s.uxi]ia_y
fuel of 300 pounds, or a discrepancy between total pri_r_ary oxidlzec and
auxi]ia.ry oxidizer of 300 pounds, th.e caution a_d warning indicator on
panel ].i is iilurninated_ The output of the oxidizer surnp tan]< s¢_-rvo
amplifier and the prim.ary potent_on_eter of the unba].anee h_dic[&or a_:e
con%pared in the con_pa.rator networ]% e.nd if 300 pounds or 90 ]percent: of

the critical unbalance ir:,dicated versus time remaining is reached
(figure Zo 4-10), the c_.tltion and warning light on pane], l 1 is illurr_i.r_ated,
With the SENSOR select switch in the PRIhiAI_Y position, the output
of the oxidizer smwp tank serve ampiifiex and the output of the primary
?
potentiometer in the u.nbalance meter are compared in the comparator

ne_work and if 300 pounds or 90 percent of the crit_.ce,.l unbalances indicated
versus tirne remaining is reached, the caution and warning light on panel 1].
is illumin_tted.
With the SEIx]SOR select switch in the AUXIL!A!&Y posit_on, the output
of the auxiliary oxJdiz, er serve amp]i:[ier and the output of the axuiliary
potentiometer are compared in the eomparator nct\vork_ and _f 300 pounds

or 90 percent of the critical unbalance indicated versus rinse ren_aining is
reached (figure Z_ 4--10)_ the caution and warning lig}-t on panel li is

il]un]inatedo
SE.[<VIC]!;PROPULSIC)]q SYSTEM
"2 ")
] _- ion .................... Basic Date_;l.._912,?;,__og_.£: .... Change Date ....................... Page _. 4-,_.0
A}POT_L,O OE__'-]'LATIO_S i-tAN])_O'.-.)f(
SYSTEMS DATA
tOTAL FUEL
QTYLBS
fROff,S[N_D,R
S_LECT SWITCH
tADC2G
FUEl. DISPtAY
PRI,_,; FUEl SOMP
PRIM AND AUX

PRIM FUELSTORAGE FUEL U_ALANCE
OF _O0 t BS
AUX FUEl.
SOLID
_ATE
S_AqTCH
PRIM AND ALIX

OXID UN3AIANCE
OF 360L_S
I
i
FROM SENSOR
SELEC[ SWITCH
MDC 20
UNBALANCE DISPLAY
A!IX OXID
PRIM OXID SUMP
PRI_ OXID STORAGE
l---
t
I
I SOLID
STATE
SWITCH
TOTAL OXIUITER
QTYLBS
Figure g_ 4-6.
S E ):_,VI C }g I: R O I-' U L,S !ON S Y S'I _ _M
•2 _ 1 "3 4 " "2

_-/ ....... ' 12 I\_'-'V 196(; r"_'_C,''_ r'a+e ....... T->a.__ g.4"-,,_ /_o._:,-Z,_.
"I, f" _,
._,..t). _ oc, -',
.,(] ""tI
PR ff,_ARY FUEl SSMP
SERVO NO. 2 IAf_K
MDC 20
l[Sl
TEST CONTROL __ ]__I l ..... l

_ AUTO
IEST
TEST ----'_f;" 28 VDC

PRIMARY FUrl DIORADE
ilIJTO0'_'---1_-O'4_-- _OM GAGING
SERVONO. 1 "ll..T_K
| } CON U?,t UNIt
_le(;Tswrrc'_ I T _ , | cAP:,c,,_A_,E:_
J I . _Js_Rvo"_ 41
PROSE FUH. hO, I I / i
TO AMP I
AND _ERVOS
OF CONIRO[
UNIT
J lEST l}S VAC L---4 _-.-L4 /
(;_--_f--0_-- FROM DA 0 i NO
i CONIROL I#NIT
]15 _U,C
TO CON'rRO{ _--"O"'kJ->--- PRIt_tA_Y OXIDIZE_ SLIMp
UNI]
0,¢_-- - Ir -
_ ___ .SE-
r_vo:?2.
AJUjg_...............
---.b_ 1o TLM
r I_. __--t I..... SFO6}6Q
i I
L )
- "%_ t
C ---c?'
_-_a, I
IESI 1 C-..... "_" I TESICONIROL
1]5 VAC -,,1---
REIUR_'I
PR F'AARY OXIEqZ_ R STORAGE

_L
SERI_O_;C, ; TANE
I "i
'VSIG!,!AL
._ GR,Q
cA%;#/_,: _..-- .........
lEST CONTROL AU×ILIA_'Y FUEl _R\'O
r......... ,£-]
GENERATOR -- "-- " i_.f:VO_ I
EOE.A.,<.
1 ,-............ _ L-'_"°U I
_"_,4£_,............
R.POINT SH,i_O;iS j ._,| IUEi DIGITAL I ................. C) I /_ l :
IN SUMP; ---" " ANALOG COMVLRI_R -- I "-- l
...... / ................ ]................... _ .J ........ --9--%

!,_Z-,,,,0,_,,,.c,,,R
,_ r [
r-_:::_;_T_ _;,,,
_A_ ...........................
_III_#L,'_'U_ISjL' _ }_ I GEPCRAIOR ,F_-----] %UX L '_RYOX DIZq"C"R"O
I oxm,zeR
T_,NKS
I _........... i i --q;,,',_D / ......... ,
NOTES: 1. POWERISDELAY[DTOA:LP;!IA'_RYOXIDIZER
AND FUEL IANK _LDWO AM}'S iOR 4.5±I.05ECON5 / 8 POINI SE:_SORS -b O× DIZER Oh;ITAL- --............
?, // I '
i
I
,
AFIER TtIDU$_ ON OR ViHiN TZST IS COt'_uUCIE[} / li!ISlOi_LGe l I ............ / ' " _ 1
2. POWER iS DELAYEDTO AHXI_ I'.R¥ POINTS

I'OR 4.511.0 S2".CONDAFiH_ _HRU'J ON
). ALL _i.]D STATI SWIT']iLS DH@i','NilV I_ORA_L ]: --. [X:_!'!-- _2!?:_C}; _ -- .................. _ L__I
POSIt!ON, WILl _'iOTS!',']ICH UI'!] H SENSOR
_LECI" SWITCH MOVI.[I TO AUXII IARY L_l-,_o,%TJ.,,q
,T-] _ l
x:.;_
4!
:ui!! o
1
£ !
!
'm
. o.OD
F PRI
C.__- ,N''_p r .._ PRIMARY PU VALVE CONTR©Lt
_ .......... T SEC --
F'OT.]
I Q / _.'_ _,_ _ rAg -_'7'_VAC'
#
L;
,q 1i_ NORM
"_,__O--q _ ......... _-...... _--_ I
li_ °l i I I "'"" _m rOT. L I J >
tT@C
I _ ---f i- ..... ---- 7
!ii <_ rj_ ....
! 211 0
:.i i [ I! L --] -_-- ! VALVE
_,e pR i , POS}TION
! I PUG t_
0
'Z
• PU VALdEI \ _ / P 0 _s,
,:: t? I' t' STOP I T t !F i ....... :_ r '--I
,_D _ MDC PRI ' _ _ _ _ NCR_A_E
N '
.":y^ _Z, _ _ : _t_,;R "7 __ IVAC-y,A, VAC:< " i
bl
Ic-, 0 FRO,q PROPELLANT j GROUND[ t _, '- ' [F-----R.d N , _.)A _',---_[
;:', J-....... : ;
i; i C- UTIL ELATION GAGING _. '<_ NOR,_,A
b>
r,
CON,ROL UN IT i O_C
OXiDiZE.,
_ _:'_<L'
_,A_v_
_
1
-_" _2'
-;,j
LC--_
"_ r-l---_
i
f-_
, PR] _uOT. /
I
._
_
:i
:-_'1
I ', ..:::: DECREASE
: ::::
u
:i
>-i
0 I r_ N " SEt rC_ 1 I \\ qT_ O _ ./'_ ] _' : >
m Z
Z ---- I _ .eP-'b • LL';:;. '", : _#_ >
..... ', PR'! --F-÷ _'-_"_w_,%-C
_ >
ce
_" 'f i I D._ z
• ? _c
ts
t: i , _ l_ 1 '] 0
0
' " I I ' I______L ..... _ t__,_b__
_._-b---_ r- ,,, ._ 1 _ N
:5:i _:
I L_<__L_'_ > ........... 4 ..... L--_ I
NOTE: 1. POWER IS PROVIDED WHEN THRUST ON
IS RECEIVED OR IS POWERED DURING TEST
L __, . AMP PR; POT. SEC PQT,_ j
i 2. _LID STATE SWITCH <.HOWN tN N_,Rt_A_
SECOND"_,Y-PU VALVE CONTROL
POS!T!ON
4! i
:!
SM-2A-IO!8
:j ,'_
,'%:
d !
Figure Z.4-7. Propellant U:iiization Valve Control and Fiag. Displ&y,
f:T:T---_
;2< :
SMZA-03-SG0 IZ
::!!i
.!4
APOLLO ODE_&ATiOI'_S I,]:AND}3OOK
SYST!_:MS DATA
[
AUXILIARY FUEL POIN'i' SENSORS
.'_,00
3300
]:
3_00
3]OO
3000
_900
2800
2700
/
2600 i-
2500
:!
2400
J"
2300
_ - f_
2200 ......... 7":i ;:7":,7 : _
2100
2000
4
!900
. i' . _-: ' ... :?i ::' -' : ._ " . .'i. I
1800
USEABLE
1700
FUEL
_'r.) UN DS
i 1600 l--
1500 -- ,. . . _ _'" "
_4oo .... :--, _. :_,_, . . . ..

300 ..... J"_-}"t7 POINT SENSOR " :- . " : _- "
" _ ,'' ': : , '> " _ "' _'.-, i _" ....
::iii::i _'. ,. ., , {- : ,. , .... _ . ........ . .
--^ _ , .... .f... :. :: ........ :::....: , .:., .:{ ....... "! ...... !....;.-{_ ............ <-
,ou_ . "
7. . .
; .;
._ '
:: :.
:-
!:: :' .:-!-.:.1":' . i, :
:! 900.- - _; , ,.: ....
: .....: ..... * • , ..................
. .: . ,' "t '
f ._" - : ' '{ : • .' i ' ! " _"_ .

80n _- _ .................... 1 ................... _ :...... : ..............
'_ • _a" , : : ! . " {: ! i ..': . : .' : ,
_ l ,_ ..a #8 PO NTSEqSOR : .......... :. " • :_ ! -, ':4 ....... "........
/OO[- /_' F-._.-: " : a .: ,. :, : :
,.,.v-,
i_ Z- ; .! +.:j.:..+: : ::_!::_}.;_j.__l,_..,..:_:...:;::'_.+'-:-.4:-:_--:-.... "..... :...-{ ..............
/ .f . _: ..:l .... . _ :b.: ........ _. : ..... • ,: ' .... ..
.500 b- _ ...... _:-,'_-.:'1 -: ..... : -:4 .--_--:_--- h ' :.'-r, "';_ :: ...... : ..... ;" ." . " '," : "- ", _ :
•iii:i_ | # 1 i " I. : - ._, : " ,1 , ,d.; :t,"_ • '" I' ' ' ..'t:. . 't" :' . ! : . "; : ' r = : "
• ::i_
400!-.t ............ .-:"/:::b:>-{-< .r ..... ............
200I"- " = i ! :.:7::{:: .:::I:::_::=}':':V":{": :-e'":-i-7::{--:,-:_]( : .. , : i

J
200 400 600 800 !OOO 1200. MOO 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600 2890
:2 11"4DIC,AT_D FUEL POUNDS
SM-2A-1 II0
£'igu.re Z.4-8. Au:d.liary Fuel Point Senso_:s
eE_l'_r'r_> - PR.OPULSIO2a
4, y J '__.,._a o*_S * J_M
> e . .
Z. 4..-Z4
..... ,,n Basi.c E'a.te ]Z Nov 1966 Ch',n_ze Date Page
1
L
oMZA .-0 3 --S C, 0 1 Z
1
,iLl APOLLO Oph]RA ± IOI_, i-iA'NDBOOT<
SYSTEMS DATA
4
t
;!
AUXILIARY OXIDi ZER POli'ql" SITNSORS
6400 --
62OO
, _wm.
i 6O00
!i] 5800
56OO
5400
520O
5000
/"!!
_.-_
4800
4400
4200
4000 -
3800 --
3600
3400
U_EABLE
¢ O>'!DIZER 3200
POLINDS 3000
bJ 2800 ........ : ..............

..... _7 ?Oii4T S_.N30_
i
2600 ......
-. :?;: ! l.....
2400
2200
..... _.._ " ; .................................. , . .

2OOO
- : -
1800 ...... i ]
1600
¢ [j
1400 #8 POINT SENSOP, .[.}.....!.- ' ; " "" "
..... ';--:- .... :i-" i_ - -: ;_-:-!i: .... _ : _ ......... .........

1 -- .:c ' - ":'i" "'l • t:, : .' ' : •
1000 .... :: :,--r -.-::-i"_...." '.[ ..... : ''] ! ..... _
( .... i _' ' +, t:
800 .......... ---<-:.... i.........I........ _.........:- ""-= i":.................. <.................

J . ..,.. i..:;..i_:4:;i ....... I ', ....
400 ........ : ......... !
] __
J / / ' / k _ _ , ' I" I , j_. I _ " J.... I ..,._,1..... i,L.........
200 600 1000 1400 1800 2200 2600 3000 34<30 3800 4200 4600 5000 5,730 5800 6_0
INDICATED OXID;ZER POUNDS
!i;J bM- 2A- 110:, _
:i I]
J Figure Z.4-9, Auxiliary Oxidizer Point Sensors
:i
t, SERVICE I-_ROPULSION SYSTEM
_,_.,_ ' Z. 4-Z5

•!i i.¢_ Missio_ Ba,'._ic Date 17, Iqov 1966 ("l-_.;_;_c, Date. Page
_'_
:{
:i
S M_P.?,...-¢ 3 ,- 5,'50 ! ;:
.& ]:;:'O i_,.'[__OO t- ,.,_ ,.J_.i J v, .t-e,. }-]i]_ ]i)"i70]3 ()<))-<.
S 7S'£']LMS DATA
COiv',PAiDt_.ORUNIY FROVIDESeLI(PUT lli_:

"re 5PS PUSiqSk FAIL S'rATUS INDICA ,roR
(Mi)C-11 ) [O1', UN!A[ANCt k CONDITIONS L
:_.400- I N rNis REGION°
I [!_ ,'<,

,'/,,,, Pp" 2x.,f.4,/xS_//,x/_-PP5._',5,xS-V,,;'S_//,',
:, :-'i.
•, 7>.W.,;////_.)//4p:_'./._: cc,u,,,'--,,iwro::
u_.4;_ou, :,u: ,s "P;<35;'-.))','_.
o ,.../....x.:...fp3/M,../.... , ....... ....,./:..- <,.
,'/_[,_'/_ ,,, i//// //
_'X/,'5"3/////V//; ". .';'//,?',V;<<" / /"/,sk'. ," 5_,/// //.pk'. ;';<.;'/4,_, //;<.,
,_5///...//j,./,d4//Z /z 5<,[/._.._X_<yf./_/../.
"/.,..(__KzZ/_
Z.y/Z.i.Z/Z_dMK I>: ,f_.zw_,:
.......... %.-_6_s_<,<,__.x/J
..................................
100% 80% 60% 40% i;0% I 0%
I
STOIV_GE ]A[qK SUMP'IANK t7%
O>'I DlZ _.P,I',EM,",!!','I! !(').

PFRCEN'IAGEOF rol;d_
CAPACIrY
SM_2A-899
EJ.gure 2< 4-.10, P_vopelia.nt Unb_!a.nce W4r_ing Syste_."n Out:I_tZt. Cha.Jtt
e o
Once the warnkng ]:._h_ ¢. is fllo.minated, the c_:'ew can. determine \vhether
there fs a :,x_].:[v.nc(:i.on within the quantS_ty r__nd in.d;.cating systems os" if there
is a t_'ue unbaia_ce condftion e>rJ.sdng by uue of the self-test poz'tion of the
system° By observing the response of each system in conjunction veil;t_ the
TEST switeh on pa.nel Z0, t].,ecrew c&n :¢eco[u_iz,e the malfunci:g.on or
determine if there :i.s a. true unLa].a.nce cxisdn.go
' ,I, 2, I0, Z Quantity Gor.uputfng anna

j )h_.dfcat:i_.g Syster.< Test,,
A test of_the ser,s:in¢._

.,y_tm_<_,.,
e>::clu_d_ngthe poknt senso:'s and pz'obes
can be i_x_])].e.rnent_ddurS.ng '!'k]IB.OST--O]q or -.OF1 ? pe_:iods,
W'_th the SE:]',_SOR select switch in PI\[N.'(A!ZY an.d the TEST s,.vftch fn
the '17_S'1' U]P posi.l.ion, t]_-_ test stimuli is appli.ed to th:_ prfrna_'y syst(.'_n.
tank se_'vo a_w, plif'e.cs a2t(:.,- a. 4_ 5.--k-].¢0 .'-_er:ond de]aye A% t:bis tin_e, the [:<:st
r;ti<nuli w].]]_ drive: the iuel and oxidi>se:c displays to at: increase reading at
....................................... ...... ........................ ................................... .,,_, .,=.............................................. ................... -.........
'-{ : : _:,!: .............................. ]3&sit? _-, • ........

_.,gdce 1;''.L...................
Nov ]q()6
:.......... '_:_,-:,_c Date . -. JPage
"-....... I............................................................................ Z.4--26
i
SMZA-03-SC01Z
SYSTEMS DATA
b%
different rates (oxidizer at a rate of approximately 3 digits per second• and
fuel at a rate of approximately l,,5 digits per second}, resulting in an
1 unbalance and indicated on d_e unbalance display as an INC (clockwise

)
rotation)o TLM would receive an increase in propellant quantity fro_ the
t : primary system simultaneously.
t Placing the TEST switch in the TEST DOWN positioa, and after a
i 4.5d:l.0-second delay, will provide test stimuli to the tank servo amplifiers
which will drive the fuel and oxidizer displays to a decrease reading,
returning the crew displays close to the reading displayed prior to t

4
t
TEST UP_ simultaneously TLM would receive a decrease in propellant i
|:. >,,:,s_
[7"_
quantity. If the TEST switch was again placed to TEST DOWN, after a
'i t". I 4.5->i. 0-second delay, the fuel and oxidizer crew display readouts wou!.d
,: iZd
.I drive to a decrease reading at different rates resulting in an unbalance
J and indicated on the unbalance display as a DEC (counterclockwise rotation).
;[] TLM would receive a decrease in propellant quantity si_r:.altaneously. To
return to the reading disp!ayed prior to the second TEST EOWN, place the
.4
TEST s\vitck to TEST UP and after a 4o 5±lo0-second delay, the crew dis-
:t
plays would return close to the original displayed readings, simuita>,eously
TLM receives _n increase in propellant quantity,
il
To test the auxiliary system, place the SENSOR select switch to
AUXILIARY and utilize the TEST switch up and down positions. There is no
] ..
- 1 time delay involved with the a_xiliary systet_o. '
<I The _4UTO position removes the electrical test stimuli inputs°
Z4. Z.10.3 Propellant Utilization Valve°
1
I ['3
i
If an unbalance condition exists, the crew wi]l use the propellant
utilization vaIve to retur_ the propellants to a balanced condition. The
{ propel!ant utilization valve housing contains two sliding gate valves within
:! r? the housing° One of the sliding gate valves is the primary and the remain.-
ing is the secondary (figure Z.4-7).
.!
Stops a.re provided within the valve housing for the full increase or
decrease positions of the primary and secondary sliding gate valves.
! @!J
The secondary propellant utilization valve has twice the travel of the
.,I
primary pro]?ellant utilization valve to compensate for pr-knar F prope]!ant
utilization valve failure in any position,, The secondary valve is selected
i by the VALVE switch and is controlled by the OXIDIZER FLOW switch 5n
J
{ the same manner as the primary.
i :J
' !iJ The propellant utilization valve controls are on panel Z0. The VALVE
switch selects the primary or secondary propellant utilization valve.
.-.
Normal position of the VALV._ switch is PRIMARY. The OXI]9IZE;R ELOW

switch is utilized to position the primary or secondary propella:nt utilization
lil;
SERVICE PROI_U£,SION SYSTEb]
tq Mis sS.o_, Basic Date l'?," .,,_._

>ZZ,,:,,A, .c,_Zo,L.:..., (_.im'.-_ge
' Date,, Page ..... Z : ..................
4,.-Z7
........ :................. -........................ -,_ ......................................................... ."--_ ................................ :_'!""!_::='_-°-°:-"_!:i ........ __ ............ /"-_":__"'_- ....... ".......... :!:!:...... 111!7":................ :-
SMZA-03-SC0 IZ F
APOLLO OPEYtATIONS I-hANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
sliding gate valve. When the OXIDIZ/E}7< FLOW switch 5s in NORMAL, the
sliding gate vah, eis in the uominal flow position and the upper and lower
OXID Flow position indicator is gray. When the OXI])IZE]_< FLOW switch is
1)].aced to the INCi]DEA.SE position, the sliding gate valve is in the increase
flow position and the upper OXI]D flow position indicator is striped. When
the OXIDiZEP.,FLOW sv,dtch is placed to IT)EC;RI_ASE position, the sliding
<-
gate valve is in the decrease flow position, but does not block the oxidizer
flow completely and the lower OXiD flow indicator is striped,
if,!
Z.4. Z. I0.4 ]Engine THRUST ON-OFF Control.
] ]Figure Z. 4-I illustrates the THl%UST ON--OFF J.og,..in the guidance

and navigation del_:a V ___.ode, the stabilization control, system delta V n_ode
i!
and the _]aanual direct mode.
The guidance and navigation. J.s the primary delta V rvmde which pro-
\ddes the most accurate trajectory corrections. The G&NAV mode of
operation will require G_eN gate 2 to be completely enabled. Its required
inputs will be an ullage maneuver input which could be supplied by the SPS
abort:logic or the direct ullage pushbutton or b F translation control 1 or 2
placed to the +X_ which would satisfy the O1< gate 3 function and the hold:_ng
input after the G&N AND _'_ 2 is enabled which is processed, through N-_\I'.ID
gates 1 and Z, with the G&,_N AV mode selected from the SCS cont;:o! panel
and the pulse train converter oatput of logic one connrr_an.ded from the C_AN
computer by the crew. These inputs \rill enab._e _'XND gate ?-and provide the
logic one input to inverter 3 which disab].e.s AND ga_;e 6_ Inverter 4 v.'lil
provide a logic one s_gnal to the solenoid drivers that: provide th_ g_,'u,_md
<]
for the two sets of o°PS relays. ']The two sets of SPS relays provide power
to the following:
a. The four solenoid control valves, which allow gaseous nitrogen
•! pressure to be directed to four aetuato.rs thai• position eight of the ball

vah, es in the injector valve asse_cably of the engine. This is due to INJEC.-
TOR PRE VALVE A and ]-3being enabled.
b. The quantity sensing and indicating system and the propellant
utilization valve.
{ c. The systerns A and B helium pressurizing valves.
:! d. When the output of the pulse converter is a logic zero, G&N AND
gate Z is disabled, which terminates a G&.N AV maneuver and removes
ground from the two sets of SPS relays. (Manual backup of the THRUST
CONT!<OL switch to OFF, )
The backup delta V mode, is the stabilization control system delta V

mode which has limitations and restrictions that require individual con-
sideration. The SCS tar mode of operation will require enabling SCS AND
gate 1 to initiate thrusting of the engine. SCS AND gate 1 has three enabling
inputs: the input from <)K gate 1 indicating _ Y.V mode is selected; the
output from the DECA indicating a value greater than ze;'o on the AV
REMAINING d_splay; and the input from th( _- THR.UST ON pushbutton light
indicator af'_er it _s processed through NANJJv-_ g_tes 3 and 4. The one logie
i
output from S()S AND gate 1 is in.vetted by INVEI<TE}I Z to a zero logic
which disables A.['_D gate 6 and is inverted by INVEK'I'EK 4 to a logic one,
1i<j SMZA-03-SC01Z
APOLLO OPERA.TIOIqS HANDBOOIi
SY STE].\4S ]DATA
.i and enables the solenoid drivers that provide ground to the two sets of
:.<_.
SPS relays. The two sets of SPS relays provide power to the same functions'
as in the G&N AV rhode.
a. When the output of the DECA AV REMAINING counter reaches zero
velocity, SCS AND gate 1 is disabled. 7'he logic output from AND g{_.te 1
goes to zero and INVERTER Z goes to a one logic output which enables A.N_
ga._e 6 to a one logic output and the sigl_al is inverted by INVERTER 4 to a
zero logic output, and the solenoid drifters remove ground from the two set[;
:::
<{ of SPS relays te-,'minating thrust. (Man.ual backup of the THR.UST CONTROL.,r ......
:I , ii:
switch to OFF. ) _ I
[
The DIRECT operating mode bypasses a!! electronics. The DIRECT L-_....
ON position of the THRUST COIqTF<O!, switch provides power to the !-wo

sets of SPS relays, the same as in the G&N /$V re.ode of SCS AV mode.
f{9
Thrust would be, terminated by placing the T}-IRUS'r CONT}<OL sv:itch
I
hi! in the OF_" position.
2
The SPS thrust control logic provides.illumination of the talk-.back
D light
.AND
in
gate
the THRUST
4 must be
ON
enabled.
switch.
I[ has
To il.].ur,ainate
two inputs
the
which
light
are
in
G&N
a G&N
A\r
fit r mode,
mode
selected and the presence of a logic one output from the pulse train con-
verter. With A.ND gate 4: enab].ed, OR gate Z wi].l trigger the lamp driver
and illuminate the THRUST ON light. To illuminate the light in the SCS ,2_\_
mode AND _a{-e 3 must be enabled, it will also satisfy OR gate Z .a.:-)d .
trigger the larnp driver. The SPS thrust control logic 5s interlocked so that
U AND gates
T}IRUST
3 and
ON switch
4 will never
ini_ibited
be enabled
to ;he pulbe
simultaneously
[:!:aJn c-o:_rel'trt;_.
because
T]-ie:re[o_e,
of the
tl_e
THRUST ON light will be il].uminated at all tirnes when the thrust is on for
nornqal operation. If the direct function is used to initiate thrusting, it will
bypass all electronics and not illuminate the TI-t.RUST ON light.
The output from the SPS thrust con.trol logic performs a. function
other than energize the fuel and oxidizer solenoid valves. It provides the
logic switch.es required to reconfigure the SCS relays for proper thrust
g
vector control. The thrust control switch provides both inputs to OR gate 4
7
I
if both de buses are operational. Either dc bus will enable or< gate 5 to
provide the upper input to INHIBIT AND gate i. A.ND gate 5 provides the
controlling input to the llNI-iIBl'rAND gate I. When the solenoid drivers are
]
not energized and the thrust control switch is in )qO]_.NiAh., both inputs to
AND gate 5 are true. The true input will _naintain a logic false output from
the INHIBIT AND gate 1 because of the inversion on _be input of the gate.
When either SPS relay set is activated by a soleuoid driver or by gi_e ground
contacts of the DII%ECT O]X_ switch, AND gate 5 will be disabled by lhe
ground or false input. The input will be inverted by the INHIBIT AND gate l
input to enable an output to the time delay. The time delay is required to
permit thrust buildup from the SPS engine before the ullage maneuver is
• : (I
terminated; however, the pitch and ,_aw attitude error inputs are i_nserted
into the TVC electronics immediately. This action assures positive g forces
SisR!_I_iu PROPULSION SYSTEM
( ff _ • 2.. 4--29
i;
SMZA -03..--SC 01Z
APOLLO OPERATIONS _LANDBOOK
r_
SYSTEMS DATA
( throughout thrust initiation of the SPS engine and gimbaling control of the
SPS engine for the entire thrust buildup, The time delay is also active
after INHi]31T AND gate 1 is disabled by enabling AND gate 5. AND gate 5
is enabled when both sets of SPS relays are de-energized, The time delay
is active for both outputs when the signal is removed to permit continued
SPS engine gimbal control, while the residual thrusC is present and inhibits
RCS operation in pitcl z and yaw until residual thrust is reduced. This
reduces the tumbling induced at thrust termination° The time delay is
approximately one second for application and removal of the engine ignition
signal.
2,4.3 pERFOR2vIANC_Z AND DI_SIGN DATA,

i::i
2?
/!i
'_
2; _ _ 3 1 Design Da:ca.
ii The follo,xdng list contains specific data for the components in the
SPS:
HELIUM TANKS (Z) 4000:k50 psia fill pressure, 4400 n_aximum

operating pressure 70°:_:I0°F, capacity
t 19.4 cubic feet, inside diameter 40 in. and
3(
!: a wa].l thickness of 0.46 in.
i REGULATOR UNITS (Z) Working

secondary
regulator
!9].=k4 psig,
-.Primary
p_imary
186m4
].ockup
psig,
ZOO
psig, secondary lockvp Z05 psig. Norma].ly
locked by worldng regula.tor; pril-mary
18].J:4:psig, secondary i91:_4 psig, primary
loekup 195 psig, secondary lockup Z05 psig0
i.
PRESSURE T_P_ANS- Fuel and oxidizer underpressure setting
:! DUOERS (Z) (SPS PRI!;SS !ight, panel. ].1) 160 psia.

i Fuel and oxidizer overpressure setting
ULLAG]E PRF2 SSU I<_
" " c_
)
(REG ULATED HIE I7.UM) (SPS PRESS l_.e, ht, - panel 1]) Z00 psia.
.j PROPE LLANT U TI LiZATION Increase position - 46. 65 ibs/second
.{
VALVE CONTROL (Z) Normal position - 45. Z7 ibs/second at

70°F and 168±4 psig
u::
i
} Decrease position - 43, 87 ].bs/second

i
i
]Response ti_m.e -- Normal to increase or

vice-versa, or normal to decrease or
vice-versa is 3 to 4 seconds
QUANTITY SENSING ±0. 35% of full tank plus ±0. 35% of propellant
S'_ _,rEM ACCURACY remaining primary system ±0.35% of full
tank p]us ±0. 35_/,_ of propellant remaining
plus Z. 3% of storage tank quantity remaining,
auxi].i,_ ry system_
SERVICE PROFULSION SYST]E1Vi
Z.4-30
?;',i_.'.:-o!_ ................... Basic Date IZ Hov l_!,)2L_ Change ]Date ................... Page
:i
SMZA.-03-SC012
A PO LI.,O OPE]<ATtO]qS i-D\ I'aDB OOK
['q SYSTEMS DATA

<
,i
'd
HELIUM RELIEF VALVE (2) Diaphragm ruptures at ZZ0m7 psig
Filter - I0 microns norm.a], 25 microns
absolute
3̧ Relief valve relieves at Z32m8 psig

i: {
liel.ief valve reseats at ZlZ psig minimum
[] Flow capacity 3 Ibs/second rnininnum at 60 ;F

and 250 psig
:::. 9 Bleed device closes at ambieni: to 100 psi
and is manually reset open
! OXi]DiZER STORAGE AND Total tank capacity 30, 600 lbs, usable
SUMP TANK ZT, 333 lbs. Each tank has a. volume of 175
cubic ft.
Fi].l pressure ii0 psia. Ullage after filling

Z.4. cubic ft in storage and 8.0 cubic ft in
sump tank. Ullage after pressurized to ]75

:q
psia, 6.8 cubic it in storage and 5.0 cubic

ft in sunup tank. Inside diarneter 5] in.,
length 165.4 in., and will elongate to 0. i25

in. when pressurized to 240 psi and IZ0°]J"
i for 336 hours. Wail thickness 0. 060 in. in
_ I:if continuous areas, 0. 069 in. weld buildup

areas and 0. 031 in. on domes. Fill. tolerance
? of i/4 of i% of full tank plus i/4°/0 of pro-
peltant rernaining.
'i FUEL STORAGE AND Total tank capacity 15,300 ibs, usable
ii r_- _ SUMP TANK 13, 677 ibs° Each tank has a volume of
I <i 139° 7 cubic ft.
a
Fill pressure 90 psia. Ullage after filling
i r? 1.8 cubic ft in storage and 5.8 cubic ft in
sump tank. Ullage after pressurized to
175 psia, 6 cubic ft in storage and 3.0 cubic
7:11 ft in sump tank. Inside dianaeter 45 in. ,
length ]66.8 in. , and will elongate to 0. IZ5
in. when pressurized to Z40 psi and IZ0°F

'f for 336 hours. Wall thickness 0. 053 in. Jn
;i continuous areas, 0. 061 in. in weld buildup
areas, and 0.03] in. on domes. Fill
tolerance of i/4 of I% full tank plus ]/40/0 .

'!l
of propellant remaining.
d
?!
SERVICE PROPULSION SYSTEM

:!
• L* _ 1
'l)i h4ission Basic Date 12 Nov ]966 Cha_zgo E.at.. Pag e _ 2a.:_%:_: -.2°a............
4
SM.ZA-03-SC01Z
AFOLLO O_PERATIONS IqANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
NOMINAL PROPELLANT 175-_.4 psia
TANK WORIiING PRESSURE
k!
500 microns _bsoJ.u_e
_!!il INTERFACE FLANGE
FIL, TEII
GASEOUS bP_"
T !tOGE N Storage vessel presst_re 2500_50 psi at 68°F,
pROPELLANT VALVE Zg00 psi at 130°F. Suppo_lt 36 valve
CONTROL SYSTEMS (Z) actuations.

h
;i
[
l_egu].ator, single stag_ 130_7 psi at all
flow t;p to 0. 035 !bs/second.
]
!45 psi maxirntnv_ ]ockup pressure.
i i_
Relief valve - relieves at 350_i0 psi,
reseats at not less than
250 psi
{ P_all valves ]. and 4 dry opening travel tinge
of 0.6 (+0. Z, -. 0.05) second
Bail vaJves Z arid 3 dry opening travel tithe
of 0. 3Z51:0. 1 second,
Ball valves ] and 4 _ry closing travel drne

of 0. 37510.05 second
Bal]. valves Z and 3 dry closing trawzl time
.{ of 0. 575_c0. ] second
ENGINE 500-second service lift on. S/C 014
Capable of 36 restarts
Expansion ratio, 6 to 1 at ablative chamber

exit area, 6Z. 5 to 1 at nozzle extension exit
area.
Cooling charnber_ ablation and filn%

] extension, radiation
Injector _ype, baffled regeneratively, cooled_
unlike i_npingen%ent
Oxidizer lead, 8 deg_
Length, 15Z. gZ inches
SEIIVICE ]:)ROPULSIOI\)SYSTEM
:,_ • t r: [OV. IZ Nov 1966 ,-'_._,_ Date_ ................... Page Z 4_-32
...........
..................................
".................................................................
"'...........................
"................
.-{_<
...............
:C"".........
":......................
":....
_.........
A ili
] SMZ.A - 0 3 - SC0 1 2.
I APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
11 SYSTEMS DATA
' [i
:!
Nozzle extension exit diameter, 94.4 inches
<!
h_
We,_ght, approximately 650 Ibs
Ablative chamber throat temperature sensor_

illuminates SPS WALL T.F__MP HI caution and
warninglight on panel iI at 380°F, one
sensor per harness.
SPS ]Pc transducer, Pc disp!ayed on panel 3 ,<

iiilL
through L/V AOA., SPS Pc switch to L/V
F_ AOA, SPS lot indicator, green range on
indicator is 65 to IZ5%, norreal Pc 85 to
<i 125 psia.
]
G!M]3AL LIMITS About Z_Z axis ±7 (4-i/2, -0) deg with
additional 1 deg for snubbing yaw
] A boul, Y-Y
additional
axis
1 deg
-_:6(+1/2,
for snubbing
- 0) deg
pitch
with
I L_!_
b_
GIMI_AL
AND OVI£RC
MOTO]K
UP_EENT
UNDER Undercurrent
detected
or more
for
shall
(primary
a duration
interrupt
only) below 6 ar_peres
of 250s:50millisec,onds
the f].ow to the load
/I R._LAYS
in !ess than 160 milliseconds.
.]
I Overcurrent dependent upon ten_peratu_e

during start transient and steady state of
gimbal _notor on primary. Secondary con-.
trolled by 70-an_p circuit breaker.
ACTUATOR CLUTCHES Quiescent current of 60 (+i0, -5) _nill]an_p_:

(iviotors off, a Z46 ft-lb force required to
move engine equivalent to i. 53 g.)
ACTUATOR PRJESSURIZED 3. 5_i. 0 psi dry air at - ] 60 °F at vendor

S/C 012 and 014 SERVO 0.23 radians per second (13. 09 ° per second)
ACTUATOR DEFLECTION
RATE
• <
FLIGHT COMBUSTION 180 g:s pea]< to peal< for 70J:20 milliseconds
STABILITy MONITOi< 600 to 5000 cycles per second

%!
SYSTEM
2.4.3.2 Performance Data.

t
Refer to mission modular data boo]<, SID 66-1177.
Z.4.3.3 Power Consumption Data,
SERVICE PR.©]PULSt©N ooYo c,,-_:-

• _._M
Basic Date 12. l<rov ]966

........
Change Date Page Z. 4.*33
Mi s s lo:_
:,i
c.j
SMZA-03-','." _'CO_ lfi
;i APOLLO OPERATIONS H.ANDBOO]£
14.?
)i#
L
SYSTFMS DATA
Watts
No. of £ o-- _2
Subsystem and
Units AC DC
Control
Component
VALVE sw and OXIDIZER

Service propulsion
.... AC! 1 --_
FLOW sw (Ref. gauging
Propellant utilizadon
valve sys)
I62.6 16.8
VropeJlant utilization I
Gauging
GAUGING
C13(41
AC
SPS
_;w SEI,_SO.R
J
gauging system
s w
21.0 42.0
1-!e valve GI3(Z) INJECTOR
Injector prevalvcs
PREVALVE sw (2)
28.0 56.0
He PRESSUF/Z!NG sw (2)
lie solenoid valves
SPS relay
Feedline heaters SPS H}2ATER sw 26 ( See f:g- 33,0
ure 2.4-2
4 10.5 4Z. 0
Pilot valves (SCS) ECA dzivers {2)
Gimbal CB (6) Channel I

Gimba! actua%or
GIMBAL MOTOR Id].e
n]olors
pitch 450<:
sw (4) 900
yaw 450*
Boost
pitcL 51i*
i022
511 ':_
yaw
Thz _st OI",'
pitch 775*
1550
775*
yaw
lvla ximum
1800,._
pitch
3600
igo0* I
_aw
C}_arma] if
Idl e
pitch
;35** ] 670
y_W
13oost
pitch 67O
y a w ; 3 5 ;:_ '::
;35_::#
13 5:1_':' i
pitch 67O
_ 35'::;::
yaw
h4axim urn
pitch
Thrust ON 1 670
_35"* ]
ya\v
_:_With quiescent current
::_::_Without quiescent current
Ghanlml I
Above statemeats assume charmel I is the operating channe] and channel II is standby.
28-vde supply values,
operating wdues applicable to channel II when channel iI is commanded.
current draw values not a d_ rect function of an applied voltage.
SERVICi.2 r)ROPUI,SION SYSTEM
".',. i:: :: ion ................... Ba sic Date .,2._. r-/£'."v.-_2..62 ...... Change Date ............................. Page ._Z, 4.._2A ..............
SMZA ..-03-._0 •Z
Iki
APOLLO OPEt%ATIONS I-IANDJBOOtZ.
i_ ,{
¢ SY STI£ IriS DATA
/i
2. 4. 3.4 SPS Electrical Power Distribution.

i7
See figure Z. 4-11 for electrical power distribution.
2.4.4 OPERATION LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS.
The operational limitations and restr/ictions of the SPS are as

follows:
a. Propellant quantity gauging subsystem is operational only during _,_,_
engine firing. A 4. 5-second firing period is required before propellant '-i.
}:
quantity information i_, Updated, when SENSOR switch is in the NORhd or _.
PI<I position. Delay is buil.t--_n to allow propellants to settle and stabilize _.
before updating the displays.
b. A one-second time delay between actuation of GIMBAL MOTOR
switches (MDC...3) is requir.ed, as simultaneous actuation may result in an
excessive power drain°
c. Engine design minimum impu].se control limit is 0. 4 second;
however, mission minimum impulse may be longer.
d. Due to adversive temperature effects, engine gimbal drive motors
should not be continuously energized for periods in excess of 12 minutes.
e. Single bank mode of operatio_ by the bSpropellant valve assembly
will result in a 3 percent reduction in thrust.
Z.4.5 TELEMETRY MEASU/<i£ME NTS.
The following subsequent ]_st is of all.SPS telemetry da.ta mc,nitored

by _.light controllers and grom%d support persor, nei.
SEP_VIGE PROPULSION SYSTEM

i
4-35
{ i'!
i
•SYSTEMS DATA
,!i
7
;i
;{
_u_,
L
q
!/
i
:4
[£
>7
7_
!
,!
•b.'
•<i
f_
J:t
Ji
x_
::::][}
3 lleli_n isolation vOl.e evenl

m_,ca;on o:_ _nergized v.he_
.al_e_ a,e ,_ cse_ _ition
SM-2A-713 D
Figure Z.4-11. SPS Eiectrical Power Distribution Diagram_
_r-RVIGJ'_ PROPULSION SYSTEM
M i s ;: _.o n ...................... Basi.c m_-_, [Z No': !966 _h;_ncse Date ................... Pave Z.4-36
';f.L3 uss:_
-!i
_,[e&surc- I v_bn nne / l{it

_]cnt Sign}:[
Co nditionc r Code <: !_ a t c :',: ": Operating R.anzc
%9 NJ c_s ttr el_._ent Number I !mange
Crew I)isplay ! Figure I
SZSAR3 !1A66 I{2 PCM -I000±50 1)si4 and

2.4-i t{eiium 'fauk Supply Pressure SP000]P I+9 +5K psia
Panel 2o ([ec rCiLS(t \v]th
firings
° i SP0006P [ +0 +300 psia $28AR6 11 :\70 HZ PCM 170 to 195 psia
Panels 20 & il 2.4-I l_egulated Helium Pressure to
Fuel Tank
S28AR5 11 A68" I-IZ PCM 170 to 195 psia

SP0003P +0 +300 psia
Panels 20 & ii 2.4-i Regulated Helium Pressure to
,] i
Oxidizer Tank
2.4-1 Quantity Sensing System

i Panels 20 & !i
and Sensor Select Switch in Normal
i I IOA94 H1 PCM
SP0658Q ::+0 +8K !bs
2.4-6 Primary Fuel Sump 2
+8K ibs I 10A92 H1 PCNi >
Primary Fuel Storage 1 SP0657Q i +0 l-f1 PCM _0
}:[!_ @ i Primary Oxidizer Sump 2 SP0656Q i +0
+I6K ibs
IOA88 H! PCM o
+I6K ibs
Primary Oxidizer Storage ! sP0655Q i+0 F
Sensor Select S_<itch in Primary i 10AD0
+:7 _ ]0A94 HI PCM
Primary Fuel Sump Z sP0_5_ I+o+8K ibs
HI PCM Variable
O
+SK lbs I 10ADZ
SP0657Q }+0
Primary Fuel Storage !
+I6K lbs • i0AD0 H1 PCb4 O 0_
Primary Oxidizer Sump SP0656Q i +0
+I6K Ibs IOA88 PIi PCM
Primary Oxidizer Storage 1 SP0655Q i+0
Sensor Select Switch in Auxiliary
+SK lbs 10A94 Hi PCM
Primary Fuel Sunlp Z SI-'06580 I +0
+I6K ibs 10AD0 H! PCM o
7!!i Primary Oxidizer Surer 2
SP0656Q
SP0657Q
I +0
I+_ +8i< Ibs ! 0A'_2 I{1 PCM
!i o Auxiliary Fuel
SP0855Q !+; +I6K ibs 10A88 }-{i PCM
Auxiliary Oxidizer
SPu054T +0 _Z00°F
i 2.4_! "Fernperature ! Oxidizer Distri-
m >
:! (D
bution Line
+200°F
z E
Z. 4-! SP0055T +0 >
Temperature 2 Oxidizer Distri-
bution Line variable
2.4-1 Temperature i Fuel Distribution SP00577 +0 +200 °F m
! m
:i o Li n e I
1 Z.4-I Ternper__ture Z Fuel Distribution SP0058T -'-0 +200 °F o
o
I Line
PCM 135 to 195 psia

$28AR8 IIA77
2.4-1 Fuel Inlet Pressure to Fuel Valve SP0010P +0 +300 psia
$2 S :\R7 !IA76 }{2 PCM 135 to 195 psia
i Panel Z0 2. 4- 1 Oxidizer Inlet Pressure to Oxidizer SP0009P +0 +300 psia
Pane[ 20 I
Valve
$28AR9 !ZAI ! H 1 PCM 65 to 125 psia
2.4-i Chamber Pressure SP0061P +0 +150 psia
Panel 3 IIAI09 H1 FQ Variable
2.4-i SP0060T
injector Temperature -'0 +200°F H1 PCM 2500±50 psia and
SP0600P $28AR41 IOA78
I Panel Z0 2.4-i Primary (:aseous Nitrogen Tank decrease with
+0 +5000 psia
Supply Pressure firings
ii r_'
SZSAR42 ilAIZ5 HI PCM 2500=50 psia and
:i o Panel 20 SP060] P
2.4-I Secondary Gaseous Nitrogen Tank +0 +5000 psia decrease with
t
Suppiy Pressure fi ri ng s
1
li; l r_ail Valve Position ! SPOOZZI-[ 1+0 +90 deg
IIAi03 H1 PCNI Open or cbsed
I Panel 20 I 2.4-i i I.'%105 HI PCM Open or_ closed

2.4-]. !;all Valve Position 2 SP0023H -k0 +90 deg
Panel 20 IIAI]0 PCM Ope:; o.r cbsed
SP0024_{ i:O +90 ,_leg
4: ! { Panel 20 Bali Va]ve Position 3
}i 1 I
t
1
! I
K _[p;tsurc'-
t i
t nlci,t :5ipna! 1Ch;t m_e] 1 ];it
[{atc¢ (>pc r ati "_i I_.,{n gc

5_ (Londi: h)ne r Cod c;:: I
< rc,.k !)isT)[_ ,I .It'. !urc
i!,\ii] HI Of>on ,_r c]¢_.,-;c({

Hb_0(,_25i! -0 '90 dog
15 [',_., V;t!ve _>oslt1'.)n %q} rlabic
Si:G04gT :<) t2(;,')" F
[',.:_!_>cr _turc C\i<h/,,'" ['_n_tI:c Foed
i | _A:_v
l'_,!_crat_Ire Fuel Engine Feed Line 51>0048T _0 +2O0°F

}-t(3 to t lZO"N
°'H_cl _(] I 7 4- I Variable

SP004%T _0 +200 °F
2.4-1 FemFeratur e l,h-gine Valve [%OdV Nl PCM IHuminat'<s C& W
SP00Z{)T +0 +500_F Collins
_ ','.:,c l l 2.4-1 FcP.uper_ture Con_oustion _]han_ber li_/hL ;it 5SO°F
,'L28 - ! A5
Outer Skin i
HI PCM Variable
SZ8AR60
SP00BOT 1-260 "Z500_F
2. -_-1 Tempere._ure Noznle Oiler Sl-in 1 Variable
%9 iOA68 N 1 FO
im_tch ActuaZor Case Tenqpera_ure Variab£e
SPZ055T I_0 +Z00°F flail9 HI FQ
Yaw Actuator Case TemFerature
5iE-09 El Eve nt
CH43ZOX
SPS So[ _nOid Drlver Out ]
5 IE- i'3 E! PCME
SPZ054T I-0 +Z00°F
C_ SPS Solenoid Driver Out Z I
Yaw Pc sition Feedback
CI{43Z]X
C}II03 z I{ _-8. 5 +8.5 vdc 5!A? • N 1 PCM
Variable _0
PGM
[_itc] Position Feedback
511<3 Hi
0
CH0034 H Ii.6 +6 vdc
:::AnaloL measurement,_ d[gitall.y coded into 8 bit words 0

.,knalog measurc;ncnts - 0 tC _ vdc
0 o-,
FQ - Flight _uaiif!cation ;ncasurernents
}{] - High o_t rate

c- ©
[-;Z . I[iKh and low bit race
El . Hizh bit ra.'.e
o
Channel code example: iOA68
_J TO
Significant number - ]
_2
l q [;] 0
i >
}lOW :nan}' zeros "_ i sample
7
luulnber is amount of 0 per
alter nuost :;iKni/icant i i
U [ sa:np[es per second. _ second Z
i u
I Analog - A
Even_ - E
Channel Code - [_S o
: i
9_
{D
1
t
SMZA--03-SC012
SYSTEMS DATA
:! SECTION Z
SUBSECTION Z. 5
REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM (RCS)
Z. 5.1 INTRODUCTION.
¢
The Rpollo command service module consists of two separate

i
reaction control, systems, completely independent, designated S/M RCS
and C/I\_ _CS. The S/M RCS is utilized to control S/C rotation in all
three a>:cs, in addition to any n_inor _ranslaiion requirements including
S-IVB separation, S._PS ullage, and C/_v_-S/}_i separation maneuvers. The

C/}_4 RCS is utilized to control C/5_ rotation in all three axes after
C/M-S/Ivl separation and during entry maneuvers. The C/NI RCS does mo_
! _'.[i
have translation capabilities.
Both the S/M and C/M RCS are contro]ied either automatically or
manually from the command module. Physical location of the IICS engines
!] I,;,C_ is shown in figure 2. 5-i, Engine firing sequence fer specific rr:aneuvers
and individual engine circuit breal<cr power control are shown in figure
t _? T-3 2.5-2.
2,5. Z S/M ]3.CS FUNCTiCbNA], D]ESCRTPT](7)N,
_ i__
The S/M RCS consists of four individual, functionally identical
packages, located 90 degrees apart &round the forward portion (+X-axis)

,! of the S/IvI periphery and offse_ froi-n the S/C Y- and Z-axes by 7 degrees
15 minutes, Each package co_)f_g_ration, called a quad, is such that the
reaction engines are mounted on the outer surface of the pane] and the
remaining components are inside. Propellant distribution lines are routed
7i , through the panel skin to facilitate propellant transfer to the reacti.on engine
}? combustion
approximately
chambers.
I0 degrees
The engine
away from
combustion
the panel
chambers
structure
are
to
canted
reduce the
:1 effects of exhaust gas on the service module skin. The two roll engines on
each quad are offse_:-mounted to accommodate plumbing in the engine
:i
:] mounting structure.
Each RCS package incorporates a pressure-fed, positive-expulsion,
pulse-modulated, bipropellant system i:o produce the reaction thrust

Jil required to perform the various S/M RCS control functions. Acceptable
package operating temperature is maintained by internally rneunted,

]
:I E_ thermostatically controlled electric heaters. The S/M RCS propeilants
:t )ii.
_1 !ii consist of nitrogen tetroxide (NzO4), used as the oxidizer; mono.-
_nethylhydrazi.ne (MMI!) used as the fuel. .Pressurized he!_urn gas is the
propellant transferring agent.
q
:! I:_EACTION CONTROl_, SYSTEM
2. 5-.!
i
. _-_<_:z",.,,_.I._-:_<.1:)
_-_ "_ _'_"_>'_
I
0
,b_.L
,'_-4 2
0
0 %
r_ r-',
i "
1 24 g
_?' 0 ,G • "Z.
i O t
_"_ _'_ ';4
o < i4
.:_ Y..3 ] ,"
I b
OC, 0 C1
G
_4
,'D
f-
t e,.
"7
.<,i
f
L........ _.Li
4:
s _)._Iddr',h3 _r _A_o d ou_._uL_i SO k{ _AI / D - _Ai / S 'd
c ,TI
_£7 i
% g@_-d
,"4
_L
o
! 2 T
i:
i
o
c_
rd
Z 1 u_
<t O.
b._
L) L
_ 0 CQ
cob _
2 o
M
0"1
{_ 0
o
<
{D ,,
.2 i:_>
G} £
L_
"_ ii!
ii::i :
F
i2
L/-4 l'_ :::2..,.:;..--: _ _2:i; ::::::_ ............ -----

F
oMZA-0J-oC'a_Z iiii:
i(9(_ [4
'?iI
APOLLO OPEf[ATIONS HA?qDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
The reaction engines may be pulse-fired, producing short-thrust

]
impulses or continuously fired, producing a. steady-state thrust level. The
short-pulse firing permits attitude-hold modes of operation and extremely

accurate attitude alignment maneuvers during navigational sightings.
GSM attitude control is norrnally maintained by utilizing the applicable
pi.tch, yaw, and roll engines on all four quads. However, in the event of a
! malfunction, complete attitude control can be maintained with only two
!
adjacent quads operating. This two-quad capability does not include the
execution of translation and ullage ma.neuvers.
1 A functional f!ow diagram of one S/M RGS quad is shov, n in
figure2.5-3. The h.elimr_s£oragevesselsuppliespressure to two solenoid-

:::i!!
operated helium, isolation valves that a_.e normally open throughout the
mission. This allows heliun'J, pres,._:v._"e to the pressure regulators down-
;I
stream of each helium iso]atiov va.].vc re_au('ul , the hieh--pressure helium
3
to a desired working pressure.
g
] Regulated helium pressure is directed through a series parallel
combination of four independent check valves, The check valves permit
!i
;]
helium pressure to the fuel and oxidizer tarJ_:s and prevent reverse flov, of
2g
propellant vapors or liquid. A pressure-relief valve is _nsta!Ied in the
pressure lines between the check valves and p.vopellani; tanks to protect the
:(t prol;ellant tanks from any excessive pressure _ncrease.
t_Ieli-am entering the propeila_?2 tanks creates a i:ressure buildup

•
a.ro,a._nd the p._-ope!!ar,t po_.it,ve _._im_lsic_n biadderg forc:i_g the prc, peilants to
be expelled into the propellant distribution lines. V'ropellants then flow
through the normally open propellant isolation valves.

:it
't
Oxidizer and fuel is distributed to the eight fuel and oxidizer injector
valves by a paraliel feed system. The fuel valve on each engine opens
Z _rq.lliseconds prior to the oxidizer valve to obtainproper engine operation.

:1
_4 Each valve asserr:bly contains orifices which meter the propellant flow to
obtain a nominal Z:l oxidizer/fuel ratio by weight, The oxidizer and fuel
i::i i_ impinge, atomize, and ignition due to the hypergolic propellants, The
: !ii injector valves are controlled automatically by the G&N system or the SCS,
Manual override direct control is provided for rotational maneuvers and
d
direct ullage only, The injector valves are sp_ing-loaded closed. This
! • system configuration maintains propellants under constant pressure ag !:he
....: engine injector valves providing rapid consistent response rates to thrust
ili:'_ on-off commands.
:::iil 2.5.3 S/M RGS MAJOR COMPONENT/SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION.

%ig
The S/M RGS i.s composed of four separate, individual packages;
each package contMning the foliowing five _a.jor s,_bsystems:
]
e, Pressurization
"Prop el]ant
:i) o Rocket engine
]RG A C T ?(
0 N G 0 N'2I<0 L S 'gST ]'<
M
i
! _,, ,_ .,_-_ ...... Z.5-4

! Mission ............... Basic Date ...... fro,, , ,6o Gba'a_e Date ...................... P_g_-_
,¢
]
• i
SMZA-03-SC01Z
SYSTEMS DATA
. _)i+!
:i ii!i!/_
D- SR5068T- IOA JgO

C- SR5067_- _0 _,98
x:< +
|:-SR5066T-lOA62
QUAD A
From: Rofotionol
ha_ :I controllers
i++++.+u
fo_ f.onual conhol
:<-q¢
(_'P 8 PLACES)
:Z:i_i
,i
!?)
::::_
ELECTR:C&L
1HERMO /STRIP H_AIER
ili _4_.
_-',
if!!
_:!i
ii /
olo :o \
_i
S/M RCS "_',OcSINi !_ _ SWITCI{
• NO. I
LEOEND
L-_J INJECTOR IN
ASSEMN.y
[]
str,_/ iil //_
SM-2_-667H
Figure Z. 5-3. S/M. RCS ]Punctional ]Flow Diagra_n (Quad A)
REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM
Mission Basic Date IZ Nov 1966 Chan e ])ate ........ Page Z. 5-5/2. 5-6
:,!!
7
i,
i:
i:
i:
!!!:
i
i
r-;q
I<
•i i:i_!i!
"i
('} iii:_i
;_ I¸
L.:._
SM
:i i.i _
\_
_ To: RCS INDIC.XTOR/
SvAlch S/lCu_ (MDC-I 2)
NEG
_US ]
:i!t _ & TLM
I]
(O[::!N) ISOLATION
VAI.VE
1 A
I HELIUM 2 ON
:i F:!
_'_ HEI IUM INDICATOR
:I
j_%, P_O_ELLANT
I _
]
L o_'r.........
}._2,._j PROPEI.o&NT INDIC/,.TOR
_ i5:I
:i
_ t :e,n
?
:. ?
:ii/i i
i
:+ f
., >,
i
ii! I
4
:'_ PITCH CHANNt'L

:t "" " R
I
'zSA_r[ _ _ ,S ! + : 5] :i, JE_i_E CONTROLLE_ ...... SWITCII PANEL 8 _. r-" ......... "_
......................... l _ _"..... _ _- POTATION CO 4TRCLS L
] i];; % r ...... 1 ', __T _ i _c_ I+---_:,_N_,._ONCO,_+=O,.S I
21_'_ ! pCSLATC_- l l l r'"-"'J i , ' !

'__' '_"_G P.uJ,.v' ! I l ILMI l l ECA I<---O&N
: 4 _..-..--.J t J- h -- ' '_'," F --_ j

I ! i = _ s_ I t [ sos,.;Rou,,, L .................. o,__:L:S
1!I I .....T.... , , ._. l"q _A,-_ , I_ "F ..I ..... !.................. _.................. ---- CO,_S
:x,:,_ri t I I i I I I sl '0 .... CO'LS
L. bu_:,.m; r:_scc.,rr J I ANYABORT I i / | . i LF 'L_..4-'J" /

:_ .......................... I_ SIGNAL
r._ou, s_ I s, I --4-'d FI'-'_.-_..I
; _ ........ I PA_uPTo L-<-.._.,- .... t ...... i__..-....... _11.-
.... :r *'-<'t_._
] _rs" [ ............. ! _NPulF,o,',_ c_'-_ , , clg/,._ I c_ _'v-_ r"" COILS

t,,,o,_
J........ 't..........
b""_ s_c|d_ )'yL J Jm'S°N°_
c_.sM it _cs I, I, ,cs I -F4, t----t--' "'::-fo×l ---m
s,,<=cs
D,_c,
r ''|DLL!,Y _r ! SEPARATION CON'IP, OL | "IRA4SR!R |>}US I# I F "l't"
_TT"iF .;TZK'7--" ............ swiTcHes
PANEL 15 Box ) ' P._N_[ _ "-+-<'T t-+"-. I
' J '-"_"
rZ,-_',q s_.CSuL_AO_ . I F----4'-----, ;........_ -:_ --I- ........ -t--L:J --
a.,_._:s
,l/@_>.___.______.__
;i___J . ZI6}.12'_.=.'- B_yjET#6
DIRECT COILS 1.'_ "_I_.Z --_-J } $1 || -_
I SI
|P"-'q_l----- I __ COILS
DIRECT
_16K2 Z16KI D+Y JEI #5• _ K. " _ _._---A'
..........
t__ ....._............
1.............. _(0×L_f-_
................. , A--P
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'! 1, _'v', , I) BUiTO_,._k'-[:_ S_Cr_"_.,J I_

j
:j I t_ RCSCMD J I I .._
I I CU,D, j j s_,,,
J L : ..N--2_'3_-+
_ L,_..
I o'_'_J
! __ |.IS TOWER JEl EISONED AND TP_,NSt_TIOI
CON FROL RO fATED COUP: fER CLOC,KWISE
J TO G&N <-
CM SM TRANSFER 1 TO BOOSTER SHUTDOWN ,<..,

J L4 MNA PANEL 25 J 10 SCS P&Y INHIBIT <--
_"'_, . TO ADAPTER SEP AFTER 1.7 SEC

*,.,_N
_'___--___J ..................
/!
F_
l>q AN-'L E''EC
L
A MN A PANEL 25 L _._
J _AIN tt'L.,.._ CM PROP JEll" LOGIC oLO._G.IC--;.

" ....
F_ ABUS _.,_ --_CM SM --- I PANEL 8 _ OFF
1I R RCS TRANSFER
PANEL 16
":!l
CM
t .... _ N ORI'_,L
SM _---_
SCS DIRECT _,
j _,%li'4 _/_..
CONTROL
PANEL 25
MN A DIRECT RCS
PANEL 8
DIRECT RCS
TO SYS I, YI
TPANSEER M(
ABUS L_J .Z. F_T_ OFF
BUS "o--
/
- --_J_-- =
•
A
SCS DIRECT
!
a
CONTROL MN B MN B
¸¸..4 J .j DIRECT ULLAGE j---'r t bYJEl'#6
PANEL 25 _ RUSHBU'[EON j [ D4VJET #5
z
4
..:¢.,
SMZA-03-SC01Z
APOLJ[,O OPt;RATIONS HANDBOOK

!
SYSTEMS DATA
iI
Propellant quantity gauging
e Temperature control system
2.5.3. 1 Pressurization Subsystem.
:ii
The pressurization and propellant feed stores, regulates, and
distributes helium to the propellant £anl.s, and stores arid distributes
propellant to the engine assemblies (figure Z. 5-3). It consists of storage

] tanks, isolation valves, pressure regulators, and the lines and valves
necessary for filling, draining and distributing the fluids.
2.5.3,1.1 IIetium Supply Tank.
The total h,.gh-pressure helium supply is contained within a single _f!....

:i spherical storage tank, Initial_ fill pressure is 4150-2.50 psig at 70°F. The i::}:::
q limit working pressure is 5000 psig to accommodate pre, ssure transients _:::
during filling. Proof pressure is 6667 psig and the burs_ pressure is [_""
7500 psig.
Helium Isolation Valve.
/l
The helium isolation valves are a two-solenoid valves and are
mechanical]y latched open and spring-]oaded closed The helium isolation

valves are _ndividually controlled bytheir own he'lium switch on panel ]5.
:i The valves are normally open in respect to system pressure substantiating

the mechanical latching feature for power conservation purposes during the
mission- , in addit_o> to p_ ew_:_ing o-,,erh<-taling of the valve coils.
A position switch contained within each valve controls a position

indicator below each switch on panel 15. When the valve is open, the
position switch is open; and the indicator on panel 15 is grey (same color
as the panel) indicating the valve is in its normal posit:ion. Wh.en the valve
is closed, the position switch is closed; and the indicator on panel 15 is
1 diagonal lines indicating the valve is in its abnormal position. The valve
is closed in the event of a pressure regulator unit problem and during
ground servicing.
2.5.3.1.3 Pressure Regulator Assemblies.
I-Ielium pressure regulation is accomplished by _.:wo regulator

_:!i
i assemblies connected in parallel, with one assembly located downstream
of each heliurn isolation valve, leach assembly incorporates two (primar?
and secondary) separate regulators connected in series. The secondary
regulator 1-emains open as long as the primary regulator functions

properly. In the event of the primary regulator failing open, the secondary
regulator will maintain s]ight!y higher, but acceptable pressures,
2.5.3.1.4 Check Valve Assemblies.
Two check valve assemblies, one assembly located downstream of
each regula.to, _' assembl-Ez,,_errnlt helium flow in the downstrean_ direction

• jl
I
1
REACm!ON C()NTROE SYSTEM
1,,!i s s ion Basic Date- 12 Nov 1966.CV.an_e Date .......... Page 2.6-7
SMZA-03--SC01Z
APOLLO OPEP.ATIONS HAb_DBOO_

_ "c -"
[:::)i
i:i[_
i! SYSTEMS _A_A.
4
only. This prevents propellant and/or propellant vapor backfiow into the
i pressurization system if seepage or failure occurs in the propellant tank
bladders.
Pressure Relies Valves.

! z. 5.3. 1.5
I
The helium relief valve contains a burst diaphragm, filter, a bleed
device, and the relief valve. The burst diaphragm is instal!ed to provide
:I
a more positive seal against helium tha_<_ that of the actual relief valve.
I
i
The
diaphram
burst diaphragm
is of the
ruptures
nonfragmentationtype,
at a predetermined
but i_ tbe
Jressure.
event of any
The burst
fragmen-
tation, the filter filters out any fragmentation and prevents any particles
.i from flowing onto the relief valve, seat. The relief valve will relieve at: a
! pressure slightly higher than that of the burs': d[aphragm rupture pressure
_T
!
and relieve the excessive pressure overboard, p_:otecting i-he. fuel and L. ¸.
oxidizer tank. The relief valve will reseat at a predetermined p._'essure.

!
A pressure bleed device is incorporated between the burst diaphragm

and relief valve. The bleed valve vents the cavity] between the burst dia-
: ii
phragm and relief valve in the event of a_y leakage from the diaphragm,
d
or vents the cavity upon completion of performing a checkout of the relief
valve from the test port on the relief valve. The bleed device _s normally
L
J open and will close when the pressure increases up to a p:cedete_m, ned
q
] pressure. The bleed device automatically opens when the pressure
) decreases to the bleed valve opening pressffre.
!
!
: j
:_ 2.5.3.1.6 Distribution Plumbing.
i
Brazed joint tubi_g is used to distribute regulated helium in each
:i
RCS quad from the helium storage vessels to the propellant t_nks.
;i Z.5.3. Z Pr opel !ant Subsystem.
1
This subsystem consists of one oxidizer ta._:ik, one fuel tank, one
oxidizer and fuel isolation, valve, and associated distribution plmnbing.
'_, 2.5.3.2.1 Oxidizer Tank.
:i
The oxidizer supply is contained in a single titanium alloy hemi-
spherically domed cyclindrica! tank. The tank is cradle-mountedto the

: %
i RCS panel. The tank contains a diffuser tube assembly and a teflon blad-
der for positive expulsion of the oxidizer. The bladder is attached to the
diffuser tube at each end of the tank. The diffuser tube acts as the pro-
• _
t pellant outlet.
:] When the tank is pressurized, the heliu_n gas surrounds the entire
bladder, exerting a force which causes the bladder to collapse about the
propellant forcing the oxidizer into the diffuser tube assenqbly and out of
the tank outlet into the manifold, providing e)-.pulsion during zero g*s.
t
:{
Tank has a working pressure of Z48 psig; proof pressure of 331 psig.
REACTION CONT]}kOL SYSTEM

,i
; Mis;:ion Basic Date I Z Nov •_966 Change Dat_'_ Page ...... ;,,_n...............
Zo 5-g
{
f_
SM.ZA -03-,SC01Z
APOLLO OT_ER ATIONS IIANDt3OOK
i [i4 SYSTEMS DATA
2. 5,3. Z.Z Fuel Tank.
The fuel supply is contalned in a slngle tank that is similar in

material, construction, and operation to d_at of the oxidizer tank,
[iJ
2.5.3. Z.3 Propellant Isolation Shutoff Valve.
J:::::_ The isolation valves in the fuel and oxidizer lines are both controlled
4 by a single switch on panel 15. The valves are two--solenoid valves and ar'e
magnetically latch Opened and spring-loaded closed. The valves are
normally open _n respec_ _.o fluid flow. This, again, es'_ab]ishes a power
<: ili L:i e ons e r ration.
q, Each valve contains ,_position swiich which is in parallel to one

• ii
;1 position
When
indicator
the position
below l-he switch on panel 15 that controls
switch in each valve is open, tl_e indicator
both valves.
on panel 15
{
is grey (same color as the panel) indicating I,o.

the crew that the valves are
in the norma, l position. When the position switch in each valve or one valve
:t3
is closed, the. indicator on pa_ei ]5 is diagonal lines indicating to the crew
that tl_e valve or valves are closed. The valves are Closed in the event of
_iii a failure downstream of the valves, line rupture, runaway thruster, etc.
D 2,5.3,2.4 Distribution Plumbing.
t
.]
:]
Propellant distribution plu_nbing within each quad is functionally
!i:i
t
_,:,_
identical. Each quad contains separa!:e similar oxidizer and f_._e!plumbing
networks. Fropel]._'.,n_swithin their zespective networ_s are directed from
{
the supply tanks, through manifolds for distribuJ_ion to the four engines in
the cluster.
1
:i Z. 5.3, Z. 5 Propellant, In-Line F_iters.
i
I stream
In-line filters are
of the propellant
installed
shutoff
in the fuel and
va!ves and prior
oxidizer
to the
rnanlfolds
engine man_fold
down-
! contained
prevent any
within the engine
particles from
housing.
flowing
The
into the
in-line
engine
filters are
injector
_nstalled
valves and
to
engine injector.
: i!
2.5.3.3 Engine Assemblies.

2_
4
T.he service module reaction control system engines are radiation-
cooled, pressure ..fed, bipropel]ant thrust generators which can be
operated in either the pulse modulated or the steady state mode. (These
modes are defined as a firing of less than one-second duration and one-
second duration or n_ore, respectively. )
i!
J
Each engine consists of a fuel and oxidizer control valve which
N controls the flow of propellants by responding to electrical commands
i] (automatic or manual) generate£ by the guidance and navigation subsystem
)
and/or stabl!lzation and control subsystem or by the crew; and an injector
SMZA-.03-SC0 IZ
;i APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDI5OOI<
SYSTEMS DATA
i
4
head assembly, which dh'ects the flow of each propellant from the propel-
lant control valves to the combustion chamber \vl)erethe propellants
atonnize and ignite (hypergolic) to produce thrust.
2.5.3.3.1 Propellant Solenoid Injector Control Valves (Fuel and Oxidizer),

4
The propellant solenoid injector valves utilize two coaxially wound

: ::ili
coils: one for automatic and one for direct n_anua! operation. The auto-
matic coil is used when the thrust command originates from the jet
:/i!
! selection logic, which is the electronic circuitry that selects the required
automatic coils to be energized for a given "_aaneuver. The manual coils
<(,t
d¸ ,._ are used when the thrusf command originates at the rotatio'acontrol
(direct mode), direct ullage pushbutton, SPS abort, or the C/M S/M SEP
switch (figure Z. 5-3).
;!I Tb.e solenoi.d valves are spring-loaded closed and energized open,
The reaction d.me of the valves are illustrated in figures Z, 5-4 and Z, 5-5,
(_i:l
Figure Z,5-4 illustrates a thrusting duration of !5 seconds (steady

state), The electrical on signal is received within either the automatic
(normal) or manual (backup) coils of the engine injector valves, The
solenoid injector valves are energized open ai].owhlg fuel and oxidizer to
<" S]'EADY STATE _._

1O0-
',: -T-r-F- 3T1 .... ,......

Fi -F-7 H l.......
q--r'T-'rq "7
! 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 tl 1.2 13 14.
O.k,. _._ "" TA_L OFF
F|
.,. srAm ELECTRiCAl_
i:i:i_
' """ ELECTRICAL ON OFF
J
:4
Figure 2., 5-4, S/M RCS Steady-State Operation (Typical 15 Seconds)
Mission
ii
I:] Sh,iZA -0 3--SG0 1 2.
APOLLO OPEI<ATIO_'IS HAi'_DBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
i ii(_:!
THRUST LBS. FUEL
i _
80- VALVE
, l
l ' I
:I
!
40-
/i
l
I F_'.? VALVE
t
20- OX I DIZER F,_\///
FULL
:1
OF'EN
]
\.
50 60 7O
!i I;? TIM E-/V!i l.l_.lSECONDS
\ "ELECTR _CAt.'_'OX1DIZER
"ON" SIGNAL
i TO BOTH
VAI_VE IGNITION "OFF" SIGNAL VALVE
?_ Fh FULl. TO BOTI4 FULLY
VALVES
OPEN VALVES C!_OSED
U
Figure 2. 5-5. S/M RCS Engine MinhT_Urn Total ]Tnpulse (Typical)
flow through the injector into the con_bustion chamber. The propellants,
;_ Lil
being hypergo]ic, ignite, providing the start transient. The engine, as a
]!
result of propellant ignition, produces chan_])er pressure, gas velocity,
l
::I r'_] and thrust. At i5 seconds after t]_e receipt of the thrust-on signal, the
automatic or manual coils are de-energized and the injector valves
spring-load closed, floweret, due to the closing time and residual
:] propellant flow downstream of the injector valves into the combustion
gCi
:! chamber,
pletely
thrust
a].lowing the
output continues
chan_ber
until the propellants
pressure, gas velocity,
have
and
burned
thrust
com-
to decay
to 0 pounds, establishing die cutoff transient.
ii
::i provided
Figure g. 5-5
to the automatic
illustrates
coils
the minL_un_
of the injector valves
electrical signal
from the
that can
stabilization
be
control subsystem jet selection logic. The following describes the

? I?!i sequence of operation and reasons why.
_, [2i
F
RE =,_'YlON COIqTROE SYSTEM
Basic ;9ate 12 Nov !966 Chan<_e Date .................. :Pa Z e 2,5-ti
}
>[
M,..A-05-SC012
q
%! APO]LLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
S_STEMS DATA [ii

a. A time of 18zk4 milliseconds (14 mH.1iseconds rninin_un_) will [2<{1
elapse before the stabilization control subsystem (SCS) can electrically
provide a con_rnand-off signal to the automatic coils of the injector valves
on the engine.
b. When the automatic coils of the injector valves receive the electrical
on signal from the SCS, the injector valves are energized to the open
i
position.
c. The fuel injector automatic coil energizes to the fully open position
in 4. 5_1.5 milliseconds, and the oxidizer injector automatic coil energizes
[7
i to the fully open position in 6.0_1.5 milliseconds establishing an approxi-
if
n_ate Z millisecond fuel lead. This is accomplished by va='ying the resist-
,!
ance of the automatic coils in the fuel and oxidizer injector valve.
d. The propellar_ts flow from the injector v_]ves as soon as they .both
start to ope!_ to the premix igniter. However, the fuel will lead the
oxidizer by two milliseconds.

e. The propellants start to flow, as soon as the injector valves start
to open, into the premix igniter and into the co_bustion cha.,:_ber which
creates sonde pressure, gas velocity aud thrust, and even though it is
<(_i!! very sn_all, the engine is operating in aspace environment.

f. The pressure, ga._ velocity, and thrust continues to increase
slightly until the valves reach the fully open position.

g. At approxima'_eiy IZ-i/Z milliseconds, the propellants ignite
<i
(hypergolic), produci.ng a spike of thrust upwards into the area of 70 to
t
80 pounds. At 14 milliseconds minimum, the SCS rernoves the electrical
:i
q signal from the automatic coils of the injector valves.

h. The thrust of _he engine continues very erratically, While the
valves beco.m_.e _e-er;.erg_.zed an@ _pring-]_d c]_se_
i. A_ approximately 21 milliseconds (closing time of 7.5 milliseconds)

i on the fuel valve and Z3 milliseconds (closing time of 8.0 ._.nilliseconds) on
t
the oxidizer valve, the injector valves are fully closed.
j. The residual propellants downstream of the injector valves continue

to flow into the combustion chamber, decreasing until complete thrust
.I decay of 0 pounds occurs at approximately 65 milliseconds.
k. In order to determine the total impulse for this tinge span of
4
operation (figure Z.5-5), everything under the entire thrust curve must
be integrated.
:i The automatic coils are electrically connected in parallel from _he
I SCS. The manual coils in the fuel and oxidizer injector valves provide a
manual direct backup to the SCS mode of operation. The manual coils of
I
the injector valves are electrically connected in series. The reasons for
;I
the series connection of the nnanua], coils are as fo].lows:
:] s. Prevent a pnisnnateh between the opening and closing of the valves

;I due to any heat soak-back, into the manual-coils, which would change the
i resistance of the n]anual coils and result in a _nisn_atch if the co[is were
connected in parallel. The direct nnanual opening time for fuel is

13 milliseconds and-oxid_.zer-is Z3 _nil_iseconds. The closing time for
:I fuel a_d oxidizer is 55±Z5 l%illiseconds.
REACTION CONTROL SYSTEN{
i
"{ itdission ,-.
o_.s',.c • Date 12 _-,_ ,o."
No_.°_(_ -
(,hange Date ....................... Page 2. 5-iZ
'[!
]
1
_7
m<7-_ _{7}ii
SNILA-03-SC0 !Z
_4
Iiii! APOLLO OPP2IZ.ATIONS H ANDBOO!(
%!
SS._,q, E,,4,_ DATA

i__I
b: The series connection from th.e fuel manual coil (positive to
negative) to the oxidizer manual coil (negative to positive), then to

ground, is to increase ttne arc s0ppression, reducing the arc at rotation
control in the direct RCS mode of operation. .,
Z.5.3.3.2 Injector.
]
The injector contains a prernix igniter. The premix igniter chamber"
contains a fuel and an oxidizer passage that impinge upon each other (unlike
impingement) withh_ the premix ign_-ter chamber. The premix igniter
chamber, along with the Z-millisecond fuel lead, provides a smoother
start tra,_sienl primarily in the pulse mode of operation and especial.ly
7!;;i in the area of minimum irnpul.se.
i The main chazw.ber portion of the injector will allow eight fuel
!77
streams to impinge upon eight oxidizer stremns (unl.Jke impingement) _or
tL_L rz
_e
main chamber ignition. There are a, so eight rue! holes around the outer
i periphery of the injector, which provides film cooling to the combustion
e_
(l !a ch am be r.
!!:¢
Z. 5.3.3.3 Combustion Chamber°
The combustion chamber is constructed of unalloyed rnolybdermrn,

1
_J which is coated with a thin layer of molybdenum disJlic de to prevent
i oxidation of lJ_e base metal. Coolin.g of the eharnoe" is by radiation and
t
filn; cooling,
'i/l
:j Nozzle Extension, The nozzle extension is attached to the engine by
a Waspolloy nut. The n.ozz]e extension is machined from a cobalt base
alloy, The stiffener rings art machined.
'i
Z.5.3.3.4 IICS JElectrical Heaters.

'; _!'R
_. ,_
Each of the RCS engine housings contain an electrical strip beater
k74
] (figure Z. 5-3). The electrical strip heaters provide prope!iant tempera-
,t ture control by conductance to the engine housing and engine injector
:I vah:es; thus the propellants. Each heater has two thermo switcbes that
,t
maintain the temperature at a given range.
i
Z.5.3.4 Pressure Versus Ten_perature hdeasuring Syste_a.
" 4' [:ii
{ The he!iron tank supply temperature measurennent and heliu_'n tank
'J supply pressure measurement (figure Z. 5-3) for eech quad are utilized
by the crew and TLM to determine the quantity of propellants ren:aining
] :[i_
h_ the respective qusd.
The non_ogram (figure Z. 5-6) depicts hew to determine the propellant
J [51 quantity remaining in percentage. The helium supply pressure is deter--

mined in psia on panel 1Z by the crew, also the helh_m supply ten:perature
a
,{
i [!i
{ RE2ACTION COi',I'f I,v_L
'_ SYSTEF4_
' #e'_ h,_ission ................ tlasi.c Date IZ Nov 1966 Change Dpte .......................... Page 2.. 5-13
i
i
• . : : : :::
SMZA-03-SC01Z
;!
5
SYSTI_MS DATA
3500
3
I
3OO0
q
c/)
I 25OO
t.O
i.lJ
2000
(;1
2_
1500
:if
JI
;!
Figure Z.5-6. S/ivI RCS Nomogran-_ Tsrpic&l Propellant f{emaining
R)-;,AC'L°].ON CONTIROL SYS'rLM
_ tvli s s ic,,a Basic Date !Z N:_z }_66 Chan_ e Date ............ Page Z, 5- 14
SMZA.-03--SC0] ff
A PO1LLO OI:'I_RATiONS HANDI%()OK
/ SYSTI!MS DATA
reads in psia. '].'hehelium supply tem_)erature readout of 0 psia is
ii! equivalent to 0°F and 400 psia is equ_ivalent to 150°F.
As an example, if the crew readout on pane ! IZ for a given quad

reads 3400 psia i_elium supply pressure and Z65 psia heliuRa supply
temperature (-which is equivalent to 100°iF'), the quantity of propellants
remaining is approximately 60 percent or 120 pounds. The crew would
utilize the RCS indicator select switch on nanel IZ to select the quad
desired in order [o obtain the helium tank supply pressure and tempera-
!::::i!j
?, ture, and determine the propellant quantity remaining in percent.
:r,
2.5.3.5 ]Engine Thrusting Logic.
i
[##1
In the S/]\i RCS, t:]_ecommands, from the stabilization and control
(,<,
system cannot be supplied to the SCS channel switches until the contacts
!, F
of tl_e RCS latching relay are closed. Closing of i:hese contacts for S/M
L.ZI RCS control may be initiated by the following signals (fiFure Z. 5--3):
a. With the launch escape tower jettisoned and the translation control
rotated counterclockwise, an S/M abort or a normal S-IVB separatior-
{ @
is initiated an.c]the following ,sequence of events occurs.
i. Inform the G&N system of an abort initiation.
Z. Initiate applicable booster shutdown.
• ]._. 3. Inhibit the pitch and yaw auton_atic jets of the SCS.
4. Initiates an ullage maneuver signal to the required manual
coils of the S/M P,CS engines (as long as the t_anslation control is _n
counterclo'ckwise, ullage is terminated when the translation contro'l
is returned to the neu2ral detent).
:I
5. Adapter separatior_ occurs at !.7 seconds after the abort was
! ini;tiated.
!
6. F2nergizes the RCS latching relay Z-1/Z seconds af&:r the
!7i abort was initiated a.Howing the SCS to provide electrical commands
to the automatic coils of the S/M RCS engines. J.n the event the logic
fails to energize the RCS latching relay, the RCS CMD switch on
H panel 16 is
the automatic
placed to
function.
the ON position,,
In addition,
providing a manual
if the ADAPTER
backup
SiEPARATION
to
!I
pushbutton on panel 5 is pressed and held for approximately 1 to
_q4',/
Z seconds, the RCS latching relay is energized.
H b. In a backup to the normal s-rvB separation sequence, the RCS CMD
switch is momentarily placed to the ON position, energizing the RCS
)i
latching relay; the tran. slation control is positioned forward, providing a
translation through the SCS to the required automatic coils of the S/M RCS
engine for a +X translation; and the ADAPTJ£R SEPARATION pushbutton
on pane] 5 is held for Z seconds to initlat:e adapter separation. (ADARTFR
•]
SEPARATION pushbutton pressed and held for approximately t to Z seconds
l!] win also energize the RCS latching relay. )
In the event the translation controls are unable [o provide an ullage

;i
n_aneuver, the DIRECT ULLAGE pushbutton on pane?, 7, when depressed
iq REACTION CONTROL SYST1EM
! i: _ Mi::sion Basic " ", T.c---_ - -, Page ...... __.=)_2 .........
,i
' ...............
'"'_:'..............
_'_'"_K"-'_ ......... ............
_'"':':_ .............
7:':'' i_" ' "'"'_!! ......_....... ...........
::""'_ '_ ,'':_!!!_',:'I_': -T'":"........ ................
_!i
APOL2LO C)PK)RATIONS HANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
and held, provides th.e direct ullage signal to the manual coils of the RCS
engines, to be energized to provide a +X translation. This provides a
manual direct backup to the two translation controls for the ullage
_-naneuver to be performed by the S/M RCS. The ullage maneuver is
terminated upon rele_.se of the DIRECT ULLAGE pushbutton.
{
In the event the SCS and/or jet selection logic is unable to provide
commands to the automatic coils of the S/Jvi RCS engines, placing the
DIRECT RGS switch on panel 8 to the ON position provides power to the
rotation controls onlyo When the rotation control is positioned fully to its
] stops in any direction, the rotation control will energize the required
manual coils for the desired maneuver,
{
}
If the SCS and/or the jet seJect[on ]ogle is unable to provkie
comn_ands to the auten'_atic coils of tlle S/Ni Rbo_
"_" engin:es, i_ is no_ed that
translation control of the spacecraft is disabled,
i
{
[
Z. 5.4 S/kd RGS PN.RFORMAN(]t!] AND ]DESIGN DA.T.A_
2,5.4.] Design ]Data°

i
J
The following list is the design c_,_t_
......of the S/A4 RCS components,
•i
HELIUM TANKS (4) 4150d:50 psJg at 70J:5°F ' during servicing;

after servicing sitting on launch pad
J
70d_]0°]7 ". Capacity 0.57 lb, b_-side
i
dia_neter 8.84 in,, wall thickness
J 0. 105 in., and intern.al volume 0. Z05 cu fro
REGULATOR UNITS (8) Pri_ary - 181:k4 psig with a normal

].ockup of 183±5 psigo Fron_ lockup
pressure, not drop below 177 psig or
rise a.bove ]85 psig and stabilize to
181_2 psig within Z sec,
Secondary -Lockup of 187d_5 psig. From

10ckup pressure, not drop below 177 psi.g
or rise above 19'i psig and stabilize a_
185_:3 psig within Z sec.
PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS I]iumi_nate CAUTION and WARNIMG light

(4) COk&MON M.ANIEOi_D on panel 10 (S/M RCS A, B, G, or D),
Underpressurc 155 psla.
Overpressure Z15 psfa,
HELIUM RELIEF Diaphragm ._'uptu_e at ZZ8_-8 psig.

V A I.,VEo<' (8)
}_iiter - I0 nMcron nominal, Z5 rnicron
ab s o hlte.
I REAC]']?ION CONTROL SYSTEM

]
Mi,_; sion ........................ Basic Date ..... [-Q_PY.i 9A.6__...C ",.an.ee Date .......................................... Page .........22._.£-_,.6 ........
o,.,IZA-03-SC0 ]2
i, 5
SYSTEMS DATA
Relief valve relieves at Z36. 5±11.5 psig.
! d
Relief valve reseats at not less than
Fi
2Z0 psig in the cavity and a helium% flow

of less than Z0 standard cublc centimeters
I:'l
I per hour across the bleed device arid rell_f
valve assembly combined, The bleed
devhze shall reopen when decreasing pres-
_i!'i
sure has - '
reac,_ed no los s than Z0 p sig. ,
J
;(
FUEL TANK (4) Connbined prope!lant and u]lage volume of

69.0 lbs, initially at 60°F at 30m2 psig,
:i
resulting in a tank pressure of no more
than ZI5 ,)sia when heated to 85°F. Out- [[7:
side dJ.ameter _axb'num 1Z.6Z in.,
i
4 ]engd_ Z3.717 (+0.(_)60, -0.000} in. Wail i :
thickness 0.0.17 in. to 0.0ZZ i.n.
.l-Ielh_n-_ in!el: port i/4 in., fi]l and drain

port I/Z in.
OXIDIZER TANK (4) Cmmbined propellant and ullage vo]urne of

<!
137.0 lbs, initially at 65°]F at 30:kZ psig,
than ZI5 psia when heated to 85°F. Out-
side d[an**etor n-_a:._-hr_u_n
IZ. 6Z i:_.,
4 length Z9 . 55 ('{0. 0o0
" . -0..0 f)0'_in.
.
]
WMi thickness 0.017 i'._.,
to 0.0ZZ in.
,:J INLINE FILTERS 5-micron norf_inal; 15-n,_!_cron abso]ute -
ENGINES (16) 1000--sec service life, capable of

10,000 operational cycles.
:i
i
Thrust i00 Ibs _:5 percent.
i!!
ii i!i Expansion ratio 40:] at Rozzle exit.
Cooling Film and radiatior,
ill! Injector type,

>:
r)? Premix igniter one on one unlike Lrn.pinge-

merit. _igl:t fuel annulus for fil:_ cooling
of premix igni.tcr, main chamber eight
on eight unlike impingement, eight fi0,elfor
film cooling of combustion chamber wall.
k_
/{ e_
I RE/_CT!ON CONTROL SYST'E:M
,_ f_' Mission .............. s_a._'.c Date 1Z No_: 1966 C:!_ange Oate ....................... Page Z q i7
!
1
:3
7ii SMZA-03-SC01 Z
_7
SYSTEMS DA'I'A
)!
Nozzle extension L-605 material

[i
Nozzle exit diameter 5.6 in.
Fuel lead.
[
Automatic coils - Connected in p:_.rallel.
Manual coils - Connected in. series. [

Weight - 4.99 Ibs.
Length - !3.375 in.
PACKAGE
TRANSDUCER
TEMPERATURE
(4)
I!lmninate
on panel 10
CAUTION
(S/M RCS
and
A,
WARNING
B, C, or
light
D) [
Under temperature'63°F.
'i
Over temperature 175°F.
J One in. Each Quad One in Each Quad
HEATERS THERMO-SZU TCH Close at 77 (+10, Close at 115°F
< J -7) °F
[
Open at 104±14°i _' Open at 134°F
[
5i 36±3.6 watts per 36±3.6 watts per
;!!I heater heater
i
Z,5.4. Z Performance Data.
Refer to Mission Modular Data Book, SID 66-1177.

[
:::d _._5.4.3 Power Consumption Data S/M RCS and C/M RCS.
|
]
Total Watts
•
J< Watts per Unit
No. of
Subsystenl
Control Units AC DC AC DC
and Component
R eacl.ion control
i</! Service module RCS
71i
8 *36.0 Z88.0
Engine heaters RCS HEATER CB (4)
SCS JET SELECTION 3Z *AUTO : ].18.0

RCS engine coils
jl
LL, GI<, or DIRECT 3. 687
i!
,:-"
D IRE C T 34.0
_iiiii 1.06Z
?,,i i :: s ion Basic Date Ig Nov 1966 Chan e Date Page Z. 5-18
SMP, A-03-SC012
APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBO()K

}i
SYST EiviS DATA
i'i
_,,Vatts )er Unit Total Watts
No, of
Subsystem
Control Units DC AC I DC
and Con_poneni:
•• q
6.75O _ 54.0
He isolation valves He VALVE CB (Z)
He sw (8)
s
PROP, ISOL. CB (Z) 6.125 49.0

Propellant isolation
4
[] valves PROP. ISOL. sw (4)
Coml_and modul.e RCS
Isolation valves (Ref. S/M/RCS IZ. 2.50 49.0
ISOL. CB)
PROP. ISOL. sw (Z) [!
SCS JET SELECTION Z4 ::_A U T 0 : [£

RCS engine coils
I,OG!C OR DIRECT 4. 208 10:3.0
•1
<"DIRECT 5Z.5.
g. 1S7 I
J ;:-'Intermittent operatin.g components.
Z.5.4.4 S/M RCS Electrical Power Distribution.
id
See figure Z.5-7 for electrical power distribution.
Z.5.5 S/M RCS OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS°

J
Operational llnfitations and restrictions on the testing of system
IU valves
a.
in a dry
Helium
unservicdd
isolation, valves
propulsion
_-nd
system
propellan/
are
isolation
as follows:
valves n_inimtmz
energization time of 0. Z second and not to exceed 5 seconds.
b. Engine injector valve automatic coil energization not to exceed
Z minutes on time during any 15-rninute period with voltage not
[J exceeding
c.
3Z
Engine
vdc.
injector valve direct coil energization on tinge not exceed
45 n-_inutes during any 60-nfinute period m_d voltage not exceed 16 vdc to
U either coil separately or 3Z vdc £o two coils in series.
2.5.6 S/M RCS TELEMETRY MEASUREMENTS.
The subsequent list ks of a].lS/Ivi RCS telemeh-y data that is

monitored by flight controllers and ground support personr..el.
i i _ Mission Basic [Date : ._ ....... ,............................

;{
k_
i
C:Xz
SM2A-03-.SC01Z
APOL, LO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK

!
:i
SYSTEMS DATA
S/M QUADS B&D

C/M SYSTEM A
i E
• ]
:!
S/M QUAOS A&C
C/M SYSTEM B
RCS
PROP ,(MDC ~._5)
ISOL
<i
S/M RCS
7 SW!TCHES (_
!iq HELIUM 1A
)J HELIUM NO. 1 7
I SOL_'TION VALT_ I
:!<i
i:]
S/M RCS
S/M RCS
% QU&D
B
<i
L_
a
i::;2
]
<4
HE LILIM 2C
g
s/M RCS s/_aRcs
QUAD QU&D
D C
<!!
;!
:]
NOTES: 1. Helium i_l_tlon voJv_ _re m_chanlcally latched opon ,sr_:l sprhlg-lce:L-,<d clc¢-_l.
2. Ihop_IIont _solotlon volv_ ar_ magneticolly I_ched open _nd _prlng-le_a_e_l clc_od.
3. Eoch h_ilum ilalation valvo ov_nt indicator is enorgiz_d when corre._ponding volvlt i$ in cl_,.¢+d pofltlon only.
4. Th_ pml,_liani ilolotlon _lve event ind;_tor is energlzed if eithl_r fu01 or oxidlz_r valve is in lhe cloled podtlon. S#/_ 2A-715D
4
Figure 2. 5-7. S/M RCS Electrical Power Distribution Diagram
P,EACTION CONTROL SYSTEM
Mission Basic Date ]Z No",, 1966 Change Date .....................

Page Z. 5-2.0
!
I Measure~ i
Bit
Si:-na] Channel
51 l_/er!". I
Cond ition e r (2ocle _:: _;[ r_/t C¢ Opetat i'lz Rang," I
,N,_ea sur cnl ent s
Crvw Display ]'lgurc
Nvm_be
SP, 50[ 3Tr { 0 +150°F
Range SZSARI64(SIA1)
Panel I " Z. 5-5 I it] iu*n 'Yank '[c:npcraturc A
70:_I0 ° I'" on I
launch Dad,
SR5014T SZSARt 6=(SI 9AZ)
P,m,,i I Z Z 5-3 lielium Tank Temperature ..B
variable during t
0 +150°F
SR5015T $285P, 164(S19A3) l_]i s s i{.113. !

P:m_"] i g 2 5-3 Helium Tank Temperature C
SRS016T ' i ,_150_F

+150°F S28AR164(S19A4}
Panel 12 2.5-3 Hehum Tank Temperature D
20 [{2 PCM
SR50011 _ +C _SK psia S28AR36(S'9A] ) IOA89
PaneI i Z 2.5-3 Helium Tank Supply Pressure A
59 4150_5°F psia
._°
if2 PC M and decreases
SR500ZP SZ8AR36(S19A2) 10AI
2.5-3 ![elium Tank Supply Pressure B -*,C +5K psia
Panel 12
,, with engine
SR5003P SZ8AR36(S!A3) IOA93: H2 PCM firings. >

2._-3 Helium Tank Supply Pressure C +0 +5K psia
Panel I 2
10A96 H2 PCM 0
SR5004P +0 +SK psia S28AR36(S19A4)
Panel 12 2.5-3 Helium Tank Supply Pressure D
C
!ca
!!A82 H2 PCM
SR5729P S28AR44(Si9A! )
+0 +400 psia
Panel i0 and :2 2.5-3 Regulated Helium Manifold O
_< Pressure A i
O (n
.m Launch pad 193 to
1I.A88 H2 PC M
Panel I0 end [2 2.5-3 R egula _.ed He'., ium Y.anlfold
SR5776P [+O +400 psla [ =)_Ana'¢<_oAZ]
207 psia decreas- q
C' 1 cn
Pressure B [Pg to 178 to q >
i
O, 19Z psla in a spacel > ,
SR5817P [+0 +400 psia S28AR44(SI9A3) ! 1A8 9 _12 PCM
o
O Panel I0 and iZ Z.5-3 Regulated Helium Manifold enviromnent. ._
O Pressure C
D- I I£Z PCM
SR58301 _" S28AR44(S] 9A4) liAl
Panel !0 and 12 2.5-3 Regulated Helium Manifold +0 _400 ps[a
Pressure D
{ c_ l'.0
< 1ZA8 ill f_ "1
} _J = 2.5-3 Oxidizer Feed Line Pressure A SR5733P
F< +0 +300 psia
e-e ?2 ¢2
,'9 SR5737P i2A9 Hi FQ
2. g--3 Fuel Feed Line Pressure A +C ÷300 psia
Launch pad 193 to O
!PAi_ H 1 FQ
i 2.5-3 Fuc] Feed Line Pressure B SR5'784D +0 +300 psia 207 psia decreas- O
ing to I78 to N
!2A14 Ztl FQ i92 psia itt a space
Oxidizer Manifold Pressure D SR582tP +0 a300 psia
Z .--3
environment.
12A15 H1 FQ
Fuel _eed Line Pressure C SR5822P +0 +300 psia
2..5-3
!ZAI6 HI FQ
SR5823P +0 +300 psia
i 2..5-3 Fuel _'eed Line Pressure D
1
[
po
H1
SRS065T !+0 [.300°F SZ8AX40(S19A!)
Panel I0 and I2 2. 5-3 Femperature Package A* P lOA95 PCM i Pad 1!5 to 134°P
Flight I15°F [
Engine 3
i to 175°7
SZ8AR40(SIA2) H l
SRS066T !+0 +300'P i 10A6Z I PCM i
Pan6] 10 and 1Z Z. 5-3 Te,nDerature Package B - Y
2".ng ins 6 I l
.<
:.::
k:<: ¸ < : _,
1
K Measure-
I_]e n t Signal Channel Bit I

N mmb e r Conditioner Code::: R ate::: Operating: Range
k4easuremcnts Range
2 Crew D:sr_]av i.'icure
J
i
Panel
Panel
10
I0
and
and
2
Z
2.5-3
2.5-3
Temperature
Engine
Temperature
4
Package
Package
C
D
-
+
P
Y
SR5067T
SR5068T
I +0
+0
+300
+300°P
° F SZBAP,40(SI
SZ8AR40(S19A4)
? A3) IOA98
10A[00
Ill
H 1
PCM ]
Pad
Flight
to
115
175°F
toi34°F
ll5°F
1
J Engine 5
H I FQ 'Variable
SR7iZ8'I +0 +500°F 51A21
2.5-3 Temperature Injector Head B + Y
Engine
59
FQ Variable
SR7134'I +0 +50O°F 51AZZ I HI
3,5-3 TemFerature Lnjector Head A
CCW R Eagine
I
t3
_a I1E1Z-061 E2 PC M E Event I >
CD0140X OFF ON
'! 2.5-3 Direct Ullage On A (Z16 Relay)
o event
I O
!_ CD0!41_[ 0FP o_ PCME Event

2.5-3 ilEIZ-08 i E2 U
!
Direct Ullage On B (Zl6 Relay)
• !!!
evetlt O
:i
2.5-3 RCS Activate Signal A (Z19 Relay) CD01703[ OFF ON IIE13-06! EZ PCME Event O (n
event
,C- 1 N
CD0171X OFF ON 11E13-07 I EZ PCME Event b_ >
2.5-3 RCS Activate Signal B (Z19 Relay)
> I
.!I
O z Tower
Tower
Jettison
Jettison
A
B
CD0105X
CD0106X
event
11EZ8-0Z i EZ PCME
PCME
Event
Event
¢D
,<
rn
L11EZ8-03 [ E2
4
[,9
1! Channel Code Example: i0A89

b
8 bit
i-•i _._ ,',_Analog rqeasurements digitally coded into words. Z
Analog rneasurements - 0 to 5 vdc
:i Significant nut,her - 1 "_
FQ - Flight qualifica:ion measure
J!
H1 - High bit rate How many zeros after I O
H2 - High and low bit rate sample O
significant number is • 0
E2 - High and low bit rate per
N
amov.nt of samples per
second I
second _ !
:!
Analog - A. '_
Event - E
•7! b Channel code .- 89
:ii!ii 7a
! ¢D'
:<$
.> :5
:!
i,i i
SMZ.A-03- SC012
APOLLO OPERATIONS I-tAIqDt3OOT_(
SYSTEMS DATA
;[53
2.5.7 C/M RCS FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION.
The command module reaction control subsystem provides the
!:({ impulse required for controlling spacecraft attitude during the terminal
phases of a mission.
J [!:!ili
c_ The subsysterns are activated normally by the crew pls.cmg the C/M-
S/M SEPARATION switches to C/M-S/Ivl SEPARATION position or by

<J ])lacing the C/M RCS PRESSURIZE switch to the ON position prior to
initiating C/iVi-S/M separation (C/M RCS PRESSURIZE switch m.ay also be"
! utilized as a manual backo.p to the C/Li-S/M SEPARATION switches).
The subsystems are activated autornaticaliy in the event of an abort from
4 the pad up to launch escape tower jettison. Separation of the two modules
occurs prior to entry (normal mode) or during an abort from the pad up
7_
to launch escape tower jettison.
}
The C/M-S/Iki consists of two identical and independent subsyste:q_s,
identified as subsystem A and subsystem B. ]Both subsyslems are operated
simultaneously. In the event a rr_a]function develops in one subsystems, the
remaining subsystem has the 6apabi!ity of providing the impulse required

to perform necessary pre-entry and entry maneuvers. The C/MI I{CS is
b contained entirely within the C/M and each reaction engine nozzle is ported
through the C/M. skin. The propellants consist of nitrogen tetroxide

:! (NzO4) used as oxidizer and _qonon_ethylbydrazine (RiiViIi) used as fuel.
J Pressurized helium gas is the propellant transferring agent,
}lit
_N
] !:i_i
:i The reaction jets nnay be pu].se-fired, producing short-thrust
I
in_pu!ses or contin_aously fired, produ, ch_g a _teady-state thrust level.
4
The short firing permits attitude re.odes of operat!on. C/iv! attitude

%1
control is normally rnaiDtained by utilizing the applicable pitch, yaw,
:,iI and roll engines of suL'systems A and ]3. However, complete attitude con-.
trol can be maintained with on].y one subsystem.
A functional flow diagram, of C/M RCS subsystems A and 13 is shown
in figure Z. 5-8. The helium storage vessel of each subsysie_m supplies
1 pressure to two helium isolation squib valves that are norn_ally cIosed
throughout the mission until C/M-S/M separation or C/M RCS pressurize
is activated. The heliun-_ isolation squib valves in a subsystem are
initiated open, allowing pressure to the pressure regulators downstream

t
of each helium isolation squib valve, reducing the high-pressure heliun_
to a desired working pressure.

J
} Regulated helium pressure is directed through a series--parallel
co_nbination of four independent check valves. The check valves pern_ifi
k_ heliun_ pressure to the ft_el and oxidizer tanks, and prevent reverse flow
of prope]iant vapors or liquids. A pressure-relief is installed in the

pressure lines between the check valves and propellant tanks to protect:
J
the propellant tanks frorn any excessive pressure increase.
[1
!
I<ttACTION CONTROL SYSTEM
Mission ................ Basi_ ........ ,..... _t .................

/
_h%._- ...... nge Date ......... ge ..... b.2:, 2 .........
-¢ i_
SMZA-03-SG01Z
:::i
ii APOLLO OPER.ATIOIqS _ANDBOOK
i!
$7 S[F ]Eiv[S DA TA
Helium entering the propellant tanks creates a pressure buildup
around the propellant positi_ve expulsion bladders, forcing the propellants
to be expelled into the propellant distribution lines. Propellants then flow

to valve isolation burst diaphrag:_ns, which rupture, and through the propel-
lant isolation valves. Each subsystem supplies fuel• and oxidizer to six
engines.
Oxidi_er and fuel is distributed to the IZ fuel and oxidizer injector
valves hy a parallel feed system. The fuel and oxidizer injector valves on
each engine contain orifices which meter the propellant flow to obtain a
nominal Z:I oxi.dizer/fuel ratio by weighG The oxidizer and fuel irnpln.ge,
atomize, and ignite due to the hypergolic propellants. The injector valves
are controlled automatically by the G&iN system or the SCS. Manual

override direct control is provided for rotational _T_aneu\'ers and direct
ullage only. The injector valves are spring-loaded closed.
J;
Extremely cold ten_perature of the C/M exterior is anticipated prior
to entry opera_i.ons; therefore, C/M RCS engine preheating _nay be

necessary before initiating pressurization due to possib!e freezing of the
oxidizer (+II.8°F) upon contact with the engine injector valves. This is
accomplisb.ed by the crew n_onitoring the engh_e te___pcratures and ener-
gizing the injector valve solenoids until acceptable engine ten_peratures

are obtained. The C/M !IGS HTRS switch on panel 200 will apply power
to the injector valve solenoids for engine preheating.
Since the presence of hypergolic propellants can be hazardous upon
C/M impact, the _-emaining propellants are burned off _n6. the RCS purged
with heT!uno_, pri_r to C!M ]andi_g.
In the event of an abort from the pad up to T + 61 seconds after
liftoff, provlsi.ons have been incorporated to automatic:_i]y dun_p the

oxidizer supply overboard, followed by a he].iun_, purge of the oxidizer
tanks and dumping of the remaining'heliun_ supply. The fuel is retalned
on board due to insufficient time for dumping and the C/M impacts with
fuel tanks full, but depressurized.
Z.5.8 C/}_i RCS MAJOR COMPONE_NTS/SUI3SYSTEM DESCR][PTION_

I
The C/M RGS is composed of two separate, norn-_a]ly independent
systen_s_ designated system A and system B. The systems are identical
to operation, each containir;.g the following four :majoT' subsystems:
Pressurization
Propellant
k_ocket engine
Temperature control system
<4
<-:i
REAGT!ON CONTROi., SYST_;M
M i,._ s ton Basic Date !Z Nov <9!-'o O.:a._g¢ r,a_ . __. Pa_e .... j_._._/'i ........
::!ii
%4
SMZ.A-03-SC0I 2
i¸-!I
APOLLO OPE!_.ATIONS HANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
,_ F:!i
;i
ILj_
ii _!i:;_"
J
<i
! _ _J_ _.I ...... _]...... 1_._C_1 ...... L......
[-T........ '....i-| .... ' " '
LESEND
_ii
I _
Figure 3.5-8. C/M RCS Functional ]mlo_v Dblgrarn
REACTION COI_T]{O]_ SYSTEM
2:5-Z5/3.5-Z6
Basic Dat_ IZ
....... ]'_ov io66 ._,
_L_____aange Date ......... Page
]vlis s ion
;!i!i:
i
: :i I
to:
':!:ili
;+
i!i ;!i
I
!
• !!
{!
i L.M_
;,7:<¸
k]
i
]
;i
i.i!
:A
:!1
• 41
..... od477
I_,0 I /?17 I
vj .......... i /
:L_7
;1
h_
SMZA-03-SC0 ]2
i I,{-
I!2_,,$
APO.L,I,C) OPERATIONS HA:'_DBOOK
_ i_ _:_:
SYSTEMS DATA•
' :.i:J
.:::_
<: :?i 2.5.8.1 Pressurization Subs ystern.
F _
:t LLil
This subsystem consists of.a helium supply tank, two dual-pressure
regulator assemblies, two check valve assemblies, two pressure-relief

valve assemblies, and associated distribution plun_bing.
2.5.8.1.1 Helium Supply Tank.
'i I%i The total high--pressure heliun-_ is contained within a single spherical
i ; 1
i L;! storage tank. Initial fill pressure is 4150_:50 psig. The limit working
3
pressure is 5000 psig to acconqrnodate pressure transients during filling.
The proof pressure is 6667 psig and burst pressure is 7500 psig.
Z.B.8. I.Z Helium Isolatior, •

(Sqmb-Operate d.) Valve.
i::! :ii
i
The two squib-operated heli.un_ isolation valves are installed in the
plumbing fro_.eachheliun]tankto confine the heliun_ to as small an area as

possible to reduce heliun_ leakage during the period the system is not in
use. Two squib valves are mlqployed in each systen_ i:o assure pressuriza
tion. The va]Mes are opened by closure of the CA4 PRESS switch on
panel 16, the C/M-.S/M SEP switches on pane]. 15, or upon the receipt
of an abort signal from the pad up to launch escape to\ver jettison.
Z.5.8,1.3 Helium Pressure Regulator Assembly.

1
:i ! .:,{ The pressure regulators used in the G/M RCS _;ubsystenns A and .G
are sirnilar in type, operation, and function to those used in the S/\,i fIGS.
! lJ
The differences are that the regulators in the C/M ]<G,'5 are set at a higher
pressure than ihose of the S/M RCS.
Z. 5.8.1.4 Helium Check Valve Assembly.

3
J
The check valve assemblies used in C/M RCS subsystems A and
are sin_ilar in type, operation, and functi.on to those used in the S/_M ]{GS.
Z. 5.8.1.5 Helium Relief -Valve.
;)1
The helium relief valves used in the C/M RCS subsystems A and B
are similar in type, operation, and function to those used in the S/M ]iCS.
The differences are that the rupture pressure of the burst diaphragm in
Ii.li the
relieves
C/M RCS
at
is higher
a higher
than
pressure
that
in the
of the
C/M
S/M
RCS
RCS,
than
and
that
the relief
of the S/M
valve
RCS.
.%1
Z.5.8.1.6 Distributio n Plm_nbing.
i Brazed joint tubing is used to distribute regulated heliun-_ in each
subsystem frorn the helium storage vessels to the propellant i;anks.
fr/_
._j
RI£ACTION CONTROL SYSTEM
}vlis sion _3g:,s i c. D a t e 1.,29!9 x._' .1:___,.6___ C t _a i_ g e 1) a _ce ........................... Pa g e ............ -.;:J2= ........
{,<_{
...... <+,_.............. _,-:,_-_ ......... -_-_._-_=-z,,-,,:-..--_.- , .::::- _._: '- "-".:.:.:...................................... : ...... r '-+>":-' :.: .......... ".......... "7' ?_: < '"...... ::".<'<< '_" : "°-_"- ........ '.......... '........ "_"::::!["
"_"'
Sh4ZA o03-SC0 !Z
APOLLO OPEF<ATIONS I-iAND]3OOK

• _ij
!z;2
SYSTEMS DA.T_A
Z.5,8. Z Prope].] ant Sub systern.
Each subsystem consists of one oxidizer tank, one fuel tank, one
oxidizer and fuel isolation valve, and associated distribution plun_bing.
Z. 5.8. Z. 1 Oxidizer Tank.
The oxidizer supply is contained in h single, titaniunn alloy,

hemispherical-domed, cylindrical tank to each system. Each tank ¢onta[n'-
a diffuser tube asse_nbly and a teflon bladder for positive expulslon of the
oxidizer similar to that of the S/M F(CS tank assen'_blies. The difference
is the C/Ni R(;S tank assemblies are s_.alJer iF_ size. The bladder is
attached to the diffuser tube at each end of th:e tan]<. The diffuser _llbe
acts .as the propellant outlet.
When the tank is pressurized, the helium gas surrounds tl_e entire
bladder, exerting a force which causes the bladder to collapse about the
propellant, thus forcing the oxidizer i,ato the diffuser rule assembly and
out of the tank outlet into the man.ifold. Working pressure is 360 psig;
proof pressure is 480 psig; and the burst pressure is 540 psig_
Fuel Tank. The fuel supply is contai.ncd in a single, titanium alloy,
hemispherical-domed, cylindrical tank for each system that i.s similar in

! material, construction, and operation to that of the oxldiz,_;r tank.
Z. 5.8. Z, Z Diaphragm Burst lsolation Valve.
: ..... 11 ,
The burst diaphraems, downstream froth: each tank are _._t._.._.ea to
confine the propellants i_ato as small an area as possible d_roughout the
mtssion. This is to prevent loss of propellants in the event of line rupture
downstream of the burst diaphragm or injector valve leakage.
When the helium isolation squib valves are initiated open, regulated
helium pressure pressurizes the propellant tanl<s, creating the positive
expulsion of propellants into the respec',ive manifolds to the burst
diaphragms, which rupture, all.owing the propellants to flow through the
propellant isolation valves, to the injector valves on each engine. The
diaphragm is of the nonfragmentation type; but, in the event of spy frag-
?.
mentation, a filter is incorporated to prevent any fragments from enterh_g
:2 the engine injector valves.
h
I ,{. 5.8. Z. 3 Propellant Isolation Shutoff Valves.
7 When th.e burst diaphragm isolation valves are ruptured, the

propellants flow to the propellant isolation valves.
The isolation valves in the fuel and oxidizer lines are both controlled
by a single switch on panel 15o The valves are two-solenoid valves and are
i'
Basic Date I Z Nov 196(.2_ Change Dat% Page ...........

_q>=%.%o..
,_"_'_"
_:'-__v:-_'.
..........
_.......................
:__"'"('¸"¸'<17
4
(! SMZA--0 3-SC0 1Z
SYSTEMS DATA
•_ili
• !}
magnetically latched open and spring-loaded closed. The valves are

normally open in respect to fluid flow. The C/M propellant switches A and '
B on panel 15 will. be placed to ON after T + 61 seconds and will remain in
that position until orbit insertio'_ to ensure that the propellant isolation
•5
valves remain open when systems A and B are pressurized upon abo_l:
2 i b initiation. The switches will also be placed to ON prior to C/M-S/M
separation and remain in that position until completion of propellant

jettison to again ensure that the valves remain in the open position. The
Y_
switches are p!aced to center-neutral position after tower jettison until
prior to C/M-S/M separation, removing electrical power from the valves. !'
Each valve contaies a position switch which is in parallel to one

•1
position indicator below the switch ol,. panel i5 that controls both valves.
When t]_e position switch in each valve is open, the indicator on panel 15
!i-7 ':
is grey (same color as the panel), indicating to the crew the valves are in
f •
the normal, position. When the position switch in each valve or one valve is
I
closed, the indicator on pa._ae] 15 is diagonal lines, indicating to the crew
.! the valve cr valves are closed. The valves are closed in the event of a
failure downstream of the valves, line rupture, or runaway thruster, etc.
The valve will operate at 0 to 360 psig a.t both the inlet and outlet ports.
The proof pressure is 540 psig and the burst pressure is 7Z0 psig.
The solenoid is a Z8-vdc type with a pull-in voltage of not more daan 15 volts
dc, and the current not to exceed Z amperes at 30 vo]ts de. The valve
assembly response is 200 .milliseconds maximum for one-cycle operation
<t ['U:? (open-to-closed or closed-to-open).
iZt
_i
i
2.5.8.2.4 Distribui_on I_iumbiag.
??? Brazed joint tubing is used to distribute pressurized helium gas to

the propellant positive expulsion tanks in system A and system t3. The
h:i
distribution lines contain 11 explosive-0perated (squib) valves which permi_
changing the helium distribution configuration to accomplish various
functions within the C/M RCS. Each squib valve is actuated by an explosive
charge detonated by an electrical hotwire igniter. After igr}ition of the
explosive device, the valve remains open permanently. Two squib valves
are utilized in each system to isolate the high-pressure helium gas supply
to the storage tanks until RCS pressurization is commanded. Two squib
valves are utilized to interconnect system A and system B regulated
1 heliu_n
dump-burn
permit
supply,
he]lure
and
which
helium
gas to
ensures
bypass
purge
the
pressu.rization
operations.
propellant
Two
tanks,
of both
squib
systems
valves
allowing
in
heliu:-n
during
each system
purging
of thc propellant subsystem. One squib valve is installed in system 13
_N regulated helium line to permit helium depressurization in the event of a
].ow-a][icude abort (pad to T + 61 second abort).
:{
REAC'IION CONTROL SYSTY2M
] :_ Mission .............. Basic Date !2 Nov 1966 C_-,an_e Date - Dage
{[
a
i
- (! SMZA-03-SC01Z
!
]
a "r
SYSTEMS DATA
t 2.5.8.3 Engine Assembly.

4
:! 7i
The command n_odule reaction control subsysten_ engines are

ablation cooled, biprope]lant thrust generators which can be operated in
, either the pulse-mode or the steady-state mode.
••4
Each engine consists of a fuel and oxidizer control valve, which
•4
! controls the flow of propellants by responding to electrical commands
ii(i
;d
(automatic) generated by the guidance and navigation subsystem and/or
i
stabilization control subsystem or by the crew (manual!y) and an injector
kb_
head assemb!y which directs the flcw of each propellant from the propellant
2:!
control valves to the cornbustior: chamber arid the combustion chamber in
which the prope]iants are burncd to produce thrust. Estimated engine thrust
rise and decay is shown in figure 2.5-9.
:'!i
_'-- ENGINE
z i t ELECTRICAL
OFF-SIGNAL
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 2,5 28 30 32
lOO
:17 i ] ....
........
-'1--__{,__
tvgkXlMIJM TIME TO 90/TI4RUST
..... -T-----I
.....
"l----i-l'
>:4
I r---r ...... -T----
---MINIMUM TIME TO 90% THRUST44&z_: 4 1
9o
80
7,<.'i I I I I ! ZtA& /,l}_)t_y_\\ , ,,
\'.///I/lktt_,_,", _W
70
60
i k4
l:¢
50
i .<<
xx_ , x,...x- ///y/ >'_,//,4,
40
il
}
30
:]
_w
10 F
'.,,..E
,O ;o ..... ............... !1 eel
i.... --L----L-_±__A]:.._XL.,--_'L.X_L__ L______,t _..... .t___.-L--.-A._. _.t___L .,,,__
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
:!
ii I'IM[ -- MILLISECONDS
.-,ah--- ENGINE
l ELECIRICAL
' ON41GNAL
?_
i!
! SM-2A-665A
!}
i Figure ,,." 5-9. C/M RCS Engine Thrust Rise end Decay Time (Typical)
i::_ REAC'rlO>_" Coi<rROL SYSTEM
?,ti_s_oa Basic Date 1_ Nov 1966 Ch._n_

.: - ................. " ............... {,,_ Date Page 2, 5-30 i[!
i!i
SMZA-03-SC0 i Z
APOILEO OPEI<ATIONS HANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
2.5.8.3.1 Prope]lant So]enoid Injector Control Valves (Fuel and Oxidizer).
The injector va]ves utilize two coaxially wound coils: one for
automatic and one for direct rsanual control. The automatic coil is used
when the thrust command originates from the jet selection logic. ,The
manua] coils are used when the _hrust command originates at the rotation
control (direct mode).
The so]enoid valves are sprimg-loaded closed and energized open.
The reaction time of tl_e valves, pulse mode of operation, reason for
pulse mode, and thrust curve ge-erated by the engine is similar to the
S/M RCS engines.
The automatic coi]s in the fuel and oxidizer injector valves _:,re
.connected in parallel from the SCS. The manual coils in the fuel and
oxidizer injector valves provide a manual direct backup to the autpmatic
systen'_. The n-_anual coils are connected in parallel from the rotation
controls.
Engine injector valve opening time of 5±Z milliseconds and closing

of 6.-52 milliseconds for the automatic coils and opening time of 7 milli-
seconds and closing of 16 to 18 milliseconds for the direct maauai coils.

The actuation time shall not vary by more than -_50 or -.Z5 percent opera--
ring time between +40 to +ZOO°F.
2.5.8.3.2 !nj ecto r.
The injector, contains e. fuel a_d o'<ldizer paCsage that irnpi>ge

(unlike impingement) upon a splash plate within the con_bustion chan_ber.
Therefore, the injector pattern is referred to as an unlike i]npi.nge_._ent
splash-plate injector. There are 16 fuel and 16 oxidizer passages in
the injector face.
2.5.8.3.3 Thrust Chamber Assembly.
The thrust chamber assembly is fabricated in foul segments: th e
combustion chamber ablative sleeve, the throat insert, the ablative
rnaterial, and the asbestos and the fiberglass wrap. The engine is
ablative cooled.
2,5,8.3.4 Nozzle Extension.
The C/M RCS engines are n_ounted within the structure of the C/M.
The nozzle extensions are required to transmit the gases from the engine
out through the structure of the C/M. The nozzle extensions are fabrica-
ted of ablative material.
REACTION CON ..,,,OL SYSTEM
r_ _ .... 12 N_,v ......1964 _...... _,, , Page Z. 5 -31

Mi s s ion Basic ,_z _e :_.:_.L_ v,:.ar.ge Date
i
.!
:_b._
SMZA ,.-0
3- SC0 1g

i]
.ii
S FS ].EMS DA TA
! Z.5.8.3.5 Engine Solenoid Injector Valve Temperature Control System.

i
A temperature control system of the C/M RCS engine valves is
;.j employed by energizing the manual direct coils on each engine.
Temperature transducers are mounted on the engine injector valve

oxidizer solenoids. A temperature-transducer is installed on the sub-
system, A counterclockwise roll oxidizer valve, negative yaw oxidizer

,i valve, negative pitch oxidizer valve and on subsystem B positive yam.'
oxidizer v_!ve, negative pitch oxidizer valve, and clockwise roll oxidizer
ff valve. These engine injector solenoid oxidizer valves were selected as
the coldest engines.
ii<i_
.Fhe temperatttre transducers have a range from -_50°F to +ZS0°F.
! The temperature transducers; from the three subsystem A and B engine
,<
1 oxidizer injeccor valves provide inputs the the TEST SELECT switch on
I
] pane1 Z00, which is located i..u the lower equipment bay of the comr_ta.nd
module. With the FUNCTION St!'LI_fCT switch on panel ZOO placed to
ii
position I3 and the TEST SEL, ECT rotary switch on panel Z00 placed to
positions l, Z, 3, 4, ]i', and 1Z, respectively, the specific engine oxidizer
valve temperature is monitored as a d-c voltage on the 0- to 5-vdc
1
voltmeter. Zero vdc is equivalent to .-50°F and 5 vdc is equivalent to
l
+250°Fo
:: 4
A C/M RCS HEATEP, switch is located on panel ZOO. The C/M

RCS HEA'I'_R sw_tch is placed to the ON positio_ when any one of the
i,:ls_.z-b_to.e.:,t1_.c] ei@ilies aFe uczo,_ ,_ -_ , ,_y_ ......... ,.... ) .........
i must be acco_nplished withh_ 26 minutes prior to C/M-S/M separation,
providing the C/M Fropellank jettison LOGIC switch is ON. The fuel and
oxidizer injector valve manual coils of all C/M RCS engines are energized
open (prior to pressurization of C/M RCS subsystems A. and ]3). A
13-minute heatup time maximum or 100°F, which is monitored on the d-c
voltmeter on panel 2,00 as Z. 50 vdc, assures engine injector w'dve
temperature is at +Z0°F minimum. If +].00°F, Z.50 vdc on the d-c volt-
i meter is reached from the coldest instrumented engine before 13 minutes,
:1 the C/M RCS HEATER switch is placed to OFF, which de-energizes the
engine injector valves and the injector valves spring--load closed. If a
t time of 13 minutes is reached before +100°JF, Z. 50 vdc on the d-c volt--
meter, the C/M RCS t-tEATER switch is placed to OFF. This will prevent
1
the oxidizer from freezing at the engine injector valves upon pressurization
of subsystems A and ]3.
The C/M RCS I-_[EA'I'EP, switch must be placed to OFF prior to C/M
RCS pressurization/ The operation of the C/M RCS HEATER switch in
t conjunction with the d-c w)ltmeter and/or heati_-g time ensurES all other
engine valves reach the acceptable temperature levels. %'he +100°F,
:i Z_ 50 vdc, or thirteen-minute time lin_it assures that the warmest engine
valve will be less than -',-200°F.
-1
REACTION CONTROJ, SYSTI£M
Mission Basic Date !Z Nov ..)66 __,hange Date ......................... Page ...............
2
[]
!1
SMZA-03-SC012
3 !}
:[!4 APOLLO OPERATION-S HANDBOOK
I
i/i! SYSTEMS DATA
:il
/
2.5.8.3.6 Engine Thrust ON-OFF Logic.
•:<_i
I
::%"
.< All thrust commands for C/M attitude pass through the stabilization
and control subsystem and the jet selection logic. These comn_ands n_ay
L:i,] originate at the following:
[i] a. The rotation controls
' b. The stabilization and control subsystem
c. The guidance and navigation subsystem.
In the event tt?e SCS and[or jet selection logic is unable to provide !
commands to the automatic coils of the C/M RCS engines, placing the
<ii b:! DIRECT RCS switch on panel 8 to the ON position provides power to the
rotation control. When the rotation control is positioned fully to its stops
i!i il;i
in any direction, the rotation control energizes the required manual coils
for the desired n_a.neuver. I<
When the CM SM.. SEP switches on panel. 1 5 are placed to CM Sh4
SEP position, the switches automatically energize relays in the RCS

transfer panels (C19A4) and in the RCS cor_tro! boxes (CI9A1)
(figure 2. 5-10) (providing the CM PROP JETT LOGIC switch on panel g is
ON) that transfers the SCS and direct manual inputs from the S/M RCS
engine th the C/M RCS engines automatically. (These same functio;,.s
occur on any LES ABORT.)
The transfer motors in the RCS transfer panels (CI9A4) and in.the
RCS control boxes (C19AI) are _edundant to each other in that they ensure
i 1
the SCS and direct manual inputs are transferred from the S/M RCS
engines to the C/M RCS engines. The transfer motors in the RCS control
boxes (C19A]) are automatically activated by the CM SM SEP switches
(providing the CM PROP JETT LOGIq switch is ON); in addition, they
i! i2 may also be activated by the manual backup of the RCS TRANSFER switch
on panel 16. The transfer motors in the RCS transfer panels (C19A4)
are activated automatically only by the CM SM SEP switches (providing
f the CM PROP ,IETT LOGIC switch is ON).
_As an example, if the RCS transfer motor in C19A1 failed to transfer
[] automatically
automatically
at CM
transfer
SM
the
SEP,
SCS
Lhe
and
RCS
direct
transfer
manual
Fnotor
inputs
in
from
C19A4
the
would
S/M
still.
RCS engines to the C/M RCS engines (providing the CM PROP JE%'T
• LOGIC switch is ON). In addition, the RCS TRANSt"ER switch on panel 16
)1 provides a manual backup to the C19A1 RCS transfer motors only.
11 Anothe.r example, the C/M RCS subsystems could be checked out

prior to CM SM SEP by placing the RCS TRANSFE]_ switch on pane] t6 to
CM position, and only the RCS transfer m.otors (C!9A!) in the RCS control
i! boxes would
engines to the
transfer
C/M
the SCS and
RCS
direct
engines. The
manual
transfer
inputs
motors
from
in the
the S/M RCS
RCS transfer
panels (C19A4) would not transfer until C/M S/M SEP (providing the C/N/i
PROP JETT LOGIC switch is ON) and ti_en start the SM jettison
:i!ii!
controllcrs.
.]. Mission Basic Date I Z Nov I!)6_.__6 Ch_nge Date ..... Page .... 2_.!_=3.L ............
!
4
SMZA-03-SC0] Z
bl
SYSTFMS ])A TA
<
d
Z, 5.8.4 Propellant Jettison.

1
There are two sequences of propellant jettison. One sequence is
employed in the event of an abort while the vehicle is on the launch pad and
through the first 61 seconds of flight. The second sequence is employed

for all other conditions, whether it be a normal or an abort mode of
operation. The sequence of events before and during a nornlal re-entry
is as follows:
Ji a. The crew will place the C/_ S/M SEPARATION switches to the
C/M S/M SEPARATION position on panel 15 or place the C/M RCS

PRFSS switch on panel ]6 to the ON position, prior to initiating C/k4 S/M
separation. The C/}_ RCS PRESS switch or the C/1\4 S/iv[ SEP switches
:} initiates the heliun_ isolation squib valves in C/i%_ RCS subsyste_-ns A and B,
thus pressurizing both subsysten]s (figures Z. 5.-8 and Z. 5-].0). The C/.N4
RCS PRESS switch provides a backup to the C/_i S/M SEP switches and
the I%CS LOGIC switch on panel 8 must be ON, urior to initiating
ii C/M-S/}_ separation to provide an au£orn_t[c IRCS transfer.
b. The C/IV[ cor;tinues to descend _.fter re-entry into the earth
atmosphere. At Z4,000 feet, barn]metric s\vitc!_ is activated which

unlatches the RCS latching relay, h_.hibiting any co_Yn_nands from the SCS
to the jet selection logic (figure Z. 5-3) (manual backup of RCS Ck4D switch
panel 16).
c. At ._-nain parachute line stretch, the RCS propellant jettison DU]VIP
switch on panel 8 is placed to the DUMP position as e normal manual

function by the crew, initiating the following functions, sin_-ultaneously.
?
The RCS LOGIC switch on panel 18 must be ON prlol to placing DUMP
switch to DUMP position.

:! 1. Initiakes the two heliu_n interconnect squib valves
Z. Initiates the fuel interconnect squib valve

Y_
3. Initiates the oxidizer interconnect ,squib valve
[
:{
4. The fuel and oxidizer injector valve manual coils are energized
on all of the C/M RCS engiDes, excluding the -t- pitch engines. The
_t
+pitch engines are not energized due to their location, being adjacent
to the steam vent. The propellants are jettisoned by burning the
propellants remaining in 10 of the 1Z engin.es. The length of time to

I burn the remaining propellants will vary, depending upon the amount
of propellants remaining h'_, the fuel and oxidizer tanks at Z4,000 feet.
If an entire propellant load remained, as an example, a nominat burn
i time would be 88 seconds through 10 of the 1Z engines. In the worst
';i
case of only 5 of the 1Z engines (manual coils energized), a nominal
burn time would be 1.55 seeonds_
d. Upon con_pletion of propellant burn, the C/M propellant jettison

PURGE switch on panel 8 is placed to the PURGE position as a normal
manual function by the crew. When the PURG92 switch is on, the switch
ip. itiates the four helium bypass squib valves, allowing the regulated
helium pressu_e to bypass around each fuel and oxidize:,: tank, thus
purging the manifolds through 10 of the 1Z engines. Purging requires
approximately 15 seconds or until helium depletion.
:i
REACTION CONTROL SYS7 tEM
• Mission ............................... Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 Change _n._-_; ................ Page Z. 5-34 }i
z
SMZA-03-SC01Z
:i!:/!
SYSTEMS DA.TA
!<14
_ ill
4 MN B 28VDC ZI6 Z16 RCS CONTP,O_ I
i
_'_Tj_<_:!Z_.;_-_ [ K2 K1 TO SPS ABORT BOX 019A2 _ ,,
I L.[ 4!----_--_ DIRECT ULLAGE
/ PANEL 25 _ _ _ _N{YI_ .... "_ "_, r- ',," TO YlC19A4 SYS B [
'_M C/M S!M IRANSrER | RCS TRANSFER i| ,.q
'i P:t
T"BCB J SWiTC.,.:;_--4L 46----_ 1
/M SiN] P NE[_---_ .... PAre L 2_ -----<>-'_'
TTT:..--:_ ---[ ''_ " |
EP, B ROPJETr .,/ oC/M HELIUM CIM _ , _$I) -l
wncH °__Lo'_lc
SWITCH " ;_J_P
swnc:. _ _A L x_ .__-" I !
ANEL I_ ('----:- _ ....... j_- .... I--- .......... --I ......... _-----'I. r.... _r---'_C S _
:j I........... j PROP _Ei# PANE[ 8 ,.._ __] TRANSF'::R} " _,

1 t DU,,_P C/_,,, I_ ............... J ............ _ W,OTOR 1 [
:i !2_
i
..,.!
:g ! r ..... ___-'_'_ >WMOH/_SK;NALi IIMER ! i TIMER l _ TIMER i I
,]
5% .J I f½ A-,, -_ ,_--, L .... L--$-_-J T I I
I(K_) (i<7) (KS) (K_). I L ........ 4, I i
.ai
:4
MESC lOG : " B ._ ....... "........
! ;:_a
L_ ......... - [....... _ AUTO• --_K1 | "
LY - SM RCS TRANS_ER_W \"_ #I0 _ LATRIilNG (K4_. (K> "_

5
MESC PYRO BUS I REFER!NIEMESC PYRO BAY B IUS
ANEL 25 _ 28 VDC ,.L J_,

ZTl',:t Z7KI
OP ISOL _ ZTK2 _i"
T Z7K2
==o= SY_TEA_ A 1-']i_--]I B!

S ,'STEA_,
i HELII_IMI I HELiU= I
I PRESS I _, PRESS
t SQUIB ! l SQUIB I '
SM-2A-901B
:ii!i%
F_gure 2.5-10. C/M RCS Squib Valve Power Control D/agre_n_
I REACTION CONTROL S'_S..LM
Basic Date 1Z Nov 1.966 Cha,_zF.e Date Page Z, 5.-35,;Z.5-?,6

d_:.:,
,_ s ion
[;I
-., ..... ., ...... -

i_i
i
a
BAT BUSB
ii,i}i _,\ PANEl_22 MES',.,
;2" AR_, ? TBCB

LES PANEL].6 LES _ =
ABORT CIM R_,S ABORT
,-p ,-- _I,
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SEP o[ S,v,TCf4 pt)ROt OUt AcTER I
rs'_ #sh
7
PYRO ENTRY
BAT B BUS .BAt" B BUS
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EQblPWEItTBAY | EQUIPMENT
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1(6
MANUAL
COILS
EXCLUDING
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BYPASS
SQUI B
:!!
:!
L ¢5C
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Zl0 Z16 RCS CONTROL I
i I,'.,21<1 TO SPS ABORT BOX CIgAI
_ !4 Lr_b_l .... _ DIRECT UI.LAGE i
• 25 " l_ PA'_E'_]."_ ......... "_ r- "_ TO YIC'IgA4 SYS A
LI
/M TRANSFER I RCS TRANSFER !I ,,, _
,_OPJEIT ,_1,_CI;v'lH,I_IUM u.v_ _ I _." J--

SWITCH 1DUMP SWITCH U K31 )']. "_r l
JEll PANEL81 ] _ TRANSFER
:H PROP /_ IZ ..... _Z_Z" _ I CE ll
4 ?PURGE I_OFF-46] SECOND__t8SECONDI_8 SECOND

I
''_ _lq _SIGNAL_ TIMER _ _ rIMER _ 1_. TIMER _ i
", ,'.,o_ ,A, ._ .... L-4'. J t

! /1<8 I ( K9 } / [ [
LOGIC !BUSA ,' LD ,ANAL22 |

:::: ,_..:;.-.,
........,.............
..........
. MFfir. LOGIC a_F_n_nr'_c" .a'r&
"_*'_":":_:";'_'_::_"_ ARM G"'A_
4 U e :::_MAIN
t;BUq # vl/bri
......
NOTF:
_' _ '_-_CONTROL
DROPOU] AUTO
OX DU/V',
P
AFTER 1. SECOND o I MOTOR
i!i!ii _:i
j:._, ]- .... f,:uTo
,tO SYS A LEGOF fh_ _ j _RCS CkID
RCS TRANSFERSW L! J'_ ,I
IG )
/'_-_ lIO RCS
LMCHiNG it E. _,K)_ i_ •
...... "_'" RELAYZ]9
t¢,ESCPYROBUS A REFERENCE/V1ESC
PYROBATA BUS
i
iI
SYSTr_ A SYS1EMB l
HELIUM HELIUNI
PRESS PRESS i
_QU,B SQUIB
!:ii
q
.:._ •
:4
i BAT BUS A MN A 28 VDC
PANEb
PANEL 22 MESC • " l_, C/M S
Zi!
I _ ?J ARW,BAT A CB
I _ _"A CB
LES " I_PA,NEI.16" "" L_ZS " _ _'C/MS/M T-p_E-_j-----/
|MESC PYkO ABORI I c!M RCS
I ABORT ISEP, A [ C/M
, ,-
OR CIM-._IM I,
, PRESS
.
_
_...... :*,_,._........... _
/SWITCH ....
_.'_, •LC_IC
-_-
i! JSWITCH SEP ,,t SWITt.:tt [!DROPOUT AFll-Ri P/,,,',IEL 1_ __;_[!
i SAtE'_iARM / ' i i 1 8 SECOND _ ____,_, t.,n,l_
_L........... 1 _!.......L.._Z_ ...........
_2 _ J, PROPi
I fz_i.,
d:.....
2-
i zm_
. I j_ ,_:1:
....
#." ........... #'T- / DUI_._ PLI, -....
!. \K:{) \.K_.)
:?-';[:LJ.
::j
I
r ...... r-- 3-
ENTRY
:, BATA BUS
• _ 1_ t K7'
NEGBUS_ !.... _ ....
i
RCS FUd_
- r "L, U,ESC
i A _ DUMPA I [c,%4 i ZOp,_
_,.o_;v_:R .>LOWFR ! ZSK2°','-: "t

!
i BAY J_
! "SIC19A4 =: K7 'K2
_....._K_
I I' =T_
z'_'n, YI FRO.,[
SYS A
SAg
MANUAL L
I : Z21KI _ CONTROLLER COILS
! t START j
EXCLU
,p DiNGI
4
i K5
1,<:, ITZ_! k 1(9 • r.._ P_NEL25 t;.'_Z8 V I
,t ,d_ ,zZ!
K_ _- PROP " SOl. :_
:_._K4 :_K6 I t\l& _ K8
: K8
, Z,_-=_t. K4_ MNA CB z
:/XIDIZER
:; DUMP
OXiDiZER !
iNTER ,_
Z,:,Tl I FU,:L F%_T]
i_ BYi_'_'SS _. l-mop. _,
4T
RoP
t DUWI _ SQUIB
:i SQUIB I CONNECT SQUiPB BYPASS SQUIB ,sol_ ,SOL
_372LJ L:!L/L SYS A ,_, . YS B
J
.l
i
.t
i
q
.... :!iii i!ii: ::::& • J: if:i:
i ,'t._JZ1(1_
DI _ . •
cj;---t
_:
kV8 J._G'¢,;d_i-iO:J
.[,
}1 ^'_ q ,_4 _u,C "
_._.1
_v_.i
Sl_42A-03...sCo 1Z
APOLLO Ot EJ_A_._ ' HANDBOOK
!! ....
SYSTEMS DATA
e. In the event of the C/M propellant jettison LOGIC sw_itch and/or ,
DUMP switch failure, the rernalning proueliants may be burned by placing
the DIRECT RCS switch on panel 8 to ON and positioning the two rotation
controllers to CCW, CW, -.Y, +Y and -P (excluding +I °) position, ener-
c#
gizing the manual fuel and oxidizer injector valve solenoid coils o,:
i0 of the iZ C/M RCS engines burned. At the comp].eti.on Of propellant _'
burn, the C/M RCS HEL_.Ub DUMP switch on panel 26 would be placed
ON initiating the four bypass squN) valves, allowing the regulation helium
pressure to bypass around ea.ch fuel and oxidizer tank, and purging the ,
I t;:i manifolds through i0 o.f the IZ engines providing the two rotation con- !
trollers are positioned to CCW, CW, --Y, +Y and --P (excluding +I_).
f. In the event the C/A,! propellant jettison LOGIC switch and DUMP
s_vitch on panel 8 hmction correctly and the PURGE switch fails, the C/bl
H}_Li[]M. DU_iP s-<_d[ch on p_nel Z6 would be place(] to ON', _hus initiating
{:l_e four helium bypass squib valves, a!icv¢ing the regulated heliu_m pres-
sure to bypass around eac]:, fuel and oxidizer tank_ and purgln_ i:he
:'i; L ii
rnanifolds through ].0 of the IZ engines.
7_
g. Prior to _>_ater K_npact _be LOGIC switch on pane] 8 n_ay be placed
....
1 to the OFF position, \vhi.ch would de-energize the manual coi•Is of the
engine injector valves allowing the engine injector valves to spring-load

closed, preventing sea \rater fro}s<_ entering the _anifolds through the
engine. The DUMP switch [)laced £o the OFF position will accoH_plish
:_ !.!S
the sarape function.
J
The sequence of events invoivi.ng an abort from the pad up ;:o
6] seconds i._ as follows:
_1 t :I a. The OXIDIZER DI.KM1 _ sw, itch on p;.u_,el ].6 is placed in the AUTO
4 OX DUMP position, and the RCS LOGIC s_vitch o._ pane] 8 is placed {_n the
? ON position, at some time in _he com)tdown prior '_o T:0.
<iI] abort
b. The
si.gnal.
following
The com.
events
ma,,_d
occur
may be
sh:_ul[aneousiy
gener.%ted
upon
autoz_.atic.ally
the receipt
by the
of the
sequence events controller subsyste_n oz" by_tdanual].y rotating the

translation control cou_-_.[erclockwise.
i. _Vh.en the abort signal is receive_4, the two squib-operated

helium isolation valves in each syste_n are initiated ope_3, pressurizing
subsystems A and B. Manual backup of the C/i_i PRESS switch,
i I:! panel
Z_
16.
The squib-operated heliun_ interconnect valve for the oxidizer
tanks is initiated open. If only one of the two squib helkun isola',ion
valves was initiated open, both systems are pressurized as _. result

of the hc]lum interconnect squib valve intercom_ect.
3. The solenoid-o[)erated fuel _nd oxidizer isolation shutoff
valves are closed to prevent fuel and oxidizer from flo_ving to the
thrust, chamber assemblies.
4. The squib-operated oxidizer interconnect valve is initiated
open_ If only one of the I.wo oxidizer overboard dv,a_p squib valves
was initiated open, tlte oxidizer manifolds of each system are common
as a result of the oxidizer interconnect squib valve.
:] -
t REACTION CONTROL o ......

o fS T_-M
:]
]
IZ Nov 196_.(_hang e "_ _ ..........................
SMZA-03-SC01Z
A PO LLO OP]'ERAT IONS HAi'_DB OOK
i SYSTEAiS DATA
5. The squib-operated oxidizer overboard dump valves route the

oxidizer to a blo\v-out plug in the aft heat shield of the C/M which
4 shears a pin due to the pressure buildup and blows the plug out,
dumping the oxidizer overboard. The entire oxidizer supply is dumped
in approximately 13 to !5 seconds.
6. The RCS latching relay will not energize in the event of an abort
" Ji
from 0 to +61 seconds due to the position of the AUTO OK DUMP switch
(figures 2. 5-3 and Z. 5-10). Thus, no commands are allowedinto the
jet selection logic from the SCS.

7. The C/M-S/M RCS transfer inotor-driven switches are auto-
matically driven upon the receipt of the abor t siznal, allowing electrical
%
signals to be supplied to the C/}_I RCS engine injector valves. ]klanual
i¸] backup of RCS transfer switch, panel 16.
c. Eighteen seconds after the abort signal [s initiated, the follov_ing
events automatically occur si_nultaneously:

!. The helium interconnect squib valve between the fuel tanks is
initi __.ted open.

Z. The heliun] overboard dump squib valve is initiated open,
%
dumping the helium pressure overbo[{rd i_to the aft equipment
:i
compartment, releasing the helium pressure frorn both fuel tanks.
3. The bypass squib valve to the subsysterns A and B oxidizer tank
is initiated open, purging both oxidizer systems out through the over-
board dump in the aft heatshield.

,ii
4. Fuel re_"nains onboard at impact with no pressure on the fuel
tanks.
The sequence of events of an abort, initiated after 61 seconds up to
launch escape tower jettison, are as follows:

a. At 61 seconds after lift.-off, the crew as a normal _anual function
will place the AUTO OX DUMP switch on panel 16 tothe AUTO RCS CMD
position.
b. The RCS LOGIC switch was placed to the ON position prior to T+0.
I. Initiate both helium isolation squib valves in C/M RCS,
] subsystems A and B. Manual backup of C/M RCS PRESS switch on

<{ panel 16; thus, pressurizing C/M RCS subsystems A and B.
Z. Drives the C/M S/M RCS transfer motors to the C/M RCS
position.
CI9A] RCS
Manual
transfer
backup
motors
of RCS
only.
TRANSFER switch on panel 16 for
[
3. RCS latching relay energized one second after receipt ol the
RCS
abort
d. At
propellant
signal.
main parachute
and jettison
line
]DUMP
stretch,
switch
as a normal
on panel 8
manual
is placed
function,
to the
the [
DUMP position initiating functions the sa_,ne as a norn_al entry.
[
[
[<
[
L!,ssion Basic DateJ.___jX95f_!_j.6 Change Date .............. I-)age

z. 5-38
!i_ ,,,=.,
SMffA-03-SC0 i2
!i '4 APOLLO OPZRATIONS HANDBOOI[
3
SYSTEMS DATA
2.5.9 C/M RCS PERFORMANCE AND DESIGN DATA.

I
2.5.9.1 Design Data.
- t i:l The following list contains data of the CM/RCS components:

;: i t_ti
H,ELIUM TANKS (Z) 4150±50 psig at 70°±5°F during servicing,
setting on launch pad 70°_I0°F. Capacit):
{
!
iJ 0.57 Ibs, inside diameter 8.84 in., wall
thickness 0. !05 in. and internal volume
" 1
3
of 365:-_5 cubic in. at 4150±50 psig.
HELIUM ISOGA'_['ION SQUIB Remove 98 percent of all particles \vi-_ose
VALVE FILTER two _mahes.t

q dimensions are greater than
40 microns.
"' t:;;_ lit _
tSl k
Remove 100 percent of all pardcies whose
: ]i two snnallest dimensions are greater than
iiEl
?
74. mtcroni_.
REGULATOR UNITS (4) Pri_nary - Initial of 291±6 psig and stabilize
within 2 seconds to Z9i:-k4 psig,. Locl<up
pressure rnini_nuna of Z84 psig and not
exceed 30Z psig.

;}
i 1/_ Secondary - Lockup Z87 to 308 psi.g a,ud

L2_ stabilize at Z94. 5±7. 5 psig within
Z s ec oD.d_,
!
[3
.i:lI] HELIUM RELIEF VALVES Diaphragm rupture at 34.0--t8 psi.
(4)
.4 Filter - 10 nMcrons nominal, Z5 microns
absolute
! Relief valves relieves al: 346±!4 psig

:i
Relief valve reseats at no less than
:)Z7 psig
L: I
=!_!
.i
F].ow capacity 0. 3 lb/min at 60'F and
346_14 psig
]
Bleed device closes when increasing
I Ii_i
_ pressure has reached no more than
179 psig in the ca_,ity and a helium flew
i of tess than ZO standard cubic cer_.timelc:rs
,
1 N
per
assemblies
hour across
combined.
thc bleed
The
and
bleed
relief
device
-'ah'e
sLall reopen when decreasing pressure has

)
reached no less than 20 psig.
_i iil
,_ REACTION CONT'i{OI, SYSTEM
::! iliiliYi Mission Basic Date i2 Nov ]9!p___Change Date ....... I-)age ................
:j
,!
SMZA-03-SC01Z
%
.APOLLO OPY]RATIONS HANDBOOK
SYSTEMS ]_ATA _:iiY
PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS l].lurninates caution and warning light on

FUEL AND OXIDIZER panel I0 (C/M RCS A or .]3)
After heliunq isolation, underpressure

Z65 psia
4
Squib valve actuation, overpressure
325 psia
FUEL TANKS (Z) Combined propellant and ullage volume

of 45. Z ibs, initJ.a]ly at 65°F at 304-2 psig,
than Z05 psia when heated to 105°F.
Length 17.3Z9 (+0.040, -0.000) in.,
oatside diarneter rna_:imurn IZ. 6Z in. , wall -
•:ili}_ thickness 0,OZZ in. to O.OZ7 in,
OXIDIZER TANK (Z) Coinbined propellant and ullage volume of

89. Z pounds initially at 65°F at 30+Z psig,
restilting in a tank pressure of no more
)iii than Z05 psia ",vixen heated to 85°F.

Length 19. 907 (+0.040, -0.000) in.,
!1%! maxirnunl outside diameter 1Z.6Z in.,
wall thickness 0. 022 to 0. 027 in.
VALVE ISOLATION BDRS'i' Rupture at 24im14 psig, within Z seconds

a DIAPHRAGM (4) afte:c ruptu._e l?_.sbu.'e ;s redcfLt:u
' " ' &i; &iiy t_
tem.perature between 40 ° to 105°F.
Filter 75 microns nominal, 100 micro;is

absolute.
ENGINE Z00-second service life, 3000 operational

;{
d
<!;,i_ cycles
Nominal thrust, 93 pounds
Expansion ratio, 9 to ]
[
/i_i
ii
:<: ;_
Cooling, ablation
[
Injector type, 16 on 16 splash plate
?
Combustion chamber refrasil ablative

sleeve and grapl-_ite base throat insert.
-i:ij
.[
li
RELACTION CONTROL SYSTi'_"M
]Basic Date iZ Nov 1960 _.....Change Date Page

.................... Z. 5-40
SR'I ZA -. 0 3 - c,(., 0 1 2
i!9
I AiJOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
AutornatJ.c and manual coils -. connected

in parallel
Weight, 8.3 lbs
Leltgtn, I i. 65 in., nxa_,::irnmn

i LJ
Nozzle e}_:itdiameter, 2. 13 inches
1
'!
[ .Nozzle extensions, ablative refrasil
:,{ OXIDIZER DUMP BLOWOUT Pin shears at 100 psig
PLUG
:i L9
Z _ 9. Z Perfornnance Data. .t£•

'{ I'4
!
Refer to iViission Iviodul.ar Data .uook, S]:D 66-]_77.
2.5.9.3 Power Consmmption Data..
Refer to paragraph Z. 5.4.3.
_
_. 5 , I0 C/M RCS OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS AND RESTP, ICTiOI'4S.
A propellant isolation va]ve switch must be placed to ON rno_en-

tarJ!y prior to lift-off and returned to neutral. At T+61 seconds after
iI lift-off _he switches must be placed to Olq untiI orbit insertion to ensure
Lil thai; floe val-,,cs will re_nin epin if a:_ LEF 7 abort is _.nJtiatod; f]_en ai:
:i
? orbit insertlo_t:, the switches may be placed to neutral. The swi.tches
l
n%us[ be placed to ON prior £o C/iN4. RCS pressurization to ensure valves

i remain open throughout entr3..
: I
2.5. i0.1 C/M RCS Electrical Power Distribution.
i See figure 2.5-11 for elect.rical power distribution.

I
Z. 5. ll C/IVl RCS TELEMETRY MEASUREMENTS.
1 The following is a complete ].ist of the C/Ni RCS telemetry data that
is monitored by the flight controllers and ground support personnel.
::d
:. t
:i
,¢ b;_
;i N
_i!i:{
REACTION CONTP, OL SYSTEM

ii
: ' t" r_..._ !2. Nov 1q66 Cha;_e Date ........................... _-"age Z. 5-4i
;i .c_i
i
}
SMZA-03-SC012
APOLLO OPERATIONS I-IANDIf3OOK
S ¥STEI_4S DATA
%
_j
iilz
_!i
'2
-!
;ii
.:,.:
: [
,%
i
il
2_
:/
.j
:,hi
?3
SM-2A-714C
:i
E'igure g. 5-i].. C/M RCS Electrical Power Distribution J)iagram

:Z
:1:7_
REACTION C;ON'ZRO.T_. SYSTEM
ission .............. Basic Date 12 Nov ]966 Chang e Date ......... Page go 5-42
, " "" '7 .....
_" " , ....... '
:!
,,,."
' _ .,'i
.r" I
J nnel Bit
Signal
rn e_,l. ]
O p ": ::ting <: nge
Conditione r
Nunqb e r Rc_uge
5_ Mcasurcn_ent
Crew Display --,' .-
t.'igur c I
8 I CZ8AR31 4150:h50 psia and
_h'lium I'ank Supply mressure A
t10A l,
Z.5-7 CR0001P I+0 +5K psia dee rcase during
Panel 1Z
l
i
P;mcl
Panel
1 "
IZ
Z.5-7
2.5-7
Helium
Hehum
'Yank
Tank
Supply
Supply
Pressure
TemperaZure
t3
A
CR00')ZP
CR000_T
l-"-0
i+0
+5K
+300
psia
°F
CZSAR3Z
CZSAR33
IOA83
iCA5Z i
fI2
H1
mission.
70_I0°F
pad variable
on launch
10A55 HI during mission.

CZ8AR34
CR00047 ;0 +300_F
i Panel 12 2.5-7 I-leiiunl Tank Supply Temperature B
F_ CR0005P +0 +400 nsia CZSAR35 lIAI07 H2
Panels 10 and IZ 2.5-7 Fuel Tank A Pressure

After pressuriza-
C28AR36 1 i.%]14 HZ
CR0006P -0 -t-400 psia tion 287 to 308
2.5-7 Fuel Tank 13 Pressure
Panels 10 and IZ
psla until propel-
CR0011P _0 +400 psia C28AR38 I I A79 fl 2

lant purge
>
2.5-7 Oxidizer Tank A Pressure
Panels 10 and 1Z
@
C28AR39 IIA81 H2 PCM O
I Panels 10 and 1z 2.5-7 Oxidizer Tank B Pressure CR001ZP +0 <-400 psia
t"
F-l
Z.5-7 Fuel Line Pressure A
CR06Z3P +0 +400 psia 0
I
{ /-%
F-Z FQ
t FQ !
CR0624P +0 +400 ps[a
2.5-7 Fuel Line Pressure B Flight recorder. <' K
P-3 FJ b_
2.5-7 Oxidizer Line Pressure A C2%0625P +0 +400 psia >
FQ
> ,
F--4
t"
i 2.5-7 Oxidizer Line Pressure B CR0$Z6P +0 +400 psi&
© C28AR295 51A17 HI O '

CRZ_01T!-50 +250°F
5-7 TeFnDerature Oxidizer Valve "
Panel 97
[ PCM_
CC¥_ R Engine A
LI
C 28 AR296 ! I A78 HI PCM l

; Panel 9"7 1.5-7 Tslmperature Oxidizer Valve -Y
C!<2LOET -50 +250°F
Variable during >
_D Engine A mission, prior to [ Z
PC M
u
5IAI8 HI
CRZZ05T -50 +ZS0_P C28ARZ99 sep&ration turn i
Panel 97 2.5-7 TerPperazure Oxidizer Valve --_ heaters on if I ©
Engine A below +64°F, turn
©
J manel 97 2.5-7 Temperature Oxidizer Valve '-Y
CRZI:03T -50 +250°F CZ8ARZ97 I0 A35 HI PCM off
time
in
or
13 nuinutes
!O0°F. I
m
t
i En£ ine B ,ahicheve
reached
r
first.
is
[
CZSARZ98 10A38 HI PCM
CR2Z04T -50 +250°F
2.5-7
i
Panel ;7 Temperature Oxidizer Valve -P
Eng ine B
PCM]
10A34 HI
• i
CZ8AR300
2.5-7 Temperature O:,:idlzer "Valve CWR CRZZ06T -50 +250°F
Panel 97
Engine B i
U_
@ 2._=-7 CCW Roll En£ine Chamber CROqI4P • +0 +250 psia
P-13 !
Pressure A Flight recorder. I
CR0_ZOP "_0 +250 psi&

F - 14 Fa ]
Z, ,_-7 CCW Ro]l Engine Chamber
P!'essilr_ t3
5, A1, o ill VQ
2.3-7 CCW Poil Engine Wa!]
CRa, 361T _0 i100GOF"
T_'.'Tq_' r a t u.r c A
i Lw_ .....
................... _ ----[
t ........l
ment
t
I Sienal i
I Channel 1 t_t
[_.at c::
T
I
I
Condlt:oner 1 Operating F, ang c
Code:;:
Crew ;?is_lav Figure i Meaaur_,ment I I
Ntu-_b c rq_, Range 51AZ0 If!
q
i V a t'inbh'
Z. =,-7 i CCW RoI1 Eni,'ine Wall
Temperature B CR458ZT +0 +I000°F

}.'Q
FCME Event
IIEIZ-03 EZ
CD0023X OFF ON
Z.5-9 C/M-S/M SEP Relay Close A
event
t I
i (Z9 to Z7) I
I!EIZ-04 EZ I PCME Event
2.5-9 C 'M-S/M SEP Relay Close B CD0024X OFF ON
ca
(Z9 to Z7}
event
I
IIEI2-01 EZ PCME Event

a 5'1 i CDOOOZXIOFF ON
2.5-9 LES Abort Initiate Signal A
] event
(Z9 to Z7)
! >
IIEIZ-07 EZ PCME Event
Z.5-9 LEg Abort Initiate Signal B
O
(Z9 to Z7)
e< tON PCME Event
U
Z.5-9 RCS Actuate Signal A (ZI9)
IIE13-06 EZ U
O
> •
O £o,
IIE13-07 EZ PCME
CD0171X]OFF ON I Event
Z.5-9 RCS Activate Signal B (Z!9)
event
o. t >
CD0173X OFF ON llEI3-08 E2 PCME Event > I
2.5-9 C/M Pressurize Signal A (Z9 to Z7) O
event i
[0
fIEf4-01 EZ PCME Event
CD0174X OFF ON Z
:! g' o II Z.5-9 C/M Pressurize Signal B (Z9 _o Z7)
event
_q
> <n
(i_ tO 1 11E14-08 EZ PCME Event t'o

CE00OTX CLOSE OPEN
2.5-9 Barometric Switch Lock In Close >
eveut
1 Relay A Z
,-+ PCME Event
t Z.5-9 Barometric Switch Relay Lock In CE0008X CLOSEOPEN liE15-01 E2
bJ
event
Close Relay B ©
IIE25-03 EZ PCME Event O
2.5-9 Lift-Off Signal A
BS006CX N
PCME Event
2.5-9 Lift-Off Signal B IIE25-04 I EZ
BS0061X i___
: i
Channel Example: i0A81
*Analog measurements digitally coded into 8 bit words.
Analog measurements -0 (+0.15 -0) vdc to 5 (+0, -0.15) vd¢

Significant number - 1
FQ - Flight qualification measurements
HI - High bit rate
HZ - High and low bit rate

s[gnifieant nun_ber is _ 0 sample
••< CO EZ - High and low bit rate arr',ount
How many of _eros after
samples per ]_ t] per
second j second
" I I
•'•2
<!i
!!!!%1 SMZA-03-SC0 IZ
:!U APOLLO OPIE]IATIONS IIANDBOOI<
SYSTEMS DATA
:_$_
iiil SECTION Z
SUBSECTION Z. 6
t
ELECTRICAL I°OWEIZ SYSTEM EPS)

i i_i
1
2.6.! INT ROD UC TIO N.
i
J The electrical power systenu (figure Z.6-I) supplies all electrical
f:i power required By the sp_..cecraft to cornp!ete its scheduled nuission.
L_ D-C electrical power is provided ])_ three fuel ceil power plants, two
t_
S/M jettison control]er batteries located in the -_erviee nuodule, and

five batteri.es (Z pyro and 3 entry) located in the coznnuand module. A-C
['!_i
$ ; electrical power i.s provided by one, or two, of the three inverters located
in the lower equipment ba.v of the co_nn_and modt_le. Controls and displays
i
for the EI-_S are positioned in the command n_odu.le near the a,;tronaut
respcmsib]e for contro]]ing and nzon[tori_ng tJ_e system. The EPS can be i?_,
....
divided into four subsystems as follows:
:i1 [i
[
Energy storage: cryogenic storage; pyrotechnic, entry, and S/]'_
jettison controller batteries
Power generation: fuel cel! power plants
I :b Power conversion: se!]d state inverters, battery charger

:i
!
I
e Power distribution: d-c power dis_ri.budon, a-..c power distribution,
sensing circuits, COl__trols and displays.
FUNCTIONAL D_'SC R].PTION.
Energy Stowage.
The primary source of energy for the EPS is provided by the cryo-
i e genic
(oxidizer)
storage
cryogenic
syste_n.
storage
There are
tanks.
two hydrogen
F]-{ch tank has
(fuel)
i£s
and
associated
two o>_vgen
controls,
)i heaters, and fans designed to give, in an automatic mode, a si.ng!e-phase
reactant to its load throughout the tank-.density range, when operath_g at
norn_al pressures.
i
A secondary source of energy storage is provided by batteries.
The batteri.es supply sequencer logic and pyro power at all ti:,rlcs, sup-
piementz{] d-.c power fox high-peak loads, and _]I electrical power required
]
during the entry and post]anding phases after CSM. separation.
:!
)
I
i
:i [:;i_
E L If"
(.:
T R iC A ]b ]PO W E _:(S Y S T i_Ni
-) f
Mission Basic D_.te LT_l'j_jv D_%,O___Changc: :[:."ate ...................... Page ........ _[_,2jf.L;]: ..........
Sh42A-03-SC0 IZ
i_iil
!i_ APOLLO OPERATIONS iqANDk%OOI<
SYSTEMS DATA
• _i
Z.6. Z.Z Power Generation.
Three Bacon-type fuel. cell power plants in the service module gener-
ate the d~c power required for spacecraft systems. 'The fuel cell power
•!:!ii•_
plants are activated prior to launch and operate continuously throughout
the _nission tuatil CSM separation.. Nornlally, fuel cell power plant 1 is
_i
i!
connected to n_ain d-c bt_s A, power plant 3 to main d-c bus B, and power
plant Z to both main d-c buses A and B. However, the capability is
provided to also connect fuel cell power plant 1 to main d-c bus B and fuel
cell power plant 3 to main d.-c bus A.
Each fuel cell is rated to produce Z9J-:Z volts dc between 563 and
14Z0 watts of power. Two fuel cell power plants are c_pable of providing
the normal power requiremer_ts of all spacecraft systen_s, if two fuel cell
power plants malfmaction, some of the electrical components must be shut
do_,n to conserve power, and the re__aiuing power plant with battery
backup will supply sufficie_t power i:o carry • the load and insure successful
mission teras-,Jnation. One fuel cell with complete battery backup can pro-
iii!!i vide m_ximtun_ power required by _ission burns, if the cryogenJcs are
available and fuel. cell temperature is above 4Z5°F.
Z. 6. Z.3 Power Conver sior:.
iii!!i!i Primary d-c power is converted into _-c power by solid-state

inverters. TJoe inverters provide I15-volt 400-cps 3-phase a-c power up
to 1Z50 volt-amperes each. The a-c power is connec{:ed to the two a-c
buses which s_.rpply power to a-c loads. Dtxri.ng nor,_al operation, one
invc:'ter v:'111 power both a.-c buses ,vh;_le the two remaining inverters e, ct
as redundant sources. For peal< loads, each a-c bus will be powered by a [
separate inverter. In case of an a-c or d-c bus failure, the inverters and
remaining buses can be isolated. Inverter switching circuits prevent con-
necting two inverters on one bus, but simultaneous ope.ration of two
inverters is possible if each is connected to a separate bus. A phase
synchronizing trait provides in-phase power when a separate inverter is
powering each bus.
,5
The battery charger is a secondary power conversion unit, which is

used to keep entry batteries charged. The charger is a solid-state device
converting a-c power frown the inverters and using d-c power from the fuel
cells to provide charging voltage.
Z. 6.2.4 Power Di sir ibution.
ili:_
Distribution of prin%ary d-c power is acco_.plished by two redundant
d-c buses in the command module. Additional buses consist of two
}
separate nonessential buses for servicing nonessential loads, a battery
relay bus for power distribution switching, two battery buses, and a flight
i and postlanSing bus to service certain communications a:.,_d
the postlanding
circuits. A-C power is distributed by two redm_dant a-c buses.
E]',ECTR1CAL POWER SYSTEM
Mission Basic: Date I Z Nov I96iChange Date ........ T°-age 2.6-2

SMZA - 0 3- SC0 ..,.
] [i!_
APOLLO OPFRATIONS i-LANDBOOK
]
SYSTEMS DATA
{
]
STRIBUTION
L__e:< __
[_
(_AT
TIE
MAIIJ
A
SWITCH
& C)
BUS
©
,i] _.,)_
i _ii
i
}]
A_
ij
_,i
¸]
[ii
NOT_S:
1. !,A:,tor swbch con'_ac?s
] $5
close
swilche_
when
are
main
:el
bus
lo bal
tie
A&C and _-_:t B&C
$4 2. _altery bus conlacts
iili
I remain
manned
closed
S/C.
on
3. F/C I ca_ Le connected

to SM Bus B& F/C31o
SM Bus A.
:i! 4. DC Bus comml cbcult
breakers ore illustraled
1 in Figure 2.0-II,
.__.J
I I
TIE
([_AT
SWITCH
B & C)
MAIN $4 BUS
<I
Y_
SM- Zk-.633K t
• ill
Figure Zo6,_I. Electricai Powe:- _ System Block Di.agram
ELECTRICAl, POWER ,_3_.'I EM
'v_iss[on }Basic "_ i

J..a._c 12 " ]\_ov
.k___£_z.1Q66 .... Cha,_
- .:g:_ _ Date _age .....................
Z.6-3/2,, 6-4
::i
I?OWE_
I'VER GENERATION POWERCONVERSION
i!.__
PYRO BUS A
[_'L
ZJ ov RLo 0 SENSE
REVERSE
AND
AC
NO. 1
iNVERTER
REt.AY
L!
I
_ii_-_ [ OVERLOAD
':J .L | SENSE AND
:_ NI' m._.e.l REVERSE
:!_] _[ CURRENTRELAY
=if!!
SENSI- AND
:"__J L CURr_ENTRELAY
i
:1
i
BATTERY
!i CIIARGER
i
i
:1
,ii
J
, :;}
I
i
-1 !:
!
l ' I 1
I-
I
i 1
o >>- I >'>" I >"- ,

Z _ _ ZP- Z r- ._
iii:
IY,
;i:{
¸
!i_?
ii
?.
SMZA-03-SG0 IZ
APOLLO OPERAT!OiNS HANDBOOK

J
SYSTEMS DATA
<
reactant temperature. With design pressures in the tanks, single-phase

:! reactant is available independent of downstream system transfer.
The manuai mode of operation simply bypasses the pressure switches.

It can be used in case of control failure or when operating with quantity
7 unbalanced,depletion. To avoid excessive temperatures, a thermal sensi-
tive interlock device !s in series with each heater element in the O Z and
H Z tanks. These open the l_eater circuit6 when internal, temperatures

reach 80°F and close when te_m_peratures decrease to 70°F. Tank
pressures and quantities are n_onitored on meters located on MDC-13.
O Z tank relief valves initially vent at 983 ps[z and reseat at 970 psi g_
H Z relief valves
wi]] alarm when
vent at Z73 psig
oxygen pressurc_
and _eseaL at Z68 [_sig, The C&W
in eitLer tank exceeds 950 psM,
system
or goes
l}
ii
,i?
!
be]o\v
pressure
800 psLa.
in either
The
Lank
hydroge_l
exceeds
systern
Z70 psia,
alarn_s
or
the
goes
C&W
below
syste_za vJhen
ZZ0 psia. E
Individual tank _es_urcs, quantities, and reactant temperatures
are telerneterec] to MSFN,
2.6.3.Z Batteries.
]
}
ii A total of seven silver oxides-zinc storage batteries _,.reincorporated 7:
in the EPS. Five of these batteries are located in the co/M lower equipment
. !l
:%:} bay, the other two in see Lot IV of the S/M.
Three entry batteries <A., B, and C) provlde the primary _ource of

pov_er after fish& ..... ...._-_e,
sepa_ n a_..dduring posd_ndh-,g u[_,e_at_o_s.
" [_h ior _
"" U
/CSM separation, the entryLatteries provide a secondary source of power

}
while the fuel cells provide the prb_ary source. The entry batteries are
{
;} used for the fo!lowh_g purposes" I
<i Provide C/M power after CSM separa'don
"4
;!2
[
Supplement fuel cell power during peak load periods (SPS gimbal _2
'i motor operation)
Provide power during ern.ergency operations (failure of two fuel t,

cells)
J
o Provide power for EPS control circuitry (relays, indicators, etc.)

I
o Provide sequential logic.power
Provide power for recovery aids during post!anding phase
'i
Batteries A and B can power pyro circuits upon selection.
:N
The entry batteries can be recharged in fliglrh
!:
ELmC _.RICAL POWER SYSTEM
i Z. 6-6 I:
]3_:sic DaLe !Z No_' 1966 Cba._ge Date ..........................
P_ge
j
SMgAo-03-SC0 lg
:! SYSTEMS DATA
. ij
MAJOR COM})ONENT/SUBSYS TEM DESCRIPTION.
:3
Cryogenic Storage.
i'ii
The cryogenic storage system (figure 2.6-Z) supplies oxygen a_nd

:!:;_
hydrogen reactants to the spacecraft. Hydrogen is supplied to the EPS
<i b
and oxygen is supplied to both EIoS andECS. The design hmctfons of the
two storage systems are identical. The physical data for the cryogenic
storage system is given in the following list.
q Design Min Approx

Allowable
!i Wt of UsAble
Flow
at Min
Rate Storage
Press. Operating
Tank
at Min
Qtys
Heater
!<_i I Tank
t, A
(psi_)" Pressure & Fan Cycling
Numb er C r yog eni.c s dq/dm
LO 12 320 ib 0. 676 lb/hr 900m35 150 psia ]31 to 82 Ibs
[; XTA 0006 320 Ib 0.713 ib/hr 900_35

245 (+15, -gO)
150
!00
psia
psi.a
!31
14.5
to 82 Ibs
to 7.3 Ibs
LH Z3 28 Ib 0.070 ib/hr
L}I 25 28 ib 0.066 Ib/hr z45 (+15, -zo) 100 psia 14.5 to 7.3 Ibs
The autocratic control mode is designed to give a single-phase

[L
:ii_i reactant flow [n%o the F/C and ECS feediines at design pressures° This Liii....
control is achieved in effect by control.ling the heat transfer within the
[!,I system. The heat required to maintain constant pressure varies with
density. Fill density for oxygen is a little above 70 !bs/ft 3. As depletion
proceeds from" 70 ibs/ft 3, or I00 percent quantity, £o approxin_at_ly
Z8 ]bs/ft3, or 40 percent quantity, the cycling of the fans and heaters for
repressurizatiou will extend u_t_] they cycle least at quantities between
131 and 82 ibs. In the hydrogen system, least amount of heater and fan
cycling will occur At quantities between approximately ]4. 5 and 7.3 Ibs.
With the system in automatic operation, tank quantities should remain
within 15 pounds of each other for oxygen and within one poun d difference
for hydrogen, The pressure switches activating the heaters and fans are
in series. The oxygen switches activa[e when pressure drops to 865 psia
in both tanks. They deacI:ivate when pressure reaches 935 psia in one of
??
the tanks. Keeping the design, pressure per_nits depletion to follow
i predictable tank densities and respective heat requirements.
When the systen_s reach the point Where the heater and fan cycling
4 is at a minir_um, the heat leak of the tank becomes sufficient to maintain
design pressures, provided flow is within rain dq/dm values as shown in
U the preceding list. This realm of operation is referred to as being in the
)i1 ,ninimurn dq/dm region. The _nlnimun% dq/dn% poin£ fox' oxygen is
23.5 Ibs/ft 3 at the nominal operating pressure of 900 psia. The value for'
hydrogen is 1.87 ibs/ft 3 at ZS0 psia. The heat required for densities less
? than the above rises abruptly for both oxygen and hydrogen. The intrin.sit
:I flow output of the systems is a rnaxfmum At the point where _ainin_t:m heat
is required to _r{aintain pressure. The time-rate of arriving at the
ii minimum dq/dm point is dependent on load demands, tank pressure, and
1
')t
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM
Z, 6-,5
Mission ............... Baltic Date 12 ]Nov lq66 _ ..... ,e Page
TANK PRESSIIRE
I 02 2
-:- 1050="
90O
_- _,5o
_oo
-- _ ,oo-
o2
_* 02 02 02
3
q
]
2 D
\OXY__6EN FILLVENT
q 02
3
/
02
-] OXYGEN FILL VALVE
i
gi
4 DENSI?/I
SIGNAL'
CONDITIONER
• AC BUS
SF;032Q NO.I
1-i
k:i
]
i
/i O2
OXYGENRELIEF
J
.,I
TANK QUANIITY ,,'_"'--"_'_

,_ / SF0033Q\
• I '_2 2 / ........ _,
F--T_-- 7 [ qUANTIT?O2 1
ii I _J'0OI _ TANK NO.2 1 ACBUS
Lt. ° 2_J OEN_ITY S,0,_AL

CONDII'IONER
1
-- OXYGENFILL VALVE
X OXYGENFILL VENT ",_....
B OXYGENPURGEVALVE (GSE) --i#
_4
i!_i!
•:I
,11
S _, ,[;, A {iq c_- fl I i,,
.APOJ-_LO
-, I- } O1'D _._RA
"Y'' ¢f.-'.ON,-)
_'r C' HANDBOOK
S .YST K:MS DA.__

rT' ^
iiii_i
_._.._
: i
, [j
i
H 2 TANK NO 2
MOTOR SWITCH
H 2 TANK NO: I MOTOR SWIICH CONTACTS C) CONTACTS
_ #_0h _ __ -o,_, ;_o"i SAMEAS

_;
::i;12 L Y_J_C__A m3, I !_. fX o _ h JTANK NO.i
I-- - _ IIIY II¢AIT,_B
ILc I MOTOR
L--
-- SWITCH (Z)
__J -- l-, _J ' 2' ' "

17 i iL!i
_-- ----7---t i W ---J I I _-- AUTO
......... --II -/ ............. -K__TIq-_ --_U i,,;"_-°

--II._l
I ,_
IENICSY_'TEM H HEATrRS 1 I-- _._ _I_
, (MDC-221 AUTO I- i ii l II
i:1 j_.. _ _ "i---t--I_--t-- ...... _,A
_ 5A o----- o--_ OFF l H2tlEATERS__
, 'JILL _-_- '_L_% X
1
H2 FANS
AUTO
------i
2
_-o,-7_--_ _ AUTO _ Iii ------<> [:ii!
v::
31<_'
[,
OFF
:7 I
%] ............ _J ........ _ H 2 FANS -2
ONll
:]
-N IC SYSTEM
EATrRS _2 "2
fl_ MEArERS
"_l;_w" _
-2 t:_7
/:r
l_ L__[._----
I
I,
'JI ..........
AUTO
OFF _4
,-TG:"
i--_--_
)
I
(_ DC-22) ..... t'_>Y L ,
__ _ulu Lu:;_ I" .... ----o, _B I
i'_ ..... I ,_ l--o_.l
'P@ ,_ o _--*,-_oF,- %- ........ I 1

t
°-o_ - L_____$i+_
}i!
I • e,-_
NOTE: I, PRESSURE AND MOTOR SWITCHES ARE

SHOWN IN LOW PRESSURE POSITION
2, TO OPERATE FANS AUTOMATICALLY, (FANS SWITCH

TO AUIO) HEATERS SV,flTCH(ES) MUST ALSO BE
POSiTiONED TO AUI'O
£t
<,,,_
:-3
SM-2A:635E
Figure g.6-g, CryogenLc Storage Syste;:n Sheet 2 of Z)

t_
.-_ EK, IEGTRIGAL POWER SYSTI_..M
...._" Bas_,-' Date ]_ Nov ]_66 Change .... _ _'cxeZ'6-9/Z'6"10

Ci )1"1 . ..... '-" -- ....
t
!
;:5::
_i:: k
i!,,
i,
i.
_:!
,L-':.
_::i8]
i IL:,_
i
!:x!
\ HYDROGEN FILL VENT ._----
!; f
HYDROGEN FIL L VALVE --.--_.
F H2
: I/'i
L ,2
DENSITY
SIGNAL DENSITY
COI4D ITIONER SENSOR
.... Lr3
J-,, -_.-NO.
I I
J
i {;i i
.........
TANK
_:j
NO. ! I 7_i___]- _
tvtOIORS
, ?_ I 3¢ FA_
l [
7 HYDROGEN REI jEFf <_
c1"-..d ,/ _ ......... _m-L.

......
i 1
_,4.,,,_'
...._............. ,_
.................................. !
_:sJ
...................... J ............
r ]
3? FA_.;
E
tT_OIORS
_Ak':<QU/,,Nri-cY /,,7_'-_"-_ 1 "-]<" !

, 14 ., i SFO03IQ X _--A----_"
2 z /_ ......... I / '\
,_................. _ ,' OUANTIIY H', 't / '-.........
i-'i
I ._
LBS
<> _
l tTAi,;KNO
_ .....
2 _1
"-'____,.
r"
A_ BU_
,_ L_....... ( -,
2,, _ _0.178 LB _,'/ F ,_._ NO. 2 DENSFIY i
! {- 20 -- --_-r"" I _,c S_NSO{_

...... I = -_ : y ...... _---'i I ............... 4
L_7 L ........... J • DENSIIY

COND
SIGNAL
ITIONER
i
i I- ILl_ VDLVE
ttYDROGEN -----_
L_.S
L}...... ...........................
...........
,, IIYDROGEN ,'-ILL VENT _ ....
[ z?
• tlYDROGEN PURGE VAI VF (GSE) .... bI-
r---f'- Jl _ H<_
L_l...Q'xd_ ,
I
FROD_ Crl
2 _ CR,O_E,.,L.
w r, -_q ,, TANK FAN t,IOTCRS i,,
!'! - CRYOGEIglC lANK PAl.; MOIOR% A(
i
F ,
c
SMZA -0 .-,--oC0 •2
APOI_LO OPI£RATI&NS HANDBOOK

-%
i
2
S YS T I_2NiS DATA
Each entry battery is mounted within a vented plastic case. The
!
battery cells arl _. individually encased in plastic containers which coptain
Ii!i_i
I relief valves that open at 40_:I0 psig, venting pressure and hydrogen gas
k_
into the battery case. F.ach battery case is vented overboard through a
manifold leading to a manually operated valve (BATTERY VENT VALVE),
which is connected to the ECS dump line. With the valve at its norm'al
! position of VENT, the battery cases are vented overboard through the E'.CS
-i
urine/water dump line. In a failure mode, this would prevent hydrogen
! gas from entering the crew cornpartn-_ent_ With the battery vent valve
J
dosed, which would be the position after fracture of a battery case, the
;i possibility exists for pressure buildup tn the battery manifold due to ,
F_'n outgassing of the batteries. The vent valve will be opened at pressures
i
slightly below CM pressure and allow the built-up pressure to vent
$ [ng_
overboard. Battery manifold pressure can be monitored using the auxiliary
DC VOLTS meter, located on panel ZOO in the RI-IFEB, and is telemetered.
:!
The two pyrotechnic battc:ries supply power to initiate ordnance
1 devices in the S/C. The pyrotechnic batteries_ are isolated from the rest
ii of the EPS to prevent the high power surges in the pyrotechnic system fronq
affecting the EPS and to ensure source Dower when required. These
batteries shall not be recharged in flight. Fntrybattery A or !3 can be
used as a redundant source of power for initiating pyro circuits in the
=:! respective
The
A or
two
B pyro
S/1_.4 jettison
system,
controller
if either
batteries,
pyro battery
located
fails.
in the S/M, supply

:!i
:'2:i
} _ower to two jettison sequencers to sustain the S/M RCS retrofh'e, as well
5::. t
as firing ',:he S/M posJ.tive roll RCS engines two seconds after CSM
Db_
separation. These batteries are isolated fron-_ the rest of the _PS and
]
cannot be recharged or monitored in flight.
,!
Performance characteristics of each S/C battery are as follows:
:i
2:i F_o_-7] Open
:/i Capacity Cells Circuit Ambfeni:
? per per Voltage Nominal

Voltage
Minimum
Voltage
B atte
Temperatore
ry
Battery Battery (Max.)

t
Batter_
t
1
Z0 37.8 vdc Z9.0 vdc Z7.0 vdc 50 ° to II0°F
Entry A, B, and C 40-amp-hr s
(37. g vdc (35 amps (35 amps
(3) (Z5 ampere
rate) in flight) ] o ad) toad)
:! Z0.0 vdc :60 ° to IIO°F

:?#,
75 amps Z0 37.8 vdc 23.0 vdc
Pyro A and B (2.)
for 36 (37. 2 vdc (75 amps (75 amps
seconds in flight) _.O a(_) load)
!i (3 5.0 vdc
open
circuit)
1i'
t N
:i
t
.a
L
:i
y_ tELP2CTtllCAL POW]_gR SYS')71EM
iss .o . nat No-, 9C., oCha,W, D

: a e....... Pa e Z.
[:i .............
: !!
ili_i SMZA-03-SC01Z
APOLLO OPER.ATIONS HANDT3OOI(
SYSTEMS DATA
Open
Circuit Ambient
Capacity
Voltage k,iini_num :Battery
per
:i Battery Battery Battery I (Max.) Voltage
Voltage T en_p e r e.tur e
i 0 37.8 vdc Z3.0 v c Z0.0 vdc 60 ° to I!O°F

S/M jettison '75 am p s
contro].ler A and ]3 for 36 I ](not (75 amps (75 amps
load)
:i (z) seconds I Imeasur - load)
I lable i.n
:i
I I °r y
L ...... J-t--e1--e.m--e
Y---L_-
tr .... J ....
NOTE "Pyro battery load voltage is not n_essurable due to the

E
7 extremely short time they power pyro']oads,
2.6.3°3 ]_'uel Cell Power IDlants_
Each fuel cell power plant consists of 31 single cells, connected in

series, and an accessory section. Each single cell generales approxi_
mately i volt. The accessory sectioll consists of a nitrogen pressurizatior_

system, an oxygen feed, a hydrogen, feed, a primary (hydrogen) loop, and
<i!
a secondary (glycol) loop (figure Z_6-3). The prin_ary and secondary loops
control the temperature within the fuel ce!i power plant° The prin_ary loop
also extracts potable water from the power plant for use by the crew. The
secondary loop radiates heat from the power plant into space through
radiators located on ff_e exterior of the S/M. F
_J
a _.).e n_..t±'ogen systen_ establishes a re*._._ en(-e pressure b., the _t,_el ce]i.
There is approximately 0.44 ]bs of iW Z contained in the nitrogen tank under
a pressure of 1500 psia. The nitrogen regulator reduces this pressure to

:9
5Z psia, which is used to pressurize the glycol accumulator, the electrolyte
(KO!-l) in the cells, and as a reference pressure for the oxygen and
hydrogen regulators.
:!
Oxygen, stored in a cryogenic state at a pressure of 900J:35 psia, is
supplied to the fuel cell power plants. Due to the low-flow rake, the
oxygen absorbs heat while flowiug through the lines, absorbs additional
!
heat in the preheater, flows to the oxygen regulator, and reaches the fuel
<¢
cell power plants in a gaseous forn_ at temperatures abo_e +100°F. The
regulator is designed to maintain a pressure differentia], of !0.5 psia above
'i
:i the nitrogen press,are, supplying the oxygen to the fuel cell at a nominal
6Z.5 psia. The oxygen in the system is approximately 99.99 percent

pure. Over a period of time, the impurities accumulate in the reactant
compartment and decrease fuel cell efficiency. This is noted by a drop in
fuel cell performance. To e]irninate the impurities, the fuel cell is

purged. Normally a fuel cell will be purged evary Z4 hours; however,
the actual purge cycle will be determined by the predicted mission power
profile and the purity of the reactant as it is calculated to be after
{
4
Mi s s ion Basic Date J_.Z jj_9_y.j_9./P_6._.Change Date ....... P a g e ._,._%.l.oK ..........

APOLLO O[-"Ei_ATIONS I.{ANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DA '_
i x_.
'
TO DC &UklN FUEL CELL2

..... ,._ h 2 PURGE LINE
: AC Z (3,_) BLtSES A & B PURGE tNu.,_.-zxl 7.. _ Ht-R (MDC-15)
U:- TOUVDPOGEN .......

ReoOUFr_:_r'RESS
H_ _ '_<'__" 11-'----i_ETi-1
--''_" o----.,- OV_RBOt,.RO
',_NT m"_
_" i L---.--_ _ " _.-To: DCt.,_,INBUSES

A _,B
INDICATORS @ I </____ @ '
'l _c_0_T
_0_,_T MOOULETFMP
SC 2069P
_--'_'_
SC
_0._
SC 2070P
oo _C S,<,N
AUX H2 PtJRGE] JO2 PURGE
• o,, I I -+ ' t I-,_I

i ---_-- SC 2086T [-%7--]
l i FUEL CELL LOAD I I l I :_'°I

• (o,. sho:,,o __ .,,,w,q __ _ l , wE__ CELL _ l f-'°l
! I _),.P.,.s:; a__,,_o.o_) F r. ..... T-4 ..........
_ 's_._Or I t • I I ,_.'O,cArO_s
'CT:J"
i :I
I _Al.vE
,--....I_ENSOR
I ,o l,--&3-,-. I b- " 4--...... _'-_-< ........ d-,ol
' i_ l,,,.-''_ -_._ ...... I SENS R lJ I F_ I L i" ....... I I " ' [------'_.I
....... Z"....... _. _,:_ I..... _-_ ................. I I I | ............... I _C 2066P XI0
............ I .......
i '_<<'Z_ .... -___'--Z: -- ...... _ :_--'-il il ........_ _-_.3...... C't,,hv, ,o_,4_
__ _ SC" .,..0671""
-.-J II I h---_"_''_--j I ]'-,<OH L.....'_;fL_"ALV_ I O'YOEN_

__c_,-, ! . tI I I n n n IJ _ _ F_ ............... o',ER_o._._'.D
l
_,/Av!............<-JL-I
r ......._-1 I _
-l-UUbl
_ • i
II i II II
.Li_-_ _--- _,3/b,-
,LC OX*OE,'
'""
l
,
VENTI_,.-AUX , ' _._oou,:
PRESS Hi F_7'_ii"':
......... • I k ..................... _ I-._---IREGLIU_TOR _ ....
:=a= .... _----'_--c___---- I ...... ---_,:g-r- " " r_ '
!l ! I HYDROGEN" "._r" /1 "- 1 II II N 2 TWO SL:P , ,%'_'_ FU_L ..ELL _
vvi .,r.G_NER_,TO_"'2 ANDS_E,',M Ir I, i I START

V,_VE _ .....
/.,.-Hy_RoO_n I H_":"-_; - . R,F,

cE I, c-......... _.....s sc _.0_0
, :le.q
...........................................................
-...=................
L_,
........ t.i.....J-co
[ !
s
[ -,_;;rz<=m-....... _-:in-.......... -___,t!,.,:.Jo;c,c=., ; ,,c,_--_....
-'" I I I ............ r ........... I J -- pREi,rAIIE,, I " 1 RFG OUT PRESS Hi
....L _ D J PREHEATER I r .... I I ........ ' I _-==_' '

_
I F
_ GLYCOL
Arr'UMULATOR I/ _j.
-'_
Ii_FbQL7
..........
EN NITROGEN
_ ....
TANK
----I
, I
....... _
_
...........
._ _U_L
_.,_,L
_-_J
_--_"&-" <_"- ' " N2
Y'_" ........
_
"_h
' ---
"----=---J
L --
---"_I_
[ ]
......
R
'f
___.%
'
.
_c 2142R
_ _
t2y
_
INDICZtTOR
"
S
I_ SC 213.9R "_'_ _.. s .y. "_ % / .... / SC 2144R 0 2

Ir[ SC 21zOR IT" 1'__']-_,/141TROGEN [ I' [ 1 _-=.-_
' -t O, F I _ I tB$/HE I
I' sC 2,4_R I I I / t \,.SHUT _- VALVE I I ' I I I.. i
i " " ! i, _Jk | 1,_, -- -
:TANTI
FSm-SOR
E_i:_ H_ I IcoNTRO_L_
!1 _k_) i[ ,_EO_.,.CEL_
!""-I
OF, / / INDICATORSl F_V--_q II H " r--TFZ_k-_'Ji _ .... l _ ,_.,_:C,,TORS
i .'.-:--I
E " _'7" RIITROGEN - SHUTOFf - " _,
. . _l 0 "
_. _ @ OVERBOARDVEN "_?" pr- _-- v
I --Ik ! 7-- o7"] ' 41" ' ....

From:
i_ .- Hydrogcn i I
IC'I _
I= 0 I /
- _\----7-!_< <M°c-_'>
,LL_ '
I-_ _ ---- i _ " _ : 2, FUEL CELL
.......
INDICATORS swltd ..... t he p acecl to
_. -- _ / L--....... J / I /r,c_ / LJ_;yfJorlbfoI-oge i • e , il r .
.mmge la_n_,_ _ ...... J@$_" FROM GSE-J dk ,._ r_,__i | _'_.k( :n Sz_ seleclea ru_l ce. mr reaaouts.
in S/M i L_ \ F/C VALVES / ..........
............. ----1 --i_ (MDC-19)_ l 3 F/C

...........1 2 & 3 rne-sur_ment No's shown in _equ_n-
............. -11 r----F---- ....... -I- ..... ,iol o,._,...

....... OFF_I4ONI-',#l-T ........... i.......
_;!:_"_"--_% _ "1 _1 ' ! H2&O2VALVE I 4 AUX- r, dcatesmeasurer_ent n_u, tstoou×dcvots
gc " _ !t _:_< [*:": _#_1_ ..... -_i _:, .... _ (MDC-92) rnetoror pane 200 RHFEI) •
sc 2324x !i :' j _'U _"_ <:¢ ? Y / i v to-

SC 2325X .......... "._:/ .... I. ..... -_-,.-_-..-.,.o _o-.--_. -- " . " 5. [:or TM & AUX F_mrneters refer to pat.' 2.6.5
"' 10A _ BATTERY REIJ_Y BUb
FJ.gure g. 6-3. Fue] Cell Power I:'].a_)t].='low Diagram
E.b= .... ,.I\ICAI., P()W]ZR SYSTEA<[
Mi_io_ ................. _<<<. m,_o.i__.f{o!L?_6.i.•c;._._n_e _o-,t< Page Z.6-13/Z.6-!4

MODULE TEMP ........
,o: AC F IAC I
7I
j 7_ j___o,_._.b,¢,..____ I
I E_l FUELCEtL _I
CONO_×. ' (_)_.'.... 'SC208,T
_HJL._ItNOICA_O_S s__0B_ ' __i_2'IL ;i,
X10 J SC 2083T
I
I
['_U EL CELL _ J
POWER PLANT1
Ii. I.
I
i
B l WATER
I 3_J SE_,-o____
I.J'___E_P_SENS_O___',_______,/
"C---..,Z{-2"{-
I _j SmqSOR"_ / "_
J I CONDENSER
I
II
[Yi
HYDROGEN
PUM_"
I / iI I F_,-,
SENSOR
l
J ....................... _[J
COOLANT BYPASS _---_- SC 21

VALVE SC 21
REGENERATOR
FUEL CEL
I NDI CA T
I TEMP
I SENSOR
I FROM H 2
LINE Hi'R :
[ (MDC-15)
PURC
I_INE
To: From:
To: ECS HEAl"
GLYCOL I_J_DIATOR POTABLE
SC 2087T WATER
s#_BB_
I,
F/C PAD
TEMP LOVV ,_ux ,/ pH HI
FUEL CELL
INDICATORS _
SM2A-03-SC012
APOLI.,O OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
p!4
SYSTEMS DATA
completiorl of S/C cryogenic tank fill. Time required for oxygen purge
is Z minutes for each power plant. Activating the O Z purge ,Jalve allows
an additional flow of up to 0.6 Ib per hr. An e_nergency purge can be
performed if steady state current output of a power plant decreases _y

approximately 3 asps. Power plant parameters (primarily voltage,
current, and skin temperature} n_ust be considered to determine if an
'1 e_aergency purge is required.
}! [::?
Hydrogen, stored in a cryogenic state at a pressure of 2,45 (+15, -20),
psia and regulated down to a pressure of 60.5 psia, flows into the hydrogen"
regenerator loop, passing through an j.n-line heater and into the fuel cell.
The in-!ine heater is an auto_aatic device which aids the fuel cell power
::_[q
plant ii_sustaining operstin_l tempe1_ature at low-power operating levels.
[i The hydrogen, or pri_w_ary regenerator loop, is used fox" fuel cell thernza]
i control and permits water removal from the fuel. cell. The heat generated
by the reaction is tra_.._ferred to the saturated IIZ fluid. The hot, saturated
:::75_ h.ydrogen is drawn into ",:hehydrogen exhaust line by the Izl
Z purn.p. A sensor
in this line provides an input to an electronic switch which corltrols
activation of the H Z in-line heater_ Activation of this heater is accom-
!;
plished automatically at a hydroge_ exhaust te_r_perature of 385±5°F, 1
{
supplying additional heat to hydrogen gas flowing to the fuel cell power I
4
plant. The in-line heater is automatic.ally deactivated at a temperature
of 390±5°If. After passing the in--line heater sensor, the saturated
hydrogen flows to a sensor-controL'.ec, bypass valve. This valve controls
the a_ount of exhaust gas flowing throc_gh the PIZ regenerator. The sensor
•'_ ,/:)aj_ c]o_es the bypass valve at 425°F, "allowing all exhaust g_s to flow throu9h
[9' the regenerator. '.Vhi_ h_ts t_%e reh:trning hydrogen and sustains opera-
i1 ring temperatu_e
tive position
of the fuel cell.
(temperatures
With
4Z5 ° or lower),
the bypass valve
if fuel cell power
in a full regenera-
plant
ternperatdre continues to decrease, the in-line heater will be activated
to supply additional heat. If power plant tez:aperature is above 4Z5 ° the
sensor causes the bypass valve to open proportionately (fully open at
495°F) allowing exhaust gas to flow directly to the condenser. .,%.
transfer
:;ilI] of heat from the hydrogen and steam to the glycol takes ]?lace [n the
:!! condenser. The temperature of the hydrogen and steam is lowered to
!! between ]55 ° and 175°F, thus liquifying some of the water _apor. A sensor
in the condenser exhaust, controls a glycol regenerator bypass valve in
the glycol radiator return line which regulates the temperature of the
glycol. This, in turn, helps control fuel. cell temperature and maintah_s
the temperature of the condenser exhaust within the desired range of
,¢t _, 155 ° to 175°]P. The liquid water and hydrogen then flows through a
!i centrifugal water separator pump which extracts the water and delivers
it to the ECS potable waler storage tank in the C/M. The amount of,.vate_
produced by each fuel cell is in direct relation to the reactants consumed
!
]
which [s _ela_eo to power output. (See figure Z 6-4.)
::i1
• [:_
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEbl

2.6-!5
]Basic Date iZ Nov 1966..... ch ange Date°, Pa g e
Mission
1
• •;:2
:!d
<!i SMZA-03-SC01 Z
>
SYSTEMS DATA
":::5::d
3.0
_.5
o
z
I_L7
i
<,:i!ill
_, I * J -
Z
2.o I
o
_C
_/ MINIMUM
/ /
Z 1.5
iiii4 .-o
o
. ! ! /
lu
f /
;] 1.0 __=f ...... Aft-----.- --
Z
O /j"
C-
0.5 _--
q ?:
[_._ ............ _ ....
3.0
0.5 1.0
GROSS POWERPEk FUEL CELL POV,/ERPLAI'!T- KILOWATTS

1.5 2.0 2.5
SM-2A-t;84
[
Figure Z.6-4, Water Production Rate vs Pbwer O_.tput [
;3
•,i•I The hydrogen pur_p circulates th_ ra___ai_;h_g _l[ghtly moist f!uid
through
the desired
ten-_perature
the "regenerator
ratio
is
of water
regulated
and
to
back
at a level
KOH
to the
in the
so that
fuel
fuel
some
cell.
cell.,
In
the
n_oisture
order
condenser
to
is left
maintab._
exhaust
in the
[
returning hydrogen, as it flows back into the cell. 'i]_e hydrogen in the
ili!ii!i cryogenic
activation
system
allows an
is approximately
additional flow
99.94
of up
percent
to 0, 75
pure.
ibs per
H Z purge
hour, and
valve
will k
normally be performed for a period of 80 seconds per power plant every

Z4 hours. The actual H Z purge cycle will also depend on the predicted
power profile and reactant purity as calculated after cryogenic tank fill.
The performance degradation participation by the H Z electrode is negli-
gible and cannot be seen with on-board .instrumentation (with normal

degradation). Lf degradation is suspected to remain after an e_ergency
O 2 purge, an H Z purge may be vearranted< There is some indication that
periodic H2 purging may be eliminated altogether, thereby only performing
the
to
up
degradat£o_
H Z purging,
position to
purge
the
energize
H z PURGE
whenever
the H Z fuel
LiNE
it may
cell
HTR
be
vent
required.
switch
line
(MDC-15)
heater
Thirty
and
rn:m.utes
is placed
preclude
prior
in the
any
f
freezing of the moist exhaust gas in the vent line,
!
I
_i ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM
j " Miss ion Basic Date_.l_oo__Lj___Change Dat% _>_ ,_2-,_:_-_

T_a_:_._ ...... I
SMZA-03-SC0] 2
APOLLO OPERATIONS HAND]3OOK
-i
SYSTEMS DATA
. •,)!
<! The secondary loop contains a 62. 5 to 37.5 mixture of ethylene
_::]
!ili glycol
and to
and
transport
water,
waste
respectively.
heat to the
This
space
loop serves
radiators.
to
An
preheat
accumulator,
the reactants
pressurized by the nitrogen, pressurizes the glycol loop and also acts as
a buffer for the expansion and contraction of the coolant as it varies in
temperature. Giyco] flow through the regenerator is controlled by a
bypass valve which operates ir_ conjunction with the condenser e-:haust
ser/sor. When the condenser exha_zst is at 155°F, the glycol is routed
! through the regenerator to increase glycol temperature and effect n_ini--

mum heat transfer' in the conde-_ser. The glycol Bypass valve is complete]}[
J
:! open at a condenser exhaust temperature of 175°F, routing the glycol !
thx'ough the pum.p to the condenser aPd on to £he oxygen and hydrogen pre-
heaters. Since the glycol temperature is lower, a n_axhnu-.n_ transfer of
],eat in the condenser lowers the conder, ser exhau.qt tep::i)erature. The
;i
conde_ser exhaust temperature sensor regulates coolant tel-z!per
" "a '_L_
, ....m
which affects the amount of water removed frora the. porter plant. The
i! 155 ° to 17501 ;` operatir_] range will ]_est l_aintain the desired ratio of
water to KOi-I in the fuel c<-:1]..
A 400-cps 3-phase a-c gear pump maintains glycol flow at the rate p<v_!?!
of 35 to 80 Ibs per hour, raising the pressure 6 psi. After the oxygen and i '
hydrogen preheaters, the o_.,._!vcol-
is louted through the glycol regenerator
.!,',, and to the space radiators, where heat is radiated into the space
env ironm ent.
<ii:i Each fuel cell contains electrolyte (KOIt) which consists by weight
of 83 pe_cc.<t potassium hydroxide" and i7 percent water on initia] f_x:,

a_d has a critical temr_eratureof 300°F (figure Zo6-5). The electrolyte
/i:i?!
:?:i:i_ remains a solid to an approxinsate temperature of ZZ0°F; wid-_ a tempera-
/!!
L,
{-]
ture increase
electrochemical
to 300°]_,
reaction
the electrolyte
he.comes effective.
beco-nes
Bringing
a liquid
the
and
fuel
the fuel.
cell to
ceii
critical temperate.re is a;ccomplished using GSE, and cannot be performed

from S/C power sources. Placing a load on the power plant will maintain
it above .thi.s critical temperature.
Z.6.3.4 Inverters ....
Each inverter (figure 2.6-6) is connposed of a clock oscillator, an
• _i
1 eight-stage digital countdown sectior', a d-c line filter, two silicon-
controlled rectifiers, a magnetic amplifier, a buck-boost araplKier, a
G demodulator,
a harmdnic
two
neutralization
d-c filters,
transformer,
an eight-stage
an a-c
power
outrut
inversion
filter,
section,
current
sensing transformers, a Zener diode reference bridge, a low-voltage

control, and an overeurrent trip circuit. The inverter normally uses a
6.4-kc square wave synchronizing signal from th::: central timing equip-
ment (CTE) which maintains inverter output at 400±g cps_ If t:his extcrna]
g signal is completely lost, the oscillator within the inverter will provide
pulses that will maintain inve_'ter output wi[hin :':'7 cps. The internal
l'!:i
3
r-r- _
E],.u,..T,.I,..,2-,L "" POWER SYSTEM
:!
P' t''. Z. 6.-t7

M i s S 1.Oi3 . }3a s ic ]bate _l.._.z_._2"_k.9.6.6 ....... chang e Date: .....................
!:_¢3
SMZA-03_SQ0 IZ
•u%4
APOLLO OPERATIOh1S HANDBOOt{
SYSTEMS DATA
ELECTROLYTE TEM_ (P)
(i
+! /]
?
: LIQUID "
-- / i "_. J / (KOH)
-- " " _" I SOLID _. I l +
I
250= _" i(KoH;',-_2o) _ / MELT
I MELT IX/
E f SOLID |........ ++_+" ......
203 _ --*/ (_OH. H20) l
b- / + I ,
_" MELT i
:::it I_- ," I J
•:•:¸::¸! 150_ / " l SOLID
_._ / [ (KOH + KOH. 1t20)
F _'/ KOHI H2O l
,oo__-T,:==_= ............... -.I l "

t sot.r_ I I
?!i [-'- KOH_ 21120 (FOH, f120 + KOH. 2H20) I ',
PERCENT OF KOH (BY WE!GHT);N ELECTROLYI'E
NOTES: 1. Porcent (83) of KOH in electrolyte at inltlol fill,
2. Critical temperature (300°F) of elechoipe at which

+t electrc_chemlcal r_-_ctio_ b_gln_, on initial start-up
SM-2A-80_
• ::: 2 of fuel cell.
i(
Figure Z.6+5. KOH }IzO Phase Diagram
oscillator is normally synchronized by the external pulse which is

provided through the phase synchronizing unit. The phase synchronizer
4
will provide these l-ulses to the inverter after a maximum of two seconds°
:I
The following paragraphs describe the function of the various stages of the
inverter.
The 6.4-ke negative square wave provided by the central timing [

equipment is applied through the phase synchroni.ze]" and. the oscillator
to the eight-stage digital countdown section,. The oscillator has two
divider circuits which provide a I600-pps signal to the rna.gnetic amplifier _!
and two silicon-controlled rectffiers,
The eight- stage digital countdown section USeR the 6.4-kc square
wave signal to produce a series of eight 400-cycle square waves, each [
mutually displaced one pulse th'ne from the preceding and following wave.
Once pulse time is 156 microseconds and represents 22.5 electrical
degrees. This series of square waves is applied to the eight-stage power
;iii_
....:] inversion section.. I,i,:
:i The eight- o_age

_" power inversio_ section, using a controlbzd voltage
from the buck-boost amplifier, amplifies the series of 400-cycle square. _
waves produced by the eight-stage digital countdown section. The arnpli- _:_.
;! lied square waves, still mutually displaced 2Z.5 electrical degrees, are
applied to the harmonic neu'_ralization transformer, which is described in g
a subseauent parac_raph. !'

L
EJfECTRICAL POWER: SYSTEM
i
,: 'Mission Basi,': Date_.l_. ?_"_v J_'(_+__.Change Date .............. Page 2.6-18 l

a t
?
1
SMZA ...L 3.-SC0 lg
A PO LLO OPEP, ATIONS !-[ANDJ3OOK
SYSTEMS DAT_ _,-
25-20 VOLTS
D-C IF:PUT
! i 81AS [
"2}
:7:'i
J ....
!a
b_
']
::t
:1
Figure g.6-O. Inve:rte_ _ i),lock Diagram
EI_..I-bC'!"P,!CAL POWE:i:{ S¥S'YEM

i
! _
_::_ Mission Basic Dai:e: IZ.......Nov 1966
-................... C},"r
, ...... g_e Date ' Pa_,e Z.6"_9
iCii:
SMZA - 03 -.,2(501
Z
A PO L].,O OPERAT][ONS I-L_,iqDifOO l<
i!<:
i_ <
SYSTEMS I)ATA
D-C power to the inverter is supplied from the r.oai.n d-c buses <?'i
through the d-c line filter. This filter reduces the high frequency ripple {:i
in the input, and the Z5 to 30 vdc is applied to the s[licon-controller recti-
fiers and buck-boost amg..lfler.
_]. .
I,:<
The s_licon-control]ed rectifiers, using the filtered d-c power and

the 1600-pps signal from the clock oscillator, produce a d-c square wave
with an on-time of greater than 90 degrees from each rectifier. This is
filtered and supplied to the buck--boost amplifier wh.ere it is coupled 'wi:th
the amplified 1600-pps output of the magnetic amplilier to develop a
filtered 35 volts dc which is used for amplification in the power inversion
stages,
The buck-boost amplifier, using tt_e !600-pps signal from t]_e mag-
netic .amplifier, the filtered d-c power from the =_aJn duc buses, and an
error signal feedback from the Zener diode reference bridge, provides a
variable bias voltage to the eight-stage power inver:sion section, The
amplitude of 1his voltage is controlled by the amplitude and phase of the
fee_tback signal from the Zener diode reference bridge, This bias signal
is varied by the error signal to regulate inver{:er vo].tage and current
output.
The demodulator compensates for any low-,frequency ripple in the d-c

input to the inverter. The high.-frequency ripple is attenuated by d-_e
fi]ters. The de_._qodu].ator senses the 35-vo¢_ d-c outptl* of the buck--boost
amplifJ.er al)d the current input to the buck-boost ar_plifier, it co_]:,-.
pensates for ripple in the i0- r.o i000-.cps range. A.n ir_.putvoltage drop
or increase will be reflected in a_ drop or in.crea.'_e i1:t
the 35-volt d.-c
output of the buck-boost an]plifier as well as -7.
drop or increase in current
input to the buck-boost an._pl[fJer. A saD.seal decrease in the buck-boost
an]p]ifier vo].t&ge output would be cofnpensa.ted for a c]ernodulator output,
transformer coupled, to the silicon-.coDtrolled rectifiers, causing them to
conduct fol a longer tinne, thus increasing their fJ.tered output. A sensed
increase in buck-boost azY_p]i.fiervoltage output, caused by an increase in
the d-c input to the inverter, would cause the demodu].aJ;oz to produce a
signal causing the si.].icorJ--controlled rectifiers to conduct for shorter
periods, producing a lower filtered out'put to the buck-.boost a.rnplifier.
In thi.s fashion, the 35-volt d-c input to the power inversion section is
maintained at a relatively constant ].eve].,
The low-voltage control sam.pies the input voltage to the ir_verter and
can terminate inverter operation. Since the buck-boost g,m.pli.fie_" provides
a. boost action during a decrease in input voltage to the inverter, _.n an
attempt to maintain a consta_Jt 35 volts de to the power inversion section,
the high boost required during a low-voltage input would tend _o overheat
the buck-boos_: amp].ifier. As a precaution:._-ry measure, i-he lowo. voii-age
control will. terminate inverter operation by disconnect}.ng operating
voltage to the magnetic _mqplifier and a power inversion stage when input
voltage decreases to between 16 and 19 volts de.
I:"], p C T T<I C g _, P OW E P, _..............

V <'P v' ],,A
v C / ..,
h_i:,sic,,n ................. Basic ]Dad:e IZ Nov..,A_.(!9_._..Cnang<." L,ate ................................... ]Page ....... _-,,,,.,622.C/..........
i'b :_ S_M P.A -0 3-SC,0 1 g-
U APOLLO OPERATIONS MANDBOOK
u_
SYS'I_ E/_S DATA
' ]'he harmonic neutralization section, using the 400-cycle, square-

wave output of the eight-stage power inversion section, transforms it into
a 3'-phase 400-cycle llb--:,olt sine wave signs.I. The manner in which these
transformers are wound produces flux cancellation which eliminates all
J
harmonics up to and including the fifteenth of the fundamental frequency.
,1 [ £i The gg. 5 electrical degree displacement of the square wave provides a
means of electrically rotating the square wave excited primary windings
around the 3.-phase, wye-connecte.d, secondary windings, thus producing
i /:i the 3'-pli.ase 400-cycle sine wave output. This ll5-volt signal is then
applied to the a-c output filter.
' The a--c outpu_ filter elin;inates the remaining higl_er harmonics.
;' tl;ii
;Zi_ SinCe the: lower harmonics were elinzJ.nated by tbe harmonic neutralization
12N
section, the size and weight of this output filter was reduced. Circuitry
in this filter a]so produces a recified signal which is applied to the Zener
,,, 17_
diode reference bridge. The amplitude" OI " lh?_
' 1"-S signal is a function of the
amplitude of a-.c output voltage. After fiitering, the 3-phase ll5-volt
a-c 400-cycle sine wave is appiied 1:o the a-c buses through current-
sensing transformers.
_ _! ['._N:
:}i g:_ The current--sensing transformer section p_:oduces a rectified

signal, the ampli¢ude of which is in direct function of inverter output _2:: ;
)i ] current magnitude. This d-c si.gr_al is app].ied to the Zener diode zefer-.
ence bridge to regulate inverter current.output. It is also applied to an
overcurrcnt trip circuit.
)I i;::_ -The Zener diode reference bridge receives a _-ectifi.<_d d-c signal,
• r,-.pr_:senting voltage output, from thc circuitry in the ,a--c outp.ut filter.
A variance in voltage output unbal.ances the bridge providing an error
signal of proper polarity and magni.tude to the buck--boost amplifier via
d the magnetic arnplifier. When inverter current output reaches ZOO to 2.50
i percent
current
of
sensing
rated current,
transforn_ers
the rectified
is of sufficient
signal applied
rnagnitude
to th;_
to
bridge
provide
from
an
lhe
:1 error signs! and cause, the buck-boost arnplifier to operate in the same
;I
manner as during an overvoltage condition. The bias output, of ti_e buck-
:!i
boost amplifier, Being controlled By the error signal, witl be varied 1:o
correct for any variation in inverter voltage o.r current output. When
inverter currer/t outF, ut reaches Z50 percent of rated current, the o-,er-
I current trip circuit is activated. .: ",. ,
The overcurrent trip circuit monitors a rectified d-c signal repr;_. -

senting current output. When tota! inverter current output exceeds
ii
ZS0 percent of rated curzent, this circuit will effect an inverter dis-
connect in [5:k5 seconds. If current output of any single pha_;e exceeds
300 percent of rated current, this circuit will effecl an inverter disconnect
in 5-_=1 second. -. "
1
:t
:I N
:! F2LI{C'ri>,]C AL POWIER oc'-t__. ,. TEN
Mission Basic Date *- No, l e6o Change. Date ................... i-_age Z 6-g_
a
SMZA., 0 3-SG0 17,
4
J APOLLO OP[EIKAT!ONS ItANDBOOK
o_7 o7 ._M,.
A phase synchronizer unit (PSU}, located in the RHEB (panel Z08),

establishes inverter outputs so they are in phase when using a separate
! inverter on each of the two a-c buses. The txvo inverter configuration is
prevelant during delta V's as a safety precaution in case of a single failure
in thrust vector control, .,
The use of two inverters during delta V's retains redundancy in the
'i stabilization and control subsystem, since power through a-c bvs I is used
for auton:atic thrust vector control and power through a-c bus Z is used for
manual thrust vector control°
Central timing equipment (CTI£) trigger pulses, used for inverter

operation, are supplied to the inverters through %i:e PSUo The PSU
:t samples _,_Bfrom each inverter output, and when an in-phase reh_.tionship
is established, supplies the 6400-cps CT_ t_'igger pulse to the inverters
being used. The @B input also supplies pov,,er for PSU circuigry.
The in--phase relationship is acquired by initially providh?.g oul.-of-

phase trigger_ pulses (6080 to 6400 cps) until the two inverters are
7
<,,
synchronized, at vthieh tin:e, the C'F]_] signal is coupled to the inverters.
>i
Phase lock, with a n_axirntm: displacement of*f0 degrees, is acquired _.n
a n_axlmum of two seconds.
The synchronizer provides this function for any combination of pairs

of the th:ee available inverters. A two-posltion toggle switch on the PSU,
when positioned to O!FF, allows for direct input of CT}!" signals to the
inverters i_ the event of failure of the synchronizer unit. However, in
this situatlon_ the in-phase relationship would not be realized.
A temperature sensor with a range of +32 ° tc +248°I p is h_sta]led

ineach inverter to provide MSFN %he capability of rnoni_oring inverter
temperature. It also provides an input to the C&V_rS which will illumine
i! a light at an inverter overttmperature of ZZ6°F,
2.6.3.5 Battery Charger,
A consta_t voltage, solid-state battery charger (figure Z.6-7),

located in the C/M lower equipment bay, is incorporated into the EPS.
The b_ttery charger selector switch (MDC.-18) contro].s power .:.:?.put _o
the cha:'ger, as well as connecting the charger output to the selected
battery (figure 2.6-11.). When the _ATTIgRY C_iARGER selector switch
is positioned to entry battery A, ]3, or C_ a relay (K4) is activated,
cmr, p!eting circuits frorn a-c and d-.c power sources to the hatger y
.!
charger. Also, the battery cha:'ger output is com?ecte, d _o the selected
battery to be charged through the iviAIN BUS TIE switches (IviDC-Z2).
Positioning the MAIN BUS TIE switch (A&C or )3&C) to O)FF, for the
J selected batteries, will discormect main bus loads from the ha:Aeries
and also complete the circuit from the charger to the battery° Only o:)e.
battery can be charged ai:a tin:e.
ELEC T RIC AL ,g _::,

1_<.) ._-xSYS'I't'.']M
L4i_ion ........... . Basic -)....

1.:._.¢ 1 ?'" Nov ,......................
1966 Gb,'-_>_*e
........ Da.;e
.. .............
................. Page
- _................................................ _., 6-_.,g
SMZA-03-SC01

J
[>;#_
SYSTEMS DATA
J
r'-----'t 1- ..... "1
i
I I I === I
/ Is_Ns_ol I t 5wnc. t
| _r_.u I '_.......u '

R[si _rO_ CHOKE
[ _ __J ,_Noc_us
---- AZB
<i I
o OFFOI:
I
I '!•
FLZ-IEII [/::Y_ F_:<-_:<q F:_"q ,

.,_L,[ _ -T- I"-I I_-_l +i-_-H ,_-I l*t,-t-1
--.J ! _..J t+.J I i L.J q ...... ! <_J , I _..
I s:+,,,t++_,oo_l IvocT^cd
AMPL It:l[ _:
I co+:,_+.+o+
CI_ UIT
l I
i U ...... _....J k_+_+i t .f ....
_]L,_ ._l
I-'-
I
-7k_l r- ..... j
I
I
t I
I
d _TT[RY | ]
|o SV'ITCII NO
4 , ^1 l
I
..J
i DiOD[
!!<7
:t +i:J
h: ::
4o VDC
>.!:'_j
MN DC K1
•i :] 25.+30
_U_A&B VDC fI _:-4- I -- -
_--l,l---n
I
! _"
r.++- ]_f
' _
q
__I
r----"........ I
..............
CtJ_:W N'/ _
[............... 1
, A UXiLt,d,'f |
']
_7 o,,] _--l'---]-t
BLli 1 _1 .... "%'"
---_:_ 2f_ '

.......
!:'llj
] SM-2A-637C
.1
]
Figure Z.6-7. Battery Charger Block Diagra:m
] The battery charger uses Z5 to 30 volts dc from the main d-c buses
:1 and 115 volts 400-cps, 3-phase ac from either of the a-c buses. All 1:hree
'1
1 phases of ac are used to boost the Z5 to 30-volt d-c input to produce
40 volts dc for charging. In addition, phase A of the ac is used to supply
1 U power for the rest of the charger circuitry. ']?he logic network in the
charger, which consists of a two-stage differential amplifi.er (comp+:_rator),
!
a two-stage Schmitt trigger, a current sensing resistor, and a voltage
,]
!t a_p]ifier will set up the initial condition for operation. The first stage
1
of the comparator is in the on re.ode, with the second stage in the off mode,
placing the Schn'_[tt trigger first sta[_e in the on +_.odc with the second
1 stage off. %7his condition provides m, axin:_um base drive to the current
1 amplifier which turns the switching transistor to the on mode. "WH:h the
:t
switching transistor on, current flows fro+"n the tra.nsfor_r_er rec:t[fie++"
through the switching transistor, current sensing reslstor, and switch
:ii
EL_CTRIC±,L POWER SYSTEA4
/i Basic Dale iZ Nov 1966 Change Date ........... ]Page 2.6-Z3

::j
+
SMZA-03-SC01?-
-] APOLLO OPERATIONS I.tANDBOOK
4
SYSTEMS DATA
• ,;]
choke to the battery being charged. As current flow increases, the voltage
c_ drop across the sensing resistor increases. The voltage across the
sensing resistor builds to a level which turns the first stage of the com- [
J
parator to the off mode and the second stage to the on mode. This condi-
tion turns off the voltage amplifier which reverses the operation of the
Schmitt trigger to first stage off and second stage on. This places the
:{ current amplifier off, which turns off the switching transistor. The
:iJ
switching transistor in the off mode wi]l stop current flow from the power
<?i
source, causing the field in the choke to continue collapsing and discharging
i
into the battery
tor. As the EMF
through the switching
in the choke
diode and the current
decreases, the current
sensing
through
resis-
the sensing
l
[
|;
resistor decreases, reducing the voltage drop across the resistor. At !
::: 4
some point, the decrease in voltage drop across the sensing resistor,
I
reverses the operation of the cornparator circuit, setting up the initial l
condition and completing one cycle of operation. The output load current, [
;i
due to the action of the choke, remains relatively constant except for the
small variation through the smlsing resistor. This variation is required
"5
to switch the switching transistor and Schmitt trigger through the action
] of the comparator.
Battery charger output is regulated by the sensing resistor until the

battery voltage reaches approximately 36 volts. At this time, the voltage
control network is activated and, in conjunction with the sensing resistor,
:) provides a sign.al for cycling the battery charger_ As the battery voltage
increases, the internal impedance of %he battery increases, decreasiltg
iii current flow from the charger. At 39 volts, the battery is fully charged
and current flow becomes negligible. (See figure Z.6-8.) Battery charger
i disconnect will be effected at a curre,__t output qf approximately 0.6 annps.
1 4O
if!
3O
;_4 BATTERY
2O
s VOLTAGE
]
10
:]
!
:] 0.5 1.O 1.5 2.0 2.5
BA1TERY
CHARG[ROUTPUT(AMPE_,ES)
.i
Figure 2.6.°8. Battery Charging Rate Chart
:{
z_ ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM
:<
h:li.s
sion B/_slc Date j_c_¥_I_%}_(L_.._.,- , :_ Date ....................... Paze Z, 6-24
71
SMZA-03-SC012
APOLLO OPERATION f_ ]-IANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
• i!
Battery input will be monitored b_:' 1Mo_. N through the normal, battery
teien_etry measurements.
2.6,3.6 Power Distribution.
D-G and a-c power distribution to components of the EPS is pro-

vided by two redundant buses in each system. A single-point ground on
the spacecraft structu"e is used to eliminate ground loop effects. Sen.sing_
and control circuits are provided for monitoring and protection of each bus
s y stem.
Distribution of d-c power (figure Z. 6-9) is accomplished with a two-

wire systen] and _tseries of interconr_ected buses individual switches,
circuit breakers, and isolation diodes. The buses cor_sist of the following:
Two redundar{t n-_ain d-c buses (A and B) powered by t_{e three fuel
cells and/or entcy batteries A, B, and C.
o Two battery buses (A and B) each po_<ered by its respective entry

batte_ry A and B.
f_]
o Flig_t and postlanding bus, powered through the naain d-c buses,
and/or the three entry batteries, A, B, and C.
Two nonessential buses, powered through either d-.c main bus A or _.
D_@_ les
o Battery relay bus, powered by entry ........ " A and B through
individua? battery buse_,
e Pyro buses, which are isolated fro_ the main electrical power
system when powered by the pyro batte_'ies. A capability is pro-
vided to connect entry battery A or B to the respective A. or E. pyro
•system in case of loss of a pyro battery.
e S/M jettison controllers, powered by S/M jettison c_n_rol!er

batteries, which are completely isolated from [he main electrical
power system.
PoWer from the fuel celt power plants is connected to the main d-c
buses through six motor switches (part of overload/reverse current cir-
cuits in the S/M which are controlled by switches in the C/M located on
MDC-18. Fuel ceil power can be connected to either or both of the main
d-c buses. Six event indicators show when fuel cell output is connected.
When an overload condition occurs, the overload-reverse current sensing
circuits automatically disconnect _he fuel cell power plants from the
overloaded bus and provide visual disp!ays for isolation of the trouble.
A reverse current condFcion will disconnect the malfunctioning power plan_
from the d-(: system. D-C undervoltage sensing circuits (figure 2. 6-10)
are also provided to indicate bus low voltage conditions. If voltage drops
Mi s s ion
SMZA-03-SC0IZ
SYSTEMS DATA.
q
below 26.25 volts dc, an applicable d-c undervoltage light on the caution
and warning pane]. (MDC-II) will illuminate. Since each bus is capable of
: < i_i handling all EPS loads, an undervoltage condition should not occur except
in an isolated instance, if too many electrical units are placed on the bus
simultaneously or if a malfunction exists in the EPS. A voltmeter, on
MDC-18, is provided to mnonitor bus voltage. An an_meter is provided on
MDC-18 to monitor current output of fuel cells l, Z, 3, batteries A, B,
C, and the battery charger. During extreme power loads or emergencies,
power to the main d-c buses can be supplied from entry batteries A and IB
?I by way of battery buses and directly from battery C (figure Z.6-11). Each
ba_tery bus is separated physically into tyro parts (e.g., battery bus A is
A-I and A-Z), b_t ren_ain connected electrically by motor switch contacts
which are not opened on manned S/C. A switch to two nonessential buses
permits isolating nonesse_tial equipment during a shortage of power (two
fuel cell povcer plants out). The postianding bus supplies power to some of
the telecom_nmications equipment, float hag No_ I and No. 3 coni:rols, and
the ECS postlanding vent control. In fli.ght and up to CSM separation, the
L
postlanding bus receives power frora the fuel cells and/or entry batteries
through the main d-c buses. After CSM separation, the entry batteries
supply power to the postlanding bus through the main d-<: buses or directly
through individual circuit breakers. Motor switch contacts which close
when the MAIN BUS TIE switches are positioned ON, complete the circuit
between the entry batteries and. the main d-c buses and open the connection
from the battery charger. The battery relay bus provides d-c pov,er to the
d-c and a-c sensing umits, and the fuel cell and inverter control circuits.
The pyrotechnic batteries supply power to initiate ordnance devices for
separation of the LES, forward heat shield, S/M froi_n C/M, and for _k•.
deployment of the drogue and main parachutes during a pad abort, high-
altitude abort, or normal mission, progression. The S/M jettison con-
troller batteries, supply power through the S/M jet'dson controllers for li{
the CSM separation maneuver. To operate recovery communications and
other aids after landing, power is provided by the entr F]_atteries through
:i
i!i
1 three circuit breakers (figure Z. 6-II} wl_ich are normally open until just
prior to CSM separation.
•i
Distribution of a--c power (figure Z. 6-12) is accomplished with a four-
wire system via two redundant buses, a-c bus No. i and a--c bus No. Z.
The a-c neutral bus i.sconnected to the single-point gro,znd. A-C power is
provided by the solid-state ll5/Z00-volt 400-cps 3-phase inverters. D-C
power is routed to the inverters through the main d-_c buses_ Inverter g
No. 1 can be powered through d-c main bus A_ inverter No. Z through
d-c main bus B, and inverter No. 3 through either d-c main bus A or B by
switch selection. Each of these circuits has a separate circuit breaker
and a power control raotor switch. Switches for applying power to th_
motor switches are located on MDC-18. All three [nverters are identical
and are provided with overtemperature circuitry. A light i_dicato._, i_i
the caution/warning group on MDC-.II, illuminates to indicate an over-
temperatu.re situation, Inverter operating temperature is telemetered
m_ECTm:CAL POV_Z_:_SYST_:_
Mission 2.6-Z6
Page
,/IZA-03-S_O 1Z
)I_RATIONS HATq DP3OO_

i _ili
i
_STEMS DATA
F_
YB
,:!?ii,_-_0co_oT-FUEL
CEL_
NO,
_.USB _:---[
!iil _s _ DC OUTFUT - EUEL CELL NO. 2
OSTLANDING BUS "_,_v[i_]_

'_h-- DC OU'.I'Ur- F''_LCELL NO. 3 '
<i
(B&C) SW!ICH
• :_[_----_cm pc ",AIn BUS _:

IGER SELECTOR SWITCH
NO, 2 UPRIGHTING SYSIEM _SEQ B)
--,._ SPS GIMBAL MOTOi_ (PRIMARY YAW)
_Q B)
_;_!!_r_i--' DC OUTPUf- FUEL CELL NO.l
i _DS ABORT ENABLE (SEO B)
I ] }!_,,_-_--DC OUTPUT - FUEL CRLI. NO. 2

: SEQ CONI-
TB I DC VOLI:_GE '_
4
,ESC LOGIC (SEO _)
[]uh
INDICATORS SW (_.T _)
I [!,_!!
-_ _,) Ei0
i,i 3 lii_i ::_ ....... _STS GIMSA. MOT-•R (,_UX PIt ....
_IMDAL CONTROL - YAW
. £._-'O C._"---_)- SFS GII,'.[V_L

MOT3._ (/.O:<yAW)
._IM_AL CONTROL - PITCH
V BUS
l S/RA JETIISON
P COI_EI_OLI ER _,_" S/M JE1 flSON COI,_T_DLL_R A [
k-2 _ BATEERYA _ [i
_.
i-2
SELECT SW - FUEL CELl NO. I
i SELEC[ SW- FUEL CELL NO. 2
iSELEC_
SW- FUEL
CELL
NO._ - _:.$i_
:j i DC VCLTAGE
[!'<_i,,-_4_ iqON I,_IS1 R

EESE_-_TI/.L
FUEL
CELE
NO' g_--I
UIOFE VALVES - FUEl. CELL NO. 2 N"
UIOEF VALVES _ EUEL CELL NO. 3 [ilj I---_ VOICE _ECORDER
LTAGE SEb_S]NG UNIT - MN BUS A
LI"AGE SENSING UNIT - MN BUS B _i_i_,_, DC MAIN BUS A OR B
• I CONTROL (DC &AC BUS l)

• 3 CONIROL (AC BUS 2)
_1_,_ SPEC}A[ QUIP g, .Y NO,
•. 2 CONTROL (DC &AC I_USI)
• I CONiROL (AC BUS 2)
• 3 CONTROL (DC & AC BUS I)
• 2 CONTROL (/kC [_UC 2)
)ERVOLTAGE & OVERLOAD SENSING UNIT (3US 1) ',_[ ""-'_ SP CL, Q . BAY NO. 2
_ _ E _LEu,__
}ERVOLTAG_ & OVERLOAD SEI'_II-IG UN_Y (BUS 2)
_if_----C_ SPECIAL EQUIP. HATCH
C BATTERY A
-q-----_ SEQUENCE R A
'I
BATTERY B
C BATIERY B On n-onr,ed S/C, contocl_ remain clo_,ed
,1
!! _'-_
_ SEQUENCER B
F2_
RCS FUEL DUMP
"-P_""_
DC INDIC_TR)RS
(PYP.O _T B_
SV¢
SM-2A-6340
I)_ C lnower ])istributi.on
966 Change Date Page Z. 6.-Z7/2.6-2.8

_h
2 APO L:_;O O1:
-i
.1 SY
,J
._::q
I ::::_&-- BA'nE_Y
SUSA -1
:ii _ U,TTER*
B,S
B-'
ENTRV
BA..¥
C
': _ CM DC MAIN g_A
,_-_ CM DC .',_IN BUS E,
l _ BLOAT BAG NO. 1 CONTROL

i: _ i'-'_ _ FLOAT BAG NO. 3 CONTROL
b._ POSTLANDING ECS BLOWER CONTROl.
':VEu_" <_ i i'T¢- UP VOICE_UP DATA D:SC
iii!i,
:i .L_-V.E
,'..1E..,.A
S',,.C.
}1}. _b_ S-_ND r_NRAMPL ?WE RELAY
I_i;_"
_'! _'-_--
SIGNAL CC, NDITIONER
_, ,_ _%_ TV _MEP_
!]2-h
" :_-_ SECONDARY (
% _!TB --_:- C-BAND XPONDER POWER RELAY
_[_ _ DATA STOP_GE EQUIPMENT I:!IilIiiii--+._CO.D,'.RY,

E:k-- BATTERYR,' "
I }::!::i:_
_ii :i -->AUdiO
CENTER-"_V
_ PREMODU_TION _OCESSOR
:;_ ..... BAITERY bUS ,_

_:] _ MIC AMPL - NAY & COMDP,
:1 ::" !! ,.b'- VHF-AM TRANSMITTER RECEIVER
/-i
: _ MN _US A • B
-I
( I:; _ EIJEL CELL I--
.x
I;:ii t._,.o_,'A_V
,'_ 27,_.-L2. i
: :_ _,_ _:tlDIO CENTER - ENGR
i'i> ji_---,-_I_ '_EACT,\I;TS
}
; : _- ENTRY BATTERY A
REACTA.'
S.
[);"'!i_.--_ pC UN[,ERVOI
_i ._._---_ DC UNDE_VO!
d
Ii>__._:L_....._¢. FLIGH f AND POSTLANDING BUS : :}'_ INVERTER NO

?
, '_ -_ INVERTEE 1"40
[{_ _lhl BUS TIE (ARC} SWITCH
: ::_ '_ INVERTER qO
A
_ ._'_ _AHERY CHARGER SELECT( R SWITCH
_i_
i.I ii_.;_ COMPRESSOR NO. I UPRI_HTING SYSTEM (SEQ A)
:-i l ._t-.._._-_/.C OVER-IIN[
':::::: _"----,. AC OVER'-UH[
!_-ii _ _ BLOAT BAG NO. 2 CONTL (SEQ A)
', :;._ MESC

ARM
& _ 3[I S_QA (LEE
I_',_)
i E SA,,OR,
ENA,,.,
SEOA, 75!
j MASIER EVENT SEQ CONT-- --_
DC VOLTAGE 1_;_
_; ..... 20A
_,_ _ LOGIC -- BATA J_'_O'_ _ l BATATOPYBO
,4 _. 13A i1
_,9 _.,,..,t;_ DC INDICATO_,S SW (_SATA) _/_5 VD_ EAT A EWR, _ N O
} (LEB 150)
-[
a fl_]---_.- EDS-BDS
NO._
_- .... PYRO/ECHNU
_ _ _*---_-_b- PRIMARY GIMBAL CONTROL-YAW SEOE(tEE_o1
,{_Si!!
--'--_N'PRIMARY G!MBAL CONTROL-PITCH
I_oi! .-\
<
_, g_.TB TO pYRO
_ ,_--_,{_ BATTERY PELAy BUS BUS TIE (IEB 1501
BAT _ PWR _'_. N.O,
(LEE 150) 20A

:i
:: 4
{ Figure 2.6-9.
)
"i
7=E C TR]:
I-:.'.
Mi s s ion-)...... Basic Date ].g _qov 1'

SMZA-03,*5(30 IZ
APOLLO OPERATIOblS I-{ANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
o
bb _,_._r
F
>
OO _::.,
I
I °z
I <
,rJ
c,J
C_
d
I
-D
d
@
.}::: r .':_:,_.;:::::> h_,_ ._, ,_vn_; x_v_:[ : :-: :::: ===========================

?i
1i
APOLLO
SM2A--03-SC01Z
OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
E
SYSTE]MS DATA
¸¸¸!%
to the MSFN, Inverter output is routed through a series of control motor
switches to thea-c buses. Six switches on MDC-18 control motor
switches which operate contacts to cormect or disconnect the inverters

fron_ the a-c buses. The motor switches are designed to prevent con--
J
necting two inverters to [he sanze a-c bus at the same time. AC loads
are powered through the redundant a-c buses. In some instances, one
phase is uaed for operation of equipment; h: others two, and in others all
three. Over-undervoltage and overload sensing circuits (figure 2.6-II)
are provided for each bus. A-.C bus vo]tage fail and over]oad lights in the
caution/warning group on MDC-II provide a visual indfcation of these
malfunctions. Monitoring of voltage and frequency of each phase on each

J bus is accomplished by select:i.on with the AC INDICATORS switch,
Readings are displayed on sep_.rate AC ¥OI/TS and FREQUENCY m.eters
::::IQ
located on MDC-18, Each phase voltage and f}.A frequency is telemetered
to MSFN stations.
PERFORMANCE AND DESIGN DATA.
AC and DC Data,
:I
• •%
AC and DC performance and design data for the EPS is as follows:
AC
ri!
Phases 3
4_
Dlsplacement t20_: Z degrees
:i.l Steady-- state voltage 115±2, vac (average of 3 phases)
Transient voltage 11.5 (+35, -65) Vac
Recovery To l15±i. 0v within 15 rns, steady

state within 50 ms
,,_, Unbalance g vac (worst phase from average)
Frequency li_it s
Normal (synchronized to 400±2 c,_s
central tin_ng equipn_ent)
Emergency (loss of central. 400_-7 cps
timing equiprr_ent)
Wave characteristics (sine wave)
Maximu_m distortion 5 percent
Highest harmonic 4 percent

Crest factor t.414_10 percent
J
Rating 1.250 va
" ii=
_:!:i$
ELECTRIC :5.L POWER SYSTEM
" Mission Basic Date !Z.l_cff_!9]_;6 .... Chano, e Date ............ Page 2.6-30
J ',A.-03-SC01Z
"RATIONS I_A NDBOOK

7 _t
• .:::
[EMS DATA
• >;]
,q
!
•il
:i:i]
DC SNSE
;1
i <iI
i:]
©
S5
N.O,
.®
$4
N.O.
ii!
NOTES: |. Normally open relay contacts, located
!:ili in RCS Control

abort cr norme!
Box, cloe
separation
dL'rlng an
o[ CSM.
2. PosHanding circuit b_eokers /3) open until
just prior t_ normal CSM separation
3. Motor switch contacls opercte when

MAIN BUS TIE switches ¢]le sel to BAT A
& C and BAT B & C p:_sHions.
4, Tl,ese contacts :emMn closed o.

me.ned S/C.
SM-2A-802F
]
:get e:nd C:M D-C Bus Con£rc;1 Ci.rcuits
SM_
APOLLO OPE
SYS5
•:::!(
;!
,ii_t
:! _ _14-------
, Z cc o214\,N To; DC AMPS

meter
;_ ? I / _AtTEry | O,_,oc-
18)
_ / / V:_IARO_P,
our l
_AT
C.G_-.BA_
C / L
5A ,,_, _ ENTF:Y _ ,_" ..... ( ,
$4 I',.C. j
TO: DC VO . ._ POST LANDING- J L_,_,,,_ _.........
:_ ,._o, (MDC-4a
IOOA
FI6 la DC V(
BATTERY RELAY
meter (MD'
To: F/C I
bus
control
c_rcuit
TE;MP
tATTERY }i CAS
To: DC AMPS
meter
(MDC-18)
DC N_:GAIIV[ BUS (
Mission Basic Date lg Nov 196

L 3
;i ii ,ii IM_TTERY CHARGER- '

LJ_ MNA
(MDC-22)
"HL_........ __ ............ +_ e.
J
I i .,A - tl
t j
t,:I
f;i
C .... "°'l "i; i_ ,dC rron, : AC bus
B ...... _'t/_, _ _S No. 1 or 2

D :_N }
i;;_ ,! BATTERY
CHARGER
A....... f"_-.... :_
sSA
E ..... ,i "'I
i L ..................................
i r.,i ;o: D_oTfs--

i i-G
:_ PI:}
q
! 7!
i]
tii_i
J
)
_i _
7
i:!:!_
i vd!
:]
i! f::_
A
!iI _q
J
i
ij
I
l
:i
Sk,i2A --03-SC01 Z
'1
7
APOLI.O OPERATIONS IJ_ANDBOO}X
Jt
SYSTE_MS DATA
[;a
q
_q Fi, i_,_ R,".'ERTER

NO. i "_
]
i } '7_._ No._ } c_, POWER
,_.ERTE' BUS
AT CAN
ANY
POWER BUS AT
ONE TIME
51 }ONLY ONE INV_ZTER
}7 g:_
,_ }i:>{ J' {,<_ INVERTER NO. a j 71i!<_ ,.<_RTER
NO.."
{#.;j [:_ ,a AC BNSR
] t_a
s o-^c
J
J
i¸ _ I \_m
• i liJ [ _ _ _'8 AC SENSE UNIi

I !.----_ i'm'............... f°'_" 7"AN__,c
:i :17:)i
_::::
_i ' "--_7 / t ,NE,,C',"ORSB"
-a _,i{
q
t"_I'; -_ '_ tb _........... =_-

ii!X.
_:"_i[±5o._o_,,,x
"'"
5 i'U_o
! ! M_IN 6"JS 2 MAIN BUS 2
E 2T: t" MAIN BUS 1 I_ _ /_,_N LU. _ I | | MAibl [,LIS 1 ; i AC
; t R.A_EC
] "r_%',7;,c
R.ASE,_
I "{', _,O,/_s0 vac/ \o/+Iso w,,C# \o/+Ia0 Va_. \*a ....... c ,e /_._t ^ ] t
'PTg,',s[ P./-77{'*, j
ii j i 5
_N I__:: ;_,_--¢=_b_-
PUMP MOTORS - FUEL CELL ] _ i_i?i
_.: _ _ PUMP MOTORS - FUEL CELL ]
i# BENSOR<,' , :_ >._t:'> pl-; SENSOR (5(A)
i::iii,,,i
.....
I:;
2_,
"'-i}C;
e'Z_
]{°'"_'I_._!"_
ia,_
,,-_.._._
FHpLIMpS
Pt'MPE N'-.ORM,
MOTORS
OTORs(_A).FUEL
- F UZ L CEEL
CELL a
_ol
l_z I'_T _,'_ PUM_MOTORS- FU_LCELLa
1 _l L_.'_ pH S'_NSOR ((iA)
_.__, _-,.,._-¢'._- CRYOGENIC FUEL QTYAMPL I (J_C) i _. '_"_'t N _ CRYOGENIC FUEL QTY AMPL 2 (BC)
• J _- CRYOGENIC FAN MOTORS - SYS 2

l i]-_4_" CRYOGENIC FAN MOTORS - SYS I
:!i . _'}_ ,,,,
i!i3
_: _ BATTERY CHARGER
!:i
kiii:i)_..._ TEEECO_._MU
N,c.vr,o
NS ! :.:i: :_--_--"-_" TELECOMMUNICATIONS
.1 F?::.L!
I :i'-_" EcB
G,_YCOL
PUM," liii:i_-.-_ EcsGLYCOL
PU_"P
f :_ . - ECS SU T COMPRESSO,
4 'r::i : i._--'-'g_ ECS SUIT COMPg.ESSOR
_ .__..- EcsCAB,N
REC,_C. "rEMP
CONTROL
!! !-.._ E_CA'_,N
REC,R__
CO.T
A.o
] I _!i ANO ,,_or_.LOWER
WASTE
i i_--_ ECS SPACE P,AD ISOL_'.TION t, ND VENT
: ]_'_-_ ECS SPACE
VENT VALVEPAD
(_i>,ISOLATION
AND C) AND
' ii VALVE (,@A AND B)
i ,! _ STAB AND CO T S "$ GROUP
; _ _ SIAB. AND CONT SYS - GROUP 1
1
;_" , .._" STAB,AND CONT SYS - GROUP. 2 [: J.
I _="_''_'_ STAB. AND CONT SYS - GROUP 2
]
I !---_. sPso_.uo,.o(_c)
NOT_: Unless _th_:r_*se
noted, =11 e-c
: ii
t : :::_"b" LIGHTING { G*..,N SIO COND (,_JB)
Imwer.
:i:ia.
i ! .... {!2<:_
Figure 2.6-1Z. A-C I'ower D_stribution
ELECTRICAL I:'OWIC]{ SYSTEM
Basic Date iZ Nov 1966 Ch:,i'(_e Date

. :i:!:_ Mission Page 6-33
:I
•:!ii
SMZA-03-SC01Z
4
• i!
SYSTEMS DATA.
DC
Steady-state voltage lhnits

E
Normal Z9±Z.0 vdc
During postlanding and

Z7 to 30 vdc
preflight checkout periods
Ripple voltage iv p-p
I 0.4.2 Power Requirements.
Pov,,e: requirements for the ,-pc are

E_,_, as follows:
i,i!
Unit input Total Input
Power Power
(Watts) (Watts)
I .
Unit -
DC
Un [t Control Quantity_
I_
AC DC
I I
[
FUEl, CELLS
FUEL CELL PUMP-I, -Z, i00.0 300.0

Hydrogen pump
•.i1 and -3 sw (MDC-ZZ)
<ii'J
<:_!,!
FUEl, CELL PUMP-l, -Z, 20.0 _o.o
Glycol pump
and -3 sw (MDC-ZZ)
FUEL CEI,L PUMP-l, -Z, Z.0 6,0

pH indicator
• iI
and -3 sw (MDC-ZZ)
_ U_:.L CELL
and
INDICATORS
I
sw (M.DC- 18)
!
Z.5 7.5
Power factor
correction for
J above [terns
i
Total
}
including pf
co r r ection :373.5
2.0 18.0
L
Pressure FUEL CELL INDICATORS
! transducers sw (MDC- 18)
[
:::?_
FUEL CELL INDICATORS 1.0 3.0
$ ,'). H 2 flowmeter
circuits sw MDC- 18)
:!
Mission Banic Date._!_Noy_lJ._66 Change Da_e._ Page Z. 6-34

:5
SIviZA -0 3 --SC012
APOLLO OPERATTONS HANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DA.TA
t_d
Unit Input Total Input

Power PO'W e ]7
(Watts) (Watts)
Unit .....
Unit Control Quantity AC DC AC DC
O 2 f]owmeter FUEL CELL INDICATORS I. 0 .%.0 "

<I
circuits sw (NfDC- 18)
]
H 2 purge H Z PURGE LINE Z.0 4.0 t
i line heater HEATER (IvIDC- 1 5)
)
Purge solenoid FUEL CELL-l, -2, -3, ° 17.5 105.0

and I-i2 I--'URGE/O Z
PURGE sw (MDC-18)
Fuel cell inline None 160.0 480.0

h e ate r (Automatic on at
+385a:5 ° F)
['?'<'!F:'
_q (Automatic" off at t
+390±5 ° F)
?I CRYOGENICS
HZ tank heater t-I Z HEATERS-1 and -2 Z0.0 40. 0
:Ii sw (IvIDC-- 13)
I 0 2 tank heater O Z IIEATERS-I an.d -Z 155.0 3!0.0

;I sw (MDC-I 3)
}{Z tank fan H 2 FANS-1 and -2 sw 5.0 _0.9

:ii
'i MDC-13)
i Li O 2 tank fan Oz FANS -i and -Z sw 14.5 58.0

il (MDC-I3)
Pressure ESSENTIAL-3 (153) 1.5 6.0

: !1 _!
transducer C/B
Signal CRYOGENIC SYSTEM-- 4.0 16.0

conditioner QTY AMPL-I and -2-
- ii '?z_
_c C/.B (?_.DC-B2)
"i _:N
I:)A _I ± Et_Y BATTERY CHARGEK
:i 55, 0 84. 0
CHARGER selector sw (MDC-18) Yfl aTi Ill aX "
:i
!
I
ELECT'RICAL POWER SYSTEM
[U Mission 2.6-35
Ba :._i c Da _ e _ l_['L.t,/,.(A.v2_.]:k] 6_6 -,. C ha n g e Da t e .............. Page
•_ !::2,
7!
B,
SMZA-03-SC0 Ig
SYSTEMS DATA
Unit Input Total Input

Power Power
(Watts) (Watts)
Un it
;2
Control Quantity AC DC AC DC
Unit
:::i{
Sz._'_SING UNITS
MAIN BUS A and ]3- 0.5

D-C under-
voltage sensing RESET/OFF sw (MDC-18)
unit (Z circuits)
!j
AC BUS I and Z_RESET/ i.0
A-C ur_der and
ore rvoltage and OFF sw (MDC-18)
overload
sensing unit
(2 circuits)
INV PHASE LOCK 7.5 7.5

Pt _AS_.
:::i.t
SYNCt-IRONIZER (panel Z08)
i:!!%(
:<':i_
UNIT
!NVERTERS AC INVY2RTER-]., -Z,

.<:<<_
iiili_
(See note) and -3 sw (MDC--I8)
NOTE With a Z8-volt d-c input, ca.ch inverter wi]l

opec:ate at air efficiency of 76 percent mini!_um with
a 1Z50 volt-ampere load, 0.9 power factor, and
2I 74 percent minimum with a 625 voli>ampere load,
iii 0.9 power factor.
) 6.5 OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS_
::% _
,!i
2.6.5.1 Fuel Cell Power .Plants.
]i':: }_ Fuel cell power plants are designed to function under atmospheric
and high vacuum conditions. Each must be able to maintain itself at
sustaining temperatures and minimum eiectrical, loads at both environment
k_
extremes. To function properly, fuel cells must operate under the
following limitations and restrictions:
e Idxternal nonoperating temperature -Z0 ° to +140°F
<i :'_
e Operating temperature inside S/M +30 ° to +130°F
u,',-
E_:ternal nonoperating pressure Atmospheric
® Normal voltage 27 to 31 vdc
ELECTRICAL POWER SYS[CEM
:J,!_;ion Basic Date ).Z N gv. ].(_66 Change Date ................... Page Z.6-36
' " [i ..... : • •

qi:!; SMZA--03-SG012
APOLL,O OPERATIONS HANDEOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
Minhrmrn operating voltage

Z0. 5 vdc at Z295 watts
Emergency operation
(gross power level)
1
1
Z7 vdc
14 Norrnal operation
] Lt';_!
31 vdc
Maximum operating voltage
Fuel cell disconnect (overload and 75 amperes for over

reverse current relay) 15 minutes, llZ anqperes
l_or Z5 to 300 seconds
Maximum reverse current

i second nMnimum
<! 563 watts

Minimum sustainhag power/fuel cell
power plant (with in-line heater off)
In-line heater 160 watts
4 watts
• H z purge line heater
i:i:)! ZZ95 watts li:

Maximuna gross power under
emergency conditions
e Nitrogen pressure 5Z to 70 psia

[:i
I
Reactant pres sure
Oxygen
6Z to 75 psla
Hydrogen
60.5 to 75 psta
ii
ff Reactant
power
Power
consumption/fu.el
plant
Level
cell
563W ZZ95W
::] 0. 0476 0.Z6Z lb/hr

ii Hydrogen
_j 0.378 Z.08 Ib/hr
Oxygen
I Electrolyte water concentration Z4.3 to Z8. Z percent
Minimum stack temperature for

+385°F
I ff
]
self-
Approximate
sustaining operation
external environment -.Z60 _ to +400°F

temperature range outside S/C
(for radiation)
!ii
Fuel cell power plant operating skin
+_8_
9 K ° to +500°F
ternpe ratur e
Condenser exhaust operating +155 ° to +175°F "

? temperature
EJ.,ECTRICAL ]POWER SYSTEM
2.6-37
bii s s ion Basic Date 1Z Nov ]_66 Change Date ................. Page
k_
SIvIZA-03-SC01 Z
APOLLO OPERATIONS I-L_kNDBOOK
::i
<;ii SYSTEMS DATA
i!
Non_ina!ly every Z4 hrs.
Purging frequency
• "(dependent on reactant purity
after tank fill)
Z minute s
O 2 switch ON time
80 seconds
! 8 H Z switch ON time
I
Q Additional flow rate while purging

Up to 0.6 ib/hr
i! O2
Up io 0.75 Ib/hr
....
!i H Z
2.6.5.2 Cryogenic Stor_.,ge Subsysten_.
The cryogenic storage subsystem must be able _:omeet the following

requiren_ents for proper ol)eration of d_e fuel ce!l power plants and the
_<i_
i_<i
i ECS:
O A,linimuln usable ouantitv

320 lb each tank
Oxyge:i
28 Ib each tank
Hydrogen
il
I Temperature
Oxygen
Hydrogen
at time of fill
-297°F
-423 °F
(approx)
(approx)
Operating pressure range

865 to 935 psia
Oxygen
Hydrogen ZZ5 _:o Z60 psia
Temperature probe range

-325 ° to +80°F
Oxygen
•:.425 ° to -Z00°F
Hydrogen
Maximum allowable difference

in quantity balance between tanks
Oxygen tanks No. 1 and Z 15 lb
1 lb
Hydrogen tanks No. 1 and 2
Pressure relief valve operation

Crack pressure
Oxygen 998 psia
Hydrogen Z88 psia

Reseat pressure
Oxygen 980 psia
Hydrogen Z83 psia

Full flow, maximum relief
Oxygen 10Z5 psia
Hydrogen 300 psia
_, 6-38
Mission Basic Date 12 Nov 19(L_...Chang e Date.__ ...... Page
SMZA-03-,SC01 Z
,4POLLO OPERATIONS ;qANDBOOK

;]
SYST]EMS DATA
', L}i
2.6.6 TELEMETRY MEASUREMENTS.
The following is a complete list of all EPS telelnetry data that is

monitored by flight controllers and ground support personnel. The last
column contains the name and type of S/C crew display. The displajy
,] • -,i utilizes the sa1_ne p!.ckoff or signal source as telen_etry, unless a separate
measure_nent nm_aber is included in the display column.
:i
An asterisk (":Jby the measure_nent number denotes infornqation
i
which is not available for recording or telemetry transmission during
:i 1
PCM low bit rate operation,
]
:h F?
No_ ,hal
.\/_ea
sur c-
i Fn ent Sensor
IRange
Operating
Range Grew Display
Nm]_be r Description
!
-t32/-:248 o , 4-40 ° to +140°F I]JV 1 TEMP ]di CaW
CC 01'75 T Temp static inverter 1
light
I
4-32/4-Z48 ° F +40 ° l:o +140°F iNV Z TEMP iI?. CaW
CC 0!76 T Ten_p static inverter Z
li gt_t
i
CC 0].7'7 T Tenap static inverter 3 +32/+Z48 °F 4-40 ° to +140°F INV 3 TEMI-' i,%ti C&W_:
:il
_ight LL.
[I:'I *CC 0178 T +3Z/+2!2°F +50 ° to I10°F None
Temp battery A case
(ZO0°F entry)
+3Z/+Z]. Z°F 4-50 ° to I10_'F N on e
*CC 0179 T Temp battery 13 case
(ZOO °F entry)
;':-CC 0i88 P Press bat compartment Zero/-I 18 Zezo Auxiliary DG VOLTS
L<-_¢
psia meter
(M;,nif)
Zero/+i 50 113 to 117 vac AC VOLTS meter
CC 0Z00 V AC voltage ma_n bus 1
;t
El ;:-'CC0Z01 V AC
phase
voltage
A
rnam bus i
V_..C
Zero/+!50 113 to ii7 vac AG VOLTS meter
phase B VaC
113 £o ].17 vac AC VOLTS meter

:,!i [? *CC 0202 V AC voltage man bus 1 Zero/+150
I CC
*CC
0203
0204
V
V
AC
AC
phase
phase
voltage
voltage
C
A
man
mam
bus
bus
Z
Z
vac
Zero/+150
vac
Zero/+!50
113
113
to
to
117
117
vac
vac
AC
_&C VOLTS
VOLTS meter
meter
phase B vac
*CC 0205 V AC voltage man bus Z Zero/+] 50 113 to 117 vac AC VOLTS meter
i ;i! CC 0Z06 V DC
phase
voltage
C
man bus A
vac
Zcro/445 vdc 27 to 3t vdc DC VOLTS meter
CC 0207 V DC voltage main bus B Zero/+45 vdc 27 to 31 vdc DC VOLTS Fneler
,:_CC 0210 V Zero/+45 vdc 35 to 37 vde DC VOLTS meter

DC voltage battery
bus A open circuit
,':CC 0Z11 V Zero/4-45 vde 27 to 29 vdc DC VOLTS n]e[er
DC voltage battery
bus t3 on load
:i!:t
ELECTRICAL I°OWER SYSTEM

i
Mission Basic Date 12, Nov 1")66 ChanGe Date .................... Page__.Z-6j39 .......
1
SMZA_01%-.SC0iZ lii!:;
APOI.Jt,OOPERA'I'!ONSHAND13OOK
SYSTEMS DATA. b
No r]._ al
Iv_easure-
n_ent Sensor Operating
Range Range Crew Display
Nmxlbe r Description
Zero/+45 vdc 35 tO 37. Z vdc DG VOLTS n_etcr

*CC 0ZIZ V DC voltage post landing
battery open circuit
27 to 29 vdc
on load
+380/+420 393 to 407 FRE]QUENCY meter
<'-CC @Z13 F Frequency ac bus 1
i phase A cps cps
Zero/q45 vdc 37 to 39 vdc DC VOLTS meter
i -':_CC0214 V DC voltage bat charger
out
"#CC 02i7 F +380/+420 393 tc 407 FRlEQUENC Y nl ere r
Frequency ac bus Z
.t
phase A cps cps
-3/+100 amp -3 to 3D amps DC A.M.PS rrieter
*CC 0ZZZ C DC current battery A
-3/÷100 alnp -3 to 30 an_ps DC AMPS meter
*CC 0ZZ3 C DC current battery B
<-'CC 0224 C DC current post landing .-3/q I00 an_p -3 to 30 amps DC AMPS meter R;
b att e r y
i CC 0Z3Z V DC voltage battery Zero/-g/,.-..5 vdc Z5 to 36, 5 None
relay bus vdc
#SC 2060 P N 2 press1_re F/C 1 Zero/+75 50 to 54 psia F/C I C&W ligh%

REG OUT PR]£SS
regulated psia
<! HI-N Z event indi-
.i cator, and auxil-
iary DC VOLTS
m ere r,
$SC 2061 P N Z pressure F/C Z Zero/+75 50 to 54 psia F/C 2, C&W ].igbt,

psia RlEG OUT I_ Rldo_
_
regulated
HI-N 2 event :" _:
ca/:or, and auz:il--
iary DC VOLTS
in eter
i *SC Z06Z i_ N Z pressure F/C 3 Zero/+75 50 to 54 psia F/C 3 C&W light,
regulated psia RF.G OUT PRFSS

HI-.NZ event indi-
cator, and auxJ.].-
iary DC VOLTS
n]eter
-*SC 2066 P 0 Z pressure F/C i Zero/+75 59 to 6[; psia F/C I C&W hgn_
regulated psia REG OUT PR1ESS
l{J.--O
Z event indi-
i] cator, and auzilo.
i iary DC VOLTS
/
Ineter
*,sc 2067 P Oz pressure F/ C 2 Zero/+'?5 59 to 65 psia F/C Z C&W light,
regulated psia RE:G OU_I ' PR]5:SS

:i
4
l-II-OZ event indi-
7 cator, and amcil-
iary DC VOLTS
Inete r
k2LECTRICAL POWER SY_)T_.N/I
x
*'/* '¢
t,', SiOn ............. J3,_.{.
_,, o ' -, Date 12 Nov !966 C''_n_" ])F, te .................. Page 2.6-40..............
_ ................ ,0
SkIZA - 03 --SC 0 i 2
,::,,]
APOLLO OPERATIONS tgANDI_OOK
<J
"!i e:U
F_ SYSTEMS DATA
Normal
_v_easur e-
Sensor Op e rating
rnent
Range . Range Crew Display
Nm_ber Description
Zero/+75 59 to 65 psia F/C 3 C&W 1Pght,

-':'-SC Z068 P O Z pressure F/C 3
REG OUT PRESS
regu]ated psia
iiu i HI-O Z event indi-
cator, and auxi]- "
B
iary DC VOLTS
]i meter
Zero/+75 57.5 to 63. 5 F/C 1 C&W light,

*SC Z069 P H Z pressure F/C i
REG OUT PRESS
psia psia
regulated
HI-H Z event indi-
cator; and auxil--
iary DC VOLTS
i:iI meter
Pi
b_ *SC Z070 P H z pressure F/C Z Zero/+75 57.5 to 63.5 F/C Z C&W light,
REG OUT PRESS
regulated psia psia
HI-H Z event indi-

cator, and amdl- i
: [_
iary DC VOLTS
meter
Zero/+75 • 57.5 to 63. 5 F/C 3 C&W light,

II Z pressure F/C 3
i:i REG OUT PRESS
i_ *SC Z071 P regulated psia psia
HI-H Z event indi-
cator, and a_uxil.-
::ii!_ [ary DC VOLTS

meter
+150/+Z50°P +157 ° to F/C 1 C&:W light,

SC 2081 T Ten_p F/C i cond
+iTZ°F and MODULE
exhaust
TEMP COND- EXH
L9'_i
indicator
+I50/+Z50°F +157 ° to F/C g C&W light,

Temp F/C Z cond
/i exhaust +I 7 Z ° F and MODULE
SC 208Z T TEMP CONDL EXH
indic ato r
+150/+Z50 °F +157 _ to _F/C 3 CaW light,

Ten_p F/C 3 cond
+I7Z°F and MODULE
SC Z083 T exhaust
TEMP COND- EXH
b
indicator
+80/q:550 °F +385 ° to F/C 1 C&W light

Temp F/C i skin
_ SC Z084 T +460°F and MODULE
TEMP-SKIN
indicator
II Temp F/C Z skin +80/+550°F +385

+460°F
° to F/C
and
Z C&W
MODULE
light
T]£MP--SKIN
GP
indicator'
!ii!.u
ELECTRICAL POXVFI{ SYSTEM
Basic Date 1Z Nov 1966 Cb.ange Date ............. pat, a'_ Z. 6 - 41

!_ M_sio___.
SMZA-03-SC0 IZ
SYSTEMS DATA
i NOrmal
Measure-
SensOr Operating
rnent Crew Display
Range Range
Number Description
_F
+80/+550 °F +385 ° to F/C 3 C&W light

SC Z086 T Temp F/C 3 skin
+460°F and MODULE
TEMP-SKIN
!i
__!!
indicator
•::IX -30 ° to +300°F F/C 1 C&W light,

-50/+300°F
SC 2087 T Temp F/C i radiator F/C RAD TEMP
outlet
LOW event indica-
tor and auxiliary
DC VOLTS meter
i!_i
1
_50/+300°F -30 ° to 4-300°F F/C Z C&W light,

SC Z088 T Temp F/C Z radiator F/C RAD TEMID
outlet LOW event indica-
tor and aLuz.iliary
DC VOLTS meter
-50/+30(' °F •-306 to -I-300°'F F/C 3 C&W light,

SC 2089 T Temp F/C 3 radiator
F/C RAD TEMP
outlet
LO_¢V event indica-
tor and amdtiary
DC VOLTS meter
i8 to ZZ amps DC AMPS meter

SC ZII3 C DC current F/C 1 Zero/+100
output amp s
OC A.h4PS meter
SC ZII4 C DC current F/C Z Zero/+100
output amp s
SC ZII5 C DC current F/C 3 Zero/+100
ii output amp s
SC 21Z0 X Fuel cell ! bus
disconnect
A Off/on
event
F/C
NECT
and
BUS
FUEL
C&W
DISCON-.
light
CELL-i-
I:
MAIN BUS A
switch event
:i!
1 indicator
Connected F/C BUS DISCON-

SC ZIZI X Fuel cell 2 bus A Off/on
NECT C&W light
disconnect event
and FUEL CELL-Z-
MAIN BUS A
switch event
indicator
Off/on Disconnected F/C BUS DISCON-

SC Zl ZZ X Fuel cell 3 bus A
NECT caw light
event
] disconnect
and FUEL CELL-3-
MAIN BUS A
i
switch event
indicator
/!
i ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM
Basic Date 1Z Nov 1966__Change Dat% Page Z, 6-.4Z

Mi s ,_ion
SMZA-03-SC0!Z
t :,
i_)ib,
_-t ;YSTEA4tS DATA
[:.:_
Measure- Normal
P1 Sensor Operating ,
{ii meat
, _ Nu_nber Description Range Range Crew Disp].ay
!
::i
i SC Z125 X Fuel cell 1 bus B Off/on Disconnected F/C BUS DISCON-
i} t:L_
_:,_ disconnect event NECT C&W light
_i _ and FUEL Cl'2LL-l-_
MAIN BUS ]3
:] switch event
} [j indicator
{ _" SC 2126 X Fuel cell Z bus B Off/on Connected F/C BUS DISCON-
_! disconnect event NECT C&W light
a, d FUEL CZL>-Z-
J'_i_ MAIN BUS B
,_: switch event
indicator
i_a Off/on Cormected F/C BUS DIS'CON-
i_ _ SC ZIZ7 X Fuel (:ell 3 bus
disconnect B event INECT C&Ig light
and FUEL C_zLJ-,-. -
_:t _ MAIN BUS 13 ::m<.i
:"t _ swil:eh event _i _
_<:i;
i I 0.046 to 0.0s6 F!C i
indicator C&W ]-r,_ht [<:a
_[ii_
.....
I " *SC 2139 R Flow rate H Z F/C i lb/hr
Zero/+0,Z I" lbs/hr and FLO'W -Iq Z
[i ",=SC ZI40 R Flow ra_e t-t z F/C Z Zero/+0.2 0,046 to 0.056 F/C g C&W light
.i" [_ I ind ic ato r
i_ _':'..a[i:l lbl>, l_.:,s/>.,,- a,_d FLOW-J- h
".:m indicator
_i -",-'SC 21.4i R Flow rate H Z F/C 3 Zero/+0oZ 0.046 to 0.056 F/C 3 C_W light
:_i [:_:_ lh/hr ].bs/hr and FLOW-II 2

j indicator
i ","SC ZI4Z R Flow rate O Z F/C ! Zero/+l.6 0.3"10 to 0.450 F/C I C&W light
lh/hr lbs/hr and FLOW- O 2
:il *SC Z143 R Flow rate O Z F/C Z Zero/+]..6 0,370 to 0.450 F/C Z C&V7 ].ight
Ib/hr Ibs/hr and FLOW.-O Z
i indicato r
_:'_" Zero/+l.6 0.370 to 0.450 F/C 3 C&W light

::{ _ -':'-SC Z144 R Flow rate O Z F/C 3
1 lb/hr ibs/hr and FLOW-Oz
_ in d ic ato r
:_{ _t,_ ::"SC 2160 X pH factor water condi- Normal/high Normal F/C 1 C&W light
:] _-, tion F/C ! event and pI-I t-Ii event
i!ii indicato,"
°_w -':_SC Z161 X pH factor water condi- Normal/high Normal F/C g C&W light
' [)_ tion F/C Z event and pI-I I-II event
__ indicator
¢SC 2i6Z X p]_ factor water condi- Norn',al/high Norma] E/C 3 C&W light
!:_ PJ ti.on F/C 3 event and pH I-II event
{ [-:_ indicator
!
:-.i '}_!_ ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM
ii
p,_ Mission Basic Date 12 Nov ].966 '_han_(' Date_ Page Z.6-43
]!
4_ SMZA-03-SC01Z
,I
1
SYSTEMS DATA
f No rm al
Measure-
Sensor Ope rating
ment
J[ i
Range • Range Crew Display
Number Description
/.a
Open FUEL CELL
Fuel cell I shut off mon Close/open
SC 2323 X REACTANTS event
1 event
.i
indicator
FUEL CELL
Fuel cell Z shut off mon Close/open Open
q sc 2_24 X
REACTANTS event
event
ind ic ato r
i SC Z325 X Fuel. cell 3 shut off mon Close/open Open
FUEL CELL
REACTANTS event
event
indicator
:3
Zer0/+Z8 Ib +Z8 lbs'to TANK QUANTITY-
SF 0030 Q Quanti_y HZ tank 1
zerO H2-1 indicator
- ._
+Z8 ibs to TANK QUANTITY-
SIP 0031"Q Quantity H Z tank Z Zero/+Z8 ib
zero Hz.-Z indicator l!!!
Zero/+3Z0 +3Z0 lbs to TANK QUANTITY-
SF 003Z Q Quantity O Z tank !
ib zero O2-I indicator
ii • i_
Zero/+3Z0 +3Z0 ]bs to TANK QUANTITY-
Sf" 0033 Q Quantity O Z tank Z
ib zero Oz-Z indicator
4-50/+1050 865 to 935 0 z PRESS C&W
SF 0037 P Press O Z tank 1
psia psia light and TANK
PRESSURE-Oz- i
ind ic ato r
5:5 +50/+1050 865 to 935 O z PRESS C&W

SF 0038 P Press O Z tank 2
<! psia light and TANK
psia
I:_REbS 0RE-,Oz- Z
indicator
SIP 0039 P Press H Z tank 1

Zero/+350 ZZ5 to 260 H Z PRESS C&W P
PRESSURE-HZ- i
indicator
Zero/+350 ZZ5 to Z60 H Z PRESS C&W

SF 0040 P Press H Z tank Z
•!
PRESSURE-Hz-Z
in d ic ato r _r
-325/+80°IP -284 ° to None

SF 0041 T Temp O Z tank 1
-140°F
.<;
-325/+80°IP -284 ° to Nolle
SIp 0042 T Te_np O Z tank Z
-140°F
#!
-425/-Z00°F -417 _ to None
i SIP 0043 T Temp H Z tank 1
-340°F
-41.'? ° to None I
SIp 0044 T -4Z5/-Z00°F t
Temp H Z tank Z
-340°F
1
__LEG ]TRICAL POWER SYSTEIvi
2.6-44
i
,M_ssior,
• _............ Basic Date 1Z Nov 1966 Ch,. ange Date. Page
SMZA-03-SC01 Z
:1
]
SYSTEMS DATA
The auxiliary DC VOLTS meter, FUNCTION SELECT and TEST

SELECT switches, located on panel ZOO in the C/M RI-IFEB, provide a
_eans of monitoring various telemetered measurements within the S/C

<I and verH'ying certain parameters displayed only by event indicators.
The following list presents the measuren_ents test can be monitored 1asing
the auxiliary DC VOLTS lneter, their respective switch positions, and the
::] i[_j
f,
range of each sensor . Norrnal operating para:neters of n_.easurable iten_s
are covered in. the telemetry listing.
it
i i:J switch Positions
}!
17:I e:_n Auxiliary DC VOLTS Meter
Function Test
Indication ( Telen_etry Identity)
Select Select Sensor Range
and Code No.)
A 0 to 75 psia
N2 pressure, psia
F/C 1 SC 2060 P
F/C Z SC Z061 P
F,/C 3 SC Z06Z P
:t OZ pressure, psia
0 to 75 psia
F/C 1 SC Z066 P 4
5
F/C Z SC Z067 P
F/C 3 SC Z068 P 6
0 to 75 psia
< • H Z pressure, psia
F/C i SC 2069 P
F/C Z SC Z070 P
F/C 3 SC Z071 P
-50 ° to 4-300°F
EPS radiator outlet temp
i0
F/C 1 SC Z087 T
ii
F/C Z SC Z088 T
iZ
F/C 3 SC Z089 'Y
B -50 ° to +25001 ;`
C/M-RCS oxidizer valve ten-_p
1
-P engine, sys A CR ZZ05 T I
Z
+Y engine, sys B CR 2203 T I
G_ CCW
CW
-P engine,
engine,
engine,
sys
sys
sys
B
B
A
CR
CR
CR
ZZ04
gZ06
ZZ0t
T
T
T
I
1
It
3
lZ
-Y engine, sys A CR 2ZOZ T
+125 _ to +135°F
PIPA ternp CG Z300 T
IRIG temp CG Z301 T

6" +1Z8.5 ° to +138. 5°F
.i:_4
71
_LECTRICAL POWER SYSTEivl
Z. 6-.45
Basic Date IZ Nov t966 Cha _g_ Date ........ Page
SMZA-03...SC01Z
APOLLO OPERATIONS H_ANDBOOK

::i
_
SYSTEMS DATA
Switch Positions
Auxiliary DC VOLTS Meter

Function Test
Indication (Te]ernetry Identity)
Select Select Sensor Range
J and Code No.)
0 to 5 amps
IMU current
:::113 He,ater CG Z30Z C
i<! Blower CG Z303 C
Battery manifold
0 to ] 8 psia
Pressure, psia CC 0188 P
'!4 ECS radiator inlet +60 ° to +150_F

i0
,<7'i
Tm_np SF 0665 T
The conversion of the previously listed telemetry measurements

to the auxiliary DC VOLTSmeter indication is presented as follov;s:
i__i
IMU
:i!
_: C/M--
Heater ECS
EPS RCS "
iliary and Radiator
Oxidizer Battery
DC NZ, 02., Radiator
IRIG Blower Manifold Inlet
Outlet Valve PIPA
VOLTS 1 HZ
Temp Current Pressure T ernp
Pressure Temp Te_np Temp
Meter I (°F) (An_ps) (PSIA) (°F)
(°F) (°F) (°F)
i/) (PSIA)
Display].
+IZ8.5 0o0 0.00 +60.0
-50 -50 +125,0
0.0 0
I-IZ8.9 r_ 9 0.72 +63.6
3 -36 -38 +]25, 4
0.Z +67, Z
+125.8 +129,3 0.4 1.44
0.4 6 -2,2 -26
0.6 2.16 +70, 8
-8 -14 +IZ6.Z +I29.7
0.6 9
+12-6.6 _130,I 0.8 2-.88 +74.4
0.8 IZ +6 -Z
+130,5 1.0 3, 60 +78.0
15 +Z0 +i0 +iZ7.0
1.0
l,Z 4.3Z +81,6

18 +34 +ZZ +127.4 +130.9
1.Z
+131.3 1.4 5,04 +85. Z
Z1 +48 +34 +iZ7.8
1.4
+128. Z +131.7 1,6 5.76 +88.8
1.6 24 +62 +46
Zi
<!i!ill
i
1.8
Z.0
27
30
+76
+90
+58
+70
+i Z8.6
+IZ9.0
+13Z.1
+132.5
1.8
Z,0
6.48
7. Z0
+9Zo 4
+96.0 [
+132.9 Z.Z 7,92 +99,6
2.2 33 +104 +8Z +129.4
+133.3 2,,4 8,64 +!03°Z
2,4 36 +1i8 +94 +I29.8
+133.7 2.6 9,36 +106.8
2.6 39 +13Z +106 +130. Z
"!!>i +134.1 Z,8 10,08 +110.4
2.8 42 +146 +118 +130.6
3.0 45 +160 +130 +131.0 +134.5 3.0
3,2
I0, 80
!l. SZ
+114.0
+1i7,6
[
3.2. 48 +174 +142 +131.4 +134_ 9
+131,8 +135.3 3,4 12.24 +lZl. Z
3.4 51 +188 +154
+135.7 3,6 ]Z.96 +!Z4.8
3.6 54 +Z02 +166 +132. Z
+13Z.6 +136. 1 3,8 13,68 +128.4 f
_a 3.8 57 +Zi6 +178
,{
+133.0 +136.5 4,0 14,40 +13Z.O
4.0 60 +Z30 +190
•)!
Z, 6--46
1,{i_sion ........... Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 .Change Date,,• Page
P
t
$IvlgA -0 3 -SG012.
L! ¸ %
APOLLO OPERATIONS HAiqDBOOIK
(iI
S--¢ SZ ",_ c DATA

.,.M ....
iux - C/M- IMU

RCS tieate r ECS
1
iliary EPS
Oxidizer and Battery Radiator
DC N2, 0 2, Radiator
Valve P!PA IRIG Blower Manifold Inlet
VOLTS tt 2 Outlet
T ere.p Temp Temp Current Pressure 'Y*enip
Meter Pressure Temp
(°F) ( ° F) ( ° F) ( ° F) (An_p s) (PSlA) (°F)
Display ( PS!A}
Z!il 15, IZ +135.6

4. Z .63 +244 +ZOZ +133,4 +136.9[ 4. Z
+258 !5.8,1 +139.2
4.4 66 -l-Z14 +133.8 +137.3[ 4.4
7,, i_ 16.56 +142,8
4.6 69 +Z7Z +Z26 +134, Z +!37,7 I 4°6
)i ¸ _
+286 4-238 +134.6 +138. 1 4.8 17.28 +146.4
4.8 72
4-300 +250 t
-, 135.0 " a-l_4
.... 8. 5 _,
_, ..)¢" 18.00 +150.0
5.0 75
: :: ;4
:!
.}
: i!
O,
5 ?
:i
:'4
l
!
:1
i!i
:7!-]
i?i
[!
:iiii a
,¢
!
_;'_ Mission .................. Basic L,

_ ate- IZ Nov 1960 " Change Date ....... Page Z,6--47/Z.6_48
:{ i:{ ...........................
i
'h
:I SIvI2A-03-SC0 ]2
APOLLO OPE_<ATIONS HANDBOOI<
SYSTEMS DATA
.a
SECTION 2
!! [q SUBSECTION 2. 7
I
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM (ECS)
_. 7. INT RO DU CTION.
The environmental control system (ECS) _s designed to provide a

co_itrolled environment for three crewmen v,,ithin the Apollo C/M for
missions up to 14 days. The system also supplies several of the metabolic
requireme_nts, as well as functioning in the removal of by-products result-
ing from the normal _=qetabolic process. The controlled environment
consists of a pressure suit circuit for use during normal or emergency
conditions, and a shirtsleeve atmosphere within the C/M cabin, for use
when normal conditions prevail. Oxygen and therma!]y controlled water
are supplied for crew consumption; whereas, carbon dioxide and odors,
: :'::(]
water-production , and heat output are removed, in addition, the _ECS

disperses equipment heat loads and provi<]es for venting the waste storage
:iu compartment.
the C/M cabin; these,

Controls
in conjunction
and displays
with automatically
a.re located in several areas
functioning compo-
within
[i!!!i_.
nents, and sensing and protective devices, aid the crew in the operation of !
the sFstens. Tkc five subsystcn2s con_posing the _ICS are the oxygen supply, }
pressure suit circuit, cabin pressure and temperature control, wa[er- i]:_,.._
glycol coolant, and water supply.
The oxygen supply subsystem controls the inflow of o_;ygen for the
entire Apollo mission. This function is accomplished by pressure regu-
lator, demand regulators, storage tanks, check valves, and manual shutoff
:!
] valves.
pressure,
The pressure
temperature,
suit subsystem
and composition
automatically
of the pressure
controls the
suit gas.
flow,
In con-
junction with the C/M pressure and temperature control subsystem, it also
controls the environment conditions in the cabin when one, or all of the
crew are out of their pressure suits. These functions are provided by
water separators, temperature control.s, a suit heat exchanger, a debris
trap, gas compressor, COg-odor absorbers, and a water glycol-to-gas
heat exchanger.
.$!:i:_
The cabin pressure and temperature control subsystem automatically

maintains the pre'ssure and temperature of the cabin within specified limits.
This function is accomplished in conjunction with the pressure suit subsys-
tem by means of regulated oxygen inflow, recircu].ation blowers, a heat
exchanger, a temperature control an_d sensors, vent valves, and other
•i!
valves and controls required. The water...glyco], subsystem is an inter-
mediate heat transfer loop which permits excess heat to be transferred
from the C/h4 interior to the space radiators where it is rejected to the
cosmic sink. Th_s function is accomplished by pu_.,ps, heat excb_angers,
ENViRONM}ENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 • 2.7-]

Mission . Change I)ate ................ Page
!:!ii o M,=,A ,.03--SC012
!!
<i! o_STkMS DA'I'A
cold plate networks, valves, and controls. The water supply subsystem
collects, stores, and provides water for supplemental heat transfer opera-
tion, and collects and stores potable water for consumption by the crew.
i These functions are accomplished by utilizing water tanks, pressure
controls, cyclic accumulators, and valves.
Other than the circuitry required for controls and displays or electri-
cal power,
systems.
tanks, which
All oxygen
three
supplied
are considered
points
to the ECS flows
a part of the EPS.
of interface exist between
from
The
the ECS
the cryogenic
and
storage
fue ! cells, also a part
other S/C
[
of the EPS, furnish the onboard su0ply of potable water ti_at is stored by the
ii
ECS. The third interface point is with the waste management system,
which connects into the ECS overboard durnp l_ne.
•j
2.7. Z FUNCTIONA L DESG RiPTION,
The ECS requires a minimum amount of crew time be spent for

normal system operation, In addition to periodically monitoring system
indicators, the crew is responsible fo.r the accomplishment of several
norrnai tasks on an infrequent basis. For conditions other than normal,
the duties of the crew will increase. Electrical and manual override and
backup capabilities exist throughout the ECS to maintain the required
!I reliability level of the system.
The oxygen supRlied to the ECS from the storage tanks in the S/M
is used to carry out a variety of system functions. Upon reaching the ECS,
oxygen is automatically regulated and manually routed to various sub-
I system
automatically
components
functioning
by a system
components
of valves
to maintain
and lines. Also
suit and/or
incorporated
cabin pressure
are
in the event of cabin decompression of equipment rnalfunction. [

i The atrnosphere of the pressurized cabin, as well as that of the
pressure garment assemblies (PGA), is routed through the suit circuit for
J contaminant removal and humidity control. The flow, pressure, and I

temperai-ure control within the suit circuit, are maintained by o_her compo-
iil nents of the subsystem. This is accomplished automatically by using
i{ transducers, sensors, and control units to regulate these functions.

Mechanical-type oxygen pressure regulators automatically maintain cabin
pressure within prescribed limits. The temperature of the cabin is con-
J_ trolled by an automatic unit that regv !ates the output of the cabin heat
exchanger with the aid of sensors and anticipators.
Carbon dioxide and odors are removed from the suit circuit and
i
cabin gases by routing the g.-%sflow through two filters in the CO2-odor
absorber canisters. Each filter contains .qufficient lithimzn hydroxide |
(CO Z removal) and activated charcoal (odor remora]) for a ]Z-hour duty
period for a crew of _hree. The suit ci_rcuit and cabin atmospheres are
also sampled by a gas cl.romatograph that will identify up to Z$ gas compo- t
nents that may be present.
Z. 7- Z
Mi s, sion Basic Da.te 12 Nov.........1966 _.
v._auge Date. Page
]
SMZA-03-SC0 !Z
,:j . A PO LLO O!:'EICA TIONS !-IANDBOOK
SYSTY]MS DATA
Heat, generated by the crew and the many items of electrical equip-
ment located in the cabin, is absorbed by recirculating water-glycol. The
_.e_t is transferred to the water-glycol as it flows through the suit heat
exchanger, the cabin heat exchanger, and the cold plate network for the
electrical equipment. The warm water-glycol is then routed through_space
radiators in the S/M, where the heat is radiated to space. Supplementing
the 'radiators and/or as a backup mode, water evaporators are employed
for a_y additional temperature control of suit gases or insufficiently cooled
water-glycol.
Potable and waste water are generated on-board the S/C. The potable
water is a by-product of the EPS fuel cells and flows to the ECS where it _s
stored. Cold potable water is avail_fble to the crew for drinking, and hot or
cold potable water is available for food recons-titution. Waste water is

derived from the moisture that condenses in the water separator of the suit
exchanger. It is collec[:ed and stored by the ECS and used for evaporalive
cooling in the suit heat exchanger evaporator and the water-glycol
evaporator.
2.7.3 MAJOR COMPONENT/SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION.
Pertinent design data in regard to components, their function <vithin
each subsystem, and how they interface is contained under major compo-.
nent/subsystem description. The description follows the logical flow,
[
component by component, through each subs_stem of the ECS. _
I _i!!i
2.7.3.1 Oxy_ien Supply Subsystem.
Two cryogenic oxygen storage tanks (part of the electrical power
system) supp]y 900:_35 psia oxygen flow to the ECS. Each t-ank contains
3Z0 pounds of oxygen_ and of the total supply, approximately one-third is
consumed by the ICCS. Oxygen fl()ws unrestricted _n parallel lines fron_ the
S/M supply tanks into the C/M. In the C/M, oxygen flows in each supply
line through a filter, a capillary restrictor, and a check valve upstream to

their connection to a common distribution line. To assure uniform flow,
the capillary restrictors are coiled around a warm water-glycol line to

increase the oxygen temperature. Each restrSctor allows a maximum flow
of 4.5 pounds per hour into the ECS to limit the demands placed on the
cryogenic oxygen storage tanks and enable the tank heaters to maintain the
prescribed tank pressures. The minimum flow rate will not decrease
below 3. 4 pounds per hour as the oxygen density decreases due to usage.
Illustrated h_ the ECS integrated schematic (figure 2. 7-13) the manual S/M
supply shu[off valve, located on the LHE]% pane] 307, is normally in the ON
position and placed to OFF prSor to SCM separation for _he entry phase of
the mission. Downstrea_n of the S/M shutoff valve 900-35 psia oxygen is
distributed to a surge tank, an entry 02 tank, a PLSS fill valve, and the
main pressure regulator assembly. Oxygen flows to the surge tank through
a manual surge tank isolation valve, located on the LHEB panel 307. The
surge tank provides a reservoir of O Z for the entry mission modes, and
during flow requirements above the 0.9 pound per hour maximum
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROl., SYSTEM
Mission Y_asi c Date IZ Nov 19(-,6 Chai\ge Date,.

1
iJ
S IvIZA -0 3- SC01 Z
APOLLO Of,-,-IuRA T IONL, c I-IANDBOO?K

'J
SYSTEMS DATA
allowable
oxygen
pressure
is
by
available
transducer
the capillary
at nominal
output
restrictors.
is
inlet
displayed
pressure
Approximately
by the
of 900-_:35
TANK PRESS
3. 7 pounds
psia. A surge
0 2
of
1 indicator,
tank [
located on MDC panel 13. The indicator input must be selected by the
switch position, SURGE TANK, locat_o o below the indicator. To reduce the
i ii demand loads on the cryogenic storage system, high flow rates from the
surge tank will _naintain cabin pressure from 5 t:o 3.5 psia for 5 minutes,
w._th a 0. 5-inch-diameter puncture __n the cabin. The flow rate into the
:ii1 cabin is a function of regulator valves downstream of the surge tank. The
5.-minute period allows unsuited cre-vmembers _o don PGAs. When isolated
by the surge _ank manual shutoff valve, the ta_.k is protected by a pressure
relief and mam-al shutoff valve assembly. The relief portion is set between
10Z0 and .1070 psig. Should the re!iefvatve fail or not reseat prorerly, the
manual shutoff valve will isolate £?,e relief valve *;'unction from _he system.
Downstream O Z supply is also stored in a one-pound entry O 2 tar, k,

through a manual three-.way selector valve, a check valve, and a check
valve by_)ass. When the many.a1 selector valve is in the FILL position, the
entry O Z supply tank receives high pressure O Z through the check valve
bypass. When the tank is charged, i:he selector valve may be positioned to
OFF to isolate the tank supply, or to ON whereby the 02 tank supply may
augment the surge tank function. The check valve prevents a reverse flow
in case of entry O Z tank damage. An isolation check valve between the two
tanks prevents reverse flow and a nnanual va!ve permits charging PLSS
oxygen tanks from the ECS.
The 900k35..psig oxygen supply, from the cryogenic _anks, is regulated

to 100ml0 psig by the main pressure.' regulator asse;nbly illustrated in
figure Z° 7-1. The main pressure regulator asse_r_bly consists of a rnanual
ii I
selector valve, two regulators, and two relief _-nd cheek valves. NORMAL
position of the n;anual selector valve parallels the regulators. Pc_sition
No. 1 or No. Z setects its regulator respectively. The OFF position
isolates all O 2 suppl.-_ for the crew and. cabin. Should a regulator fail open,
•iq the relief valve for that regulator will limit the pressure to !40 psig dov,'n-
;! stream
This fault
and vent
s.hould
a maximum
be corrected
flow
by
<f
selecting
0. 75 pounds
the
per
alternate
minute
regulator
into the
only.
cabin.
An oxygen flow transducer, downstream of the main regulator_

provides a signal to the flow ind-;cator, located on the main display console
panel 13, and the O 2 FLOW HI light° Although short periods of flow in
excess of 0.45 pounds per hour are considered normal, a continuous flow
: .!I
rate between 0. 45 and 1.0 poun:t per houz should no2 be tolerated. Flow
• ii_
1 rates above ]. 0 pounds per hour and for a period of 15 seconds and above
activate the red O Z FLOW HI warning light located on the caution and
warning (C&W) pane] 11. The 15-secend time deia.v prevents the 02 FLOW
HI light from iighting during O 2 flow require_:nents of the cyclic accumu-
!ators that remove water from the suit heat exchanger, and during transient
conditions. Continued flow rates in this range are indicative of cabin
leakage, O2 supp!._ed subsystem leakage, or subsystem mismanagement.
" :i!i ENvIRONMENTAl., CONT tkO]_, oY

'_ "_.SR"
EM
I
Mission Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 ........... (_,,._a n g e Date ................ Page 2, 7-.4
SlvIZY_-.0 3-SC0 1 2.
APOLLO O_-)ER ATIONS ].EANDBOOI<
SYSTEMS DATA
[J
L
)]
!t SELECTOR
:]
PRESSURE [I[GULATOR
.!
E!
:l .IEFVALVE
;HECK VALVE
ECS-43C (T_?I]
[(! F_= .....

Figure Z. "7-1. Main Oxygen Pressure R'egulator
li :
# _:::!,
k ;,. :_:
Connected to the !00_!0--ps_-g regulated pressure line is a fluid tank
[J pressure regulator and relief valve assembly, located on the OXXG'_
i
CONTROL PANEL No. 314. It consists of redundant pressure regulators
and relief valves which provide oxygen at regulated presst_re to the expu].-
sion bladders installed in the potable water tank, waste water tank, and the
water-glycol (W/Q) reservoir. Two four-position selector valves are
[:l employed
elements
st
or
the
complete
inlet and
shutoff
outlet,
as
and
desired.
enable isolation
The pressure
of malfunctioning
.regulator is a
normally opened, diaphragm-operated poppet metering valve which

functions to reduce 100±10-psig supply pressure to Z0±Z-psig O Z pressure
to the fluid tanks, in relation to cabin pressure. The relief valve incor-
porated in the assembly outlet chamber functions to relieve O Z pressure in
excess of Z5±Z psig into the cabin.
Should a regulator diaphragm rupture, and is isolated by the inlet

manual selector valve, the manual outlet selector valve must also be
positioned to isolate the relief poi-ti6n of the failed regulator. Th_s

prevents a feedback from the alternate regulator flowing oxygen through
the ruptured diaphragm of the failed regulator into the cabin.
:]
Should the selector inlet valve of the assembly be placed to.position i,
the selector outlet valve must also be placed to position l (or NORMAL).
!ii If instead, the selector outlet valve were placed to position 2, the valve
port to pressurize the tanks would be closed, and the port to the relief
[
[I ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
Basic Date. 12 Nov 196.{., .Change Date_

! SMZA- 03.-SC01 Z
]
:1
APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOI<
SYSTEMS DATA
valve would remain open. This permSts tl_e pressure relief function <)f the
'"3 valve to remain operative but prohibits subsequent tank pressurization.
7i
• "ii Conversely, when the selector outlet valv.e is set to position 2, the selector
inlet valve must also be set to position Z (or NORMAL). The OFF position
of th.e in!et and outlet selector valves is normally for ground checkout;
however, if both pressure regulators malfunction during flight, the selector
inlet valve must be set to the OFF position. This eliminates the tank
"I
4
pressurization
response
outlet valve
to the
must
function,
possibility
be set
but
to
of
the
does
both
OFF
not
relief
affect
position,
valves
the
This
pressure
malfnnctioning,
action
relief
will
function.
the
eliminate
selector
In
[
both the pressurization and pressure relief functions.
The 100a:10-psig oxygen supply is controlled by the emergency cabin

'i
pressure regulator, located on panel 314, to 15rovide increased oxygen flow
to
pressure
valves
the cabin,
to
regulator
prevent
ahd prevent
consists
overpressurization
rapid
of
decompression.
dual aneroid-operated,
of the aneroids,
The emergency
and
normaliy
a manual
cabin
closed
four-
[
position se?ector valve with positions designated No. 1, No. 2, NORMAL,
and
sense
OFF.
port
A
allows
PRESS-TO-TEST
a fix bleed of
button,
100 cc
which
per rnin
closes
to pressurize
the cabin
an
pressure
aneroid
{
chamber and drive the v_.lve open. Normally the 100_10-psig oxygen
supply to the cabin is controlled by the cabin pressure regulator assembly.
it consists of dual, aneroid-absolute type norrnal].y closed valves, and each
li
will deliver a minimum of 0. Z pound per hour oxygen flow a.t a cabin pres.-
sure of 5. 0±0.2 psia. Failure mode of the valve is normally closed. A
manual control valve nSay be opened and allow a minimum 6 pounds per
1 hour flow of O Z directly into the cabin for repressurization from 0.0 to 5.0
9_
psia within one hour. The cabin pressure regulator and the emergency
cabin pressure regulator are associated with the cabin pressure and
9 temperature
at 100±10 psig
control
is routed
subsystem
to a manually
(paragraph
operated
Z. 7o3. 3),
metering
Oxygen.
valve,
distribution
for direct
{
flow into the suit inlet duct. !n the full open position, oxygen will flow from
0.6 to O. 7 pound per minute.
[
Downstream the dual suit demand pressure regulator and relief valve,
located on LHEB panel 310, compares suit compressor inlet pressure to
cabin ambient pressure. When the cornpressor inlet pressure is 2. 5 to 3. 5
inches of water pressure below cabin pressure, the demand regulator
controls O z flow into the suit circuit at flow rates up to 0. 007 pound per
minute.
water pressure
When the
above
compressor
cabin pressure,
inlet pressure
the relief
is above
valve
Z to
vents
9 inches
the suit
of
[
circuit gases to the cabin at a ma-ximum flow rate of 0.66 pound per minute.
Normally the compressor inlet manifold is regulated to an average of 6. 10
inches of water above cabin ambient pressure. When cabin ambient pres- I
[
sure is less than 4 psia, a 100 ccm bleed within the demand regulator _s
i used to maintain the suit circuit pressure at 3. 75±0. Z5 psia. With cabin
t
ambier:t
the demand
pressure
regulator
below
should
3. 5 psia
sustain
and
suit
a 0. 66
circuit
pound per
pressure
minute
at
suit:
3. 75±0.
ieakage_
Z5 psia.
li
[
A four-position manual selector valve witi_ contro] positions designated as
No. !, No. Z, both, and OFF provides isolation of a fault. The demand pres-
sure regulator and relief valve are described in paragraph 2.7°3. 3.
Mission Basic Date

- 1Z Nov 1966
_ ....... _'_ -_e . Dal:e ...............
_,,_ang Page _-' 7-6 ,
.. [
f
J
;1
S R,i2A -0.5-. o(_. 012
APOLLO oPERATIONS }-iA.NDBOOK
SYST ]EIvIS DATA
Oxygen regulated at 100a:10--psig pressure is used as a motive force il_

the removal of waste water from the suit circuit and then expelled into the
Suit heat exchanger. .,
2.7.3.2 Pressure Suit Circuit Subsystem.
' The pressure suit subsystem is a loop or circuit designed to supp]y a

conditioned atmosphere for a crew of three, whether they be in or out of
their PGAs . The circuit provides fo" ventilation and cooling for the crew,
the removal of carbon dioxide and odors, and the controlof relative t-ur'_idity_
Suit circuit pressure is maintained by controlling the amount of oxygen
entering the subsystem.
A supply-return hose assembly is connected between each crewmarJs

PGA and a suit hose connector assembly. This assembly consists of a com-
£1 V
bined supply-return connection. A three-position svit _.o\ control valve,
vehich diverts oxygen into the cabin when a c_-ewme_zcFoer is unst_ited, and a
check valve prevents return flow from the cabin.. Normal operation 5s to
disconnect the hose at the suit. There is also' a venturi--type flow li_nqiter,
located upstream in each supply line, to ]trait_ flow" to any one suit to a n_a>:i-
mum of 0. 7 pound per minute. During the time a c:rew_ernber is in the
shirtsleeve mode, the flow control valve is positioned to permit suit: circuit
f].ow into the C/M cabin, through the suit hose, which is removed at the PG.A
connection. The return section of the suit hose is capped to prevent cab_-n
gas flowing into the suit circuit when crewmen remove their suits.
;: i,.:
Cabin gases are returned .to the suit circuit for removal of carbon
dioxide, odors, heat, and moisture. These gases e_,ter at the su_t .... ";*
return air valve assembly, whict- consists of two check valves in series,
and a manual shutoff valve for isolating the suit circuit if the cabin becomes
contaminated. The combined cabin and suit circuit atmosphere first P_ows
through the debris trap, where small particles of solid matter are removed.
The trap contains a bypass valve in the event the filter screen becomes
clogged.
Two suit compressors, connected in parallel, maintain circulatior_

within the suit circuit. NormaJly only one compressor is operated at a
time; however, both may be operated for a small advantage in sensible heat
remova_l with a large increase in power consumptior_ in all cases except
prelaunch, or when the three crewmembers are unsuited in a 5-psia
pressurized cabin. A differential pressure transducer between the inlet
and outlet manifolds of the compressor supplies signals for indication on
the main displz_y console (panel !3). Con@ressor output is dependent on the
mode of operation. In normal space operation, the operating compressor
delivers approximately 35 c_bic feet per minute of suit gas at: a Fressure
rise of 10 inches of water within the condition of 4. 93 psia and 88°F. Yfhen
the cabin is unpressurized, the operating compressor delivers approxi-
mately 34.5 cubic feet per minute suit gas at a pressure rise of 6.9 inches
of water when inlet conditions are 3. 5t psia at 85°F.
ENVIRONMEIqTAL. CONTROI_ SYSTEM
:_ [_'_i Basic Date ]Z Nov 1966 2. 7-7

Mission Change Date ................. l°age ..............................
a
SMZA-03-SC01 g
APOLLO OPERA'I_ICN S HANDBOOK

ji[!
SYSTEMS I]ATA .:.j_
i:] The suit demand pressure regulator (figure 2.7-2) controls suit
circuit pressure _.n nor'real and emergency modes. It supplies oxygen to the
::ii!
i
>>: suits whenever the suit circuit is isolated from the cabin, and during
depressurized operations. It also relieves excess gas to prevent over-
pressurizing the suits.
i:]
The regulator consists essentially of two redundant demand regula-

tors,, and a relief valve, A selector valve is provided for selecting either
•g
or both regulators. Normally both are in operation.
Each regulator section consists of an anerold control, and a differen-
tial diaphragm ho'osed in a referenc{_ chamber. The diaphragm is connected
by a rod to the demand valve. The den_and valve will be opened whenever a
pressure differential is sensed across the dJaphregrn, In operation there is

a constan_ bleed flow of oxygen from the supply into the reference chamber,
,t
:N
:i} ]
2)il ANEROID
TEST
REGULATOR NO, 1 DIAPHRAGM REGULATORNO. 2
FERENCE ANEROI D
TEST ROD
REFERENCE
PRESSURE
1
BLEED
ORIFICE--, REi IEF
VALVE REFERENCE
CHAMBERS
DEMAND
REGULATOR
DIAPHRAG[I RELIEF
:]:!i!i VALVE
DEMAND
SUPPLY VALVE
(REEL
i'i1 SUIT SENSING
AND RELIEF PORT
i! Z ATi ON
ORIFICE
PRESS
i DEPRESS.
[ ...... _. DEMAND REGULATOR

/
El OWg| __" SU!T RELIEF
" "'I ..... ;*" CONIROLLED _I.EED
I. ....... _';'"REFERENCECHAMBER RELIEF
SU II-
] TEST
I NLE \_ _EST
OUILET 'DEPRESSURIZAIION
ECS-50D
i1 I]O SUII ORIFICE
CIRCUID
il Figure 2. 7-Z. Oxygen Demand Pre,_sure Regulator a_d Relief Valve
ENVIRONbIENIFAL CONTROL SY STEM
•_ _.T_,. _ c, _ 6 Z. 7- 8
Mi s s ion Basic ., .
Lat_: .,:.LjZ._-jL_;..,.._
........
Char_ge Date ...................... Pag e
<i:i
4
SMZA-03-SC01Z

:!
i
SYSTEMS DATA
around the aneroid, and out through the control port into the cabin. As long ,
as the cabin pressure is greater than 3.75 psia, the flow of oxygen through
the control port is virtually unrestricted, so that the pressure within the
reference chamber is essentially that of the Cabin. This pressure acts on
•i ij the upper side of the diaphragm, while suit pressure is applied to the under-
side. The diaphragm can be made to open the demand valve by either
inc'reasing the reference chamber pressure, or by decreasing the sensed
suit pressure.
• d
The increased pressure mode occurs during depressur:Lze operations.
As the cabin pressure decreases the aneroid expands. At 3. 75 psia the

aneroid will have expanded suffiziently to restrict: the outflow of oxygen
through the control port, thus increasing the reference chamber pressure,
':il .... ,.:%
Decreased suit pressure mode occurs whenever the suSt circuit is
isolated from the cabin, and cabin pressure is above 5 psia. In the process
_ i_
!i of respiration the crew will exhale carbon dioxide and water vapor. ]in
circulating the suit gases through the COz-odor absorber arid the suit heat
exchanger, the CO Z and waeer are removed. The removal reduces the
pressure in the suit circuit, which is sensed by the regulator on the under-
side of the diaphragm. When the pressure drops approximately Z inches
o} I-IzO below cabin pressur.e, the diaphragrn will open the demand valve.
The regulator assembly contains a poppet-type relief valve which is
integral with the suit pressure sense port. During operations when the
i"
cabin pressure is above 3, 75 psia_ the relief valve is loaded by a coil
, !
spring w1_cb allows excess suit gas to be vented whenever suit pressure
rises Z to 9 inches I-IzO above cabin pressure. When the cabin pressure
decreases to 3. 75 psia, the reference chamber pressure is increased by
.-i the
pressure
throttling
is
effect
applied
of the
through
expanding
ducts to two
aneroid.
relief-.valve
The reference
loading
chamber
chambers
which are arranged in tandem above the relief valve poppet. The pressure
in the loading chambers acts on tandem.diaphragms which are forced
against the relief valve poppet. The relief portion of the valve is thus
increased to 3. 75 psia plus Z to 9 inches HzO.
i Iil compressors,
Two parallel
function
COz-odor
in the
absorber
removal of
canisters,
carbon
downstream
dioxide and odors.

of the
A
suit
i removable filter within each canister contains sufficient lithium hydroxide
(for CO Z removal) and activated charcoal (for odor removal) to last 1,5
man-days of operation. This operational limit requires each filter be
changed, on an alternating basis, every IZ hours. An _nterna] bypass is
incorporated within each filter to furnish the req_dred flow during the ECS
emergency mode (cabin depressurized), but re,ill. also increase the flow
under normal conditions, Although 50 percent of the flow is per:nitted to
bypass the lithium hydroxide, the total flow must pass through the charcoal
lilte r.
! - . _:_ . ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
i g. "I-9
Basic Date lg Nov 1966___Change Date Page
Mis sion-,
SMZA-03-SC012
APOLLO OPIERATIONS HA N*.-

DBOO _'_
-,,.2-
? SYSTEMS
,_ DA'I.
T "A i<:!_
The COm.-odor absorber filter change sequence involves numerically

identified fillers and alphabetically identified filter stowage containers.
b:_
Although the filters are replaced in numerical sequence, the stowage con-
lathers arc not opened in alphabetical sequence relative to filter replace-
mont. Ocld-numbered filters will always be installed in suit circuit
canister A (upper) and even-numbered filters installed in canister I% (lower).
After the proper filter stowage container is located by the crewman, the
!
corrc_ct filter is obtained and the filter change accomplished. The used
filter is then stowed in the container from which the unused replacement
u
came. Where two filters are stowed one above the olher, the used filter
_vil] always be placed belo\v the remaining _:rmsed f]l_er, This provides a
:i more readily accessible unused filter at the next IZ-hour rep!acen_,ent
h_
period. Filter replacement data, such as filter number and rots:zion time,
j is recorded by the crew in the Nighc log,
A diver[er v_tlve located at the canisters inlet is normally positioned
to direct ha,{ flow through hoN_ filters. In conjuncti6n with check valves,
kil located at each canister outlet, repositioning the diverter valve isolates an
ii ::_ expended fi]tero A manua!].y operated ver,,t valve for each canister e.l!ows
si equalization to cabin pressure prior to the removal of a filter.
Suit circuit gases, upon leaving the COz-odo r absorber canister

F'
assemb]y_ are at a higher temperature and humidity level than at apy other
L
point in _he suit circuit. Heat has been generai:ed in flowing through the
compressoJ, s andN_.e canister assembly. Also, the already i_urnid gases

4
have picked up additional n-_.e_sture due to cbe,-n;c_l -_o_ction betwee_ the
carbo_; dioxide and lithium hydroxide, The suit heat exchanger removes
this heat and humidity from the suit gases.

<t
Normally the heat transfer fluid, v,,a_;er-glycol, Nowing through the

suit heat exchanger red,novels the suit circuit heat loads to space through
space radiators. A water-glycol evaporator supplements heat transfer

when the space radiators are inadequate_ A suit evaporator (part of the
suit heat exchanger) is provided and used only in the ev¢nt of an emergency.
Under all od_er _'-'
con.(_t_on_ " the suit evaporator controls are to remain in the
} OFF posW_tion. The control switch (SUIT EVAP, AUTO -- MAN, located on
panel !3) controls e].ectr_eal power to the system. This operational change
will not impose added constraints on the mission; howeve-c, if the water-
J glycol evaporator should fail when it is required for cooling of electronic:s,

etc., this would be sufficient cause to terminate the mission°
Should the ability of the suit evaporator system demonstrate proper
operation, the control switch would be placed to the AUTO positio__o When
wa!er-g]ycol inlet temperatures to _he suit heat exchanger exceed 52°F or

the outlet temperatures of the suit circuit g_ses frorc; Ihe heat exchanger
exceed 60°F, the suit heat exchanger is bypassed by the water-glycol flow
through a diverter valve. When the automat!c-controlled diverter valve is

in the full bypass position, an integral switch _n the diverter valve assembl 7
is activated. The diverter valve switch activates the suit evaporator steam
pres'sure control unit. Th,5 correct steam duct pressure is augomatical!y
]-;NVIRONMEN T A L CON T RO I_ SY S3.U:; _<4
Basic Date IZ Nov 1966 Ch-_n[{,. Date ....................... Page Z.7-10

SMZA-03-SC01Z
SYSTEMS DATA
+ ,:,_
established for a given temperature error by the steam pressure control

unit_ pressure transducer, and the steam pressure control valve. Initial
opening of the steam pressure control valve causes a switch in that valve
assembly to activate the wetness control unit. Water inlet through a ,
solenoid valve to the suit evaporator is automatically controlled by sensing
the suit evaporator wetness and the temperature of the suit gases at the
heat exchanger outlet. When suit gas temperatures re1:urr to normal, the
evaporator mode is sequencially deactivated and water-glycol flow is
re-established. By overriding the suit gases temperature sensor at the
outlet of the heat exchanger the system may also be activated, providing
the SUIT EVAP control switch is in the AUTO position, Simulated high heat
load is initiated by the SUIT >IT EXCI_I switch (LHEB -310).
As the moisture-laden suit gases are cooled, condens_ztion takes
place within the heat exchanger. This moisture is absorbed by a wick-like

material, removed by capillaiy action and the suction of the ttzO accumu-,
].ator, and pumped into the waste water system,
The two accumulators are automatically controlled, self-cycling,

reciprocating pumps. Oxygen at !00:I-I0 psig periodica].ly activates the
pumps on the expulsion stroke, while a return spring is utilized for the
suction stroke. Only one accumulator can be operated at a time with the
second for standby use in the event of a malfunction. A manua] backup
mode of accumulator operation is also incorporated. Following the dis- ,__.<_.':
charge of suit circuit gases from the suit heat exchanger, the normal fl0w [
is to the three suit hose connector assemb].ies. A suit flow relief valve is !
-incorporated in the bypass line between the outlet of the suit heat exchanger }_.:_,...
and the inlet to the suit compressor. The valve opens at a .5.P ol 5.0+0.Z
in. HzO and automatically maintains a nearly constant flow in the event
of suit circuit flow resistance fluctuations.
Z. 7.3. Z.I CO Z Sensor.
B the
The
suit circuit,
CO Z sensor,
is a compact
situated between
unit that
the
operates
inlet and
on the
outlet manifolds
infrared absorption
of
principle. The unit measures the amount of infrared energy absorbed by

the CO Z in the atmospheric sample passing throug]_ the sensor. This is
accomplished by comparing two different wavelengths in the infrared
spectrum. One wavelength is absorbed by COz, while the other acts as a
reference. This establishes a ratio signal which is amp!ifiecJ and reads out
B as a d-c
gas.
voltage proportional to the partial pressure of CO Z in the sample
The sensor is divided into the optics section and the eIectronics
section. The optics section includes an infrared energy source (a small
tungsten filament lamp), and optical lenses and mirror for focusing the
beam through two wavelength filters and the atmospheric sample onto a
detector. Both wavelength filters (4, 3 microns for sampling and 4.0
microns for reference) are attached to a tuning fork which vlbrates at
i!i
i •
iI ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
! [,:_:_ g(ission. Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 Change Date_., Page Z. 7-11
2
SMZA-03-SC01Z
!i;;
i SYSTEMS DATA
600 cycles per second. The f_iters move back and forth across the focused
light beam, alternately transmitting energy at the sample and reference
wavelengths.
The basic purpose of the electronics section is to detect and trans-

form signal information. Miniaturized components are mounted on seven
!1 printed circuit boards, which accornplish all the electrical functions.
These functions inclx_de supplying the power for the infrared source lamp
and the operation of the tuning fork, the detector, and the various pream-
plifiers and amplifiers. The output signal activates the CO 2 PP I-IIsystems
,/1 status light (MDC-!I) and the CO 2 PART PRESS indicator (MDC-13).
2.7.3.2.2 Gas Chromatograph.
The gas chromatograph is an item of GFE that is installed in several

of the Apollo ]Block I spacecraft for flight qualification purposes. The unit
is capable of identifying and measuring the co_centrs:tions of Z8 gas compo-
nents, and the resulting data is then telemetered to Ivi'SFN. This compact
:ii
I item of equipment
outlet manifolds
is installed in the L.EB, and
of the suit circuit in the LHEB.
it interfaces the inlet and
The gas chromatograph operates on the basic principle of routing

samples of the suit c_rcuit and/or cabin atmosphere through three separate
capillary columns and detectors. Low-pressure helium is used as the
carrier gas for the sample streams. The helium st.tpply, even under
continuous demand, will last the length of any proposed mission. The
he]iun: is stored i;;.
a reservoir at 6000 psig and is regulated to Its norn_ai
working pressure of 4Z psia. In the event of regulator malfunction, pres-
sure relief is provided by a ZOO-psig rupture disc. Each capillary column
and detector identifies a specific number of gas components. One colun_n-
detector will identify five of the permanent gases; namely, hydrogen, nitro-.
gen, oxygen, methane, and carbon monoxide. Another is concerned only
with the separation and detection of ammonia, carbon dioxide, and water.
The third column-detector identifies Z0 trace contaminants listed as
follows: Freon I!, metl_yl alcohol, methylene chloride, ethyl alcohol,
benzene, P-dioxane, acetone, hydrochloric acid, hydrogen sulfide, ethylene
oxide, isoprene, diethyl sulphide, nitrogen dioxide, ethylene glycol, vinyli-
dene chloride, methyl chloroform, acetylene, dimethyl sulfide, Freon i14,
and i, 1 trichloroethane.
Cross-section ionization-type detectors are used in conjunction with

the three columns for gas component identification. The output current of
the detectors produces a minimum-strength signal that must be greatly
amplified, then conditioned for telemetry. The capillary columns, the
detectors, and the electrometer amplifiers are housed in an oven, the
temperature of whici_ is maintained within a very close tolerance. The
iii_i
I balance of the electronics, installed-in a separate package, consist of a
transformer, a programmer, and a regulated power supply. Solid-state
circuitry is used exclusively throughout the electronics of the unit,
• /!
_- ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEbl
,_ Mission ...... Basic Date 1Z Nov 1966Chang e Date ........... Page 2.7-12 [
SMZA-03-SC012
11 APOLLO OPERATIONS I-!ANDBOOK
_ !i SYSTEMS DATA
The gas chromatograph will complete one identification cycle in
approximately 80 minutes, regardless of the sampling mode selected.

Samples are taken from the suit circuit atmosphere, the cabin atmosphere,
F !i
or from each atmosphere on alternating cycles depending on the positioning
of a selector switch located on the LEB panel 120. The selector sw_tch may
be positioned to CABIN AIR/AUTO/SUIT AIR by command.
The gas chromatograph is serviced and in6talled by ground support
'iiI personnel prior to flight crew ingress°
A three-position START/OFF/PREHEAT switch, controls power for
operation, and must be placed to the PREHEAT position for a minimum of

80 minutes before switch is set to START. A push-type switch, ANiPL-
CAL, for bench calibraZion only and the STA .RT/OFF/PREHEAT switch,
are located on panel IZ0.
During the mission, the fligh_ crew will .not be required to make
control adjustments "_o the unit unless directed to do so by MSFN. During

descent, the rernaining helium in the reservoir is dumped into the cabin by
I the action of a pyro valve inside the unit. A full tank (abort condition) can
be emptied in a maximum of 3 minutes. Pyro valve initiation is si_ulta-

neous with the C/M-P_CS propellant purge operation,
Z.7o3.3 Cabin Pressure and Temperature Control Subsystem.
The pressurization and tem.perature control of t]_e C/M ca.bin are

!i!ii!
1 primarily automatic functions with manual backup an_ override modes
provided. Cabin pressurization is maini:ained by th_ cab]r_ pressure _ceg_-
iI
lator assembly (figure Z. 7--3). This unit consists of dual regulators and a
manual repressurization valve operated by a knurled knob. Both regulators
operate simultaneously as there is no selector valve incorporated and no
off position. The regulators automatically maintain the cabin at 5a:0. Z psia
during normal conditions and at a maxim_m oxygen flow rate of I. 3 pounds

per hour. ]f the cabin should become depressurized for any reason_ the
D regulators
valve, with
close
a maximum
at a pressure
flow rate
of 3.5
of
psia
7. Z pounds
to conserve
per hour,
oxygen.
may be
The
adjusted
manual
to maintain cabin pressure in event of regulator malfunction. However, ic
is primarily used to repressurize the cabin following decompression,
requiring approximately i hour to raise the cabin pressure back to 5.0:_-0. Z
ps_a.
An emergency cabin pressure regulator assembly (figure Z. 7-,I) will
EJ flood the cabin with oxygen to prevent rapid decompression in the event of
cabin wall puncture. As cabin decompression is hazardous to life only when

a crewman is in the shirtsleeve mode, the regu!stors are not selected for
use until just prior to a crewman removing his PGA. The regulator
Mission Basic Date 12 Nov 19_._.Chang e Date,

'_._
SMZA-03-SC01Z
APOLLO OPERATIONS HA NDI_OOK
SYSTEMS DATA
f-T_.-'_. --,
2}
-_i--ANER01D
t ...... _7i
_i!
¸
<!
:i9
<:i i
" F- C i !
.....
REPR_..,SURIZAIION i =i==:_-_--
FLC_/V LIMITER
CONTROL _,!, ii%._
ECS- 4A
)
Figure Zo7-3. Cabin Pressure Regulator
assembly consists of a four-posltion manual selector valve and two redun-

dant regulators which, when selected for use, automaZ_cs_iiy open when the
cabin pressure drops to 4.5_-0. l psia. The emergency cabin pressure
mode of 3.5 psia is contingent upon Apollo design limits and meteorite tests
and allows unsuited crewmen time to don their PGAs. This minimum pres-
sure can be maintained for 5 minutes, providir.g that meteor'ite holes do not
exceed the total equivalent area of a hole 0.5 inch in diameter. At the end
of this time, the pressure will drop more rapi¢_ly, going to g.0 psia in
I0 minutes and to i. 0 psia in 15 minutes.
The dual cabin pressure relief valve (figure 2.7-5) provides positive
t and negative pressure relief for the cabin throughout the entire mission.
Although they function automatically, cable-operated manual override
i
controls, located on panel 307, are provided for adjustments during flight
to close relief valves for a malfunction, or to prevent ._-eawater inflow
:?i during postlanding phase and ground checkout procedures, When the cabin
i_
pressure beco_es higher than the ext'ernal ambient pressure, the relief
'%i valves limit the differential pressure to 6 (+0. Z, -0.4) psi. During the
ascent phase, this differential pressure may go as high as 7.0 psi for a
short period of time. Conversely_ when the cabin pressure becon_es lower
'I
than the external ambient pressure (as during descent), the relief valves
• 'i limit the differential pressure to a maximum of 25 inches of water. The'
assembly is located in the steam duct overboard line which provides the
means of venting _he positive and negative cabin pressures.
Oz
IvY.is sion Basic ]9ate lZ ]qov i_-66 .Chang e ]Date. Page Z.7-14
:5
p.._,
SMZA-.03.-SC0 ]2
{i}
J
APOLLO OPE_ATIOIgS HAND__,OOK
• i
i :+>-_ SYSTEMS DATA
Figure 2. 7-4. Emergency Inflow Regulator
Vent_q.ation within the C/},_ _s provided by dual fans, which circulate

cabin gases through the cabin heat exchanger° Normally, both cabin air
fans are selected by the crew for simultaneous operation. If either fan
malfunctions or is shut down for any reason, a closure (cover) is manually
installed over the inlet of the inop.erative fan to prevent backf].ow. A cabin
air control louver, located at the outlet of the cabin heat exchanger, is
manually adjusted for directional flow of.gases within the cabin.
Although cabin temperature control is norma].ly an automatic function,

resort to manual backup and override modes of operation may be utilized.
Cabin gases are heated or cooled by their drculatlon through the cabin beat
exchanger, which uses water-glycol as the heat transfer medium. A cabin
temperature control unit compares a desired temperature, selected by t}_e
crew, to the temperature that is sensed at the inlet to the cabin air fans.
Any difference results in a signal that repositions the motor-operated cabin
temperature control valve. This valve regulates the amount of hot or cold
water-glycol flowing into the cabin heat exchanger. At each end of valve
full travel, the total hot or cold flow is routed through the heat exchanger;
whereas, at intermediate valve positions, the water-glycol flow through the
heat exchanger varies. A cabin temperature anticipator, located at the'
cabin air control louver discharge, senses the temperature rate of change
and signals the cabin temperature control unit, preventing overcorrection
by the control valve.
2.7-15
....
i_ F'!:_[_g Mission ............. Basic Date ]Z Nov 1966 Change Date .... Page
:!:L_
SMZA.-03-SC0 IZ
<i i
APOLLO OPERATIONS _IANDBOOIi
SYSTEMS DATA E
•;a
/ %
:<
,%
ECS-33+B(._)
Figure Z, 7-5. Cabin P_'essure Relief Valve
Ventilation during the post!andi.ng phase is accomplished by circulating

outside ambient air _hrongh the cabi,_:, All of the equlpmer-t neceL, su, ry to"
carry out this function (other than controls) is located on the C/M forward
tunne! cover, Outside air is drawn into the cabin through an in!et duct
containing a shutoff valve and fan. The inlet duct includes a flexible exten-
< i_:i sion for promoiJng more efficient ventilation, After circulatingwithin the
cabin, the air is expelled overboard through an adjacent outlet duct and
shutoff valve, Both motor-operated shutoff (vent) valves and the vent fan
are controlled by the VENT FAN switch on MDC..Z5. High- or low-speed
fan operation is availab!e, and either switch position will simultaneously
activate the fan and. open the cabin vent valves. An assembly consisting of
a pendulum-type attitude sensing switch and an adjacent override control
switch (PLVC) are instal.led in the LHEB. The pendulum is free to move
only in the Z-axis. Should the C/]vi roll beyond a specified lin_it or become
inverted (stable II condition), the attitude sensing switch activates the cabin
vent valves to the closed position to prevent water .ingestion. If all efforts
to zeturn the C/M to the upright (stable I} condition should fail, the PLVC
switch (I,HEB-141) is set to OPEN, This overrides the closing action• of
,/ the attitude sensing switch by opening both cabin vent valves and flooding
the forward portion of the C/M. The pressure on the tunnel hatch then
becomes equalized, thus a.llo'_ing its removal for the escape of the crew.
The PLVC switch +may also be used'to open the cabin vent va].ves if the
attitude sensing switch should fail after having closed the valves. In order
to prevent the inadvertent opening of the vent valves in flight, two precau-
tions are taken. A lockpin is installed in each vent valve, ap+d the circuit

:!
-#
2.7-16
Mi s s [on Basic Date 12 Nov i966 Change Date ................... Page
i
SMZA-03-SG01Z
APOLLO OPERATiOIqS I-LANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
breaker applying power to the PLV system is not engaged during flight.
Therefore, before the PLV system can be operated, the lockpins must be
removed (pulled out approximately 0.5 in.) prior to CSM separation and the
applicable circuit breaker engaged after landing.

<!!
U 2.7.3.4 Water-Glycol Coolant Subsystem.
The water-glycol coolant subsystem is a closed loop through which an-
W aqueous
The mixture
ethylene-glycol
ratio by weight
mixture
consists
(water-glycol)
of 6Z.5 parts
is continuously
of glycol to
circulated.
37. 5 parts off
water. Basically, the subsystem provides a heat transport _uid loop for
<i the cabin atmosphere, the suit circuit atmosphere, the electronic equip-
ment, and a portion of the potable water. It also serves as a source of heat
for the cabin atmosphere when required. All of the unwanted heat absorbed
4
I by the water-glycol is transported either to the space radiators, where _t
i!i
_i D is radiated
by the evaporation
to space, or
of water_
to the water-glycol evaporator, where it is rejected
The water-glycol (W/G) evaporator outlet temperature must be main-

tained between 40 ° and 43°F (nominal 41.5°F). Sensed at the W/G
evaporator inlet" from the space radiators W/G temperatures between 4Z.9 °
and 45.9°F (nominal 45°F) activates the automatic mixing valve control
system (figure Z. 7-67. High-temperature W/G from the water-g]yccl pump

i is mixed with the lower W/G temperature from the space radiators to main-
rain the evaporator outlet nominal temperature of 4!_. 5°F. The manual
override for th_ mixing valve is located on the coolant control panel 311 I
W (GLYCOL
tion of AUTO
EVAP
or MAi'_
TEMP IN)
operation.
and a switch located on panel 13 allows selec-
8 Three lines from the water-glycol pump assembly are paralleled to
the water-glycol evaporator inlet. The aforementioned oxygen supply

capillary restrictors are wound around the line routed to the space radiators
:<'ii
i and relief valves. The other line is routed to the mixing valve. To insure
proper operation of the oxygen supply restrictors, in the line between the
cryogenic O Z storage in the S/M to the surge tanks in the C/M during cabin
repressurization, full water-glycol flow through the line to the space

radiators is required. Sufficient heat must be available to prevent cryo-
genic oxygen entering the C/M oxygen system and preclude the possibility of
freezing the water-glycol. To achieve this, the mixing valve must be
<!
D
manually placed to the full closed position 15 to 30 minutes before repres-
surization and remain closed until the surge tank returns to maximum
pressure after repressurization of the C/M.
D space
High-temperature
radiators and sensed

water-glycol
at the evaporator
between 48 ° and
inlet
50.5°F
initiates the
from the
water-glycol
evaporator temperature control system_ Once the evaporator mode is
initiated by the evaporator inlet sensor, an evaporator outlet sensor

supplies the controlled variable signals to the controller. If a heating
temperature error is sensed by the evaporator outlet sensor, the steam
pressure valve begins to open and repositions at a velocity proportional to
ENVIRON_vimNTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
_:_ IZ Nov 196!_.Chang e Date. Page Z. 7-!7

{ _ Mission Basic Date
:}
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S.k42A-03-SC0i g
APOLLO OPERATIONS i-IANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
the temperature error. Evaporator wicks are maintained in a wet condition
D to provide
Should
immediate
the steam pressure
boiling
drop
when
below
the steam
5. 0=_0.2 mm
pressure
Hg
valve
abs,
is opened.
a pressure
switch overrides the temperature signal and closes the steam pressure
valve. The override pressure switch provides adequate pressure margin
above the freezing pressure of 4. 58 n_.m Hg abs. A switch in the steam
pressure valve assembly is activated when the valve is initially cracked
i!i!il open. The switch activates the wetness control for replenishing water to
D the
wick
evaporator
temperature
through
sensor
a water-solenoid
are indicative
control
of the
valve.
relative
Signals
wetness
from
of the
the
evap-
_i:J orator wicks. As water evaporates, the wick sensor temperature increases
:k;:
and exceeds an evaporator inlet reference sensor signal and cycles the
U water control valve open. The reference input sensor varies the control as
a function of heat load to maintain the desired wick temperature with no
water carryover into the steam duct. When the evaporator -wicks become
ii replenished with water, the wick sensor temperature decreases and
approaches the saturation temperature corresponding to the steam pressure
and cycles the water control valve closed. The water control valve con-
;ili!!
1
D tinues
required.
to cycle as long as water-glycol cooling by water evaporation is
The steam pressure control valve can be electrically repositioned to

control the steam pressure for 40 ° to 43°F outlet glycol temperature using
the pressure monitor indicator (panel 13, GLY EVAP-OUTLET TEMP).
The control switches (GLYCOL EVAP - STEAM PRESS) must be placed to [
the MAN position, and then to iNCR for open and DECR for closing the
U steam pressure valve. The H20 FLOW switch (panel ]3) should be in the L
AUTO position for the autornatic wetness control to be effective. Should the
wetness control fail, the water inlet control valve can be energized open by
N placing
portable
the HzO
indicating
FLOV¢
unit
switch
should
to O]_T.
he used
When
to prevent
operating
water
in this rhode,
carryover
a
into the
steam duct. The portable indicating unit consists of a four-position
selector switch for selecting OFF, WICK TEMP., EVAP INLET TEMP.
AND NUL. The unit has its o\v_ 175-hour battery-operated power supply.
WICK TEMPERATURE indicator markings are 40 ° to 70°]7", WATER-
GLYCOL INLET TEMPERATURE indicator markings are 40 ° to 100°F,
and the NUL indicator markings are a red line across the midlength section
of the dial face and is marked above the red line on the dial WATER ON, and
below on dial WATER OFF. A water control tabulation chart (figure Z. 7-7)
W for
wick
unit
operation
temperature
should also
of W/G
versus
be used
evaporator
inlet glycol
when manual
in the manual
temperature.
water bypass
mode,
The
is provided
control
portable
valve
showing
indication
(GLY
EVAP WATER CONTROL BYPASS panel 317) is used. The portable indi-
D cator
enters
unit will connect
the cabin temperature
to J39 (panel
control
311).
valve,
The
where
main wa_-er-glycol
it is routed either
flow next
to the
cabin heat exchanger or to the remaining thermal coldplates. The action is
dependent upon the temperature control unit, which automatically controls
the movements of the motor-operated cabin temperature control valve. The
ill
IN valve
cool
is so construcfed
water-glycol (167
that in the cabin
pounds per hour)
full cooling
is routed
mode,
first through
the total flow
the cabin
of
lZ Nov 1966 _-
iss on ...... =___.,,ango_ ate
.............. Page 7-lo
: _7i .... 71_:_7i7

..... "!7_ !:, i'.!i :i! ::::!!!_! ....... :: 7 : :::
di;l SMZA-03.-SC01Z E
7!:'_'ii
;I
: ![i
SYSTEMS DATA
Evaporator Inlet Wick Temperature Evaporator Inlet Wick Teynpe

2_ Temperature Sensor Sensor Temperature Sensor Sensor
!
(°F) (°F) _) (°F)
63 ratur I'
.i 40 41 62 71 54
41 42 13 72 54 96
42 42 65 73 55 28
43 43 15 74 55 60
• 44 43 65 75 55 91
1 45 44 14 76 56 21
46 44 63 77 56 51
:ii
I
47
48
45
45
11
58
78
79 °
56
57
80
08
E
: 24 49 46 04 80 57 37
i 50 46 50 81 57 66
!i 51 46 95 82 57 93
:i 52 47 39 83 58 19
: J
53 47 82 84 58 4,5
)
i 54 48 25 85 58 71
55 48 67 86 8.96
)i 56 49. O8 87 59.21
?
57 49.49 88 59.46
:i 58 49.89 89 59.71
? 50.30
59 9O 59,94
4
6O 50.39 91 60.17
!
.! 61 51.07 92 60.40
62 5i. 45 93 60.63
63 51.83 94 60,85
;i 64 52.20 95 61.06
65 52.56 96 61.28
ii 66 52.92 97 61.49
! 67 53.27 98 6)..69
68 53.62 99 61.90
'i 69 53.96 100 62.10
? 7O 54. 30
,] Figure Z. 7-7. Water Flow Control Chart

z_
heat exchanger and then through the thermal coldplates. In the cabin full
ii heating
where
mode,
the
the
water-glycol
total flow
absorbs
is routed
heat,
through
and from
the
there
thermal
flows
coldplates
through,
first,
the
[
cabin heat exchanger. The intermediate valve positions are for the partlal
cooling or partial heating modes° In the intermediate positions, the quan-
tity of cool or warm water-glycol flowing through the heat exchanger is
reduced in proportion to the demand for cooling or heating. Although the
::2 amount of water-glycol flowing through the cabin heat exchanger will vary,
the total flow through the thermal coldplates wilI always be Z00 pounds per
hour. (See figure 2. 7..8,) An orifice restrictor is installed between the
ii cabin temperatt:re control valve and the inlet to the coldplates, its purpose
/! is to maintain a constant flow rate through the coldplates by reducing the
[
[:
q
s s ion
._,.4i 2. 7220
Basf.c Date 12 Nov 1966 Change r)at 9 ............. Page
SMZA-03-.SC01Z
i _i
1 SYSTEMS DATA
--:4
From:
Woler-GlycoJ
Evoporalor _ _:
40 ° to 50.5°F
/I COI_DPLATE
o
BRANCH
NO. 1
I I
!7 I DISPLAY I
I
ORIFICE
I, ! UNIT I I
I L-T-I I
L .
:!I
COLDPLAIE r ...... I
BRANCH
NO. 2
--
J
I
I I
I I
i!!i:i'
I I I
I I J,
i'
:
I I
I ' I
•/ #:i I To:
Cabin J
jlt
:)ii_.
i
[e.mp
i I
Control
Volv_
J
i
I
D
!
I L2J-
1
D -- F-]-
AUX
ECA --
I -7;_- !
,
L_tFL_J
B SM-2A_628D
Figure 2. 7-8. Equipment Coldplate Flow Diagram
EiqVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
}Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 _h_n._ _ Da_e ......

Mission
;I
S iviZA .-03 -SC01 Z
i _iiI
APOLLO OPER.A'£IONS H_ANDi3OOt_
• 15 SYSTEMS DATA
heating mode flow rate to that of the cooling mode flow rate. Another
•!4
orifice restrictor, located in the coolant line from the IMU, maintains a
constant flow rate through this component regardless of system flow

a fluctuations.
The total flow leaving the cabin temperature control valve enters the
)] water-glycol pump assembly which provides the continuous coolant circu-
lation
pumps,
and an
within
two
accumulator
the
pul-op
subsystem°
outlet
isolation
check
The
valves,
shu._off
assembly
valve.
a full-flow
consists
The two
of two
filter,
pumps,
an
water-glycol
accumulator,
mounted in
E
parallel_ can only be operated one at a time with the second pump for
• +i)_
standby
flow through
redundancy.
the nonoperat_ng
Each pump
pump.
outlet check
Water-g]ycol
valve prevents
entering
coolant
the assembly
back-
E
first passes through _he full-flow filter before reaching the pumps. There
is also a side passage that leads to the accumulator°
The purpose of the accumulator is to maintain correct pump inlet
pressure and to compensate for small amounts of leakage and/or thermal
expansion/contraction. The manual shutoff valve in the side passage J.s

closed to isolate the accumulator in case of a punctured bellows, which
would permit the coolant to leak into the cabin, causing contamination, if
the water-glycol accumulator, quantity indicator on the main display console
shows a steady decay to zero, a ]eak in the water-glycol system is the

probable cause. However, an indication showi_g a slow steady decrease_
which s_ops at a point above zero, is probably due to thermal contraction

indicath_.g the water-glycol temperature is below the nonqina! range.
Located do-vnstrcam of the ,'aump assembly is the ......

,_te_-g.yco:.'- _ purnp outlet
pressure transducer which measures the static pressure of the water-glycol.

at the pump outlet, thus giving an indication of pump performance.
[
i!
i has
total
pressure
At
greatly
flow
this
of hot
control
point
increased
in
water-glycol
valve
!he
due
subsystem_
to
to prevent
the
is
absorption
routed
ice
the
from
ten'_perature
through
of
forming
the various
a passage
within
of the
in
heat
the
water-glycol
the
loads.
s_eam
valve opening.
The
Icing at this location could result in valve malfunction and/or blocking of

the steam duct. To prevent ice from forming at the outlet of the steam
duct, two redundant electric heaters are used. The two 3-watt heater
elements inside the duet extend approximately 8 inches upstream from the
outlet.
7_
The water-glycol next flows to the water-glycol evaporator inlet

[
temperature control valve (previously described). The hot water-glycol
that
cooling.
is not
Any
used for
pressure
mi:_ing
losses
by this
in the
valve
space
is routed
radiator
to the
circuit,
space radiators
regardless
for
of
[
f_ the number of radiators in operation_ will be limited by l:he action of the
J
dual water-glycol pressure relief valves. These two valves are in parallel
and are located between the inlet and outlet lines of the radiator circuit.
:'ia Just upstream of each pressure relief valve is a manual shutoff valve, By
controlling the shutoff valves, one relief valve at atime is normally

::ij selected for use with the second for standby redundancy. When a _P of
Miss ion Basic ])ate IZ ,Nov.___1906......... r'l,._ no,e,, Dp_te Z. 7-Z2

Page
({
SMZA-03-.SC01Z
APOLLO OPEI_ATIONS I-LANDBOOK
J_
SYSTEMS DATA
Ii psi is reached, the relief valves open to bypass coolant to the radiator
return line, closing at a Z_P of 8. 5 psi. In order to preserve the water-.
glycol closed loop, the relief valves function as a bypass when all space
radiator isolation valves are closed or when the water-glycol radiator_ shut-
a
off valve is closed. This is a manual shutoff valve thai: controls the flow of
water-glycol from the C/M to the S/M. It is placed to the closed position
shortly before CSM separation to prevent the coolant in the C/M from
flowing overboard after separation°
Two space radiators with an area of 30 square feet each are located '
on opposite sides of the S/M in sectors Ii and V. Each radiator panel
_i
¸i:_
U̧ contains
four tube
two
circuits
_eparate
is
sets
individually
of tubes.
regulated
The flow
by
of water-glycol
a motor-operated
through
radiator
the
isolation valve located on the inlet side of each tube circuit. The four
,J
valves are remotely controlled fro,n the C/M and give the crew some
degree of latitude in their selection of cooling area. However_ the pri:__.ary

purpose of the valves is to isolate tube circuits should they develop leaks.
A check valve in each tube circuit outlet line prevents _he backflow of
%¿ coolant from entering any radiator tube circuit that is leaking. Freezing
within the radiators is the point at which flow ceases, and may be prevented
%! by maintaining the inlet temperature above 75°F. This temperature is
obtained on the AUX DC VOLTS meter (RHFEB-.Z00) or from MSFN if the
crew is unable to leave the couches.
The water--glycol, after leaving the space radiators and re-entering

the C/M, flows through a capillary restrictor. This is placed in the !inc to [
make the pressure drop through the radiators con_patible with that through _ _:o,.
the water-glycol temperature control valve during £he mixing n_ode. Upon
leaving the restrictor, the water-glycol flows through two check valves in
series. These valves prevent coolant from flowing overboard following
CSM separation. A temperature sensor, ]ocated betweer_ these check
valves, gives an indication on the main display console of ihe tempe._-ature

of the coolant leaving the radiators. The indicator is located on _vIDC-13.
Under normal space flight conditions the water-g!ycol reservoir is

isolated from the coo]ant subsystem by the proper positioning of three
glycol reservoir manual shutoff valves. The water-glycol reservoir inlet

and outlet valves are closed, and the reservoir bypass valve between the
inlet and outlet lines is opened. During the prelaunch and ascent phases,
however, the position of these _hree valves is reversed to permit coolant
flow through the reservoir. The one gallon of water-glycol contained in the
reservoir is then utilized as a heat sink, which becomes necessary during
the ascent phase. The space radiators are not effective during ascent and
/
evaporative Cooling takes place only after the ambient pressure reaches
0.05 psia, which is appro×imateIy 150, 000 feet altitude (T + 2 minutes and
!
i0 seconds).
If a water-glycol leak should occur, the coolant subsyster n may be

refi]led from the limited supply in the water-glycol reservoir after the
leak is isolated. The glycol reserve shutoff valw_, located in the line from
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL S .__ S m_ E_,

_,_
:_ [_ Mission Basic Date IZ Nov 1966 Chan e Date ........ Page Z. 7-Z3
ii
.......... ...... ......... . ,, ..... ...........

:-"% ..........................................................
....................
SMZA-.03-SC0 ]Z
/] APOI.,LO OPERATIONS KANDBOOK
• _/i, i
SYSTEbiS DA _
the reservoir to the inlet side of the pump, is used for this purpose. As
the reservoir contains a bladder [hat is under Z0_=Z psig oxygen pressure,
positive expulsion of the coolant is assured. The pressurized reservoir
may also serve as an accumulator for the coolant subsystem, if the regula_r
water-glycol accumulator becomes inoperative and is isolated° The i]ow of >.b
water-glycol, either through the reservoir oi" bypassing it, next enters the
water-glycol evaporator (previous].y described), thus completing the coolant
loop.
During pre]aunch operations, the _ow of temperature-controlled

water-glycol is furnished by GSE through lines connected to the fill and vent
couplings in the _/'_'M. The solenoid-operated water-glycol shutoff valve,
upstream of the oudet coupling, is contro!]ed at the GSE and is opened to
permit coolant flow through the spacecraft loop andback to the GSE.
2.7.3.5 Water Supply Subsystem.
The primary function of th.e water supp]?- subsystem is the storage and
collection of potable and waste water° Potable water produced by the fuel
cells and waste water recovered from the suit he, at exchanger water separa-
tot are stored in separate tanks in the C/M. Supp].ernenting th_s supply are
two water tanks in the S/M that c::.ntain potable water for refilling the C/M
potable water storage tank. 'rli.e water supply subsystem also supplies hot
and cold potable water to the crew and waste water 'co the water-g].ycol
evaporator and suit heat exchanger for evaporative cooling.
,%
The water produced by the fuel cells in the S/M is a steady source of
potable water and is stored in a 36-pound capacity tank located in the aft
compartment of the C/M. The tank, which contains a bladder, is pressur-
ized with oxygen at Z0±Z psig by the tank pressure regulator and re]ief
valve assembly, thus assuring positive expulsion of flu'_d. Fuel cell water
flows into the tank at a potential pressure of approximately 6!. 5 psia. which
is high enough to overcome the tank pressure.. The potable water tank may
be serviced before flight by the manually operated servicing valve, which is
also in the aft compartment and not accessible to the crew. A quantity
indicator" on the main display console gives the measurements obta-_ned by
the tank quantity transducer. Located in a water line between the rue] cells
and the potable water tank is a check valve and the potable tank inlet shutoff
valve. The check valve prevents any reverse flow of potable water. The
shutoff valve, when closed, prevents fuel cellwater that has become con-
taminated from entering the C/M potable water network.
Temperature-controlled potable water is avail.able to the crew fron_.

two cornpor)ents wi.thin the C/M. Cold water, which is nnaintained to 50°I ``
(at the water chiller), is available at both the food preparat._on water supp]y
unit and 21_e water delivery unit. ttot v-ater, however, is available only at
the food preparation water supply up.it. This component utilizes a small
tank with an electric heater to raise the water temperature to 154°m4°F,
By selecting the ,proper valve, hot or cold water ismetered out for food
reconstitution or other crew needs., The water delivery unit is used by the
:5:
P_
ENV.IRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM.
Mi _ s ion Basic Dale ].Z Nov 1966 Cban",_ Da£e. pago .!:.o!£i ............
B APOLLO
SMZA-,03-SC012
OPERATIONS HANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
crew exclusively for drinking purposes, It consists of a housing containing

a coiled flexible tube and a water delivery valve for use with the individual
mouthpieces of the three crewmen. Upstream of this uni_ is the drinking
water supply shutoff valve that is closed if the water delivery valve s_ould
leak.
' Waste water collected from moisture condensate within the suit heat
exchanger is drawn into one of the cyclic accumulators, and from there
pumped into the waste water network. If, however, there is a water demand
by either the water-glycol evaporator or the suit heat exchanger evaporator_
t_
the waste water flows directly to the water control, valve of the appropriate
evaporator. The 56-pound capacity waste, water tank contains the pressur-
ization and quantity measuring features of the potable water tank. A
servicing valve is located on the water coetrol panel in the C/M cabin and,
therefore, is accessible to the crew, if necessary.
f '_'_
ii Although waste water never enters the potable water network, potable
water may enter the waste water network under certain conditions. If the
potable tank becomes full, the differential pressure between the networks
will eventually overcome the 6.0:k0. 5 psi at the waste tank inlet valve, thus
!! permitting
if the waste
water
tank
flow.
is empty
Potable
and there
water
is
also
a. water
enters
demand
the waste
by either
water network
evaporator..
ii The
tank
low
inlet
pressure created
vah, e activation.
by this
The
water
valve
demand
also
J.s responsible
incorporates a manual
for waste
shutoff
feature for use if the relief valve portion malfu.nctions. Closing the valve
thus prevc_nts the premature dumping cf potable water into the w_.ste water
network. A. check valve, located do\vnsfrea.m of the relief valve, separates L
the potable and waste water networks by permitting flow in one directSon
only.
0 To prevent overpressurizing the water supply subsystem, a pressure

relief assembly is installed aownstrearn of the check valves that separate
the potable and waste water networks, The assembly consists of a selector
valve and two redundant pressure relief valves in parallel. When the
potable and waste water tanks are full, the continued supply of water
produced by the fuel cells will be dumped overboard by these relief valves.
Normally, both valves are selected for simultaneous use, and dumping
occurs when the water pressure reaches approximately 3Z psi above the
outside ambient pressure° Another line, with two check va]ves in series,
bypasses fuel cell water output directly to the pressure relief assembly.
However, this action will take place only in event the waste tank inlet valve
fails closed. The bypass prevents fuel cell water flow from bein_ blocked,
thereby preventing total fuel. cell fail.ure due to flooding within the cells.
t
To provide sufficient water for a maximum duration earth orbital
i. mission, two 56-pound water tanks are installed in the S/M. These tanks
are similar to the C/M waste water tank but lack the quantity rrJeasuring
capability. A separate tank pressurizing system Js used for positive
expulsion of the water. Nitrogen at 900 psig is stored in a sma!i tan',, that
i
is protected against overpressure by a relief valve set at 1045±Z5 psig. In
J ENVIRONMENTAL CONTI{OL SYSTEM
"_
.... _ Mission Basic Date 12 Nov '_9_6
_ • Chan.ge Date. Page 7.'7
...... ")a
SMZA - 03..,SC01Z
_i_-i
i
APO LLO OPEKAT],ONS HANDBOOK
4
:!
:', :_ SYSTEMS DATA,
:i
addition to a nitrogen fill• valve, there is a pressure regulator and relief

] valve to reduce and regu]ate nitrogen pressure in the water tanks. These
<:i4 tanks are pressurized at 40_.2 psig, and' the relief valve will function at
<::_
44 to 48 psig.
• it
At the water outlet of each tank, there is a manual fill valve and a
<
solenoid shutoff valve. The shutoff valves are controlled by the WASTE
H20 TK KEFII..L switch in the C/M. These valves control the flow of
•5: !_ water from the tanks to a common line in the S/}4[ that subsequently connects
into the potable water line from the fuel cells. Wb, en the C/M potable water
• ,:}
tank quantity is low, it will be refilled from d_ese S/M water tanks at a flow
rate of Z. 9Z pounds per minute.
2.7.3.,6 ECS-.Waste Management System h_terface,
_:ii!L
] Although the waste management system (WMS) and C/M battery vent-
I ing network are not subsystems of the ECS: they will be covered as such in
_Fc
the AOH because of system interface. The interface mentioned is in refer-

ence to the ECS water overflow line.. All of the urine and the fecal odors of
the WMS, as well as gas pressure from the C/M batteries, are also routed
overboard through this single ECS water dump line. Incorporated atthe
outlet of the dump line (urine/watel) is a 0.055 inch orifice nozzle that
restricts gas flow to a maximum of ! cfm and liquid flow to less than 1 cfm.
The gas flow is limited to prevent excessive lose of cabin atmosphere during
fecal canister usage.. The restriction on liquid flow, in conjunction with a

5.7-watt, contim_ousl.y operating dump nozzle heater, prevents the forma-
".!
b
tion of ice at the nozzle, which could block all flow. |,.:!
• :: _,t The function of controlling and/or disposing of waste solids: liquids,
::i1 and gases is accomplished by the W M.S. Except for the fecal canister and
i:ii
other items of stowed equipment, the major po-_tion of the system is located
in the IIHEB. The WMS is basically divided into the urine/fecal and the
vacuum cleaner sL_bsystems. Several components !:hat are no longer

functional have not been ren-_oved from the W}d:S, as shown in figure 2, 7-9.
This is due to recent modifications that would not permit their removal
because of schedule impact.
ii E,
The components for the urine portion of the urine/fecal subsystem
,._ consist of a separate urine sample volume measuring system unit (USVMS)
:!1 .1 for each crewmember. (Refer to section 5.) The unit is used for each
:ii urination, in order to provide a urine sample, with the remainder of the
contents being dumped owzrboard in the to!for.ring mariner. The USVMS is
first attached by quick-disconnect to an. inline filter: which remains
attached (by quick-disconnect) to the waste management dump ]ine. The

USVMS valve is set to the DUMP position, followed by setting the WASTE
MANAGEMENT-SELECTOR vah, e on REEB-Z01 to URINE FECES and the
adjacent OVIBD DRAIN vaive to DUMP_ A 5-psi differential pressure,

.!_ provided by the valve settings, will empty the contents of the collection bag
:4:!i
overboard through the urine/water dump line. Should a USVMS unit fail,
direct overboard urination may be accomplished by using the urine
ENVIPONh4ENTA]_ CONTROL SYSTEM
Mission Basic Date 12 Nov !966 {-',h_n_r_ Date Page Z.7-26 [!

{"
:4
4 e_,,r'>A_0 3-SC01 g
APOLLO OPERATIONS I-D%NDBOOIi
<i !Y! SYSTEMS DATA

P_
.... ['_
_f_r,_. 7--7 (:.:_'_
::Im-I 11/ 7,I II f-_ % "ff URiN_ ,

I it lil t #_==:==_ "_ ¢_.. RECEPTACLE/ ' II !1
I,t !!I , usv_s_,l I I ._ _ TK_NSFER ; II /1
4 Ill dl O) " I I _ :5 VALVEASS'," , I) )1
.:3
! B
I""S_;"_'_"t']_. "_ QD X _ ¢'- '_''" - - Ci.EANER "Tl"
. :{
,)
CANISTER " __ Z_.. _-" _
.?'7 OD CAP .,%i111_......... 1

.,,-._ _7 ._,'
_'
WASTF MANAGEMENT _J _ "
, DuffP _,,NE 'I U "

"ii,,,,,,lillli,,i,,_"_:--
......... =_li !1 i1¢
SELEC TO R [[::::!'-_
__'_i::::::_
[i_ :_'_91i
:: ::[ii-_-'_i::i_i_i'rl
::i:::: !(¢i'_'_i
i1:: i_I]
• - UUM ::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::: I1:::: ::::;::+_ :::::': _ W_/_
VAt.. ............t.............I"......................................
=:;I \\ .......... _{ !ZiiHi{i Z{{ii{{!l
]i{i{i{i{{{iii{ii{_<_
_ --_--
..........................................................
:_[..................
_..... \---__/ I
FECES _:!::i[:::[ili!
t ,:!:!:i:_:i:.i:i:[:[:!:!:{:i:_:[}:iii[!i:{;3::i:i:{:i:[:}:!:_i:_ _ / 7,-<_
<:L
•" ,_-LL-______,_.-.
_ l_J I- / I IZ:: ;i
' ,....... I! t
d t:-_
11 F_rn : VTc,Sle
ilB
OVBD DRAIN
DUMP
....... {
,1 e"_)J:C!:'L%I,--___.
"'?" (
OFF EC5 STEAM

g DUCT HTR
(RHEB-_OU
URINE DISPOSAL (RHEB-] 24)
To:
:,!! C/M
Cabin
From: ECS MN A
:i Water
oc, Oiiit
VENT @b CLOSED
BAITERY VENT Overflow 9

(RHEB-202)
Fro_: C/M ?
URINE/WATER
t_tterles ._ T.
DUMP NOZZLE
:.il AND HEATER
_ ELECTRICAL CONNECTION
::;_I2iI
_] ..... MECHANIC.AI CONNECTION
ABLATOR SM-2A-625F
Figure Z.7-9. WMS I'unc_,_ona,_

" *" ' Flow Diag ram
L7
Z,7-Z7
u, : Mg.ssion Bask: Date 12 Nov
__.Z 1966
.... ._-
,_.n_nge Date ......... Page
SMZA-03-,SC0] Z
I,,A
APOLLO OPERATIONS i{ANDBOOK
;9
SYSTEMS DATA
I
receptacle, which is a backup component. The PHA urine collection device
(UCD)
same
may
way.
be used
The transfer
during prelaunch,
valve (of the urine
and if so, is emptied
receptacle/transfer
in much
valve
the i
i
assembly) is inserted into the UCD after it is removed from the PGA. The
i
::_ L(
urine
waste
and OVBD
receptacle
management
DRAIN
is then
dump
valves
attached
line.
are set
The
to
by quick-disconnect
WASTE
the URINE
MANAGENIENT-SELECTOR
FECES and DUMP
to the filter on the
positions
I
:i
i respectively, emptying the contents overboard. Upon completion, the PGA
'i
L,] IICD
operate
is stowed
whenever
in the
the
PGA
SELECTOR
stowage
valve
bag.
is
Although
set to the
the
URINE
WMS blower
FECES
will
position,
i
:! functional operation of ('.he blower is fo_' vacuum cleaning only.
i
For the fecal portion of the urine/fecal subsystem_ components con- [

::ii!:ii sist only of the fecal canister and hose assembly. Normally stowed out of
the way, the canister is secured to the center COz--odor absorber filter
storage
disconnect
container
to the
at
filter
the
on
LEB,
the waste
The hose
management
is then
du_bp
attached
line.
by
'['he
quick-
WASTE
I
MANAGEMENT-SELECTOR valve is set to URINE FECES and the OVBD
;ii DRAIN
routing
valve
the odors
is set to
overboard
DUMP. Differentia].
through the
pressure
urine/water
of
dump
5 psi
line.
is thus created,
[
The vacuum cleaner subsystem is made up of the vacuum assembly
i
! and
ment.
an 8-foot
After
flex
removing
hose,
tLe
which
vacuum
are stowed
cleaner
in the
from
vacuum
the storage
stowage
compartment,
compart-
i
it is placed in operation by setting tlfe WASTE MANAGEMENT-SELECTOR
valve to VACUUM CLEANER° This single actSon activates tb.< _. WMS blower
_5 and opens the valve port that connects tDe vacuum cleaner line to the blower.
g The WMS b]:ower Frovides a gas flow of 5 cfm at a ,:_P of -4.9 inches HzO to
i effectively remove debris, either solid or liquid. A porous bag, inserted
into the vacuum assembly, traps the debris while the gases are exhausted
into the C/M cabin,.
The C/M battery venting network consists of a manifold, a BATTERY

VENT valve (RHEB-ZOZ), and lines that are routed to connect into the [
:!4 urine/water dump line. The vent valve is to remain in the VENT position
<i
b', during normal operation ";o provide unrestricted flow for intermittent
i
battery
vent manifold
relief valve
leakage
operation.
will the vent
On]y
valve
in event
be
of
closed.
a battery
This
case
prevents
rupture
loss
or
of
i
cabin atmosphere overboard, thereby, conserving oxygen.
1
Z. 7.3°7 Electrical Power Distribution.
The types of electrical power requ]red for the operation of the ECS
'I are Z8 volts dc and ll5/Z00-volts 400-cycles 3-phase ac. (See figure
2.7-10.) The larger motors of the system utilize 200-.volt 3-phase power,
whereas the smaller motors and control circuits operate from a single
;i
phase
those
of the ac at ll5
components using
volts.
Z8 volts
Except
dc will
for the postlanding
receive power from
ventilation
the fuel
system,
cells
!
before CSM ;separation and from batteries after separation. The postland-
ing venti]ation system will operate from batteries, exclusively.
i
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTt\OL SYSTEM
l_ission D"",_ 12.............

Nov 1966 _,, Pa,-_ Z. 7-Z8 "
Basic _' .,_uange Date .........
i:i?_
¢]
_i_,ii
_ _
,:::::1
>:: ':ili!_
SMZA-03~SC012
SYSTEMS DATA
AiR _CAN A}R FAN CONTROL VALVE VALVE VALVE VALVE

' NO,] NO.2 Z_.LVE To: 6-tube "[o: 4-1ube To: 6-tube To: 4-_ub_
, --- circuit in c[rcult in circuit in circuit in
.>) TI -T- ,.....

,_)
OFF ON
.p
)---" NAI
| EAN--';F__pOE';'
IMDC_ -21 Ot -- --_ CABIN AIE CABIN [[MR- _ ECS O" ECS O 0" 'B ECS
, _ FA_:-2 ' AU*O/;_AN _ _DIAIOR- ' _OiATOB- _ PADIATO"- PADIA_OR-
&_DC-21 ) (MDC-21) (MDC-21)
(_C-2_) (MDC-Io) I I( I-B L2-A (MD__C-21) 2-B
_tN CABIN CAIHN PAD VALVE- PAD VALVE- I

R _AN- AIR _/,._- A_RPAN- C IA AC 2B I
: I-
5- AC
ECS-I- AC 1-
E!z3S- ECS- J ECS-" [CS- (_'A)
ECS- /J (_'B)
ECS- I ECS- _CS-
CABIN CABIN CABIN
%
AIR FAN- AIR FAN- A_R FAN- '2A
_( A_ '( C Ac _- AC 2- . AC2- _( _. _( 2/, J AC
PADIBVALVE- R_.D2AVALVE-
AC
AC_- AC,- ECS- ECS: _CS- I ECS- ECS' CB- ECS- ECS-
_ ,., GLYcc.. OLYCOL _L'<_:OL ' surfco_._- SU,_PRESBO,s_CO,'.'-
_U;'_ESBORs__OM-
_ISU'T_'R_SSOB_-COM-
/.SU,_ER_SSOBs_CO,.,-
_1
_"RB._SSORS_-U"
CO_.:-
_iii ^C "< AC 2- _r- 9- AC I-
_A" _B , g}: ._,_A
"< !" ._B _c leA .j _, .; _c
GLYCOL RUMP ?UMP

(MDC-21) I 2 (_c-_) _, _ _ v -
P_ESSOR
_/
................ CO_PB
-AdoAC-ICO_R
AC AC i/l
!!!:ii
•!_
WATER-GLYCOL SUI1
+:<,a PUMP COMPRESSOR
o._ No._:,L.__"
SM-?gA-709G
Figure Z. 7-10. ECS Power Distribution Diagram
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, SYSTEM
2. ?-_.91z. 7_3b
Mission Basic Date 12 Nov ]96i Chang e Date Page.
:::31
_i__
• c)
<ii
!I
,,i
S[EAM PRESSURE
WATER-GLYCOL l CHROMA IOGRAPH
CONTROL
EVAP WA;ER (C_FE)
GAS 1
V_LVE
'! !
EVAP PEMP CONIROL UNIT ONI. '
C_
MENT
SELECTOr, }
(m_E
_ _'._!
k__.
F- - I
INCR DECR I
GLYCOL EVAP- M._\N

(_LYCOL SIEAM PRESSbPE- GLYCOL EVAP-
" I NCR,/DECR SIEAM PRLSSURr]- GAS
ji Hc_O FLOW (A,iDC-13 ) AUTO/MAN
(MDC-13) (MOC-13)
I
_ R_.
_f NOTE: U,_loss olhe_lse filled,

tillcircuit b_ec_kcrs ore
V_NT FAN- located on MDC.-22.
PL BUS-FLOAi BAG 2
ICossr_ w,B DUCT PI_._ STLAMDING-
HPRS-MN DC-25)
>!i _,_
...............................................
:] VENT FAN
POSTLANDING SUIT EVAP
(_4DC-:_5) & MDC-13
IflGH,
ILO,_ t (LHEB--141)
!
":4
_---_! '_ __
¢_.E_I,,,)
f _ tk_j_4___
DUMP NOZZLE
-] <j_ tL <y;; v
}
[
::]
:1
;s
:J
i}
l
, ¢
:i:iii
i:i!_
-I
i°
ii!_
TI ApERATU_"
11 _NSDUCE
NEP, SUP_
,i_
I_
SMZA- 03-.SC012
:_iiii<i_'
APOLLO - ,_
OPE_.ATI( )_T
L_S HANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
PERFORMANCE AND DESIGN DATA.
kietabolic Data°
The following table contains the average metabolic rates, thermal

balance, and water requirements for S/C crewmernbers.
Pressurized Cabin Depressurized Cabin
'I] Parameter (Normal) (Emergency)
Total metabolic load

BTU per man/day 1 i, ZOO IZ, 000
Water production
ib per man/day 4.0 9.8
CO Z production
ib per man/day Z, IZ Z.Z7
O g consumption
ib per man/day 1.84 1.97
Water consumption
6,6 IZ.4
ib per man/day
Urine production
Sk
2.., 6 Z.6
_. Ib per man/day
_44 I_¸.:
L_
2.7.4.2 Oxygen Supply Subsystem.
iiiii ii! Performancc

as follo_vs:
and design data for the oxygen supply subsystem are
¢_ Maxin_urn oxygen flo%v rate to EGS.frorn cr?ogenic storage tanks:

9.0 ib per hr
Surge tank quantity: 3.7 ib (approx)

Surge tank nominal pressure: 900±35 psig
Surge tank pressure relief seLLing: I045:_Z5 psig
e Entry tanh quantity: 1 ib (approx)

Entry tank nominal pressure: 900J:35 psig
Entry tank pressure relief setting: blone
P_egulated working oxygen pressure: I00:_10 psig

Pressure. relief setting: 130+!0 psig
Flow rate: 0.7 Ib per n_in max
IZegulated tank pressurizaiJon oxygen pressure: Z01Z psig

Pressure relief setting: Z5_--Z psig
Flow rate: 0.075 Ib per _nin (one regulator) and 0. ]5 Ib per _nin
(two regulators)
:i!!¸__
_{ ENVIROb[A4.EI'CFAL CO!'YI'ROL SYSTEM
,:q
SMZA-03-SC012
APOLLO OPEI%ATIONS HANDBOOK
SYSTEMS DATA
., _
2.7.4.3 Pressure Suit Circuit Subsystem°
Performance and design data for the pressure suit circuit subsystem
:!i'i_ are as follows:
;]
o Heat exchanger cooling capacity: 2.100 BTU per hr max (Gly or evapJ
o Water evaporation rate: 1.97 lb per hr max
;,g
o Regulated demand pressure
":)i
Normal: Z.5 to 3.5 in. HZO below cabin pressure
? Emergency: 3.75 ±0.25 psia
Flow rate: 0.67 lb per rain max
!:i
i i o Suit compressor volumetric flow
/i Normal flight: 35 cfm
:<:)_ Emergency flight: 33.6 cfm
:.:,_
e Automatic temperature control: 45 ° to 55°-_-'
Max O Z flow into suit circuit: 0.66 ib per min (regulator or manual
;! valve)
3.7.4.4 Cabin Pressure and Ten_perature Control Subs)Istem.
Performance and design data for the cabin pressure and temperature
control subsystem are as follows:
<¢
Heat exchanger cooling capacity: 1Z50 BTU per hr max
o Regulated cabin pressure: 5.0±0oZ psig

Flow- rate: 0.65 lb per hr Cone regulator) and 1°3 lb per hr
i
(two regulators)
}
u_ o Emergency inflow pressure (maximum of 0.5 in. diameter total
leakage area): 3.5 psia for 5 minu_es
Flow rate: 0.67 lb per rain max [i
Cabin pressure relief
Positive relief: 6.0 (+0. Z, -0.4) psig [
ii Negative relief: I0 to 25 in. HzO
i] Differel_tial
Normal
pressure
ascent: 7.0
(C/M
psig
cabin-to-aft
max.
section)
[
, :2
Abort ascent: 8,6 psig max.
Automatic temperature control (flight): 70 ° to 80_'F
O Z required for cabin repressurization, 0 to 5 psig at 70°F: 9.1 ib
Z.7.4,5 Water.-Glycol Coolant Subsystem_
Performance and design data for the water-glycol coolant subsystem

are as follows: [
[
1 o Reservoir quantity: 9 ib (approx)
o
Total
Evaporator
system quantity
cooling
(less
capacity:
reservoir):
7620 BTU
18
per
ib
hr
(approx)
max
[
[
Mission Basic Date 12 Nov !966 Change Date ....... Page 2. 7-3Z
_9
'{
.I
S..'M 2 A -03 -SC01 ?-
: J
APO]LLO OPERATIONS I-IAND]3OOK
<ii
![: i SYSTEMS DATA
Water evaporation rate: 7.5 ib per hr max
j Accumulator quantity: 1.36 Ib (approx)
d
Pump flow: Z00 ib per hr
{%<
Pump pressure
inlet: 7.5±io5 psig
Outlet (flight): 38(+8, -IZ) psia
_i_
_i
i
W Automatic temperature controh 40 ° to 50 5°F
i 2.7.4,6 Water Supply Subsystem.
Perfor_nance and design data for the water supply subsystem are as
J follows:
Potable tank quantity: 36 lb

!1
: i Waste tank quantity: 56 Ib
S/M water tank quantity: IIZ lb (Z tanks)
1 S/M nitrogen tank quantity-(pressuz'ant): capacity of 3.7 Ib, filled

to i. 5 ib (approx)
i1 Nitrogen tank fill pressure: 900 psig
Nit._oogen tank pressure relief setting: I045*_5 psig
)::I l_itrogen system regu]ated pressure: 40±Z psig. !iI_
o lqitrcgen system pressure relief setting: 44 to 48 psig

i'!
Overboard dump pressure: approx 3Z psi. above outside an-fbier.t
Flow rate: Z. 5 ]b per rain n_ax
Food preparation water supply unit

Capacity: 1.9 ib
Hot water: 154°-,'=4°F
Cold water: 50°F (at water chiller)
2.7.4.7 Waste Management System,
;I Performance and design data for the waste management system is

ii as follows:
® Urine/water dump nozzle orifice: 0.055 ±no
: ;il Z.7.4°8 ECS Power Consumption Data.
!I power
The foDowing
consumed by
]±st contai_s
components
the
of the
latest
ECS°
available
The
data
wattage
o_ electrical
figures are for
the earth orbit phase o.n]y, and apply to operations during the normal mode
(pressurized cabin),
!i!i ENVIP, ONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
fftl:_ ' _ Nov J'966Chang e _D,_te ......... Page 2 • ?-33

I :] Mission Basic Date *'- _
]
"i
)! "I
A PO LEO
SMPA-03-_SC012
OPEIt_,_f
.... IONo
_ _ HANDBOOK
J_
_9
SYSTEMS DATA
No. Watts _er Unit Total Watts

• "}I of ......
Subsystem
Control •nits AC i DC AC DC
and Component
OXYGEN SUPPLY
ECS-TRANSDUCER- 2.4 2.4

O Z flow transducer
PRESS GROUPS-Z
4 ::il cb (Z)
ECS-TItANSDUCEX- 0.8 0.8
O Z press transducer
PRESS GROUPS-Z
cb (z)
PRESSU RE SUiT
_!i
iil
I CIRCUIT
SUIT COMPRESSOIAS Z 85.0 1"85,0

Suit compressor
S "W
170.0
ECS-T ItANSDUCE_:-. 1 l.g8 IoZ8

P sensor
PRESS GROUPS- 1
cb (z)
ECS-TRANSDUCER- 1 I 1.0 i°0

CO Z sensor
PRESS GROUPS- Z
cb (z)
Diverter valve SUIT EVAP sw 1 Z.5 Z.5
control unit
Diverter control valve SUIT EVA.P sw i ;:lV,z _::7.Z
SUIT EVAP sw i Z.5 2.5

Steam press control
unit
L
SUIT EVAP sw 1 ',k7.Z ',"7.Z
Steam press contvalve
Steam duct abs press SUIT EVAP sw 1 i. 28 i. Z8

i<!i sensor
V_Tetness control unit SUIT EVAP,sw 1 5.0 5.0

[
Water
valve
inflow control SUIT EVAP sw 1 # 3, 0 -_:-'3.0
[
Wetness sensor SUIT EVAP sw 1 0.2 0. Z
(i 1 0.00! 0.001
:i \Vater-gly
sensor
Evap outlet
temp
air tcmp
SUIT
SUIT
EVAP
EVAP
sw
sw 0.001
i
0.001
sensor
FI
[
ii!iiiili
_. I:
'::Intermittent operating componeflts L
tOnly one component operates at a Lime
[
[
ENVIRONivIENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
_ Mi.ss.l.on Basi.c Date 12 Nov__, .--.-_-,_,,-o1966

t':_._ _,ue, Date ....... Page 2. " _
<I
[ :' 'i::.i:{: " '
SM2.A--03-SC01Z
APOLLO OPERATIONS NANDBOOK
.7 SYSTF, MS DATA
4
No. / Wa[:ts per Unit Total Watts
Subsy sten_
. _ DC AC DC
Control
:ii and Component
oNT i --
ECS- TRANSDUCER- i _ 0.8 0.8
Suit press transducer
PRF.SS GROUPS- 1
cb (z)
B Suit ternp sensor ECS- TRANSDUCER--' I 0.04 0.04
•.)
TEMP GROUP cb (2)
CABIN PRESSURE &
i
TEMP CONTROL
CABIN AiR FAN-.I&2 38.0

Cabin air fan
ja sw (Z) I
::!ii)
i]
Cabin te_p control CABIN TEMP-AUTO/ 1 z._ I 2°5
unit A4AN sw
CABIN TEMP-AUTO/ "7.2 *7.2

Cabin temp contvalve
MAN sw
ECS- TRANSDUCER - 0.00]

Cabin temp sensor
ii _' TEMP GROUP cb (Z)
}::
• .... [ : •
ECS-TRANSDUCICR- 0.001
<£.3_ Cabin ternp anticipatorl
TEMP GROUP cb (Z)
ECS-TRANSDUCER- 0,8 0.8

Cabin press
transducer PRESS GROUPS-- Z
cb (z)
I° WATER-GLYCOL
COOLANT
Water-glycol pump ECS GLYCOL sw 36.0 I J'36.

I
0
PUITIp
transducer
Water-gly
outlet press
accum qty
ECS-. TRANSDUCER-
PRESS GROUPS- 1
cb (z)
ECS- TRANSDUCER .-
0.8
0.8
I
I
0.8
0,8
sensor PRESS GROUPS- !

c> (Z)
[i
i
<-'Intemtnittent operating cornponel_ts

*Only one component operates at a time
)i ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROl., SYSTEIvi
! g 2. 7- 35
i _ Mission Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 Change Date ................ Page
?i
i
SMZA-03-SCO IZ
APOLLO OPERA'i'[ONS HAJqDIbOO]'2
SYSTEMS DATA _:i
Total Watts
Subsystem -i__Noiiii]Vatks per Unit. AC DC

ConLro] - '_-_.I DC
and Con_poneI)t
Z.5 ,, '_[!i
GLYCOL EVAP-
5 Water-g]y
control unit
temp
TE}dP IN sw I-7 1
I .': .Z *7. Z
Water- g]y temp
GLYCOl.,
TEMP ._
EVAP-
sw
[i{
control valve
0. 001 0. 005
GLYCOL EVA P--
Water-gly temp
J
S ensOl"
TEMP IN sw; GLY [
EVAP-.STEAM
PRESS- AUTO/MAN
sw; GLYCOL EVA] D'"
j{
}tzO FLOW sw
2.5 Z.5
GLY EVA P-STEA M
q
Steam press control
pRESS-AUTO/MAN •'I_j[
unit
S \V
l
_:<7.Z g'_7. Z F::?
GLY EVA P-ST.EAM 1
Steam press cont
PRESS-INGR/DECR
valve
S_V
ECS- TPJ_IqSDUCER- T B I) TBD TI3D T]3D g

P :
Steam duct press
PRESS GP, OURS- 1
sm_itch
cb tz]
5.0 5.0
Water control unit GLYCOL EVAP-HzO h
FLOW sw
*3.0 Iv
5
Water control valve
FLOW sw
L
i GLYCOL EVAP-IIzO
0.Z8 0.Z8
GLYCOL EVAP}IzO
Wick temp sensor
7 FLOW sw (
<5
O. 04 O. 04
ECS- TRA1NSDU CE t<-
Rad outlet temp
TEMP GROUP cb (Z) t
sensor
[
4 1 4. 4
;:_ :_57.6
Rad isolation valve ECS RADIATOR sw
(4)
2
)
':qntermittent operating ccn-_ponents
i{
/{
I'TNVIRONMENTAJ-, CONTROL SYSTEM

9
Z. _ - _,6
Page
},ii_;_;ion ................. Basic D_'_ 12 Nov 1966 Change D'-;teo
'7
7!I SM2A-05-SC012

4
:il
sYsTEMS DATA
Z
Watts per IJnit Total Watts
;J
Subsystem
and Component Control
f2 '!: AC DC AC DC
WATER SUPPLY
ECS-TRANSDUCER- 1.28 1.28

Pot water qty
i!i_
1
transducer WASTE & POT HzO-
i)!
MN A&B cb (2)
i!7! t_
ECS- TRANsDucER- 1.28 3..28

Waste water qty
H
transducer WASTE & POT }120
MN A&B cb (2)
:.:.i•
¸!_ _:"45. 0 _45. 0
Food prep water POT H20 HEATER
supply unit sw
H20 accurn control HzO ACCUM--AUTO/ 3.0 3.0

unit MAN sw
H20 ACCUM-ON/ * 3. 0 *3.0

H20 accum valve
OFF sw
ii
ii
H20 accun_ fail ECS-H20 ACCUM- 1.5 1.5
sensor MN A&B cb (Z)
S/M water tank shut- WASTE ]:IzO TI_ #!60. 0 "160.0 _:

off valve R Et,'.ILL s v.,
U MISCELLANEOUS
WMS blower WASTE MANAGE-. '1-'20.0 *20.0

MENT SELECTOR
valve
Urine/water dump ECS-STEAM DUCT 5.7 5.7

nozzle heater HTR-IvIN A&B cb
(z)
Steam duct heater ECS-STEAM DUCT 3,0 6.0

HTR-MN A&B cb
(2)
Temp xducer pwr ECS-TRANSDUCER- 10.5 10.5
supply TEMP GROUP cb

(2)
*Intermittent operating components
0
i] ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
..... [i_} Mission Basic Date 12 Nov igooChang e Date ........ Page 2.7-37
_i
_, SM_.A - 0 J-._-C0 12
,.J
APOLLO OPIIHtAT!ONS I_!AI'$DBOOK
!i:
i;
<!::!_
SYST ElviS DATA
l N0. i Watts _er Unit Total Watts
Subsystem
DC AC DC
and Component Control _--C--
ECS- TRANSDUCE'R- 5 0.04 0, Z
Temp sensor
¢(ii amplifier TEMP GROUP cb
(z)
ECS- TRANSDUCER- 1 1.5 1.5

Steam duct temp
k::.i
VI:i_ sensor signal TEMP GROUP cb
conditioner (z)
iii!
_ii
G_,s chi'omato gr aph GAS AlqAL--AC 1 cb ____1 9 9
*Intermittent operating components

¸¸<ill¸!
Z,7o5 OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS
Z. 7. 5. ] ECS Caution Placards.
il)il
1 Caution notes bordered by yellow and black stripes appear adjacent to
the postlanding vent valves in the forward tunnel area. The notes read,
i<i_ "POST LANDING VENT VALVE---PULL PI_q BEFORE OPERATING VENT
FAN." If the pins were not in place during flight, inadvertent opening of
the cabin vent valves would immediately dump all cabin pressure, %vith
possible catastrophic results.

•q
7 A placard on each COz-odor absorber canister cover cautions the

crewman to "PUSH BUTT©N BEFORE OPFIqIi,,_G, _'enid includes an arrow to
indicate direction button should be pushed. This instruction must be
followed any time a canister cover is to be opened. By pressing the push-
button, the differential pressure is equalized and the cover _ay then be
removed.
The caution note on LHEB-314 pertains to filling the PLSS oxygen tanks
[
and, therefo-_e, is not applicable to earth orbital (Block l) missions. It
2.7.5. Z
reads,
ECS Caution
"CAUTION
Notes.
900 PSI. CLOSE VALVE BEFORE REMOVING CAP."
[
[
Design. restrictions require that certain procedures be followed when I;
positioning the inlet and outlet selector valves of the tank pressure regulator
and relief valve assembly. If the inlet selector vslve is placed to position 1
(or 2), the outlet selector valve must also be placed to position 1 (or Z) or to
....
:9 NORMAL position. This prevents shutting off the supply of oxygen for pres-- [
• <! surizing the potable and waste water tanks and the water-glycol reservoir.
Conversely, if the outlet selector valve is placed to position ] (or 2), the
[
inlet selector valve naust be placed [o position i (or Z) or to NORMAL
position°
[
[
{'i ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
_] Mission Basic Date IZ Nov !966__Change Date Page _2.7-38 [!
]
D APOLLO
o_v,,.A -03-SC012
OPEPvATIONS HANDGOOK
/I
":!ii
SYSTEMS DATA
2.7.5.3 ECS General Data.
Several ECS controls are inaccessible during the mission. Those
affected are located behind the two ren_ovable Y-axis attenuator pane]_ in the
LHE:B. They include all controls mounted on L]qEB-311, the suit circuit
return air manual valve, and the diverter valve handle for the COz-odor
absorber canisters. The attenuator panels are in place during the entire
mission, but are removed to gain acces:: to these ECS controls, and then
i:_rnediately reinstalled. They provide an adequate bearing surface for the

!
Y-axis attenuator shock strut pad for the landing impact.
The circuit breaker for the postlanding ventilation• syste _rn is not
engaged until after landing impact. This precaution, in conjunction with the
]ockpins previously inserted in the postlanding \rent valves, assures that the
cabin pressure will not be inadvertently dumped during flight.
High-oxygen flow during cabin repressurization, or when filling an
en_pty (150 psia rain) surge: tank, may cause w.ater-g]ycol freezing. This will
occur when there is less than full flow through the w, arn_ water-glyco! line
upon which the flow restrictors are wound. Full coolant flow at this location,
therefore, may be assured in the fo!]owing manner. ]Between 15 and 30
rr.ainutes pr:ior to anticipated high oxygen flow, set the GLYCOi_ EVAP-TEi_IP
Ib] switch (MDCLI3) to MAN, and override the GI,YCOL EVAP TEMP IN
valve (LHEI3-311) to the full cciol posit._on. [¢='<_1!
Radiator heat rejection

•
(as.freezing) is a function of radiator inlet
ii
• [
_.n_p_u.,._: and --_: ....... o_-ientg_i.ion, m_ . if the -' "....... _n]e_: te_i-_,per_Lu_:-e,__::
decreases to 75°F, the S/C must be p].aced in a 2 to 5 RPH (0.2 to 0. 5 degree
per second) :roll rate. During this time radiator inlet _emperature must r, ot
decrease ]0elow 70°F, or the individual radiator outlet temperature below
30°F.
1
2.7.5.4 Cabin Depressurization Rates.
The time required for the C/M cabin to become depressur_zed is con-
tingent upon how pressure is released. If the cabin is intentionally dumped,
the time it takes to reach zero pressure will be as shown in figure 2.7--Ii,
sheet 1 of 2. However, if the pressure is lost as the result of meteoroid
punclures, tl_e time will vary according to the size and number of holes.
Fig',_re Z.7-]I, sheet 2 of 2, only reflects flow rate data for meteoroid holes
that do not exceed a total equivalent area of 0.5 in. in dia_eter. The same
chart also applies I:o the flow rate of one cabin pressure relief valve that has
failed open while in the i'40P, MAL position.
2.7.5.5 Cabin Repressurization Rates.
The C/M cabin may be repressurized by using either of two il6w ra_es.
To return the cabin pressure to normal in the shortest possible tinqe, the.
conditions as set forth in figure 2. q'-12, sheet 1 of 2, must be con_plied v,it}'.
The flow rate, however, is dependent upon a full supply of oxygen in the
ENVI]_ONN_tgNTAL COI'_TROL SYSTEM
]'dis s:,on ......... Basic Date 12 Nov l c_6,_Ch._ng e Date ....... Page......1/:1:3!<
........
J
_Z
SMZA.03.-SC012
APOLI,O OPER.ATIONS HA]._DBOOK
SYST EMS DA TA
?i
CABIN DEPRESSURIZATION - 5 TO 0 PSIA

IN1ENTIONAL DUMP TIME - 6 MIN, I1 SEC
:+:,,
<] 5.0
4.5
>!iii_!i!
I _m__
4.0 _ --'_
_iii
¸;_
fi
! _15 --i E
t_ 3.0
z
2.5
3
m
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
ii 2 3
TIME - MINUTES
5 6 7 8
[
: g!
]
CONDITIONS: I. EMERGENCY CAB!N PRESSURE selector valve set |o OFF.
[
2. CABIN REPRESS manual valve set to close.
3. CABIN PRESSURE RELIEF valve sel to DUMP.
4. 14om_al cabin pressure regulators aulomafically close nt
[
3.5 _ia.
[
:1 SM-2A-890
Figure Z. 7-].1. Cabin Depressurization Rates (Sheet 1 of 2)
k
ENVIRONMENTAL, CONTROL SYSTEM
4
bi is s i o n Basic Date 1Z Nov 1966 Cl-_mze Date ................ Page 2.7-40
ii_i
' _!
')t
SMZA- 03-SC01 Z
SYSTEMS DATA
CABIN DEPRESSURIZATION -- 5 TO 0 PSIA

UNINTENTIONAL DUMP TIME - 45 MIN, 40 SEC _
%i
R
,;:f
i_iilq D <
'D
,q
U
'!!ii-
<
,,j
: i]
! I
i:i B 20 25 30 35 40 45
i i:i!l 5 10 15
TIME - MINUTES
CONDITIONS: I. EMERGENCY CABIN PRESSURE selector valve set to NORMAL.
ii 2.
3.
CABIN
CABIN
REPRESS manual
PRESSURE RELIEF valves

valve set to close
set to NORMAL.
4. Normal cabin pressure regulators automatlcel!y closed at 3.5 t_ia.
5. EMERGENCY CABIN PRESSUf_E selecto_ valve set to OFF position

when pressure.reaches 3.5 psia (5 minutes.}.
Depressunzat,on _s through a 0.5-inch-diametel (or equh, alent) meteoroid puncture,

or lhe mcaxlmum flow through one CABliN PRESSURE RELIEF v_lve that fails open while
in the NORMAL position.
• SM-2A-888
Figure 2.7-11. Cabin Depressur_zation Rates (Sheet Z of Z)
F_.NVIRONMENTAI., CONTROL _ oTl(M
_<<_
b] Mission Basic Date 1Z Nov
.................. !966 Chan_-
, ,__ Date , ........ Page "4.7-41
S_\4ZA -03 --SC01 Z [2;
APOLLO OPERATIONS ttANDBOOK
SYSTEI_-S DATA
CABIN REPRESSURIZATION - 0 TO 5 PSIA_"
MINIMUM TIME -- 52 MIN, 22 SEC
5.5 -
i
5.0.
I
i • I I
4.5
- I
4.0
_g
.... i
3.5
i I
3.0 ----.---------4-------
J
r.i
I
i 2.5
I
!
II
2.0
il I
i
/ I
• 4 1.5
lr
/
!
1.0
/
0.5 - T--
0 5 I0 15 20 25 30
Z "l 85 4O 45 50 55
lIME - MINUTES
i
CONDITIONS: |. EMERGENCY CABIN PRESSURE selector valve set to NORMAL.
1
2. CABIN REPRESS manual valve set ._o OPEN.
3. When surge tank pressure indicator decr_a:.es to 15,0 F_kJ, EMERGENCY
CABIN PRESSURE selector valve set to OFF; ._urge tank miMmum
pressure (150 psia) main|_incd by regulc_tlng CABIN REPRESS manual

valve unti! valve |s full open and su,ge tank pr_ssur_ slarts to incr_._sse.
4. Normal cabin pressure regulators auto,-natically open at 3.5 p_ia.

L
i 5. When surge tonk pressure again decreases to 150 psla. CABIN
REPRESS manual valve regulgt_d to maintaln this minimum surgo

tonk prer, sure.
ii 6. When cabin pressure |ndicator reoches 5.0 mla, normal cabin

procure regulators automatically cl_e arid CABIN REPRESS manuol
valve set to clo_e.
Requ;res 9. lib oxygen at 70°F cabin temperature
SM-2A-889A
_igure 2o7-12. Cabin RepressurizaLion Rates (Sheet I of 2)
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTIIOL S_ZSTI_M
._,,Ii _ s ion
Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 .Change Date ....... Page 2. 7 - 42
Sh,12A--03--SCO !2
APOLLO OPtERATIONS I-IANDBOOK
SYS TE:MS Dzq '1".A
4
_t
'i
.i!
%]
ii! .0 I
_iI 'i!
:!t
D!:
i,_k:iii
B
'i CONDITIONS: 1. EMERGENCY CABIN PRESSURE selector valve set toOFE.
2, CABIN REPRESS manual valve set to OPEN.
B 3. Non'hal
3.5 psla.
cabin pressure regulators autc,mafically open at
!i 4. When
cabin
cabin
pressme
pressure
regulalors
indicator reaches
autc#r.atieally
5.0
c!ose
psla,
and
nomqel
CABIN
D
REPRESS manual valve _et 1o cl_e.
Requires 9. lib oxygen at 70°R cabin temperature
D SM-2A-887A
Figure 2. 7-12. Cabin Repressurizai:ion Rates (Sheet Z of 2)
g,¢!
EiNVIROi'qi_4ENT,AI., CONTROl, SYS'£_.M
i
_!:i_ MiSSiOn .. Basic Date 12 Nov 1<)66 P,-
,.,n_thge _ Date .............. Page Z. 7-43
........................
iI
SMgA-03--SC01Z I%_4,
:;1
SYSTEMS DATA
:i
surge tank. When the surge tank is not full, o1" the repressurization time is
not critical, the conditions for the flow rate as shown in figure 2. 7-12, sheet
ji j 2 of 2, are used.
Y4
2.7.6 TELEMETRY MEASUREMENTS.

:3
The fo]lowing is a complete list of all ECS telemetry data that is moni-
_!>ii
• ui
tored
contains
same
by
pickoff
flight'control]ers
the name
or
and
signal
type
source
and ground
of S/C
as
crew
support
display.
telemetry,
personnel.
unless
The display
a separate
The last
utilizes
column
measurement
the E
'i
number is included in the display column.
An asterisk (_:j by the measurement number denotes information which

is not available for recording or telemetry transmission during PCM low-bit %!
rate operation.
Measurement Se_so_" Operating

Number Description Range I Range
Normal Crew Display
CF 0001 P Pressure cabin 0/17 psia [5.0=k0. Z psia PRESS - CABIN

indicator
:!I
I CF 0002 T Temp cabin 40/125°E 70 ° to 80°F TEMP - CABIN

indicator
CF 0005 P 0/30 *rim tIg 1<7.6 i-he: fig PART PP.ESS CO 2

Press CO Z partial
I indJcalor and CO 2
PP HI C&W light
*CF 0006 P Press surge tank 50/1050 psia 900±35 psia TAN]< PRESS - 1 -
O 2 indicator
•ii:!:_ _I
_:=CF 0008 T Ten_p suit supply manf Z0/95°F 55°F TEMP- SUIT
indicator
:9
=i| CF 0009 Q Quantity waste water 0/100% Variable WATER - QUANTITY

t a nk indicator
CF 0010 Q Quantity potable t-I20 0/100% Variable WATER - QU.ANTITY

%
tank indicator
C] ,_ (!012. P Press suit demand reg 0/17 psia 3. 75:k0.25 PRESS -. SUIT
sense )sia indicator
CF 0015 P Press suit compressor 0/1 psid Min 0. 3 to 0.4 AP SUiT COMPR
:!!}:I d iff psid indicator
GF 0016 P Press glycol pump 0/60 psia 37 to 45 psia PRESS GLY DISCH
outlet indicator
• a
ENVIRONMENTAL GONTROG SYSTI<M
Basic Date 12 Nov

......... ] 966 Ch" _ aoe
_., Date £ .................... Pa_,e Z. 7-44
:i
SMZA-03-'SC0 ! Z
APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOI<
i!
:!:I _!!ii_
SYSTE'MS DATA
/t, Norn_a]
Measurement Sensor i Operating

Crew Display
Nun_be r Description
7i _i_
Range I Range
None
::-'CF 0017 T Temp glycol evap outlet
2.0/95°F I>450F
steam
!:iii _<_
25/75-oF 40 ° to 50. 5°F GLY EVAP -
CF 0018 T Ternp glycol evap outlet
OUTL}ET TEMP
liquid
indicator
CF 0019 Q Quantity glycol accmn 01100% 40 to 60% GLY ACCUM -
QUANTITY indicator
-50/+100°F Variable ECS RAD - OUTLET

CF 002( T Temp space radiator
TtCMP indicator and
2I 6utlet
GLYCOL T EIVl P
LOW ChW light

]:i?,
7 psi min None

0/60 psia
iI ::_CF 0025 P Press
inlet
pump package
0.0510.25 0,098 to0. 154 GLY EVAP STEAM

CF 0034 P Back press glycol
PRESS indicator
evaporator psia psia
C1 p 0035 R Flow rate ECS O Z o.z/1.o 0,425 !b/hr FLOW O Z indicator ;
Ib/hr
I t!! 4<
"#CF 0036 P 0/150 psia I None

Press outlet O2 reg
supply i00±10 psia
_:_CF 0120 P Press H20 and glycol 0/50 psia 18 to 35 psid Nol) e
tanks
_:<CF 0135 R Flow rate manifold 0/0.2 lb/hr I'BD None
inlet to suit 1
Flow rate manifold 0/0.2 lb/hr T1-3D None

,:_CF 0136 R
:inlet to suit Z
':-'CF 0i37 R Flow rate manifold 0/0. Z ib/hr TBD Nolle
:::7 inlet to suit 3
<_CF 0148 P DP supply and returp 0/0. 8 psid 0.25 to 0,5
manifold )sid
,:-'CF 0153 T Temp compressor inlet 50/125_F 121313 None
-'::C F 018.4 T 90/200°F T}3D None

Temp CO 2 absorber
outlet
7i:ii
] ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM
Mission Basic Date 12 Nov 1966 Change Date ............. Page 2. 7-45
!_!i:i
:t
.... : ..... " ;_ 11;!: : :i: :': :::: " ::i . "
ii!iii:!d
:i<;] SM2A-03--SC012
i<i
SYSTEMS DATA
Normal
Sensor
Measure_nent
Number Description Range
Operating
Range Grew Display
El
50/+150°F None
!!:i_ *CF 0245 T Temp 0 2 reg inlet
,:-'CF0326 P Press potable HzO tank 0/50 psia

TBD
18 to 35 psid
None ,Eli
drain
ii:i;_ *CF 0327 P Press

drain
waste H20 tank 0/50 psia 18 to 35 psid None
E
::-'CF0481 T Temp CP branch 1 40/150 °F TBD None
inlet g
40/150°F FBD None

Ten_p branch
E
*CF 0482 T GP i
outlet
40/150°F FBD None
i
<'-CF 0483 T Temp CP branch. Z
inlet
40/150°F TBD None

"#CF 0484 T Ten-_p CP branch 2
>: _=_ outlet
0/Z. 0 psid TIGD None

k
_:-'CF0549 P Diff press coldplate
!?ill
9
_ii'i<i branch 1
*GF 0550 P /i0 psid TBD None

Diff press coldplate
branch 2
GT 0108 K N/A N/A None

: #i
Gas
cabin
analysis - suit and
li
SF 0665 T 60/150°F rariable None

Tenqp space radiator
inlet t_
:2h
SF 0671 T Temp EGS radiator o/5o °F rari.able ECS RAD OUT
: %/_
outlet 1 TEMP-1 indicator
[
SF 0672 T Temp ECS radiator o/5ooF fariable EGS RAD OUT
out]et 2 Tti2MP- Z indicator
[
....
i:
i
i<]
!
i":!_
H •/.
Mission Basic Date 1_ Nov lq66 Chan e Date Page 2 7--46

SMZA-03-SC01Z
:I _ APOLLO OPEI[ATIONS HANDBOOK
SYST]_MS DA TA
a,>:%_
H20 ACCUM SELECTOR VALVE
:I Li
!
i
H20 ACCUM
FAil SSNSOR
i IJ H20 ACCUM FAIL

im_icalor (MI)C- 1I)
I-_R°OIIIl>',"0Y
<t'I
'E
tllO ACCUM CONTROl UNIT (2)
]
_N
VATER-GLYCOL
i! :ONTROL UNi I
H20 ACCUMULAI OR
!i [3 H20 ACCUMU_FOR
I
I $U_T E'/AP
DIVER1ER VALVE
COhrTIOL UNIT
WATER
"ROL VALV_
P!OID) \VATER-GLYCOL EVAP
,\BSOLUTE PRESS,
f .
lo: GLY EVAP SIEAM
h_icolor (MDC-13) ,_ T/M
!:?L,
17=;::
! U
i
:1
I
: _ fIJll
,,I
h
i SUIT ClRC
RETUEN A.
VALVE
ASSE7/,BCI'
"]
(/4kNUAI.
VALVE)
;1
T/M(_Dc-13)&
;1
:2
!I st<t-,t,t - 637:-i
:?:i
Figure 2.7-13. F_:CS Schernatic Diagram
;{
ENV. RO_IM.I:.]'7 F.A_-, COJ'IT_T Oz, SYSTEM
!
"" PageZ 7-47/Z.7-48
i _!'i_ vlissi.on, Basic Date. 12 Nov 19oo Chamge. Date:
>_
.-'i=
ili •
z_
_c.m
i
6
8_
f-:,
6>£
;::::::
t
;2:;
z_
-> !
ii
__.j 8u
<
z [i
zz 06 Z
*li iL
.....!_,
o.3 !
_8
ii _---Y ,.,
z i
6£ 8
6.1 181
8F,
I)
[il i,
!
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To: ECS _,D OUT TEMP "
indlcalo_ 1 & 2 (MDC-I?)
i & T/M
i!
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WATER-
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RADIATORS I
(2)
i
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SM2A-03-SC0 _2
SYSTEMS DATA
D SECTION Z
SUBSECTION Z. 8
B TELECOMMUNICATION SYST ElVl
D Z. 8.1 INTRODUCTION.
The telecommunication (T/C) system includes the spacecraft (S/C)

Hi communications and data equipment required for voice communications;
acquisition, processing, storage and trans1_iss_on of operational and flight
qualification telemetry (TLk.4), te]evision (TV), and bio'_nedical data; recep-
tiorf of up-data; afld transnnission of appropriate tracking and ranging signals.
At least part of the T/C system will be in operation during all phases of the
_!i! mission--from prelaunch through recovery. The following list summarizes
T/C capabilities as utilized on SC-01Z°
e S/C inter'communications between crewman

/1
o
e Hardline voice communications and transmissiorf of TV and TLM data

to the Lsunch Control Center (LCC)via the service module umbilical
(USM) during prelaunch
In-flight voice cor_amunication.s with the manned spa'.ceflight network '

(_v_SFN)"
Voice tape recording of commen_s, observa.tioas: opinions, etc._ v,i_:h

time correlation
Acquisition and processing of TLM, TV, and operational biomedical

data from the S/C structure and systems, TV camera, and crei_'-
:i
i man biomedical sensors, respectively
® TLM data storage
Transmission of real-time or stored TLM data
Reception of up-data (guidance and navigation, and timing data and

real-time commands) fron_ the MSFN
® Transmission of C-band tracking pulses i,_ response to received
radar signals
Li_vait-ed capabilities for S-band operation_ including transmission

of voice and TLM data plus TV, stored analog, or pseudo-rando;'7_ -
noise (PRN), ranging codes, and receptior_ of voice and up-data
Postlanding recovery aids including voice communication.s and
i
I:_!
recovery beacon
T ELEC
transmission
OMMUNICATION SYST EM
_i_ Mission Basic Date 1Z Nov 1966 Change Date., Page Z.8-1
:!<::<
SYSTEMS DATA
....
i e Generation of timing signals for synchronization of the T/C and
other S/G systems.
Z.8. Z FUNCTIONAL DESC RIPTION.
i:!i
ilii_l The functional description of the T/C system is divided into four parts:
voice communications, data operations, tracldng and ranging, and S-band
operations. The unified S-band subsystem (USBS}, used for all S-band
operations, provides back-up voice, data, tracking and ranging capabilities,
and the sole means for transm.ission of TV or analog data.
g. 8. g. i Voice Communications.
Z.g.Z.I. 1 General.:
All S/C voice, colnlnunications (figure Z.8-1) originate and terminate

in the crewmen:s personal comn_unication assemblies (headsets). Each
crewman has two beadsets; one is It,cared in the "bump-hat" for use while
1 wearing
helmet.
the constant--wear
Each headset
garment;
is comprised
the other
of two
is located
independently
in the spacesuit
.operating ear-
phones and two microphones with self-contained preamplifiers° The
headsets are used for all voice transmission and reception.
:!I
Each crewman's headset is connected to the audio centez (A/C) equip-
rnent by a separate electrical umbilical assembly, commonly referre6 to as
a "cobra cable." .Inaddition to the audio circuits, each. of the three cobra
cables contains wiring for the operational biomedical sensors in the constant
wear gar_ents and th_ push-to-talk (IaTT) control circuitry. The PTT
control circuitry consists of a pushbut!-en-type PTT key and a PTT/CW
selector switch. With the PTT/GW selector switch in the PTT position,
:!i!
the PTT key permits manual control of voice transmission by the appro-
_:!_!i
i_ priate transmitter and mike amplifier circuit in the audio center module.
The PTT mode was designed to be used (tu._ing the launch phase of the
mission when high noise levels would preclude usage.of the VOX circuitry.
In this nnode, the PTT key will enable the microphone amplifier_ voice
q recorder, VHF-AIvi and S-Band transrnitters if the latter three have their
attendan_ control switches configured properly. The audio center power
switch and the cobra cable mode switch would be in PTT position during
this mode.
The CW mode was also designed to be used during the high-noise

levels of the launch phase. In tltis mode_ however, the VHF and S-band
downvoice communications links are not enabled. This gives us a PTT
controlled intercommunications° The voice recorder could also be
enabled in this mode if needed. The audio center power switch would also
<I be in the PTT position, but the mode switch on the cobra cable must be in the
CW position., It should be noted that on older cobra cables, the CW position
was used only for emergency key. Now, this position will be _sed for bod_
<i!
i TELECOI_{MUN!CATION SYSTEM
2.8-2
_..Si ,;tion Basic Date IZ Nov 1966 Chang e Date Page
i
:I
ST'd ZA.- 03 .- SC01 Z
!i APOLLO OPERATIONS t{AND]3OOK.
!
7 SYSTEMS DATA
J
2-KMC PORTIONS OF
VHP PORTIONS OF VHF RECOVERY HF RECOVERY
<t SC1N ANTENi'JAS ANTENNAS ANTENNA
SCIN ANTENNAS
:,i
LOWER (4Z) UPPER (-Z)
LOWER (*Z) UPPER (-Z) NO. 2 NO. 1
i Xc7 \
".I
I:i BRACKET
(MDC-9)
I COAXIAL
i?r,_3
}
i:i
:3 v_lF _,_L_ RECY BCN
A_NNA S-_AND n
3
[i [-- Prom: VHP X_>ON_ ,qOH
i
;7
MULTIPLEXER ]
i SURV,VAL
k_
I XCVR
..........
Iol I j w_; _ !_ _4_ _;_
4
L? LOW_ " ):_ONDt_ tOW S_C _SG _-_'
'--oC-:
_",-7,
-:-_ _7,i7%, o_+? i
In _ ? L J< ,+7
IU \J.I LIt <*_+_ AGE / i/_t_ :;s" ff7 ,<_-$-___
c,, %_. %::-J® L_--_.-J i / III,,_, ill

"_% , ,,, (M_C--_) ::- &..<,.+_! I11_DYIIt
..... "_>-_,J. F-.t--1 r-;:.:;--iq_ .,._=-:_;
...... _ <_1
?_'_m_72l Tb",N SC EI\"ER I I ' I/2,7, _._._<.¢;" o,,
] F_ -_=:-.-cs fl ii III J #_ 4"_ _)AU.IO

4"_ or, _::Thj) 7:::,)t' t I ,. _ -
\'<-._ _ It .... i I t .... -- ' " , .. _,, .
" ' IU U tJl I i --" " [ '_ ._-', "_'---#- ,LL \IA UL:,M
F_
U "k,_j. _ I VHP-AM J" - ....... No. _. 1 _I
] _-_f_;>l XMTR-RCVa
I K_YI.G vOLTAGE I OI
t:_" • [-_' MODULE _ ,__,,I M I •
l_ I_.,_-- -_ (3 MODUtES- NO. 3 ""< j' B ] RECY FORCE
CMDR {,IAV J U I-'" -----{:," VIA SWIMMER
:'$J ENGRi Ld CONNECI'OR

PUSH TO TALK KEY
!I
NORMA_/_
AuD,oZ_-'-4:
:7'{
i
3
/_/'J Pn/cw c....
_:_,.-_- / SELECTOR SWITCH CABLES (3)
:7 EMERGENCY
1 E_ To:
EARPHONES
HEADSET
vox s_N
& MIKE AMPLS
NOTES: 1. There ore three heodsets, three connecting

It4T[I*COM
cobra cables, three _,;d]o control panels,
i and three audio center equipment modules'-
2.
one
Additional
on
set
the
for each
translaficn
PTT key_
crewman.
_re
controh.
also located
®
vot u_
3. All controls and switches shown ore e.n

} MDC-20 unles_ olherv,'he [ndlcated.
(MDC-13, 23, AND-26) SM-2/'.-843D
J
Figure 2.8-i. Voice Communications
! TEL, ECOMMU;_CA'
' _ qI'lON' SYSTEM
{
"_"_ Z< 8 - 3
',:]
! :_ Mission.,. Basic ]Date ]Z No;' lq66
.L ....... _'a_,
tat" _.[_ e Date ...................... Page.
'i
- "" ":'<":::"" " ? ':':'_::Tp ::'5'2 :;" ..... : '"'_h]:T:_:7::::=": ::" " ' _ 'Z'"'T:'::};: :'r:_,? z _:': _":':": 7:'<"'<',: :" _':":'::':_<'<.c;:?'<!:"a :'- , =_ ':','_ _:.i!'5-,',t!,
SRiZA..03-SC0 ]2
APOLL, O OPERATIONS PIANDBOOK

gli
{{;
)
SYSTEMS DATA
' !5 L:
emergency key and the PTT intercommunications functions. PTT keys are
also located on the translation controls. Their function duplicates that of
the PTT key with the PTT/CW selector in the PTT position on the cobra
cable.
The head of each cobra cable has two electrical connectors, marked
NORM and EMER. Normally, the connector marked NORM will be used;
however, in the event of fsi]ure in one of the A/C modules, the affected
crewman may connect the cable from his spacesuit to the connector marked
/(1 EMER. This will connect his audio circuits to another A/C module and
allow the same module to be shared by two crewmen.
A s_rap has been added to the cobra cable so the PTT button can be
held in the ON position if desired. This would allow a continuous Jntercoln
if the Audio center PO].VE]K switch, (k4DC 13, Z3, Z6) is in the PTT position.
The A/C equipment contains three separate'but identical _lodules,
one for each crewlnan, and a commonly connected intercom bus. This
J equip1_-_ent serves as a control and distribution center :for all S/C audio
signals. Each

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REPORTOF

The spacecraft (S/C) consists of a launch escape system (LES) assem-

TEST IN PROGRESS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT

Spacecraft 012 was undergoing a "Plugs Out Integrated Test" at the

TESTS AND ANALYSES

Results of tests and analyses not complete at the time of publication

Throughout this report, time is stated in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

The Honorable James E. Webb

Dear Mr. Webb:

Pursuant to your directive as implemented by the memorandum of

_ .-x <,/, "

Dr: Fr_a IL.,l"h'or_pso/(

/Dr' M&xime A'. Faget -ZGeorg_'C. Wh ire, Jr. '

E. Barton Geer (JJ'ohn J ?'Williams

_ .i'::' f " '.....

Charles F. Strang, Coi.,-US._jtF"

NARRATIVE OF BOARD HISTORY 1-1

NASA MANAGEMENT INSTRUCTION 8621.1 APRIL 14, 1966 1-3

MEMORANDUM, JANUARY 28, 1967, FROM DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,

NASA, TO APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 1-5

MEMORANDUM, FEBRUARY 3, 1967, FROM DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,

NASA, TO APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD 1-9

MEMORANDA, FEBRUARY 3, 1967, FROM DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,

NASA, TO APOLLO REVIEW BOARD

DR. ROBERT W. VAN DOLAH 1-12

MR. GEORGE JEFFS 1.13

DR. FLOYD L. THOMPSON CHAI RMAN . 2-1

FRANK BORMAN, COLONEL, USAF BOARD MEMBER 2.7

MR. GEORGE C. WHITE, JR. BOARD MEMBER 2-9

DR. ROBERT W. VAN DOLAH BOARD MEMBER 2.11

MR. JOHN J. WILLIAMS BOARD MEMBER 2-13

BOARD MEMBER 2-15

BOARD, SUBJECT. ESTABLISHMENT OF APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD

ADVISORY GROUP 3-1

MEMORANDUM, FEBRUARY 7, 1967, FROM CHAIRMAN, APOLLO 204 REVIEW

BOARD, SUBJECT: ESTABLISHMENT OF APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD PANELS 3-5

BOARD PROCEEDINGS 3-11

SPACECRAFT AND RECORDS CUSTODIAL RESPONSIBILITIES 3-35

DR. ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR.

DR. ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR.

TO THE ADMINISTRATOR, NASA, FEBRUARY 14, 1967 3-51

DR. ROBERT C. SEAMANS, JR.

TO THE ADMINISTRATOR, NASA, FEBRUARY 25, 1967 3-55

STATEMENT BY JAMES E. WEBB,

ADMINISTRATOR, NASA, FEBRUARY 25, 1967 3-61

PART IV HISTORY OF THE ACCIDENT

DESCRIPTION OF TEST SEQUENCE AND OBJECTIVES 4-1

CHRONOLOGY FROM T- 10 MINUTES THROUGH MEDICAL

DETERMINATION OF DEATH 4-4

PART V INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS 5-1

PART Vl FINDINGS, DETERMINATIONS AND

April 14, 1966

This Instruction establishes the policy and procedures for investigating

This Instruction is applicable to NASA Headquarters and field installations.

In general, a failure is defined as not achieving a major mission

a° It is NASA policy to investigate and document the causes of all major

i). The Deputy Administrator may conduct independent investigations

a. Officials-in-Charge of Headquarters Program Offices are responsible,

(z) Informing promptly the Deputy Administrator of each major

(2) Determining the causes or probable causes of all failures,

b, When the Deputy Administrator decides to conduct an independent

(i) Establish a (name of project) Review Board, comprised of appro-

(2) Define the specific responsibilities of each Board, encompassing