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 CHAJPTBR IV

BNKUY SITUATION OK THB VISTULA. IK 1920

CHARACTER AND AIMS OF TUCHAOZJSWSXI: PURSUIT

In regard to sw>h v a r i e d h y p o t h e s e s , wo w i l l t r y t o recon­

s t r u c t the exabt d i s p o s i t i o n of the Russian t r o o p s , as was
r e a l i s e d on the 1 3 t n of August on the P o l i s h f r o n t . Jf&? t h i s we
must f a l l back on the h l s t o r i o p u b l i c documents and the l a s t < - -.
worky on the war drawn up by the c h i e f s of the S o y i e t army, as
w e l l as on our own documentation whloh nay f r e q u e n t l y r e o t i f y the
f a c t s as presented by the h i s t o r i a n s . In f a c t the orders published
today have not always been executed c o m p l e t e l y . The expose' of
e v e n t s , by thoi r authors c a r r i e s a s u b j e o t i v e merle v e r y oomnrei:en­
e i b l e from a human p o i n t of v i e w . These documents muat be comple­
ted by the information of the jnemy, to g i v e a true p i c t u r e of the
s i t u a t i o n of the troops of Tuohaosewelci on the eve of the b a t t l e
whloh dooided the e n t i r e R u s s o - P o l i s h war.
A f t e r having won the v i o t o r y of the Auta i n J u l y , the Com­
mander on the w e s t e r n RusBian f r o n t undertook h i s h i s t o r i c march
on Warsaw, making the b e s t of the d i s p o s i t i o n of Iiis troops a t the
end of the b a t t l e , n a t u r a l l y , t o throw b i s armies by the s h o r t ­
e s t route on the o a p i t a l of Poland. The handling of t h i s enor­
mous assembly of troops such as had been gathered a t the gateway
of Smolensk i n the a waiter of 1920 was i n f a c t very d i f f i c u l t due
 -2­
to tho defeotiv9 state of communications in this region. It was

proportionately unrealizable, to a greater degree, to the east of

the Hitmen and the Bug. & ^

Those ooneiderationa partially justified the oonoeptions of

the Oomnvander of the western front who held in hand a powerful

t^v-up of forces to be the means to oontinue, with rapidity and

energy the pursuit of the beaten Polish armies. The war of 1920

was in fact a classic of open warfare. The inroads of Tuohaosewski

on the Auta provoked, in a ver" short time, the displacement of

almost half of the Polish troops from tbs North Eastern front.

To take advantage of the results of this dislocation of the entire

Polish front was to gain suocess. If Tuohaozewski could not have

recourse to out flanking movement, for the reasons treated in

another part, tbo best guarantee for suooess which remained to him

was to move rapidly forward. If he marohed to the right of the

enemy, his movements in the first phase of the comba^ wa& possible

and even easy, in view of the fact that the Polish plans for the

defsudive gave no consideration to the elaatio defense of tho

front. Thus the Polish army falling back from position to position,

would wear itself out and destroy itself in the oourse of a re­
treat of many bunarod kiuneters.

Moreover, Tuefcaozewskl was afraid of any suspension of opora­

tions which permitted his adversary » draw breath, to reorganize

his forces and Attempt to reseize 'the initiative^ lost on the Auta.

The uninterrupted advanoe which was assured after his viotory on

the 4th of August demoralised us to a high degree and hurt our

 -3­
aorale as well, it waa under theee given oiroumstancoa, the oon­
dition neoessary for suooess of hia plan based on the continuity
of the offensive on tte .Yeatern front with a powerful light wing*
It was not in this that he erred, the boldness and the Vigor
of tho pursuit which he organised showed that he had the ^ualitioa
for high command. He began to blunder awkwardly, when, impatient
of attaining the end that he had sat for himself, bs forgot com­
pletely the means at his disposal, parting with the prudeuoe ne­
oogoary to all military oooraandors, */hen he ceased to be grounded
on positive information; pursuing blindly and reotiessly without
manouver, straight aiiaad.
Xamieniew suggested manouver to him at the time of the
battle on the Bug but Tuobaoaewsfcl tonic no heed of this suggestion.
Presuming; on the higher moral of his soldiers, oonfident iu
their role as victor a, and above all yielding io the p,~038u?e of
political Influenoeo affecting hla aimy, he desired ardently to
neglect nothing of that whioh he belioved useful in exploiting u
victory won. He refused to out flank, widely, tho Polis v la£t
and was aot in position to out their natural linos oZ retreat, he
pursued therefore the Northern Polish troops straight ahead (by
direot pressure), Hastening his pace, he did not modify in print­
olple his dispositions, and was not at a l l disturbed that a pur­
suit thus directed lacked strategio surprise, ftrom vhis last point
of view TuohaQzewsfci figured that our intelligence agenoies would
not be able to funotion normally in the midst of the general rout.
In this, he erred grievously, as lator developements were to show.
 -4­
Tho rapid fall oi' the fortified plaoes of Ossoweio, Lomza and
Cstrolenlca defended by units of our Volunteer army made a great
IEore88ion on the Russians although these plaoes were out ot date
and Qonstruoted facing north. It oonfirmed Tuohaoaewsfci in his
error. Ho oonoluded from it that the Polish Volunteer Army whioh
;
had been the terror ' tbb Russian Bolshevio, was not ablo to
disturb the lied army.
The quick f a l l of the northern fortified plaoes caused the
Russians to forget our destruction of bridges and communications,
i t counterbalanced the resistanoe offered by the Polish troops
in the oenter and on the South east front.
Under those conditions the evident suooesses of Comrade liadelc
and the emphatic talks of the revolutionary diotatoxg was so If
explanatory. These doouruents as well as the communist communiques
of the period affirmed, in ooaoert, that the Polish army was oom­
pletely beaten,,
Half of Poland was already oooupied by 3oyiet troops* l"hfl
other half, in truth, is materially and morally stronger, i t s
patriotism undaunted, 8la is rebellious to ooramuniam. ifhat does
it matterl She will hurl her numerous but unorganized forces in­
to the teeth of the resistance. She will be subdued by Tuohaose­
W3ki. The capture of Warsaw, and -following that of a l l of Poland
will be simply a matter of time.
The ftolsbevio leaders were also desirous of cutting off Po­
land from Dantr,igv from whence came the flow of munitions and
military material, incut.speasible to the continuance of an
 -5­
effeotlve Polish reoiatanae, under the protootion of Prenoh warships
vhioh intimidated the workers of this Port, in spite of the sobemes
of Tuohaoaowslci and the promises of the Communists in Dantzitf.
The Capture of ./arauw announoed for the 12th of August, be«<
yond the advantages already ind|oated would permit Tuohaoaewslci
to Install a communist government in Poland and to assure himself
of a valued ally. This government should be able, by official
ooaomunist propaganda to ape ad anarohy in the ran lea of the Polish
army, in a manner to b re ale the ultimate foroe of reaistanoe of the
adversary, conformable to the methods so suooesaful against the
iiussian counter revolutionaries*
The proclamation of the government of. the Soviets at .Varaaw
would lead rationally to the organisation of a Had Polish army,
for whioh tna voluntary enrollments opened at Vilna and Bialystole
had amounted to nex* to nothing*
She conquest u£ the Polish capital rould permit the organi­
zation of wide spread propaganda in view of the general European
'"evolution of whioh the first rumblings were preemptible. .In a
word tte f a l l of .Tarsaw would put In the hands of the Soviets not
only a powerful tool in the interior of Poland but also a redoubl­
able arm In the international arena.
These alluring perspectives at first glance f e l l logically
and naturally into; (a) To take frarsaw as soon as possible; (b)
To oooupy rapidly the west of Poland; (o) To out the communications
betwoen Poland and the sea*
It was neoeasary for this to tifota the Hiemen and to oontinue
 -6­

tbe pursuit.
Th9 execution of this deoialon depended aa always on tbo
three prime faotora; The enemy, the situation of the Russian troops
on the Western front, and the terrain where the ganw would be
played out. These three dements counselled, e a r l y , tto execution
of a decisive of tensive 'oy a powerful right wing.
In e f f e o t , Tuohaoaeweki deoidod to end the war by a deoioive
final o f f e n s i v e , relying upon, aooordins to his i n t e l l i g e n c e ,
finding the mass of the Polish foroe in area: Gieohanow-Modlln­
flaraaw. He evaluated these forces an 70,000 bayonets and sabers*
He was then persuaded that the enemy s i t u a t i o n , f u l l y j u s t i f i e d
the assembly of the forces constituting tbe right Russian wing.
The seoond factor influencing the decision of the Commander
of the western front, arguod equally on .raking his principle e f f o r t
with h i s right wing. His d i s p o s i t i o n remained then unaltered in
general, from tb& 4th of July. Tuohaacewalri roarohed on the Vistula
disposed on his right flunk: in thrss armies which coula be iwed
e i t h e r to attack: frontally or to oat i'lank, widoly, the Polish l e f t f

IHFLUiCHOE OP THE TiSRRAIH ON THIS DS013I0N

OP TUCHACZEffSZI IN 1920

In order to understand the manouvor of Tuohaozewski i t i s

necessary to examine the third factor which influenced the making
of his d e c i s i o n , that i s to say the strategio influence of the
terrain, suoh as we have out l i * e d a propoa of the theater of
operations a t Vfarsaw and i t s f o r t i f i o a t i o n s .
 -7­

Our last natural Una of defense toward the east had fallen,
when Tuohaozewsk* marching on Yfarsaw in 1920, took Grodno, oroes­
ing the middle Miemen, paeged through the forest of Bielowieje
and appeared at Wolkowysk just as Brest on the Bug foil, where
the Bolshevio troops on the 3outU ea.st tfront ha* possession of
the middle stretohes of tha Bug. The enemy a A* open before him
the routes leading to the Interior of Poland, of which we have
spoken at tho beginning of our study*
Tuohaozewski aarohing on the Capital of Roland, had an ex­
aggerated idea of the field works that we had thrown up, since the
middle of July, on the bridge head at Warsaw; he over estimate*}
their oapaoity for reel stance. This is why he deolared himself
for thfl outflanking of the bridge load in order to avoid the diff-*
iodlt redoubt'!.
He favored this project for another reason. An onemy advanc­
ing from tie east or north on WSOTSQV p.uit first of a l l foroe tho
powerful strategic barrier of tho Vistula, ao operation perhaps
full of dangers* In faot, as i t appears from our description of
the theater, the terrain below .Vareaw lent itself very l i t t l e to
a forced passage from eadt to v/est, v/hile the bridges at tfyszogrod
and ^/loclawek gave to thdlp possessor control of tbu rivor. It ia
then easier to reduce )hQ resistance of the oity by attacking from
the rear according to the ojuass:lo example of the canpaign of 14&1.
S t i l l other topographic considerations, we know, induced
Tuobaozew8ti to dlreot his attention to tYe bridges at .Yyssogrod,
Plook and Wloolawek. His troops mu .uing on V/arsaw from the right
 .8­

wing had tho ohoioe of two solutions only:

dither a s - - I hav9 already inc&oated in analysing tha ordor of
the 6th August, of the Polish Commander in ohief—to piaoe him­
s e l f to the South of the Bug by tbe permanent bridges at Maikin,
Brok or f i n i a l l y y/yaakow and attack 7/arsaw from east to v/est.
Or e l s e to continue to the v e s t . t o oross the llarew and the
Orzyt, to furoe baofc the enemy from these rivers and make his way
as quickly as possible to the plateaux of Uarsovie, favorable to
mass man ouver, to win tbe re at one stroke the easy passages and the
bridges of tbe Vistula, then advance on Warsaw, demoralised by
this manouver, or on tho railroads of Poroerania.
In sumoing up, since Tuobaozewski renounced from tha f i r s t
the attoolc on the bridge: htad at Tfarsaw, he muat avoi/?. the impasa
at the £unot,ure of the Nare*-Aug- Vistula,, naturally dangerous
and weXl protected by fortresses, to raaroh to the west, in the
footsteps of Paakiewitoh and, taking advantage of the terrain, ex­
eoute his principal effort on the right.

0 ? M B UU33IAM AKMIJS3 BJSLO.Y ;)

In this man**';.- were the Hussian troops dfispoaad on the west­

ern front in mid-August 1920 along tha Polish-Crezuan frontier at
Dremblin (See sfcetoh }Z)
On the extreme Hussian right operated than the IV Army of Com­
rade Chouwaiew. It was composed of III Cavalry 03orpa of Gay-Khan
(10th and 15th oavalry divisions) and the 12th, 16th, 33rd and 54th
 -9­
Divioions of chasseurs a pied; i t had besides, the 164th Infantry
Brigade at 3rodno and the 143rd infantry brigade at Vilna. Those
unit8 were marching on the objectives whioh had boen assigned them
by orders No.'1479/ issued the 13th August by tho Oonmander of the
IV army. The Cavalry Corps reacted Sierpt the 13th august, from
whence it threw out detachments toward Thorn, Uoolawetc and tflook,
the 18th and 53rd found themselves in the vicinity of CUinnoJeofc*
Szrensk; the 13th division ooo ipied Dzialdowo extended along the
Prussian frontier, covering tte IV army on the north; the 54th
Division in army reserve extended toward Gleohanov?.
On the laft of the IV army waa the XV army (Comrade Hoik)
whioh contained four divisions of ohaaaeura (the 4th, 11th, 16th
and 33rd). The 4th and 33rd marched from the north and northeast
on i'lonsk, the 4th in the first line and the 33rd in the second
line. Howe Uiaoto having been taktm the 16th divMion made pre­
parations to £oroe the .'kra in the direction of Popieloeyn ani the
11th division toward 1'aeielatc.
The III army (Comrade Lazarewilon) contained the 5th, 6th,
Sist and 56th Divisions of chasseurs. It was maintaining olose
liason with the left of the XV army. Our reoonnrlrtanoe verified
the presence of the 6th division as early as the 13th of August in
the vioinity of Naaielstc: the fth and 66th Divisions were operat­
ing then in the vicinity of 3erock, the 21st division was preparing
to attack 3adzym!n with the 27th Division*
The XVI army (Comrade Dowoyno-Solohub) with the 27th, and,
17th, 10th and 8th Divisions o£ Gi-ieoeura, in this order, found
 -10­

I t s e l f confronting the 1st Polish Army, loea the 8th Division whlob
was on the front of our 2nd Army,
The Mosyr CJroup (Comrade Ohrepin, the 67th and 68th Chasseur
Divisions and nixed detaohmenta continued aooording to Husaian
aouounts, to advance v/ith one part in the region Zeleohow-Koolc and
with the other one Lubartow.
Further 3outh, on the South .Vest front was the XII Army (Com­
rade <ya8lcanow): tha 26th, 7th, 44th and 24th Chasseur Divisions
and the group of Comrade Qolilcow).
This army on the 13th August by orders Ho. 2716 was given the
mission of attaoIcing Tomaszow-Kawa Runlca, to gain this objeotive
by .iuguat 16, i t was at the same time to exeoute a raid of BOOB
magnitued to siege the passages of the Stn de 3.1 en lav/a a t Radymno*
To this end the Solikow group w*s to be relnforoed by the 26th
Cavalry Brigade, (3|okkirl # the 1st and 7th Cavalry regiments and
the 44th foot Chasseurs Divisions.
The XII army, the 13 August oooupied approximately the front
0palin-3olcal paralleling the Bug, the 24th Chasseur Division oover­
ing the right of the 1st Cavalry Army.
Tbe l e t Cavalry ^.rmy (Comrade Budienny), the 14th, 6th, 4th
and 11th Cavalry Divisions, and an independent Cavalry brigade was
engaged in tie direction of Busk, to their l e f t were the 46th and
47th Chasseur Divisions which were operating toward Brody-Podfcamien
and cooperating in the dirootlon of Zloozow with the Cavalry Army,
their joint mission, to take Ivow.
The XIV Army (Comrade Uolkoozanow; the 60th and 41st ohasseur
 -11­
diviaions engaged the 60th Division at Jeziarna while tbo 41it
division helrt tha 3trypa do Zletnifc on the Dnelster.
Suoh was the sit'\ation on tba northwest front; his armies
were to attack In the following directions.
The IV Army with the III Cavalry Corps directed by Tuohaoz­
ewsici along an axis PszasnysB-itaoiaz raarotod on Plook to QXQZQ
there the bridge and orosa the Vistula, onoe on tbo left banic of
the river it would reoleve later directions depending upon the
situation. The Cavalry Corps was to orcae the Via tula at rtloolawek
and Bobr^vuiki, i t was to raaroh on Pomerania passing around Thorn,
to oeoupy this province and out the railroads 7/arsaw-Dantzig-Odynla
anl Poseu-I'aiitzig-3dynia.
The dlreotion of the limultar.eous offensive of the XV army
passed by Plonak and inolined then toward .'/yszftgrod, where this
unit v/as to orosd ths Vistula to oooperate, it oaoasion presented,
in the taking of the capital, in the rear, with the Illrd and XVIth
Soviet armies, in oase 0/ tte f a l l of the capital it would reoelvo
another mission.
The eventual axis of attaolc of the Illrd *rmy v/as to puss be­
tween Uasielslc and 1'odlin. Ita initial mission consisted of the
talcing of Zegrze and the parulyzlti^MO&lin, to support thus the
operations of the 17f and XVI armies. The Illrd Amy was to Grose
the Vistula at Modlin and talc3 possession of the bridge, if not
suooesful i t was to pass around Modi in to the north to force the
V'dtula at .Vyszogrod Join the XV Army and attaoic flarsaw from the
-.Vest.
 -12­

The deoieion of Tuobaosewsfci to ma Ice his main of fort on his

right involved the dlrooting toward tie oast of the mass of the
XYIth Soviet army on the axle Radaymin-Praga, eo that this aray
would oross the Vistula to the north of Jarsaw, IT the bridge
head offered strong realstanoe.

AUAX.Y3I3 Oi1 TIE HU33IA2I DfSiJ03ITI0U3

The general Russian dispositions thus eohemaUoally outlined

shows that the enemy was completely ignorant of the deoioions from
the 6th to the 9th august of the Polish Commander in ohtif and was
even incapable of understanding them*
Confidenoe in previous suooesses had made the Uolehevio lead­
ers lose a l l oritloal perspective of the situation as a whole*
Just when the faculty of Judgment was so neoessary on the field
of battle*
The Bolshevio armies did not take account of the re groupment
of the Polish divisions effected on their front at the beginning
of *iugustp although their progress had been rendered painful at
many points of advan ?. The Russian leaders were dealing complete­
ly with an abstract enemy and nevor talcing into account at a l l the
eventuality of a deoiaive battle on tfco right bank of the Vistula,
If Tuohaozewsfci had seriously considered our army, if he had
admitted that Marshal Pilsudski would be able t o retake the i n i ­
t i a t i v e and seek a decisive battle on the right bank of the Vis­
tula, he would probable have stopped the forward progress of his
troops the 6th August* He would have established himsel:* along
 -13­
the strategic li>e so important In this case*— Ohoraele-Oatralenku­
ltelkin-3okolov^.3iedlte-Iiukow-^droaev/-Lubar tow-Lublin; utilising
the principal parallel routes to hie axis of advance In the region '
Ualkln-3iedio9*Lulcoii toward the east, be ohould have regrouped hie
forces after the situation had olarifiod and prepared for a well
coordinated effort ugainst /areaw.
On the oontrary, he concentrated the mas* of bis troops on
the -Vest front north of the 3u#; aooor" to th* testimony of the
auasians themselves he left m -.y the XVI army from the i*ug to tne
tfiepra to oover 160 kilometers of .front, imposing on i'i thus a most
difficult ©lesion and unoovering dangerously his left flank, threat­
ened, we knew, by the decisive attack of the Pollgb Commander in
chief.
Eventually, Tuohaozenakl strove to oheok this throat with the
aid of the XIX army and the Cavalry army of 3udlenny, this last
dlreoted on Lublin by orders of the 12 Auguot was marching towards
tbo rear of our manouverlng fordo* <7itb regard to the battle in
the vicinity of Uodlin, ho foresaw it ratfcr than he prepared;
he counted the gain in breaking the north front of General Joseph
Kallor, thanks to the enormous superiority of force aiid materials
at hi3 disposal on Mo extreme right.
Against the left of the main Polish groupment, writes Tuoha­
ozewski, v'9 are putting in line not less than 14 divisions of
Ohasseurs a pied and the III Cavalry Corps* Granted the superior
morale cf our troops, we have a perfect right to count on a victory*
Thus to our IYth, ZVth, and Illrd armies counting 12 divisions
 -14­
o£ infantry and. 2 of oavalry th» Poles oan oppoae only 3 and 1/2
divisions of infantry and several smaller units.
<Ye have than the beat of chances to orup.h the enemy by break­
ing his r.'.ght wing and cutting hia communications. The XVIth army
attaoks the main front of the Polish forces and fixes it during
the development cf the general aotion. Our left wing has not im­
proved with regerd to the redistribution of troops. In front of
the two (2) divisions of the Mozyr group and the 3 divisions of
our Xllth Army operating toward Lublin, the Poles have aooumulated
6 reinforced infantry divisions art have thus assured'themselves
numerioal superiority. Meanwhile if the units of the Oavalry army
have converged on Lublin at the proper timo, this force will seri­
ously threaten the Polish troops (whitou). Not only will the Poles
be unable to debouch from Demblin-Lubliu but they will be oaught
badly plaoed and are oertain to be thrown baok across the Vistula.
In consequence, it is evident that wo oan and ought to take
the offensive to the west of the Vistula and that this offensive
will certainly be oruwned with suooeee if there has been no tnia­
oaloulation in our atr&tagio concentration.
Prom the plans of the enemy consequently the northern front
played the major role in the massing for the battle of the Vistula.
If this point had given away unexpectedly the group of the Oom­
mander in Chief would have >nen in great difficulty in the oourse
of his counter offensive; in fact he wasn't reaching the oertor
of the Bolshevio masses
 CHAPTER V
DISPOSITIONS AND SITUATIONS RESPECTIVELY
OP THE ADVERSARIES AT THE BATTLE OP WiCKA
AT THE TEE OP THE ATTACK PRESCRIBED
POR THE 6TH ARMY

THE ATTACZ OP THE 6TH ARMY IS HASTENED

The 13 August toward noon radio orders, addressed to the
Russian armies fighting in the northern seotor, were intercepted
at V/arsaw. On orders of the command or of the XVI Soviet army, i t
developed that at day break the 14th August t h i s e n t i r e army would
attaok the bridge head at .'/arsaw with a mission of roaohing by the
following day the line Jablonna-Marki-Y7olomin-V/awer-Okuniew-K&roi3ew«
Osieck-Xolbiel.
This news l e f t .Yarsaw thunderstruck. It put an end to a l l
doubt; there no longer existed the fears dictated by anxiety on
the subjeot of the Capital, that i s t o say of a simultaneous and
oonoentrio attaok of tho three 3olshevlo armies, oonverging 6n .7ar­
aaw. ThiB hypothesis presented t o the oomander of the front,
IMNM&U to have more foundation oinoe i t agreed to oortain degree
with estimate of the oommander i n ohief of the 11th August; (ao­
oording to l a t t e r throe armies f the XVIth, I l l r d , and XVth) were
to attaok frontally the bridge head at far a aw1 the only ohange

1. Intelligenoe 3 u l l e t i n 0..H. Q, 10 ^ugust 1920

 -16­
being that now the XVth army must oooperata with tins other *wo on
the north.
According to Oolonol ::agorski 8 "all of tho Illrd and XVI Bol­
shevio armies would attack tho ./arsaw bridge head the 14 August
at day break".

2. Interview recorded by Hughes between- 3eneral Haller in

command of the north frcnt and Colonel Zagorski his ohief of staff,
with General Sifcorski commanding the Vth Army on August 13, 1920.
— General 3ikorski: "I have just returned from e. tour of in­
spection on my front. 7/hat I have seen obliges me to ask that the
attaok ordered for tomorrow morning be postponed until afternoon
of 3 6 .August, I am profoundly surprised at the order baatening
the exeoution of i t to the 14 August* beoause the Vth army i s *&fr
so far from being ready that catastrophe i s certain. May I bring
you-to see things my way?"
-- Oolonel tfagorski: General, I an going to explain the situa­
tion and you will see that tho launohing of this attack at daybreak
io absolutely neoessary. The Illrd and XVIth Bolshevio Armies
or08sod today to the south bank of. th9 Bug, they will attaok t o ­
morrow at day break, the bridge head at Warsaw, engaging two d i ­
visions on each line, furthermore the XVth Army,,the composition
of which is known, has i t s leading elements at Naaiolsk. It will
attaok from north to south, the llarew seotor, Zegrze-Uodlin. Any
delay of tto attaok of the 6th Army, even a hall* day, would have
as a oonsquenoe that the reserve for the Uorth front (10th division)
 -17­
would not be availabe to follow up the r e s u l t s , if such should be
the oa.se, of the attaolc of the Vth army. The sector of Bug~3egrse­
Llodlin is weak and must then be defended offensively. Moreover,
only the offensive of the Vth Army way assist the following .days,
the bridge head front at Jarsaw whioh may have the some fate as so
many of our preoeding defensive fronts, if it is subjected to tho un­
interrupted pounding of massed Bolshevio divisions on the north
flank. I understand perfectly that the offensive of tho Vth army
would carry more weight the 15th .^i-just, but there is not the least
doubt th'it i t would be too l i t e . The ne,n;ligenoe of the garrison
at .7a re aw and the l i t t l e importance acoorded our north flank are
the oause of this situation".
— General Sifcorski: "Colonel, it ia urnieoossiiry to oonvinoe
me of it* Meanwhile i t i s a waste of pap or to .it t-a. v t to change
a situation of war. iSven if I resigned my self to the loss of
the Vth array and dooided to attaok tomorrow, thia attaolc would be
inposaible or ujoomjlishv.ent. The situation of my units is at
prooent as follows: tho 10th 1Hvision io reassomUlln<y at Plonsk.
The group liaranowski is in the vicinity of ivon immobilized, with­
out ammunition, without rolling kitohons, sinoe the oombut trains
are s t i l l at Xegrte* The Siberian brigade is absolutely horo de
oorotrat i t could not even entor the lino at present. The 17th
division on the Dembe-Uodlin front, the 18th Infantry Brigado ia
reassembling v/lth difficulty in *ho vicinity of legrze. Hot to
speak of tho laok of mater1 A e/tru. nUnnrily gravo, but toll mp
with v/hat oo^ild I commence an attaok tomorrow* X am so certain
 -18­
of a repulse that X would absolutely not be able to f u l f i l l this
mission. I am aoquainted with the situation at Jarsaw, but v/araaw
ahould be able to hold out at leant two days. I insist on the
faot that oven by making super human efforts I will just be able
to oomnenoe on the 16th. I must at least move the 10th Brigade and
got the group Barnowski in shape to move itself. I think: that
these explanations will modify your views. As yet X have not men­
tioned the 17 th Brigade whioh X must have for the at took. Knowing
of these conditions in advance, mjt attack would be so weak that
i t would oarry no weight in the balanoe, i t would only be a repe­
tion of our previous unfortunate experiences. That is all*"
-- Colonel Zagoreki: "General, X myself telegraphed yesterday
that the armies should be ready for the morning of 14 August.
Today after noon X had a long conversation about this plan with
Colonel 7/ollkowski. As I had reoieved no objection to either of
the two communications, the Commander of the front has given oper­
ation orders timed for tomorrow. The 1st Army at one o'clock
gave i t s orders in oonaoquonoo, and will not bo able to oanoel them
without inoonvenionoo and confusion* As for your disposition for
the attaok, i t i s unquestionable, even under the most unfavorable
oonditions, nothing but the direotlon of attaok and the s u r p r i s e . . . . "
— General Sikorsfci: "Oolonel, X do not know what tfolikoweki
said but I have d e a r l y indioated to-night that the 16th is the
nearest date a d v i s a b l e . X pray you believe that X am not one
to make things diffioult, but X am not rually able to reoonoilo
mycalf to a plan whioh will ruin the Vth Army and helps no one#
 -19­
The Siberian Brigade whioh should attaok on Naslelak has soaroely
received i t s maonine guns and has not yet had time to distribute
them, i t lacks so many things that at this moment i t is impossible
to enumerate them* The Cavalry Brigade has not yet reoeived its
amunition, i t must be sent for tonight. I make the most instant
and formal demands for delay until the 15th."
-- Colonel Zagorski: " General, I pray you to permit me a mom­
ent . • . General, General Hall or is near the telephone, he con­
siders that it is imperative to attaok during day light tomorrow,
but beoause of tie condition of the material of the Vth army, he
oonsents to grant a delay (taken the day of the 14) that is to say:
the Vth Army di^osed for tho attaok in the several directions,
will orosB the v/kra around noon ready to attaok the afternoon of
the 14th and gain the line Popowo-3wierszoze before dark."
— General Sikorski: "I pray you assure the general that I will
do all that is humanly possible to oomply vdth his desires. I
do not know however whether I will get there at the time sot, if
i t will be able to get the 17th Division to the Narew, for in
the failure of this I have really nothing with whioh to attaok."
— General Ilaller: "Here is General Haller. I am absolutely
sure, general, that not only will you exeoute the entire plan but
also that tomorrow you will report good results attained* I have
just seen General RoBWadowegi; and General <Veygand; we have all
been in aooord on the date on whioh I insist: all depends on sur­
prise * the time factor ia at this moment more decisive than the
force faotor. According to a l l probability, the slowing up of
 -80­

yourraanouverawill lose you your freedom of movement. . Until to­

morrow your foroea have the initiative: they will oooperate with
the other armies in the great oounter-offensive, for which it is
absolutely neoessary that the enemy be already throwr baok from
the VVkra on the Narew. Katurally I wish you to attack1; as soon as
possible. I am oonvinood that- this i s possible i f you mate your
dispositions for the situation before noon tomorrow, because all
the enemy forces are engaged in other direotions. attaok them right
away* At a l l events I must be sure that you cross the l;'.ne v/kra-
Nowe Uiasfe'a not later than neon and preferably sooner.
As for the munitions for Barnowski the most energetio in­
structions have already been given in this regard and in addition
to yours. The 17th Brigade -will detrain, unfortunately,tonight at
Warsaw on aooount of the railway situation, bat in any event it
will be at Modlin tomorrow during the day; I will /nak© every ef­
fort to send them there either by truck or by rail* Moreover your
energetio offensive, general, will free for my use the foroee im­
mobilized in tho Modlin-Zegrze sector and in particular the 10th
Division. This latter i s alerted at Jablonna, i t will be able to
move without delay in any direction neoessary, i t has disposed its
means to that effeot. Naturally a l l depends on your attaok, whioh
will blook any Russian, attaok in the dlrootion Degree-Warsaw and
f i l l oause a withdrawal of part of the foroe attacking rtadayaiin.
Tho sooner you oross the v/kra the sooner the 10th Division will
be able to make its dispositions. If your attaok does not make
itself felt too late the 10th Division may be used in aotion in
the .'far saw bridge head to oounter the powerful enemy attacks possible
on Radeymin. Yesterday I front to see the Siberian Brigade at Ze­
grae, i t s moral is exoellent. The 16th Division on the other hand
i s rested and refitted. I am oonvinoed that they will be able,
unaided, to gain their objeotive. The more you delay the less
o ha roe you will have of suooeeding in your attack, whioh, I repeat
i s a question of opportunity: If you wait, your f oroes will perhaps
be larger but they will strike in the air. In resume', i*' the s i t ­
uation as i t presents itself, Oeneral, I count formally on your
successful offensive*11
— General 3ifeoraki: "General, I present my respects. I under­
stand thoroughly the situation. General, I pray you believe that I
will give my soul to f u l f i l l my mission within the given time, but
l e t us take only one example, not later than 4 o'olook, I oailed
the attention of Colonel H«nsza to his delay in oooupying his new
position, the straggling of his oolumns on the maroh and the aban­
doment of his rear guard at Modi in; he replied to me tnat his bri­
gade is absolutely inoapabte of immediate operations and asked me
not to throw on him the responsibility for them. It is neoessary
then to have one day of delay under penalty of leading my army to
disaster. And what Is your deoision with rogard to the 17th
Division whioh i s in the Modlin-Dembe BOO tor, r:; General? What
is the enemy situation to the west of Oieohanow from your intell­
igence agencies. Om you assure me that the latest communiques
will reaoh me?"
n
, —> General Haller: tfe11,enough, General, but the 17th Division
 -zu

has already reoeived from you notification of my order of relief,

i t s Beotor will be taken over by the I8t Army."
-- (Jenaral 3ikoraki: " I beg your pardon, General, I have been
up at the front a l l day and was in ignorance of this ohange."
— General Haller: IVery well, you see the 17th Division i s
disposed of. I indict then on the execution of this attack with
a l l possible energy, beoause I am almost mathematioally oertain
that the enemy will attaok without doubt at mid-day as te so often
does, perhaps even before mid-day in the directions lfasielek-Dembe
and Pultusk-Zegre. Suoh are my convictions and you must then
understand the capital importance of your actions, to take at
least Hasielatc when the enemy will attaok Eembe-Zegrze us for the
enemy situation to the west, my chief of staff Is going to give
ijo*1! full information immediately! because I must fly. I oount
absolutely on your attuolc tomorrow. Clod keep you. flood 3ye."
»
— General 3ikorski: "General, I ask you to direct the 1st army
to relievo tie 17th division at onoe and to direot i t on I'.odlin.
I have judt found out that this order has not yot boon given, oi thor
by you or by the 1st army4 A telegram with regard to this Ivis Just
t h i s instant reached us from the front. The 17th division is s t i l l
in i t s eeotor."
— Colonel Zagcrski: "Uy respects 3enoral. I will uake an in­
quiry at onoe on the subjeot of the delay of this telegram. As for
tk> enemy situation, his IVth Army is directed on llieaaawa and
vaoolawek. ?or> your 17th Division I will repeat to the 1st Army
orders to relieve i t at once, with regard to the onomy we know
 -as-
s t i l l tliat his 31st Division will attack tomorrow from 3erook on
iSegrjse; I am all the moro persuaded that any delay in the action
of the Vth Army may lead to a diea ter. Personally in my position
as ohlef of Staff of the front I must st te in au emphatic manner
that history will not pardon a delay in the attack of the Vth i*rray
and that you must justify yourself to history•"
— Qener*! Sikorski: "Colonel, l e t me make my psaos with his-
i;ory, you oblige me to respond in another fashion. The order on
Ue front has been given in absolute ignoranoo of our situation,
If we were fighting and conquering paper soldiers I would be ready
to attack at once. But when we must fight with flesh and blood
soldiers, I pray you take into account the state of tte troops,
tiifra and space. I did not* know that the ?ront was not counting
on any resistance from tte fort at Zegrze even Tor a short period*
I will do all that I con; The efforts I demand from the troops
uiy last general order, may oonvinoe you of this. But I pray
you do not throw back on me, in history, the responsibility for
all the "muddling" of all the Polish authorities'.'"
-- Colonel Zagaraki: "Uy General, I will not squander your
time or nine in answering you; your words are inspired by your
indignation toward me for fulfilling the duties oharged to me*
I do not blane any one, meanwhile I must express that v4i ioh I
lee I profoundly. My respects."
-- General Sikorski: "You may oount on me."

Knd of Note

 -24­

by engaging eaoh one two divisions on eaoh line, Besides the XV

army marching on tfasielsk was to attack from north to south the
Nare* .-Bul-Zogrze-Demblin seotor. The oommander of tho front,
under the influence of this Interpretation of intelligence or­
dered tft» hastening of the counter-offensive of the 6th array and
fixed the date as the morning of the 14th August*
The exaot knowlege of the Russian forces attacking from the
oast or northeast directly against the v/arsaw bridge head and
on Zegrze-Demblin, the anxiety of the Command*r of the front at
the announcement of an imminent enemy attack, the recognition
that the badly organist! Warsaw bridge bead oould not withstand the
assault of tla red divisions in spite of a superiority of foroe,
the recalling of my responsibility to history if I hesitated to
advance the attack in oonformity with tls desires of the Oom­
mander of the front--all of this oame over me suddenly.
The offensive of the 6th Army was Justifiable and necessary,
there was no need to demonstrate that, but tho orders for i t was
given in a .aoment of feverish impatience. The conference on this
subject took plwje at 6:OOP.M. 13th August. It v/as at this hour,
only, that tho order of th* Oommander of the front, to tho army,
was given, prescribing the exeoutlon of the oountor offensive.
The launching of the attaok of tho 6th army the 14th August
at day break was therefore impossible, in sp.Ue of the more favor­
able oondition8 of time and space entering into the situation,
riven if the army and division staff worked a l l night, the order
for the attaok would only have reaohed the fighting regiments at
 -25­
dawn of the next day* And these last would have had need of time
to publish their own orders and organize their respective attacks.
Furthermore, the extreme shortage of mater Mil, above a l l cm—
nitions, as I have mentioned oefore^the 13th August so that the
problem oould be settled without a study. iYe had just succeeded
by great energy in arming the Siberian Brigade, .vs for the divi­
sion of Volunteers and the 3arzyoKi group i t was neoessary to bring
in their munitions in a l l haste from Cracow, It was neoessary to
bring up their oombat trains and rolling kitchens to the di/r#r«m
units in order to put them in state for combat.
On these grounds, Colonel Zagorsk! assured us (see note on
conference) again that evening, that the attack of the 6th army,
fixed for the 15th august, oould not be set forward.
Before undertaking a deoisive action, it was neoessary to wait
antll the bulk of tho Vth Army was oonoentrated at liodlin, in order
to have the means with which to attaok. But by the 13th august
the oonoentration of divisions of the Vth army was not oompleted*
The exoesive slowness of the formation of this army prodioed then
negative results. At the time of my oonvorsation "4 th the oomman­
der of the front, several divisions were s t i l l on the maroh to their
assembly areas and after their arrival in these so nee should have
at least 24 hours in whioh to prepare for oombat. The Volunteer
Division, joined to tho group Zar»yoki; found itself in for a tho­
rough period of reorganization and rearmament1.;

l . reorganization ordered at tho same time as that of the

northern oavalry groupment, by written instruotions Ho. 16.220.E0 B.
the 13th August«
 -26­
the 17th Division exhauatud iind abaol Italy incapable of righting
./as slowly gathering itself at Uodlin by reason of tin delay of
the 1st Army to relieve them in the iiembe-Zogrze sector.
*y wariness was then inspired by the realization of my res­
ponsibility nuturully and not by an exoesaive desire for method
and order, elements which otherwise play so great a role in tho
rational preparation for a battle.
The tin* factor, on which the Commander of the front and his
a
ohief of staff justly layed such s t r e s s , had a prepondero£ impor­
tance in a l l operations of war. It was of prims importance for as
in the oat tie of the Vistula in 1920. the inactivity ot the 6th
Army especially would above a l l expose the plan to unavoidable rain
jy reason cf the great superiority of the enemy und his heretofore
Victorious offensive* only a strong attach, 3uduonly Launched,
with surprise .vould uo able to save the situation lcr tj.o *r y on
this front.
Bat on the otl.or i. ind, I ho urmy would certainly be l o s t , i t
would suffer an irredeemable oatit;tro.<ho, -ii i t ./as forooa to oond,
prematurely, under fire i t s units in a veuiionod atil diutrvjunizod
condition—an error against v/hioh general Joygand was ^lurdLiv; with
so ruaoh oner^y~-lf we were not suitably prepared for an offensive,
abovo a l l If ho was not assured by the strength of tho f i r s t phaso,
and the continuity in the following phases, in short if we were
limited to recognizing the theoretical principle of rapidity of
aotlon without oreating conditions for i t s pruotloal application.
The dispersion of effort, the scattering of foroes in our
 -27­

grave situation would be tantamount to their progressive wearing

out, their ruin v/ithout compensation; this was to surrender a l l claims
to the execution of any plan of operation. To oommonco the b-.ittie
without having organized the troops, without ovon assembling them
\/aa absolutely impossible.
On the battle f ifclfl. at I'asielsk and a t I'lons'i was to be played
out the olimax of tie mortal struggle whioh had bean going on since
the f i r s t days of July on the northern front. This contest had
been maintained v/ith great difficulty, without hope, in the atmos­
phere of a losing £ight. The battles were waged by troops, whioh
aftor the exhausting fatigue of a retreat of several hundred kilo­
meters, were to counter attack without delay, without a day of
respite. The counter-offensive of the manouvering group launohed
the 16th of August on the ./ieprz was exoouted under better condi­
tions, by troops relatively fresh and in superior strength, where
the enemy mass .ma immobilised on the northern front. I t would
destroy our l a s t hopes if we were to be thrown v/ithout sufficient
preparation into this supreme endeavor.
Hat irally tl/j vommander of the 7ront did not know in detail
the above situation of the 6th army. He looked en the situation
from the point of view of his command and his responsibility,
whioh very naturally were at divergence with those views of the
Commander of the Army, as witnessed by the conversation above
(referring to note H). The Commander of the front had above a l l
the responsibility far the security of the Capital, whose f a l l he
must avoid at a l l costs. He was particularly uneasy on the act-re
 -28­

of the vigorous* attack of the XVIth 3oviat Array dirooted along tho
j..:ia itedzymin-Prag*, the shortest route whioh led the Bolshevio to
..'arsaw. This route was blooked by the array o£ General Latinik,
really strong; i t was barred by the reinforced bridge head at yfar­
aav/.and under surveillance of the tv/o oomplete divisions, in r e ­
30rye on this front, and s t i l l i t caused general Haller serious
apprehensions. Having a feeling of the weakness on the front of
ills 1st ^rwy, he hurried the attaok of the 6th Army whioh would
aavo ./arsaw indirectly, by diverting the ZVth Soviet Army and draw­
iir; down on them the mass of the Illrd Soviet Army, if i t engaged
itself at this time, and in general, eased the defense of the rest
of the north front. This explains the order of Meneral Hyller to
hasten the entry into action of the Vth Army without waiting for
the completion of i t s preparations.
Our situation moreover was more complicated by information
received the 13th August, seeming to indicate that the enemy was
.bout to over run the Vth Army, i t showed the possibility of an
attaok by the XVth Soviet army and of a part of the Illrd army
toward tte south wast or the west rather than toward the south.
The oalm observed in the entire Modlin-Zegrze sector, the com­
plete absence of 3olshevio patrols on the Bug confirmed the hy­
pothesis, that this front would not bo attacked. This increased
Lho difficulty of the mission of the Vth army and limited our
possibilities of advanoe. In faot the concentration of the Vth
army behind the »7kra thoroughly mislead the enemy, but only from
a strategio point of view, and not a tactical one. In spite of
 -29­
vvhat has been written In regard to this, Tuohaazewakl hover counted
on running afoul of an army capable of attacking him, on the <Ykra
or north of iJodlln, but the e x p o s i t i o n and intentions of his XVth
army and part of his Illrd army automatically paralyzed oui* offen­
sive in th* region.
The flank attack of the Vth army forecast by our Ctlef Df
General Staff transformed Itself thus into a meeting engagement
many times more dangerous ani requiring very oareful preparation.
By reason of these changes and their consequences the deoision
to hasten the counter-attack of the Vth army was very grave,
Vlotory is only possible with the wi?.l to conquer by rapid
and vigorous action. These necessary conditions for :uooess were
oertainly not lacking to us the 13th August. The will to conquer
however is not sufficient to win An the field of buttlet It was
not sufficient during the last Polish-Hussion war; the defeats of
the Polish army bear witness to this during the retreat from the
Divina to the Vistula, in spite of the repeated promises of victory
and the many attempts of counter-offensive8 on a series of inter­
mediate l i n e s .
In conclusion to Bet the attaok of the Vth army for 12 o'olook
noon the 14th August was a deoision entirely foolhardy, the risk
undertaken involved however more than the Vth army, once oommenoed
i t must be oontinued until i t s end was attained even under threat of
disaster.
 -30­
THK ATTACK 01*1)33 703 THIS ilO.KTE 'MOWS

The order of the Commander of the 'front direoting us to take

the offensive was received by the Comander of the Vth army a t 7:00
i3. U. the 13th august. I t s contents were as follows: 1
The IVth enemy army (12th, 10th and 5?rd Divisions and the
3rd Cavalry Corps) i s marching from the v i o i n i t y of Oioohanovv­
Ltla.ra towards the west with the probable intention of o u t t i n g the
r a i l r o a d Tborn-./arsaw or else of forcing a oroesing of the Vistula
a t Plook-7yszogrod and a t too ting our army in r e a r .
The 1CV enemy army (4th, 11th, 16th Divisions along the l i n e
3wierszoze-Nasielsk-llarew, with the 54th Division in reserve around
Hakow) oontinuM.: i t s a t t a c k on .Yarsaw fraa north to south.
The I l l r d enemy Army (6th, 33rd, 56th Divisions plus the 21st
Division in reserve) i s operating on the north bank of the Bug
marching from e a s t to w e s t .
The XVIth enemy Army (27th, 2nd, 17th, 10th, 8th Divisions)
pushes the 27th d i v i s i o n on .'/llioa-Zawady, the 2nd Division on
-tadzymin-Madjan, the 17th Division on Okuniew-Brzeziny, the 10th
Division on Uiohalewsk-Hynioe, the 8th Division in p a r t i c u l a r has
for a mission the forcing of the Vistula around Praga.
Tomorrow oommenoes the b a t t l e which w i l l decide the f a t e Ox
.Poland.
I order:
With the end of circumventing the onemys intentions and defeat­
ing h i s XVth Array, *he Vth Army w i l l a t t a c k , making i t s p r i n c i p a l
effort on ita l e f t , i t will oross the ./kra the 14th August at day­
break, i t s right on itodlin, Blendow*, i'okrzywnioa; Its left on
Gasooin, Stary, Solymi*. It will reach the line i.'okrzy*vnioa-3tany
Solymin; i t will push fovvard strong dntaohmenta in the direction
.laoiaz-GlinnoJeok-Cieohanow; it v/111 dispatch on Plook the f l o t i l l a
.vhioh is at J'odlin at i t s disposal.
Use will bo made of the tanks on flat oars on the railway.
The attaok of the Vth Army will be executed with the utmost
energy and a l l possible speed. It will hurl baok the XVth enemy
army on the Narew and cause the Illrd enemy army i t s e l f to f a l l
baok with the XVth.
There is the deoision.
The offensive must be exeouted with extreme energy with de­
taohments covering the left flank of the Vth Array, thla is a con­
dition indispensable to auooess*
The 10th Division, in reserve for the front, will be at Jab­
lonna at day break prepared to fight; as many motor omnibusseu as
possible will be sent you by the Commander of the front; an officer
will be kept on duty at the telephone port at all times.
The 1st Army will maintain i t s ppsition at a l l costs, without
counting on any reinforoement, and utilizing a l l the a r t e r i a l means
at i t s disposal. In so far as the situation permits, it will make
raids on Wyszkow and on the railway tfarsaw-Bialystofc and on Howo
Minsk, (end of order)
Thir- order for th9 front gives a sufficiently definite idea
ot th« situation and intentions of the enemy: i t was an advance.
 -32­

In tne order of battle for the west Hussian front indioated ,tho
(
54th Division i s assigned wrongly to tte XVth army whilo in'\reality
i t waB part of the IYth army. Likev/ise the 33rd Division was part
of the XVth army and not the I l l r d . 0ut3ide of these errors the
order of battle given is substantially oorreot.
The movement attributed, in the order, to the IVth Army and
to the Illrd Cavalry florps did not correspond to tte actual move­
ment of the Bolshevio Divisions on the extreme right of the Russian
front.. Theae divisions, v/e now know, rnarohod on Plook and the
orossings of the Vistula to the north of Plook.
Moreover the XVth army i s not very aoourutely located, i t was
not aotually, at this time, on the line indicated in the order but
actually on the line 3aofcooin~llowe IliastDo-lIasielsk. The direction
of attack expeotod on this side was no more exact; i t was baaed on
the theory of the offensive of this army from the north on Jarsaw.
Accordingly, the direction of cooperation of the Illrd Army given
in the order, out the axis of operation of the XVth Army a t an
angle of 90°.
The operation orders of the Ccmmander of the front, in th*3
precise, had an historio importance, because they commenced the
battle of Jarsavv, the combats on the -Vkra and tte battle of Hasiolsk
and 'Oieohant;?.
They out lined for the f i r s t tirno the difference which in the
future will separate the operations ox tlu Vth ^rrny from the opera­
tions of the other armies on the north front.
This same day a special o::<?er established the strong points
 •33­

aaat of Itodlin a3 the boundary betvvoon the 1st and Vth Armies,
this freed completely the division on the right of tho Vth Army
(the 17th division) whioh was already falling baok on Modlin.
2
PaiH0IPL£)3 OF THii BSCI3IOH UP THE OOMHAKDEIi
OP THB V'fll AHUY

In this manner, as thrown in r e l i e f by the expose* of events

above, the Vth Army prepared i t s e l f for the oounter-offenaive,
having before i t two d i s t i n c t masses of Russian troops. The f i r s t
was formed by the XVth Army, in rear of the right wing of whioh was
advancing most of the divisions of the I l l r d Army* This groupment
in principle was to take the offensive on the Wkra except that the
d i v i s i o n s of the I l i r a Army must attack Zegrze aud according to
the s i t u a t i o n must bo able also to move .from the northeast on War­
saw. The second enemy masswae oomposed of the IVth Army and Illrd
Cavalry Corps, i t operated in the zone included between the Mlawa­
Cieekanow-Uodlln railway, the Polish German frontier and t.he bend
of the Vistula.
These two masses threatened the Vth Army in a manner e n t i r e l y
d i f f e r e n t , in time as well as in spaoe. The offensive of the XVth
Army whioh w*s able to be supported by the I l l r d was aimed direotly
at the zone of concentration of tte Vth Army and rested i t s l e f t
wing on our base of operations a t Uodlin. If i t suooeeded, i t would
siejEQ the i n i t i a t i v e from us, destroying our o ha noes for a counter
offensive on the Wfcra and threatening Warsaw immediately*
 -34­

The groupment of the IVth Army--The III Cavalry Corps was

suspended like the sword of Damooleg over the Vth Army, threaten­
ing to envelope i t , by attaolclng us quiolcly from tha rear, i t
oould orush the left wing of the north front; but the a e movements
oould not be exeouted Immediately. In faot at least three days
would be necessary to assemble the dispersed units of the IVth
Army and launoh a ooordinated off©naive. Besides, at the moment
of our oountar-offensive, the IVth Army was continuing to displace
to the west, an off center direction, whioh constantly inoreased
the separation, already notioeable, the 13th August, between the
IVth and XVth Soviet armies, the two Bolshevio armies were to
find themselves separated, one on the Wkra and one on the lower
Vistula
Utior these conditions, the Vth Army, placed between the
two enercy groupments, oould move successively from a oentral posi­
tion, on either of them giving battle to aaoh in turn.
In conformity with the decisions already shown and the direc­
tives in effect, we were constrained in the first phases of the
battle to seek victory on the Wkra, hurling back the Bolshevio divi­
sions whioh were approaohing. V/e assigned this mission exclusively
to all the divisions of the Vth Army without exoepting the Krajowatl
groups which operated apart on the left of the army. General
XraJowsKl to f u l f i l l his special mission must engage the divisions
oi the XVth Army which appeared on his front. In this fashion ire
spent the 14th August, in order to assure ourselves of looal sup­
eriority neoeaaary from the p:int of view of material, but above
 -35­
from the point of view of morals.
Immediately after this viotory on the .Vkra we would turn
against the IV Soviet Army.
In the group of Hussion forces on the Wkra it was possible
to distinguish two sub-groupment 8 of foroes with difftrwitt missions.
One directing itself around Uasielsk the other toward S«ohooint
The first was able to be aooomplished by drawing to it the division
of So root and was ver£ strong. It watt this one which was to open
the Bolshevio offensive; i t was therefore the most threatening in
point of view of time. At Naslelsk therefore we would seek the
deoision in the battle on the <Vkra, covering ourselves by the
vigorous aotion of our left wing, organized on the axis Plonsk­
Saohooin-Gieohanow.
This plan corresponded in general with the decisions made the
preceding evening and required then no ohange in the united dis­
position of the Army.
In this disposition (of troops) (Sketch f 3) the necessity
for keeping out the greatest available reserves overruled the
necessity of assuring the maximum foroe in the first blow of the
army.
These reserves were stationed in the vicinity of Modlin since
we con aide red an enemy attaok ooming from Hasielsk to be the most
dangerous; this was likewise a location favorable to our idea of
manouver to the aouth, in case of an attack by the XVth Army on
jt>lonsk, and of the Illrd Army on liasielak-tfyszogrod. Besides
;>lodlin held in oheok the Bolshevio towurd the south as well as an
 UBLB I o . 1

* f f *otiv» ooari>«tt*&tt gun*

» °sT»lry »

6th OhMtfiur D|T. 6,416 677 7,846 141 29

6th " * 5,ftT9 — 6,346 119 80
•1st * " 4,195 WO 6,610 1*2 2/
56th * "8,069 105 4,081 6* 24

*ot«l 16,549 970 28,524 110

Srd 7 o 4,694 59
, 4,651 6,654 61 26
18th " 6«4M 220 7,005 119 40
n 1,950
53rd 40 6
64th " 7*4*
7,4
148/46 * r l p 4 » 1,640 2,(V65
164/66 " 2,465 2,652 56

144
4th Ohstttiur 5,641 860 8,254 111 29
11th * 5,659 200 6,606 127 17
16th N 4,747 6,487 4?
55rd " 5,150 4,426 26

660 66t 128

2«d 4,500 99 52
8th 4,777 6*180 77 26
10th 4,600 6,795 67 29
17th 6,684 406 9,194 148 70
»7th 6,690 866 7,917 266 58

66S 88^87
672
189

57th HY. 5,116

46 5,?64
96
2ft

l,tO4
116
2,404
42
6

6,020
164 7,668
158
27

0*i*r*l 98,826
7,498 116,189
2,675
598

 UBLB BO. *

B#pert of offtotiTOi of « * Tth i n y at ai4-A««ati 19SO.

u&as uuw ror »UOM

00 I,TM 1,041 w — i,uo

D
18vh iftftBtanr iTt«io» 1*6 7,wo t,0M so s9ooo 1a
S1AJOUAV Byigtdt IM 4.TC0 1.6«C 4T ft,860 190

VOUKiitt D i r i i i o a t S16 T,6M 16664 1?2 4,800 «T6

9*sh laftmtry I>lTlfloa 260 1,600 E.000 160 8,400 60

D
lTtti Inf-mtrj lrl8lom 169 6V»S8 £,801 M 8^400 60

VB&&& Oyvwp t s ) 76 £,668 1,067 68 660 044

M0WJI Oyovp 90 8,600 *,000 66 1,160 —

TISIDU Oyoupli) 106 4,646 £,670 96 l,fttO 008

(hroup(»pimzj — — — 100 860

fOfiU, Of fSit TXB 48UX I,t51 U,076 16,C69 ' 696 2*,010 #,68ft

( l ) Ocwploto firom th« 16th i a j u t 19SO,

rgii&jiMitlom «&4 briaslaf w> to

fro* tb» 17lh *tt*03t, 1990*

(4) pM§#4 lo tlM ^th ^ngr tht 16th **gu% 19to.

(ft) 'roa tho 81st *%&*% 1990*

 1UJ« SO. t (OOITIKUD)

*ttik»

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108 —- tO

49 „„, 4

90 M U
80 —« U

4K 91 HI 9(l)
 -36­
attaok toward tto west; i t gave us an opportunity Tor if! an icing
counter attaofc in either oaso.
The Commander of the Vth Army took great care to distribute
his divisions uniformly in the front occupied, an error in which
would have been f a t a l . He strove not to be completely absorbed
in the danger of the over running of his l e f t , v/hioh had already
led him to reinforoe himself in the v i c i n i t y of ^lonsic; he r e ­
served for himself the p o s s i b i l i t y of moving his reserves rapidly
to the threatened region, limiting in this way the risk: taken,
while s t i l l following the exeoution of. hia main idea of manouver.
These taotios were made possible by the Modlin-Oieohanow r a i l ­
road i t s branching lines and rolling 8took: being held available,
but above a l l by the autobusses from ./araaw which the Commander
of the front had placed at the disposal of the »rth Army.
( Table 1 and Table 2 (go in here) Pages 145-146-147)

RESPECTIVE 3ITUATI0H3 0? 0PP0HEHT3 CN THE WXRA

Table 1 gives the effective oombattant strength of the armies

in the ./est Russian front the 1st August x9£0; th?oe effectives bad
not varied much between this date and that of the battle of the
Vistula.

Yl Information obtained from page 485 of the v/orks Joinza z

Blelopoliakami (£»i:urin-L!ielilcow). This aorlc is too optimistic under
the heading "effectives for r it ions." ilever did the Solshevio
divisions on our front a t t a i n a percent i~o of oonij itt ;r.ta J.B high
as ths repeated effectives for r a t i o n s . On the contrary the ji-ooorticn
of combattants and rationed were less satisfactory in the Soviet
than in the Polish Army
 -37­

The part of tba forces which were fotnd in front of tte Vth
Army during the battle of the Vistula numbered in the neighborhood
of 6Q,000 bayonets, 6,67a sabres, 1406 heavy moohine guns and 327
field guns. <7e obtained these figures by computing the total of
the XVIth Army and the Wozyr group and deducting from the IYth
Army the 143rd and 164th Infantry .Brigades remaining at Vilna and
Grodno and taking away from the I l l r d Army the 51st Infantry Divi­
sion which took part in the attaoic on -iadaymin; operating in tte
seotor of the -tVIth Soviet Army against the 1st Polish Aruy.
I t i s very diffloult to furnish, exaotly, the order of battle
of tto Vth Army and the number of i t s bayonets on the same date,
by reason of the constant state of change in the effectives, the
hasty creation of the army and the continued changes in i t s compo­
sition. The graphic order of b a t t l e , drawn up at this time throws
into relief i t s weatoiaas in depots and supply services. The figures
indicated are extracts from documents in the 3ureau of Military
History and the returns made by the different division commanders;
they attrioute to tte Vth army the following forces (see table Z)
The Vth Army in the most c r i t i c a l phase of the battle, numbered
20,250 bayonets (without counting the a r t i l l e r y gunners), 3,826
combattant sabers, 452 heavy machine guns 31 heavy $uns and 103
field pleoa8, 9 armored oars, 46 tanks and £ armored trains.

ATTACZ O&DSR OP THE V AHUY

The Comaaoder of the V Army based on the considerations above

 -38­

and the instructions frcni tho Jommander of tho .'roitt decided to

ooploy his forces in the following manner;1
With a view to oiroumventing the intentions of the enemy and
of defeating his XVth Army, the Vth Army attacks tomorrow, on the
./kra to tho east and north east. Vith a primary objective, of
reaching the line of the Karen and Orzyo Hivers.
IV.—Orders given—The troops of the Vth Army will be in the
following places at 10 o'clock 14th august.
1°. The garrison of the ontreuohed camp: in i t s sector v/ith
a mission of holding at a l l costs the entrenched oarap.
2°. The Idth Infantry Brigade and the Volunteer Division (re­
organized according to the special order) will assemble in the
vicinity ozf dorkov under command of Colonel Luozyiislci commanding
the 9th Division.
3°. The 3iberien Brigade of Colonel Humsza: in tte vicinity
of Zawada on tho dlcra.
4°. The 18th Infantry Division and the Cavalry Brigade ao corcl­
ing to the situation will group themselves at this time infantry,
at l e a s t , in the vioinlty of Saohooin, Cavalry in the vicinity of
Smarzew.
The three groups above have an offensive mission.
5°. In army reserve: the 17th Infantry Bivision with the

1. Operations order 4313/3 of tho Vth army signed General

3ikorski. .
 -39­

exception of a resriwent of infu«itry loft on tho Uarew front and

provisionally undor orders o£ Colonel Ualewioz, oommanding the
fortress of liodlin; the 17th Infantry Brigade and the a r t i l l e r y
of the 9th Divioton will bo en route from .Yarsavr to Uofllin; the
yth Cavalry Brigade en route likewise to Liodlin.
t>°. The group Osikowski: will have the war f l o t i l l a under
ita ordora from 14th August, i t will insure the aeourity of the
aeotor ./yaaogrod to tfloolawek inclusive, devoting ita attention
prii>oipally to the bridges at I'look and .Yloolawefc.
V--Attaok—The army disposed thus will attack on the 14th
Augu3t: (a) The Group Luoaynski will march steadily on Kasielsk
of whioh it. will taice possession at Hour Hz 12. I oount on the
capture of Nasielsk by 12 noon at the l a t e s t . ?urthar mission of
this group to cover i t s e l r strongly to the south and toward Soroot,
tc attaotc with greatest vigor on rultualc and take possession of
thi? important oenter of communications.
(b) The Siberian Brigade will attuok from ^awada on Kowe
hliaatf. and take possession of this placet It will^dirootthon
tho major part of ita forces on Stary-Qolymin and ./ill take posses­
sion of and 08tabliah i t s e l f as soon as possible on the railroud
;. odlin-Mlawa in the vioinity (3asooin-3itlustow9. Hour H = 11. I
Count on tho objeotive indioatod bein^ tuken at 12 o'olook.
further mission: to support tl 4J attnok of Oolonel Luozynaki
from i'rzewodowo on -'ultuek, to take 3tary Oolymin.
(o) The 18th Infontry Division: to defout tho onemy advanc­
ing on .lcnskt to push with itr entire forco on Cieohanow, to take
 -40­

und bold energetically this plaoe, H hour will depend on the lo­
cal situation, i t will bo set as early as possible.
(d) 'Jho Cavalry Division of ifornioki, whloh will unite with
the JJlonsk squadron of the reserve of the 4th Lanoers will oover
v
tho left of General Xrajgakl during the entire aotion, i t will as­
s i t t him during the fight; after the talcing of Oieohanow and the
establishment of liason with th3 Mlawa group in the vioinity of
Ulinnojeok i t will reassemitle to assure the seourity of the rear
of the 18 th Division; i t will oonduot uotive reoonnaisunoo in the
direction of Breaun, 3ierpa und J?look.
fe) The group of Oolorel Uabioht: aotually on the J)ziuldowka,
will attaok at 10 o'olook in the direotion of Mlawa and will make
the greatest effort to take possession of that plaoe.
The attaok: ordered must be driven home with great energy by
maintaining the cohesion of the troops. The troops will bo formed
in order on the line Oieohanow-Hasielsk and must be prepared to
continue the offensive. During this talcing of stations, i t will
be neoessary for the Luoaynaki group to protect itself on the
line Poniaty -Yielfcle (on the Hasielaic-Palfcusk road) and 2abosyn
to tho southeast of Nasielsk. In oase of need, i t oun oount on
strong cooperation from i.Iodlin en the roar of any enemy whloh might
uttuok them from the slopes ot Serockc-Dembe* Uy intention is to
•t first
louvo tho Oiec hanow front iminobiloAund to puah the following day
to the lino Sttvry ^olymin-Pultuslc-Bledowo. All units will sieze
ovory occasion to strike the enomy in rear and to doi'c :>i his troops*
un tho rosulta of the offoneivo of tae V Army rests the fate of
 -41­
the war, no one will hesitate to make the greatest aaorificas to
assure our oomplete suooess.
VI--Liasona--I i n s i s t again on the necessity for maintaining
the olosest liaaon with the Army and with neighboring units. Re­
ports will be sent in from the beginning of the aotion and at least
at 18 hours, 16 hours and 20 hours, a l l exceptional happenings ..ill
be the aubjeot of spaoial report. The Commandor of the 18th
Division will organize a t I'lonsk a oonter of information Tor the
18th Division and the Cavalry Division. The information center
for the army will be at the crossing of the roads .iakroozyin-Plonsfc
arid llasielslc-Jorny.
In the disposition for the jump off indicated for the Vth
Away, we see in tha cantor tho ;;roup Luoaynski (18th Infantry Bri­
gade and the Volunteer Jivision) and the Siberian Brigade; on the
left wing of tte army; the group Xrajowskl (18 Infantry Division
and ie £th Cavalry Brigade. These two groups the same as the
Jiberian Brigade had an offensive mission.
On the right wing of tho army the sootor Modlin and Bug.
,/araaw must remain in the defensive, i t v/ould loavo, moreover,
only a single infantry battalion the day after tomorrow on the Bug.
In Army roservo the 17th Division and the 17th Infantry Brigade
at i.todlin, tho 4th Infantry Kegiment of Pomerania and a battalion
of Marina fusiliers near Gorny; the 9th Cavalry Brigado on route
to i.iodlit..
.ill of • 330 troops were grouped within a radius of 46 kilo­
moters.
 -42­
The order of the Vth Army dirootod the d i v i s i o n toward the
north and not toward the east by reason of the expectation of the
attack of the XVth Soviet nnny on Plonsk and of the Illrd Army on
Nasielsk, by reason also of tbo strong enemy group whioh threaten­
ed our left flank in the vicinity of Cieohanow.
To offset this threat and to oheok the danger of an enemy
advanoe from Raoiaz on the rear of the Vth Army, the Krajowski
group was directed on Cieohanow, this might seem to be an exoessive
dispersion of troops• In reality i t was noooaaary that the 18th
Division attaok in this off oenter direotion. This was of prime
importanoe; i t showed i t s e l f efflotMOUtand in short fort mate with
regard to the results attained.
We foresaw decisive oombat in the vicinity of Waslelakj that
is why the Kr»Jow8ici group by i t s independent and very delicate
operation covered the threatened flank, and cooperated with i t in
seeking a victory at Hasiolsk. This group operating exoentrioally
must gain distance; attacking in a fashion to threaten the rear
of the IV Soviet Army i t would demoralize the enemy and deoieve
him as to our weakness on this flankt
Besides i t i s around Cieohanow from our previous estimutos t
that the entire front of the V army must wheel. In faot artor having
bouten the enemy on tbo tfkra and taken Gioohanow we had the inten­
tion of clearing out the entire terrain between tho Wkra and the
Narew, then operating by a wheeling movemont by the riftht, around
Oioohanow and confronting the Russian groupment whioh was muroh­
ing on the Lowor Vistula. In oonso^uonoe, the f i r s t lino to be
reached by tho Vth Army was the Gioohuuow-HasielBk railway, the
 -43­
noxt was Cieohanow-Pultusk.
In our plan of battle on the «Vkra we should have been able
to take into consideration more, our oounter offensive from tfiepri,
whioh oould in two days bring theraanouveringmass of the Commander
in Chief on the rear of the Russian troops attacking Warsaw and
the rear of the Vth Army. This oaloulation would have been oorreot
under normal circumstances, but i t was not so under those (oiroum­
stanoes) whioh the Vth Army entered the battle. The attaok of
the Commander in Chief freed immediately our 1st Army. In faot
the distances were short enough on this side so that the attack:
of the manouvering group on the XVI Soviet Army had immediate re­
percussions in the theater of operations of the l i t Army,
This was absolutely the contrary as far as the Vth Army was
oonoerned, whose seotor was too remote from the base of departure
of the manouvering group, for the attack of the latter to nuke i t ­
self felt ^uiokly on the rear of the XVth and Illrd Soviet Armies.
In examining these diffioult eventualities i t is advisable
for us to plaoe ourselves in the spirit of the times in order for
us to form a true estimate of the situation* Thus we will ascer­
tain how many of the elements of the Polish counter attuotc were
yet uncertain the 13 August, with what general impatlenoo waa
awaited the first successes of the battle of <areaw, which would
favor the reestablishment of morale, neoessary with the great muss
of soldiery.
In oonseiuonoe, the operations undertaken by the Vth Amy
the 14th August had all the morale and strategic ohuaoteristios
 -44­
of a separata independent a c t i o n .

MORALE JPR3PARATI0N FOR 'IHB BAlTTLB 0? THE WKRA

An eloquent testimonial of the s t a t e of a f f a i r s i s furnished

by the preliminary orders of the Commander of the Vth Army; dated
t h i s day, they c o n s t a n t l y appealed t o morale f a o t o r s . Likewise
i n the general order of the 14th August, the o f f i c e r s were sternly
oautloned not to delude themaelvas on tho one my s i t u a t i o n or to
infer from i t causes for r e t r e a t ; i t was formally forbidden to a l l
Commanders to f a l l baolc without express orders)
I am not aooustomed to suoh p r a o t i o e s , s t a t e s t h i s orderl and
w i l l not t o l e r a t e them in my urmy.
Military duty i s in war a ruthless n e c e s s i t y whioh presents a
dilemma: exeoute s t r i o t l y the orders received or die on the f i e l d
of b u t t l e .
Determine to hold under o f f i c e r s to their duty, I w i l l oourt­
rnartial any o f f i c e r who in an hour as serious a s t h i s , shows any
failure in his duty.
On the actual positions, a l l units must hold t i l l the l a s t
man, oven to the point of being surrounded ut least until ordered
to the contrary.
The evacuation of u position w i l l be the cause for legal
investigation aguinst the oommandor responsible Tor i t s do Tense...

1. 3.900iul order to orfloox* Vth Army 14 August 1930 eignod

}onerul 3 i k i
 -45­
I will have shot any soldiers who abandon their positions
in the face of tte enemy. To a greuter degree I will render l i ­
able to the same punishment officers responsible for the conduct
of their troops*
In the beotor of the Vth Army rests the fate of Warsaw and.
the destiny of a l l Poland. I will not allow the oarelessnese or
the insanity of oertain offioar3 to endanger the Patherlaud. I
will break the bad officers. I will remain to the good cnes that
whioh I have always been, and I will win.
I demand then that a l l officers of the Vth Army cooperate
sincerely with my plans, that they grant no their entiro con­
fidence as they have mine, that they exert their entire energy
in our oomtnon tuslc. All offioers under my orders, if they perform
their whole duty, may be oertain that I will uphold thorn with a l l
my power and defend them if need be without reserve.
As the comparison of the opposing for008 has shov/n, the Vth
•ltU'tlOB
.*riny kid to do with a very superior enemy, fht, stasis was so muoh
the more grave by reason of the fact that half or the troops of tlw
V Army were improvised units or Volunteers, indifferently equipped
and feeling the effoots of their too recent creation.
Besides the Vth Army, born in the lust few days, had not yet
any traditions of .mr, they did iwt have t . a t 0 oho si on, iuvisable
uat unshakable, of the reciprocal confidence .vhioh must unite of­
fiooru and mon, in ordor to win. In the course of my inspections,
louviug out feats 0:! oxoe^Monal heroism, I found units resembling
H ho I'd subjoot to panic, rather thai troops disciplined and
for combat*
 -46­
In this m a l ^ u s t e d human throng, I t v/aa necessary to awaken
the w i l l to d i e , the oure, to oroate in them the doaire to s t r i v o
and win. deforo entering upon the supreme b a t t l e , it v/aa necessary
to i n s t i l l in the s o l d i e r s the c e r t a i n t y and confidence of v i c t o r y ,
i n s p i t e of the numerioal s u p e r i o r i t y of the enemy. I aroused t h i s
f a i t h by publishing the 14th of August the folloain^ proclamation:

OiiDKtt
3 OLD IE.131
Today sees the beginning of the counter-offensive which the
-olish Army and the e n t i r e nation Luc looked forward to so long.
To the 7th .»rmy iius l'allen the auolinra mission of making the
f i r s t attack and of bringing about the duoision of ti.o ^ o l i s h ­
..ussian .far.
3oldiers In hurling yourselves t o the assault under a deluge
of machine gun f i r e , remember that you fight not only for in/.iortal
;lory but for the l i b e r t y and existence of our Country.
At the point of your bayonets you carry to day, the future
of Poland.
All the nation is with you heart and s p i r i t . All Poland hopes
and b e l i e v e s . On to b a t t l e which commences, without mercy and you
w i l l need no other ro.vavd.
Victory and triumifc-h to the a m lea oi' the i'olioh ttopublio.
Tenacity and s t r e n g t h !
The i l l u s o r y power of the Jolshovio will ^rlvo away undor your
ahouk. -Uth the sword, wo will r e s t o r e the old f r o n t i o r s of Joland.
Forward! 3oldlerel ForwardJ
 -47­
Looic death in the faoe, what i s death, i t is glory, i t is
viotory, i t is our lUture.
forward, until the enemy is destroyed I
Long live Jolandl
Sikoraki
 CHAPTiSS VI

OSTiilJSIVi) Oi' xnlfci YTH AHllY

C0UBAT3 0? TH3 I3T AKL1Y AT

OP TH3 BAT'fldSS OF TKiS V

.

In d i r e c t i n g the lira jo* 8k:i group to the v i o i n l t y of Saohooin,

the 13th August we took into aooount the d i f f i c u l t i e s of hie mis­
sion. Thrown f u l l center on the assembly of enemy forces i t was
going to s t i r up a l i v e l y r e a c t i o n . Meanwhile the nativ e of tho
Russian reaotion in t h i s s e c t o r could hardly bo determined in ad­
vanoo, because the enemy had i n t h i s d i r e o t i o n , very varied pos­
s i b i l i t i e a of tnanouver. That i s why the mission of the ilrajowski
group could only be a general one, i t depended in prinoiple on the
u t i l i s a t i o n of the gap in t h e enemy d i s p o s i t i o n s , observed in the
neighborhood of Cieohanow. Jeneral Krajov/sSci should oporate
vigorously following tte p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the s i t u a t i o n whioh wero
inodssantly ohanging; he would a i d us thus, in the 1st phase of
tho b a t t l e on the .'tcra, to have s u p e r i o r i t y at Kaaielgk and to
propure to envelop the Russian group operating then on tho Lower
Vistula.
w
. mission as hard as this one demandod great r e s o l u t i o n ,
i n i t i a t i v e and energy on the p a r t of the general oor.ununding our
 -49­
left wins. In givins him as an objective, Ciechano.7, insisting
on this direction of manouver after.vards, I had not only a taot­
ioal end in view, I obeyed also morale dictates.•
Jeneral Krajowski discovared the 13th August, an unusual
movement of Huaslun troops on the lino Jieohanow-^aoiaz. After
having repulsed, during the ni^ht, lied units vvhioh crossed the
./kra at 31ep*v»ony, he threw out, a t day break: 14 ^Agust five (6)
oattalions, four0 (4) batteries and the Cavalry brigade in the
direotion of 3obszowo-3arbie//o, subsequently L'ystkowo-nze.vin (Skotoh
llo. 4). He reaohed these l o c a l i t i e s , the same day abound noon,
after some light encounters with the enemy. The movement of the
loth Division menaoed the left flank of tie IV Army and the III
Cavalry oorps of the 3oviot .kXtny, which was operating then in the
vicinity sierpa, Biezun, Jlinnojeok, with the exception of the
12th Foot Chasseur Division covering the IV Army to the north, It
was not surprising then that th) enemy countered this diversion by
an energetic) counter-attack on the left of the Krajowski group rest­
ing on the ./(era. These engagements were talcing plaoe in consequence
the 14th august in the vioinity of Saohooin-Jonieo did not give
the enemy any positive local suooess* They, however, foroed General
;:rajo.V8tci to abandon his f i r s t direction of attack and to face about
to attack the ri^ht of the XVth 3oviet Army*
On the remainder of the front of the Vth .*rmy the .Russians
took tl£ orfonaive on tio morning of the same day, they endeavored
to cross the Jkra around 31edowo-3orkowo but without success. Thoy
uttuoked Modi in from the north am guinod possession oi the t.vo
 -60­
interior forta of Uiekoszyn and Torun which we h-id ID Id l i x h t l y .
This oauaed u moment ojf disorder at llodlin, v/hich Colonel L'alev/ioz
quieted quickly, ;*ut the 3olshevio attack on this side was not
continued with vigor, we regarded the f a l l of tte so tv/o forts us
of secondary importance and we engaged there not a s i m l e reinforc­
ing battalion.
Ii| the immediate neighborhood of the 7th .^nny, the 7th Reserve
Jrigade, of Jolonel Ualaohowski. ropulaad the 3clshevio attacks
to the north of Zegrze.

?ALL OP :UiXlYLf.IH All) TH^ ?I1HT TO THii 30UTH

It was not the same on the Sast front of our 1st army where
things turned out unhappily as predicted by General Haller and his
Chief of 3taff Colonel Zagorski.
In this aeotor the 21st and 27th 3oviot Divisions attacked
.iadzymin at duy break, located in the marshy Valley of the Hzondaa.
The 3ol8hevio8 hurled themselves hero against our 46th Infantry
.:o,^iment, disposed in line Bleeping them by f i r e , according to the
Russian expression, took possession of Vco Viliu.?e and pushed their
uuvanoe guards to the line 3orki-^lnk3aitdDow-Helenoir. Cur 11th
division was .veakenod by a l l the recent changes of personnol; ooat­
cered on a line of almost 25 kilometers, i t did not have uny unit
so plaoed as to be able to oountor-attack. .ilso tic enemy with
ids oulk in tho fight to the -.vest of .tadzymin ourrioj tho second
l a s t line or defenses of the ./araaw bridge head, the lino rvhlah
 -51­
used the sand dunes extending from Kieporety to Membertew, bounded
on the east by marshes.
To retake these lost positions we ware obliged to engage the
19th Infantry Division which was in reserve for the front at ilarki.
This unit was thrown in to the counter-attucjk fron tally and re toot
.^aCaymin, the same day around noon; but i t could only hold i t s
position a few hours against the 27th Soviet division which retook
the Village obliging then (the 19th Div.) to withdraw. General
Kuller had to direct the 10th Infantry Division on .~lad*ytnin, his
l a s t reserve; but i t was not in shape to interveMo quickly enough.
The 14th August we a l l rernainod under the very painful impres­
sion of a Russian Viotory in this sector.
rladzymin is 23 fcilonotero from I'arsuw. I t s l o s s , happening
unexpectedly in spite Oi* our superiority of offectivos and means
in tho lUrsaw thaater of operations, caused in the capital a very
real anxiety; i t disturbed tte Jomrui»nder in Jhief. It monopolized
tha attention of the Joumandor of the .'ront and absorbod his reserves)
.vhioh rendered our situation oxtrenely sjrave, if the enemy renewed
his ^ttuolcs in tha direction of i'ra^a. To free <uroa.7, thus nonuced,
car Jotnmander counted on tho oointor attack of the 10th jivision,
x'uan on the co inter offen3ive of the Vth .kray hastened and under-
ti::on the 14th of august around noon, at the insistence of tho
:. rth front,, we see i t no* j u s t i f i e d .
It almost tarned out that the diffioitlties o;' the Jront tsM
}«j.st(«n»#qually UB ooanter-offers ivo or^unisofi on A .ie.:rs, In
i t was demanded th-.t liar shall -llaudaki fix the date of i t s
• off tho 16 .t-a^ust, this would have htid aori. ous co."i3e•uienaos
 -52­
by reason of the s t a t e of unpreparedness of the nanouverin^ group.
The Commander in Chief however kept to the date of 16 August as had
been previously s e t .
•it the center of the Polish front on the contrary the 3rd
division of Legions defetted tlie 7 th 3ovlet Division 14th .-tug us t
at .Lrubieszow; i t foroed the s ^ i i t of the 12th .-ted .tuny to with­
draw and gained the time and space necessary for i t s attack in a
northern direction. The same day our south front had to withdraw
on Lvrow under pressuro from 3udienny Cavalry Army*

DBS^iUTS ?IOHT3 FOH CONTROL 0? TH3 ./iLU

The precipitation with whioh the Vth army hftd b9en engaged
h*d already made f e l t i t s bad e f f e c t s , above a l l at the center of
Via army. In fact the organization of the center of the army, where
the Luozynsfci group and the 3iberian 3rigade were to cooperate,
httd not beon able to aohieve any delay. Our lack of material p.b­
aolutely forbade us to give this group the naoessary means to oon­
ujct these operations; the reorganization of the Volunteer Division
:.ud not been able to be achieve-*, in so short a timo. This Division
hid been formed by the union of the Volunteer group of iar^nowskl
und .:oo( two distinct groups whose ooheaion was diminished by their
oombiit 108808 in their l a s t f i g h t s . To matce a division roudy for
,:o:.:oat, i t would have been neoessary to reinforoe i t , v/hKh was
i. possible in 24 hours, in spite of feverish a c t i v i t y .
The attack of the 18th Infantry 3ri:^ude, whioh had beon
 -63­
substituted for tho Luozynski group suffered equally a certain de­
lay.
Accordingly there remaind a t the center of the army only Colonel
.luinsza with his 3iberian irigude.Without awaiting tho arrival of
the 10th Infantry 3rigade Colonel Humsza oommenood hia attack at
the prescribed ti;'.e; he direoted one Siberian Itegiinant from 3awady
on Nowe-LIiastoo and the other from 3orkowa on llasielsk, The exoess
confidence which .vaa indioated by this separation of columns, and
the delay of the unita v/hioli were to cooperate with the Siberian
3rigade wus regrettable. The results were only v/hat v/ere to be
expeoted. The Russians replied by a vigorous counter-attack which
tie Siberian 3rigade succeeded at firat in beating off victoriously.
His 1st Regiment beat off the Russian units which attacked the bridge
head at Borkov.., while the ^nd Regiment even crossed tho <7rka at
I'.awady.
3ut at 6:00 P.hi tho entire 11th 3oviet Division attaoked
concentrically the position of thy 1st Itegircent, pushed to the
right bftnk; of the ./kra. This regiment underwent heavy losses,
a'oovo sl\ in officers and non commissioned officers; i t was not
able to continue the unequal struggle and evacuated the bridge
head that afternoon. Its withdrawal ffeod 3or'<cowo to tho i l t h
Soviet Division who took, besides, a battery and u number of
prisoners. 2awady f e l l in i t s t irn. The Siberian brigade one
of i t s regiments beaten and the other greatly weakened had to r e ­
t i r e to v/rony-Jo3efowo.
 -54­
Thi.8 roeulted in a very grave situation for the left wing
group, while at tha cantor of the army tho -Sussi un troora crossed
the .lk.ro. on a .vide front.
On our left wing, general Krajowaki moved at daybreak tho
14th August against the flank of the Russian column marching on
j^look; but ha had l i t t l e information of the 8 it nut ion of hia op­
ponent, ills offensive movement on -tooiass vori^bd for us that we
had l i t t l e to fear on this s i d e , uecause the IV 3oviet Army was
continuing to push on euergotioslly to tho west aril to oover them­
selves toward i'lonak with woak units only#
The gap which inoonaGquenoe of this movement oponod bet.voen
tlB IV and XV 3oviet armies offered us a favorable opportunity,
provided v/o oou^d take advantage of i t . There v/as in reality no
liusion bet.veen tho Interior v/in^a of the two armiec v/hioh v/ere
opposing us , a o that the r i g h t v/ing of tho IVth ^r^iy v/us in tho
air. The Commander of this .ii*my reacted against tho uovG'nont of
our Id ft which t hr etiterjd him as well as his neighbor to the v/ost;
.vith his 4th t>nd 16th Divisions i n the l e t line and tho 33rd Div­
ision in reserve lie moved to meat the attaok of fraotions of oner
18th Infantry Division urxl our Oth Cavalry Brigade v/hioh found thom­
selvea around 3aohooin and in the .'/fcra. It turnod out then by chance
to benefit the froedom of manouver |th»tt the gap in tho Jjolshevio
front gave to the offensive group of our 18th Division corning from
Hzewin.
General Krajowski escaped from this situation; he directed
the 8-:h Cavalry Brigade on Slinnojeck to cover him against the IV
 -55­
the Soviet Army; v/ith two infuntry regimont3 supported by his di­
visional a r t i l l e r y ho nurohod on the 14 ^ugust in tla oarly aftor­
noon on Saohooin and J.Ilook to attack the ri.^ht of tho IVth *irriy.
ground oaohooin he oame aorosa numerous groups of the 4th and 16th
ioviet Divisions and surprised them at tho moment when they v/ere
preparing to take the offensive against i'lonsk. At 1.11 oo5c on the
contrary ha fell into tho gap.
Hard fighting took place in consequence in the vicinity of
Jachooin; they impeded the enemy's freedom of manouver so dangerous
for ua on this Bide. They permitted is to occupy this town ofter
several hours of fighting; the 145th Infantry .teginiont took i t v/ith
the bayonet toward the end of the day, i t captured hero muoh material
and many prisoners.
The import of t h i s success of ouv l e f t wag lessened by the
oheok suffered tho same day by the Siberian 3rigade. In fact the
Jolshovic units, v/hioh had crossed the Vkra u.t 3awajty on the heels
of the 2nd 3iberian Hegiment, faced north, t'ttaoked the right of our
18th Division and tried to reach i t s rear. This attack gavo b i r t h
to engagements where we had variable luok, in spite of tho remark­
able steadiness of the 144th Infantry itegiment, flank guard for
the rip-ht of our Division. The cVove diversion of the Russians
hindered the movements of the left wing of our army; i t almost
caused" the separation of our front into two IUIIVOB, v/hioh would
have ruinod a l l of our plans and led perhaps to the dostrnotion
of the army in d e t a i l .

KB./ PALL OJ

The situation was rendered s t i l l moro tinoortain by the grave

 -56­
news of the 2nd f a l l of :*adzymin: the 19th Division seemed to
have beon destroyed there and the 10th Division which v/as covering
our right and rear at Jablonna had beon sent to itodzymin. The
Bolshevio patrols had after t i e 2nd fall of ^adzymin reaohod the
line .Valomin-lzabolin-llieporety; the unfounded rumor sproudors,
always active in suoh circumstances, had them already at the base
of the fort8 at Howy Dwor and in the s t r e e t s of Pragu.
The advance of the Bolshevio patrols on Prog a mude us fear
being out off from Jarsaw. It was necessary hen above a l l to
clear up the situation on our right, A strongoffioers reooaaailanoe
patrol, sent out at night to Benjaminow verified that t h i s fort was
held by Colonel Lukowski commanding the 48th infantry I?egii:.ent;
i t established the fact that Nieporety v/u8 held by the Bolshevic
in unknown strength. In consequence, i t was necessary for us to
drive in further to reestablish a solid front then retake the
offensive.

1112)3013 r/ii BATILU Oil 'iHi: .7KIU

At f i r s t Colonel Luczynaki reooived an order to operate with

greatest energy, in spite of the exhaustion of the 18th Infantry
Brigade and without regard to the losses that this mission would
cause him.
Thia Brigade, reassembled near the fort of 31edowo must attaok
from the south against the left flai k of the 11th Soviet division
which held Borkowo, to immobilize them here and to prevent the
enlargement of the breaoh in our front on the /kra.
 -57­
The 10th Brigade put in motior that aftornoon, oould not
completely jfiilfill t h i s mlaaion beoauae it oould i.ot roach Jortowo
and Vron. However i t Jorosd tho enemy to doploy purt of hia i'orooa
facing south vviiioh took: from Via: temporarily hiu l i b e r t y of ciovo­
nont so threatening to us i't t h i s tiino and plaoe.
,le u t i l i z e d t h i s break to organize a v/oll coordinated operation,
order was reestablished in rear of the Siberian 3rl/5»de. Jy aovoro
mea&ures I out an end to the confusion whiuh had aiozod tho ror.r
oi' the atay. I went t h i s same ni&ht to )orne ./rony, in order to
get under v/ay the action of the Volunteer Livision vvhioh must
jump off from /rony the next day. This i^iviaion h a s t i l y reorganised
and rearmed was thrown into the positions -vhioh had boon evaouated
by th3 Siberian iiri^ude. Hov/ovor in spito of it.) forood niaroh,
in apite of the t i r e l e s s energy of i t s offioora, thoy did not arrive
in the v i c i n i t y of /rony-Joaefowo boforo 10:00 i'.l!.. Vhore p r o f i t ­
ing by darkness i t immediately roliovod tho units of t\a 3iberian
jri^ado v/hioh had been driven baot: to thut plaoo; i t tool: ooauoasion
of the liei^hta to the e a s t of t h i s l o c a l i t y . Tho 9th division oo­
ooeruted with the Voluntoer .Uivieion fW«tha uouth on 3or»c«.vo; i t
had been reconstituted by union oi" the 10th Infantry >ri^ado .vith
tljQ 17th ivhioh was then in army roaorve.
In t h i s nwnouver, althovujh during tho ni^h t many onomy attacks
v/ere beaten off by the 14 4th Infunvry .<eglraent, flanl: .^tiuro of the
l b t h Division, I .vas ablo to -jot undor .vay tUa oountor-offonalvo
on the axis Jorkowo-Tasielalc prooeeilin.f from tho .vost ind the a o i t h
weat. In t h i s operation, tho iiborian iiri^ado oi>oratin? to the
 -60­
of .Suwudy v/ue covering tha l e f t of tho ' J I u n t o o r Division md
lujlined uftoraarda on I.'o.vo liiusio to holp out ti.o Intorior ./inj of

In tho oourso 0/ ti.o ni^ht, I obuorvod tho ooiifuulor. of oor­

ii of ay u n i t s , tho dlaoouru^omont of tho o f f i o a r j , tho luolc of
confidence in viotory among moat tho hi arbor ^ruloa. .he30 luat
;or^ au^ioatin,^ to rny ohiof of s t a f f tliO iwnadiute .iaeponaion of
tho joL.atar-o:fonaivo ,oppurer.tly iiseload, und I'i i l l evonto too
j o a t l y , \n<\ tho continaution Oi tho re t r o u t . In oonaaqiwuoo, X
i jaaad tit u o ' o l o a t a tolophoAio ordor in ;;i.ljh I apooulod to tlusir
J O t t o r nuturos. I invited my aubordin.itoa to f u l f i l l thoir mia­
jiona v/ithotit ovmlon, aid to rooomonoo tho uttaois it d'iybrouk
ti.o 16 .iUjjaa1..
Vhu fifjht on tho 14 .uij.'at ;ad tho olvauutor of a mooting on­
• . ^:.-iont, bloody jut indool«lvo, Tor the r-ua tory oJ tho . t r u . Tho
nilta of our V .»r:.v vhloh took >>t*rt In i t horo To i;;'»vt a^uiriat tho
J:.ti.ro I.'ih .veu . . r . ' j , v/lth tho oxoeijtion of the 3.->rd d i v i s i o n ,
. ovoci t h . t trf«BlBfftc.vtird t J^J r i ^ h t of thla unny, and a^iitiBt t.vo
ivialona of tho I l l r d ..n^y on^u^od in tho v i o i n i t y of liusielak .
..o»-<»ovar Jonarsil .Irujo.vakl in turohin^ on .uov/in cvno into o o l l i ­
;ion kVith U.e a a o i r i t y d«tajLTionta of tio 10th -tod Infantry Division
%o ti.o IVth i o v l e t ainy. vhls l a t t e r on tin 14 .kUfljuet
the v i o i n i t y of J l o r p t I Hi Javalry -lor^a), .vaoiu?., iUozwn
»a»d l.l)th Jiuiaaovir ^iviaions) . i'ln 54th division ftolii.^ oeyon*
arrived ut )linnojoa!;. VUo 12th Iiiviaion oxtondin^;
tuo }<j»rriun f r o n t i a r defoatod tho uixod oovorinr dotuoh ont ii

l.I'«taohir.ont of Jolonol ^aruioht, ." aquadrona o;' tlu) 3rd ron;l­

of / n n U i r -?iurda, >x ^litoon of hovio, 8 rnuohino runs und 1
 -5U­
ana oooupiod I;zi#ldov/o, threatening iomeruniu, dirootly,
i'ho b a t t l e on the /era ended indeoiaively this day, but i t
hid cleared u:i tho enemy s i t u a t i o n ; i t hud ohooiced the offensive
movement of tl» XV ,»rmy and p a r t i a l l y that of the I l l r d 3oviet

TiiB OHOU.-' Oil i'lili LO.ilA VISTULA

On the 14th .tu^ust the Chief of the -Jenoral 3taff attached

to the North front the Osikowski group which oovered the lower
Vistula. This ^roup was then put directly under my command. This
attachment ^uve me the means of oovoi in,? im rear of the Vth -a.rr;iy^,
This .;roup, called the lower Vistultr, ^roup, f u l f i l l e d i t s cover in?
mission, sproud on an immense x'ront from ./yszo^rod to .floolawek
inclusive, i t l o s t a i l value when called upon to make any movement,
oeotiuso it v/aa formed of un anomolous collection of units luclclng
instraotion.
In this sector o£ tlio Vth .vrmy tho Oavalry x'oroes ..'ere roor­

; ;anized". Tho Oth and 9th Javalry .'ri.r.uloa ( t h i s l a t t e r v/as sent

to i'lonsic) reunited -mder Jomm:ind of Colonel Dre^er formed a now
Ouvalry Jjlviaion. janeral Ilai'nicki was put in ooirunand of a division
in tho formation of the Osikowslci group (211th, 212th and 214th
lanoers, the 9th and 11th -ieginents of frontier guards). These

1. Orders To. 3(J20/3 and 39:VJ/3, 14th .nigust l'J20 of the llorth
front, Binned )eneral J . Hallor.
a. Order8 Ko. 3U26/3 of the 14 august, i.'orth front, signed
Jeneral Joseph Hallor.
 -60­
large u n i t s ./ere organised ua of 17th ..u;u8t. Vho new .lurnioi:i
Division pliiyo'.! no >urt, jooause I t 3 or^uiiiziition did not
i t any p a r t i c u l a r vxluo, aa i s true of a l l hasty oavairy
improvisations in v/ur.
(Skotoh Ho. 4 hare)
 CHAPTER VII

o:1 TILS .<;:;u, VICTORY OP «A3iELyt AND

BEGINNING OP THE C0UNTER-0i!'PEli3IVE OP

TUB INITIATIVE OP THE 2NEJ,£Y iiODIi'ISS THE PLAH

OPERATIONS OH THE .VOA

At daybreak the 15 august, the Russian troops-oame

irom Saohooin to Bortowo inoluaive. They wore repulsod by the 10th
IH via ion v/hioh hurled them baob aorosa the /Icra and also by the
Volunteer Division which held a l l of i t s positions at .Vrony and
uawady. However thia i n i t i a t i v e o£ the enemy retarded and mod­
i f i e d in part our plan of operations thiro'.vn out oi' gear the p r e ­
ceding night, 'i'he modifications are shown by the follov/ing order
uuuliahad On the morning of 15 August.
1°. General Osinsici v/ill debouoh at 11 o'oloot from the n o r t h
l i n e of f o r t s with the e n t i r e £3rd Infantry Brigade, as much d i v i ­
on^l a r t i l l e r y as expedient and two armorod t r a i n s , he w i l l a t t a c k
L'asielaic from the south and gain possession of i t . He w i l l cover
r i s r i g h t flank with u n i t s of the 17th Division a c t u a l l y on the
iliioly-Orzeohowo front; to t h i s end he v/ill withdraw them from
t h e i r position anci after liasielsk i s tuken push them forward to the
 -62­
vioinlty of Cieohanow in protection oS. the Serook clunk.
All of those movements w i l l be made with vis;or. General Os­
inski v/ill maintain liaaon with the commander of tba army ana ./ill
reestablish liuaon with Oolonel LvLQzynaci, .»fter the oapture of
L'asielsk he w i l l take advantage of the /uot that he v/ill be in
rear of tho 11 th ,3oviet division ./hioh is in tha viointiy of Bor~
kov/o-Tomaszowo.
2°. Colonel Iiuozynski v/ill take uotive ooramand of the 9th
Infantry Division* He will attaolc v/itbout delay irom Jlodoivo, the
right flank cl' the 11th Joviet Division defeat i t and turn toward
i<aaielek following the instructions already ^iven.
3°. Colonel ^oc (Volunteer Division) will bold the enemy on
tha line Hi11-103-Zawftdy; he will then exeoute the mission which
has already bean assigned him. .Beginning the 15th .*ugust he will
be directly under orders of the -vrmy oonurccder.
4°. Colonel iiumsza, mission unchanged. I demand of him to
exert his personal authority over Ms subordinates and exeoute his
mission aa rapidly as possible.
5°. The 18th Division will reassemble in the vicinity of
5 ac hoc in. I t will reinforce the iavaj.ry Division with an infantry
regiment and will attack Jieohanow v/ith this det .ohmont. It will
direct the bulk of i t s forces toward the west on Jtary Qolymin and
x'rzevfodowo. I place the Cavalry division and tire Siberian Brigade
provisionally under the command of Jeneral ^rajowski.
.Vhen the ^ieohauov/ Llodlin railroad is reached further orders
•7ill be #iven.
 -62­
The 4th Pomeranian Jegiuwnt and the battalion of karine ?usi^erB
remain at -lonalc as a permanent garrison.
Jome unita operate with too l i t t l e energy and liaaon functions
uadly, I am insistent on this subject.
I have been obligod to place two officers under arrest l'or neg­
ligence in their duties in combat and to order one of them (Captain
L. . «) before a court martial.
?rom the l a t e s t intelligence Borkowo and jledowo have been
taken by our troops*.
The above order divided the Vth a.rmy into three distinct groups.
^he center group, the largest, after the reorganisation of the ICoo
Division was given the mission of holding the tain enemy attack:
v/hioh was debouching from ilasialst; i t s taslc v/^s very hard by rea­
son of the energy which the enemy displayed at this place, iliis
energy explained i t s e l f later by the concentration of .ted troops in
the vicinity of Uasielsk, where the reserve divisions of the Illrd
Soviet ..my were being pushed forward. In case of success the
Yolunteor Division afterwards would pass automatically to urmy
reserve.
In faot the Vth Army reserves had been expended very rapidly.
.i.3 i t was apparent that the Oth Division, jould not alone defeat
the enemy L'asielslc groupment, i t 7/as reinforced by the ^3rd Infantry
3rigado. This Brigade was in the following phase reinfoiced by
the remainder of the 17th Division, under orders from General Osinslci,

1. This information was later found to be oromaturo.

 -63­
to march on Nasielslc from tho south. Jy road on of this joooeration,
tho 9th and 17th Divisions constituted the south attack: firoup,
relatively powerful, whose f i r s t mission was to do/o^t the unitod
Russian forces around Kaaielsi and to take this oity as soon -*s
possible, i'hie crystallized the realization of the idea of nan-
Oliver: to attack, from .lollin, in flank the Soviet divisions .vhioh
.vare over running this place from the north.
at the left wing of the <irmy, the .Irajowaki pjrou;* were rein­
forced by the Siberian brigade .vhioh had oeen attached to i t . .*t
th3 some time i?lonsk was «lven a fixed garrison; the 4th Pomeranian
..e^ioent and the lUirine ?usilier Jattalinns; these units ware not
of >re-+ value; they were however sent to ^lonsfc. ibe array comman­
der in placing a par.ianent ^arriaon in thia tovm took into account
the security of the re^r of the lirajowski group, whioh >/ould have
oy virtue of this fort greater freedom of movement. If he assumed
this responsibility with troops relatively weafc, i t was not done,
ho.vever, thoughtlessly, because ho av/uitod the arrival of the^9th
Javalry Brigade, whose fir3t echelons were due to arrive at ~:odlin
the evening of 15 August.
In resume, we continued to neglect the IVth Soviet Army and
the Javalry Jorps of ^ay-rThan, 3tilL so dangerous to us. »'e threw
in a l l the divisions of the Yth ^.rny against the enemy .vhich v/as
attaciiing to the oast and north, 30 as to win firstly and at a l l
003t8 the battle in this sector.
In this situation, the l e t h Livi3icn .vas obli^od to operate
in sovoral diractxona; us the Siberian ri.^ado on the other
 -64­
aido did not support i t a i i e r ^ a t i d i l y enoi-h, the Irujo./sici group
ran the risk: of the diapor3ion of i t s o / f o r t a . In order to ohcod
t h i a , iaier.il ;IraJo«3i:i .7u3 ordered to concentrate tha or. t.;'o 18th
: iviaion In the vioinlty o. iualtoain zA ti.j -:'. w ariij; ri^uda .v-iS
placed under hia ordara.
*'i»e ;Lrajo;/3i:i ^roup thus roirircrjed ./..", :1VJ:I t o :.:is3ic!ia.
-he f i r j t <Vi3 to t-^a ieoi-:*:: 7 ./ith tl.o idaiGtance of th) Javalr;.',
ti.j ajj^:.d to ^tt *c:: in an eaatorly d i r e c t i o n itl. :..o T.-J .toot
.it.-jn^th p o s s i b l e . Jieckincw reuuined ti^ objective tl.^t ./o aid
-iir.3d -it sinoe the l^th .*.u^aat, in order to brout the liuaon lie­
t./een t:i9 Yth ur.d IVth i o v i e t . k r:nies and to thrcr the a may r^nka
into the :rr3iit0 3t coTii'-.iaion. Tha u t t a c t of tlB north group en the
ri->ht riaiit: of the T-'th J.X.:J- in tl.o fiiroaticn of Jolj-r^in ^td _rza­
.vodo wa3 Oj.uully liejeas-^iv; ./itiioat this covesient via could not have
nopod to defeat tha nunorioally 3 t r o v e r Hussion f o r c e s , v/hich .vero
ua on tx^ .ilcra and ut

OK Tc£

-j.11 of theae d i s p o s i t i o n s ./ere not e-isy to r o ^ l i z e . In partic>

u l a r ths commander of the 17th id vision, which propoaod to f u l f i l l
i t s Liisaion hy attacking mounted along the ilodlin-l.'asielsi: railway,
was not aole to a t t a c k a t the prescrioed time. Vhe general r e a s ­
sembly of th.0 J3ivio.\on, operating around the f o r t s north of ilodlin^
toot co auch t i n e , tUat i t w s not able t o junp off from t h i s line
u n t i l 6:00 P.M. A3 a complete Sovist division was north of tied 1 in
 -65­
(v/e verified this l a t e r ) , the attack of the 17th Division on Nt*8­
i e l s t , from ilodlin, was equally difficult. .»fter a bloody fight,
General Osinsii, foroed Via enemy wail back fron the forts at
and lor an, but he could not, in spito of a l l his efforts,
the line Torun-Uielcossyn-atudzienta-Oogiolnia.
Tee operations of. the 17th Division exerted a decisive influence
on the offensive of tia 9th DiviLioc i t s neighbor. This l a t t e r ,
or. ti.e -icrto^o side, was also unaole to jurap off at the proscribed
hour. It fought a l l dty in the vicinity of -^ledov/o; i t suffered.
heavy losses hire, especially in the 41st Infantry Regiment, and
suacieeded finally in driving back superior one my forces; a brilliant
bayonet attdoi: gained for I t thit afternoon the bridge at Boricowo,
M'LS TO i t captured a any inachine guxis. This important event .-/as
attained in spite the du.n.^er of the outflanking of the ri?ht of
the Division, v/hero the 22n& Infantry degioent distinguished, i t ­
self, ibis was one of the most glorioaa feat3 of arms of thia
division.
^ lice success cane to the Volunteer Division which had been
angled since early norning in Yiolent fighting. Unsupported by
the Siberian 3rigade, i t was tto:eutened by a turning movement from
.vdamowa tfola and found itself in a very c r i t i c a l situation. To
^.uintain it3 position i t had to further squander ltu blood and put
in a l l of i t s reserves.
On the left flank of the -»rmy, the course of event3 v/as n
favorable.
 -66­
The 8th Cavalry Brigade, under Oommand of General Xarniokl,
with whom collaborate the i'renoh Colonel Loir, oxouted with reso­
lution and a b i l i t y the order to take Oieohanow. Constantly fight­
ing, i t penetrated to the roar of the IV Soviet Army, It destroyed,
en route, the machinery oif supply, trains paoks and convoys, leav­
ing o on fusion and ohaos in their wake. At 11 o'c it took:
Cleohana.v, defeating i t s garrison, and put to flight tl . Commander
of the IV Soviet army and his staff, where i t seized the offloe
records, and took suvoral hundred prisoners; afterwards it burned
the radio-telegraph 3tution of the army, the sole means of com­
munication between the Soviet JTront, the IVth Army so far extended
to the west and the I I I oavalry Corps oooperuting with i t .
This luoky raid of our oavulry caused tfra enemy a very undor­
stcndablo fooling of uneasiness* To offset this disagreeable in­
cident or to oover the threatened right flank of the XVth Army,
the Commander of the army sent a reserve division on Cieohanow;
the 23rd Kouban Division, an olite unit composed of proven oommunists.
The fights whioh followed deprived General Krajowskl of liason with
the ftth Cavalry Brigade, until around the 17th august; but i t
absorbed the reserves of the XVth Soviet army, a vory important
faotor in tl» batUe whioh oentorod at this moment on the ./kra.
Cieohanow was retaken by the. 33rd 3oviot Division, and our
Cav.lry withdrew to the west under oovor of dark; but this hud no
particular importance to the Vth army compared with the divorsion
produced above, in faot x)n destruction of tho only radio station
 -67­
of the IVth Army and the flight of ita headquarters, work of the
iX)3rd Lanoera(actually the ^3rd Lanoera) had oouaequenoea muoh more
far reaohlng than we were able to foruee at this time.
The happy raid on Gieoh*now helped tto struggle against the
XVth Army by absorbing i t s reserves and threatening i t s right.
General Krajowcici having freed his left flank was able to attack
Howe Uiastx>o with two infantry regiments. <tfter a lively fight
around iluohury} he broko the enomy resiatanoe and took Howe Uiaetoo
at 8:00 P.M. to mar oh next on Szozuwin, Klukowo, Swierszoz. His
eeoond group attuokod at the same time from Mlook on Ojrzon, 3ar­
nowa Oora, donsk. The fights on this terrain were s t i l l favorable
to as; they found the 18th Division on the evening of the 15th
AUgUB I on the Ciuuhutiurt iaud^lii ralli'Oud w'aioli w*d i'duolidu at Jonsic
and 3wierazozo. The pursuit dotaohmonts of the division pushed
on jevoral kilometers to the west, in the direction of I'rgewodo.vo
und Jtary flolymin on the heela of the divisiona of tha XVth Army
.vhioh were quitting the ,/kra.
In reeiune, by night of tho 16th August the front of the Vth
.trrny extended on tha lino 3onsk->3wiorazoze tho length of the r a i l ­
road, bonding then in a southeasterly dlruotion i t p-iaaod to tho
oujt of 3orkow«, then to Miokoszyn, 3tud»iurii:ul Jeglelna. i'he
,<i:ru was tlien in our hands In a l l plaoes thut counted.
At this moment the distribution of enemy x'orooa was u9 follows:
Tho lath OluABSour Division was fighting on tho slerman-^ollsh fron­
tiora uround Latitonbourg. The I I I Cavalry Corps had ita bulk at
.Uorpe and vma oporulin^ v/ith dotaohiionta tit iJobrov/niki, .Vloolowok
 -68­
and Lipna, i t was aupportod by the 53 Chasseur Division whioh was
awaiting orders while the 10th t»nd 54th Divisions woro operating
in the v i c i n i t y of Raoiaz.
The XVth Army had suffered severe l o s s e s . I t counter-attacked
a t Oieohanow with the 33 rd Chasseur Division, to clean out t h i s
town, to oover i t s expose.' flank and reliove tiie 4th and 16th
Divisions, forced to f a l l back to the lino 3arnowa Qora, Bonak,
Szlu8towo, Swieraoze, toward tho north and west. Tlie 11th and
5th Divisions withdrew a t the same time behind the Vkra and aban­
doned this r i v e r to the Polish t r o o p s . Tho 6th Division vms s t i l l
r i g h t i n g on the l i n e of f o r t s north of Modlln.

TiliJ ILL'OKflAHOH W OUK 3U00i£33*S3 0? 15TH AUGUST

UW TH2£

The eucoesses reported tho 15th August on the .'/Icru. hud a

;reut import.
In the f i r s t plaoo i t raised t]x> mor'U.«oi' the s o l d i e r ; it
a.voice sntnueiam in the ran.-;a or the Yth Aruy and inspired oon­
l'idonuo in i t s oommander.
Uy report of tho end of the day on t h i s date ondod ./ith those
./orda: 'The men havo now tho s p i r i t of v i c t o r y . " That way, I
jonaod the (ivident l o b i r t h of moral amon^ the soldlorn. I know
.vol}. tho importance for t i e .vholo front, to t h r a ; tho balanoo to
our Bide in the b a t t l e , .aging around Warsaw, our SUOOOBB could
net (jnduro without tho aid of our troo^n on the /ieprst who woro
:>ropurin;$ to attack. i'i» dlsputolioa OJ" tlo Jommatidor in Ohiof
took advantage of tho f i r s t Polish viotory to point out that tho
enamy was not invlnoiblo, us ovidonoed by t h e i r reTorsos at .iud­
zymin. I t aroused among tho Jolish troops, ardor, energy, «JIJno­
t a t i o n ; i t oreated a sane and houlthy oo;;;jut r i v a l r y between dif­
ferent arms and divisions.
Our guooesa had auroovor an import from tho point of view of
operations. Jeneral Haller oonvoyed it in these terms to the tcnow­
lege of the entire front.
"The enemy has thrown in a l l of ius reserves in the a t t a c k on
the Vth Army, In the neighborhood of 10 enemy divisions opera tad
on this front. Vhanfcs to the energy of the Commander and the hero­
ism of the troops, the Vth ;*nny has turned aside fro in tno ,» ites of
,/araaw weighty one my forces. . . "
The progress of the 10th division had f i n a l l y a deuiaive influonoo
cr. the b a t t l e of Uasielsi: s t i l l uMecido* in spite o_ n i l of cur
offorts.
In re'eaiTiO' on ono lund the viotorioua fi^hta of the Vth ^rniy
on 15th August frood Warsaw by drawing to the >krn tho divisions
of tlio I l l r d Soviet Army, whioh oould no longor oooporato with the
.Vlth Russian anny in the uttuok: of ^adzyniin-fraga, so dan.;orous
to oui* c a p i t a l , on tl» othor 1. aid tho auooeas of tho loft win' of
Li.o anny aided us in the victory :v:u3ht at iiasiolslc.

i'1 Xiiii HJJ3UH OOUlii^.i-ATTACH ..V JL01I3<:

In tho meantime the Joli3h Oommander in Ohiof intorooptod at

moment .iusBian operitiona order I'o. "£Z In '-vhioh tiD ^o;na.>
 -70­
OJL the IYth Soviet urmy i>roj)oaod to finiah oiT tho loft o;' o ir Vth
Army, whose inovomonta disturbed hltn. In uoon'd .vith tuia ordur
the 18th and 64th Ohaaeour Divisions rforo to uttv*o«w lt.vr-odiutoly in
tho direction or i'lonuk against tho roar or tho vth a nay, ooordl­
nuting ti^lr offortu .vith tho ulinulttitiooaa oountor-attaoic /roci tho
oi* tho :vth .irty. Xho I^tli Jovlot Divio ion w^o to rouiain
Lftutenuoartf. Vho 53rd Divibion woula nuint^ln i t a o l / la ti.d
v i i i n i t y of :Uesun~3ioriA with a vlovi to jovo/in; tl.o i>rojaotod
attaoic Oh j-'lonst. i'ho III G-'iVitlry Jorps ./uo to disoii-ir^o thj Ui*mo
r.ilas ion oroand Ltpno and .Uoolawot in QURO of u Polish oount«r­
^itaok from Torun (Thorn in .onoranib).
Thoae in8truotlona from Jomrudo Jho iwtiiow Sox tho dig trio utlon
cT hia i'orooa .vjro an uiiSftLllU'til Intar ;ro tut ion oi lUo (Urootlvou of
ti.j Jomm'indor of tho <oatorn anaaiin -'ront:
In iViot luohnoiovtsii «»w i t thui^-s
"Tho XV und HIrd knnioa lia^o ocon on? ^od in ho wy mooting
Ji. •. ;o;nontu on tho i.odlln front. It ia outlmutud that tho IVUi
Joviot Amv^', in oontlnuin^ to 30 Tor^^rd towardu tho tiorttuvoat,
ihu lon^th of tho jorrldor, w i l l not obtain poaltlvo rooults oy
i'o.ijon of tho uuduon oajii^a In tho ^onorul atruto^io aitu.ition. It
ia thoroforo ordoro.i tiut thlc army ohaoic tho fan ah'iood .'rogrosa
in' i t j divisions and join roaolutoly, .illh i t s tuln /orooa, tho
I'i^ht in tho vlolnity uV i.odlln*
i'urauunt tu thia idou oT monouvoi , tho IVth Jovlot .»rrr\y muat
jut off tho rotrout ol tha .'ollah foroor. o»wnq!od > >Lnat tho %

1. Banurin-I.lioliitotf. /oinu >HoL.>.•«> 1 1; it.1l.

 -fl­
uid I l l r d .»ral*a (lnatruotlonB :.o. ^ y 6 / o p . ) , and attuok iron u
n)^tl.gatitoi'ly d i r e c t i o n to nt an oi*l to tho onorny oooapyin-; the
ri,$h': uuut 0/ tho <tra.
Those orders 01' tto Oooununder of tho ./eat Front v/ere ^ivon
w.der proBBare of the reoent events* t'h«y show olourly th it tho

01' th« Tronl ./luhdd to ]>ro/lt by tho puaBa>o to the

of tho north -oliBh ^roup to do/ont thorn on tho rLght

of tho Viatula. In fuot tho OCOOOBB 0* thia nanouvor would

jivon vis t»ooaott to the rjur of tho x'ollah army by tho ahortoat
re Ua ulou/; tho lo*t ouulc oi" the Vistula; thla would 1. ivo urought
th3~d00traction o£ tho ; ;o.vor:al ncrth ?rouj of i'oliah v/hitoa
tod ut 70,-00 0 i.,'onot3."
Its no-va of t h i j propouod toanouvor cf tho .tuaaian -ortunaiiier
n ..*jo4 in ua tn ur.wtion dually uniaratar.dablo. .-motion moroovor,
. ro 1 ivoly, In that Jlonaic, u inodiiun Boiiod l o a u l t t y , n l t h I l t t l o
rojiutin? kio-«ort olt.i.tod In ti.o 0 en utid not jovorod oy natural
.vould htiv* to OQ defended strongly to ooenponsato /or tho
of itu position*
How a t thtd U .16 40 hud no ro jar von a t our diuposul, Vho
reaarvea ./oro o n t l r a l y o/..utjndod and the Uth Javuiry Brigade
i.1.1 not yo t arrived* j'he Oth Infantry ri^ude iiromiued by tho
o.L.iondar ci' th« 'rotit svaa s t i l l with tho XInd ^rmy und oould not
JO it liodlin before duybreuic tho 17th avigitat. .it i'lonalc fijtrd -VUB
only x rtoalc g a r r i s o n , rihilo a l l 'he i.'rujo.vaki ;?roup joro strongly
OIK .~;od.
 -73­
Itwaa therefore neoosaary t h a t we push the b a t t l e of liasielsk,
u n t i l then iudeoisive, with ne.v energy in order to bo able to with­
draw troops from t h e r e .
During; t h i s time, our l e f t wing remained neoeaaarily weal:,
i f the era ray tool: advantage of t h i s i'aot with r a p i d i t y and t e n ­
a c i t y , the two ;ied divisions mentioned above oould havo gone through
the t h i n l y garrisoned jelonslc. In a f i r s t phasa these two divisions
--and l a t e r six. enemy d i v i s i o n s , if the i n s t r u c t i o n s of the Com­
mander of the iiussian front wero followed, would a s s a i l the rear
of the Polish troops engaged against the XVth and I l l r d Soviet
Armies. This at took would harmonize with the operations of the
three Hussion .trmles of the north und the Cavalry Corps; i t would
ooordinute with the offensivo of the .\VIth Soviet army on tie iYar­
3u,v oridgo hoad. It oould exeroise a decisive influonoo on the
of the Vistula.

THK i'iltidiiOVATION Ol-1 THK IDKA 0? kLdiOUVER

OP THE YTli AH

Thase oonditions gave b i r t h , with us, to a projoot of modify-

i n ; of prooodinft i n s t r u c t i o n s .
The i n s t r u c t i o n s in iuoation had reaohod us in an or dor frorn
Joneral Hallor, roooivod that morniaf;, whioh had oarriod tho alarm
ing nows on the subjoot of the attuolc on rlonsk from tho west.
.iore th y a r e ;
The Vth Army will oontinuo i t s offonsive wl th tra objoot of
 -73­
reaohing ay fur up the Narew as Pultusk inclusive, I t will oooupy
this position lightly and will move the bulk of i t s forces to the
vicinity of Cieoharaw-Mlfcwa to out off and destroy the enemy troops
whioh remain s t i l l to the west of the lino indicated!•
To conform was the f i r s t solution.
Another alternative consisted of suspending the offensive on
Haaielsk, to plaoe ourselves on the defonaive on this side, won ken
the right OJP the army and hasten to the rescue of Plonsk a l l of
thH troops thus saved. This was the 2nd solution. Vhioh solution
should we accept? The danger which was developing toward the west
was in faot 3erioua, but the breaking off of the indecisive oombat
again*t th« XVth and Illrd Soviet Armies wua equally perilous.
If we persisted resolutely in our f i r s t intention, i t was
perfectly possible tint the Russians would ^uiokly take jflonsfc and
attack in a southeasterly direction, However this possibility was
limited in time and space by certain fuotcrs. ''rora the f i r s t the
Russian liason had functioned only fairly .yell, tnen aiao thu
Jo in" .an dor of she IVth 3oviot Army hid ahown an excessive oonfidenoe
in ilmeelf, scattering hie army ovor a wide area, simultaneously
gainst j?look and Thorn, i'he distances entering in plfty, this
time, the well known lack of coordination between tao various enemy
armies* the news of the tiding of GioahanO*.-, a l l of theso indioatod
to ,ia that we could take tlo risk, -ho riak oonsistod in ercoitlng
the deoiaiona proviouoly rnudo und following up tho deoislvo battle
on all our front engaged at llaslolak*
The aeoond solution could expoao us to a dlsaoter. Vo suspend
our ofi'enaiv<» in prooeaa of developer, t on Uo .^kra and rorro.tp our
 -74­
troopa in full battle array, to organize more effioently flank and
rear protection Tor the army~~thls was not only talcing half measure
whioh i8 always the worst thin?; in war, this wan due to lead the
Vth army to inevitable decent in the shortest time.
Then the first decision allowed as to gain t i « aiid the hope
of winning the battlo of Huaielsfc, before wo wore attacked by the
enemy divisions from the west. The seoond led us into a aimultaneoiB
defensive on two fronts which tho Vth Army could not Baa tain,even
for a few hours, under the given conditions.
For these roaaona I propoaod the f i r s t solution ut the con­
ference whioh was held tho aftornoou of the 15th August at General
Headquarters of the Vth Arcy. Those present: General Sosntcowski,
chief of tlB Jeneral Staff and Jen oral rfeygand* This proposition
supported by General Soankowsfci wu3 unanimouoly approved. Tho
offensive on Naaielalr, would then bo continued without regard to
li.o danger thro a toning us arov.nd t'lonsk.
vhA information received during the evening irom I/lonak and
oaohocin confirmed our preooncioved opinion of the situation on
our left. The most interesting report wan tlut of officers of the
armored oars, in action si no-a daybreak: of the 16th August in rear
or tho Soviet troopa marching toward the west. 11* eight vehicles
of this gr:jup under tho leadership of J.iajor d ' i . U, /iroiszewalci
in the vioinity of ^aciaz-Drobin-Bielalc had fought for two hours
.-vinot the 157th and 15Uth 3oviet Hogiments in I)IQ neighborhood
ui1 Drobin. ilipping easily into the midat of *\usBiin units, attack-
in; small poits, destroying trains and gear, they renderod, thiB
duy as well ao the days following, notuble aarvioo. iliey doubled
 -76­
their force by their greut mobility, scattering oonfusion in r e a r of
the Hussion Divisions and oreatlng the impression that t h e i r work
was preparatory t o a great offensive.
This diversion paralized the i n i t i a t i v e of the enemy in this
poriod of general oonfusion, moreover the oontaot constantly
maintained by this means furnished us invaluable information. In­
formation received the 15th August indicated oleurly that flonsk
oould be attacked the next evening under the most favorable conditions
l'or the Russian troops, ;/e h.\ then, 24 hours in vvhioh to gain a
suooe88 at Nasielsk or to organize security for the rear of the
army.

KAPPSNIKOS IK XHJS CSliT&t AlCD 30UTH OH IHi) P0LI3H iMOHT

Along the remainder of the Polish front on tho 15th August,

particular attention should be attached to the fights around »<ad­
zymiu whioh pl'vyod an integral part In the battle of MB Vistula.
ri;sse fight? nvrwoked severe oritioisci but vindicated tho Commander
of the f r o n t 1 .
finally General Jeligowski toot: command of the throe divisions
(luth, 11th and 19th) oooupied in s e t t l i n g affairs at Hadsymin.
do attacked the 16th August at daybreak with tl j 10th Division to
t\\Q north a l l along tho Jegrze-Uokre road, with the 19th Division
to tho south vvi th coopor.it ion from the 11th Division to tie wo St.
ihis concentric attack degenerated into bloody fights which lasted
u n t i l late at night, itadzymin wac defended stubbornly by t\vo
joLshevio divisions whloh would not yield easily or ^ive up tho
 -76­

hope of taking Jarsaw* These fights absorbed the reserves of the

front loruer than had been at f i r s t for seen, disturbing us by reason
of the Imminent happenings in the sector of the '/th ,innjT.
lenaral iv.ca\sradowatei« in execution of the d i r e c t i v e s received
from-the Commander in chief at inlawy, 7&V0 i n s t r u c t i o n s t h i s
day, which fixed the 10th -ugust for the jump oft* of the muoa
group, li© indicated the l a s t phases of it and predicted the d i s s o ­
lution of the Ilnd Army, the greater .part of whose u n i t s had passed
to the raserva of the 'Jommunder in Ohiaf.
In this order General . J*§;#ado-.73lci cmlled on the 1st army
Commander to hold the- Warsaw bridge-head a t fill c o s t s , he directed
him to ©r^uniza on the road from ;>reat a group ' * armored urr-:lnoa
v/hioh on the 17th .s.uguat could execute .vith tlio aid of the 15th
.Division a reoonnttiasanae on I'.linste i.-aaov/ieoivi, in order to cooperate
with the offensive of the .'onviiander in Chief.
The same order antloiputoS thut the '.Vith 3olshevlo army v/ould
bo routed in aiaorflnf and i t s l i n e s of r a t r e a t cut; t^e ;olah®vio
troops attaolcin?? ..'arsaw would be hurled b.ioii to the '.ini$ and u l l
of the 3olehevio armies ^ould he driven bn.a<i r.-n the ler^an frontier.
Tlifi uui'oi-seon r e t r e a t of our'.troops from iUo south front vt-i&
tie objgyt of detailed inatruottone from the ohiof of the lunar>i.
3taff^. General .iozv/adowaki hero diroc'.od 'i-enor:il i.v«'aaa!:io^i«a
"to -.rive ao t]m method oi* do* 3n.se of contiHuoaa line?*, .va.u'.-:Xy i«cl<';, •­
method w'hlch rives up y,ll I n i t i a t i v e t,u f;,.e onamy v.i.d r.i.i.^ts a l l
manoaver i
 ;i8 o r d e r e d , on the ocr^r.'U'y to jK.aa fron iao ei;stty... <••*. dcsfsnai
l i n e s to oii'stiisive oomu-.t .vi ih t ue u M <• ' ij.a -rroaos fcrrceo in the
v i c i n i t y i;f -oorov;- us'-:- "•;.. i •.. :u : „ ->tr ;;.;i*o;vu, ths o a v a l r / assembled
y,t 3ou-.il ^liJ ..-v •.;•: /..C;>G1. ...acording 1 to the 'Jhief of the V;erJ
i n t >rv<3ritii>ii .. / U, j , : o •: •. •,:•.* . •, a i d p v i r ^ l y z o the

la the same order t i s Ohief of tl» g e n e r a l at*.:'/ ,.'••:•.';• • : j

; G ) . : \ t i ' ; ; : .i L-.yo'.v f o r dei'ona©. lie i n d i c a t e d among o t t e r
^a L;io d o : u l r ^ ^.e--<; •:.;' ', i^ 6 t h I n f a n t r y S i v i a i r t i ,,;;u .-i;i:
ti.^ .ri-ou,' of J r i g a d i e r J o n e r a l J.iuoaynr-skl t o foim the perw.uiomt
§ -risen.
Tiiti iiytioua t h u s ui'rung0<rj to the n o r t h and ijonth - i tlie
f r o n t aa.;:.a'evl i'resd'.vn of n a t i o n t o tho ooisanar;der in J h i e / ; They
,?ave liira time to rauaaorrule >xhd r e o r - ^ ^ i s o \A\o troo.;>a ;-f t h e Cesrttur
f r o n t , whioh paved the »vay for the «uio .^lun of i^;t;tle on tha
Vistula.

1. {pa-te 7 6 ) , . . ; i e . i \ v t i o n a o r d u r '.'v, ro,":-/?< t 1 4 1 h a ; r f . i a t 1 9 ^

uc y ; ^ v _ • . „ . . , x i i - i t i - T r o u t , -3,1 :,-,od l c : . . : : r ^ l T ?!2^;^h ' - . . l l r r ,

I1'. ?h# V t h , i r m y havs L-it/iL t i i o o f / a r i B l v e . li-a l e i ' t iiaa

f o i o o a u u u t i : t h o I h i h -.uid 4 t h • ' c l s h e v i o . i v i s i c j i M w h i c h h - w a f
O^-JJ: i n d i e o x n o r tow'-a-d t h ^ o o r t i . . arm n o r t h e a s t . Ita le-'l reua
t h a erifflu^ :-itt,ao.vs i n s u p e r i o r f c r o e o n t h e .ia*-u
.Cm l o t .,r\\y u l t i i O :h r o i r:.rori;eti by t h e r o s o r v o " / t h o f r o n t
h j . s tiO t (j.-'.vft .'• h »t o o a r s e to t .*.k,o rl *;h r c . ^ a M tt< l,i,o enosay f o r c o s
v.'hioh u u v e iiiv-.vled t h o . . a u x / ' / I n o ? ; v i r o > . s »
eii . » o r s o i t n l l y t.Ii--.. t I n : . ; c r t \ i i r . . . r , i t H o f

f r . r c o m b . i t u h d "j.h-.o 0 .-.vj t i t i i o o i f - t , , a o»:o<! I ' . i o r j o t : r d o r i » --^uori-?

o t h a r ' . h i i . ' t H . ( ' i i 3 .. f - t r - j o .
3°, I ; j i v e t i . o J o l i o i v i f f f o r ; . i ^ l c r u o r t ; t h •> l i ; 1 ^r\: j : t h e
l l r . h , 1 9 t h ;..kiu; l ^ t h , . , i v j . : j i o n s , ' i l l r , v v o l . - i t o . m : - ; ! 11 >m i ^ n i v i . t , ,
li'iQ^- w i l l ..t 1;t t-:*•. , ^ « : : ; : ; : i i i u ^ / o r o d u , 1 i f , l.d xor;.: l l o t . i n . - h i a h t•.e,>''
•xi'ij ti-*sr3 - . u ' r i A h ' - ' O d L M - n v o . 1 ; e i . t l y -*Si'.. a ; - 3 V "•-:.''.. i o ' * l . I,." • •;.£„ . ' i l l •vllli­
o u t f i l l , d r J, vo o a c i , t h e ai'.ew,'/ U, o u r o l d .. I r a t Lir-o bo^^-rti 3 : . O , ..

 -78­

n 1
t •-;, • -v,: ; n r v > v

A1 he naruero;i.3 operation orders of the ^cLununder tu' the Vth

.vrrny carry hi-i the d^te ex" the 16th -ugaat are witBesa tc ti.o

ra^idii;y ana multijilioity o;.' huuyorjings on t h i s day in t h i s soo­

t o r ; they ahcw how mviah watehXallndSS and xi rrxxtesa the -Tide

v a r i a t i o n s In the s i t u a t i o n required in th© direction oi; Oj>erationa.

Uiir idea of manouver >it thie t i « is outlirjO<J as follows by

on of tii© orders (t\& 4th oi" the s e r i e s ) :

. . . I direct th« contiaaation of Hie ofioTiaiy© vnth t-£»

g re a lo is t orier>*,y, in coriformity v/ith the idea o..' manouver, the g i s t

o£ v/hioh is us follows, namely: dei'eat as ''iu.ick.iy as possible the

diiaiiiy forces actually in our i'rout; than •f-t.oe uuout on the onemj'­
trooi>s which are oonuing u;» in o;ir r o i r out, whoso liaaion hue

bean broken f-)et;vQan the ,kVth und IVth Soviet --.mies) .

ordirj^ to the plan indicated in tho orders of the l o t h

, ('aalelsk must \te tal:en by two .J on verging att^o!;.1* Trorn tbe

ao'ath and north, i'he 17th Division w^ultl attack 2.uaiol«k leaving

a imioh i t Lid ta'cion to the south »md covering i t a e i r on

aTF""!La ta,€e~5T", ^^""w'oimri-i!^or" bi*" "tha' ' iaFTTrmy' : H1I V^iiib ct7ary~o?t'or t

Casing the larjur uato b->aaea) to sand the 10th division to .Silvi

and allieszo'.v touth of Jablonna, .vhere I '//ill nwuit the a r r i v . i l of

his .first oonvoy by not l i t e r than 1,2 o'clock; noon precisely.

I present ?ny heai'tiest oon^ratual tiona to the Vth -nny :Crsr tha

•Itill ;.uid energy with ./i.ioh, in spite of the ^roat fatigue of i t s

troops, i t executed a.min to-day a daoialvo attack*
4 ° . Th® Vth ..rmy ,vill attack: with limited Toroo, the l^th

tind 4th l-'Olahevio ^iviaiona, i t v:ill ;niah i t s uulJr or. ^ a i o l s i c ,

andeavgrin? to hurl b^ok tho *>ol9hQvt-.i troopn t*.o iia aast ana northeast.
5 U . The 10th Division at J&hloftna w i l l h.ivo an cfTioor per­
natientl;; at tha telephone , and ;*/lll 8st.-..,Uli^h telephone connuui-i

cut ton .vita .v&liiBayn not la tor ir.xn the 13 r

th .. (.-;uat«

1. Order I'D, 601/.>, 16tb .*ug\i3t V3; A, VI,;. ^rrr.y, si-tnod

General i i

 -79­
the 3eroct s i d e . The 9th Li vision, reiiiforcad by t l s 15th infantry
regiment and t*o b a t t e r i e s would cooperate v/i'th the 17th Division.
Ths Yol inteer Liviaion should a t ti.a sarao tirne hold tha e rainy north
of tha road 3orkowo-Kasiel8fc and «i~ ould pass to amy reserve after
the o apt ore of llasielsk. ' lenoral L-'ra^owsSci received orders to
attack in the d i r e c t i o n of 3tory Solynin and irzetfodowo; f i r s t of
a l l he a. ould oooperate in the atiaok converging on Ka>ielsk by
launohinj the ^ioerian 3rigade fron Kowe ::iaato tov/ard Ohaialewo.
This order, like a l l other orders or this day o a t i r a t e d in­
aeourately the enemy s i t u a t i o n around £ieohitno.;, by reason Oi." our
laal: of Ii83on with the 8th Otwalry Brigade. It was aojcrdin^ly
too optimiatio jn o o r t a l n points, o;it i t breathed "ho s p i r i t o;*
t ;.o offensive, .;ven the Lower Vistult ^roup lietioral vniko^slcl)
/oooived orders t o execute reoonnaissaxice in advaruo of his Vis­
: .;1;». bridge-he ado.
ienoval v.3insjci in oonfo;*mity .vii)i hip in3truotlon^ prcteotcd
:.i.solf around 5eroa>: by umtn of tho 6Jth Infantry ASgiment d i r ­
ootad or. I'MVLZI •••» K1. linked ilasiolst: ".' ith th Tee ro^.Vnsnts of hi3 17th
Division » lira «i lehod tc r.il:2 4>ro^^**«n nO OAP the route waarnowo­
tj.uin and the r a i l r o a d fron i.odlin to ^astelak, hi3 reserves
r.. i£3ed on his l e f t flaukt Jolonel v.-caynski (;*th Division) i n ­
tonded to a t t a o t alor>^ the ro.ito Jortcwo-^asiolsi: with tvo r e g l ­
or.ts in the f i r s t vav9 the 3rd ro^i'ner.t in reserve follo,7i«ig «he
rl
-i.:i*3 of the .ittao^. i he Jiuorian .?ri-raCe ooordinatod i t s tr.ovoments
4uonoe ir. t;.o direotion
 -80­
The b a t t l e of Uaaiolsk oor/imonoed alon.^ tho v/holo front a t 7
o'clock in the niornir:$ of the 16th .lU^uat.
Senoral Csinaki axooutod a violont a r t i l l o r y oroparation and
using ULH two armored t r a i n s advanced vigorously to the north.
Ho f o i l on an opponent, roinforood during tho oourae of tho orocod­
in$ night and auperior in numbers; the Cth Soviet JUvinion, aomo
p a r t s of tho 56th Division and a 3r;gado of tho 2cJth Division,
.vttaokin^ and counter-attacking c o n s t a n t l y , he pro^reaaed very
alov/ly, ao that his l e f t l»d acarcoly roaohod tho l i n o r.orgi-./on^o­
rod»oby mid-day. Hia ri^lit remained eohelonod to the rear and
holding around ilrofjuly.
Tho 'Oth Division run into a t i l l atron^or roaiatanoo. Ita
4Zn<l and .">5th Infantry rogi^onta foiujht b i t t e r l y u n t i l noon.
3tron-;ly uttaokod from tho alopoa of Jlaalolsk, they oould not nC
vanoe in soito of onor;^otio o f f o r t a , and ovon l o a t for a ahort
timo tho orosainga of tho ;l:ra, whluh tijoy rotook witli An bayonot.
T,ie Voluntoor Division Ukowi3O mido no oro^roaa boforo noon
on
Those fifthta provod tho atren^th of tho onomy ^rouomont uvound
n^aielHk; they had thorc. on a r e l a t i v e l y limited front moro thxn
four Joviot divlnionu, ./Jiioh .vo .voro not able to dofout a t t n e k i n ^
from tho ./oat. Unly u airnultanooua oonvorjiii'; utt'ioi: from ti.o r.orth
anO south would do tho j o b . It .vu;- thon a b s o l i t o l y nooouaury t h a t
tho Siberian 3ri^ado move in tlu dlrootion provioualy ohoaon for
thorn, Hit hio unit vm.'i l a t o in iln anvm^omonta, m-d thla t)iroi";)i
tlo Ci l i t of Jenoril ilajov/oki.
 -01­
, in }eneral ilrajov/ski 'e comnand tho Oavalry Jrl-fudo
was weat of CUoohanov/ and the Siberian 'iri.^utle a r r i v i n g around
ilo.ve Wiastyo; the morning of tho 16th .tunjua fc the 10th Infantry
Division held the lino 3ernov/a '3oru-3onsk- >a80oin-3v/ier8zo2e.
This division had been constantly under fire binoo the 13th of
^uguat, i t j looaoa .vero in oxoeas of 30^ of I t s offootive oom­
b a t t a n t atronfjth and p a r t i c u l a r l y hifjh amona; the ofi'ioors and non
oommiaaioned Oifioors.
Cronoral ilrajov/aki, obliged to hold in so =jroat a front, had
no other rosarvoa boaidoa tho S i b e r i a n Brigade v/hioh '.va9 belatod.
Hia men ,vere jxhauated by the e f f o r t s that v/o hud boon obliged to
demand of thorn during t h i s or is i s of tho Vth -irmy.
I t wan undor tho so oiroumatunoos that tiio Oonrnundor of tlio
XVth Joviot .irrriy, having oloarod out Oioohano,;, dirootod hia 33rd
Ghaaaour DivJuion to mako a forood maroh to tho nouth; at 0:0°)-'.J.I.
he hurled 3 infantry r o ^ i ' o n t a , 1 o ivvilry rogimont and tlw d i v i s i o n ­
a l a r t i l l o r y a^alhat our 42nd Infantry .vo,?kflnt, oxposed nt Jonak
und Jumovva lora. Tlia 42nd v/aa not able to v/itlietand a fi.^ht oo
unequal• I t l o a t almost h i l f of i t a offootivoa, tho creator part
of i t a tAoliino ,qjuny and tho b a t t e r y v/hioh v/aa oapportinjj i t ; during
tho i.fternoon i t f e l l buok In diaordor on OJrr.on-Lopaoin^
about thia tirno v/hon our l o f t was thiw alukon, tho 10th
3oviot diviaion had roaneo:nblod i t a two bri.^idoa around aajl*?, and
>ora: t)io hoad3 of Its oolunnB woro a>pro to)iin,^ 'lonwk. from tho
west und north.vosit (KOO .llcotoh !'o. 5)
 -02­
i'rom tho t o l e p h o n i o r e p o r t a of tho Gonunandor a t Plonnk the
s i t u a t i o n WH8 d e a p a r a t o in t i n t a o u t o r . Thoy r o p c r t o d tho d o f o a t
of tbo e n t i r o 1 0 t h D i v i a i o n , a m r t of .vhioh .vithdrow on a a c h o o i n
and of numeroua 3olahovio columns murolling on ..'loriak from tho
.VG3t.

Upon my r e t u r n t o i l o m k Ydth Major .iOatv;orov;aki I o a t l m t o d

tliat tho s i t u a t i o n thoro vma indood o r i t . l o u l b u t i?ot 0 o u p o r u t o .
.Jonoral ilrajowekl luxd not l o a t hi.a o o o l n o a s i in r o p l y to tho
i o r t u n u t o a t t a o k of tho 33rd 3 o v i o t D i v i s i o n , ho t o o : bold moaauroa,
but tlia only cnoa o o a a i b l o , indor t.ho -ivoii a Lrou/iat j i u c a , t o r o ­
,;roup hia r o ^ i n e n t s utid r o o r ^ \ n i ; : o hit-, n o r t h j ' r o i i t , d l e l o o a t o d by
tiB rovorao a u if a rod j y )Ai\ 4,'Jnd ..o^iniont, roliovocl . i s t i l y tho
on t i r o 145th ..o-'lnjut .'or IUO on t.io l o i ' t t'lair: in tho v i o i n i t y
of 3arnowa lor i-•,**y.;on , .;horo ho ho 10 liia Trouml, ..o ro'inao
at ;^jii'n:iu li.<j I'oi.ii. .iJ.o of Uo 4.ind D i v i a i o n .v It}, i vl. 1 / 1<

thori, v/jvo urrLvlu • tha l ; t . o - h ' o n t i>." lJ.;:ht­

horao and tlio 7th ' ; t t o i \ : i-.t iho .M,h "lold .rLillory .o;itnont andor
OOmuuind of ••».]"/ d'... . . U'o'oiukii ^'h-JiJ :^vo i i.O l a n d i n g olOi^iOnt3
of tlio h u r r i o d l y or ;..m i j-.od ^rou]) u* J o i o u o l i>roa«iir, .liioli .via to
inoludo: the Oth Gavulry Uri/;ada, o t l l l in tha f L r h t , tho v t h
Oavalry orL,5j.do .vhoao ro^imonto v/uro Blov/ly a r r i v i n g .t ..odLin anil
Uio 6Lh i t u a n t i V J r i j a d o , t r a n a p o r t o d by narrov/ (I;U'.IT;O r a i l . ; \y from
Jura . . n L . t r J a to ./arjaw juid tlion by bout from ./.iratiw tt. ;;a'f;roozyin
.vhoro buaaou .voro . . w l t i r . ; tu t .:;o t i o n to Jlonalc. ./o Iviu ooon t^,o
on tlio j u u j o o t of tho tit.io nooauunry £or for'iLnj tho
 -83­
J
x lonsk group• Ita offonaivo employment in the direction of Haoiaz,
primarily envisaged, ooald not be rouliaod.
kujor Jroblokl reuohod i?lon8k in the inldat of tho ;$or.oral
disorder of tho s^rriaon which v/aa Cloeins from tho oity, while tho
leading Auaaian attacking elementa were oooupyins the outskirts
to the west, ne led a oountar-attaok at the hoad of tho 1st Light
Horao With the bravery and koenoaa of a true horsonun and dialodgod
the onomy. He diapellod the danger so threatening for a momont and
kept tho bewildered Husaiuna a t a rospootful distanoo i'rom x'lonsk
a l l night. In thia way the left flanl: of tho sU*my was relatively
oonaolidatod, a auoocBe very important for the eivjire front.

VICTOriY Oi' KA3I^L3K

Theae happenings did not aliake my e a r l i o r roaolution; on tho

contrary thoy oonfirmod for me tlo noooaaity of finiahin^ qaioily
at Uc\aielak. I wrote in n\y ordora of thia day 1 .
In spite of tho s r e a t numbers of the onetny in the vicinity
of LaaiolQk-Borico.vo, I bolievo that in thic plauo .vo are numerically
and materially superior to tho ^olahovlo.
iiy reason of tho importance of tho buttlo thut lo bo in; v/a#od
in thia oootor, I order formally tho attack, at tho pruuoriuod hour
v/ith a l l forooo, oonvor^od on i!a.:iolB;t, which inust ab3Olutoly uo
taf;on by tho proaorlood tin-o, without roj?ird to loaaoo. Jor tho
information of a i l , I will follow cloooly tho happonin^o auA I will

1. 8r"dor uo. GU4/3, Vth Army, s l^nod >onoral aikoriski.

 -64­
reliovo rrora oomauuid uny of floor evon tin) holders or tho raojt di.8­
tin ; $uiahed poaltiona, ./ho, in ao gravo a momont, doo3 not 3ho./ onou^h
s p i r i t of ro:ii8tunae and Qnor^y.
JJonorul U8inaki rooiovoa at the sano tine a l'orrul order to
take li'uaiolafc tho aumo day boforo 4:00 1\M.
Of General ^rujowaki, in s p i t a of tha o r i t i o a l a i t u a t i o n of
hia l e f t fla:ilc, I dei.uind mi uttuolc by tho 3iboriuii orlg^do on
l.aaiolaic from tho north aa he hua boon instractod.
Uo ono dooieved my oxpootutionj, rer.oral UeinaKi hurled tho
u^th Infantry *{o^imont on Nunu iCukurzo'.vo, aupoortod by u r t i l l o r y
and i'ree in thla nunnor hia rl,^ht; eurly In the afternoon lio movod
forward tov/ard the north with hi3 ontiro divialon.
On hia aide Jenarul ^rujo.vaki., in apito of hia d.uirjoroua s i t ­
uation aent t'-a 3 i b o r i a i Jri^ado in tho dlrootlon indioutod. i'hi8
i3rifj>vdo took 32lU8to\vo at ^:oO iMii., i t throatonod tho i'lunlc and
roar of tho .tod tri.opa onjj.if5od a t IJuoielok, whioh donoralissod tho
onemy, ao.vovor roaoluto .voro tho 3ovlot dlvioion in tlva dofotiio of
Uaaielai. Thoao made many oountor att;ioko with tho bay ono t aapportod
by a r t i l l e r y and intense fire of tiutomatlo .voabona. .aoanv/hlle
the audaian troopa vigorously proaaod from tho aouth und throatonod
from the north savored and "^un tc {lvo way horo and thorn.
At t h i s moment Jatvjrdl u a i n a i i hurled hij troopa to tho aa-
Bault and broke through tho 6th 3oviot Lividlon. Driving baolc
tho onon\y vifjoroualy ho entered Hualel8l: vlotorouuly at 4:00i\U.,
a £9 A of urma v/hioh iro/ltod for him tho war orous Tor .
VJ .:tue.
 -05­
At the same timo Jolonol Luozynaki broko the rasiatanoo of
the 11th 3oviat Division .vi.ioh opposed hi:n. bellowing up tlio flight
of the .;od troops at tho head of the Uth Division, he guined Kas­
iolBb from tho .vojt ut 4:30 P.M. The 3nd 3iborian itegirnent and
units of tho Volunteer Division entered l^aielak simultaneously,
talcing part In the final as3uult until this aity rang with the
ories of triumph of our soldiery.
To exploit the victory, i t .vas neoossury to purauo withaut
pause the Soviet troops which were in retroat and oven, in tho
Naaielalc aeotor in full flight* A well orfjanizod and energetically
pressed pursuit would ^ive us decisive r e s u l t s , i t y;ould strike
onerr\y troops who were withdrawing or who were panio stricken uid
destroy them.

In tho plan of p u r o i i t , J.t v/as not Juat a oaae of overrunning

the .(ed troops, s t i l l fi<jhtin> near .asiolsl;, from the north itui
cutting Oi.'f their r e t r e a t . i'he jUivisAons on tlo ri.^ht flank of
the AY Soviet ^rmy atilJ held fast in spite of tho f a l l of Haeielak;
even nore they pressed our ldth Division so stroiv;ly that thoy plaood
i t in duntfor. It was i>ot then possible to movo the 10th Division
or, mure to the point, to break tho right wing of tin XV 3oviot
Army*
'i'he entire situation oould bo changed ay tho utt*ois: of tho
lot Ai'my, in attack offoativoly ordorod by tho Jommandrr °i' t,he
Uorth front 1 . It hud un order to ittuok: frum iogrza on Jultusk
in a northorly direction. Vhis clireotion vory .viaoly ohooon offered

TI ardors No. 41^7/a, i6th August li)ao at 7: '0 r.M. Horth front
si^nod jjuoral ilallor»
 -06­
ohanoQ8 i'or decisive auoooaa. Tho 1st ,wmy unfortunately oould
not f u l f i l l i t a mission. The 7th ;\osorvo i r i j a d o stationed a t
;iegi\jo was too woal: to oarry the oneniy trenches or mate any &i*eat
pro&rosa.
./e thon or.-janiaed tho p u r s u i t in our zone or a c t i o n . Tho
17th Division rooiovsd orders to push the onomy e n e r g e t i c a l l y to
ir^ure tlB security of tho Vth Anny to tha e a s t and, if poaaible,
to advance and eieze the lerook bridge on the 1'arevv. The Jth
Jivieion and the Volunteer Division reinforced by a rogiment of
the Jiuetfian Bri,;ade must a t tho same time purouo with tho fjroat­
oat energy by throwing for//(U'd lii;ht dotaolvnont3 in automobiles
and horae o a r r i a j o s . "
In this order, i t was rooommondod to send foiv/urd with th)
purauing detoohinon s iioiiB li^hu a r t i l l e r y . Tha mission was "to
aooure aa quickly as poasiblo tlw oroaain^s or tho Karow a t - u l ­
tuak, to oriwh tlio Jolahovio troopa, whioh aooordin^ to a i r roports
./jru orov/4in<5 th030, and to oapturo aa tmuli manorial us poajiole^"
I t v/aa not poatii^lo,, unhappily, to roalizo thoua d i s p o s i t i o n s ,
ihe Vth arwy having uaod a l l or i t 3 roaorvoa lwd 5io i.ore ii'oah
troopa; i t wag not ooholonod in dopth us i t ohoaid have uoon at
this time; i t v/a.j v/indod. u»e Oommandor or i \») i'ront oould not
support hio very propor dirootivos .vith froah Lovioa of roaorvo.
In Taut tho 10t)\ Iiu'autry Division, ,/liioli ,v ia i.old b-iji: i'or u.?u
ut thio important noinont v/ua a t i l l iv, /ioo H i :;uo u.v t-'uo inton..lnaolo
(-7 around .\ad3y^ln.

i<o. Uuii/.J, Djtli .a^ust lD.iO, t'ortl* iV

 -87­
Tiio troops v/hioh liad tukon I'asiolsr: v/oro constantly fi.rhtin£
during r.iany days and nifthta; thojr .voro ao exhausted that they
v/oro not ubla to gather the onor$y neooosury to uiraue. ihoy must
f i r s t eat and than aleop aovoral hoars bofor; they would bo in
condition to advance.
The ni#ht rfhioh f e l l oontributad to relax nervos too Ions
put to t e a t , ao th*t in tho f i r s t hour3 a f t e r tho la^iiv^ Ox llaa­
iel3ic i t ;va8 impossible to oxouato tho abovo ordor. Vhis dOiii'ivod
us 01 tho f r u i t s of v i c t o r y , whan ti.o olghovio ;v:ia leavin:;
Ila3iol3t; t janio atrioken; thiB o::joooc B to oi..a\";otio oountor­
attaok whon thoy iiud out an onci to t h e i r temporary d i s o r d e r .
In aoite of t h i s tniufortunG \v>& t l a honvy loasoa sufforod
ut rusiolul: tho no./s ox o vr victory ovokod ~onorul thar)c8>lvin^.
The oo:,i;;v.r/uji' i>.% ti.o north front doolorod, himaolf "doliThtou /i Ih
ti.o !.'.-. «•/ tho Vth .»n:iy;" ho 'iv/aitocl our aotU'n .v.Li.^t .iltiak
and plaood ti.o 5ti. i'ojurvvj r i > d o urnior i^y onlors to f a o i l l t a t o

i.' a;),Jivaiaed o.caotl^- t/uo onomy o i t u a t i o n ; lio c a l l ­

ed uttontAon to tho l.*ji; of t>laiio and. tho norvouunoaa of tho
*\UB8iuns i t t h o i r operationy.' 4 ilo onocura^od ua "to continuo
to oomiuor" >itid Btatod that 'tho Jolahavio offunaivo was oollapainfj"
iiut tie o i f f i o u l t i e o at .uidzyrnin oontinaod. Vhi i 1 ;ht oonsnonaod
tho 10th Alienst in tho morning laotod during a l l da;.1 of tho lGth
August with vttri.\blo rotnilta. Jenoral .ioli^o-zati triiunuliod f i n a l l y
a l l alon^ tho l i n o ; hov/evor ho .vu3 i.ot ablo to ut tho 1 th JDiviuion

1. Ordoru no.Tl37/»5, 10th August VJiib at 1iOO,i\U, .liorth

front.ai.jnod :5onoral iiallor
a. .toport Uo. d6(S/a, 16th .avsivat l'J^j, norht f r o n t .
 -80­
a t tha diapoaition of the front .vhich ooliged /onoral Bailor to
ropiaoo i t <v:.th the Gth .io serve iirigido .
In the Lower Vistula 300tor the 15th division of Soviet
Cavalry attacked ./loolawek the loth .tugust and oompoiled i t s
feeble garrison to f a l l baolc to the left bun; of tho Vistula after
haviiitf burned tho oriage.
The 10th Soviet Cavalry liivia ion auooojdod in potting oloae
to llleazovva and. Bobrovmitci ,/hore i t fired tho f i r s t shells on tho
./araaw-Dantzi(;-Jdynia railroad.
^nomy rooonnaiasanoo dotuohmenta appeared at I'loo'f.
The aorieo of dooisive fi^hta on the .tira end at Naaiolst
absorbed tho diviaiona of the Illrd iiussian ->rmy which would have
been able to reinforoe the ofi'onaivo of tho XYIth .irmy* Tliis
faot and the on^apercent of the th.oee Russian .\rmioe to tho north
of tho iiuf Karea exhiiustod Tuohaozowski's rosorvon; thoy freed
,/araa\? and the sector of tho 1st i'olinh armies on tho north aide.

COUNTS o;''iv:«3ivis OP :ii£ ,/iw.t;

This some day, .taraaw '.va8 freed to the aouth by tho Jump off
of the 0 ounter - offe naive of the Oonvnander in chief of tho Jiopra
base (3ice toh Ho. 6)
Tho command of the troops oonoentratod on tho uontor x'ront
had been taken over by iiarahal I'ilaudQki hisoolf, who tfna at al­
awy tho 13 th .tUfjuat with a rodaood opo rat ions stiff, rho oominandor

3* OiMor iio. 41.^/ii, 16 .lUfljust 1'J.iO, North front

vie nor al Joseph Hallo r.
 -89­
in Chief devoted throo days for tie material organization 01* the
oountor-offensive and to oringin.;? up to strength noat of tho div­
i s i o n s 0/ the Jonter front with fresh reinforcements. Tia morn­
ln* of tho 16th .m^ust he s t a r t e d from hia JUBO of departure
Demblin-Lubartow-Oheltn to a t t a c i , by sur : >ri30, d i r e c t l y north.
On his l e f t General 8 icier ski attacked at tia head of the
IVth .a'tny (14th, 16tn and Slat Diviaiona). Leaving Domblin-Ly-
siboki-IIooic ho tnarohod >y v/uy of janvolia and Ilolbiel, on l.'insk
Uazo'.viooki, by ioleohow on .Jiluaayn and by Lukw/ on 3ieldo~t
To his r i >ht marohod leneral .iydz-Smi^ly a t the ho ad of the
ofienaive #roap of tl^ I l l r d .knny / l s t and 3rd Divisions or
Legionnairoa, 4th Cavalry 3 r i $ a d e ) . He att^olced north of Lublin
and Jholm on JaroaOi? and ..'lodawa.
The att*ok of thaae troopa was iidod oy auroriae, t u o t i o a l
as well uu 3 t r a t j g i o . It only ran into the bulk oi% the onorny
masse3, on tlo a.;i3 of ciawh of the 14 th Diviaion,
In foot iouoral .lor.trzo./aivi pushod tho advanoo by i.uoiojo.vioo
on JariVO^Ln in adv;uioo of other lar^o unita, at t i e ho-d of tiie
oxoellont diviaion from Jrand Poland, whoso i'ir>htin.c; worth .vao
alv/jya bolstered up by Jolonels raskiewicz md Andors* iio mot
the 67th 3oviot Uiviaiona ut )yoow and dofeatod it*
On the contrary ;ot:oral budoe (16th Diviaion) marohiivT on
3tojaok and )oraral Jdliou (^lat fountain Uiviaion) narohinf? on
ilooi: mot no sorious oppojition fron^ tho om'r^y.
)enoral Dab-i3iornaot:i f l a t l o t i o n Diviaion) a t t u o c i u ; .iudzyn
ouptitrjd a mixed dotuolimont of tlo 3oviot i..osyr :ruitu 'ouoral
 -00­
3erbeolci (3rd Legion Division) attaodLrv? .Vlodtiv/a defeated the G8th
3oviot Mvieion which -.vithdre.v to tho north.
The Gotnraandor in chief having in thia inannor upset the ri^ht
flunic protootion of tho XVI Soviet .irray reached on tla evening
of 16th .uigust tho line 3ttr//olin-3eleoho.7-^adzyn with tho 3rd
Legion Division a t .;iodawa.
Thi3 movement was e f f e c t i v e l y covered to the oast uy lenoral
Zigraunt .^ielinski a t the head 01 the covering group of the I l l r d
^rmy, in apite of tho l o s s of Krubieszow tulcen t h i t day by units
of the Xllth Soviet Army^ Hie tniasion waa mude oa3ior for him by
tho fuGt that iudienny attuotod on the 16th .iU(?uat off center in
a direotion between 3u3k and -oiinionta 3trmnilo;va on tho *>outh oust
front, v/ith tho aim of breu:<in& thia front and oontinumf; the
march on Uvo.v .vith tho Javalry i.rmy.
i'lie oifenaivo of tlio Joma-undor in whiol md i t a f i r s t roaulta
ware incorrootly eatit.uted by Aio]uo3e,v3ki, who in orinciplo did
not modify the general -Uapojitiona of liis :'ront. livsre '.vaa on
tho oontrary ^ ir.vnedi.ito re ; )oro;iaaion on t):e .araav/ opor.tiona.
In fact aiohaaewati resolved to parry .vith only the wYIth An.iy,
thio inoidont Judged of seoMKv»ry importunoo; i:e dooidod to aus­
pond ii;\medi.»tely tlto offonjivo of tho ..VHh .irt^v* on .iudnymin ITA tho
i'arau.7 b rid/jo-head and assigned f.o t h i s 1 .r;^o unit » s t r i c t l y
defensive wisalon.
The pro^reao oi* tlu o l i i h diviaiono to/ard tho north p^r-tlling
the .iuoaiuu fi\-nt ahov/od up ainoo tie 16th '.a:;u;t ti.o .iaoliko3noaa
cf \'i.c v.aaivo j'ront of our Ilnd ^r,::y. Ala aooLcr .via J it o.'i';
 -91­
tho Jocinvmd'U* in Ohiof plaood .it tho d i s p o s i t i o n of tto Vth .»rr.\y
f i r s t ono ri^do .r.d t'-.on tho othor ;rL-j-uio of tlu 4th Infantry
lUvision, vihilo ho i:opt the ~ind JiO^ion i-iviaion in J. H. ^.
reserve it Jauolin.
l a i ' i n ; this tino tua troopa oi" tho IV th >:viot .r.uy ocutimiod
to naroh to tbv3 .7ajt tla'a-.tonL'K;; ei.iorania aorioualy.
Iu i'aut ti.e 10th ioviot Chassour ^ i v i J i * n t having d9foa*,od
oar Habioht, detaobnont h-A laken iabiluowc l\:o 12th •uvjuat,
brea::in^ the re3iatanco of t)o looal n i l i t i u or^i.uizocl O.HT,t tnooualy
by Ilacicj i-iol^ynaJct, i t was on tic 14th ..-.^aat .-it hil2u.nl: xnu
tool: -rodnioa (3trua3!>iir;j) on tljj 15th ui"s^ust.
un tho otiiOi' ],U:o t;.o X.'. ;lr;- oT h ^ - J l u n took '.'uronin o.nd
.vjjin on l o t h .viju^t; i t o-4.>tu'3c1 )ot..foon "iosnx/a ar.d iubrovvniki
t,;o or c\u* boats v/hioh woro c-u'r;"in: r i t i o n s and munitions to L'.odlin;
i t flavin tod boldly tho l o r t i J i o d placo o." Vhjrn in -.o::iaranin.
ani-.t ,vaa not thon in a at ^to to OVOTOOMG tho u.». TOr .vhioh
ti i t . +ho Russian O..valry in J o n t i n i l n t to advaixjo oould
out tho l'ii!..•-.*;,• oo'-inrinioutioiu? bot.;oon 'oluiiti jjid tiit a on and r.vi':o
voiv d i i ' i i o u l t ti;o supply of our u i n i t i o n s of wiiloh tho atooka .voro
boin ; ; oxr.Aviato6 .
Tw oo;.>'.iand in Jonorania lud bo.tn v.'ouiranad by tho orontion
of tho Aoja ,;roup; i t hud at tliis tl rxj noithor truinod ^olCiora
or 8uffioi.«nt n itori«l to orj-junizo no.v vinitst
Vho aitiuition v/aa than d i / f i o u l t for ro.ioral h'ausor, oomrwrd­
in* tho fortroao of Thorn antf Mu -roup of f o r t i f i e d o.mipa of Thorn,
irudzius or »i\iudonta (Jolon*)! iiaosbour^ , Jholr.mo, 3viooio (Jtal ijak)
and ?ordon (Lieutenant Osarlina'ri). Tardily facing the imminent
danger, stripped of his regular u n i t s ( ho bid to i;:v>roviso h-.istily,
garrisons for hi3 different f o r t s , aided by r e c r u i t s recently
oulled from the deputs, f o r t r e s s b a t t a l i o n s ur.c. fleuertors takon
oat of prisons« The garrisons thus constituted ./ore only t jo'r:o
but tijey ..ere bettor Ihitn an rr.tiro ab.jonoe oi" i,.e olcrv.ont o '
dex'ense.
In his ca.xioity as Jou-aandor of IVern lonoral llausor sont t i e
£15th Uhlans on tl.o lA*.veja in the vioinit;. of ^rodniou and. cooiuod
to oonoeal h i s v/oakness by the aid cf h a s t i l y i':nrovised r.ooilo
detaolinents. .». b a t t a l i o n and a battery which ho sent ta.v:*rds
IlieszB'.va, in fuot, forced tho iolshevio to .uilX baoi: to t);e ri.^ht
bank of the Vistula, 'ron intona ivo reoonntiissaiuio thrown out
from Thorn to\;:;rd east v.-horo they nat';ed s i i i l l f u l l y t)*o ;usol -.te
ir.aa^'i^it,,' fv.>r rasi^tu'ioo.

*1JO over.ts :f tj.0:?6 t./o J : I ; J are ot forth as folla./s in :YQ

h i s t o r i c records of th; .Cusai^n fos;jrr.l i t a f f . ^
Tho 15th .»-iT.'wSt, Jonrulo ^houv.-kiof, coa'.ViUuin: the IVth .irt.Ty,
with a vio.v xo a i u i n ; the ri-Tht v/in^ of tho .Vt)* .iin.iy ordcrod:
1°. tlio Mth 0i-.;a&eur3 Division :. i l l atUu-.L ariO'iV in lYa
d i r e c t i o n .iaoiar.-*lo:ak, covorin-: i t s flan': low.ru liiivP ,1ool: UJXI
sudlntainin: liaaon ..ith t..o 4th Infantry i i v i d i o n •:f tho .'.Vth .ir*\y,

It ..'anuriTi-. J.oli::ov.'. .'ojiia-. ioloPcl'Vriitai ^-i :o ."11, par-A-Ti*:; >h

.^ to pa;e «'51o, translation o ' Japtain i. 'n;»y,;u.v8;;i.
 -93­
,/hose r i ^ h t is in the v i c i n i t y of llopno (on the ./ta
2°. xiia l a t h OhaaaaiTv Division will rorcain in tte v i o i n i t y
of l
3°. Tho 13th Ohasae ir Divi3ion w i l l attack e n e r g e t i c a l l y
d i r e c t l y on i'lonsl: i n ooiOunotion with the 54th Diviaion.
4°. The 53rd Ohassoir Division, occupying t'r.o saotor >iezun­
j , w i l l o ovor t i e oporationa of tho IGth and 54th Divisions.
5°. The I l l r d Oavalry Oorpa v/ill i\3oupy tho front I.ipno­
lc and cover tie saanouver oi* the 54th ,18th Ohaaseur d i v i ­
sions toward Thorn and tha »ri8tiiLa; to thi8 end i t w i l l tooj indor
aurvoillauoe prinoipally tho front on the i'i8tula Troa *loolav;#i
to J l o o t .
The order mentiona further on that tho oor.v^and po3i. ci1 tho
.:r:-y v/ti3 at Oieohar.ow and .vould ao Tioved t o Maw a i f tlio s i t u a t i o n
a.Tar.tad i t i
It is u i / f i o u l t to '^redict ,vlvit rosulti? would h;\vo boon a t -
t.i'.n:d if t-.o divisions of t'r.o .r:^.* h.id jon^oi^iou i t r i o t l y to thia
.--lor, M:K" ir wr.t troasuro t.ho euocosa thus ^-.iir.ed :.*t flir.ak -.'ovild
:. ivo irifluonood tha :-str ite ; :\io s i t u a t i o n on tl:o on t i r o front, it
in i'da.lity this ordor was novor carried out in t i:c i.wv1ority of i t s
uot.iil^. In fv.it the otn'-x; pi •lotrntod In tiio j<\p bo two on the IVth
and ^Vth ..rnios around »lint*jooi: and took: -•iool^uiow, \t l ? : 0 0 .^.Lr,
on tho 15th .k-.i^ut, v/hen tho oor.irvir.d poat of tl.o IV ioviot .viiny
v.as loo itod iti oonfon.lty ..'ith t i.o AOOVO ordei*.
Vhia incursion of a ro:inont o.' one;fiy cvalx*;: coli'od ii,o oc;>
::(andor of \.\.o IVth r:.v to ov^o.; ; to ' I.o t v;n L^rjcci .ktoly. '.l
 . -94­
i ts^> staff of *hd front and the .Tvth .Army was interrupted
by tnie raid; i t waa not reestablished during the Jours of our
re treatfour retreat was necessitated by our absolute lack of meanB
of strategic communications)
However tte IVtb .Army Gommunder in losing, temporarily, Cio­
ohanow not only l o s t liason with the Oommander of the west front
but also with his divisions (except the lfcth Chasseurs) which r e ­
mair.3d two days witUou* orders aooording to the reports of the

The radio station of the IVth .-.rciy was burned by i t s ohief,

who feared to see i t takan by the enemy, then in possession of
Cieohanow.
Thus at the moment • hen the enemy renewed his onergotio at­
taolcs on tho right of the XVth Army* the bulk o£ the forces of the
IVtii ^rmy were already far to the west, to reoall i t would have
meant vie lay in case the IVth .xrmy had tc be re^i.-ocqped to cooperate
more directly with the XVth Army. >
Our 8et back in the Violnity of . 'eohanow and VCB bonding back
of the light of the XVth -iXrmy obliged tho Gommanier of the front
to issue instruction Ho. 351 dated the 16th August in vhioh he gave
to hifi arraies the supplementary mission "to envelop the ovor ex­
tended Polish group.
The IVth Army received orders; to leave a covering force facing
west and to attaofc with i t s bulk; on Saohooin-Zakrooaym, i t s reserves
assembled in the vicinity of Oieohanow-Praasztiysz, The XVth Army
v/ur to attack Plonsk vigorously and roaoh with i t s right the road
 -96­
PrzaszTjysz-Cieohanow. The Illrd army formed With i t s right an
attack group which marohod on Plenak: in Hason with the XVth Army,.
and finally thy 56th Chasseur Division was direoted to hasten i t s .
movement on I la tow.
The limits of the zon^a of action wore fixed between the IVth
and XVth Arm lea as Przasznysz-Oi-Jzen, between the XVth and IIT.rd
armies at &ozdn-Nasielsk—7yszogrod.
Farther telegraphio orders Wo. 378 of the 16th August oonfirmed
to the Ulrd Army to direot the 56th Division at once on Mafcow at
the disposition of the XVth Army; this division was to be reassem­
bled at llakow at 8:00 P.II, on 17th August with a view of moving
next on Przaaznysa. A division was to be placed in reserve (the
21st Ctiasseur Division).
In oonsequanoe of these movements, tea situation of the IVth
Army was as follows around the 16th August: The 12th Chasseur
oooupied the area around Strasbourg, the 10th Oavalry Division
was around Bobrfcwniki, the 16th Cavalry Division, .Yloclawek, the
55rd Chasbeiu- Division the area LipnO-//loolawak~Tulibowa. The
18th Infantry Division took Toslioe with i t s right brigade and a t ­
tacked vA t h two brigades from BrvidzevD-LIystkowo on Plorsk. The
54th Chasseur Divioion continued to operate on the Sacbooin-
Ciechanow front*
In the direction or ilonsk and Modlin, around the 15th August
the enemy was concentrating strongforoes which our Intelligence
Servioe of the .Vest ,?ront estimated at 40,000 infantry and cavalry 1 .

T"» Estimation twioe two strong (author's Ho to)

 -96­
On the front of the XVfch Army, the enemy attacked stubbornly
a l l day long on the 16th August. ' 0 u r troops oounter-^t tacked
many times, but suffered heavy looses in the faoe of the enemy
f i r e ; they were forced to withdraw at 19 hours the 16th August and
oontinue the struggle on the line;
4th Chasseur Division: Sarnowa (Jora, Bankovro, llbv/e Mi^sto*
16th Chftsaeur Division: Nov/e lliasto, Andzin fall reserves
engaged)
2he 11th and 5th Divisions (Illrd Army) had at f i r s t reached
the .Ykr& and oroaeed to the right bank; they were unafcle to v/ith­
stand the enemy oounter-attacks and pulled baok 6 or 10 kilometers
east of the Wkra fllasielsk station, //ulka, Kikolska) whilo their
advanced elements held 3l£dovro,
The 33rd Ohasseur Division of the XVth Army reassembled the
evening of the 15th August around Koleozyn, received the mission
of attacking the morning of the lOth August to retake Oieobanow
(base of departure 8 kilometers to the south east of this town)
On the front of the 6th Ohassour Division the enemy poured
a scathing fire from the Moditn farta and from two armored t r a i n s ,
which shuttled book and forth between Czarnov? and the front of
this division.
!fhe 21st ChaBseur Division, cooperating with units oi* the
27th Division on tho 16th of August repulsed b r i l l i a n t l y the enemy
attacks, united and retook the ground around Hadzymin.
The enemy continued to fire a l l night of the 15th and 16th
August, with his a r t i l l e r y ana automatic arms on tha front of our
 -97­
XYth and IXIcd armies* Our amunition stoolc3 in the Armies voro
so depleted tha* we oould not think of replying to thi» enemy
attaok by fire*
Our brigades and regiments wore extraordinarly lev/ in effec­
tives and laoIced oartrld^oa and shells to suoh a point that they
had to abstain from responding to the enowy firo during t'ro wliole
day.
Tte 16th August at daybreak, the Polish troops attacked
energetically, assailing Lt the same time the right of tte. XYth
•»rmy and the Junotion between the -tVth and Illrd Armies*
This same day, the 33rd Chasseur Division fulfilled i t s mis­
sion with suaoess. Taking 1200 prisoners and 7 guns it broke
into Cieohanow and oleared out this town at 7:00 P.M., The Cavalry
group(86th and 90th Cavalry Regiments) put at tVe disposal of the
33rd Division pursued with suooess the Polish troops who withdraw
in disorder to that south west or at least the few who escaped in.
•'•• • . ' • i . " . • » •

1
captivity.
The result of these fights of the 16th August was that tho
divisions of tha ISVth and Illrd Armies f e l l baok on the liner ;
railroad Cieohanow Hasielsk:, Nasielsk: station; Nona, 3©rook, Itokre
where they rejulaad with difficulty the continued ene*ny atta^ia.

I . Aooount in error. The 33rd 3oviet Mvision,did not fight;

the 8th Cavalry Brigade at Cicohanow, because this brigade (previously
estimated by the Russian author to be a regiment) avoided in reality
a l l serious combat at Oiechanow and evuodated the town at the timti.'
The success, of whioh there is a question, had come, as I have al­
ready mentioned, on the front of our 42nd Infantry Division in the
vloinity of 3onsSc (author's note).
 -98­
The stubborn fighting of the 14th and 15th of August in the
vioinity of llqdlin ana on the flkra shewed clearly thnt the ini­
tiative of tte operations in tbiB sector was passing progressively
into the hands of the enemy. /Ye bad failed the 14th and 15th of
August, in npite of a l l of our efforts» to break the fortified
front of the Warsaw bridge-head and likewise to the south of
Okuniew•
The fire of enemy armored trains and automobiles ploughing
along the roads and railways paralleling the front broke, .pitilessly,
a l l attempts of our divisions to get forward, in thalr exhausted
and weakened condition. Around the 16th August die enemy suooeeded
in pushing back the 27th Chasseur Division behing the atruga, while
the divisions remaining with the XVIth Army oontinueC to fight
along the line oooupied the 14tb and 15th August*
Around the 16th of August however the balanoe of the foroea
was changing radically, The news Xrom the left flank of the west
front was disturbing and the enemy orders intercepted disclosed
the import of his oounter-manouver; the Commander of the fleet front
had then to take security measures to remedy the situation of the
XYI Any; he directed it to plaoe the 8th Ohasseur Division in re­
serve and to avoid engaging i t , while Hiking his dispositions to
thftflvthe 8th and 10th to the south (more or less) toward Lukow.
The check in our offensive in the tfkra in the vioinity of
Uodlin and in front of Warsaw furnlahed to the Polish command a
favorable onaasion to execute order Mo, 8752/3 and to realize his
 -99­
ingenioue plan: the counter offensive ox tte Wieprz.2
• . The situation on the -teat Russian front, the 16th of
August is sufficiently summarized in the conversation by Hughes v.
whioh toot plaoe the night of the 17th -18th August between the
Commander of the /Jest Russian front and the Russian Commander in
Chief, quotation:
The ooounander of tb& tfest front: "the 16th of August the
enemy attacked along the whole front; having thrown back the 4th,
16th and 11th Chasseur Divisions behind the Cieohanow-Modlin r a i l ­
road, he took Naeialsk.
The Illrd Army stopped this attack about the line Nasielsk,
Nuna, 3erook, 3truga r i v e r . The enemy in the //arsaw bridge-head
pusned baok the 21st and 87th Chasseur Divisions from Radzymin to
the Struga. Mozyr Group: the 67th Division was driven back to
the line MagnuBzew-Laskarzew-Zeleohow-Parozew; the mixed group was
driven baok to a line 5 kilometers east of Parozew; the 58th .
Division continued to attaok and advanced t o v/ithin 10 kilometers
to the'northeast of 3iedllszose. The Xllth Army took Hrubieszow
and advanced 12 kilometers to the northeast of thttpoint.
The intercepted .enemy orders-showed that in the vicinity of
Lublin between, the Vistula and VYieprz they had assembled a new
Army in advanoe with a mission of attacking to the north; the
mission of the Illrd Polish Army was, to oover this oohoentraticu
and to gain time until the 18th of August.

2. Kakurin-Mielikow. tfojna-Bielopolakami. P. 316-318

translation of Captain >!. Czaykowski.
 -100­
Under these oonditions the movement of the 1st Cavalry Army
was an absolute necessity. I pulled back the Oth Chasseur Division
to Lukow, but the 66th Division was on gaged and it a displacement
was slaved up* The enemy wcs bring ing up oonstantly new Volunteer
units, while he withdrew 4 Poaen d i v i s i o n from the front of our
XVIth Army. Today the 16th of Au*;. ^e Comrade JCork commanding the
XVth Army affirms that in ppite of all,our troops ore s t i l l in
condition to fight. Many reinforcements now en route will reach
us. I am preparing to incorporate them into the front line units.
Ir general I admit that the Lublin group is dangerous to us,
that a powerful enemy offensive is possible and that we must dis­
place the attack group of the XVI Army (that is to say, i t s right
flank).
Ho information on the movements of the 1st Cavalry Army; the
order was transmitted to Comrade Budienny this morning. The Cum­
mander of the IVth Array is at Sierpo"
The Commander in Chief: "I Vftve indicated to you the im­
portance of the Lublin area, s t i l l , for my oroasictf at Minsk. I
have put you on guard against sliding your whole front to the
north; I fear above a l l for tie XVIth Army. <>aln:cn the 11th of
August. I gave instructions for the regroupment of Budlenny* By
reason of a series of annoying events, this regrouumsnt has not
yet commenced, and to-day i t i s not sure that i t will begin to­
morrow. In foot the Evolutionist war Soviet of the CavaU-y Army
having reoieved instructions over a single signature (yours) is
not oertain of i t s authenticity and demands on i t the oountor­
aignature of a member of tte Revoulutioniat War 3o*iet of the Front;
do thi^ immediately so that these instructions may be executed* I
do not approve the idea of pushing the IVth Army along the oorridor
to the north. I advise you to send the 143rd Brigade of the 48th
Infantry Chasseurs Division from Vilna to Brajt-Litowsk. I am
oomplately of the opinion that you should dj.splaoe the attack group
of the XVI Army, beoauae I disapprove formally of the frontal at­
tRolc that this group has undertaken."
From this conversation, i t develops not only that the loft
flank of the strategic Polish front, and especially tbe^t of the
Ytlx Army, was developing i t s offensive successfully, but also that
the offensive group of Marshal Pilsudski had commenced to exeoute
i t s oounter-manouver. .
Before passing to a description of the offensive of the Polish
Armies, we will endeavor to show how the success of the Pgles in
the vioinity of Vfieprz were envisaged by the Commander of the XVIth
Army and the Uoayr group. .Likewise we w'JM try to eluoldate the
instructions given by the Commander of tno .Vest front after the
opening of the enemy offensive. "
The Cpmmander'of the!XVIth Army, having reoi«ved on the 16th
August the report of-the retreat of the Uqzyr group, did not
admit at a l l , that tMg group had encountered any considerable
enemy for cos. He was convinced that only the 14 th en<=j\y division
was operating around Demblin. ^e judged then that the withdrawal
of the Mozyr group was a passing inoldont due to the low state of
material and morale '-'.' this numerically weakened group*
 -102­
This optimism was shared by the Commander of the Mozyr group
who in hla report (by Hugheb) to the Oommrnder of the ?ront o on firmed
the opinion of Opmrade Sollohub; before him were operating only
minor em my foroes.
In the oonversation above between the Pront and the Commander
in Chief, we sea that the Commander of the i/est ?ront in possession
ox* intercepted enemy orders, knew already -hat a new enemy army
was being assembled around Lublin and foreoaw the whole situation
maturing on his left flank.
The Commander of the ?ront was absolutely sure that the
advance enemy elements were followed by more powerful enemy foroes;
also by Dispatch Ko. 392, operative the 17th August, he ordered
very olearly the assembly of the 8th Division of the left wing in
front reserve at Lukow. It is true that a olose examination of this
order, shows us that the Commander of the West Front did not forsee
at this moment that events would follow the rapid sequence observed
the 17th and 18th August*
Ac o or ding to Tuohaozewski on the Contrary:
The Vth Polish Army driven behind the Vistula 2 reoieved orders
to pass to the offensive and undertq6k i t on the entire front of
the XVth and Illrd Armies.
Our offensive had lasted already for five weeks. We had sought
for five weeks to reaob the aotlve foroes of the eneniy and destroy
them in one decisive buttle, During those five weeks in the White
I • v . • :; ., "• '•" '

1. Tuohaosewaki. Maroh on the Vistula, page 49.

3. Error (Author's note).

 -103­
Polish Armies wore constantly avoiding a deoisive battle beoause
they were in f u l l rout; on the Vistula, the Poles having reoieved
reinforcements decided to fi^ht. We oould not well see where we
might meet the principal enemy resistance, on the Vistula or be­
hind thD Vistula? But we might; be certain that we would meet some­
where the bulb: of his forces and that weowould defeat them in a
deoisive battle.
And tore tto enemy himself was giving us the possiolitiy of
attaining thiaeud. The Vth Polish Army, the weakest, from the point
of view of strength and morale, passed to the offensive against
our XYth and Illrd Armies, when his uncovered left flank was within
reach of the freshest and best units of our IVth -irmy.
The Commander of the front was overjoyed at this news. The
XVth and Illrd Armies reoieved orders to counter-attack the enemy
resolutely on their whole front, and to drive him back across the
V/fcra. The IVth Army was oovering itself from the direction of
Thorn; it attacked with all i t s foroes, in•the very act of manouvor,
the flank and rear of the enemy, by marching from the vicinity of
RaoiAz-Drobin on Modiin.
It seemed that the destruction of the Vtb enemy Army was
t»rlom
unavoidable; i t led up to the most Mfflfc consequences in the oourse
of a l l of our latter operations. However fortune smiled on the
Poles. Our IVth Army did not estimate the situation well, beoause
its new chief had lost liason with the general staff of the front.
Heoieving no orders from the front he left in the area Haoiftz-
Drobin a vague system of incomplete seourity and threw his units
on the front tfloolawek-Plook.
 -104­
The Yth onemy Army was saved. Although i t had on i t s flank
and rear our powerful IVth Army (4 Chasseur divisions and 2 divi­
sions of Cavalry) i t oontinued unpunished to attaofc our Illrd
and XVth Armies* This illogical situation, unprecedented, allowed
the foles not only to otop the progress of ou* Illrd and XVth
Armies but alao to drive them back step by step to the east*
lit this moment our ZYIth Array had vigorously crushed the enemy
troops; i t was 8lmost up to the crossing of the Vistula where the
enemy counter-attack forced i t to f a l l baolc. It came back at. the
charge; than followed unimportant fighting with variable results.
 CHAPTER VIII

THE XVTH AND IIIRD SOVIET ARUIE3 ARE THROWtf 3*GZ BEHIND
THB NAHErf AND TUB LEffT tfllTG OP THE XVITH ARUY
13 DESTROYED

VICTORIOUS BATTI33 0? TH5 VTH IRUY AT PL01JSK HUD PULTU3K

The enemy previously drunk with success, was thrown buck far
behind the tffcra and l o s t from t h i s the cohesion of his front. In
faot his XV and Illrd Armies were divided after our victory a t
Hasielsfc into two fragments; one continued to fight to the south
o± Oieohariow; the other withdrew some of i t s divisions on Pultust
and others on Serook: and .Yyszkow.
The enemy commander took into account tho danger which threat­
ened him then. Profiting from our i n a b i l i t y to pursue, he bent
a l l efforts during the night of th> 16 to 17th August, to quell
the panic which had spread since Nasielrfc-- He counter-attacked with
the fresher units of the 66th Chasseur Division, o f f i c i a l l y put
at the disposal of the;2Yth Army,, bat retalnr/d in r e a i i t y near - ^
Naaielsk; he reassembied at Pultusk, and Serock, the" retreating u n i t s ,
and restablished there energetic d i s c i p l i n e and t a c t i c a l control.
The dooiBions taken at t h i s moment by the Commanders of the I l l r d
and XVth Armies did not take much notice yet of the decisive action
 -106­
of tbb group of the Polish central front debauching from the
The victory of Ifaslelsk brought ua to the 2nd-mission of the
Yth Army; to finish off the 17th 3o7iet Army and the Cavalry oorps w
whioh was operating on the Lower Vistula. To prepau ourselves
there, we must throw back the enepy east group behind tbe Uarew as
80on as possible and after having thus assured the safety of our
right turn against the forces remaining tc the west of the Harew.
from tbe Instructions of this day, this intention shows as
fOllO.YS. 1
Tbe 7th Brigade had boon put under my orders by the commander
of the ?ront, which enlarged my zone of action ip to Zegrse, 3erook,
Pupowo.2
i't was given the mission of si a zing quickly the crossing of
the Narew at 3erocfc by attacking vigorously from the south; this
would out the principal line of retreat of the Illrd Army retreating
on Jyszkow,
To the same end, a seoonlb7;idge over the Narew, more to tie
north at Holendry, would be taken by the 17th Infantry Divisicn
(right of the Vth Army) which at the same time would pus!i its front
to the south of PultusL.
Pultusk, where the bulk of the Bolshevic troops were massed
on their return from iiasielsk, was to t?^ taken front tie northwest
by the Siberian Brigade reinforced by the 22nd Infantry Regiment,

1. Order Ho, 613/3 of the 16th August 1930, Vth Army, signed
General 3ikowrski.
2. Order Ho. 4137/3 of the 16th August 1920, North ?ront,
signed General J, Haller,
 -107­
, }.ooated the 17th August In the vicinity of
Pruainovrioz, was en the axis of Attack: Praewodowo-Pultusi; and oo­
oupied & good position from which to launch the projected operation.
The at took arranged by the two flanks y/ould yield a l l important
insults while saving us'iess losses.
The la ft flank of the array must s t i l l be left to do i t s job
alone; i t was reinforced progressively by the formation at i T n«»k
of the Dreszer group (9th Cavalry Brig ado and anits of the 6th
Infantry Brigade transported in autobuases, graauatSy, as they
arrived at Modi in).
The 9th Infantry Division and ^he Volunteer Division would
paas to army reserve; t h i s directive had as i t s aim tha freeing,
as soon as possible, of a part of cur forces to send them next to
faoo the enemy west group.
T:& commander of the Korth iront did nut change his dispositions.
His orders reoiflved a t day break the 17th of August prescribed
the continuation of the attack to the end of outting off tha
r e t r e a t of tha ^uesian foioea operating wast of the line tiodlin-
Ulawa; he organized minutely, on the other hand, the cooperation
of the right of the 1st Army with the actions of the Oo>.vaur>der
in Chief by making the 15th Division attack as arranged from west to
east on MiLsk-tiazowleoke.1
Tho oommanders of the Russian Armies which, weakened by losses,
were quitting the V/kra and lfauielak, sought to better their s i t ­
uation by a plan of reaction. The XVth Army was to counter-attack

"». Order lfo. 4139/3 16th of August 1920, 23 hours, north

front, signed Jeneral Hallar.
 -108­
wlth i t s ri^ht wing, by ongaginR f i r s t l y th9 33rd Division of
Koub«n; i t would alow up the retreat of hie le.?t flank. The Illrd
Hussion Army was to rest on the llaraw and reouperato i t s foroes
for u oounter-attack, afterwards, on Naaielski Tho whole plan vras
to be oompleted by the attaoic of two 3ovlet divisions on Plonstc
and Saohooin.
This plan was oorreot in principle, but it was workable only
if tho Vth .wrmy remained stationary and if thd Russian armies
thrown into aotion, although di3or;$ani<*od, oould suooodd in oo­
ordlnating their oommon aotion in time and spaoo. But the two
oonditions oould not bo fulfilled. llov/«svor tho relative aotivity
dieplayod at thoao points by the uifi'orent Soviet Divisions nao­
essitated the engagement of almost a l l of the divisions of the
Vth ,irmy av.d altered oar plan of uotion, agreed v.pon durit\<^ the
preceding ni^htt
Although tbe enemy was finally boaten in tho oourue of the
fighting of thio day, ho elowed up the progress of our troopa; thia
saved +h« Russian divisions in the aot of orossing tho Warew and
retarded tho ro$rou.>ment prouoribod for our Vth Army*
In faot the manouvor ordorod for the 7th Keeorvo Brigade was
notably hold up by tho aotivity of unite of the IIT-M Soviet .irtny*
It was not until aftornoon t i n t Oolonol LlnlaohowBlci roaohod
rokray/zonioa and uot i'oot on the left bank of tl» Narow at Seroak­
.fiorzbioa. Ho onuld not then, retoh tho rear of the Hussion unita
on thoir w*y back from jJaalelak, a part 02! which withdrew on
kovr, tho roat e eoupod toward Holondry and ^ultnslc*
 -109­
The energetic oounter-attaoks of units of the 6th, 11th and
66th 3oviet Divisions on the nor: ing of the 17th August against
the oenter of our Army immobilized the 17th Division; it fordod
the engagement of the 9th and Volunteer Divisions, designed tu
pass to Army reserve. The 17th Division, only reaohed Uolendry
that evening where they found the bridge over the Harew burned.
The two other divisions had to aaoept combat on the lino ii'innioa-
Kedsiorowiot, and the Volunteer Division there again suffered
heavy lossdo*
finally the 9th Division broke the resistance (<£ the huesians
at .Vinnioa, in ocoperation with the Volunteers, it foroed unite
of the 6th and 11th Soviet Divisions to fall baofc; i t took PulVisk
at 18 hours, a feat of arms due to the 16th Infantry regiment,
and brought about by Major H&ppe of the <?'renoh Army.
In the neighborhood of Ohmielewo and Pruainowioae where the
Siberian Brigade was, the fighting was stubborn sinoe early morn­
ing, with variable Mole. Our troops had for a moment to abandon
Prusinowioso. finally tho Ooleliovio reaiBtunoo was ovoroome there
also; 3zoae#oain and Jasiorowo w*oro taken; JU«I tho Siberian Brigade
had not been able to f u l f i l l i t s mis a ion of at tao Icing x'ultualc from
the northwest.
1
The left flank of the Armyt the 18th Division repulsed repoatod
assaults of Communist; regiments of the 33rd, 4th and 16th Soviet
Divisions* All of the dttaotta of these unito were directed on
Jaaooin, 3amowa 3ora, Ojmon; thay soffered heavy losses and wer*
repulsed. The 8th Cavalry Brigade was at OJrzen on this day*
 -110­
Plonsk, the weaic apot of the Vt-i Army, was on the 17th o£
August the weno of interesting operations where our Cavalry regi­
ments distinguished themselves*
Colonel Dreazer had a di£ftoult mission. Ho oommanded a
hastily organised group; two regiments of Cavalry and an inoomplete
infantry brigade, beoause the movement of the 8th Infantry Bri­
gade was not completed. It had orders to attack the enemy whioh
was threatening Plonsk with elements of two Infantry divisions.
It was itsQif attaoked around Sarblewo, at a moment when i t was
preparing to attaok Bobossewo. His two* regiments undertook de­
fensive combat, in the oourse of whioh they wore enveloped first
from the north then from the south.
The 201st aegiment of Light horse, particularly, found i t ­
self in a orltioal situation, in the oouree of whioh ita oommander
Major Xulessa was seriously wounded. The greatest danger was ar­
rested by Major 3robioki, who, at the most oritioal moment, ohurged
at tho head of the 1st Hegimonfc of Light-horse, from north to south
paralleling the front of his threatened neighbors; at the oost,
unfortunately, of heavy losses he routed tho enemy and gained tho
deoision for us.
In the oourse o£ his energy Mo aotion, oolonel Dras.ier oap­
tured a battery of £1 heavy machine guns, 700 prisoners and some
equipment of the 18th Soviet Division, on which UU infleoted a
large number of killed ana wounded*
In tte sector of the Lower Vistula events moved along with
nothing noteworthy r aavo t)o bombardment of iJloofrwek. Tha Huesiane
 -111­
seemed to employ tho day of the 17th of August, than, in bringing
up the 63rd Division from tho Vistula and in exeouting operatives
order No. 28 of tte oommander of the IVth Army, who oontinuod to
betray hia oornplete ignoranoo of tho general situation of the
Soviet troops.
In the exeoution of those dirootives, the Cavalry Corpa of
day-Xfcan intensified i t s reoonnaiaaanoe; he Bent numerous and
important rooonnaisaanoe detachments in the direction of Thorn.
In resume the 17th of August was oharaoteriaed every where
by the defeat of the XV th and Illrd Soviet Annie a, tho%uaaian
sources themselves acknowledged i t ; this was also a suooossful
day for the Vth Army on the entire front*
.le guined a looal Buooeae at Plonsle where were thrown buolc
tte elements of the IVth Soviet Amy whioh oounter-attaokod our
left* xt the siune time we defeated the ^od divisions whioh were
holding us to the east and throw them baotc aorose the ftarew* This
Bolshevio defeat would have boen tar icd into a disaster, i f we had
been able to exeoute the ^vu w eot^ uotio\ on iHiltiisk and 3erook.
To exploit the suooess w u on the 17th of August we intended
to oover oorsolves on the Marew, on tho right bank of wliioh the
Bolohevio s t i l l held, and to i'aoe the maximum foroe against tho
IVth Joviot ^rmy to olear out and seal up tho oorridor separating
us from east Trussia, and thus out off the retroat of the IVth Army*
 -112­
FIKST RESULT 02 TH3 OPS^NSIVK 0? riM3
OOl&UNDKR IH OUIKF

The evening of the 17th of August we rooiovod the f i r s t i n ­

formation on thd viotorlouaaAvftttOut of Marshal Pllaudski. Tho r e ­
s u l t s of tho two days of fighting In t h i s theater were considerable.
t

General Kornaraewski continued to .advance having defeated the

6th Soviet Division at Kolbiol und Dembe tfiolkio. Tho 16th and
21st divisions hia neighbors had taken without fighting I-Caluatfyn,
Luka7. then SeidtoJ, v/hile the lat Legion Division roaohed Mieday­
raeoz and Biala.
On the right flank of tho Central front, General Berbeoki had
taken Wlodawa by night* The morning of the 17th of August he oon­
tinuod his maroh on Bres%sur--Bug; in cooperation with the 4th
Cavalry Brigade lie attaokod and completely defeated the 68th Soviet
Division at 31awatyo86*
In the offensive of tho Central front was oooporatlng, this
day, our 16th Infantry Division which fought in the sector south
of the Varaow bridge head. Jonorul Yung commanding this unit was
strongly opposed by the attack of tho 10th Soviet Division exoouted
exactly this same night on tho bridgo-Uead* He waa only partially
able to fulfill hia mission, .tfter the rupturo of the enemy posi­
tions (the morning of tte 17th august) he attaoked along the route
V
.
are aw-Minsk Itazowiookl with only tho aaaault battalion of l-lajor
M&tosynski and three(3) resorvo battalions of the division, instead
of tho whole division as he had boon ordored* Kover the lea Minsk
 -113­
Masowie'ofci, threatened simultaneously .from the south by tte 14th
Division f e l l without muoh trouble to the hands of the 16th Divi­
sion whioh was after this, attached to the IVth Army.
This converging attaok by two Polish divisions broke the 10th
Soviet Division whioh v/ys defending the out skirts of Minsk.
In.the fighting deaoribod above, the troops of the Central
front took in the neighborhood of 10,000 prisoners, 40 oannon and
socres of maohine guns. The evening of the 17fa August they found
themaolvep, as'well as the 16th Division on the line Minsk Mazowieofci,
Xalusayn» SiedUa, MiedByraeG, Biala, Ifcdlaska.
This XVIth Soviet army was now defeated. As its oovering
foroe the Uozyr group and i t s two divisions of the left wing (8th
and 10th) were destroyed, it found i t s e l f in a very diffioult po­
sition. In order to e.:trioute i t , i t s oftief ordered vigorous
looal oounter-attaoks. whioh slowed up a moment the advonoe of the
left wing of the Central front. The -With Army was thus enabled
to withdraw from the glaois of Jarsaw in spite of the great dis­
order prevailing in i t s divisions.
The Xllth Soviet Armj and the Uudienny Cavalry Army played
no part in this buttle* The former displayed no aotivity on this
day, The Xllth oontinuod to vonturo towurds IAVOW without profit,
both thus oontrovening the formal orders of the Russian Commander
in Ohiof.
The next day, our oenter front v/ao reorganised. The Jind
army was reoonstituted and oompriaod; 1st, 3rd, 19th, 21st In­
fantry Divisions* 4th Drigude and Jav/orski's dotaohnont of Cavalry.

* ( 1 b i l i m Ihli should U th« i«titr«)

 -114­
The 4th Army woe oomposed hereafter of the I4t>i, 16th, 16th Divisions
and the ISth Brigade a l l infantry. The Illrd Array formed of tho
2nd and 7th Infantry Divisions v/us attached to the Central front.
The axis of pursuit of the Ilnd Army passed through Uiedayi-po­
Bielek-3ialystok. Tha 4th Army waa directed from ilalusayn on
Ostrcw-Ostroleuka. The Illrd Army continued to assure the seourity
of the right and rear of the armies a,ttaoking north*
The events which took plaoe from the 13th to ths 17th of
August to tte north flank of the ^ via elan front and the flank mar oh
of our ./iepra group the 17th August provoked a l i v e l y reaction in
the Russian Commander in Chief. The Russians tried to counter the
Polish i n i t i a t i v e ! but they were in too muoh disorder.
The Russian radio telegrams intercepted by the Goran under of
our north-front showed that Tuohaozoweki's deoision vrua s t i l l waver*
ing. In one of them he ordered the IVth Army to throw the Illrd
Oavalry Corps and the 63rd Infantry Division against i?lonsk. In
the next, he prescribed the uonoentration oi the entire IVth Army
in the area Oleohanow, Uakow, I'ssasnyss and entrusted simultane­
ously the attaok on ^lonsk to the III Cavalry Corps a l o n e . 1
finally he found himself greatly emburrassed by reason of the
extreme dispersion of his troops; he endeavored above a l l to re­
o o n s t l U t e the IVth Army in a mass oapable oi delivering a violent
blow to the north.
Ultimately, by reason of his uuooessive errors, Tuohaozevrski
found himself disarmed at the dooisive moment or the war, facing

1* conversation by iuigtaa of colonol '.a^orski with ileutenant*

Colonel i/olikovfski t^je 17th august
 -116­
tho Polish Commander in Chief, who followed the r e a l i z a t i o n of his
great atrategio oonoeption on one front with a p i t i l e s s tenaoity
and on the other with an order rarely enoountered.

ATTEMPTED aUSSIAN REACTION OH THB VISTULA

The plan of Kussian oounter-aotion, although incapable of ao­

oomplishment, was oontainod in orders No. 406/op. of the 17th
August, north wesi .front whioh presoribed: 8
1°. The IVth Amy w i l l leave a oovorins foroe faoing flrom­
berg (Bjudgoszoa); i t w i l l group for the 20th August, in the area
PrzasnysB-Oieohanow-Makow, at l e a s t 2 or 3 Chasseur Divisions and
the I l l r d Cavalry Corps, with a mission of attaoking i n reverse
the enemy whioh s t i l l is operating against the Illrd and XVth Armies*
8°. The XVth Army w i l l oover the assembly of the IVth Army
and attaok at the eame time, with a part of i t s foroeo, the enemy
group in the v i o i n i t y of Plonsk.
3°. The Illrd Army w i l l defend the approaches to the Nar#t
(
and the Bug from i t s oonfluenoe with the Karew to the right of
the -vVIth Army* It w i l l hold a bridge head at v/yBBkow, on the
l e f t bank, of the Bug* The 21st Chasseur Division w i l l be sent
i n three marches by way of Koasow to Drohioayn in front reserve*
4°. The XVIth Atray w i l l withdraw bohind the Liwied and w i l l
plaoe two d i v i s i o n s in reserve behind i t s l e f t flunk;
5°i The Hosyr group w i l l throw baok t ^ onomy from tho
v i o i n i t y of Bialt and w i l l defend ut a l l ooats the area 0*>now­

2 . Kalcurin-iiielikow* Woinon o liiolepolakami, translation

by Captain Ozayko.veti.
 -116­
3 iala-31owatyoze;
6°. The Xllth Army will oohtinue to attaok vigorously with
the bulk of its foroes on Chelra-Lubartow; the 66th Chasseur Divi­
sion reverts to it;
7°. The 1st Cavalry Army will make evory effort to reas­
semble , at a l l oosts for the date fixed, in the area .Vlodsinlorz
f.fladmir) Wolhyneki-Usoilu£ with a view subsequently of attacking
the rear of the enemy offensive group•
A Russian Author oomments in these tterms of the aotivlty of
the Russian Command and intorprets thus the above or dori
. . .We deem it useful to study this order in details by
reason of i t s great strategic importance, beoause it summarised
a l l of the Special orders given for the period 16-17 August*
The Commander of the West front took into consideration the
following situation on the 17th AugviBt: the 18th Division was
fighting around ^lonsk, the 64th Division was attacking from Wola
Druse on Saohooin; the remaining 4 Divisions of the IVth Army
(10th and 16th Cavalry Divisions, lath and 53rd Chasseur Divisions) »
were very far in advanoe. Consequently he thought the XVth .vrmy
would have to pass through three phases in exeouting a new oounter­
manouvor:
1st l>haeo--To repair to the region indicated, in other words,
to convert itself lntc a strategio roBervo oi' the west fronts
2nd rhaao--./hile the troops of the IVth .trmy wore re vohing
the region x'rji&anysa-Cieohanow-l.takow, thay must attuok around

1* Kakurin-liielikow. /olna c 3ielopolukaw.i, pp. 64 and

 -117*

Plonst, the rear of the enomy Modlin group, to put an end to its

offensive against the XVth and IXIrd armies.

3rd Phase — If the situation of the XVth and UXrd Armies

was still notioeably aggravated, the IVth *umy would have to

attack in a southerly diredtioi somewhere between the Liwieo and

the Bug*

It is neoessary to prove that this plan of operations was

altogether oorreot, in view of the new strategic situation of the

right wing of the west front, Still, it permits of. two decisions

of prinoiple and of exeoution of a delicate moiouver. It demanded

tlit
then onApart of the troops a great rapidity of action and also
on the part of the Commander of the Army muoh oharaoter and i n i ­
t i a t i v e , as we'll as a profound knowlege of troop leading.
In so far as oohoerned the retreat of the XVIth Army behind,
the Liwieo the Oommander of the front ascertained in the units
of the Uozyr Jroup a great lessoning of mor-ilo, he aoknowloged
t h i s by withdrawing thoso units rapidly, he auooooded in wresting
then from the embraoe of the enemy and freed his flank, he should
be able to assemble rapidly and group the divisions indicated,
in rear of the l e f t flank of the front; the Oth, 10th and 81st
Chasseur Divisions I the l a t t e r oornlng from the III Army was
assembled at Drohioayn but must move more to the * >*th).
In general, this part of the order was equivalent to a de­
cision to retreat on the whole rront, exoept that of the <iVth
and Illrd .irmieo which must maintain their position, in order to
<?ivo the IVth Army a ohanoe t o withdraw.
 -118­
Conoerning the XIIth Army and the 1st Cavalry ^rmy, thej kept
t h e i r former mission, to destroy tho Lublin group of enemy by
attacking the rear of the 3rd and 4ta Polish Armies. To this
end tho 68th Chasseur Division was put a t the disposition of the
Xllth Army, the lot Cavalry Army reoieved an order to execute
more rapidly instruction 36l/op of the 16th August.
But the Communier in °hief, when he reoieved Instruction No*
406-op. of the West front analysed the reports from the right flank
of tho West front and estimated that he must propoae certain
nodlfioatlons to tho ner phase of the front. </e find them ex­
pressed in the interview oy Hughes of the morning t£ the 18th of
August.
— Commander in Chief: "From tho intelligence reports of to­
day, I estimate* that the IVth army is well plaoed to a t took the
flank of tho enemy dispositions. In consequence, i t seems to me
that your order to concentrate the IVth Army in the area rrzasnyez­
Oieohanof-Makow is not absolutely justified. It is better to oon­
tinue the maneuver already oommenoed by these divisions. Moreover
a ay-Khan is already across on the right bank of tho Vistula, and
I doubt whether i t will be expedient to ohango his mission. I
have started the 66th Chasseur Division and the Xouban Brigade
of the <trmy reserve of Comrade )olborg, whioh are at your disposal."
— Commander of the Front: "In r e a l i t y , It' the XVth and Illrd -
Armios fulfill their mission, the IVth-^rmy will a ^ l n positive
results oy operating from i/lOQlawuk on Kutno. *iut tlie .(Vth and
Illrd Armios are constantly hara god by enemy attacks, so much so
 -119­
that tie Commander of the away, Xork, reports straight forwardly, t
that the troops are beginning to weaken, ^his fact obligee me to
seek at all ooats to defeat ti.e enemy .iodlin 3roup, all the more
ao Binoe only a part of the Cavalry corps has orosset tte Vistula
up to the present without positive results*
The enemy Modlin group comprised evidently oonsiderable strength
when surrounded on three sides by nine divisions i t oontlnues to
win BuooeBa after suooesB*
I have decided consequently to reinforce my covering force
approximately on the line Strasbourg-.Vloolawek-Qoslioa and to orush
the enemy Modlin group with the bulk of my foroe.
Besides, the situation will -undoubtedly foroe me to oreate
oertain reaervoe to moot the changes In disposition, I doubt
whether I oould ibrm a manouvering mass \"\ attaolc from north to
south before having disposed of the Modi in Oroup.
Thus I have had to limit tte mission of the IVth Army to
avoid the dispersion of a l l the forces of r.iy right wing since this
army is widely separated from the theatre of the prinoipal action*
The oavalry army has reported that on the 16th ^f august i t
wus in the aroa Juek, 3ielirzed, Bialogora, ./iezno^ieo and that
i t had already mot rosistunoe»n
-- Commander in Ohiof; " You have not understood me; I speak
of tt.e opportunities of the situation of the IVth to attack: the
rear of the Modlin group; I think that the Cavalry Corps can at
the same time tafce ./orsav in r o j , if it ia dirocted without
Go lay on l'loolc*
 -180­
Tilat which you are preparing now I wrote you of i t as far
baofc as when you gave your directive to a l l the ^rmios; in a
subsequent interview I have shown you the necessity of an attaok
from north to the south, oat this was duria^ t)je battle on the
Bug. You resisted there, you have obstinately followed your own
idea; novr I wish to derive some sort of profit from i t if poaalbla ,
and I believe i t ^osaible, notably by attacking energetically on
Plonak-3akrooaym and Plonsk-Naaielsfc with your assembled forces*
I demand that you t e l l me whether you w i l l do i t , or if you per­
s i s t in your deolsion to rewvte the divisions in the area Oieo­
hancw-iiakow -^raaenyaz•"
-- Commander of the I'Yont: "In presorioinr, this assembly I
have given the mission to attaoic thorn in rear* It is true that
I have introduced a restrioiiou there with regard to time; the
IVth .>rmy musl attaok their rear before oonoentratin$, while the
XVth and Illrd armies have a mission temporarily defensive booause
tvfo or three days are nooe3sary for the OavJLry Jorpa to bo at
hand and until that timo the -Vth and Illrd Armies oannot move
offensively.
.Vhut i s the Matter? ^otually although .ve may bo oonquorors,
we are weaker then the x'oles. .^o have laao fao i l l t i e s for man­
ouver than they have. Moreover ihe 1st Cavalry ^rmy i s belated
when I oounted on i t on the l e f t flank of the main foroes. Under
these conditions i t i s neoeusary to destroy the enerrty Uodlin )roup."
-• Oommandor in Chief: "Are you sure that tho -nvalry ^nny vrll
naroh in the prop-sr direction?
 -m­
-•• Commander of the /ront: "I don't thlnft this will offer any
speoial diffioultiea but in the actual laolc of liaaon existing I
oan only oflnflrm that tha Cavalry Arrjy will exeoute this movement."
The conversation above seecm to end inconclusively, as if tho
Commander of the ./eat ?ront refused to disclose the aim of his
direotive. In the main his directive organized a sadden retreat
in order to reoover the possibility of nunouver.
The XVth Army alone had an aotivo misslon t of an unique looal
itnportanoe that of facilitating the retreat of the IVth Army. But
the direotive only considered expressly the regroapmenv and did
not 8peak at a l l of a retreat*
Evidently, the Commander of the -'eat front did not hope to
win quickly from tho Vth Polish Army. He did not intend to engage
in this struggle so long as the situation oS the XVIth Army mid
the iloayr Iroup could not be bit to red.
In any oaae, after the above conversation the directive re­
mained in force without modifibation. Moreover, neither the deoiroa
of the Commander in Chief on the subject of the new disposition
of the IVth Army, nor the provisions forecast of the -Yont Com­
pandor concerning the .CII»h Army and the 1st Cavalry »>rmy ;voro
realized*; beo^uoe at the moment when v/e decided to put an ond to
tho Vth Polish Army in the vioinity of :.oalin, and on the other
hand to take Iwow ut a l l costs, the en any oy his powerful offen­
sive fran south to the north broke the left flank of tho west front
and reduced to nought a l l o£ our plane11.1
 -122­
. . .Tlw Divisions of the IVth Army were fighting under very dlf#­
ioalt oomUtions; they were so far advanoed to the west of the
Vistula that information on their Buooesses or failures reached
the Commander of the -test front wi & greatest difficulty. The
rooordc showed that in the oourse of the fights of the 17th August
the Commander of the front knem nothing of the exact situation of
the unite of the IVth .irmy; the Commander of the IVth /rmy himself,
circulating between his starf and the division s t u i f s , was inex­
actly informed o* i t .
The 15th August Comrade Chouwalfjfcv commanding the IVth Amy
x'ound himself at Lipco whore he me.t also Comrade day-Khan command­
ing the Illrd Cavalry Corps. They reoieyad information frcm th©
staff of the 16th Infantry division (Drobin) that throe hearers
of flags of truce had arrived a t their headquarters from the
Polish command. These parliamentairee'proposed an armlstioe aru
the surrender of a l l the divisions of tl* IVtb Soviet army, seeing
thdt this army found i t s e l f already surrcunded and that O.leohanov/
had fallen into Polish hands.
These Polish parlimentairea hod orders to await the reply of
the Jommander of the IVth 3oviet Army until the 17th of August.
-a'ter this'tine and in case of th3 refuasl of the Army Commander,
^r.e Polish troops would attack oonc«ntWoally on Sierpo, Lipno,
_;lon8k, Jiechanow and Soldau (Bzialiowc) to achieve the envelopment
und de&traotion of thr. IVth ArnyT
To parry t h i s eventual enemy blow, Comrade Chouwaiew Commander
ci the IVth Army before leaving the'nent day for his headquarters
 -123­
at 3ierpo, ordered the Illrd Cavalry Corps "to oieze the area
around V
. loo lav/at and to cross the Vistula."
At this moment hie 18tfo and 54th ChasBeur Divisional1'; were a t ­
tacting desperatley to oapture Plonsk, while the 63rd Division and
the Cavalry Corps (10th and 15th Cavalry Divieione) were continuing
operations south of Lipno. His 12th Chasseur Division fcund i t ­
self J.n the Vioinity ut Stra3Sburg.
Xn exeouting the above order t h e Commander of III Cavalry Corps
oommenoed his operations on TTLoclaweK* lie defined clearly the s i t ­
uation on the Lower Vistula (iVtb Army and Illrd Cavalry Corps) in
the following terms "After many f r u i t l e s s attempt» t the Cavalry
Corps aided;-by a brigade of the 53rd Chasseur Division suooeedod
finally in siezing the bridge at sYloolawek and threw advance de­
taohments into toe city and along the Vistula. At t h i s .aoment i t s
r i g h t flank got hold of Boorowniki; i t siezed, below Hieszawa, two
steamboats and many supply boat^; i t transported a covering force
by brat to the left bank of the Vistula.
The 17th ..ugust, the enemy having! broken the right win,? of the
XVth Army in the vioinity of Cieohanow, hurled several divioions
from Uodlin Ji t h i s direction, A part of this enemy force repulsed
the attaok of the lo.•'**••<• of our 1st Army on i*lonsk.
The situation on the remainder of the i/est Front was no better
known by the staff of the Cavalry Corps, than that of the IVth and
XVth Armiest by reason of the rapidity of the operations of tte
Cavalry and the la^k of means of transmission of information i?he
Cavalry jCorps had no o€har rae *ns of information th'^n the rare presb
dispatches on the subject of the West front, mosuagea from neighboring
 -124­
divislons by mounted llason agents, informatiorp. of the enemy
often included in operation orders of tie IVth .iiwy. Sometimes
i t reoieved full bags of old communiques. The Army had taken the
radio aervioe from itne 10th Division; i t lost It a t Cieohanow.
.iround 6:00 P.M. the 17th of August, by staffs agency of the
53rd Gha>aeur Division, I reoievod orders to quit the llieazawa-
Cieohanow front and to detaoh t'u& 6th Cossaolc Hegiment fwhioh was
acting a-3 a covering detachment tov/ard Thorn-Dobrzyn) to the vicinity
of Kifcolo at the disposition of the 63rd Division. I must besides
send the 86th Cavalry Hegiment immediately to Didaldowa at the dis­
position of the 12th Chasseur Division and attack: Plook with the
remainder of my force (bocause the situation of the XVth Army was
so o r i t i o a l that it was necessary to come to i t s aid)
I t is necessary to Add that the General situation of the IUrd
Cavalry Corps was very-b^d, at the time this last order of the IVth
Army was recieved.
I t had left i t s service trains more than 700 kilometera behind
i t , and had had no opportunity in the oourse of i t s march to approach
the troopu of the XVth and IVth Armies. Its effeotive strength
had been greatly reduced by sickness and the numerous detachments
required of i t s Cavalry regiments. It no longer represented the
powerful manouvering force which i t did at the beginning of operations
and which was so threatening at the extreme right of the West front.
The Commander of the IUrd Cavalry Corpa after having reoieved
ordors for the regroupment, in view of the attack on Plook, gave his
own instructions, Knowing l i t t l e of the situation of the troops of
the XVth Army he oould not render exact reports at the end of a l l
of his movemonts*
 -185­
"Even now--wrote he-,-J do not well see what motivated the order
of the Army oommardor. Did ha wish to make a feint with the Cavalry
Corps from J?look on Warsaw? Did he wiah UB to mate a i'lank.movement
in the rear of the enemy operating against the XVth Army to diminish
the pressure vxerted on this anny? In any oase he seems not to
have taken any oount of time, space, the situation of the Cavalry
Corps or of the enemy forces. This blindness was to oost us dear
a little later.
The Army order mentioned that the 18th Brigade of ^oot Ohas­
eear8 would attack from Bielak on Plook. ,
Instructions Hoi .36l/op.. of the 16th, August and Ho. 4O6/op. ,
of the 17tb August of the West front finally made clear the aim
of the operations of P3.oofc.
The general situation required in effect that we maroh on
Plook an1 in the general direction Plonsk-Zakroozym to relieve the
XVth Army 1 ind th» right of the Illrd Army exposed to tie bloody
attaoks of the enenv1 Modlin group. .
The enemy had already gained important successes the 16th and
17th Au^vst. He continued to bend all his efforts to drive baok,
as f»r to the Bast as possible, the r i g h t flank of the V7est front.
2y his uninterrupted offensive he wished to deter us from trans­
porting elements '.•!' the XVth and 11 Ird Armies to the south to aid
the retreat of tte XVIth Army, as had been planned. The PoliBh
Commander reinforced the left of his Vth nrmy by sending the 8th
Brigude of the 4th Infantry Division (2nd Army) to Plonsk.
The 17th of August the enemy progressed without pause on the
front of our XVth, Illrd and XVIth Aiwieo and followed step by
 -136­
step our troops in t o t r e a t .
A fight of three hour a a t iYinnioa, where the 9th Polish Divi­
sion breaking, through our r e s i s t a n c e , opened to the enemy the
road to Pultusk, which was taken a t 6:00 P.M. the 17th August.
At the same time the 7th Reserve Brigade of the 1st Polish Army
moved rapidly forward on the junoture of the liar aw and secured
the Seroak area*

ANALYSIS OP THE ORDERS OP THi3 ittJJSlAN 00MHAND1SR

All of the above i n s t r u c t i o n s of the enemy high oommand showed

o l e a r l y what ohaos reigned on the Russian side under the s t r e s s of
these l a s t events. .'X'hese happenings were not the scheme of Xam­
ieniev who played here the role of an observer more than one of
Commander in Chd.Af; the remarks that he expressed on the oonfused
decisions of Tuohaozewski were morever in part justified.
In faot ut t h i s date the resolute u t i l i z a t i o n of the situation
oreated by the e r r o r s of the IVth 3oviet Aimy wo ild al one bring
the Russian troops oloser to their objective. I t oould only be
aooomplished by a oonverging attaok of a l l the IVth Soviet Army
and the Corps of Gay-Khan on the rear of our Vth Army (with the
exception of the 12th Soviet Division too far separated, because
i t wae engaged a t Brodnioa). The continuation of the Cavalry
Corps to attook Plook was then nonsensical; the foroing of the
Vistula, with a view of marching on Warsaw by thg l e f t bank of the
r i v e r s t i l l more s o .
 .-137­
ICamieniev was nanifestly lod into error by the report3 of
subordinate Commanders, as to the aotual situation of the Russian
troo.JB engaged against the Polish Annies. Also he erved in ad­
vising Tuohaozewski to continue the offensive of the Illrd Oavalry
Corps in the direotion outlined by Paskiewitoh. He reoalled
having disapproved the plan of operations on the Vistula submitted
by the Commander of the .Zest front, but t h i s saroastio observation
only took the form of advioe, and not an order, the same as his
former disapproval was oonfined to a simple criticism and did not
take the form of a fizm dioision oonstfcalning the Oommaader of the
West front to modify his pltn. Now the situation of the seoond
ten (10) day period in August 1920 demanded that the Russian Com­
mander make clean out and energetic decisions, in full knowledge
of oause.
The Hussion Commander in ^hief did not know any longer how
to demand the execution of his orders for the regroupment of the
South west front, following v/hioh the Cavalry Army of BwdiennV-raust
be hurled to the north--last ohande to better Tiwhaozewski's s i t ­
uation, 'i'he Commander of the 3outh west fro i t t comrade Jegorow
had formulated the fantastic projeot of siezing Lwow, occupying
Przemysl and Sambo*1, then forcing the Dniester and threatening
Roumtnia; he clung to hid opinion obstinately here, even after
having put the Budienny Cavalry Army a t the disposal of Tuohaaaewski.
Now ilaraieniov, in his oonversati n with Jegorow the 18th of august,
contented himself with deploring the delay, caused in the execution
of his order, to face the Xllth Army and Budienny on Lublin. '.This
 -188­
delay had already had serious oonsequenoes, but i.amieniov was ab­
solutely unable to remedy i t .
Tuohaozeweki took theoretically oorreot measures in the face
of the events whioh developed on the northwest front* riut too re­
movod from tlie theater of operations, ho was badly Informed, having
rjs inexaot idea of the whole situation and did not secure the ef­
feotive direotiw of his battle* Jhen our Vth Army, in conformity
with ita mission, had defeated the XYth and Illrd Soviet .ironies and
rendered thus irrealizable the offensive on tfarsaw from the west,
Tuohaozewski overestimated the strength of the Uodlin group and
did not realize olearly the danger threatening to the south. He
believed that in order to escape from the t r i p i t auffiaed him,
"to oruah with the bulk of his foroe the enemy Modlin group", whioh
v/ould certainly not be enough to reestablish his position.
The destruction of the Modlin group should have been the work
of the IV Soviet Army, whioh was on the defensive around Bromberg
(Bydgoezoz) and should have attaoked resolutely the rear of oar
Vth army. The XVth 3oviet Army had for its part an order to oo­
operate with the IVth by attaoklng florist from the northeast, the
Illrd should oover the Narew and the left flank of the -CVIth Army
by oiezlng a bridge head on the Bug at V/yaakow.
Under the protection of these two armies and after having de­
feated the Modlin group, the IVth Army wa9 to have concentrated
in the triangML Cieohanow, Przaahysz, Mafcow. In t i l s fashion in
rear of the XVth Army's front would have been found the entire
IVth Army and the Cavalry of Oay-Khan in reserve of the </est front,
 Kamieniev was manifestly led into error by the reports of
subordinate Commanders, as to tho actual situation of the Hussian
trooos engaged against the1 Polish Armies, *lso he erarad in ad­
viaing Tuohaoaewsfci to continue the offensive of the IUrd Cavalry
Corps in the direotion outlined by tfaskiewitoh. Ho reoalied
having disapproved the plan of operations on the Vistula submitted
by the Commander of the .Vest front, but this saroajtio observation
only took the form of advioe, and not an order, the same as his
former disapproval was confined to a simple oritioism and did not
take the form of a firm dioision constraining the Commas dor of the
West front to modify his plen. How the situation of the second,
ten (10) day period in August 1920 demanded that the Russian COD­
mander ma See olean out and energetic decisions, in full knowledge
of cause.
The Russian Commander in chj.ef did not (enow any Longer how
to demand the execution of his orders for the regroupment of the
South west front, following whiob the Cavalry Army of Budienn^ must
be hurled to the north--last ohande tc better Tiwhaozewski's s i t ­
uation, i'he Commander of the Southwest front, oomrade Jogorow
had formulated the fantastic projeot of siezing Lwow, oooupying
Przemyal and Sambo*, then forcing the Dniester and threatening
Roumtnla; he olung to his opinion obstinately here, eren after
having put the Budlenny Cavalry Army a t the disposal of Tuohaasewaki*
Now Kaiaieniev, in his conversati n with Jegorow t\& 18th of august,
oontented himself with deploring the delay, caused in the execution
of his order, to face the Xllth Army and Budienny on Lublin. This
a mass which oould attaok then from north to south.
tfith this attaolc would have harmonised the offensive ox the
Xllth Soviet Army, in liason with the Budienny Army, from the
vioinity Hrubieszow-Wlodzimierea V/olynski in the direotion of Lu­
bartow*
Tuohaozewslci on the contrary appraised the situation of his
oenter with r.n optimism so unreasonable that he thought thit he
oould reestablish i t with the foroes of the XVIth Army alone; this
l a t t e r withdrew only behind the Livrieo, and not behind the Bug;
i t sent the 21st Ohaiaeur Division in reserve to Drohiozyn by way
of Kossow in thrae toarohes.
The XVI *rray must besides alter entirely i t s disposition; i t
was hoped that i t oould pUt the 8th and 10th Divisions in reserve
of the front behind i t s left flank around SoKolow. The Moayr group
should o.over Breot %nd the loft flank of the front on the line
Janow, Biala, Podlarjka, Slowatyoze.
The HUH3ian front would be thus stabilized about on.the line
jt'lonsk, Novvo Miaato, .Vinnioa, 3eroo(c, the i3ug, tho Liv/ioo, Janow,
3iala, 31owatyoae. The projeot was to aooornpliah then a vast op­
1
*
eration: the converging ofi'ansive of a south group (Xllth Army
and Budienny) and a north group (IVth Army and Jay-Khan) whoso
directions of attack intersected aroused Minsk JIazov/ieoki.
This plan of Tuohaozewski 's was fantastic and was grounded
on nothing. It is difficult to understand to-day how he oould see
the situation in so erroneous a l i g h t . In any event his instructions
oorrespondod by no means with aotualities and v/^re inoapable of
 -120­
exeoution, even with armiesTOre compact and manouvoruble than
Tuohaoaewski's word in 1920.
The Commander of the front was 80 iar led into error by
oonfuaad and inexaot information, that he believed in tho saooess
of the attaolc of the 18th and 54th Chasseur Divisions on ^lonsk
and 3aohooin; by hia instraotion Ho. 423/op., he ordered the XVth
A.rmy to attack Kowe lliasto after the arrival of the Illrd Cavalry
Corps in front of .eionsk, and the Illrd ^nay to rraroh on Nasielsk.
Thus Tuohaozewski believed he oould place a l l of his units,
as if the situation had not been profoundly nOdifiod. Now at this
moment our Vth Army was destroying progressively his right wing,
whioh weakened the hold of the Illrd Cavalry Corps and the 53rd
Chasseur Division around JPlook; Marshal Pilrotofci already held, the
line Minsk Mazowieoki-Sledloe, liiedzyrzeoz, Biala,. Slowatycze; the
XVIth Army was beaten and the IJozyr group no longer existed; and
Budienny oontinued to risk his fordo arcind Lwow. It is not as­
tonishing then that the plan of Tuohaozewski, magnifioant in theory
f e l l flat in the ft^ce of r e a l i t y .
The Commander of the .YeBt front on one hand had an exaggerated
idea of the numerical strength of our VthvArmy and believed that
he was engaged with several fre3h divisions around Cieohanow the
17th August, when aotually we had there a cavalry brigade and an
infantry brigade; on the other hand he did not make his conclusions
conform to his hypothesis.
The concentration prescribed for the IVth Army in the areu
aOieohanow-Przasny8z-Uakow for the 18th August was in Tact only
 -131­
possible if tbd Vth Polish .^rmy was orushed, or at least regained
inactive on tbd ./icra for many days. The Russian Gomnander did
rot izive the right, I believe, to pro a tuna this considering the
suooes8 already gained by this army and tie energy of i t s action,
and muoh more so as he attributed to i t such considerable strength.
The situation of the IVth Soviet .irmy v/us s t i l l aggravated
by the flight of i t s division staff, as early as the 17th of august,
at the news of the defeat of the MVth and Illrd armies, they with-
to
drew Praasnysz, Ustrolenfca and L'.mza on their o.vn i n i t i a t i v e , with
indispensible supply establishments; they wore directing themselves
on Jrodno, thus disorganizing the command of tha different units.
Likewise trains of the divisions were in flight to tha oast
by Cieohunow, Ckorzele, xlolno, oarrying with them the reserve sup­
p l i e s , making thus difficult repW.nshment. of the IVth Array, v/hioh
the ^i\ny oomMander had alwady oomplioated by his completely in­
opportum instructions.
In fact--Comrade Chou.vaiev summoned to surrondor by o.u* flag of
truce; ordered, on August 17th the oonoe. tration of a l l his troops
with a view to an attaotc upon JPlook with the maximum forces "bocaiae
the very c r i t i c a l situation of the XVth ^rmy requlrtsthut we go to
i t s aid".
This illogical order served no purpose and was particularly
harmoful, for i t diverted the troops from the principal theater of
operations which was, at that moment, ftonak.
The Oommandor of the IYth Army did not ive consideration to
the oonsequenoes of his i l l considered orders. The useleeo and
 -X32­
bloody confliota in th9 streets of Ploolc, the 10th or ^ugis t - ­
v/aro too late to ooqp«fe»*t4 d for tha loss of Jay-Khan &t Jplno.
The instructions of Tuohaozews'ci were even more fantastic.
His XVIth a,rmy wao already soundly beaten; i t was incapable of any
operation whatsoever, particularly of the oomplioated nwnouver ..v
.vhioh the Oonvnandor of the lestorn ?ront preacriood for it--the
IBth of ^;i