Professional Psychology: Researcl
Research and Practici
1989, Vol. 20, No. 5,122-328
Memory and Hypnosis: Implications for the Use of Forensic Hypnosis
Anthony J. Pinizzotto
Georgetown University
I review arguments regarding hypnosis in forensic investigations, offer procedures of a nonhypnotic
nature to enhance memory recall, and suggest guidelines for hypnosis in criminal cases. The effects
of hypnosis on memory, as well as the concomitant dangers regarding those effects, are discussed.
A typical summer day quickly turned into a nightmare for 26
children and their bus driver. In July 1976, children and driver
were abducted by several masked men. At gunpoint, all 27 were
forced into vans, which were then buried beneath the ground
of a rock quarry. The bus driver and 2 of the older boys were
able to dig themselves to the surface and escape.
This case, referred to as the Chowchilla kidnapping case, is
one of many cases that drew national attention to the use of
hypnosis in criminal investigations. Because the bus driver had
seen two of the van license plate numbers and tried to memorize
them, he was considered an appropriate subject for hypnotic
recall. In the hypnotic session, the driver was able to recall
enough numbers of the license plates to speed the apprehension
of three men. Those three individuals were tried and convicted
of the charge of kidnapping and were given life sentences (Kro-
ger & Douce, 1979). The literature is replete with equally fasci-
nating recountings of major crimes solved by hypnosis (Arons,
1977; Reiser, 1980).
Hypnosis has been applied in many different clinical settings.
Psychologists, dentists, social workers, psychiatrists, gynecolo-
gists, and surgeons have applied hypnosis in their respective
practices (see Cheek & LeCron, 1968, and Kroger, 1977, for
examples of applied hypnosis in these and other areas). Within
recent years, the forensic use of hypnosis has been increasing at
an exponential rate. Major law enforcement organizations have
availed themselves of the use of hypnosis to assist in solving
crimes. This has been done on federal, state, and local levels.
Among the more widely known departments and offices using
hypnosis are the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Ault, 1979,
1980), the Los Angeles Police Department (Reiser, 1976), and
the New York City Police Department ("The trial of hypnosis,"
1981). Clifford and Bull (1978) also reported that the law en-
forcement agents in Israel make extensive use of hypnosis.
ANTHONY i. PINIZZOTTO received his PhD from Georgetown Univer-
sity and is currently on faculty at Georgetown University in the Depart-
ment of Psychology. In addition to his university teaching, he is a consul-
tant in forensic psychology. His current research includes criminal per-
sonality profiling, hypnosis in criminal investigations, and cult-related
criminal behavior.
THE AUTHOR EXPRESSES HIS GRATITUDE to Darlenc Howard, George-
town University, for her comments in the preparation of this article.
CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THIS ARTICLE should be addressed to
Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Department of Psychology, Georgetown Univer-
sity, Washington, D.C. 20057.
322
Copyright 1989 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
0735-7028/89/S00.75
From these numerous accounts, as well as from my applied
forensic cases, the use of forensic hypnosis in criminal cases
appears to be more than justifiable. In many cases (Barnacle,
1975;Misseck, 1978;Reiser, 1974) it was through hypnosis that
the investigators allegedly were given major leads and informa-
tion in order to close cases. At first glance, this is most impres-
sive and would lead many to draw the conclusion that hypnosis
can enable one to "replay" memory experiences and hence
solve crimes. Yet a flag of caution must be raised at this point;
there are several questions and assumptions that should be ad-
dressed before such a conclusion is drawn.
Among the questions are these: What is hypnosis? What
"working model" of memory is assumed by the hypnotist? Is
that working model an acceptable one, given the current state
of cognitive research? Does hypnosis actually enhance recall—
that is, is memory any more accurate with hypnosis than with-
out it? Is the alleged enhancement of hypnotic memory in real-
life, forensic situations greater or less than in laboratory
settings? If hypnosis is to be used in forensic settings, what
guidelines can be implemented to safeguard against its inappro-
priate use?
Denning Hypnosis and Hypnotic Trance
Hypnosis is not easily defined. Extreme positions exist, as
with all theoretical constructs. Some hold that hypnosis in-
volves major neurological alterations, and so hypnosis can be
denned in terms of concomitant and specific physical signs. It
is argued that the trained hypnotist can determine levels of hyp-
nosis on the basis of certain signs and thus that researchers will
be able to discover the neurological changes that take place dur-
ing hypnosis. Early proponents of this theory were Mesmer
(1779/1948) and Charcot (1882); among the more recent theo-
rists were Erickson (1939) and Spiegel (1972). Others (Couch
&Fross, I976;Segall, 1975) define hypnosis by using psychody-
namic explanations, suggesting that hypnosis is a function of
the unconscious mind. Many other definitions of hypnosis are
similar to those frequently given for psychotherapy: It is the in-
teraction that happens when a trained hypnotist (therapist) per-
forms what he or she defines as the process of hypnosis (therapy)
on a client or patient (Orne. 1977). There are inadequacies in
many of the attempted definitions of hypnosis.
Explanations as to the way in which hypnosis works are
equally varied. Sarbin and Coe (1972) spoke of hypnosis as in-
volving "as if" behaviors; Shor (1970) suggested that there is a
 MEMORY AND HYPNOSIS
loss of generalized reality orientation; Hilgard (1977) stated
that there is a shift in multiple cognitive control systems. In
many cases, hypnosis has been denned by fiat: It is based on
the qualifications of the hypnotist and the "fact" that he or she
hypnotizes a subject and then asserts that hypnosis has taken
place (Orne, 1977). Because there is little way to quantify such
a view of hypnosis for the purpose of validation and reliability
testing, a different approach to its definition is necessary.
In defining hypnosis, Spiegel and Spiegel (1978) stated that
"this [hypnotic] experience is characterized by an ability to sus-
tain in response to a signal a state of attentive, receptive, intense
focal concentration with diminished peripheral awareness" (p.
22). They stressed that the hypnotized person remains awake
and alert; he or she does not "fall asleep." It was within this
context that Spiegel and Spiegel (1978) went on to explain the
ability that one develops within the hypnotic "trance" to de-
velop concentrated attention:
The crux of the trance state is the dialectic between focal and pe-
ripheral awareness. Any intensification of focal attention necessi-
tates the elimination of distracting or irrelevant stimuli. Likewise,
a position of diffuse and scanning awareness requires a relinquish-
ing of focal attentiveness. In fact, the one type of awareness implies
the existence of the other. We not only pay attention to our given
task, we also ward off distractions, (p. 22)
In the end, Spiegel and Spiegel (1978, p. 23; see also Spiegel &
Spiegel, 1987) likened the experience of hypnosis to that of be-
ing absorbed in an interesting novel, in which one's attention is
focused in a very concentrated way. At the end of the novel,
the reader needs a moment to reorient himself or herself to the
surroundings.
In attempting to define hypnosis, one must be able to specify
objective measures. Many authors (Arons, 1961; Cooke & Van
Vogt, 1956; Teitelbaum, 1965; Weitzenhoffer, 1957) have sug-
gested a variety of means by which levels of hypnosis are tested.
Yet, at best, these tests are merely descriptive of some behaviors
that typically take place during the time that the experimenter
defines as "hypnotically induced." There may well be a correla-
tion between certain states of relaxation and concomitant phys-
iological responses. However, to speak of those relative behav-
iors as defining some internal processes seems to be unwar-
ranted. An apparent problem with so many approaches is that
no systematic study can be made of them. This is why Spiegel
and Spiegel (1978) suggested that "by using a standardized in-
duction procedure, which involves systematic questioning re-
garding physiological, behavioral, and phenomenological re-
sponses, the variable influence of different operators on the
trance performance is minimized and the trance capacity of a
subject can be systematically documented" (p. 28). The prob-
lem of defining just exactly what hypnosis is remains. However,
standardizing the process of induction and operationalizing the
behavioral, physiological, and phenomenological responses
brings one closer to an experimentally controlled understanding
of some of the elements of hypnosis.
Once the induction process has been invoked, is there assur-
ance that the individual is actually hypnotized? There are
groups that seriously question the claims of the very existence
of the hypnotic state, as well as groups that seem to include any
experience as evidence of a heightened hypnotic state. Perhaps
the most balanced view concerning the test of hypnosis was ex-
323
pressed by the American Medical Association (AMA), Council
on Scientific Affairs (1985): After the hypnotic induction, "it
can be recognized by administering a series of different test sug-
gestions of varying degrees of known difficulty, typically involv-
ing alterations of perception, motor control, or memory. The
degree to which these suggestions are followed and experienced
as real and involuntary indicates the extent to which hypnosis
has taken place" (p. 1919). (A more detailed explanation of test-
ing measures can be found in Spiegel & Spiegel's 1978 book.)
In all forensic cases, it is important that the investigator corrob-
orate all material elicited from the subject. Not only are individ-
uals capable of simulating or faking hypnosis, but also those
in "deep hypnosis" are capable of intentional false statements
(AMA, Council on Scientific Affairs, 1985). Cautious consider-
ation of retrieved forensic information is the rule, not the ex-
ception.
The accuracy of much information received from a hypnotic
session remains difficult to verify objectively, as is evident in the
Chowchilla case. In this particular case, it is true that the recall
of the license plate numbers facilitated the closing of the case.
However, there are many reported cases of the use of hypnosis
in which the license plate numbers retrieved were not at all re-
lated to the actual plate revealed later.
The problem of verification of data is more obvious in the
use of hypnosis for age regression, which was explained by Spie-
gel and Spiegel (1978, p. 32). They stated that some people who
are highly hypnotizable are able to achieve a form of age regres-
sion wherein they relive periods of their lives as if they were
actually in those periods. When these individuals are tested,
they respond with a vocabulary appropriate to their trance-
state age. When quizzed about current events, they are igno-
rant. Spiegel and Spiegel went on to show how some individuals
become nonverbal when regressed to ages of 6 or 7 months. One
of the problems with age regression is that of confabulation, the
tendency on the part of the hypnotized person to fill in memory
gaps with suggested or fantasized material. The hypnotized per-
son is then unable to differentiate confabulation from the truth.
It all becomes part of the individual's "memory." Indeed, the
confidence that individuals have in their own recollection of de-
tails within hypnosis is greater than it is outside the hypnotic
situation, even when these recollections are false (Dywan, 1983;
Sheehan & Tilden, 1983; Timm, 1981).
Though some (Reiser, 1974, 1980; Schafer & Rubio, 1978)
tend to understate the serious problem of confabulation, several
notable and recent examples reaffirm the need to be cautious.
In one case, an individual under hypnosis gave a description to
a police artist of a man whom he saw commit a murder. Upon
further questioning, it was shown that the person giving the hyp-
notic testimony could not possibly have seen the act take place.
The witness to the alleged crime was approximately 250 feet
(76.2 m) away from the action, and he viewed the activity in a
condition of semidarkness. According to the testimony of an
ophthalmologist, identification beyond 30 feet (9.1 m) under
those conditions would have been impossible. The witness,
however, strongly believed that he saw the crime and had a clear
view of the perpetrator (People v. Kempinski, 1980).
A second case involved a woman who accused a man of stab-
bing her with a knife several times in the vagina. This informa-
tion came about during a hypnotic session but was proved in-
324 ANTHONY J. PINIZZOTTO
correct by medical examination, which revealed only one vagi-
nal lesion and no damage to the labia or perineum (State v.
Mack, 1980).
There are recorded court cases (for example, State v. Stolp,
1982) in which previously unknown information was retrieved
through hypnosis and, it is asserted, proved so accurate as to
effect the capture of an offender. However, "the vast majority of
. . . reports [of memory enhancement in hypnosis] are anec-
dotal, and most fail to provide independent corroboration of
the memories recovered in hypnosis or to establish that hypno-
sis was responsible for any effects observed" (AMA, Council on
Scientific Affairs, 1985, p. 1920). More controlled, empirical
studies are needed to determine whether what is recalled in hyp-
nosis is more verifiable data or more confabulated data. At
present, definitive statements regarding these data would be
precipitous.
Models of Memory and Problems of Confabulation
The working model of memory that one adopts determines
how one views confabulation and its effect on memory. It is nec-
essary, then, to view certain models of memory and how they
deal with the issue of confabulation.
Some views of hypnosis assume working models of memory
wherein memory is a kind of tape recorder. This particular
model of memory is especially dangerous in forensic hypnosis.
This theory suggests that all stimuli are received and recorded
in the mind as originally perceived. The rationale for using hyp-
nosis, then, is to engage the memory tape recorder and have the
individual "replay" the experience.
Penfield (1975) has been attributed with developing such a
static notion of memory. This view apparently has been adopted
by others (Reiser, 1980, for example) whose implicit theory of
memory suggests that what was experienced in the past has
been stored in the mind like a tape recorder. The purpose for
using hypnosis rests on the assumption that the mind will be
able to rewind, play forward, and produce a copy of the original
experience.
This static view of memory is held by some despite the large
body of research suggesting that other important factors affect
the construction of memory data. As only one example, re-
search has shown that cognitive strategies and mental imagery
are important factors in human memory (Carroll & Maxwell,
1979; Richardson, 1980).
This "video-recording" type of memory not only lacks sub-
stantial experimental data to support its claim but also creates
the possibility of developing an approach to forensic hypnosis
that leads both the hypnotist and the client into the realm of
magical thinking. As Perry and Laurence (1982) stated in their
criticism of an approach to hypnosis that uses a static concept
of memory, "By a series of metaphors from televised sports, the
victim is encouraged to zoom-in, freeze-frame, and re-experi-
ence in slow motion the events of a crime" (p. 445). The empha-
sis here is on the re-experiencing of the crime, as if to infer that
one can replay the exact experience as originally perceived.
The problem with such a concept of memory and perception
as mere machines that copy environmental stimuli is that they
simply do not function that way. Buckhout (1974) stated that
"perception and memory are decision-making processes
affected by the totality of a person's abilities, background, atti-
tudes, motives and beliefs, by the environment and by the way
his recollection is eventually tested" (p. 25). He went on to show
how the observer is an active perceiver of external stimuli, not
a passive recorder. The conclusions that the active perceiver
reaches are the result of evaluation and reconstruction. The ac-
tive observer imposes meaning on the information that im-
pinges on his or her senses (Neisser, 1967). Buckhout concluded
by stating that the sense organs of seeing, hearing, tasting, smell-
ing, and touching are social organs, as well as physical ones.
In strong contrast to this static view of memory is one that
suggests that memory, even in the unhypnotized state, is con-
structive (see Alba & Hasher, 1983, for a review); that is, among
other things, memory is characterized by distortion and inaccu-
racy. As such, the constructive nature of memory may influence
individuals to complete or fill in gaps of their accounts with data
not directly perceived at the time of the incident that they are
recalling (Sheehan & Tilden, 1983).
There is a growing body of literature (Brigham, Maass, Sny-
der, & Spaulding, 1982; Loftus & Burns, 1982; Loftus, Miller,
&Burns, 1978; Powers, Andriks,& Loftus, 1979)about experi-
ments with unhypnotized subjects that have shown that mem-
ory is affected by information received after a particular occur-
rence. These experimenters follow the same basic pattern in
testing this theory. The subjects are shown a series of slides, or
view a movie, or listen to an account of some incident (e.g., a
staged robbery or a traffic accident). After seeing the incident,
one group of subjects would be given subtle cues that suggest
events that did, in fact, not occur or that contradicted the facts
of the original occurrence. When later asked to relate to the
experimenters what had taken place in the created crime or in-
cident, the experimental group that had been given erroneous
suggestions reported the material suggested to them rather than
what they had perceived. The amount of erroneous and contra-
dictory information given by the experimental groups was al-
ways significantly greater than that given by the control groups
that were not given any additional information.
In related research (O'Connell, Shor, & Orne, 1970) with
hypnotized individuals, the confabulation took the form of
combining the facts of a recalled event with fantasies of the indi-
vidual recalling the particular event. In these particular hyp-
notic sessions of age regression, the subjects tended to produce
more details than they did in the nonhypnotic state, but they
also tended to confabulate more. When checking the validity of
the data received from these age-regressed subjects, the experi-
menters found that certain individuals, vividly recalled from
the past, never existed. In therapeutic settings, this material can
be dealt with through appropriate psychological interventions.
However, for forensic purposes, it is the accuracy of the material
that is important and necessary, not whether someone is work-
ing through a fantasy wish. A further finding in O'Connell et
al.'s (1970) study was that the actual amount of factual data
received (and of significance to the law) was not greater than the
amount received without hypnosis.
Witnesses of crimes depend on their memory to aid them.
Often, they believe that what they recall is, in fact, accurate.
However, as Loftus (1979) pointed out, there are several mis-
conceptions about eyewitness testimony:
 MEMORY AND HYPNOSIS
Witnesses remember the details of a violent crime better than those
of a nonviolent one. Research shows just the opposite: the added
stress that violence creates clouds our perceptions.
Witnesses are as likely to underestimate the duration of a crime
as to overestimate it. In fact, witnesses almost invariably think a
crime took longer than it did. The more violent and stressful the
crime, the more witnesses overestimate its duration.
The more confident a witness seems, the more accurate the testi-
mony is likely to be. Research suggests that there may be little or
no relationship between confidence and accuracy, especially when
viewing conditions are poor. (p. 24)
Buckhout (1974) concurred with Loftus: "Both sides, and usu-
ally the witness too, succumb to the fallacy that everything was
recorded and can be played back later through questioning"
(P. 23).
That is not how memory works. To believe that memory
works like a mechanical device is to accept a "nineteenth-cen-
tury view of man as perceiver, which asserted a parallel between
the mechanisms of the physical world and those of the brain.
Human perception is a more complex information-processing
mechanism. So is memory" (Buckhout, 1974, p. 24). Memory
is constructive and integrative.
Hypnosis and Memory Enhancement
A highly related area of current investigation within the field
of hypnosis is that of its memory-enhancement function. Some
researchers (Buckhout, 1974; Putnam, 1979) question the
memory-enhancement capability of hypnosis altogether; others
have shown that difficulties have arisen in laboratory studies in
which researchers attempted to demonstrate clear, significant,
and controlled examples of hypnotic hypermnesia (Barber &
Calverly, 1966; DePiano & Salzberg, 1981; Dhanens & Lundy,
1975). An even greater amount of experimental literature
(Buckhout, Eugenic, Licitra, Oliver, & Kramer, 1981; Dia-
mond, 1980; M. C. Smith, 1983) suggests that in laboratory
settings, recall aided by hypnosis is no better than recall without
hypnosis.
These studies in experimental psychology are contrasted with
the reports of forensic investigators/hypnotists who have un-
covered information not available before the hypnosis (Arons,
1977;Reiser, 1976;Teitelbaum, 1965), as well as with some lim-
ited empirical studies that suggest that forensic hypnosis does
enhance eyewitness memory retrieval (Geiselman, Fisher,
MacKinnon, & Holland, 1985). The question remains, then:
Why have the experimentalists not been able to replicate what
appears to be occurring in the real-life forensic situations?
Crime scenes differ in considerable ways from laboratory set-
tings (DePiano & Salzberg, 1981). Because of these differences,
perhaps the factors of the crime scene aid the hypnotic effects
(M. C. Smith, 1983). These same factors are not available or
replicable in laboratory settings (for practical as well as ethical
reasons) and could be part of the explanation as to the differ-
ences in effect of hypnotic recall. M. C. Smith (1983) outlined
several differences between the crime scene and laboratory en-
vironments: type of material being recalled, level of arousal,
intentional versus incidental learning, and the consequences of
recall.
The material used in real-life situations, in contrast to the
material used in typical laboratory experiments, is usually quite
325
different. In the real-life experience, the material is usually
meaningful and dynamic, rich with both verbal and visual cues.
The material used in laboratory settings, however, is usually
composed of lists of words, lists of nonsense syllables, or short
prose passages.
M. C. Smith's (1983) second factor is the level of arousal.
Crime scenes, unlike the relatively sterile laboratory, are usually
highly emotional. Perhaps hypnosis improves one's memory
only when the learning takes place in an emotionally charged
and traumatic set of circumstances, and so perhaps hypnosis is
most effective in uncovering repressed or motivated forgotten
memories.
In the laboratory, most recall material is given in an inten-
tional learning paradigm, unlike the street situation in which
witnesses or victims of crimes are not specifically asked to pay
attention to or attempt to memorize any particular material.
Perhaps hypnosis is most effective in recalling incidentally
learned material.
Last, there are far-reaching consequences concerning the in-
formation gained in forensic settings. Lives are very greatly
affected. The subjects in laboratory studies have no emotional
investment in the process. There is an emotional difference be-
tween describing the fact of a mugging or a rape and recalling a
series of words or phrases.
Experimenters (Brigham et al., 1982; DePiano & Salzberg,
1981;Putnam, 1979;Zelig&Beidleman, 1981) have attempted
to incorporate as many real-life situations that are as emotional
as possible into the laboratory settings. M. C. Smith (1983)
summarized these findings from the various sources and what
effects they have had. She stated that it is not merely the absence
of "dynamic, meaningful stimuli to elicit arousal" (p. 398)
while subjects watch these stimuli, nor does it appear to be the
perception on the part of the viewer of the serious consequences
of recall, that accounts for the lack of increased recall under
hypnosis in laboratory settings. According to M. C. Smith,
there is, however, some small degree of support to suggest that
hypnosis does improve memory for incidentally learned mate-
rial. M. C. Smith's (1983) final statement demands attention:
"All in all, however, one is struck by the absence of any strong
experimental support for the improvement of memory through
hypnosis" (p. 398).
Applications to Forensic Hypnosis
There are blessings and curses in attempts to use hypnosis in
forensic investigations. Given the real-life field data of applied
hypnosis and, in addition, the experimental findings, what can
be said about the use of hypnosis in forensic investigations?
Whether hypnosis produces—in and of itself—the effects
that field investigators claim remains a disputed issue. Though
hypnosis sometimes appears to enable rather accurate revivifi-
cation and recall of perceived situations, it can also elicit con-
fabulations: false memories. These false memories are most
dangerous because the persons experiencing them believe that
those memories are accurate. Consequently, the courts have be-
come most cautious with regard to testimony received from
hypnosis sessions (State v. Hurct, 1981). One court (People v.
Shirley, 1982) suggested returning to an earlier decision (Frye v.
United Slates, 1923) that requires a "scientific procedure" to be
326 ANTHONY J. PINIZZOTTO
generally accepted as reliable within the scientific community
before it is accepted by the courts. There is no real consensus
within the scientific community concerning the nature, func-
tion, and use of hypnosis.
Much of the controversial use of hypnosis began in 1968 with
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals (Harding v. Stale,
1968). Using hypnosis for the purpose of refreshing one's mem-
ory was seen at that time as being similar to referring to one's
note cards. Though many courts followed this decision for
years, a serious challenge to it came about in 1980, when one
court (State v. Mack, 1980) ruled against the admissibility of
testimony received from a hypnotized witness. After the deci-
sion of many other jurisdictions (which include California,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and New York), the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals reversed its 15-year-old Harding deci-
sion in State v. Collins (1983).
Currently, there are differences in various courts' opinions
regarding the use of testimony resulting from the use of hypno-
sis. Because many courts have rejected testimony received
through hypnotic sessions, nonhypnotic memory-enhance-
ment procedures are needed. What are some of these tech-
niques for enhancing memory without the use of hypnosis?
Two nonhypnotic methods have been shown with some reli-
ability to produce greater and more accurate recall: "reinstate-
ment of context" and "repeated testing sessions."
In several studies (Godden & Baddeley, 1975; S. M. Smith,
1979), researchers have suggested that the context in which
learning originally took place aids in the recall of the material.
Even the physical conditions of the environment in which the
learning occurred (e.g., odors, sounds, sights, and temperature)
assist the individual's ability to remember the information
learned. In Godden and Baddeley's (1975) experiment, for ex-
ample, scuba divers were given lists of words to remember. One
group was given the list to learn underwater; the other group
learned on land. Each group was then tested for recall in either
the same or the alternative environment. When the learning en-
vironment was the same as the testing environment, recall was
significantly greater.
Watkins, Ho, and Tulving (1976) tested recall effaces. When
the face was paired with the context within which it was learned,
the experimenters found clear evidence of memory enhance-
ment.
Of greater interest for purposes of application of the rein-
statement of context are Norman's (1976) findings, which sug-
gest that the actual physical setting need not be present in order
for memory enhancement to occur. In these findings, recall was
accomplished by the use of imagination, visualizing a particular
setting within a specific emotional context. Similar experimen-
tal findings (Bower, 1981) suggest that the reinstatement of the
original mood in which material is learned aids significantly in
recalling that information later.
These uses of contextual reinstatement appear to assist indi-
viduals in recalling details from the past without the apparent
risks of bias that hypnosis has.
The second nonhypnotic aid in recalling previously learned
material is that of repeated testing. When an individual who has
attempted to remember an incident is later asked about that
same incident, a greater amount of information is recalled the
second time (Erdelyi & Kleinbard, 1978). This is referred to
as "hypermnesia," the recollection of more information after
repeated testing. Information retrieved in hypnosis may have
had nothing to do with the hypnosis per se, but rather it may be
a function of repeated questioning. However, caution must be
used here because of the possibility of confabulation by the per-
son being questioned. This must be particularly safeguarded
against in forensic settings because, as Clifford and Bull (1978)
suggested, "under interrogative report he [the subject] will be
asked questions to which he has no relevant memory, but be-
cause he is being asked by an authority figure an answer is likely
to be given; also, by the very fact of being asked a question the
implication is that he ought to know the answer, and is consid-
ered capable of giving it" (p. 156). What complicates matters
(Clifford & Bull, 1978; Timm, 1981) is that when the witness
or subject responds, he or she now believes it to have occurred
that way. Clifford and Bull (1978) stated the problem as such:
"The witness leaves all doubt behind and accepts his output as
the outcome of genuine recall" (p. 156: see also Nogrady, Mc-
Conkey, & Perry, 1985; Sheehan & Tilden, 1983, 1986). By re-
sponding favorably with follow-up questions, the interrogator
can suggest to the witness—unwittingly—that what the witness
is saying is, indeed, factual and valid.
In this regard, more research needs to be done on the ways
in which questions are asked and the effects of such lines of
questioning. Work that has been done in this area (Hilgard &
Loftus, 1979) suggests that the greatest accuracy of information
given is when the witness is simply asked to report what he or
she can remember about the crime. This is referred to as free
recall. There is, however, a trade-off here: Though accuracy is
high, quantity of recall is low.
There are criminal cases in which every investigative tool has
been used and each nonhypnotic procedure has been applied,
and yet no substantial leads have been formulated. For this situ-
ation, the use of hypnosis is very cautiously recommended.
However, even this use must be performed with certain and
well-defined safeguards for both the client and the individual
inducing hypnosis. Such measures have already been proposed
(Orne, 1977; Orne, Soskis, Dinges, Orne, & Tonry, 1985). Judi-
cial authorities themselves recognize both the potential benefits
and the potential dangers involved in the use of hypnosis, as
well as its controversial nature within the fields of mental health
and law: "The use of hypnosis in criminal investigations . . .
is controversial, and the current medical and legal view of its
appropriate role is unsettled" (Rock v. Arkansas, 1987, p.
2707). On the basis of the present understanding of the nature
of memory and the complexities surrounding the forensic and
experimental findings of the use of hypnosis, I agree with these
guidelines. The hypnotic session ought to be conducted by a
psychiatrist or psychologist trained in hypnosis. This individual
should receive a written document that states only the informa-
tion about the case that he or she needs to know in order to
conduct the hypnosis. This individual ought to be an indepen-
dent professional, not connected to the agency requesting the
services. Because nonverbal suggestions are possible, and inso-
far as they can affect the testimony of the witness/victim, all
contact between the hypnotist and subject should be recorded,
preferably on videotape.
Before the hypnotic session, a detailed account of the recol-
lection of the victim/witness should be taken. This should be
 MEMORY AND HYPNOSIS
done by the psychiatrist/psychologist because frequently an in-
dividual will remember something when speaking to a psychia-
trist/psychologist that he or she did not recall when questioned
by the law enforcement agent.
The psychiatrist/psychologist also should elicit a statement
from the witness/victim concerning his or her history with or
understanding of hypnosis. Perhaps a certain technique has
been found to be more or less effective than others for inducing
hypnosis. There may also be reason to dispel some misconcep-
tions concerning hypnosis.
Because observers may inadvertently communicate approval
or disapproval of the responses of the witness/victim by their
gestures, sounds, or other nonverbal movements, in general only
the psychiatrist/psychologist should be in the room with the
witness/victim during the hypnosis. Others may view the ses-
sion from behind a one-way mirror or on a video monitor.
There are no guarantees that when one follows these proce-
dures, all inappropriate suggestions will be avoided. However,
it does allow two very important checkpoints. The first is that
the subject of the hypnotic session is optimally protected when
the session is conducted by a trained medical or mental health
practitioner. Though complications during hypnosis are rare,
the availability of such well-trained personnel is a safeguard
against their occurrence. As Perry and Laurence (1982) stated,
complications are possible with any psychological procedure,
and hypnosis is no exception. Hence only the trained profes-
sional ought to use this procedure.
Second, it allows for an adequate record of the entire session
to be maintained. If there are any questions concerning the pro-
cess, they could be answered by examination of the actual hyp-
notic session.
With the knowledge of memory and hypnosis that is avail-
able, the cautious use of hypnosis may be of great importance
to the field of forensic investigation.
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Received February 16, 1989
Revision received May 6, 1989
Accepted May 9, 1989 •