In re: Adoption of Edwin Villa insistence of rigid adherence to procedural form of pleadings.
The tendency of
Republic vs. CA Bobiles
Petition for review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts:
 February 2, 1988 – Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason
Condat (6 years old) who had been living with them since he was 4 months old.
 Nobody appeared to oppose the petition so on March 20, 1998 the court held
the trial and rendered its decision to allow Bobiles to adopt the child.
 The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals stating that the RTC erred in
ruling that the FC could not be retroactively applied to the adoption. The Court
of Appeals rule in favour of Zenaida Bobiles.
 Petition for adoption was filed of February 2, 1988 when the applicable law was
still PD No. 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code. The Code only required
that the petition for adoption be filed by either spouse. After the trial court
decided on the petition and while it was still on appeal in the Court of Appeals,
the FC took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the FC, joint adoption by the
husband and wife is required.
 Petitioner contends that the court should retroactively apply the FC because
Mrs. Bobiles did not acquire vested rights to adopt Jason Condat by mere filing
of her petition. The court, in applying the FC retroactively should have
dismissed the petition because it was only filed by Mrs. Bobiles.
Issues:
1. WON the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the FC could be applied
retroactively to the petition for adoption – NO
 Article 246 of the FC states that the provision of the code will only retroact so
long as its application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.
 Zenaida filed the petition for adoption under the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
This code allowed her the right to file the petition alone. Upon filing, her right
to file and to receive a decision in accordance with the law at the time was
already vested.
 The right cannot be prejudiced by the enactment of a new law.
 A petition cannot be dismissed for failing to comply with a law that was not yet
in force at the time it was filed.
2. WON the Court of Appeals should have modified the trial court’s decision by
granting the adoption in favour of Zenaida alone and not both Zenaida and
Discoro, since he was not a petitioner. – NO
 Discoro was not a petitioner but he submitted an affidavit of consent which was
attached to the petition and his testimony in open court shows that he himself
actually joined his wife in adopting the child.
 Adoption statutes as well as matters of procedure leading up to the adoption
should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the
adoption institution. Future of a child should not be compromised by arbitrary
modern courts is to hold that there need not be more than a substantial
compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the validity of such
proceedings.
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner
vs
Honorable Rodolfo Toledano (as RTC Judge) and Sps Clouse, respondents
June 8, 1994
Evelyn married natural born citizen of the US Alvin clouse in June 4, 1981. She
herself became a naturalized citizen in August 19, 1988. Her 12-year old younger
brother, Solomon Alcala, has been under their care and custody since she got
married (1981-1984, 1989-time of decision). The spouses are now attempting to
adopt Solomon. The mother of Evelyn and Solomon, Nery Alcala has given her
consent to such adoption since she cannot support and educate her son due to
poverty. Nila Corazon (the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child
Study) also recommended the granting of the petition for the adoption.
RTC granted the petition and has published such order in a newspaper of general
circulation for 3 consecutive weeks when through the OSG, the petitioner, contends
that the couple isn’t qualified to adopt under the Philippine law.
WON They are qualified to adopt under the Philippine law
No. Art184 of the FC states that the H is not qualified to adopt Solomon since he
is a natural born citizen of the US who is trying to adopt a person neither his
relative nor a legitimate child of his sps. See A184.
Even W is no longer a Filipino citizen when she tried to adopt her brother in 1990.
She may appear to be qualified to adopt him under par3(A) of A184 but the
petition cannot be granted in her favor without violating A185 which reads that the
husband and wife must jointly adopt except in cases wherein the adoption
contemplated is that of illegitimate children or legitimate children of one sps.
Court further said that this is clear from the historical evolution of PD 603 (uses “H
and W may adopt) to EO 91 (uses shall) and the FC. This is to protect the Filipino
children who are put up for adoption since the concept of joint parental authority is
the ideal situation. Also, since the child will be elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is only necessary to require joint adoption where harmony between the sps
can be insured. As such, the Court must uphold the interest and welfare of the child
to be adopted as such are upheld by the FC.
See 186 FC as well, it was cited lang to show that joint parental authority will be
recognized in cases of adoption under A185.
Republic v. Miller
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA. 1999
FACTS: Claude Miller, formerly a member of the US Air Force assigned at Clark Air
Base, and his wife, Jumrus Miller, both US citizens but residing in Angeles City, filed
w/ RTC a verified petition to adopt minor Michael Magno Madayag. Poverty and
deep concern for his future prompted Michael’s natural parents to give their
irrevocable consent to the adoption. RTC granted petition for adoption finding
petitioners to possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
adoption. Michael was freed from all obligation of obedience and support w/ respect
to natural parents. He was then declared child of the Millers by adoption. His
surname was to be changed from “Madayag” to “Miller”.
ISSUE: WON the Court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the
prohibition under FC, effective on Aug 3, 1988, when the petition for adoption was
filed before FC, on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, w/c allowed aliens to adopt.
HELD: Yes. The enactment of FC will not impair the right of alien respondents to
adopt a Fil child because the rt has become vested at the time of filing of the
petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. A vested rt is
one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to
the will of the holder.
The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Adoption statues, being humane and salutary, hold
the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill the noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.
Lazatin vs. Campos
Santos vs. Aranzanso
Department of Social Welfare and Development vs. Belen [July 18, 1997]
Administrative Matter in the Supreme Court
Facts:
♦ The administrative complaint was initiated by Corazon M. Layug, Social Welfare
Officer IV of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Field
Office No. 1 stationed in San Fernando, La Union, respondent Judge Antonio M.
Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is
charged with rendering an erroneous decree of adoption in violation of Article
33 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as "The Child and Youth
Welfare Code," and the corresponding Supreme Court circular thereon, namely,
Circular No. 12 dated October 2, 1986.
♦ Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized
American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor
Zhedell Bernardo Ibea.
♦ Judge based his decree primarily on the "findings and recommendation of the
DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the other
hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting
rules have been demonstrated to the minor."
♦ findings and recommendations, as respondent judge asserted in his judgment,
are contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report"
prepared by the local office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedañ
♦ When Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance
from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the
department uncovered what it considered as an anomalous adoption decree
regarding said minor. It turned out that the DSWD did not have any record in
its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from
respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in
the case. Furthermore, there was no directive from respondent judge for the
social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the
matter of the required reports for said minor's adoption
♦ The adoption never passed through the DSWD and as such the administrative
complaint was filed against Judge Belen.
♦ Judge Belen explained that he Vedaña to conduct the home and case study, and
thereafter submit the required reports thereon, precisely because the same are
among her duties under the Manual for Clerks of Court. Since these functions
were so provided to be performed by her, there was no need for him to order
said respondent social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD as he
assumed that it was routine procedure for her to do so.
♦ Vendana on her part said that there never was any directive from Judge Belen
to coordinate with DSWD concerning the adoption. She also denied asking for
money from the adoptive parents.
Issues:
1. WON Judge Belen rendered the adoption decree in derogation of the provisions
of Article 33 of PD 603 and of Circcular no. 12. YES STERN WARNING
2. WON Vedaña, failed to comply with the requirement in Circular No. 12 that she
should have coordinated with the DSWD in connection with the preparation of
the home and case study reports. YES REPRIMANDED
Ratio:
♦ Article 33 provides: No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the
Department of Social Welfare, or the Social Work and Counselling Division, in
case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case study of the
child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting
parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to
the court hearing such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall
intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study, that the
petition should be denied
♦ Circular No. 12 was issued by the Supreme Court to obviate the mishandling of
adoption cases by the judges. The circular provides:
(1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local
agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to
those cases already filed;
(2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree
.
The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall
coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services and Development
representatives in the preparation and submittal of such case study. . . .
♦ The judge should have notified the DSWD at the outset of the case so that the
corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted. The DSWD
is undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by
the court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation
♦ Judge Belen should never have merely presumed that it was routinary for the
social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding adoption
proceedings.
♦ Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a magistrate should be the embodiment
of, among other desirable characteristics, judicial competence. Among the
prime duties to which a judge of the law must ever be faithful is that of being
abreast with the law and jurisprudence, since, as has so often been advanced,
the administration of justice requires the continuous study of law and
jurisprudence
♦ Vendana should have been aware not only of the scope of her duties and
responsibilities but that she should have likewise been familiar with current
laws, rules and regulations pertinent to her position as such social welfare
officer.
♦ Judge Belen acted in good faith when he stated in his decision that the DSWD
submitted the required reports to his court through respondent Vedaña,
presumably in the belief that it was standard procedure for the Social Welfare
Officer II of a Regional Trial Court to do so in coordination with the DSWD.
Duncan vs. CFI
Cang v. CA and Clavano
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA. 1998
FACTS: Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married in 1973.
They begot three children namely: Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony. Anna
Marie learned of H’s alleged extramarital affair w/ family friend Wilma Soco and filed
a petition for legal separation w/ alimony soon after.
Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court approved manifestation of the Cang sps
providing that they agreed to live separately and that H Cang provide the children
monthly support of PhP1K.
He left for the US, sought divorce from a Nevada Court and was issued a divorce
decree w/c ordered him to provide another USD50/mo as support for his kids and
that also granted sole custody of the 3 minor kids to Anna Marie. Thereafter, he
took an American wife and thus became a naturalized US citizen. In 1986, he
divorced (again) and never remarried.
In 1987, resp-sps Ronald Clavano, a businessman who travels a lot, and Maria Clara
Clavano,an intl flight stewardess, bro & sis –in-law of Anna Marie, filed petition for
adoption of the 3 minor Cang kids w/ the signature of then 14-yr old Keith signifying
consent to his adoption. Mom Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent
alleging that H had evaded to support the children. In light of her need to go to the
US to attend to a family business, leaving the children to the respondents were
much better in the interest of the children esp since they were financially capable of
supporting the children. Moreover, her children were already attuned or close to the
resps.
Upon learning of the petition, petitioner H immediately returned to the Phils and
filed an opposition thereto alleging that though the resp-sps were more financially
capable than him, his “meager” finances should not strip him of his parental
authority over his children.
RTC ruled that Anna Marie had in effect relinquished custody over the children and
therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. In 1990, however, RTC
issued the petition for adoption to the Clavanos. Its reasons were the kids’ close
filial ties w/ the Clavano family, that the latter were a childless couple and the
children’s own manifestation to be w/ them as manifested in kids’ snuggling close to
their uncle even though their natural mother was around.
ISSUES & RATIO:
1. WON minor children be legally adopted w/o the written consent of a natural
parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them
 NO, notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the
natural parent to the adoption is indispensable and has remained a requisite for
its validity. Nevertheless, the requirement of a written consent can be
dispensed w/ IF the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is
insane or hopelessly intemperate. The Court may acquire jurisdiction over the
case even w/o the written consent of the parents or one of the parents
provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant
exemption from compliance therewith.
2. What is abandonment in adoption cases and did H Cang abandon his children?
 Abandonment means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support w/c parents owe their children. Physical
estrangement alone w/o financial and moral desertion is not tantamount to
abandonment.
 NO. In the case, although petitioner was physically absent as he was then in
the US, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligs of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication w/ his W and
children by way of letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mails
and catered to their whims. Although there was some irregularity as regards
the bank account he opened for his children, he did previously intend and gave
support to them. It was only difficult for him to do so because of his previous
status of illegal alien in the US.
 It was actually Anna Marie who left her children to the care of her relatives to
pursue her business abroad. The adoption appears to be a matter of
convenience for her because she herself was capable of supporting her own
kids. It was bad enough that their father left the children when he went
abroad, but when the mother followed suit for her own reasons, the situation
worsened.
 And even though the children are now all grown up: 2 of legal age and one
approaching 18, the case must be determined as of the time the petition for
adoption was filed and as it was filed w/o the required consent of their father
who by law and under the given facts has not abandoned them.
HELD: Petition for review on certiorari granted. Judgment and resolution set aside.
Macario, Celso & Aurelia all surnamed TAMARGO, petitioners vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, Hon. Ariston Rubio, RTC, Victor & Clara Bundoc, respondents
 Petition for review of CA decision
Facts:
Oct. 20, 1982: 10 yr old Adelberto Bundoc shot Jennifer Tamargo w/an air rifle
w/c resulted in her death.
Macario Tamargo, Jennifer’s adopting parent & sps Celso & Aurelia Tamargo,
Jennifer’s natural parents, filed a civil complaint for damages against sps Victor
& Clara Bundoc, Adelberto’s natural parents w/whom he was living at the time
of the incident.
Criminal case: Adelberto acquitted for acting w/o discernment.
Prior to the incident or on Dec. 10, 1981, sps Sabas & Felisa Rapisura filed a
petition to adopt Adelberto such was granted on Nov. 18, 1982.
Bundoc sps claim that the Rapisura sps should be the proper parties in this suit
since parental authority shifted to the adopting parent from the moment the
petition for adoption was filed.
Tamargos claim that since Adelberto was staying w/the Bundocs at the time of
the incident, their parental authority over the child had not ceased.
Trial court: dismissed petition claiming Bundocs were not proper parties.
Tamargos filed MFR but denied for failure to give notice to all parties 3 days
before the hearing. Appeal was likewise dismissed for being filed out of time.
CA: dismissed. Petitioners lost their rt to appeal.
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON petitioners despite losing their rt to appeal may still file this
petition. - YES
Since MFR did not comply w/notice requirement, it’s only considered pro forma
& it did not interrupt/suspend reglementary period to appeal.
What’s mandatory is the service of motion on the opposing counsel indicating
time & place of hearing.
Technical rules suspended in order that substantial justice may be served. Rules
of procedure ought not to be applied in a rigid technical sense. They’re only
used to help secure not override substantial justice. Rigid enforcement would
defeat the aim.
2. WON effects of adoption in so far as parental authority is concerned may
be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the
proper party in a damage suit filed against their adopted child. - NO
Not disputed that Adelberto’s act gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict
against him. CC Art. 2176: Whoever by act/omission causes damage to
another, there being fault/negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault/negligence if there’s no pre-existing contractual relation bet parties
is called a quasi-delict.
CC ART. 2180: Obligations under Art. 2176 are demandable not only from one’s
own acts/omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father, & in case of his death/incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Responsibility
will cease if they prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
CC Art. 2180 is frequently called as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed
negligence. Parental liability is a natural/logical consequence of the parents’
duties & responsibilities (includes instructing, controlling & disciplining of child).
Civil liability is based on parental authority vested by CC upon parents. It
assumes that parents were negligent in the performance of their legal & natural
duty to supervise the child who’s in their custody & control. Presumption may
be overturned by proof that they exercised all diligence to prevent damage.
Bundoc sps had parental authority over Adelberto when incident occurred. It’s
logical that the natural parents who had actual custody of the minor are the
proper parties to the suit for damages. But they rely on Child & Youth Welfare
Code, Art. 36 w/c provides that a decree of adoption shall be effective as of the
date the original petition was filed. Further, they rely on Art. 39 of the same
code w/c provides that adoption shall dissolve the authority vested in the
natural parents except where adopter is sp of the surviving natural parent.
But CC provides that the basis of parental liability for torts of a minor child is
the relationship existing bet parents & minor child LIVING with them & over
whom law presumes the parents exercise supervision & control. Art. 58 of the
Child & Youth Welfare Code provides that parents & guardian responsible for
damages caused by child under their parental authority in accordance with the
CC. FC Art. 221 likewise provides that parents are responsible for damages &
injuries caused by minors living in their company & under their parental
authority.
Retroactivity may be allowed if it will permit the accrual of benefits/advantages
in favor of the adopted child. But it won’t be proper to retroactively apply a
liability incurred when adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over
the child. Unfair to burden them w/liability they could not have foreseen or
prevented esp in this case where they were in the US at the time of the
incident. Holding them liable would be inconsistent w/the philosophy & policy
underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Art. 35 of the Child & Youth Welfare Code provides that no petition for adoption
shall be finally granted unless adopting parents are given a supervised trial
custody period of at least 6 mos to assess their readiness. During the period of
trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in adopting parents. In this
case, trial custody period had not yet begun or had already been completed at
the time the incident took place. Besides, actual custody was then w/his natural
parents.
Held: Petition granted. CA reversed & set aside. Complaint reinstated & remanded
to the lower court for further proceedings.
Sayson vs. CA
Johnston vs. Republic [April 30, 1963]
Appeal from a decision and order of the COFI Rizal
Facts:
♦ June 24, 1960 - Isabel Valdes Johnston (48 years old and married to Raymond
Arthur Johnston), filed a petition for the adoption of one Ana Isabel Henriette
Antonio Concepcion Georgiana, 2 years and 10 months old.
♦ The dispositive portion of the decision provided that the surname that should be
given to the adopted child be Valdes and not Johnston.
♦ October 24, 1960 - Isabel Valdes Johnston that the surname of the minor be
Valdes Johnston instead of Valdes but her motion was denied.
Issue: WON the surname of Valdes Johnston should be given to the adopted child.
NO

Ratio:
♦ Isabel argues that since she is now using the surname of her husband by
virtue of Article 370, par. 1 of the new Civil Code, and because that is the
surname (Valdes Johnston) she used in filing the petition in the present case,
under which she testified at the time of the trial, and under which she is now
known to all her relatives, friends and acquaintances, she had to be known by
her maiden surname, and the lower court should have decreed that the minor
whom she adopted should be allowed to bear the surname she is now using.
She also argues that the use of the surname "Valdes" by the adopted child, as
prescribed by the lower court, will create the impression that she is the
illegitimate child of petitioner-appellant begotten before her marriage, a
situation which is humiliating to both adopter and adopted.
♦ The SG argues that Isabel’s surname is Valdes and not Johnston; that a married
woman has a surname of her own to which may be added her husband's
surname if she so chooses; that if the minor be permitted to use the surname
Valdes Johnston, much confusion would result because the public would be
misled into believing that she was adopted by appellant's husband also, which
is not true in this case.
♦ The court ruled that the provision of law (Art. 341, par. 4, Civil Code) which
entitles the adopted minor to the use of the adopter's surname, refers to the
adopter's own surname and not to her surname acquired by virtue of marriage.
Isabel's real surname is Valdes and not Johnston, and as she made the
adoption singly without the concurrence of her husband, and not as a married
woman, her name as adopter was her maiden name. The adoption created a
personal relationship between the adopter and the adopted, and the consent of
Raymond Johnston, Isabel Valdes' husband, to the adoption by her individually,
did not have the effect of making him an adopting father, so as to entitle the
child to the use of Johnston's own surname.
♦ To allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter, would
mislead the public into believing that he had also been adopted by the husband,
which is not the case. And when later, questions of successional rights arise, the
husband's consent to the adoption might be presented to prove that he had
actually joined in the adoption.
Republic vs. Wong
Republic v. CA and Caranto
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA. 1996
FACTS: RTC Cavite granted resps Caranto sps’ petition for adoption of Midael C
Mazon along w/ prayer for the correction of the minor’s first name “Midael” which
was mistakenly registered and recorded in his cert of birth as “Michael.”
In the notice published in the newspaper, the notice stated the adoption of one
“Michael C. Mazon.” He has been staying w/ the sps since he was 7 yrs old.
ISSUES & RATIO:
1. SolGen opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of
the child from “Midael” to “Michael” w/c should not be granted because the
petition was basically for adoption; that the correction of names cannot be
effected in the same proceeding for adoption.
 The error, though concerning only a clerical and innocuous error, could be
corrected under Rule 108 in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent
multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to the petitioners.
2. Another contention is that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the private
resps’ petition for adoption insofar as notice by publication did not state the
true name of the minor child.
 The correction involves merely the substitution of the letters “ch” for the “d”, so
that what appears as “Midael” as given name would read as “Michael.” Hence
the change cannot possibly cause any confusion because both names can be
read and pronounced w/ the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono,tunog). The
purpose of the publication requirement, w/c is to give notice to those who have
any objections to the adoption should make it known, has been served by
publication of notice in the case. Hence, RTC correctly granted petition for
adoption.
 However, pursuant to Rule 108 Sec 4, the notice for correction of entry must
also be published (for 3 consec wks in newspaper of gen circulation). While
there was notice given by publication, it was only a notice for adoption.
Nothing was mentioned that in addition, the correction of his name in the civil
registry was also being sought. The local civil registrar, who was not given
notice of the proceeding, was thus deprived of notice, and of the opportunity to
be heard being an indispensable party w/o whom no final determination of the
case can be had.
HELD: Judgment affirmed w/ modification: by deleting the decision of RTC ordering
local civil registrar to change the name “Midael” to “Michael” in the birth cert of the
child. Hence, adoption of Midael C Mazon affirmed.
Republic vs. Hernandez [February 9, 1996]
Petition for Certiorari to review a decision of RTC Pasig
Facts:
 March 10, 1994: Van & Regina Munson (respondents) filed a petition to adopt
Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran alleging that they were qualified & fit to be
adoptive parents. They likewise filed a petition to change child’s 1st name to
Aaron Joseph Andrade-Munson as this was his baptismal name & he’s been
called as such by his adoptive family ever since he arrived at their residence.
 Republic of the Philippines: opposed claiming that petitions for adoption &
petitions for change of name should be done in 2 separate proceedings.
 RTC: approved petition for adoption & granted change of 1st name claiming that
no rts have been prejudiced & since child’s barely over 1 yr old, there can be no
immoral, criminal/illicit purpose for seeking change of name. RTC likewise
claims that it’s the right of the adoptive parents to freely select their adopted
child’s first name.
 Republic appealed but it didn’t assail the fitness of the Munson sps to be
adoptive parents and the validity of the adoption. Sufficient proof that they are
qualified & that the complied w/the requirements.
1. petition for hearing was published 3x in a newspaper of gen. circulation
2. they’re financially able.
3. they don’t have criminal/derogatory record
4. DSWD recommended legal adoption finding that the Munsons are religious,
responsible, mature, & friendly. They’re physically healthy, mentally fit,
spiritually & financially capable. They provided child w/his needs, shared
 their time, love & attention to him & they’re ready & willing to continue
providing him a happy & secure home life. Child is growing normally & had
comfortably settled in his new home. 6 mos trial period created close bond
bet the parties.
 However, petitioner still insists that change of name should not be granted since
adoption & change of name are not related to each other considering that
they’re governed by different sets of law & rules. Adoption governed by FC 183-
193 & Rules of Court (ROC) Rule 99 while change of name is governed by CC
364-380 & ROC Rule 103. And in this case, only the adoption requirements
have been complied with. Adoption only allows change of surname. Rule should
be adhered to strictly by virtue of State’s natural interest in maintaining as
system of identification of its citizens & for the orderly administration of justice.
 Respondents on the other hand claim that ROC Rule 2, Sec. 5 allows permissive
joinder of causes of action to avoid multiplicity of suits in order to discourage
prolonged & vexatious litigations and that they have complied w/the
requirements of this rule (jurisdiction of court, proper venue & joinder of
parties). They claim that rules don’t prohibit joinder of adoption & change of
name. Their only reason for change of name: upon grant of adoption, adoptee
assumed ipso facto a new identification & designation & Aaron Joseph was
name given during baptism. They claim that change merely confirms
designation by w/c he’s known & called in community in w/c he lives.
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON RTC erred in granting change of registered proper/given name of
child-YES
 FC 189 allows as matter of rt & obligation and as natural & necessary
consequence of adoption the adoptee to bear adopter’s surname even if latter
does not pray for it. However, it does not confer upon the adopter a license to
change adoptee’s registered first name. It must remain as it was originally
registered in the civil register. It’s not a mre incident/adjunct of an adoption
proceeding. Inserting such prayer in a petition for adoption cannot be granted.
Registered name remains until court orders otherwise, it should come w/a
judicial order.
 Change of name is governed by ROC Rule 103 wherein sufficiency of
reasons/grounds is determined. Petition should be filed w/RTC where person
desiring to change name resides. He should be a resident of that province for at
lest 3 yrs. Date & place of hearing should be published. Only granted if
allegations are proven true & causes are reasonable. Grant should be recorded
w/proper civil register. This is an independent & separate special proceeding
governed by its own set of rules. It can’t be granted by means of any other
proceeding.
 Joinder of causes of action means uniting 2 or more demand or rts of action in
one action. It’s the union of 2 or more civil causes. It’s permissive & not
mandatory. It aims to avoid multiplicity of suits & to promote efficient
administration of justice w/o prejudice to rts of litigants & to expedite litigation
at minimum cost. They’re liberally construed. ROC Rule 2 Sec. 5 requires that
joinder will not violate rules on jurisdiction, venue & joinder of parties and that
cause of action arise out of same contract, transaction or relation bet parties or
for money demands or of same nature & character. Allowed when there’s
some substantial unity between causes – unity in the problem &
common ques of law & fact involved.
 SC findings: petitions don’t meet test of conceptual unity demanded to allow
their joinder under SC’s rules. Sol Gen was correct in saying that adoption
assesses adopter’s fitness & qualifications while in a change of name, propriety
& reasonableness of grounds supporting proposed change of name is
ascertained w/o creating/affecting family relations. So WRT petition for change
of name, the action instituted was grossly insufficient in form & substance.
Suits/actions whose subj matters/corresponding reliefs are unrelated/diverse
are best taken up individually.
 Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be
ignored at will to suit party’s convenience. They’re impt in ensuring effective
enforcement of substantive rts thru orderly & speedy administration of justice.
They should only be relaxed in very extreme circumstances when rigid
application would frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. In this case,
no injustice will be done by following the reglementary procedure set out for
change in proper/given name. The State stands to be prejudiced by
disregarding Rule 103.
 Respondent judge exceeded his prerogatives by rendering assailed decision w/c
is unsupported by both statutory & case law.
2. WON there was a lawful ground for the change of name - NO
 No legal/jurisprudential basis for RTC’s ruling.
 Name: combination of words by w/c a person’s known & identified &
distinguished fr others for world’s convenience in addressing/dealing w/him.
Two parts: given/proper name + surname/family name. Former is chosen by
parents, latter fixed by law.
 CC 408: person’s birth must be entered in civil register. Official name & name in
the eyes of law is the one given in the civil register.
 CC 376: No person can change his name/surname w/o judicial authority
premised on the interest of State for purposes of identification.
 Change of name can only be done under Rule 103 of ROC implementing CC
376. It’s a privilege & not a rt w/c is based on the court’s discretion. Proper &
reasonable cause should be given to justify change. Some proper reasons
recognized by jurisprudence:
1. name’s ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write/pronounce
2. change results as legal consequence of legitimation/adoption
3. change will avoid confusion
4. continuous use & has been known since childhood by a Filipino name &
unaware of alien parentage
5. change is based on sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage in good faith & w/o prejudice to anyone
6. surname causes embarrassment & not for fraudulent purpose & w/o
prejudice to public interest
 Baptism & fact that one has been using a different name & has been known by
it are not proper & reasonable causes to legally authorize to change name.
Other names not entered with the civil register are unofficial & can’t be
recognized as person’s real name.
 Thus, grounds raised by respondents are not proper. The Court is concerned
w/factual realities & legal consequences rather than sentimentality &
symbolisms. Case cited is not applicable either since it involves change in
surname based on embarrassment caused by such. Sol Gen was correct in
saying that an instance where natural parent names a child for the first time is
different from instance where adoptive parents wish to disregard & change a
child’s name given by the natural parents. Former is proper whereas latter is
not since the right to name a child has already been exercised by the natural
 parents. Of course, adoptive parents have the privilege to change proper/given
name, only such must be done in a proper petition for change of name.

Held: Modified. Child will be known as Kevin Earl Andrade – Munson unless later on
changed in accordance w/law. Other aspects, RTC affirmed.

Dempsey vs. RTC

Santos vs. CA