Policy Brief January 2011

Democratic Republic
of the Congo
Problem Recommendations & Actions
Ongoing conflict A comprehensive U.S. policy in the DRC must address the pervasive poverty and immediate
between the needs of all Congolese. Substantial diplomatic energy must also be focused on resolving the
government of the conflict in eastern DRC to create stability necessary for political and economic development
Democratic Republic to take root. The U.S. has a vital role to play in shifting the current regional approach to the
of the Congo (DRC) rebel groups in eastern DRC away from military strategies and toward civilian protection and
and multiple rebel political dialogue.
and militia groups has • Appoint and empower a Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region to coordinate U.S.
created widespread activities and assert U.S. leadership with the United Nations (UN) and regional and donor
regional instability. governments.
Partially fueled by • Mobilize previously dedicated resources behind a comprehensive plan to prevent and
illegal exploitation of respond to sexual violence.
mineral resources, the • Help the Congolese government ensure security forces are adequately and regularly
ongoing conflict and paid, professionalize its armed forces and police to protect the civilian population, and
instability has created strengthen judicial systems to hold perpetrators accountable;
a humanitarian crisis • Continue supporting the UN peacekeeping force, MONUSCO, and its role in protecting
that has displaced more civilians. Ensure MONUSCO troop numbers are not reduced until tangible improvements
than 2 million people. are made in civilian protection and security, and specific benchmarks are met for estab-
Meanwhile 45,000 die lishing state control and the rule of law.
monthly from disease • Use diplomacy, technical support, sanctions legislation, and monitoring by civil soci-
and conflict, and ety groups to press for more transparency concerning natural resource extraction and
sexual violence is at related revenues to ensure they do not fuel conflict, corruption or human rights abuses.
unprecedented levels. Ensure full, effective implementation of the Congo Conflict Minerals provisions (Section
One of the largest 1502) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
African countries, DRC’s • Increase support for humanitarian and development efforts and appropriate transition
strategic location in the programs that bridge the gap between relief and development to foster an environment
center of the continent that promotes peace.
and vast mineral • Facilitate improved coordination between the Congolese government, MONUSCO and
wealth make it key to regional actors to better protect civilians from groups such as the Forces Democratiques
promoting peace and de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).
stability in the region. • Proactively coordinate with donors and the UN to provide sufficient resources to ensure
civic education, the opportunity to vote for all citizens, free and fair elections in 2011 and
full political participation by women.

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Results
Concerted U.S. leadership and support will help ensure the Congolese can
move this vast, complex, key regional power forward for the benefit of its 60
million inhabitants and the region.
Background
The protracted war in the DRC is one of the deadliest
conflicts since World War II. Over the past decade, fight-
ing between government forces and rebel groups in the
eastern region has led to more than 5 million deaths.
Beginning in 1998, and stemming in part from the 1994
Rwanda genocide, the war at one point involved armies
from eight neighboring nations. It came to an official end
with the Pretoria Agreement signed in 2002, which the U.S.
helped broker. While Rwandan and Ugandan troops who
had been fighting directly and through proxy groups in the
east withdrew, former Rwandan soldiers, many of whom
participated in the genocide, remained in hiding in eastern
Congo, forming the Forces Democratiques de Liberation
du Rwanda (FDLR). They, along with many other protago-
nists in the conflict, are implicated in much of the violence
that occurs today.
UNICEF estimates that hundreds of thousands of women
have been raped, constituting the worst pandemic of
sexual violence in the world. Gang rape, rape of girls as
young as eight and genital mutilation of rape victims are
pervasive. Incidents of gender-based violence have only
increased in 2010. In July and August, reports surfaced
of the mass rape of nearly 500 villagers in eastern DRC.
According to aid groups responding in the aftermath, local
militias were unable to provide protection against the over-
whelming force of the attackers. The June 2010 renewal
of the UN peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO—previously
MONUC) mandate focused peacekeeping forces on east-
ern DRC. However the mass rapes and other acts of vio-
lence that often go unreported, underscore that while the
20,500 strong MONUSCO has helped protect civilians and
disarm rebel groups it is inadequate to meet all the protec-
tion needs across such a vast territory.
In 2006, the DRC held its first presidential and parlia-
mentary elections in 40 years. Despite hopes that the post
election period would usher in peace and stability, it has
proven difficult to break free from decades of exploitation
by foreign nations, individuals and armed groups, and to
address persistent conflict, economic stagnation and cor-
ruption. Despite its unrivaled regional natural resource
wealth, DRC has virtually no modern infrastructure and
minimal basic services for the majority of the population,
who live on less than $1 per day. Opportunities for educa-
tion and jobs are limited, making recruitment of young peo-
ple easy for armed militias. And the challenges of integrat-
ing formerly violent opponents into a new political system
have created enormous obstacles to securing peace. The
DRC government’s authority remains weak, and multiple
armed groups take advantage of this power vacuum. With
porous borders, weapons and military equipment flow into
the eastern DRC, fueled in part by the illegal exploitation
of mineral wealth.
Today, 2 million people are internally displaced and over
400,000 live as refugees in other countries. Recent attempts
to end the longstanding conflict include the Nairobi Com-
muniqué signed by Rwanda and DRC in November 2007,
aimed at disarming and repatriating members of the FDLR.
The Goma Agreement signed in January 2008 by the gov-
ernment and 22 armed groups (most importantly the CNDP
(National Council for Defense of the People) led by Laurent
Nkunda) collapsed in August 2008, and full scale fighting
resumed. In January 2009, in a surprising move, Rwanda
arrested Nkunda and joined forces with the Congolese
army (FARDC) to carry out an offensive against the FDLR.
The DRC Government continued the offensive against
the FDLR after Rwandan troops withdrew. An estimated
800,000 civilians were displaced by these operations, and
reprisal killings, burning of villages and widespread looting
and rape occurred in the ensuing months. In March 2009,
new agreements were signed between the Congolese gov-
ernment and the CNDP plus other militias from North and
South Kivu. This led to the hasty integration of as many
as 13,000 militia fighters into the FARDC, but the March
agreements remain tenuous.
Meanwhile, in December 2008, in northern Congo, a
joint Congolese-Ugandan-Sudanese initiative to dislodge
the Ugandan rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) failed to
apprehend top rebel leaders or protect civilians from sub-
sequent rebel reprisal attacks. UN officials have estimated
that since December 2007 the LRA has killed nearly 1,800
Congolese civilians, abducted as many as 2,300, and dis-
placed 280,000 more.
Over the years, the U.S. has played an important role
in responding to the crisis in DRC, using its diplomatic
muscle to facilitate recent peace agreements and support-
ing MONUSCO, the transitional elections process and the
provision of emergency relief, health, education and other
basic services. Consolidating real gains in the region, how-
ever, will require an even greater investment of funding,
expertise and use of U.S. influence. If the U.S. does not
act, the consequences will be grave not only for Congolese
but also the region as a whole.