Quigg Vincent 108932 State of California Bar Multiple Bar Discipline Binder3

(Do not write above this line.
State Bar Court of California

Hearing Department
Los
ACTUAL SUSPENSION
Counsel For The State Bar Case Number(s): For Court use only
14-O-01717-YDR
Anand Kumar
Shane C. Morrison
14-O-02118
14-C-02229
FILED
Deputy Trial Counsel
845 South Figueroa Street
Los Angeles, CA 90017
(213) 765-1714 STATE BAR COURT
CI,ERK’S OFFICE
LOS ANGELES
Bar# 261592 / 284115
Counsel For Respondent
Artak Barsegyan
James I. Ham
Pansky Markle Ham LLP
1010 Sycamore Ave Unit 308
South Pasadena, CA 91030
(213) 626-7300 Submitted to: Settlement Judge
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND

Bar # 279064 / 100849 DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
In the Matter of:

VINCENT J. QUIGG ACTUAL SUSPENSION
[] PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED

Bar # 108932
A Member of the State Bar of California

(Respondent)
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the
space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts,"
"Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
A. Parties’ Acknowledgments:
(1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted July 1, 1983.
(2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or
disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
(3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by
this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The
stipulation consists of 22 pages, not including the order.
(4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included
under "Facts."
(Effective January 1, 2014)
kwiktag ® 183 823 167 Actual Suspension
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(5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of
Law".
(6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading
"Supporting Authority."
(7) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any
pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
(8) Payment of Disciplinary Costs--Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 &
6140.7. (Check one option only):
[] Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless
relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
[] Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: two (2)
billing cycles immediately following the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter.
(Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If
Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar
Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
[] Costs are waived in part as set forth in ,a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
[] Costs are entirely waived.
B. Aggravating Circumstances [Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional

Misconduct, standards 1.2(f) & 1.5], Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are
required.
(1) [] Prior record of discipline

(a) [] State Bar Court case # of prior case 87-0-17169
(b) [] Date prior discipline effective August 19, 1993
(c) [] Rules of Professional Conduct/State Bar Act violations: former Rules of Professional Conduct,
rules 6-101(A)(2) [failure to perform competently; see current rule 3-110(A)], 2-111(A)(2) [failure
to promptly refund unearned fees; see current rule 3-700(D)(2)], and 2-111(A)(3) [failure to
promptly return client file; see current rule 3-700(D)(1)]. Respondent also stipulated to
violations of Business and Professions Code sections 6068(m) [failure to communicate] and
6106 [issuance of client trust account checks against insufficient funds].
(d) [] Degree of prior discipline two (2) years stayed suspension and two (2) years probation
(e) [] If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below.
In addition to the discipline imposed against Respondent in case number 87-0-17169,

Respondent has one other prior record of discipline.
In State Bar case numbers 02.O-15983, et al., Respondent received discipline consisting of a
one (1) year stayed suspension and a two (2) year probation with conditions including a thirty
(30) day actual suspension for four violations of rule 3-110(A), Rules of Professional Conduct
[failing to perform competently and failure to supervise an employee]. The discfpiine became
effective on September 22, 2005.
For further discussion of Respondent’s prior records of discipline, see stipulation, at page 17.

Actual Suspension
2
(2) [] Dishonesty: Respondent’s misconduct was intentional, surrounded by, or followed by bad faith,
dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional
Conduct.
(3) [] Trust Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account
to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or
property.
(4) [] Harm: Respondent’s misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice.
(5) [] Indifference: Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the
consequences of his or her misconduct.
(6) [] Lack of Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her
misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.
(7) [] Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct: Respondent’s current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing
or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct. See stipulation, at page 17.
(8) [] Restitution: Respondent failed to make restitution.
(g) [] No aggravating circumstances are involved.
Additional aggravating circumstances:
C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standards 1.2(g) & 1.6]. Facts supporting mitigating
circumstances are required.
(1) [] No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled
with present misconduct which is not deemed serious.
(2) [] No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client, the public, or the administration of justice.
(3) [] Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of
his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
(4) [] Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and
recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her
misconduct. See stipulation, at page 17.
(5) [] Restitution: Respondent paid $ on in restitution to without the threat or force of

disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
(6) [] Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to
Respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.
(7) [] Good Faith: Respondent acted with a good faith belief that was honestly held and reasonable.
(8) [] Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct
Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical or mental disabilities which expert testimony
would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the
(Effective January 1,2014)
Actual Suspension
3
product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and the difficulties
or disabilities no longer pose a risk that Respondent will commit misconduct.
(9) [] Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress
which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and
which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
(10) Family Problems: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her
personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.
(11) [] Good Character: Respondent’s extraordinarily good character is attested to by a wide range of references
in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.
See stipulation, at pages 17-18.
(12) [] Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred
followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.
(13) [] No mitigating circumstances are involved.
Additional mitigating circumstances:
Mistaken Belief, Pretrial Stipulation, see stipulation, at page 18.
D. Discipline:
(1) [] Stayed Suspension:
(a) [] Respondent must be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
i. [] and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and
present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard
1.2(c)(1) Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.
ii. [] and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to
this stipulation.
iii. [] and until Respondent does the following:
(b) [] The above-referenced suspension is stayed.
(2) [] Probation:
Respondent must be placed on probation for a period of two (2) years, which will commence upon the effective
date of the Supreme Court order in this matter. (See rule 9.18, California Rules of Court)
(3) [] Actual Suspension:
(a) [] Respondent must be actually suspended from the practice of law in the State of Califomia for a period
of six (6) months.
i. [] and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and
present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard
1.2(c)(1), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct

Actual Suspension
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ii. [] and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to
this stipulation.
iii. [] and until Respondent does the following:
E. Additional Conditions of Probation:
(1) [] If Respondent is actually suspended for two years or more, he/she must remain actually suspended until
he/she proves to the State Bar Court his/her rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and learning and ability in the
general law, pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1), Standards for Attomey Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.
(2) [] Dudng the probation period, Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of
Professional Conduct.
(3) Within ten (10) days of any change, Respondent must report to the Membership Records Office of the
State Bar and to the Office of Probation of the State Bar of California ("Office of Probation"), all changes of
information, including current office address and telephone number, or other address for State Bar
purposes, as prescribed by section 6002.1 of the Business and Professions Code.
(4) Within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation
and schedule a meeting with Respondent’s assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and
conditions of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the
probation deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must
promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.
(5) Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10,
July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state
whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all
conditions of probation during the preceding calendar quarter. Respondent must also state whether there
are any proceedings pending against him or her in the State Bar Court and if so, the case number and
current status of that proceeding. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report must be
submitted on the next quarter date, and cover the extended period.
In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than
twenty (20) days before the last day of the period of probation and no later than the last day of probation.
(6) [] Respondent must be assigned a probation monitor. Respondent must promptly review the terms and
conditions of probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner and schedule of compliance.
During the period of probation, Respondent must furnish to the monitor such reports as may be requested,
in addition to the quarterly reports required to be submitted to the Office of Probation. Respondent must
cooperate fully with the probation monitor.
(7) Subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly and truthfully any
inquiries of the Office of Probation and any probation monitor assigned under these conditions which are
directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to whether Respondent is complying or has
complied with the probation conditions.
(8) Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must provide to the Office of
Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School, and passage of the test given
at the end of that session.
[] No Ethics School recommended. Reason:
(9) [] Respondent must comply with all conditions of probation imposed in the underlying criminal matter and
must so declare under penalty of perjury in conjunction with any quarterly report to be filed with the Office
of Probation.

Actual Suspension
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(10) [] The following conditions are attached hereto and incorporated:
[] Substance Abuse Conditions [] Law Office Management Conditions
[] Medical Conditions [] Financial Conditions
F. Other Conditions Negotiated by the Parties:
(1) [] Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination: Respondent must provide proof of passage of
the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE"), administered by the National
Conference of Bar Examiners, to the Office of Probation during the period of actual suspension or within
one year, whichever period is longer. Failure to pass the MPRE results in actual suspension without
further hearing until passage. But see rule 9.10(b), California Rules of Court, and rule 5.162(A) &
(E), Rules of Procedure.
[] No MPRE recommended. Reason:
(2) Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court: Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20,
California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30
and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court’s Order in this matter.
(3)[] Conditional Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court: If Respondent remains actually suspended for 90
days or more, he/she must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and
perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 120 and 130 calendar days,
respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court’s Order in this matter.
(4) [] Credit for Interim Suspension [conviction referral cases only]: Respondent will be credited for the
period of his/her interim suspension toward the stipulated period of actual suspension. Date of
commencement of interim suspension:
(5) [] Other Conditions:

Actual Suspension
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~Do not write above this line.)
In the Matter of: Case Number(s):

VINCENT J. QUIGG 14-O-01717, 14-O-02118, 14-C-02229
Financial Conditions
a. Restitution
Respondent must pay restitution (including the principal amount, plus interest of 10% per annum) to the
payee(s) listed below. If the Client Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed one or more of the payee(s) for all
or any portion of the principal amount(s) listed below, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the
amount(s) paid, plus applicable interest and costs.
Payee Principal Amount Interest Accrues From
[] Respondent must pay above-referenced restitution and provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of
Probation not later than
b, Installment Restitution Payments
Respondent must pay the above-referenced restitution on the payment schedule set forth below. Respondent.
must provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation with each quarterly probation report, or
as otherwise directed by the Office of Probation. No later than 30 days prior to the expiration of the period of
probation (or period of reproval), Respondent must make any necessary final payment(s) in order to complete
the payment of restitution, including interest, in full.
PayeelCSF (as applicable) Minimum Payment Amount Payment Frequency
[] If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court,
the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
c. Client Funds Certificate
If Respondent possesses client funds at any time during the period covered by a required quarterly
report, Respondent must file with each required report a certificate from Respondent and/or a certified
public accountant or other financial professional approved by the Office of Probation, certifying that:
Respondent has maintained a bank account in a bank authorized to do business in the State of
California, at a branch located within the State of California, and that such account is designated
as a "Trust Account" or "Clients’ Funds Account";

Page 7._.7__
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b. Respondent has kept and maintained the following:
A written ledger for each client on whose behalf funds are held that sets forth:
1. the name of such client;
2. the date, amount and source of all funds received on behalf of such client;
3. the date, amount, payee and purpose of each disbursement made on behalf of such
client; and,
4. the current balance for such client.
ii. a written journal for each client trust fund account that sets forth:
1, the name of such account;
2. the date, amount and client affected by each debit and credit; and,
3. the current balance in such account.
iii. all bank statements and cancelled checks for each client trust account; and,
each monthly reconciliation (balancing) of (i), (ii), and (iii), above, and if there are any
differences between the monthly total balances reflected in (i), (ii), and (iii), above, the
reasons for the differences.
c. Respondent has maintained a written journal of securities or other properties held for clients that
specifies:
i. each item of security and property held;
ii. the person on whose behalf the security or property is held;
iii. the date of receipt of the security or property;
iv. the date of distribution of the security or property; and,
v. the person to whom the security or property was distributed.
If Respondent does not possess any client funds, property or securities during the entire period
covered by a report, Respondent must so state under penalty of perjury in the report filed with the
Office of Probation for that reporting period. In this circumstance, Respondent need not file the
accountant’s certificate described above.
3. The requirements of this condition are in addition to those set forth in rule 4-100, Rules of
Professional Conduct.
d. Client Trust Accounting School
Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must supply to the Office of
Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School Client Trust Accounting School,
within the same pedod of time, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.
(Effective January 1,2011 )

Page 8
ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
IN THE MATTER OF: VINCENT J. QUIGG
CASE NUMBERS: 14-O-01717,14-O-02118,14-C-02229
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits the following facts are true and that, with respect to case numbers 14-0-01717 and
14-0-02118, he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct
and that with respect to case number 14-C-02229, the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense
for which he was convicted involved other misconduct warranting discipline.
Case No. 14-O-01717 (Complainant: Felipe Tolentino)
FACTS:
1. On January 2, 2009, Felipe Tolentino ("Tolentino"), was involved in an auto accident and
sustained bodily injuries. That same day, Tolentino, hired Respondent to pursue personal injury claims
arising out of the auto accident against the at-fault driver.
2. Tolentino subsequently received medical treatment from various medical providers, including
California Imaging Network Medical Group ("California Imaging"), and on May 29, 2009, Tolentino
and Respondent entered into a lien agreement with California Imaging. Pursuant to the terms of the lien
agreement, Tolentino authorized and directed Respondent to pay directly to California Imaging all sums
that may be due for the medical services rendered by California Imaging unto Tolentino and specifically
granted California Imaging a lien against the proceeds of a prospective settlement or recovery on
Tolentino’s behalf, and Respondent agreed to pay and honor the lien if and when it came due.
3. In mid-December 2010, Respondent’s office informed Tolentino that he was only eligible to
receive medical or economic damages, and was statutorily barred from recovering any damages for his
pain and suffering. At that time, Respondent’s office also informed Tolentino that Respondent would
attempt to negotiate his medical providers’ bills and make the disbursements to them, including
California Imaging, and if there were any monies leftover, Respondent would provide that sum to
Tolentino.
4. On December 22, 2010, Respondent’s office informed Tolentino that a settlement offer had
been made by the insurance carrier of the at-fault driver (the "insurance carrier") in the amount of
$6,958, and invited him to come into the office to sign the settlement release, which Tolentino did.
5. On December 27, 2010, Respondent consummated the settlement of Tolentino’s claims for
$6,958 with Tolentino’s knowledge and consent.
6. On March 29, 2011, Tolentino was notified by the insurance carrier that it had issued a
settlement draft for $6,958 and sent the check to Respondent.
9
7. In April 2011, Respondent received the settlement draft from the insurance carder.
Respondent’s office notified Tolentino regarding the receipt of the settlement draft. On May 2, 2011,
Respondent deposited the settlement funds ($6,958) into his client trust account.
8. Thereafter, Respondent delayed in paying California Imaging on Tolentino’s behalf pursuant

to the executed medical lien as follows:
On October 13, 2011, Respondent sent a letter to California Imaging notifying it that
Respondent had received settlement funds from settling Tolentino’s claims. At the time,
there were competing claims for the medical bills, which totaled over $10,000 based on
the original medical bills; the total medical bills exceeded the total available funds from
the settlement, which amounted to $3,300 after deduction of Respondent’s attorney’s fees
and costs; and Respondent needed the cooperation and agreement of all providers in
accepting a reduced amount in order to avoid having to interplead the funds. Therefore,
in his letter, Respondent invited California Imaging to accept a reduced lien amount of
$1,742.18 from its original medical bill of $5,660.
¯ On March 26, 2012, California Imaging faxed Respondent a form, which stated that
California Imaging had agreed to accept the reduced lien amount of $1,742.18.
Respondent received the form but failed to respond or disburse $1,742.18, or any portion
thereof, to California Imaging.
On June 29, 2012, California Imaging faxed a second request for the $1,742.18 to
Respondent. Respondent received the form but failed to respond or disburse $1,742.18,
or any portion thereof, to California Imaging.
On July 30, 2012, California Imaging faxed a letter to Respondent requesting a status
update of the outstanding payment of the $1,742.18. Respondent received the letter but
failed to respond or disburse $1,742.18, or any portion thereof, to California Imaging.
¯ On July 30, 2012, California Imaging also called Respondent’s office and left a message
for Respondent requesting a return phone call. Respondent received the message but
failed to respond.
On September 10, 2012, California Imaging faxed a third letter to Respondent requesting
payment of the $1,742.18, and also stating that if no payment was received by California
Imaging within 30 days that it would seek payment of the full balance ($5,660) from
Tolentino. Respondent received the letter but failed to respond or disburse $1,742.18, or
any portion thereof, to California Imaging.
On October 10, 2012, California Imaging sent Tolentino a letter informing him that
California Imaging had been unsuccessful in seeking payment from Respondent after
several attempts, inviting Tolentino to arrange for Respondent to contact California
Imaging and requesting payment from Tolentino for the outstanding lien amount.
On January 11, 2013, California Imaging faxed a final request to Respondent requesting
payment of the $1,742.18, and also stating that if no payment was received by California
Imaging within 30 days that it would seek payment of the full balance ($5,660) from
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Tolentino. Respondent received the letter but failed to respond or disburse $1,742.18, or
any portion thereof, to California Imaging until on or about April 29, 2013.
9. After Respondent agreed to pay California Imaging the reduced amount of $1,742.18 on
March 26, 2012, Respondent made efforts to obtain agreements from Tolentino’s other medical
providers to reduce their bills.
10. On April 29, 2013, Respondent paid $1,742.18 to California Imaging.
11. In January 2014, Tolentino filed a State Bar complaint.
12. In May 2014, Respondent completed the negotiation of the rest of Tolentino’s medical bills.
There was a remaining balance of $200, which Respondent paid to Tolentino on May 19, 2014.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
13. By not paying any portion of the $1,742.18 that Respondent held on behalf of Tolentino for
approximately thirteen months pursuant to the terms of the medical lien executed by Respondent and
Tolentino, and as requested by California Imaging in March 2012, Respondent failed to promptly pay
funds, as requested by a client, in Respondent’s possession to which the client was entitled, in willful
violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(4).
Case No. 14-O-02118 (Complainant: Marlene Medina)
FACTS:
14. On May 20, 2009, Marlene Medina’s ("Marlene) mother ("mother") died after receiving
medical care from Kern Medical Center and other medical treatment providers ("defendants").
15. At the time of her passing, Marlene’s mother was survived by her spouse and her children
(the "family"), which included Marlene’s father ("father"), Marlene, and her two brothers ("brothers")
(collectively, the "children"). Marlene’s younger brother was a 17-year old minor at the time.
16. On August 28, 2009, Marlene’s father entered into a retainer agreement to hire Respondent
to pursue claims for wrongful death and medical malpractice against the defendants arising out of her
mother’s death. The retainer agreement only identified the father as the client, as none of the children
originally retained Respondent.
17. In November 2009, Respondent associated into the matter another attorney to act co-counsel
("Respondent’s co-counsel"), who was experienced in handling medical malpractice, to primarily handle
the wrongful death litigation on behalf of the father, which the co-counsel did.
18. Respondent’s co-counsel determined that the children, including Marlene, should be included
as additional claimants in the wrongful death case, and brought the children in as clients. Neither
Respondent nor Respondent’s co-counsel entered into a written retainer agreement with the children.
19. Thereafter, Respondent’s co-counsel drafted a complaint on behalf of the family.
20. On May 10, 2010, Respondent filed the complaint in Kern County Superior Court on behalf
of the family, which identified Respondent as the attorney for the father and the children.
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21. On May 13, 2010, Respondent filed an ex parte application, prepared by Respondent’s co-
counsel, for the father to be appointed by the Court as the Guardian ad Litem for Marlene’s younger
brother. The application was granted.
22. On June 3, 2010, Respondent filed a summons, prepared by Respondent’s co-counsel, which
identified Respondent as the attorney for the father and the children.
23. On July 6, 2010, Respondent’s co-counsel was formally associated into the case as attorney
for the father and the children.
24, In December 2010, Marlene’s younger brother reached the age majority and no longer
required Madene’s father to act on his behalf for purposes of the litigation and settlement negotiations.
25. In February 2011, Respondent’s co-counsel sent a settlement demand letter to the
defendants’ counsel, who in turn offered to settle the case for $299,000. Respondent’s co-counsel
discussed the settlement offer with Marlene and the family. Subsequently, Respondent’s co-counsel
sent a proposed settlement release to Respondent’s office for the purpose of forwarding the form to the
father and the children for their review, approval and respective signatures.
26. On May 3,2011, the father and each of the children signed the settlement release form and
returned the form to Respondent’s office for Respondent’s signature. Respondent signed the settlement
agreement and returned it to Respondent’s co-counsel for submission to the defendants’ counsel, which
Respondent’s co-counsel did.
27. The settlement agreement identified Respondent and Respondent’s co-counsel as attorneys
for the father and the children, and each of them signed it. The settlement agreement called for the
defendants to deliver a $299,000 check issued by Kern County to Respondent’s co-counsel made jointly
payable to the father, each of the children, Respondent and Respondent’s co-counsel.
28. The settlement agreement did not include an individualized accounting or a provision
regarding apportionment of the distributions to the father and each of the children. Respondent did not
obtain the written informed consent of the father and each of the children regarding actual conflicts of
interest, which existed between the competing claims of the father and the children to the aggregate
settlement received on their collective behalf.
29. On June 14, 2011, Kern County issued a check in the amount of $299,000 in accordance with
the settlement agreement.
30. On June 16, 2011, Respondent’s co-counsel endorsed the settlement draft on behalf of the
father and the children pursuant to Limited Power of Attorney clause in the retainer agreement, and
deposited the funds into his client trust account.
31. Respondent and Respondent’s co-counsel’s legal fees were govemed by statutory limits
pursuant to the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act ("MICRA"), outlined in Business and
Professions Code section 6146, as follows:
¯ Respondent was required to deduct costs prior to calculating his legal fees. The costs in
the instant matter were $2,580, leaving a net settlement of $296,420 ($299,000 - $2,580).
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Attorneys’ fees were limited to 40% of the first $50,000 settlement funds recovered
($20,000); a third of the second $50,000 settlement funds recovered ($16,666.67) and
25% of the remaining settlement funds ($196,420 x 25% = $45,105).
¯ After deducting the costs totaling $2,580 from the total settlement recovery of $299,000,
the maximum amount of attorneys’ fees were $85,771.67 ($299,000 - $2,580 - $20,000 -
$16,666.67 - $45,105).
Of the $85,771.67 sum, Respondent and Respondent’s co-counsel were each entitled to
attorneys’ fees of $42,885.83 ($85,771.67 x 50%) and their respective advanced costs,
which were $1,355 for Respondent and $1,225 for Respondent’s co-counsel.
Accordingly, of the aggregate settlement funds, Respondent was entitled to $44,240.83
($42,885.83 + $1,355) and Respondent’s co-counsel was entitled to $44,110.83
($42,885.83 + $1,225).
¯ The remaining funds of $210,648.33 ($299,000 - $2,580 - $85,771.67) belonged to the

father and the children collectively.
32. On June 17, 2011, Respondent’s co-counsel appropriately withdrew his share of attorneys’
fees and costs, which totaled $44,110.83 ($42,885.83 + $1,225). Respondent received the remaining
balance of $254,889i17 ($299,000 - $44,110.83), which, less Respondent’s fees and costs, belonged to
the father and the children.
33. On June 29, 2011, Respondent deposited the $254,889.17 into his client trust account. Upon
receiving the funds from Respondent’s co-counsel, Respondent promptly informed the father of the
receipt of the funds, but Respondent failed to directly inform the children regarding his receipt of the
funds, believing that the father would inform the children.
34. On June 29, 2011, Respondent issued a check to the father in the amount of $176,820, a
portion of which belonged to the children. The check was only made payable to the father. The
children did not receive any portion of the settlement funds between June 29, 2011 and April 19, 2012.
35. At no time did Respondent inform each of the children regarding the receipt of the funds or
that Respondent intended to, was giving, or had given their father a check for the aggregate settlement
amount on June 29, 2011. At no time did Respondent obtain the informed written consent from each of
the children to disburse all of the aggregate settlement funds to their father.
36. At the time he provided the $176,820 check to the father, Respondent provided the father
with a disbursement sheet for his review, approval, and signature. The disbursement sheet identified the
clients as the whole family, but did not identify the individual shares each of the children were to
receive.
37. The disbursement sheet also reflected an improper calculation of Respondent’s attorney’s
fees and the amount of settlement funds belonging to the family. As a result of Respondent’s improper
calculation, he collected an excessive and illegal fee in the sum of$78,069.17, in violation of Business
and Professions Code section 6146 in two respects, and underpaid the family as follows:
¯ As stated above in paragraph 28, Respondent’s share of the settlement funds were limited
to $44,240.83 ($42,885.83 attorney’s fees + $1,355 advanced costs),
13
Respondent failed to collect his attomeys fees based on the net settlement amount
($296,420), and instead he miscalculated and collected his fees based on the gross
settlement amount ($299,000), in violation of Business and Professions Code section
6146(c) ("net accounting error"), and
Respondent failed to adhere to the MICRA limits in violation of Business and

Professions Code section 6146(a) by collecting an excessive and illegal fee of $33,838.34
("MICRA accounting error"). Instead, Respondent should have issued a check to the
family for $210,658.34 ($176,820 + $33,838.34).
38. The father signed the disbursement sheet and returned it to Respondent’s staff. The form
contained handwritten notes in Spanish, including a note under the father’s signature, which when
translated into English states "representative of the family."
39. In September 2011, upon reconciling his CTA and a conducting a review of the distribution
of the settlement funds, Respondent checked the fees he had taken and realized he had taken the
excessive and illegal fee described in paragraph 37, and that his fees did not comply with MICRA (i.e.,
the MICRA accounting error). Respondent then attempted to contact the father regarding disbursement
of supplemental funds to correct the MICRA accounting error, but was unable to reach the father
because he had moved to Mexico sometime after June 2011 and his whereabouts were unknown.
Respondent was also unable to contact Marlene until February 2012 due to her unavailability during that
period.
40. In March 2012, Marlene learned for the first time from Respondent’s co-counsel that
Respondent had received the family’s settlement funds from Respondent’s co-counsel in June 2011, to
disburse to the family.
41. In March 2012, Marlene visited Respondent’s office to discuss the status of the settlement
funds with Respondent, but Respondent was unavailable. Instead, Marlene spoke with one of
Respondent’s non-attorney employees, who informed her that Respondent had given her father a check
for the aggregate settlement in June 2011, and that Respondent would give her and her younger brother
$15,000 each. Marlene informed the employee that she would speak to her father, who had returned
from Mexico, and would let Respondent’s office know how she wanted to proceed.
42. On April 18, 2012, the father and Marlene visited Respondent’s office, and Respondent
provided both of them with a supplemental disbursement sheet ("April 18, 2012 supplemental
disbursement sheet") that identified the entire family as the clients. Marlene and her father were given a
check in the sum of $31,248.33 ("supplemental disbursement check"), drawn from Respondent’s client
trust account from personal funds that Respondent restored to his client trust account to account for
MICRA accounting error.
43. The $31,248.33 supplemental disbursement check was made payable to the father, Marlene
and one of Marlene’s brothers. (Marlene’s older brother waived his interest in receiving any share of the
settlement ~_.nds.) The April 18, 2012 supplemental disbursement sheet was signed by the father and
Marlene. After receiving the April 18, 2012 supplemental disbursement check, the father shared
approximately $30,000 from the aggregate settlement with Marlene and her younger brother.
44. Respondent’s April 18, 2012 supplemental disbursement sheet corrected his MICRA
accounting error, but did not correct his net accounting error as described in paragraph 37 above. As a
14
result, Respondent was still obligated to make restitution of $2,580 to the family even after he issued the
April 18, 2012 supplemental disbursement check.
45. Marlene filed a State Bar complaint in March 2014, and Respondent did not realize he had
made the net accounting error until a State Bar investigator alerted him to the error in late August 2014.
46. During the State Bar proceedings, Respondent attempted to rectify the net accounting error
by disbursing the remaining $2,580 to the father and the children collectively, which he successfully did
in June 2015.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
47. By continuing representation of the father and the children when Respondent entered into an
aggregate settlement of wrongful death and medical malpractice claims on their collective behalf, where
the interests of the clients actually conflicted as to competing claims of undetermined amounts of the
settlement proceeds, and by failing to obtain their respective informed written consent as to the conflicts,
Respondent continued representation of more than one client in a matter in which the interests of the
clients actually conflicted without the informed written consent of each client, in willful violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-310(C)(2).
48. By charging and collecting an excessive and illegal attorney’s fee from the father and the
children to represent them in an action against a healthcare provider based upon such healthcare
provider’s alleged professional negligence, that failed to comply with the statutory limits of Business
and Professions Code section 6146(a), Respondent willfully violated the Rules of Professional Conduct,
rule 4-200(A).
49. By failing to promptly inform each of the children regarding the receipt of the $176,820
settlement funds, by failing to obtain the consent and authorization from each of the children to disburse
their shares of the $176,820 settlement funds to the father and by subsequently disbursing the $176,820
settlement funds to the father without informing the children that he was making the disbursement,
Respondent breached his fiduciary duty to the children, in willful violation of Business and Professions
Code section 6068(a).
Case No. 14-C-02229 (Conviction Proceedings)
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND IN CONVICTION PROCEEDING:
50. This is a proceeding pursuant to sections 6101 and 6102 of the Business and Professions
Code and rule 9.10 of the California Rules of Court.
51. On September 24, 2013, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a complaint in the
Los Angeles County Superior Court ("LASC"), case number 3DY05594, charging Respondent with two
misdemeanor violations: one count of violating Penal Code section 273.5(a) [Corporal Injury to
Spouse/Cohabitant/Child’s Parent] and one count of violating Penal Code section 245(a)(4) [Assault by
Means Likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury].
52. Commencing on March 21, 2014, a jury trial was held in LASC case number 3DY05594.
53. On March 27, 2014, the court dismissed the count of a violation of Penal Code section
245(a)(4) pursuant to a motion by the deputy district attorney.
15
54. On April I, 2014, Respondent was found guilty of one count of a misdemeanor violation of
Penal Code section 273.5(a) [Corporal Injury to Spouse/Cohabitant/Child’s Parent]. Arraignment for
judgment and time for sentencing were waived. The court suspended imposition of Respondent’s
sentence and placed Respondent on probation for a period of three years on terms including that
respondent perform 20 days of community labor, serve an additional 10 days in the county jail or
perform an additional 10 days of community labor, complete a 52-week domestic violence treatment
program, and stay 100 yards away from and have no contact with the victim. After his conviction,
Respondent successfully completed the 52-week domestic violence treatment program.
55. On July 28, 2014, the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California
transmitted records of Respondent’s conviction in LASC case number 3DY05594 to the State Bar Court.
56. On August 12, 2014, the Review Department of the State Bar Court issued an order referring
the matter to the Hearing Department for a hearing and decision recommending the discipline to be
imposed in the event the Hearing Department found that the facts and circumstances surrounding the
offense for which Respondent was convicted involved moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting
discipline.
FACTS:
57. On the evening of August 26, 2013, Respondent and his wife had a party at their residence,
and according to their trial testimony, they both consumed alcohol at the party. During the course of the
evening, Respondent and his wife got into an argument and during the argument, Respondent head-
butted his wife causing bruising and swelling on her forehead and face. Thereafter, Respondent and his
wife went to sleep in their bedroom.
58. On the morning of August 27, 2013, Respondent and his wife resumed their argument from
the previous evening. Immediately after the argument his wife exited the home and went to the rental
unit house behind their residence. The tenant in the rental unit provided Respondent’s wife with access
to a phone, and the wife called the police.
59. On August 27, 2013, Downey Police Officers were dispatched to the residence of
Respondent and his wife in response to a possible spousal abuse call. Upon arrival, the officers spoke
with Respondent’s wife and noticed she had bruising and swelling on her forehead and face. After
interviewing his wife, the officers interviewed Respondent, who told them that he and his wife
accidentally butted heads. At the time, the officers noticed bruising and swelling on Respondent’s
forehead consistent with his wife’s statements. The officers then placed Respondent under arrest for
spousal abuse.
60. During the March 2014 criminal trial, Respondent’s wife recanted her prior August 27, 2013
statements to the police officers and instead testified that Respondent did not intentionally head-butt her
and that she and Respondent accidentally bumped heads during their August 26, 2013 argument.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
61. The facts and circumstances surrounding the above-described misdemeanor conviction for a
violation of Penal Code section 273.5(a) [Corporal Injury to Spouse/Cohabitant/Child’s Parent] did not
involve moral turpitude but did involve other misconduct warranting discipline.
16
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.5(a)):
Respondent has two prior records of discipline since being admitted to practice law on July 1,
1983: 1) a two-year stayed suspension from 1993 and 2) a thirty-day actual suspension from 2005.
In Respondent’s first record of discipline, he entered into a disciplinary stipulation in State Bar
case number 87-0-17169, wherein Respondent received discipline consisting of a two (2) year stayed
suspension and a two (2) year probation with conditions. The ensuing disciplinary order became
effective on August 19, 1993. Respondent stipulated to five ethical violations for misconduct which
occurred in 1987, namely failing to perform services competently on three occasions for different clients
in violation of former Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 6-101 (A)(2) [predecessor to current rule
3-110(A)], failing to promptly return unearned fees and the client file upon withdrawal of representation
in violation of former rules 2-111 (A)(3) [predecessor to current rule 3-700(D)(2)], and 2-111 (A)(3)
[predecessor to current rule 3-700(D)(1)] respectively. Respondent also stipulated to violations of
Business and Professions Code sections 6068(m) and 6106 for misconduct stemming from his failure to
inform his client that Respondent had shut down his office, and issuing five checks against insufficient
funds in non-client trust accounts. Respondent was also given mitigating credit, because some of his
misconduct was a result of family difficulties he was experiencing at the time.
In Respondent’s second record of prior discipline, he entered into a disciplinary stipulation in

State Bar case numbers 02-0-15983, et al. wherein Respondent received discipline consisting of a one
(1) year stayed suspension and a two (2) year probation with conditions including a thirty (30) day
actual suspension. The ensuing disciplinary order became effective on September 22, 2005.
Respondent stipulated to four violations of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A) for misconduct
which occurred in 2002, including failing to perform services competently in two client matters and
failing to supervise his non-attorney staff in those client matters. Specifically, Respondent failed to file
complaints on behalf of two clients prior to the expiration of the statute of limitation on their respective
claims, filed complaints on their respective behalves after the statutes had expired, and failed to
supervise his staff in sending altered documents to insurance carriers in the client matters to facilitate
settlement of the clients’ claims.
Multiple Acts of Misconduct (Std. 1.5(b)): Respondent committed four separate acts of
misconduct in two different client matters, and committed a criminal act that constitutes other
misconduct warranting discipline, which constitutes an aggravating circumstance.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Remorse (Std. 1.6(g)): In the Medina matter, Respondent made the April 18, 2012
supplemental disbursement to the family to correct the MICRA accounting error, showing that
Respondent took prompt objective steps, demonstrating spontaneous remorse and recognition of the
wrongdoing and timely atonement, nearly two years prior to any State Bar involvement.
Good Character (Std. 1.6(t)): Respondent has submitted six declarations from a widespread
sample of the legal and general communities, including two attorneys, a pastor from his church, a former
colleague, a doctor with whom he worked on cases, and a long-time friend. All of the witnesses are
aware of the full extent of his misconduct, attesting to an extraordinary demonstration of his good
character and showing his involvement in the community by providing pro bono legal services to clients
17
on a regular basis, and undertaking other non-legal voluntary work such as coaching youth basketball for
five years and doing missionary work with his church in South Korea. (See In the Matter of Respondent
K (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 335, 359 [performance of civic service and charitable
work is entitled to mitigation as evidence of good character under former standard 1.2(e)(vi)]; see also
Porter v. State Bar (1990) 52 Cal.3d 518, 529.)
Additional Mitigating Circumstances:
Mistaken Belief." With regard to the Medina matter, Respondent paid the initial disbursement of
the aggregate settlement funds to the father based upon his belief that the father was acting as the
authorized representative of the family and that the family as a whole would receive the settlement
funds. Although respondent’s belief was mistaken, he believed he was serving his clients’ interests by
disbursing the aggregate settlement funds to the father and there was an absence of bad faith on his part.
Respondent is entitled to some mitigation under relevant case law in light of his actions taken upon his
mistaken belief that the father was receiving the funds as the family representative. (Arm v. State Bar
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 763,779-780 [In concealing his suspension from a court and sending a proposed
settlement to opposing counsel while he was under suspension, an attorney mistakenly believed he was
serving his client’s interests, which lessened the seriousness of the attorney’s misconduct].)
Pretrial Stipulation: While some of the facts in this matter are easily provable, Respondent’s
agreement in the instant stipulation fully resolved this matter without the necessity of a trial, thereby
saving State Bar resources. (Silva-Vidor v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigative
credit was given for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability].)
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct "set forth a means for
determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction in a particular case and to ensure consistency across
cases dealing with similar misconduct and surrounding circumstances." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit.
IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.1. All further references to Standards are to
this source.) The Standards help fulfill the primary purposes of discipline, which include: protection of
the public, the courts and the legal profession; maintenance of the highest professional standards; and
preservation of public confidence in the legal profession. (See std. 1.1; In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th
184, 205.)
Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed
"whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92,
quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.)
Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating
disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of
similar attorney misconduct. (In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) Ifa recommendation is at the
high end or low end of a Standard, an explanation must be given as to how the recommendation was
reached. (Std. 1.1 .) "Any disciplinary recommendation that deviates from the Standards must include
clear reasons for the departure." (Std. 1.1; Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fla. 5.)
In determining whether to impose a sanction greater or less than that specified in a given
standard, in addition to the factors set forth in the specific standard, consideration is to be given to the
primary purposes of discipline; the balancing of all aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the type
of misconduct at issue; whether the client, public, legal system or profession was harmed; and the
18
member’s willingness and ability to conform to ethical responsibilities in the future. (Stds. 1.7(b) and
(c).)
Here, Standard 1.8(b) also applies to Respondent’s instant misconduct, because of his two prior
records of discipline. Standard 1.8(b) provides:
(b) If a member has two or more prior records of discipline, disbarment is

appropriate in the following circumstances, unless the most compelling mitigating
circumstances clearly predominate or the misconduct underlying the prior
discipline occurred during the same time period as the current misconduct:
(1) Actual suspension was ordered in any one of the prior disciplinary matters;
(2) The prior disciplinary matters coupled with the current record demonstrate a
pattern of misconduct; or
(3) The prior disciplinary matters coupled with the current record demonstrate the
member’s unwillingness or inability to conform to ethical responsibilities.
While Standard 1.8(b) applies to Respondent’s instant misconduct, under the current
circumstances, there is a compelling justification and reason to deviate from Standard 1.8(b) and impose
lesser discipline. (See In re Silverton, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 92.) The Supreme Court has routinely
held that disbarment is not appropriate in every case in which Standard 1.8(b) applies. (E.g., Arm v.
State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 763, 779-780 [applying former Standard 1.7(b), Court held disbarment was
"excessive" for a respondent who had three prior records, of discipline, where there was a lack of a
common thread from the respondent’s prior misconduct and there was an absence of significant harm
and bad faith]; Conroy v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 495,503,508 [even in the absence of compelling
mitigation and despite the respondent having two prior records of discipline, Court imposed one-year
actual suspension]; Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762 [Court imposed two-year actual suspension
for attorney with three prior records of discipline]; see also In the Matter of Miller (Review Dept. 1990)
1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 131,136-137 [finding disbarment to be too severe for attorney with two prior
records of discipline, court held that "[t]o properly fulfill [the] purposes of lawyer discipline, we must
examine the nature and chronology of respondent’s record of discipline. [Citation.] Merely declaring
that an attorney has three impositions of discipline, without more analysis may not adequately justify
disbarment in every case."].)
Here, as in Arm, supra, 50 Cal.3d 763, there is no common thread from Respondent’s prior
misconduct, nor does his present misconduct involve significant harm to his clients or bad faith.
Reviewing Respondent’s prior records of discipline in conjunction with the instant misconduct,
Respondent’s record of practice does not reflect a pattern of misconduct or an unwillingness or inability
by Respondent to conform to his ethical responsibilities. Respondent’s prior records of discipline
largely concerned failures to perform legal services competently for clients and are dissimilar to the
instant misconduct. Similarly, Respondent’s actions reflect his willingness and ability to conform to
ethical responsibilities as he took steps to rectify his misconduct prior to the filing of State Bar
complaints in both client matters by ultimately making the appropriate payments to California Imaging
on Tolentino’s behalf in April 2013, and by making the April 2012 supplemental disbursement to the
family in the Medina matter. Respondent’s misconduct is further surrounded by mitigating
circumstances, including good faith and his showing of good character. Moreover, while there is some
harm inherent in the nature of Respondent’s misconduct, there is an absence of significant harm. Lastly,
19
Respondent’s first discipline from 1993 arose from misconduct which occurred in 1987, and is remote
and therefore entitled to less weight in the consideration of the appropriate discipline for the misconduct
described herein. (Miller, supra, 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 131,136-137.) Therefore, a deviation from
Standard 1.8(b) is warranted under the circumstances.
In this matter, Respondent admits to committing four acts of professional misconduct and other
misconduct warranting discipline. Standard 1.7(a) requires that where a Respondent "commits two or
more acts of misconduct and the Standards specify different sanctions for each act, the most severe
sanction must be imposed." Here, several standards apply to Respondent’s multiple acts of professional
misconduct. The gravamen of Respondent’s misconduct concerns his failures to promptly pay out
entrusted funds to a medical lienholder in the Tolentino matter, observe his fiduciary duties to all of his
clients in the Medina matter, and his conviction for inflicting corporal injury on his wife. Therefore, the
most severe sanction that applies to Respondent’s misconduct is found in Standard 2.8(a) for his breach
of fiduciary duties owed to the children.
Standard 2.8(a) provides that disbarment or actual suspension is appropriate for Respondent’s
willful violation of his breach of fiduciary duties, a violation of Business and Professions Code section
6068(a), for his disbursement of all of the settlement funds to the father and failing to protect the
interests of the children. (See In the Matter of Malek-Yonan (Review Dept. 2004) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct.
Rptr. 627, 635 [an attorney has a "non-delegable" and "personal obligation of reasonable care to comply
with the critically important rules for the safekeeping and disposition of client funds."].) Here,
Respondent’s more recent discipline consisted of a thirty-day actual suspension, and as such his instant
misconduct warrants a longer period of actual suspension. (See Std. 1.8(a).) Based on the unique set of
facts in the Medina matter, and Respondent’s voluntary corrective actions taken in both client matters
(e.g., the April 18, 2012 supplemental disbursement to the family and the April 29, 2013 payment to
California Imaging), he has demonstrated a willingness and ability to comply with his ethical duties
since the time he engaged in his misconduct, an important indication that the instant misconduct is
unlikely to recur in the future. For the reasons stated above, Respondent’s misconduct does not warrant
disbarment, but does warrant progressive discipline consisting of a period of actual suspension of more
than thirty days.
Based on the misconduct described herein, the unique set of facts, and all the above-stated
factors at play, including Respondent’s prior records of discipline and the mitigating factors, discipline
consisting of two years of stayed suspension and two years of probation with conditions including a six-
month actual suspension is appropriate discipline to protect the public, the courts, and the legal
profession; maintain high professional standards for attorneys; and preserve public confidence in the
legal profession.
DISMISSALS.
The parties respectfully request the Court to dismiss the following alleged violations in the interest of
justice:
Case No. Count Alleged Violation
14-O-01717 Two Business and Professions Code section 6106

14-O-02118 Six Business and Professions Code section 6068(m)
20
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed Respondent that as of
June 8, 2015, the prosecution costs in this matter are approximately $10,157. Respondent further
acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the
costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
EXCLUSION FROM MCLE CREDIT
Pursuant to rule 3201, Respondent may no__!t receive MCLE credit for completion of State Bar Ethics
School and State Bar Client Trust Accounting School. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)
21
~Do not write above this line.)
in the Matter of: Case number(s):

VINCENT J. QUIGG 14-O-01717, ! 4-0-02118, 14-C-02229
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
By their signatures below, the parties and ~_~ counsel, as applicab!e, signify their agreement with each of the
recitations and each of the terms an,~A ~~is Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.
June 1[ ,2015 ~~ ..... VincentJ. Quigg

~ ..... R e s p,~(==~ ~9__~==~tt~1~ ~ "
~
, /’)q~-~4 ~ d.- James 1. Ham

~ .... tt~-l~i~ond~ounsel Signature ~ "
June I’ ,2015 . ..",~.._...9 ./~i~i__~j {j~,.~._I ~ ,,o Anand Kumar

~~ Deputy Yri~l Counsel"s Signature Print Name
,2015 , ;han¢C. Mo son

Date
~~dnt Name

Signature Page
Page _?_2_
In the Matter of: Case Number(s):

VINCENT J. QUIGG 14-O-01717, 14-O-02118, 14-C-02229
ACTUAL SUSPENSION ORDER
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the
requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the
Supreme Court.
The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the
DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
[] All Hearing dates are vacated.
1. On page 2 of the Stipulation, at paragraph B.(1)(c), line 2, "2-111 (A)(2)" is deleted, and in its place is
inserted "2-111 (A)(3)".
2. On page 2 of the Stipulation, at paragraph B.(1)(c), line 3, "2-11 l(A)(3)" is deleted, and in its place is
inserted "2-111 (A)(2)".
3. On page 13 of the Stipulation, first,,b, ullet point paragraph at the top of the page, line 3, "$45,105" is
deleted, and in its place is inserted ’$49,105".
4. On page 13 of the Stipulation, second bullet point paragraph, lines 2-3, strike ($299,000 ~ $2,580 -
$20,000 - $16,666.67 - $45,105)".
5. On page 14 of the Stipulation, second bullet point paragraph, lines 2 and 4, "$33,838.34" is deleted, and
in its place is inserted "$33,838.33".
6. On page 17 of the Stipulation, second paragraph, line 8 at the end of the sentence, "2-111 (A)(3)" is
deleted, and in its place is inserted "2-111 (A)(2)".
7. On page 19 of the Stipulation, last paragraph line 12, "good faith" is deleted, and in its place is inserted
"his belief he was serving his clients’ interests".
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed
within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved
stipulation. (See rule 5.58(E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date
of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of
Court.)
Dat~ RLEBECCA MEYE~R RO~SENBER~JUDGE PRO TEM

Judge of the State Bar Court

Actual Suspension Order
Page
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen
and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and
County of Los Angeles, on June 15, 2015, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND

ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal
Service at Los Angeles, Califomia, addressed as follows:
JAMES IRWIN HAM

PANSKY MARKLE HAM LLP
1010 SYCAMORE AVE UNIT 308
SOUTH PASADENA, CA 91030
by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California
addressed as follows:
ANAND KUMAR, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los An on
June 15, 2015.
Case Admink,
State Bar
FILED
THE~STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA JUL B 201
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
CHARLES A. MURRAY STATE BAR COURT
CLERK’S OFFICE
845 South Figueroa Street LOS ANGELES
Los Angeles, California 90017-2515
Telephone: (213) 765-1000
IN THE STATE BAR COURT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE MATTER OF THE Case No. 14-C-02229

CONVICTION OF:
Transmittal of Records of Conviction of Attorney (Bus. & Prof.
VINCENT J. QUIGG, Code §§ 6101-6102; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.5 et seq.)
No. 108932,
[] Felony;
[] Crime(s) involved moral turpitude;
A Member of the State Bar. [] Probable cause to believe the crime(s) involved moral
turpitude;
[X] Crime(s) which may or may not involve moral turpitude or
other misconduct warranting discipline;
[X] Transmittal of Notice of Finality of Conviction.
To the CLERK OF THE STATE BAR COURT:
1. Transmittal ofrecords.
[X] A. Pursuant to the provisions of Business and Professions Code, section 6101-6102 and California
Rules of Court, rule 9.5 et seq., the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel transmits a certified copy of
the record of convictions of the following member of the Bar and for such consideration and action
as the Court deems appropriate:
[ ] B. Notice of Appeal
[ x] C. Evidence of Finality of Conviction (Docket)

kwikt-’i~ ® 048 639 599
IX] D. Other
Name of Member: VINCENT J. QUIGG

Date member admitted to practice law in California: July 1, 1983
Member’s Address of Record: Quigg & Associates
5411 Long Beach Blvd.
Long Beach, CA 90805
2. Date and court of conviction; offense(s).
The record of conviction reflects that the above-named member of the State Bar was convicted as follows:
Date of entry of conviction: April 1, 2014

Comcicting court: Superior Court, County of Los Angeles
Case number(s): 3DY05594
Crime(s) of which convicted and classification(s): Violation of count 1 of the complaint, Penal Code
§273.5(a), (Corporal Iniu _ry to Spouse/Cohabitant/Child’s Parent), a misdemeanor which may or may not
involve moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting discipline as in In re Otto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 970.
[ ] 3. Compliance with Rule 9.20. (Applicable only if checked.)
We bring to the Court’s attention that, should the Court enter an order of interim suspension herein, the Court
may wish to require the above-named member to comply with the provisions of rule 9.20, California Rules of
Court, paragraph (a), within 30 days of the effective date of any such order; and to file the affidavit with the
Clerk of the State Bar Court provided for in paragraph (c) of rule 9.20 within 40 days of the effective date of
said order, showing the member’s compliance with the provisions of rule 9.20.
[ X] 4. Other information to assist the State Bar Court
On March 27, 2014, the Court granted the People’s motion to dismiss count 2, Penal Code ~245(a)(4), (Assault
by means likely to Produce Great Bodily Injury), a misdemeanor. According to the Judge’s Clerk, the charge of
count 2 was erroneously entered in the docket as Penal Code §243(a)(4).
Because the court clerk has declined to complete the State Bar’s Notice of Lack of Appeal form, the complete
docket certified on July 24, 2014 is being presented as proof that no party has filed an appeal within 30 days
after pronouncement of Judgment on April 1, 2014 (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.853) or within 60 days after
pronouncement of Jud~.~,ment (See Cal.. Rules of Court, rule 8.308).
DOCUMENTS TRANSMITTED:
Certified Complaint
Certified Sentencing Memorandum
Certified Docket
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA

DATED:
CHARLES A. MURRAY
Senior Trial Counsel / ’"-..
DECLARATION OF SERVICE
by
U.S. FIRST.CLASS MAIL / U.S. CERTIFIED MAIL / OVERNIGHT DELIVERY / FACSIMILE-ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION
CASE NUMBER(s): 14-C-02229
I, the undersigned, am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within action, whose business address and place of employment is the State Bar of
California, 845 South Figuema Street, Los Angeles, California 90017, dedare that:
on the date shown below, I caused to be served a true copy of the within document described as follows:
TRANSMITTAL OF RECORDS OF CONVICTION OF ATTORNEY: CERTIFIED COMPLAINT;

CERTIFIED SENTENCING MEMORANDUM; CERTIFIED DOCKET
By U.S. First-Class Mail: (CCP ~ 1013 and 1013(a)) [~ By U.S. Certified Mail: (CCP §§ 10t3 and 1013(a))
- in accordance with the practice of the State Bar of Califomia for collection and processing of mail, I deposRed or placed for collection and mailing in the City and County
- of Los Angeles.
By Ovemight Delivery: (CCP §§ 1013(c) and 10t3(d))

I am readily familiar with the State Bar of Califomia’s practice for collection and processing of correspondence for ovemight delivery by the United Parcel Service (’UPS’).
By Fax Transmission: (CCP ~ t013(e) and 1013(f))

Based on agreement of the parties to accept service by fax transmission, I faxed the documents to the parsons at the fax numbers listed herein below. No error was
reported by the fax machine that I used. The original record of the fax transmission is retained on file and available upon request.
By Electronic Service: (CCP § 1010.6)

Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by electronic transm ssion, I caused the documents to be sent to the person(s) at the electronic
addresses listed herein below, I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transm ss on was
unsuccessful.
[] (foru.s. Rtst-Clas$ Mail) in a sealed envelope placed for collection and mailing at Los Angeles, addressed to: (see below)
[] (for ce,~e,~ill in a sealed envelope placed for collection and mailing as certified mail, return receipt requested,
Article No.: .......... 7!.96 9008.9!.!.!,10~6 88~5 ........................ at Los Angeles, addressed to: (see below)
[] #orov~n~,tool~,e,~) together with a copy of this declaration, in an envelope, or package designated by UPS,
Tracking No.: ......................................... addressed to: (see below)
~
Business.Residential Address Fax Number Courtesy Copy to:
Person Served
Quigg & Associates ................ i~i~ctro~ic Add=r~s ...................

Vincent J. Quigg 5411 Long Beach Blvd. - ...........................................................................................
Long Beach, CA 90805
[] via inter-office mail regularly processed and maintained by the State Bar of Califomia addressed to:
N/A
I am read y fam ar with the State Bar of Califomia’s practice for collection and processing of corr.,es_pond.e.nce for mailing, with the..Un.ited. S~tes Postal..Se .m.’ce,...an.d _ .
overnight delivery by the United Parcel Se~ce (’UPS’) In the ordinary course of the State Bar of Califomla s practice, correspo.n.aence colleCl.. ,eo aria processee .o.y me ~ate.uar or
California would be deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day, and for overnight delivery, deposited with delivery fees pa o or provided for, with UPS that same
day.
I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date on the envelope or package is more than one day
after date of deposit for mailing contained in the affidavit.
I declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Los Angeles,
California, on the date shown below.
DATED: July 28, 2014 SIGNED:
Declarant
State Bar of California

The document to which this certificate is affixed is a full,
true and correct copy of the original on file and of record
in the State Bar Court.
ATTEST August 6, 2020
By
Clerk
022 604 626
ORIGINAL
1 THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
2 MIKE A. NISPEROS, JR., No. 85495
CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL FILED
3 RICHARD A. PLATEL, No. 163455
ASSISTANT CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL DEC 0 B 200
4 DIANE J. MEYERS, No. 146643
DEPUTY TRIAL COUNSEL
5 1149 South Hill Street LOSAN~
6 Telephone: (213) 765-1000
8 THE STATE BAR COURT
9 HEARING DEPARTMENT - LOS ANGELES
10
11 In the Matter of ) Case Nos. 02-0-15983

) O3 -0-OO916
12 VINCENT J. QUIGG, )
No. 108932, ) NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES
13 )
A Member of the State Bar. )
14
15 NOTICE - FAILURE TO RESPOND!
16 IF YOU FAIL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THIS NOTICE WITHIN THE

TIME ALLOWED BY STATE BAR RULES, INCLUDING EXTENSIONS, OR
17 IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AT THE STATE BAR COURT TRIAL, (1) YOUR
DEFAULT SHALL BE ENTERED, (2) YOU SHALL BE ENROLLED AS AN
18 INACTIVE MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR AND WILL NOT BE
PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNLESS THE DEFAULT IS SET ASIDE
19 ON MOTION TIMELY MADE UNDER THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF
THE STATE BAR, (3) YOU SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO
20 PARTICIPATE FURTHER IN THESE PROCEEDINGS UNLESS YOUR
DEFAULT IS SET ASIDE, AND (4) YOU SHALL BE SUBJECT TO
21 ADDITIONAL DISCIPLINE.
22 STATE BAR RULES REQUIRE YOU TO FILE YOUR WRITTEN

RESPONSE TO THIS NOTICE WITHIN TWENTY DAYS AFFER SERVICE.
23
IF YOUR DEFAULT IS ENTERED AND THE DISCIPLINE IMPOSED BY
24 THE SUPREME COURT IN THIS PROCEEDING INCLUDES A PERIOD OF
ACTUAL SUSPENSION, YOU WILL REMAIN SUSPENDED FROM THE
25 PRACTICE OF LAW FOR AT LEAST THE PERIOD OF TIME SPECIFIED
BY THE SUPREME COURT. IN ADDITION, THE ACTUAL SUSPENSION
26 WILL CONTINUE UNTIL YOU HAVE REQUESTED, AND THE STATE
BAR COURT HAS GRANTED, A MOTION FOR TERMINATION OF THE
27 ACTUAL SUSPENSION. AS A CONDITION FOR TERMINATING THE
ACTUAL SUSPENSION, THE STATE BAR COURT MAY PLACE YOU ON
28 PROBATION AND REQUIRE YOU TO COMPLY WITH SUCH
1 CONDITIONS OF PROBATION AS THE STATE BAR COURT DEEMS
APPROPRIATE. SEE RULE 205, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR STATE
2 BAR COURT PROCEEDINGS.
3 The State Bar of California alleges:
4 JURISDICTION
5 1. Vincent J. Quigg ("Respondent") was admitted to the practice of law in the State of
6 California on July 1, 1983, was a member at all times pertinent to these charges, and is currently
7 a member of the State Bar of California.
8 COUNT ONE
9 Case No. 02-0-15983

Business and Professions Code, section 6106
10 [Moral Turpitude- Fraud]
11 2. Respondent wilfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6106, by
12 committing an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, as follows:
13 3. In or about July 2001, Maria De Jesus Bautista ("Bautista") hired Respondent for an
14 injury claim arising from a July 6, 2001 automobile collision. The opposing party’s insurance
15 carrier was Mercury Insurance Group/Califomia Automobile Insurance Company ("Mercury").
16 4. On December 20, 2001, February 22, 2002, April 1, 2002, April 26, 2002, and June
17 18, 2002, Mercury sent correspondence to Respondent in which it requested verification that
18 there was liability coverage for the vehicle driven by Bautista.
19 5. On July l, 2002, Respondent’s non-attorney employee, Frank Villanueva
20 ("Villanueva"), agreed with Kevin Maki of Mercury to settle Bautista’s claim for $2,000. The
21 settlement did not include compensation for general damages as Respondent had not produced
22 evidence that there was liability coverage for the vehicle Bautista was driving at the time of her
23 July 6, 2001 accident.
24 6. On July 9, 2002, Bautista executed a release in Bautista’s claim which reflected that
25 Bautista’s signature had been witnessed by Villanueva. On July 9, 2002, Respondent caused his
26 secretary to mail the release to Mercury with a cover letter. In the cover letter, Mercury was
27 directed to contact Villanueva with any questions it had.
28 7. On July 12, 2002, Mercury mailed a $2,000 settlement draft to Respondent.

1 8. After the settlement draft was received and after the expiration of the one-year statute
2 of limitation in Bautista’s claim, Respondent signed an injury lawsuit prepared on behalf of
3 Bautista.
4 9. On September 9, 2002, or after the expiration of the one-year statute of limitation in
5 Bautista’s claim, Respondent filed or caused to be filed the lawsuit for Bautista in the Los
6 Angeles Superior Court, entitled Maria De Jesus Bautista v. Richard F. Noriega, case number
7 BC281107. In the lawsuit, general damages were requested.
8 10. On October 9, 2002, Resptmdent sent a letter to Mercury with a copy of the lawsuit,
9 and a civil case cover sheet and statement of location purportedly signed on July 2, 2002. The
10 copy of the lawsuit had been altered to reflect that it had been filed on July 5, 2002. In the
11 October 9, 2002 letter, Respondent stated that at the time of Bautista’s July 6, 2001 accident,
12 there was insurance coverage on the vehicle Bautista was driving. Respondent demanded
13 $3,268.67 to settle Bautista’s claim. With the letter, Respondent enclosed a check from his
14 client trust account for $2,000, payable to California Automobile Insurance Company and
15 directed Mercury to contact Respondent or Villanueva to further discuss the matter.
16 11. On or about November 1, 2002, Mercury contacted the court and discovered that case
17 number BC281107 had been filed on September 9, 2002.
18 12. On December 18, 2002, an initial case management conference ("CMC") was held in
19 Bautista’s case. Respondent did not appear at the CMC and had not served the lawsuit on the
20 defendant. The court continued the CMC and issued an order to show cause why the case should
21 not be dismissed ("the OSC").
22 13. On January 23, 2003, the court granted the OSC and dismissed Bautista’s case due to
23 lack of prosecution.
24 14. Respondent caused the July 5, 2002 lawsuit to be mailed to Mercury with the intent to
25 mislead Mercury into believing that the one-year statute of limitation in Bautista’s claim had not
26 expired in order to collect additional settlement funds.
27 ///
28 ///
1 15. By intentionally attempting to mislead Mercury in order to collect additional
2 settlement funds, Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty and
3 corruption.
4 COUNT TWO
5 Case No. 02-0-15983

Business and Professions Code, section 6068(a)
6 [Failure to Comply With State Law]
7 16. Respondent wilfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6068(a), by
8 failing to support the Constitution and laws of the United States and of this state, as follows:
9 17. The allegations of paragraphs 3 through 14 are incorporated by reference.
10 18. By sending the altered lawsuit to Mercury with the intent to mislead Mercury in order
11 to collect additional settlement funds, Respondent concealed or knowingly failed to disclose the
12 occurrence of an event that affected Bantista’s right or entitlement to an insurance benefit or
13 payment in wilful violation of Penal Code section 550(b)(3).
14 19. By wilfully violating Penal Code section 550(b)(3), Respondent wilfully failed to
15 support the Constitution and laws of this state.
16 COUNT THREE
17 Case No. 02-0-15983

18 [Failure to Comply With Federal Law]
22 22. Respondent devised a scheme to defraud Mercury for the purpose of obtaining
23 additional settlement funds, and for the purpose of executing such scheme, caused the altered
24 lawsuit to be faxed to Mercury.
25 23. By causing the altered lawsuit to be faxed to Mercury for the purpose of defrauding
26 Mercury, Respondent wilfully violated 18 U.S.C.S. section 1341.
27 24. By wilfully violating 18 U.S.C.S. section 1341, Respondent wilfully failed to support
28 the Constitution and laws of the United States.

1 COUNT FOUR
2 Case No. 02-0-15983

Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A)
3 [Failure to Perform with Competence]
4 25. Respondent wilfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A), by
5 intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failing to perform legal services with competence, as
6 follows:
8 27. On December 19, 2002, ttie State Bar of California ("State Bar") opened an
9 investigation identified as case number 02-0-15983, after receiving a complaint from Mercury
10 against Respondent regarding the altered Bautista lawsuit.
11 28. On July 1, 2003, State Bar Investigator Benson Horn ("Hom") sent a letter.to
12 Respondent regarding Mercury’s complaint.
13 29. On October 23, 2003, Respondent’s counsel sent a letter to Deputy Trial Counsel
14 Joseph Carlucci ("Carlucci") in response to Hom’s letter. In the response, it was represented that
15 Respondent’s non-attorney employee, Javier Luna ("Luna"), had filed and altered the Bautista
16 lawsuit because he wanted to re-negotiate Bautista’s settlement amount. Also, it was represented
17 that Respondent did not discover the alteration to the lawsuit until after he received Hom’s letter.
18 30. With the response, Respondent provided a declaration under penalty of perjury
19 allegedly signed by Luna. In Luna’s declaration, he represented that:
20 a. he had been an employee of Respondent since 1993;
21 b. he had negotiated and settled Bautista’s claim;
22 c. after the settlement funds were received, he discovered that Bautista had
23 insurance coverage;
24 d. after discovering the insurance coverage, he had Respondent sign the Bautista
25 lawsuit with numerous other complaints, filed the lawsuit late, and altered the file date to obtain
26 a better settlement for Bautista;
27 e. he had Respondent sign a October 9, 2002 letter to Mercury Insurance in
28 which he demanded a $3,268.87 settlement;

f. the October 9, 2002 letter was submitted to the insurance carrier with a copy of
the altered lawsuit; and,

g. he continued to indicate to Respondent that the case was settled when it came
4 on for the status conference in the court.
5 31. On December 23, 2002, Mercury sent a letter to Respondent. The letter reflected that
6 the $2,000 check from Respondent was returned because Mercury’s $2,000 offer had been
7 accepted and Mercury’s draft had been cashed. Mercury asked for proof that the statute had
8 been protected. ;
9 32. From July 6, 2002 to September 8, 2002, Respondent had not confirmed whether a
10 lawsuit had been filed with the court for Sandoval.
11 33. Following the December 18, 2002 CMC mad dismissal of Bautista’s case on January
12 23, 2003, Respondent took no action to confirm that Bautista’s claim had been settled a second
13 time or to confirm that new settlement funds had been received and disbursed.
14 34. On or about August 14, 2003, Respondent disbursed $666.67 to Bautista as her
15 portion of the $2,000 settlement and $1,333.33 to AAA (Interinsurance Exchange of the
16 Automobile Club) in payment of its subrogation lien.
17 35. Without proper supervision, Respondent allowed a non-attorney to negotiate a

18 settlement of Bautista’s claim with Mercury, to file a time-barred lawsuit with the court, and to
19 present an altered lawsuit to Mercury.
20 36. By not confimling whether Bautista’s claim had been settled a second time or whether
21 new settlement funds had been received for Bautista from the date of the CMC, December 18,
22 2002, to July 2003; and by not properly supervising his non-attorney employee’s negotiation of
23 Bautista’s claim with Mercury and presentation of Bautista’s time-barred lawsuit to the court and
24 Mercury, Respondent intentionally, recklessly and repeatedly failed to perform legal services
25 with competence.
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///
1 COUNT FIVE
2 Case No. 02-0-15983

Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1-300(A)
3 [Aiding the Unauthorized Practice of Law]
4 37. Respondent wilfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300(A), by aiding
5 a person or entity in the unauthorized practice of law, as follows:
6 38. The allegations of paragraphs 3 through 14, and 27 through 35 are incorporated by
7 reference.
8 39. By allowing a non-attorney to negotiate the settlement of Bautista’s claim and to
9 decide when and whether Bautista’s lawsuit should be filed with the court, without supervision
10 by Respondent, Respondent wilfully aided a person in the unauthorized practice of law.
11 COUNT SIX
12 Case No. 02-0-15983

13 [Moral Turpitude]
17 reference.
18 42. By aiding a person in the unauthorized practice of law, Respondent committed an act
19 involving moral turpitude, dishonesty and corruption.
20 COUNT SEVEN
21 Case No. 02-O-15983

22 [Moral Turpitude - Misrepresentation to State Bar]
26 reference.
27 45. The representation to Carlucci that Respondent did not discover the alteration to the
28 lawsuit until after receiving Horn’s letter was false in that Respondent knew that he had not filed
1 a lawsuit for Bautista by July 6, 2002 as Bautista’s claim had settled on July 1, 2002 and
2 Respondent knew that he had not signed the lawsuit until September 2002, after the expiration of
3 the one-year statute of limitation.
4 46. Respondent submitted the October 23, 2003 letter and declaration to Carlucci with a
5 misrepresentation of fact in order to avoid culpability for his conduct
6 47. By making a misrepresentation of fact to the State Bar to avoid culpability for his
7 conduct, Respondent committed an act of moral turpitude, dishonesty and corruption.
8 COUNT EIGHT
9 Case No. 03-0-00916

10 [Moral Turpitude - Fraud]
11 48. Respondent wilfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6106r by
13 49. On September 6, 2001, Rafael Sandoval ("Sandoval") was involved in an automobile
14 collision.
15 50. On October 17, 2001, 21st Century Insurance ("21st Century") issued a settlement draft
16 to Sandoval for his property damage.
17 51. On October 24, 2001, Respondent sent 21~t Century a letter in which he stated that he
18 had been hired by Sandoval for Sandoval’s injury claim.
19 52. On Augustl2, 2002, Nick Delacruz ("Delacruz"), an adjuster with 21St Century,
20 offered to settle Sandoval’s injury claim for $6,500.
21 53. On August 19, 2002, non-attorney Frank Villanueva ("Villanueva") of Respondent’s
22 office contacted Delacruz and rejected the $6,500. Villanueva offered to settle Sandoval’s claim
23 for $8,500.
24 54. On August 27, 2002, Delacruz called Respondent’s office and asked to speak to
25 Villanueva. Non-attorney Javier Luna ("Luna") of Respondent’s office told Delacruz that
26 Villanueva was not in the office. Delacmz left a message with Luna for Villanueva to call him
27 back.
28 ///
1 55. On September 10, 2002, Villanueva called Delacruz. Delacruz offered to settle
2 Sandoval’s claim for $7,000. The offer was contingent upon Respondent providing proof that a
3 lawsuit had been filed for Sandoval prior to the expiration of the one-year statute of limitation on
4 September 6, 2002 and a request for dismissal with prejudice. Villanueva accepted the
5 settlement offer.
6 56. On September 13, 2002, Delacruz made another demand to Respondent’s office for
7 the summons, complaint and dismissal. Aurora of Respondent’s office replied that she would
8 have Villanueva fax the documents..’ On September 13, 2002, or after the expiration of the one-
9 year statute of limitation in Sandoval’s claim, Respondent filed, or caused to be filed, a personal
10 injury and property damage lawsuit for Sandoval in the Los Angeles Superior Court, entitled
11 Rafael E. Sandoval v. Menlencia Algoso, et aL, case number BC281466.
12 57. On September 17, 2002, Respondent caused his employee to fax a copy of the lawsuit
13 and a request for dismissal to 21st Century. The copy of the lawsuit had been altered to reflect
14 that it had been filed on September 4, 2002. The request for dismissal reflected that it was
15 executed by Respondent on September 17, 2002.
16 58. On or about September 18, 2002, 21st Century contacted the court and discovered that
17 case number BC281466 had been filed on September 13, 2002.
18 59. Respondent caused the altered lawsuit to be faxed to 21st Century with the intent to
19 mislead 21 ~t Century into believing that the one-year statute of limitation in Sandoval’s claim
20 had not expired in order to collect settlement funds.
21 60. By attempting to mislead 21st Century in order to collect settlement funds, Respondent
22 committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty and corruption.
23 COUNT NINE
24 Case No. 03-0-00916

25 [Failure to Comply With State Law]

1 63. By sending the altered lawsuit to 21st Century with the intent to mislead 21st Century
2 in order to collect settlement funds, Respondent concealed or knowingly failed to disclose the
3 occurrence of an event that affected Sandoval’s right or entitlement to an insurance benefit or
4 payment in wilful violation of Penal Code section 550(b)(3).
5 64. By wilfully violating Penal Code section 550(b)(3), Respondent wilfully failed to
6 support the Constitution and laws of this state.
7 COUNT TEN.
8 ’ Case No. 03-0-00916

9 [Failure to Comply With Federal Law]
13 67. Respondent devised a scheme to defraud 21’t Century for the purpose of obtaining
14 settlement funds, and for the purpose of executing such scheme, caused the altered lawsuit to be
15 faxed to 21st Century.
16 68. By causing the altered lawsuit to be faxed to 21s’ Century for the puipose of
17 defrauding 215t Century, Respondent wil fully violated 18 U.S.C.S. section 1341.
18 69. By wilfully violating 18 U.S.C.S. 1341, Respondent wilfully failed to support the
19 Constitution and laws of the United States.
20 COUNT ELEVEN
21 Case No. 03-0-00916

Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A)
22 [Failure to Perform with Competence]
23 70. Respondent wilfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A), by
24 intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failing to perform legal services with competence, as
25 follows:
27 ///
28 ///
1 72. On March 6, 2003, the State Bar of Califomia ("State Bar") opened an investigation
2 identified as case number 03-0-00916, after receiving a complaint from 21~t Century against
3 Respondent regarding the altered Sandoval lawsuit.
4 73. On July 8, 2003, State Bar Investigator Benson Hom ("Horn") sent a letter to
5 Respondent regarding 2 lat Century’s complaint.
6 74. On October 23, 2003, Respondent, through his counsel, sent a letter to Deputy Trial
7 Counsel Joseph Carlucci ("Carlucci") in response to Hom’s letter. In the response, it was
8 represented that Luna had filed and altered the Sandoval lawsuit because he had mistook 21st
9 Century’s August 12, 2002 letter as confimaation that Sandoval’s claim had settled for $6,500. It
10 was further represented that after Luna discovered his error, in early September 2002, Luna
11 prepared the Sandoval lawsuit for Respondent’s signature and altered the filing date without
12 making Respondent aware of the alteration. Also, it was represented that Respondent did not
13 discover the alteration to the lawsuit until after he received Hom’s letter.
14 75. With the response, Respondent provided a declaration under penalty of perjury
15 allegedly signed by Luna. In Luna’s declaration, he represented as follows:
16 On August 15, 2002, I was in negotiation with 20’h (sic) Century
17 Insurance. An offer was made to settle the case for $6,500 by
18 letter which I mistook as confirmation of our conversation settling
19 the claim. However when I contacted the cartier earlier to follow
20 up on the release. The adjuster who had been on vacation, failed
21 to recall or note our agreement. I failed to confiml the offer in
22 writing.
23 When Mr. Quigg approached me, to ask me about the settlement I
24 represented it was done. I lied and told him I filed the lawsuit
25 already prepared and signed by Mr. Quigg in August 2002. To
26 hide my error I altered the date on the Summons and Complaint
27 and gave it to Mr. Quigg who unknowingly submitted this altered
28 complaint to the carrier.

1 Mr. Quigg asked me for the file to appear at the scheduled Status
2 Conference. I told Mr. Quigg the case had been settled and the
3 dismissal, Mr. Quigg had previously executed, was filed and
4 therefore would not need to appear.
76. Respondent did not settle Sandoval’s claim with 21~t Century by September 6, 2002.
5
6 77. By September 6, 2002, Respondent had not confirmed whether a lawsuit had been
7 filed for Sandoval.

78. From September 6, 2002 to July 2003, Respondent had not confirmed whether
8
9 settlement funds had been received for Sandoval, and if so, whether the funds had been
10 disbursed.
11 79. Without proper supervision, Respondent allowed a non-attorney to negotiate a

st
12 settlement of Sandoval’s claim with 21 Century, to file a time-barred la~vsuit with the court, and
sl
13 to present an altered lawsuit to 21 Century.
14 80. By not settling Sandoval’s claim or filing a lawsuit for Sandoval by September 6,
15 2002, by not confirming whether settlement funds had been received for Sandoval from
16 September 6, 2002 to July 2003, and by not properly supervising his non-attorney employee’s
17 negotiation of Sandoval’s claim with 21st Century and presentation of Sandoval’s time-barred
18 lawsuit to the court and 21st Century, Respondent intentionally, recklessly and repeatedly failed
19 to perform legal services with competence.
20 COUNT TWELVE
21 Case No. 03-0-00916

Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1-300(A)
22 [Aiding the Unauthorized Practice of Law]
81. Respondent wilfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300(A), by aiding
23
24 a person or entity in the unauthorized practice of law, as follows:
26 reference.
27 ///
28 ///
1 83. By allowing a non-attorney to negotiate the settlement of Sandoval’s claim, and to
2 decide when and whether Sandoval’s lawsuit should be filed with the court, without supervision
3 by Respondent, Respondent wilfully aided a person in the unauthorized practice of law.
4 COUNT THII~TEEN
Case No. 03-0-00916

5
[Moral Turpitude]
6
85. The allegations of paragraphs 49 through 59, and 72 through 79 are incorporated by
9
10 reference.
11 86. By aiding a person in the unauthorized practice of law, Respondent committed an act
12 involving moral turpitude, dishonesty and corruption.

COUNT FOURTEEN
13
14 Case No. 03-O-00916

[Moral Turpitude - Misrepresentation to State Bar]
15
17 committing an act of moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, as follows:
18 88. The allegations of paragraphs 49 through 59, and 72 through 79, are incorporated by
19 reference.
20 89. The representation that Luna was in negotiation with 21st Century on August 15, 2002
21 was false in that Luna had no conversation with 21st Century before August 27, 2002. 21st
22 Century’s record reflects that Villanueva, not Luna, was conducting the negotiations for
23 Respondent.
24 90. The representation that Luna mistook 21st Centtlry’s August 12, 2002 letter as
25 confirmation of a $6,500 settlement was false in that on August 19, 2002, Villanueva rejected
26 the $6,500 offer and made a counter-offer of $8,500.
27 91. The representation that Luna could not confirm the settlement with 21~t Century was
28 false in that on August 27, 2002, when Delacruz tried to reach Villanueva and spoke to Luna,
1 Luna had the opportunity to confirm the settlement at $6,500, or make a counteroffer. He did
2 neither.
3 92. Respondent submitted the October 23, 2003 letter and declaration to Caducei with
4 misrepresentations of fact in order to avoid culpability for his conduct
5 93. By making misrepresentations of fact to the State Bar to avoid culpability for his
6 conduct, Respondent committed an act of moral turpitude, dishonesty and corruption.

NOTICE - INACTIVE ENROLLMENT!
7
8 YOU ARE HEREBY FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT IF THE STATE BAR

COURT FINDS, PURSUANT TO BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE
9 SECTION 6007(c), THAT YOUR CONDUCT POSES A SUBSTANTIAL
THREAT OF HARM TO THE INTERESTS OF YOUR CLIENTS OR TO
10 THE PUBLIC, YOU MAY BE INVOLUNTARILY ENROLLED AS AN
INACTIVE MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR. YOUR INACTIVE
11 ENROLLMENT WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO ANY DISCIPLINE
RECOMMENDED BY THE COURT. SEE RULE 101(c), RULES~ OF
12 PROCEDURE OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA.
13 NOTICE - COST ASSESSMENT!
14 IN THE EVENT THESE PROCEDURES RESULT IN PUBLIC DISCIPLINE,

YOU MAY BE SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF COSTS INCURRED BY
15 THE STATE BAR IN THE INVESTIGATION, HEARING AND REVIEW OF
THIS MATTER PURSUANT TO BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE
16 SECTION 6086.10. SEE RULE 280, RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA.
17
Respectfully submitted,
18
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
19 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
20
21
22 Dated:/~/~//~
~2Iiane J. M~/y.~" (’.} "
23 /Deputy Tri~i’l CounscT
24
25
26
27
28
1 DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY CERTIFIED MAIL
2 CASE NUMBER: 02-0-15983, 03-0-00916
3 I, the undersigned, over the age of eighteen (18) years, whose business address and place
of employment is the State Bar of California, 1149 South Hill Street, Los Angeles, California
4 90015, declare that I am not a party to the within action; that I am readily familiar with the State
Bar of California’s practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the
5 United States Postal Service; that in the ordinary course of the State Bar of California’s practice,
correspondence collected and processed by the State Bar of California would be deposited with
6 the United States Postal Service that same day; that I am aware that on motion of party served,
service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date on the envelope or
7 package is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing contained in the affidavit; and that
in accordance with the practice of the State Bar of California for collection and processing of
8 mail, I deposited or placed for collection and mailing in the City and County of Los Angeles, on
the date shown below, a true copy of the within
9
10 NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES
11 in a sealed envelope placed for collection and mailing as certified mail, return receipt requested,
Article No.: 7160 3901 9844 3985 3738, at Los Angeles, on the date shown below, addressed to:
12
13 VINCENT J. QUIGG
QUIGG & ASSOCIATES
14 5411 LONG BEACH BOULEVARD
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90805
15
16 in an inter-office mail facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed to:
17 N/A
18 I declare under penalty of perjtu3, under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Los Angeles, California, on the date shown below.
19
20
21 DATED: December 3, 2004 SIGNED: ~,
22 Declarant ~" ~
23
24
25
26
27
28
ORIGINAL
I THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
2 MIKE A. NISPEROS, JR., No. 85495
CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL FILED
3 RICHARD A. PLATEL, No. 163455
ASSISTANT CHIEF TRLAL COUNSEL DEC 0 6
4 DIANE J. MEY]3RS, No. 146643
DEPUTY TRIAL COUNSEL
5 1149 South Hill Street
6 Telephone: (213) 765-1496
8 TI~ STATE BAR COURT
9 HEARING DEPARTMENT - LOS ANGELES
10
11 In the Matter of ) Case No. 02-0-15983, 03-0-00916

)
12 VINCENT J. QUIGG, ) AMENDED DECLARATION OF SERVICE
No. 108932 )BY CERTIFIED MAIL, RETURN RECEII~T
13 ) REQUESTED
A Member of the State Bar )(Bus. & Prof. Code §6002.1(c))
14
15 I, Darlene J. Gutierrez, hereby declare:
16 1. I am over eighteen years of age and not a party to the above-entitled action. All
17 statements made herein are true and correct and if necessary, I would and could competently
18 testify thereto.
19 2. I am employed by the State Bar of California. My business address is 1149 South
20 Hill Street, Los Angeles, California. In my capacity as Legal Secretary for the State Bar, I am
21 readily familiar with the office practice for the collection and processing of correspondence for
22 mailing with the United States Postal Service. In the ordinary course of State Bar office
23 practice, correspondence collected and processed by the State Bar of California for mailing is
24 deposited with the United States Postal Service that same day. I am aware that on motion of
25 party served, service is presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date or postage meter date on
26 the package or envelope is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing contained in
27 the affidavit.
28 ///
1 3. On December 6, 2004, at my business address, and in accordance with the practice of
2 the State Bar of California for collection and processing of mail for mailing with the United
3 States Postal Service, I deposited or placed for collection and mailing with the United States
4 Postal Service, a true copy of:
6 with this Amended Declaration of Service to correct the original Decimation of Service served
7 on December 3, 2004 which was not picked up by the U.S. Postal Service, attached hereto as
8 Exhibit 1,in a sealed envelope placed for collection and mailing as certified mail, return receipt
9 requested, Article No.: 7160 3901 9844 3982 3243, at Los Angeles, on the date shown below,
10 addressed to:
11 VINCENT J. QUIGG
QUIGG & ASSOCIATES
13
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
14
foregoing is true and correct.
15 Exeeuted this 6th day of Dec ember, 2004, at~C~
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1 DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY CERTIFIED MAll,
2 CASE NUMBER: 02-0-15983, 03-0-00916
3 I, the undersigned, over the age of eighteen (18) years, whose business address and place
of employment is the State Bar of California, 1149 South Hill Street, Los Angeles, California
4 90015, declare that I am not a party to the within action; that I am readily familiar with the State
Bar of California’s practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the
5 United States Postal Service; that in the ordinary course of the State Bar of California’s practice,
correspondence collected and processed by the State Bar of California would be deposited with
6 the United States Postal Service that same day; that I am aware that on motion of party served,
service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date on the envelope or
7 package is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing contained in the affidavit; and that
in accordance with the practice of the State Bar of California for collection and processing of
8 mail, I deposited or placed for collection and mailing in the City and County of Los Angeles, on
the date shown below, a true copy of the within
9
11 in a sealed envelope placed for collection and mailing as certified mail, return receipt requested,
Article No.: 7160 3901 9844 3985 3738, at Los Angeles, on the date shown below, addressed to:
12
13 VINCENT J. QUIGG
QUIGG & ASSOCIATES
15
16 in an inter-office mail facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed to:
17 N/A
18 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is tree and correct. Executed at Los Angeles, California, on the date shown below.
19
2O
21 DATED: December 3, 2004 SIGNED:

22 Declarant
23
24
25
26
27
28
By
Clerk
supnsm-:cou
F I L E DR
S0329o7° JUL 2 01993
(State Bar court Case No. 87-O-17169) R°b°" Cler
DEPUTY
IN THE BUPRBHB EOURT OP TH3.8TlTB OF CALIFORNIA
ILEBEE
IN RE VINCENT J. QUIGG ON DISCIPLINE
It is ordered that Vincent J. Quigg be suspended

from the practice of law for two years, that execution of
suspension be stayed, and that he be placed on probation
for two years subject to the conditions of probation,
.
including restitution, recommended by the Hearing

Department of the State Bar Court in its Order Regarding
stipulation filed December 11, 1992. It is further
ordered that he take and pass the California Professional
Responsibility Examination within one year after the
effective date of this order. (see segretti v. State Bar
(1976) 15 Ca1.3d 878, 891, in. 8.) Costs are‘ awarded to
the State Bar.
I.RohmtF.Whninlltldkulihnlquunnchun
ouhesouuotoanun.auh-up-ggu..¢u,.
FUNW31‘IIflblqvulallflhnfllllolitas Ché/ef Justice
dnwnhyflnrumuhalnyqflh;
'
Wham!flwflundnniInIuflI(finChInflflu
W P. QUINN -
Dull‘! Goth
237 301 256
lmfililllllll||||||||||||
THE STATE BAR OFFICE OF THE STATE BAR COURT
OF O Senior Executive. STUART A. FORSYTH
coum CLERK’S OFFICE, 1oo VAN NESS AVENUE, 28th noon, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102-5233 (415) 241.2050
P E R S O N A L A N D C O N F I D E N T I A L
NOTICE ACCOMPANYING SERVICE OF
STIPULATION AS TO FACTS AND DISPOSITION
AND ORDER APPROVING SAME IN
CASE NUMBER 87-O-17169-AKG THE MATTER OF !;flQ§flI_§;_Q§l§§
Enclosed is a copy of the Stipulation As To Facts and Disposition
entered into in the above-entitled matter pursuant to rules 405 and
406 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, and a copy of the
Order Approving Stipulation filed pursuant to rule 407 of said
Rules.
A Copy of rules 405-407, Transitional Rules of Procedure of the
State Bar, Amended California Rules of Court and Rule 1400 of the
Provisional Rules of Practice are also enclosed for reference.
Your attention is directed to these rules which set forth post-
stipulation. time limitations and procedure applicable to this
proceeding before the State Bar Court and the Supreme Court.
DECLARATION OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, over the age of 18 years, whose business
addressed and place of employment is 100 Van Ness Avenue, 28th
Floor, San Francisco, California, declare that I am not a party to
the within action; that in the City and County of San Francisco, on
the date shown below, I deposited true copies of this Notice, the
Stipulation. As to Facts and Disposition, the Order‘ Approving
Stipulation, and rules 405-407, Transitional Rules of Procedure of
the State Bar, Amended California Rules of Court and Rule 1400 of
the Provisional Rules of Practice in a facility regularly
maintained by the United States Postal Service,in a sealed envelope
with postage thereon fully prepaid addressed as follows:
Robert G. Markle, Esq.
Pansky 5 Markle
333 S. Grand Ave., #4050
Djinna Gochis, A/L
333 South Beaudry Ave., Ninth Floor
*without rules
I declare under penalty of perjury at San Francisco, California,
that the foregoing is true and correct. Dated/this 11th day of
Dace ber, 1992. ", fl~;Li\
flKVfJ%” ’“”"“ 3 3
A
Maryann Martinez
_;. Deputy court clerk
State Bar Court
~~
lr'rnEsfAmnncoUn'r mwmtmém \\!g!\T
‘
OFTHE :16“
"’\ Q“
srA'rEnAnmrcALmmN1A \\'..‘.\;
av‘
rum
~
L‘ »
*“
*
HEARING DEPARTMENT 7
DEC 11 1992
H SIATE BAR COURT cu-:m<'s orace
[x 1 LOS Anaauas 1 ]SAN FRANCISCO SAN ERANC‘3C0
IN ms MATIER OF CASE NO(S).
87-O-17169-AKG
VINCENT 1. QUIGG '
No. 108932
ORDER REGARDING STIPULATION FIRST AMENDED
MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA. [ SECOND AMENDED) AS TO FACTS AND DISPOSITION
1
( I 1
A fully executed Stipulation as to Facts and Disposition pursuant to rules 405-407, Transitional Rules
of Procedure of the State Bar of California, consisting of 35 pages, and a 5 page Declaration
by
respondent as to mitigating circumstances, approved by the parties, was submitted to the State Bar
Court in the above-captioned case(s). All stipulations submitted previously are rejected. The
Stipulation is attached to this order and is incorporated
by reference herein. Unless a party withdraws
or modifies the stipulation pursuant to rule 407(c), -Transitional Rules of Procedure of the State Bar
of
California, this order shall be effective 15 days from the service of this order. After consideration of this
stipulation, the Court hereby orders:
Modifications to the stipulation are attached:

I ] the panics having no objection.
I ] the parties having agreed on the record on .
[ ] any party must object within 15 days of the service of this order to the stipulation,
as modified by the Court, or it shall become effective; if any party objects, the
Stipulation shall be deemed rejected.
Q L5 Q It appearing’ that this stipulation and all attachments are fair to the parties and consistent
with adequate protection of the public, the stipulation is approved and the disposition is:
[ ] ordered.
[X]
V
recommended to the California Supreme Court.

[X] further discussion attached.
After due consideration of this stipulation and all attachments, it is rejected:

[ ] for the reasons discussed with the parties in previous conference(s).
[ 3 for the reasons attached to this order.
2
/B It is further [] ordered [ X] recommended that costs be awarded to the State Bar
pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6086.10.
DATE: Dec:mber 9, 1992.

ALAN’K. GOLFLEE AMER
JUDGE or TH.
'
ATE BAR COURT
Apv
Lu;J’J'l'l\
.
-2"
rauncoun
‘TEEEI-‘ECI'lVElULY2A,l9V2 ORD 410
PAGE]
ATTACHMENT TO ORDER REGARDING STIPULATION
AS TO FACTS AND DISCIPLINE
IN THE MATTER OF VINCENT J. QUIGG,
CASE ‘NO. 87-O-17169-AKG
My approval of this Stipulation is based upon what I regard as
compelling mitigation which is presented in and with the
Stipulation. Particularly when viewed in the light of when the
misconduct occurred, I believe that the proposed discipline is fair
to the parties and will adequately protect the public.
/9V%
0 RIGINAL
PAGE 1
COUNSEL FOR STATE BAR: A

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT:
‘iflkck coxue R_ G<rc.\c\ ("\m*\<\i¢
THE STATE BAR COURT FOR COURT USE ONLY

_*
OF THE
'
‘
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA '
HEARING DEPARTMENT DEC 0 4 1992
M LOS ANGELES
STATE BAR count CLERK'S omcg
SAN FRANClSCo
M SANFRANCISCO
r=-1?
IN THE MATTER OF CASE Nms),
’
8‘|«o -1715?
\/guceu'\‘_3. Quuqq
No. D 8331 .
STIPULATION AS TO FACTS AND

MEMBm OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA. DISPOSITION (RULES 405-407,
TRANSITIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE
OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA)
[ 1 FIRST AMENDED I l SECOND AMENDED
SCHEDULE OF ATTACHMENTS '
[V SECTiON ONE: {>d’ FORM STIP 110: STIPULATION FORM, INCLUDING

GENERAL AGREEMENTS AND
WAIVERS
I 1 FORM STIP 120: ADDITIONAL
AGREEMENTS AND WAIVERS
SECTION TWO: FORM ATEMENT OF ACTS OR DMISSIVONS
I‘/23"
pg STIP 130: 5‘.
Am) CONCLUSIONS c”- LAW

.. ‘°°”"§j* f ardedto
§‘",qz
f'-’' v\ xRRANTlNG THE A« REED
u n
»POS|TlON {-—_-;—F'-A-6 H‘
r
T
STA‘ BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE .
- .'4;v- —u4\.1— -
PAGE 9-
[ ] SECTION THREE: I ] FORM STIP 140: STATEMENT OF FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES BEARING ON THE
AGREED DISPOSITION
(Y? sracnom FOUR: [ 1 FORM
STATEMENTSUPPORTING DISMISSAL
DISP 2002
OF ALL CHARGES
[Xi FORM DISP 205: STATEMENT SUPPORTING DISMISSAL
OF CERTAIN CHARGES
FORM DISP 210: ADMCNITION
FORM DISP 220: PRIVATE REPROVAL
FORM DISP 2302 PUBLIC REPROVAL
co--It-Ir-I
n-lhfiij
FORM DISP 240:

STAYED SUSPENSION
FORM DISP 2502 ACTUAL SUSPENSION
FORM
7 PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
u_a|..-A
DISP 260:
v--qr-HI
CALIFORNIA EXAMINATION
FORM DISP 2702
R‘EG*eR'9‘|'N'6 FURTHER CONDITIONS
TO BE ATTACHED TO REPRCVAL
FORM PROB 310: GENERAL CONDITIONS OF
PROBATION AND/OR APPOINTMENT
OF PROBATION MONITOR
FORM PROB 320: RESTITUTION
FORM PROB 330: PROTECTION OF CLIENT FUNDS
FORM PROB 340: MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT
FORM PROB 350: ALCOHOL/DRUG IMPAIRMENT
FORM PROB 360: EDUCATION AND LAW OFFICE
MANAGEMENT
FORM PROB 370: COMMENCEMENT AND EXPIRATION
OF PROBATION
FORM PROB 380:
‘REG-ARBFNG FURTHER CONDITIONS
OF PROBATION
{Y} SECTION FIVE: APPROVAL OF PARTIES ‘{'FA'6"E-H’
.4n.»x»,. S__]'_l_P 1 O0
'4‘
1'
'5
PAGE
J-_ I
K FOR COURT USE ONLY

~
OF THE
~
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
DEC 04 199%
HEARING DEPARTMENT
~~~ STATE COURT cLERK,S OFHCE
I I 1.05 ANGELES SAN FRANCBCO
sm FRANCISCO
~~~~
54
~IN THE MATTER OF

mm
cAs5 No(s)_
91- 0-
\/JLJC-ed 3 .‘
Qmsg
STIPULATION AS TO FACTS AND
No.’0933'l .
DISPOSITION (RULES 405407,
TRANSITIONAL RULES or PROCEDURE
MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA. OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA)
I IFIRST AMENDED [ ISECOND AMENDED
SECTION ONE. GENERAL AGREEMENTS AND WAIVERS.
A. PARTIES.
1. The parties to this stipulation as to facts and disposition, entered into under rules 405-407,
Transitional Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California (herein "Rules of Procedure"), are the member
of the State Bar of California, captioned above (hereinafter "Respondent"), who was admitted to practice law
in the State of Californua on3‘|.J I and the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel. represented by
the Deputy Trial Counsel of record whose name appears below. ’
Respondent and have have

2. If Respondent is represented by counse|,‘fiIs or her counsel has reviewed _
-this stipulation,
I
has-
approved it as to form and substance, anggas signed it below.
ve
3. If Respondent is appearing in propria persona, Respondent has received this stipulation, has
approved it as to form and substance, and has signed it below.
B. JURISDICTION, SERVICE AND NOTICE OF CHARGE(S), AND ANSWER. The parties agree that the State
Bar Court has jurisdiction over Respondent to take the action agreed upon within this stipulation. This
stipulation is entered into pursuant to the provisions of rules 405-407, Rules of Procedure. No issue is raised
over notice or service of any charge(s). The parties waive any variance between the basis for the action agreed
to in this stipulation and any charge(s). As to any charge(s) not yet filed in any matter covered by this
stipulation. the parties waive the filing of formal chargels), any answer thereto, and my other formal
"procedures.
117:.‘
=
INK
--mm
PAGE :L_
D. PROCEDURES AND TRIAL.
In order to accomplish the objectives of this

stipulation, the parties waive all State Bar Court procedures
regarding formal discovery as well as hearing or trial. Instead, the parties agree to
submit this stipulation to
a judge of the State Bar Court.
E. PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
.. . .
‘A
investigations and matters Included nn thus supulatuon are lnsted
.
. . . . . . . .
by case number in the caption above.
F. EFFECT or THIS STIPULATION.
1. The parties agree that this stipulation includes this form and all attachments.
2. The parties agree that this stipulation is not binding unless and until approved by a judge of the
State Bar Court. If "approved, this stipulationyshall bind the parties in all matters
covered by this stipulation
and the parties expressly waive review by the Review Department of the State Bar Court.
a. If approved by the hearing judge, the stipulation [cont bel
3. If the stipulation is not approved by a State Bar Court judge, the parties will be relieved of all
effects of the stipulation and any proceedings covered by this stipulation will resume.
4. The parties agree that stipulations as to proposed discipline involving suspension, are not
Supreme Court of California. Pursuant to Business and Professions Code sections 6078, 6083-
binding on the
6084, and 6100, the Supreme Court must enter an order effectuating the terms and conditions_ of this
~~~
stipulation before any stipulation for suspension, actual or stayed, will be effective.
(3. PREVIOUSLY REJECTED STIPULATIONS IN PROCEEDINGS OR INVESTIGATIONS COVERED BY THIS
STIPULATION. '
Unless disclosed by the parties in subsection I, there have been no previously rejected or
withdrawn
stipulations in matters or investigations covered by this stipulation.
H. COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS. (Initial appropriate paragraph(s).)

The Stat_e Bar is awarded costs.
. .._ _
Code, §§ 6086.10 and’6140.7.) Respondent has been notified of

':-:.
his
~~ .(BUS.&PfOf.
orher duty to pay costs.
~
~~
- ~~
" -H..+—H« r-uuow:s»~+
.' e ma
O ter ~~
y a
~~~
ge
_
-
.u=.s.a.
* MR3:
~
'
.
~ ;:.:r:22‘;:...¢2.u; :5.’ «is
P""““""+ Ab-/1.+9 q‘2/T:rl'+lb~0’ /QM‘! o4‘Ioroc¢-U~"“'/ 644* fl"I'°*“‘(‘V"
€l=II‘1t:'~1 meg--(yet: cull g¢,_,,L ,,,9Lu1-1.
I. SPECIAL OR ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS
g Respondent"
stipulation.
?as been advised of pending investigations, if any, which are not included in this
Fcrm3T:}" 3 is attached, Stating further eneral agreements and waiv s.
ont of 2a] .5?-—‘ ‘adthe parties in t .e proceedings to wrxch it relates

.less withdra iified with .a},'~;’~Y"w'c. of the judge, upc good cause
.3wn and u or ~ ion of a pa‘
»_,_____._ y’ '
r. within 15 days of urvice of tin-
‘axon.
‘~m snp 110
I‘wlc
1*
mm
us
L.
-
PAGE
SECTION TWO. STATEMENT OF ACTS OR OMISSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
WARRANTING THE AGREED DISPOSITION.
4(- The parties have attached FORM STIP
set forth in this stipulation.
130 and agree that the same warrants the disposition
AND AUTHORITIES
SECTION THREE. STATEMENT OF FACTS, F*6¥9R'6-OR C|RCUMSTANCE$ BEARING ON
THE AGREED DISPOSITION.
The parties agree that the following attachmenus) constitute the facts and circumstances considered
mitigating; aggravating or otherwise bearing on the agreed disposition:
or
AND AUTHORITIES
I 1 FORM STIP 140: STATEMENT OF FACTS *N'B'ClRCUMSTANCES/BEARING ON THE AGREED
DISPOSITION
SECTION FOUR. AGREED DISPOSITION

Based on the foregoing and all attachments, the parties agree that the appropriate disposition of all matters
covered by this stipulation is (Initial appropriate disposition(s); attach schedule(s) if indicated]:
DISMISSAL OF ALL CHARGES [FORM DISP 2001
K DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN CHARGES [Attach FORM DISP 205: STATEMENT

SUPPORTING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN CHARGES]
ADMONITION [Attach FORM DISP 210: ADMONITIONI
PRIVATE REPROVAL (Attach FORM DISP 220: PRIVATE REPROVALI
PUBLIC REPROVAL [Attach FORM DISP 230: PUBLIC REPROVALI
SUSPENSION ENTIRELY STAYED [Attach FORM "DISP 240:

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STAYED SUSPENSION]
ACTUAL SUSPENSION [Attach FORM DISP 250: RECOMMENDATIONS FdR ACTUAL
SUSPENSION]
ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS:
[X] FORM DISP 260: CALIFORNIA PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EXAMINATION
I I FORM DISP 270: fifibffififlflt-: FUR”'HER CONDITIONS TO

BE ATTACHED TO REPROVAL
[)<]' FORM PROB 390: STATE BAR ETHICS SCHOOL
'95.»; ’;OL=."
uni? STIP
"5"~‘7
110
ju-_ —"'
IN THE MATTER OF
~CASE NO(S). ~
Vincent J. Quigq 87-O-17169
A Member of the State Bar.
nj
ATTACHMENT TO: I X I STIPULATION [ 1 DECISION
SITATEMENT OF ACTS OR OMISSIONS

WARRANTING THE AGREED DISPOSITION
CASE NO. 87-O-17169 couN'r One
In August 1987 Glen Bumbalough employed Respondent to file for

bankruptcy on his behalf. Respondent accepted $300 in advanced
fees.
Shortly thereafter, in the fall of 1987, Respondent, because
of marital difficulties, closed his law office on Pico Boulevard
without notifying his client. Bumbalough could not locate
Respondent for approximately seven months. In that time Respondent
did not file the bankruptcy case, nor did he return to his client
the unearned fee or the client file.
In March 1989 Respondent repaid the $300.
Respondent's failure to competently performl was a wilful
violation of former Rule of Professional Conduct 6-101 (A)(2).
Respondent effectively withdrew from employment during the seven
month period and his failure to return the unearned fee and the
client file were wilful violations of former Rules of Professional
Conduct 2-111 (A)(2) and 2-111(A)(3) respectively.
APPROVED BY STA
EXECUUVE COMMI . '24, I992
snP1:“
PAGE 1
DLSP 9-OS
PAGE_1__
IN THE MATTER OF CASE NO(S).
\/mmzm. OM33 , 8‘!-o~me¢1

ATTACHMENT TO: [j(]\STlPULAT|ON I IDECISION
STATEMENT SUPPORTING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN CHARGES
CASE NO.: 97' 0-W53 coum‘ NO.: 0.» C1>qm3.q,L 3 OJQ

ark“ °_‘(_‘_3a_"°p Is pgf swap‘;-\.¢.). 45.’ aka, “V9 ccpvuicn-93 ¢u.l;u-‘ct.
1k‘ 3‘*’I“‘$T 0:-‘J (""F¢fl‘IIr! Cal: §€I0é G“-¢5a.+ou-r sL...lJ~ L-< °(U"““““"
ma
APPROVED BY STATE BAR COU
EXECUTIVE COMMSTTEE £FFEC E JULY 24, $992
\ P F-N
PAGE 1 . —«
V
~
Vincent J. Quigg 37—o—17159
,
~
A Member of the State Bar. ~~
ATTACHMENT TO: [X] STIPULATION I 1 DECISION
STATEMENT OF ACTS OR OMISSIONS

CASE NO. 87-O-17204 COUNT __'1'@_j_
In July 1987 Harvey Lasasso employed Respondent to file for

bankruptcy on his behalf. Respondent accepted $320 in advanced
fees.
of marital difficulties, closed his law office on Pico Boulevard
without notifying his client. Lasasso could not locate Respondent
for approximately seven months. In that time Respondent did not
file the bankruptcy case, nor did he return to his client the
unearned fee or the client file.
In March 1989 Respondent repaid the $320.
Respondent's failure to competently performt was a wilful
violation 'of former Rule of Professional Conduct 6-101(A)(2).
Respondent effectively withdrew from employment during the seven
month period and his failure to return the unearned fee and the
client file were wilful violations of former Rules of.Professiona1‘
Conduct 2-11l(A)(2) and 2-111(A)(3) respectively.
APPROVED av ‘STAT’: an r
56
'‘
'
‘'‘.'‘’‘'''
1
1'
EXECUTIVE COMMDYTEE EF. "E JULY 24, I992 CK ‘M1

5.‘-Jli
PAGE1
V
; . .
-1 _f:.!',‘.'»IlI
~
~~
IN THE MATTER OF
\}wc.—c~‘\‘j.
A Member of the
ATTACHMENT TO:
Qmqq
State Bar.
[>11 STIPULATION
~ CASE NO(S).
13’?-o-\'H6‘i
~
ms? 2
PAGE __
5
~
1 1 DECISION
CASE NO.: 87-o- 47 1°“ COUNT No.:”m C 13 ouifl

TLnj q"¢5¢+l§M jg yd‘ 5¢.\g¢.,4|~¢-Q by, ¢(<g,- ¢.,.J ¢.yvu'¢n-y ¢vo¢«‘<H¢'¢;
41-x B~.:..-at c..—s¢ 9n>«Fv.sr«o~s Cook 5 Slot; a.¢(-CJG-+:er-I sL~e-J4 ‘--1 ¢9W""“"'
STAT'.'
—
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— - -- -1'
9
'
11,15
‘
3
ORAF7:
_
-..
~~
~~~
IN THE MATTER OF
VIHC-cufkflx‘. (9%-«n53
A Member
ATTACHMENT TO:
CASE NO.:
~~
of tha Stats Bar.
(‘+} snpuumou I 1
3‘5'°"0° 37
DECISION
CASE
coum NO.: ’1'lm-c<

NO(S).
Q‘I—o—me‘i
DISP 205
~~
fk‘, C°M;(- .5 L_n,,-.u¢,l.(4_ a._y CoFPlG.|oHII3 c...'hvt$S',G-curse Dcunevy

ke; 4‘-(J.
DISP 205
PAGE _u_
IN THE MATTER OF
CASE NO(S).
—I~ Qmgo
\)|Nc-ea-4'
g7.o- no 69
A Mamhnvwf the State Bat.
ArrAcuMan' TO: 17% snpuumon I I DECISION

~
CASE N%O.: %%»0-117.19 COUNT NO.: F-‘our

"jug C _?\-
‘S rug s‘_YP°(+._Q [,1 41¢’ «F5; ¢.,,.u.uc.co-'9eu...Q<H¢.-C.
—rL.( ¢o,‘P(”_,",.’ m.(.,,,,,-) K,_,,,.¢-(4. Donn’, kc; A-(ya-¢r+¢a! 4“-ail’-l/L-1.14. oLa./Tor
5-< Jtlt'HSI'?&.
IA 45'
c P 205
1’!
Vincent J. Quiqq I
87-O-17169
A Member cf the State Bar.
‘
ATTACHMQHTTD: {XXI STIPULATION »[ 1 DECISION

WARI-'{ANTlvNG THE AGREED DISPOSITION
CASE NO. as-o-11597 COUNT Five
In May 1985 Respondent filed two lawsuits (as named in the

Notice to Show Cause) in Superior Court on behalf of his client
Thaddeus Kurowski. The cases involved monies lost in the same real
estate transaction. Respondent accepted advanced fees of $250 in
the Bailey case and $400 in ‘the King case.
In the fall of 1987 Respondent, because of marital
difficulties, closed his law office on Pico Boulevard without
notifying his client. During the following approximately seven
months Kurowski was unable to locate Respondent or communicate with
him. Also during that time Respondent failed to attempt to serve
the defendant in the Bailey case and failed to file a status
conference questionaire in the King case. In that seven month time
period Respondent also failed to return Client
files.
Respondent's failure to communicate was a wilful Violation of
Business and Professions Code section 6068(m). Respondent's
failure to competently perform was a wilful violation of former
Rule of Professional conduct 6-101(A) (2). Respondent effectively
withdrew from employment during the seven month period and his
failure to the client filesjii/°‘9°\
wilful violatior. of former Rules of‘ Professional Conductj
2"1l1(A) (3)
H -7
~-“H
am COURT
>
ware
V
’
'
.‘..~K-=»
.. t wurree errecnvz JULY 24. 199,- ' ‘ ‘ '
war‘
~ INTHEIMATTHROF
Vincent
A Member
ATTACHMENT TO:
J. Quiqq
of the State‘ Bar.
Ix 1 STIPULATION [ 1

~~
CASE
DECISION

NO(S).
87-O-17169
PAGE I
‘3
CASE NO. 87-O-18338 CCNJNT'_§;§________
In October 1986 Rita Zonenachwili employed Respondent on a

contingency fee basis to represent her in a slip and fall personal
injury case. In September 1987 Respondent attempted to file suit
in Los Angeles Municipal Court, however it was rejected because
Respondent submitted a worthless check as the filing fee.
of marital problems, closed his law office on Pico Boulevard
without notifying his client. For approximately the following
seven months Zonenachwili could not locate Respondent or otherwise
communicate with him.
Zonenachwili was able to employ other counsel and negotiate a
$3,500 settlement.
Respondent's failure to communicate was a wilful violation of
Business and Professions Code section 6068(m). Respondent's
failure to competently perform was a wilful violation of former
Rule of Professional conduct 6—101(A)(2). Respondent's improper
withdrawal from representation was a wilful violation of former
Rule of Professional Conduct 2-111(A)(2). 3
"
'APP"nC BY STATE EAR COURT ..
0
' '
EXFCU 1 COMMITYEE EFFECTIVE JUL .' 2' I.v;|1p1

A
L)
DISP 205
PAGE 1
IN THE MATTER OF
CA5; No¢s).
l/1r4C:trf*"’.S.. Q-M55 ,. 3'}-O-V7“?
A Mambo: of the State Bat.
ATTACHMENT TO: [#1 STIPUIATION I I DECISION
CASE NO,; g7'°'I%33% COUNT No_; S\,( Co:-‘L-‘ (IO6a((4,en"vov)
“(ken qL(-c3.-her 0'? q uu(eH'u:./ 54‘ 3“-W-"” 4""‘€"°+u"°“'

C&‘ $5 ((06 is M4. s,n,°,+.¢,Q 5.’ °(¢_.U_ “J oowcrqr; -cu LI‘~:H<.1-9
IX
,
,
'
.
COKE?
,
£7!
.
’CUTlVI COMMIT‘!!!
‘
W1’:
""" ‘
PAGE S
~ IN THE MATTER OF CASE NO(S).

Vincent J. Quigg , 87—0—17169
~~A Member of the State Bar.
2- —"
ATTACHMENTTO: [XX] STIPULATION I IDECISION

CASE NO. 88-O-11647 COUNT Seven
From the bank accounts, on the dates, in the amounts, and to

the payees listed in the Notice to Show Cause Respondent issued
five worthless checks. When each check was issued there was
insufficient funds in the respective account to cover the check.
Respondent knew or should have known of the insufficiencies.
Respondent wilfully violated Business and Professions Code
section 6106.
vwnovso av sure am courrr A

'7'
':cunve commune: zssscnvs JULV 24, ~
r
1
.
_
PAGE !
ms? 205
PAGE lg
IN THE MATTER OF
CASE NO(S).
Vwc—(.r\*3- QM-gc
e’1—o»nI£9
A Member of tho Stats Bar.
ATTACHMENT TO: [-741 srwuumou 1 I DECISION
CASE NO.: 67-o-ms‘; coum NO.: ‘j£.3L+

‘FL-r Cauo—'\‘ If lvb“‘ S‘-\0Pofl‘-*3 c(-<4, Q.-J C.arv-WNW) <-V“Q"""
Q-42 <t‘osJ9 b-< ‘(unsettl-
m,,,,§,$_,_m
VI 0
-
5 ms? 20:
Dull!
PAGE_[1_
\Iu v(<rf\’ C37 Qklss §fl«0—flIefi

ATTACHMENT TO: Dd STIPULATION [ 1

DECISION.
STAYED SUSPENSION.
the bianks as appropriate and inmal left margun for an language that us intended to be included in the stipulation.
{Fill in
deietung words or phrases that are not appropnate. when designatmg numbers for the amount of suspension or probation,
please Snell out the number and include the arabuc numerals in parenthesis provnded.|
__L_ It is
law
recommended
for a period of
that Respondent be suspended from the practice of
o '1 that the
execution of such suspension be stayed, that Respondent be placed
upon probation for a period of ('3) jwo
-+ years, and that Respondent be ordered to comply with the attached
conditions of probation.
" ‘
DISP 240
FACE 1
Rev.Trials 9/:7;
W
LL
"*»}Q5‘
PAGE
-1
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION:
{X1 FORM PROB 310; GENERAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION

AND/OR APPOINTMENT OF PROBATION
MONITOR
FORM PROB 320: RESTITUTION -

FORM PROB 340: MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT
FORM PROB 350: ALCOHOL/DRUG IMPAIRMENT
pd FORM PROB 360: EDUCATION AND LAW OFFICE
MANAGEMENT
[><r FORM PROB 370: COMMENCEMENT AND EXPIRATION OF
PROBATION
I ] FORM PROB 380: ADDITIONAL PAGE(S) REGARDING
FURTHER CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
pa FORM PROB 390: STATE BAR ETHICS SCHOOL
FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS:
__£_ It is
Respondent
further recommended
that the California Supreme Court order
and pass the California Professional Responsibility
to take
Examination administered by the Committee of Bar Examiners of the
State Bar of California within one (1) year of the effective date of the
order of the Supreme Court (Segretti v. State Bar (1976) 15 Cal.3d 890-
891) and furnish satisfactory proof of such passage to the Probation
Department, State Bar Court, within said year.
61.5.
‘LH’-£3-‘I ms? 2376
Rev.Tr1aLs 9/ ;; .'r3§"‘,‘ k A-
PAGE 2
PAGE I 9
~~
"-‘-
4?‘
~
ATTACHMENT TO: I I STIPULATION I 1 DECISION
STANDARD CONDITIONS OF PROBATION‘ GENERAL -
COND. 300. COMPLIANCE WITH RULES.

>< COND. 310. That during the period of probation, Respondent shall
comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of
Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California:
COND. 400. QUARTERLY REPORTING.

5 COND. 410. That during the period of probation, Respondent shall
report not later than January 10, April 10, July 10 and October 10 of
each year or part thereof during which the probation is in effect, in
writing, to the Probation Department, State Bar Court, Los Angeles,
which report shall state that it covers the preceding calendar quarter or
applicable portion thereof, certifying by affidavit or under penalty of
perjury (provided, however, that if the effective date of probation is |ess
than 30 days preceding any of said dates, Respondent shall file said
report on the due date next following the due date after said effective
date):
(a) in Respondent's first report, that Respondent has complied

with provisions of the State Bar Act, and Rules of Professional
all
Conduct since the effective date of said probatjon:
(b) ineach subsequent report, that Respondent has complied with

a|| provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct
during said period;
(c) provided, however, that a final report shall bevfiled covering

the remaining portion of the period of probation following the last report
required by the foregoing provisions of this paragraph certifying to the
matters set forth in subparagraph (3) thereof;
attaqinyi to forms DISP 220 or DISP 22 word “probation,” as "rec

‘
If A
the erean, shall be interpreted

to mean 'C0ndlVIOT attached to a reproval" pursue to rule 956, California 7»u".‘: es "ourt.
:4--.‘
PROB si
'1 °
m-».n».nm«nul«uwIIO
PAGE
-«-»
COND. 600. MAINTENANCE OF OFFICIAL MEMBERSHIP ADDRESS.
-»
av
3 COND. 610. That Respondent shall promptly report, and in no event in
more than ten days, to the membership records office of the State Bar
»
and to the Probation Department, Los Angeles, all changes of

information including current office or other address for State Bar
purposes as prescribed by section 6002.1 of the Business and
Professions Code;
STANDARD CONDITIONS OF PROBATION:

ASSIGNMENT OF PROBATION MONITOR
COND. 500. MONITOR:

COND.. 510. ASSIGNMENT OF PROBATION MONITOR:
)( That Respondent shall be referred to the Department of Probation, State Bar Court, for
assignment of a probation monitor. Respondent shall promptly review the terms and
‘
conditions of Respondent's probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner

and schedule of compliance consistent with these terms of probation. During the
period of probation, Respondent shall furnish such reports concerning Respondent's
compliance as may be requested by the probation monitor. Respondent shall cooperate
fully with the probation monitor to enable him/her to discharge Respondent's
duties
pursuant to rule 61 1, Rules of Procedure of the State Bar;
COND. 550. AUTHORITY OF PRO>BATlON MONITOR TO QUESTION RESPONDENT:

K That subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent shall answer fully,
promptly and truthfully any inquiries of the Probation Department of the State Bar
Court and any probation monitor assigned under these conditions of probation which
are directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to whether Respondent is
complying or has complied with these terms of probation;
3
33
¥
4.5 PAGE 9. \
\_] gs.) CfU+T- Qutgg 81' O i [Sq

A Membef of the State Bar.
ATTACHMENT TO: ‘I 1 STIPULATION I 1 DECISION
STATEMENT OF FACTS ‘ANDCIRCUMSTANCES AND AUTHORITIES

BEARING ON THE AGREED DISPOSITION
A. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
1. Respondent has a record of prior discipline. (Std. 1.2 (bNi).)'
Supporting facts:
2. Respondent's misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing. (Std.

1.2 (b)(ii).) Supporting facts:
3. Respondent's misconduct evidences\demonstrates a pattern of

misconduct. (Std. 1.2 (b)(ii).) Supporting facts:
4. Respondent's misconduct was surrounded or followed by bad faith,

dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other circumstances defined
by Standard 1.2 (b)(iii). Supporting facts:
Ref4..:.nces to "Standards" are to the "?wan'

‘
«is for Attorney Sanctions fox Profe:. nal Misconduct: (See Transitional
Rules of Procosgre of the State Bar of Califo:n~..x Di «n V.)
waaouccaon-ounce .
1'01’
0¢ --
-5’
14‘
-V-r»:-vuanoou-nnnln
PAGE ‘L?
‘
w
‘
Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly client(s). the public or the
administration of justice. (Std. 1.2 (b)(iv).) Supporting facts:
Respondent demonstrated indifference to rectifying the consequences of

misconduct. (Std. 1.2 (b)(v).) Supporting facts:
Respondent demonstrated indifference to atoning for the consequences

of misconduct. (Std. 1.2 (b)(v).) Supporting facts:
Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to any victim(s)

of misconduct. (Std. 1.2 (b)(vi).) Supporting facts:
Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to the State Bar

during disciplinary investigation or proceedings. (Std. 1.2 (b)(vi).)
Supporting facts:
AP! NOV .5 E-V

'
ICOUFIT ‘.9-~.-,~.4-wt
’
.' DI
tvrv-::*r\"' nr-» ==¢‘(‘Y1\/F NH‘! ".1 -m:-- ._ I
y
PAGE’§_
and authorities_
.4.
10. Additionat circumstance(s) in aggravation or additional facts/regarding

the above paragraphs are stated as follows:
nu-35:...
MOM
w
rm
u
PAGE 2‘!
v
X!
B. MEITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:
1. Respondent has no record of prior discipline over many years of practice.

»
coupled with present misconduct not deemed serious. (Std. 1.2 (e)(i).)
Supporting facts: ecxpor-14./\’ Ma: Q» q,«:fc¢-¢I~ Sn-c<‘3ul-. 0 I? V3
m
gtlgc £g[g¢.p‘Ap¢‘%
'2. Respondent acted in good faith. (Std. 1.2 (e)(ii).) Supporting facts: _
3. Respondent's misconduct did not result in harm to the clientts) or

person(s)who were the objects of misconduct. (Std. 1.2 (e)(iii).)
Supporting facts:
4. Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties at the time of

misconduct of the type which is subject to the conditions recognized by
Standard 1.2 (e)(iv). Supporting facts:
5. Respondent suffered extreme physical disabilities at the time of

misconduct of the type which is subject to the conditions recognized by
Standard 1.2 (BWV). Supporting facts:
_ 6. Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation

./ictim(s) of misconduct. (Std. 1.2 (e)(v).) Supporting facts: __ ~
to the
APPROVE
‘VTCUTH
‘
A
’
I
seenmcoum
"V"
"‘5FC"V\./F '1 '1 V ".
' " " ‘
’
- .
‘
~
PAGE 1 5
Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation to the State
Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings. (Std. 1.2 (e)(v).)
Supporting facts:
M-sun
..*'u-
W»:
or
-o-Ct.
Respondent presented an extraordinary demonstration of good character

A-.
-4
as set forth in Standard 1.2 (e).(vi). Supporting facts:
nnasnal
4.
A
or
‘v
Respondent promptly took objective steps to spontaneous|y demonstrate

remorse which steps were designed to timely atone for any
consequences or Respondent's misconduct. (Std. 1.2 (e)(vii).)
Supporting facts:
A10. Respondent promptly took objective steps to spontaneously demonstrate

recognition of the wrongdoing acknowledged, which steps were
designed to timely atone for any consequences of Respondent's
misconduct. (Std. 1.2 (e)(vii).) Supporting facts: A
Considerable time has passed since Respondent's misconduct, followed

by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation (Std. 1.2 (e)(viii)).
Supporting facts:
12. Excessive delay occurred in condagchting this disciplinary pcoceeding,

which delay is not attributable 1o Respondent and which eelay was
prejudicia* to Respondent. (S'"u'; 1. (e)(ix).) Supporting fac ,2
5V STAIE BAR
g 13. '
PAGE
and authorities
Additional circumstance(s) in mitigationior additional facts/regarding the
ahnvp. naraoranhs are stated as follows:
At the time of Respondent's misconduct

he was a sole practitioner
and was attempting to deal with a difficult
situation involving his
wife, Robin Quigg. They had been married
since June 1986 and Robin
had two children from a former‘ marriage.
In 1987 —Respondent
learned that his wife had been the victim
of a sexual assualt at
the hands of her former husband in
1985, that the assault had been
videotaped and that the videotape had been published.
Additionallyf Robin was suffering from a substance
abuse problem,
which became severe following Respondent's
discovery of the assault
and videotape. Respondent decided to
discontinue his law practice
and focus his éfforts on helping his
wife. Respondent participated
with his wife in extensive and intensive
psychological therapy-
throughout the latter part of 1987 and
early 1988, ultimately
leading to his wife's recovery. Robin's
therapist Dr. Debra Sharon
said Respondent's "efforts definitely
were a key to [Robin's]
emotional/mental recovery" from her
addiction.ETh q,;(&,—f—,,°,.)/§—<_<_
0!"/’(_Q.<>‘\-coo
(4-¢a(QNJ+I0r‘ o J‘ Qflg/Mo .Q._u7B
_
14?‘)
PAGE 27
THIS PAGE
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
BLANK
PAGE ‘L7 <
Ufflcfflji ,
EYW/0-4116?
ATTACHMENT TO: If; STIPULAWON

‘
I 1 DECISION
RESTITUTION
[Please use a separate form for each person or entity to which restitution will be made.)
A 4COND. 210. That within 5‘:

effective date of:
(Q) d-ays/monthsb,4eere—from the
I 1 The Supreme Court's order in this matter,
I 1 The administration of a reproval by the State Bar Court in this matter,
7>{_; As set forth in FORM DISP 250:
M1 Respondent must make restitution to CoAn(r<(¢| d\( J’? Cop/"1‘¢\

or the Client Security Fund if it has paid, in the amount f $923 I ,
plus interest at the rate of 10% per annum from I1‘|fl£?| ,
until‘ paid in full and furnish satisfactory evidence of restitution to the
Probation Department, State Bar Court, Los Angeles:
Respondent must make restitution to

or the Client Security Fund if it has paid, in the amount of
plus interest at the rate of 10% per annum from
in monthly / quarterly / yearly installments
until paid in full and furnish satisfactory evidence of such restitution to

the Probation Department, State Bar Court, Los Angeles:
‘
Other:
IE
'VE
BY STATE BAR COUH
COMMITTEE EFFEC . n L)
N03 320
m!v\!v‘.4s'I|V-lanj’
- PAGE 33
j_I+,.;c—u1‘\” 35. Qmxmq
UI Qfl-O-' VH6"
ATTACHMENT TO: {-{I STIPULATION I 1 DECISION
STANDARD CONDITIONS OF PROBAT|ON:'

EDUCATION AND LAW OFFICE MANAGEMENT
COND. 1000. LAW OFFICE MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS.
COND. 1010. PLAN TO BE SUBMITTED TO PROBATION MONITOR:
_,X_ That Respondent develop a law office management/organization plan

that meets with the approval of Respondent's probation monitor within
3 [-d-av-s+months) from the date on which Respondent is notified of
the assignment of Respondent's probation monitor. This plan must
include procedures to send periodic status reports to clients. the
documentation of telephone messages received arid sent, file
maintenance, the meeting of deadlines, the establishment of procedures
to withdraw as attorney, whether of record or not, when clients cannot
be contacted or located. and for the training and supervision of support
personnel. -
COND. 1050. COMPLETION OF COURSE ON LAW OFFICE MANAGEMENT:
.X..L That Respondent provide satisfactory evidence of completion of a course

on law office management which meets with the approval of
Respondent’s probation monitor within §_-I-d-6-vs-/month(s)+ye-&f+8')l from
the date on which the order of the Supreme Court2 in this matter
becomes effective.
COND. 1100. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

COND. 1100. That within one year [or of the 1
effective date of the Supreme Court's order“ in this matter, Respondent

must attend no less than hours of courses which are
California Mandatory Continuing Legal Education approved in law office
I
'
I! attached to fovms DISP 220 or DISP 230, the word "probation," as wed hereun, shall be Interpreted to me: I ‘condition
attached to a removal” pursuant to .-we 956, Calatorma Rules of Court.
’
’
If attached to forms DISP 220 ' DISP 230, the "order or the Suprev '"our(," as used hereur 7‘: r‘ a State Bar
‘ four! -0-0-0-oh letter of re- .val or
'
V, sosing reprova
"
If attached to fours iii ~= ." DISP 230, the "Supreme Court ovc‘ ail rate! to the Stal_v Jvanwng
of reproval or
<
~
1mpos1
‘_
de ..*_on .31-
' _
‘
’ *
V
»
f.—.................
'"-‘—— -5B—3§5
E’
aU>*
PAGE 30
management, attorney/client relations, and/or general legal ethics and
which must be approved in advance by Respondent's probation monitor.
Respondent must provide satisfactory proof of attendance to the‘
probation monitor [and the Probation Department, Los Angelesl within
said one year [or {period of time}].
I ll ‘
ll
OB 360
V
man
a-«wlmu:
1- PAGE |v~\
v-

Uu-on/’<‘ 3. Qkgg ?’]»o-t‘h6‘i
ATTACHMENT TO: I I STIPULATION I 1 DECISION
COMMENCEMENT AND EXPIRATION

OF PROBATION‘
COMMENCEMENT OF PROBATION
That the period of probation shall commence as of the date:
D<f On which the order of the Supreme Court this matter becomes effective.
if:
On which the issuance of a reproval in this matter by the

state Bar Court becomes effective.
COMMENCEMENT OF SUSPENSION
That the period of actual suspension shall commence on
That the period of suspension commence
*
shall as of the date:
I I on which the order of the Supreme Court in this matter becomes effective.
I I
EXPIRATION OF PROBATION
That at the expiration of the period of this probation if Respondent has complied with
the terms of probation, the order of the Su reme Court suspending Respondent from
the practice of law for a period of mo '2 shall be
satisfied and the suspension shall be terminated.
That at the expiration of the period of this prob‘-‘tion a condi-
tion has been attached to a reproval, if Responde t has complied
with such condition as ordere by the State Bar C urt, the
condition shall be terminated
If attached 10 forms P 220 or DISP 230. Lb won." as used here:. rated to mean
"condmon attached to a team Inursuanl to rule 956, than
..I ~tCourt.
.77
DROB 370
%
~~
[
IN THE MATTER
Hm;-<J\”C. OM53
A Member
ATTACHMENTTO:
1
OF.
of the State Bar.
FOR REPROVAL CASES:

NI STIPULATION [
,
IDECISION
CASE No(s)_
81.0-— VH6?
PAGE 3’?
Within one year of the date of the issuance of the letter of reproval
in this matter, Respondent shall attend the State Bar Ethics School,
which is held periodically at the State Bar of California (555
Franklin Street, San Francisco, or 333 S. Beaudry Avenue, Los Angeles
and shall take and pass the test given at the end of such session.
Respondent understands that this requirement is separate and apart
from fulfilling the MCLE ethics requirement, and is not approved for
MCLE credit .
;x¢ FOR SUSPENSION CASES:

Within one year of the effective date of the Supreme Court order in
this matter, Respondent shall attend the State Bar Ethics School,
which is held periodically at the State Bar of California (555
Franklin Street, San Francisco, or 333 S. Beaudry Avenue. LOS Anqeles
and shall take and pass the test given at the end of such session.
Respondent understands that this requirement is separate and apart
from fulfilling the MCLE ethics requirement, and is not approved for
MCLE credit.
P 220 or DISP
'
attac»T
If .,
L‘,Th'e.-w-cc non,‘ as used 5.
23-
—"-‘ £9.§£L_L‘.DndL? m:uré"S“ ueso

‘
"
anornna
095°
‘
'13":
PAGE 32;;
IN THE MATTER OF Vincent CASE 87—0—17169
ATTACHMENT TO: [ X] STIPULATION [ ] DECISION
FURTHER CONDITIONS OF PROBATlON:‘

Respondent stipulates that he will cooperate by participating in
arbitration proceedings (public or private) or civil litigation, as
elected by Thaddeus Kurowski, of the fee dispute between respondent
and Kurowski. Respondent further agrees that in the event the forum
or tribunal chosen by Kurowski renders a monetary award, decision or
judgment in Kurowski's favor, that respondent will be bound thereby.
attacwe DISP 220 DISP 7.30,1m\

‘
or :1 ”probat:on," as used HC’-WU,

‘
If g
mean "condui-V‘ to a reproval” puts-Jam in u 356, Cahfornna Rules .1 C’. ,:
if
In
-..»l'%!\
PAGE 2.
THE STATE BAR COURT
I
FOR COURT USE ONLY

OF THE
FILED
HEARING DEPARTMENT
DEC04199
I LOS ANGELES smna BAR COURT CLERK'S Omcg
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN FRANCISCO
91—o—me9
-3. Qua;
\)| uc-cu-f\‘
SCHEDULE OF ATTACHMENTS
No. 3039?’). .
MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA.
ATTACHMENT TO; bq STIPULATION 1 1 DECISION

FORM DISP 20 0: STATEMENT SUPPORTING DISMISSALS OF ALL CHARGES
FORM DISP 205. STATEMENT SUPPORTING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN CHARGES
FORM DISP 210: ADMONITION
FORM DISP 220:‘ PRIVATE REPROVAL
FORM DISP 230: PUBLIC REPROVAL
FORM DISP 240: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STAYED SUSPENSION
FORM DISP 250: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTUAL SUSPENSION
FORM DISP 260: PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EXAMINATION
FORM DISP 270: FURTHER CONDITIONS TO BE ATTACHED TO
REPROVAL
FORM PROB 310: GENERAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION AND/OR APPOINTMENT OFPROBATION MONITOR
FORM PROB 320: RESTITUTION
FORM PROB .340. MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT
FORM PROB 35C ALCOHOL/DRUG IMPAIRMENT
FORM PRO8 36( EDUCATION AND LAW C-FFICF MANAGEMENT
FORM PROB 37« COMMENCEMENT A!"’)v 3!? TION OF PROBATION
FORM PROB 38 flrR91'NG"FURTHER CONDITION’. OF PROBATION
[‘f]. FORM PIECE ,‘>: STATE B1’
SCHOOL
Mfifi
r
haul:
-«(la
PAGE3i_
SECTION FIVE. APPROVAL OF PARTIES.

The parties and all counsel of record hereby acknowledge that the foregoing stipulation consists of this form
and 3" attachments. Comprising 7} page(s), and the parties agree to be bound by all terms and conditions
stated and the agreed disposition.
DATE: Ill/6,‘-Wr
D!}puty Trial
DATE:
Deputy Trial Counsel
DATE
DATE:
///29//flz
DATE
/ / ‘w
DATE:
7/~~
/P
Respondent
///@792 Respondéntg Counsel V7
DATE:
Respondent's Counsel
‘
APPROVED B‘ r 91-
CXECUTIVE C'.'-’-. M /Y P !ULY 7d tan?
x-naMMmmw'
PAGE 7_5_
THE STATE BAR COURT F°-°°-N-=°-W
D
.
(s):AT:':5EaAn
or CALIFORNIA
DEC 0 4 199
”EA”'“G DEPARTMENT
sum: BAR COURT CLERK;S OI-1-'|cE
SAN FRANCISCO
I I LOS ANGELES I SAN FRANCISCO
\)|uc~<u-r\‘—T~ Quugg 87-O-l'H6°}
ORDER REGARDING STIPULATION nnsr AMENDED

(
MEMBER or THE STATE BAR op CALIFORNIA. lsecouo menoeo AS TO FACTS AND onsposmou
I 1
.
« )
A executed Stipulation as to Facts and Disposition pursuant to rules 405-407, Transitional Rules of
fully
Procedure of the State Bar of California, consisting of pages, approved by the parties, was submitted
to the Stage Bar Court in the above-captioned case(s). All stipulations submitted previously are rejected.
The Stipulation is attached to this order and is incorporated by reference herein. Unless a party withdraws
or modifies the stipulation pursuant to rule 407(c), Transitional Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of
Califorma, this order sha|| be effective 15 days from the service of this order. After consideration of this
stipulation, the Court hereby orders:
The above mentioned case numbers are hereby consolidated for the purposes of ruling upon
this stipulation.
Modifications to the stipulation are attached:

[ the parties having no objection.
I
[ the parties having agreed on the record on

1 .
[ any party must object within 15 days of the service of this order to the stipulation, as
I
modified by the Court, or it shall become effective; if any party objects. the Stipulation
shall be deemed rejected.
It appearing that this stipulation and all attachments are fair to the parties and consistent with
adequate protection of the public, the stipulation is approved and the disposition is:
[ I ordered.
[ I recommenaed to the California Supreme Court.
further attached.
'
[ |
After due consideratuon of this stipulation and all attachments, it is rejected:

[ for the reasons discussed with the parties in previous conference(s).
1
i for the reasons attached to this order.

I
nrther I I ordered { I recor nended that costs be awarced to the State Bar pursuar“ to
~.-ss and Professions ection 6086.10.
DATE
Judge me State Bar Court
_l.’.£- A
DECLARATION OF VINCENT J. QUIGG
I, Vincent J. Quigg, declare and state as follows:

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of
O€D®°~'lO§UlIBCDl\'9r-I
California, am the respondent in the within proceeding, and I make

this declaration for inclusion with the Stipulation as to Facts and
Discipline to which it is appended.
2. I have personal know1edge_of the following facts and if
called upon as a witness, I could and would competently testify
P‘
thereto.
hi I-1
3. I sincerely regret the misconduct reflected in the
D-‘
stipulation and the accompanying difficultiés caused to the clients
N
H co who complained about me in this proceeding. Although I know the
H4
A explanation set forth below does not excuse my misconduct, and while
U!
|—| I do not offer it as an excuse, I believe that is lends the
prospective necessary to put my misconduct in the proper context.

.
nu m
5-‘
-J 4. As to the Bumbalough matter, i.e. count one, Mr.
H‘
W Bumbalough first retained me in 1985 for the purpose of filing a
hi
to chapter 7 petition. I did so. However, shortly thereafter Mr.
[0 G Bumbalough suffered a heart attack and underwent coronary bypass
[O I-|
surgery. As the result of his incapacity and the addition of
[0 N) substantial new financial ‘obligations occasioned by his
N 60 hospitalization, subsequent treatment and disability, I advised Mr.
N IR Bumbalough (and he agreed) to allow the bankruptcy court to dismiss
N3 OI the original petition, following which ea new pe.ition could be
N) G} filed, Virrluding the additional debts. Thus, Mr. Bumbalough
[0 N1 returned t~ me in the summer 0“ 1987.
28 ///
& MARKLE
‘
GRAND AVE.
E 4050
"LES. CA 90071
26- 7300
5. By the time Mr. Bumbalough had furnished me with all of
the necessary creditor information, I (at the time, and for most of
my career, I was a sole practitioner) was attempting to deal with
what amounted to a life-threatening situation with my wife, Robin
QUi99- My wife and I met in 1985 and married in June 1986. My wife
C€D®~'lO'§¢JItFuO3t\'.>I-I
had two young children from a former marriage. In 1987, I learned

that my wife had been the victim of a sexual assault at the hands of
her former husband in 1985, that the assault had been captured on
videotape and that the videotape had been published. This
H revelation was overwhelming for me and also served to seriously
I-I 0-‘
exacerbate the emotional turmoil that my wife had been suffering,
I-9
Nparticularly since she had not previously disclosed the fact of the
I-‘
assault (and the videotdpe) to me., In addition, my wife was
(.6
:- A suffering from a chemical dependency at the time, which dependency

H CI became severe during the months following my discovery of the 1985
0-! 6': assault.
9-:
Q 6. Faced with this" crisis and my wife's deteriorating
I-1
® condition, I elected to discontinue my law practice and focus as
H to much energy and attention as I could on efforts to promote my wife's
NC recovery. I participated with my wife in extensive and intensive
[Q I-I
psychological therapy throughout the latter part of 1987 and early
N N) 1988, ultimately leading to her recovery. In the words of her
N) 03 therapist, Debra Sharon, Ph.D., "Vincent's efforts definitely were
M vii a key to (Mrs. Quigg's] erotional/mental recovery and physical
NJ Cl addiction."
[0 03 7. Although my effor to promote my wife's recovery were
N)
J success! 1, thereby preservf our family (and, twr that matter, my
28 w1fe's fie), those e?f fi”« ulted in a lhvel compromlse of my
3"
_
_
; -
ANSKV & MARKLE

‘
SOUTH GRAND AVE.
SUITE 4050 2
ANGELES‘ CA 90071
213-626-7300
ability to attend to the matters of my clients, and also resulted in
a severe strain on my finances. At" the time (and, indeed,
throughout most of my career), my practice primarily consisted of

the provision of low-cost legal services to the elderly and others
who do not have the financial wherewithal to afford the high cost of
O€D®°~‘lO§UlIF€.Ol\’)I-|
legal services. Indeed, before the difficulties with my wife arose,

I had successfully handled over 500 bankruptcy matters for very low
or no fees (as the fee arrangement with Mr. Bumbalough and the other
complainants in this proceeding bear witness). I successfully
I-|
completed or uneventfully withdrew from all of the matters for which
III‘ I-1 I had responsibility when I closed my office, except for the matters
which are the subject of this proceeding.
8. In Mr. Bumba1ough's case, although I for the most part
completed the chapter 7 petition, I acknowledge that the petition
was not filed. In March 1989, I wrote Mr. Bumbalough apologizing
for the delay, returning the $300 retainer, and offering to complete
his matter for free.
9. —As to the Lasasso matter, i.e. count two, I prepared the
chapter 7 petition and accompanying schedules, following which Mr.
Lasasso asked that the filing of the petition be delayed briefly
until he was "ready." By the time Lasasso became "ready" a few
months later, the crisis with my wife had arisen and, as a result,
I failed to go forward with the filing.
10. In March 1989, I wrote Mr. Lasasso with an apology, and I

returned the fee that Lasasso had paid. I also offered to complete
Mr” LaFasso's matter without charge.
28
PANSKY E: MARKLE
L433 SOUTH GRAND AVE.
SUITE 4050
La.)
..OS ANGELES, CA 90071

2136267300
I-I
11. As to the Kurowski matter, i.e. count five, Mr. Kurowski
N employed me in April 1985 concerning two matters. As to the first,
00 Kurowski v. Bailey, I explained to Mr. Kurowski that the applicable
Hi statute of limitations on his claim against Bailey had expired.
01 However, since the Department of Real Estate ("DRE") has a client
U9 security fund and since the "loss" may have been a reimbursable loss
4| as far as the fund is concerned, Kurowski and I agreed that I would
file the action against Bailey notwithstanding the clear statute of
limitations defense.
€D‘®
This is because the DRE fund requires that an

I-|
O applicant present an unsatisfied civil judgment. Thus, I explained
I-l |-‘
and Kurowski understood that the "plan" would succeéd only if Bailey
HN allowed the action to proceed by default. (Further, Bailey was
l-l CO obviously insolvent. Bailey was prosecuted criminally in connection
D-I
A with the underlying investment and he was later incarcerated. He
I-I U1 had also declared bankruptcy.)
I-| O: 12. Although I undertook substantial efforts to locate and
|-‘ K‘! serve Bailey, I was unable to do so.‘ In 1987, I asked Mr. Kurowski
r- on for funds to hire an investigator. He declined to remit the funds,
H CO agreeing instead to undertake the task. of’ determining Bailey's
N)
C whereabouts himself. I provided Mr. Kurowski with the summons and
[Q 0-‘ complaint for this purpose. Although Bailey was ultimately served,
NN by the time service was effected, the three-year statute had
NJ 03 expired. Thus, Bailey's counsel succeeded in having the action
NA dismissed.
[0 U1 13. The second matter involved an action against Rex King and
[0 O} Rex F-ng Properties, ari: ng from the same underlying investment
N K‘! As the Rex King m:.t , the "plan" was the same as the ox-
28 invoi ad in the a 2‘.~ gainst Bailé;A That is, since af
PANSKY & MARKLE
333 SOUTH GRAND AVE.
SUITE 4050 4
LOS ANGELES. CA 90071
213-626-7300
applicable statutes of limitations with regard to Kurowski's claim
against Rex King had expired by the time Kurowski consulted me, we
agreed that Mr. Kurowski's ability to recover was limited to his
ability to perfect a claim with the DRE client security fund. In
ctooodazmahcotoha
other words, the action against King would be pursued only if the
action proceeded as a default. The action did not proceed as a
default, since King appeared and defended the case.
14. As to the Zonenachwili matter, i.e. count six, I
prosecuted Zonenachwi1i's claim, making av prompt demand on her
I-I
behalf. Following Ms. Zonenachwi1i's fejection of the $2,500 offer
I-‘ I-‘
I received, I filed a timely civil action. By 1988, I succeeded in
I-‘
N negotiating offers of $2,750 and $3,000, respectively, both of which
I-1 09 Ms. Zonenachwili rejected. Zonenachwili hired new counsel in place
‘H uh of me at that point and her claim was thereafter resolved for

I-I U1 $3,500. I received no fee for my services.
H O: 15. As fo the returned check allegations, i.e, count seven, I
P‘ K1 concede the issuance of the checks and the fact that they were
in on returned. However, the checks were issued during the height of my
I-1
:9 wife's problems and at a time when my wife was unknowingly writing
NO checks on the account.
N? III‘
I further declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of
[0 N the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and
[0 03 that this declaration was executefi on this 25th day of November,
N IA 1992, at Los Angeles, California.
N) U!
N) O}
N
3,0
PANSKV 8. MARK
333 SOUTH GRAND p
"
SUITE 4050
LOS ANGELES. CA 9
213-626-7300
H R. Gerald Markle, Bar No. 71816
PANSKY & MARKLE
E0 333 S. Grand Avenue
Suite 4050
03 Los Angeles, California 9°°71 SIATE BAR coum CLERK'S Bpp;¢5
(213) 626-7300 SAN FRANCISCO
#»
Attorneys for Respondent Vincent J. Quigg

Cfl
O3
-4
G)
BEFORE THE STATE BAR COURT

:3: ECEIVED OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
2;
OCT 2 '|- 99' HEARING DEPARTMENT - LOS ANGELES
remoouat
F‘ 0-‘
‘Ems GENE
UIMME5
I-I
N
Id {:0
I-|
IR
In The Matter of NO. 87-0-17169
0| ANSWER TO NOTICE TO SHOW
VINCENT J. QUIGG, No. 108932,
Pi
CAUSE
0:
\a\a\/\J\a\J\J\/
HI
Pi ‘J
H‘
W
hi
#9
TO THE OFFICE OF TRIAL COUNSEL OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
NO AND TO ITS COUNSEL OF RECORD:
N I-5
Respondent Vincent J. Quigg answers the Notide to Show
‘
ormcs
NN Cause on file herein as follows:

2%I
ad
C-ERKS NW 1. The address to .which all further ny ices to
~~ respondent in relation to these proceedings may be t is as
_.’n*ward
_
* *
f
follows: R. Gerald Markle, Pansky & Markle, 333 S. 7 avenue,
Suite 4050, I s Angeles, Califoxnfz 90071.
2. Qspondent admits Je as admitted '
%‘aCtiCe
of law i? ;h mate of Califor '
2 or about 5 »:3-
3. Except as expressly admitted above, respondent
generally denies each and every allegation of the notice to show
cause and denies that he is culpable of professional misconduct.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

O¢Dm'~1O§¢JlhB€»9l\'JI--I
(Failure to State a Disciplinable Offense)
4. The Notice to Show Cause does not state facts

sufficient to constitute a disciplinable offense.
I-i WHEREFORE, respondent prays that the court find that
II‘ III‘
respondent did not commit acts constituting professional
II‘
N misconduct, and that the Notice to Show Cause be dismissed.
Hw
H it Pansky & Markle

I'd
U!
H‘ G:
H‘ *4 R. Gerald Markle
Attorneys for Respondent
I-1
W Vincent J. Quigg
hi
:9
NO
N H‘
NN
N) 09
N) A
N) U!
N O}
N) <1
NW
-\'(KLE
'
D AVE.
90071
1
PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL
(Non—attorney--state and federal)
I am over age 18 and not a party to this cause. I am
employed at, and my business address is, 333 S. Grand Avenue,
Suite 4050, Los Angeles, California 90017 in the office of a
coooqoacuunflcowu
member of the bar of this court at whose direction service was

made. on October 21, 1991, I served ANSWER TO NOTICE TO SHOW
CAUSE by (1) placing a copy in a sealed envelope with the
postage on it fully prepaid and (2) deposited the envelope in
the U.S. Mail at Los Angeles, California. Once such envelope
I-|
C
was addressed to each of the following:
I-l I-1
Jack Coyle, Esq.

|-‘
N Office of Trial Counsel
State Bar of California
P‘ W 333 S. Beaudry Avenue
9th Floor
MA Los Angeles, California 90017
hi 0!
declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is
I
hi CD true and correct and that this declaration was executed on
hi <1 October 21, 1991, at Los Angeles, California.
W
Cywwfipfc
F-i
Hi
to
N)
O
hi
Charles C. Bagai
[0
[0 N
N! 03
M vii
N U!
N 65
N9 N1
28
MARKLE
SRAND AVE.
_ «-050
.:. CA 90071
.
7300
PUBLlu" MATTER
1
OFFICE OF TRIAL COUNSEL
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA V
2 JACK COYLE, No. 149238

Attorney at Law
5 333 South Beaudry Avenue, 9th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90017 W
QCT{)11g9
”‘
4 STATE BAR COUR
(213) 580-5000 CLERKSOFFICE
5 LOS ANGELES
6
7
8 THE STATE BAR COURT
9 OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
lo HEARIN_G DEPARTMENT - LOS ANGELES
ll
12 In the Matter of ) Case No. 87-O-17169

15 VINCENT J. QUIGG, No. 108932, )
) NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE

14
A Member of the State Bar. )
15
TO: Vincent J. Quigg, Respondent herein:
16
IF YOU FAIL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THIS NOTICE WITHIN THE TIME
17 ALLOWED BY STATE BAR RULES, INCLUDING EXTENSIONS, YOU MAY BE
ENROLLED AS AN INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR AND
18 WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL AN ANSWER IS FILED.
,
19 You were admitted to the practice of law in the State of

l
20 California on July 1, 1983. Pursuant to rule 501, Transitional

C/w(v/11,?
21 Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, reasonable

t
22 cause has been found to conduct a formal disciplinary hearing,
’\}’vL,Z"
3 ";; commencing at a time and place to be fixed by the State Bar Court
-
(NOTICE OF TIME AND PLACE OF HEARING WILL BE MAILED TO YOJ BY THE

5*y§;\
59?
~
STATE BAR con
’
CLERK'S OFFICE), by reason of the fo1lo'ing:

_/
forv} ~
nf
;,6 / / /
dflcurne
”‘
/ / /
3”!‘
+7
’U(!"“
1 / / /
rd
COUNT ONE
83
Case No. 87-O-17169
N 1. On or about August 25, 1987, ypu were

t§
employed by Glen Lee Bumbalough to represent him in a
U! bankruptcy matter. You were paid $300.00 as advanced
Q attorney fees.
-1
2. You did not file the bankruptcy matter in
GD court and otherwise failed to perform the services for
® which you were employed.
8 3. In or about October 1987, you misrepresented

I-‘ I-4
to Mr. Bumbalough that you had filed the bankruptcy
R5 matter and provided him with a false case number.
13 4. You failed to communicate with.Mr. Bumbalough
14 despite his numerous attempts to contact you.

15 5. You withdrew from employment without taking
reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the
rights of Mr. Bumbalough.
6. You failed to promptly refund unearned fees.
You failed to return other client papers and property
as requested by Mr. Bumbalough.
You committed the above—described acts in wilful violation

of your oath and duties as an attorney under disciplinary case
law and/or California Business and Professions Code settion 6106,
and former xuies of Professional Canduct 2-111(A)(2), 2-111(A)(3)
and 6—101(A)( ).
///
///
1 COUNT TWO
2 Case No. 87-O-17204
5 1. On or about July 28, 1987, you were employed
4 by Harvey Lasasso to represent him a bankruptcy matter.
5 You were paid $320.00 as advanced attorney fees.
6 2. You did not file the bankruptcy matter in
7 court and otherwise failed to perform the services for
8 which you were employed.
9 3. On or about September 25, 1987, you

10 misrepresented to Mr. Lasasso that you had filed his
11 bankruptcy case and provided him with a false case

12 number.
13 4. You failed to communicate with Mr. Lasasso

15 5. During the course of your representation of

16 _
Mr. Lasasso, in or about the autumn of 1987, you closed
17 or relocated your office without informing Mr. Lasasso
18 of the closing or of your whereabouts.

20 reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the
21 rights of Mr. Lasasso.
22 7. You failed to promptly refund unearned fees.

23 You fa’led to return your client's papers and property
24 as reg ested by Mr. Lasasso.
25
26 Ycu cc, fitted the ahcve—" ribed acts in wifiw ‘
violation
27 of yczh cat. and duties u 2 xorney under F '. inarY Case
33 law ‘“r ffornia Bus
e
Professio‘ i .
Ction
H
6106, and former Rules of Professional Conduct, 2-111(A)(2),
w 2-ll1(A) (3) and 6-101(A) (2).
m
9 COUNT THREE
m Case No.: 88-O—10083
m 1. On or about March 8, 1985, you were employed

4 by George Doumani to represent him in a civil matter.
m You were paid $450.00 as advanced attorney fees.
m 2. on or about March 14, 1985, you filed a

5 lawsuit on your client's behalf, entitled George
11 Doumani v Daniel N. Bailev and Sierra Realtv
12 Laygggmgng, in Los Angeles Superior Court, case no.
15 453313.

15 Mr. Doumani, in or about the autumn of 1987, you closed
16 or relocated your office without informing Mr. Doumani
17 of the closing or of your whereabouts. Thereby, you

18 failed to communicate with your client and withdrew
19 from employment without taking reasonable steps to
20 avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of your

21 client.
22 4. You failed to serve the defendant in the

23 case, and otherwise failed to take action to prosecute
24 the case prior to any applicable statute of limitations
25 expir.ng. You failed to p¢rform the services 'vr which

26 yod w :e employed. You feiled to refund unea. ‘d fees.
27 / / /
28 //
l-4
You committed the above-described acts in wilful violation
m of your oath and duties as an attorney under disciplinary case
u law and/or California Business find Professions Code section
9 6068(m), and former Rules of Professional Conduct, 2-111(A)(2),
m 2-1l1(A) (3) and 6-10l(A) (2).
m
4 COUNT FOUR
m Case No.: 88-O-11229
o 1. on or about June 15, 1987, you were employed

5 by Kenneth Dunn to represented him in a bankruptcy
D-4 D-4
matter. You were paid $400.00 as advanced attorney
12 fees.
15 2. You did not file the bankruptcy matter ih

14 court and otherwise failed to perform the services for
15 which you were employed.
16 3. You failed to communicate with Mr. Dunn,

18 4. During the course of your reéresentation of
19 Mr. Dunn, in or about the autumn of 1987, you closed or
20 relocated your office without informing Mr. Dunn of the

21 closing or of your whereabouts.
25 reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the
24 rights of Mr. Dunn.
25 6. You faile€.Lo 'romptly refund unea ned fees.
26 Yct Failed to returr '
client's papers an property
27 a _ quested by Mr.
28
1
2 of your oath and duties as an attorney under disciplinary case
5
law‘ and/or California Business and Professions Code section
4 6068(m), and former Rules of Professional Conduct 2-111(A)(2),
5 2-111(A) (3) and 6-101(A) (2).
6
7 COUNT FIVE
8 Case No.: 88-O-11597
9 1. In or about April 1985, you were employed by
10 Thaddeus Kurowski to represent him in two matters.
11 2. on or about May 2, 1985, you filed a lawsuit
12 on behalf of your client, entitled Kuroygki et. al. v.
13 Bailey et.al., in Orange County Superior Court, case
14 no. 457539.
15 3. on or about May 28, 1985, you filed a second
16 lawsuit on behalf of your client, entitled ggggyggi
17 et.al. V. Rex Kinq et.al., in Orange County Superior
18 Court, case no. 459744.
19 4. Thereafter, you failed to communicate with

20 Mr. Kurowski or opposing counsel in either case,
21 despite their attempts to contact you.

23 M1. Kurowski, in or about the autumn of 1987, you
24 cfased or relocated your office without informing
25 M3 Kurowski of the clasing or of your whereabouts.
26 6. You withdrew from employment w’ Wout taking
27 onable steps to a\ id foreseeable f 4
‘ice to the
28 's of Mr. K1
_ 5 _
7. You failed to serve the defendant in the
figiigy case: you failed to file a status conference
questionnaire in the K';ng case: and you failed to
otherwise take action to prosecute either case prior to
cooo-2oa_cnu>ozzo»—-
any applicable statute of limitations expiring. You

failed to perform the services’ for which you were
employed.
8. A
You failed to promptly refund unearned fees.

You failed to return your client's papers and property
HO as requested by Mr. Kurowski.
D-4 l-‘
HN You committed the above-described acts in wilful violation

1-
01 of your oath and duties as an attorney under disciplinary case
H¢ law and/or California Business and Professions Code section

H‘ O! 6068(m), and former Rules of Professional Conduct 2-111(A)(2),
H‘ O) 2-11l(A)(3) and 6-101(A)(2).
P‘
‘Q
P4 O0 COUNT SIX
- C0 .Case NO.: 87-O-18338
D3 C) 1. on or about October 6, 1986,. you were
03 I-4 employed by Rita R. Zonenachwili to represent her in
03 D3 a personal injury matter.
03 CR 2. On or about September 20, 1987, you attempted
83 1% to file Ms. Zonena3hwili's personal injury matter,
D3 01 éntitled Zonenachwz i v. Ralphs Grqg§.V Store, in
D3 03 os Angeles Mvnicip Court. The fjl’ng was rejected
DD *1 cause you svfiflifte to the court 3 C:/C ‘to cover the
03 G) fee '
5 subsequer ;urned for

_ 7 -
H insufficient funds. Thereafter, you failed to notify
m your client that her complaint had been rejected or
u that the Statute of Limitations had run against her
9 claim.
m 3. Subsequently, and until April 1989, you

m failed to communicate with Ms. Zonenachwili, despite
her numerous attempts to contact you.
'4
m 4. You failed to perform the services for which
o you were employed.

l-4 I-‘
reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the
H to rights of Ms. Zonenachwili.
14 You committed the above-described acts in wilful violation
15
of your oath and duties as an attorney'under disciplinary case
16 law and/or California Business and Professions Code sections
17 6068 (m) and 6106, and former Rules of Professional Conduct

18 2-l1l(A)(2) and 6-l01(A)(2).
19
20 COUNT SEVEN
21 Case No.: 88-0-11647
22 1. From your account at AVCO National Bank you

23 issued check number 901, dated July 26, 1987, in the
24 amount of $185.00, payable to Boys Market.
25 2. From your account at AVCO Natienal Bank, you
26 Issued check nu*' 903, dated July 26 1987, in the
27 Aount of $7.4?_ .ble to Boys Market
28 2-
3. From your account at Imperial Savings, you
issued check number 1143, dated August 27, 1987, in the
amount of $43.37, payable to Ralph's Market.
4. From your account at First Interstate Bank,
5CO(D-2O)C!1rJ>CflZ\3I-I you issued check number 1097, dated November 23, 1987,
in the amount of $259.83, payable to Von's Market.
5. From your account at First Interstate Bank,
you issued check number 1487, dated December 19, 1987,
in the amount of‘$196.74, payable to Mayfair Market.
6. Each of these checks was returned for
P-‘ I-'
insufficient funds. When you issued each check you
H 20
knew or should have known that you had insuffigient
H CH
funds in your respective account to cover the check.

law and/or California Business and Professions Code section
6106.
COUNT EIGHT
1. Counts one through Six are hereby

incorporated by referenced as if set forth in full
herein.
2 . In th.~: a 7orementioned matter. , you repeatedly
failed to pvffvrz services on behélf of your clients
and you dis’ and neglected if’ terests of your
clients.
law and/or California Business and Professions Code section 6106.
5COCI>~20>O1»#>Cnz0n--
WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS after service of this Notice to Show

Cause, you shall file a written answer as provided in rule 552,
Transitional Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California.
NOTICE - DEFAULT PROCEDURE!
YOUR DEFAUDT MAY BE ENTERED FOR FAILURE TO FILE A
WRITTEN ANSWER TO THIS NOTICE WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS
11 AFTER SERVICE AS PRESCRIBED BY RULE 552, RULES OF
PROCEDURE OF THE STATE BAR. SHOULD YOU TIMELY FILE AN
ANSWER, YOUR DEFAULT MAY ALSO BE ENTERED FOR FAILURE TO
APPEAR AT THE FORMAL HEARING. THE ENTRY OF YOUR
DEFAULT MAY RESULT IN THE CHARGES SET FORTH IN THIS
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE BEING ADMITTED AND DISCIPLINE
RECOMMENDED OR IMPOSED BASED ON THOSE ADMITTED CHARGES.
IF YOUR DEFAULT IS ENTERED, YOU WILL LOSE THE
OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE FURTHER IN THESE PROCEEDINGS
UNLESS AND UNTIL YOUR DEFAULT IS SET ASIDE ON MOTION
TIMELY MADE UNDER THE PRESCRIBED GROUNDS. SEE RULE
552.1 ET SEQ., RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE BAR.
NOTICE - INACTIVE ENROLLMENT!

YOU ARE HEREBY FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT IF THE STATE BAR
COURT FINDS, PURSUANT TO BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE
SECTION 6007(c), THAT YOUR CONDUCT POSES A SUBSTANTIAL
THREAT OF HARM TO THE INTERESTS OF YOUR CLIENTS OR TO
THE PUBLIC, THAT YOU MAY BE INVOLUNTARILY ENROLLED AS
AN INACTIVE MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR. YOUR INACTIVE
ENROLLMENT WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO ANY DISCIPLINE
RECOMMENDED BY THE COURT. SEE RULES 550 AND 560, RULES
OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE BAR.
///
//
//
NOTICE - cosr Assnssnnnrz
IN THE EVENT THESE PROCEDURES RESULT IN PUBLIC
DISCIPLINE, YOU MAY BE SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF COSTS
INCURRED BY THE STATE BAR IN THE INVESTIGATION, HEARING
AND REVIEW OF THIS MATTER PURSUANT TO BUSINESS AND
PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 6086.10. SEE RULE 460 ET
SEQ., RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE BAR.
Cr-D‘CD(D'~'lO3OJrFCflZ\Dr-I
1991 BY:
~~
DENICE E. BRUE U
Assistant Chief Trial Counsel
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NO
to 1-4
Z0 Z0
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24.
JACK COYLE, No. 149238
A't=‘.to‘rney at Law
333 South Beaudry Avenue, 9th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90017
F LE ‘ ’
0CT()31gg)
(213) 580-5000
sms amcour
OFFICE
’c'5cooo~2o>o:u>-onto»-a CLERK'S
LOS ANGELES
THE STATE BAR COURT

or THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
0-‘ P‘
In the Matter of Case No. 87-O-17169

Z0
VINCENT J. QUIGG, No. 108932
1-4
DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY
MAIL OF NOTICE TO SHOW
s/‘guys./\a\.r
C»!
A Member of the State Bar

r—«
CAUSE
I-‘
vb
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01 I, the undersigned, declare that I am over the age of 18
+—- O) years and not a party to the within action; that my business
+- ‘Q address and place of employment is:
Iv-‘
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[X] 333 South Beaudry Avenue, Los Angeles, CA;
0-4
C0 [ ] 555 Franklin Street, San Francisco, CA;
20 O that on October 03, 1991, I served a true copy of the Notice to
N 1- Show Cause herein by certifiefi mail, return receipt requestéd, in
Z0 Z0 a sealed envelope, postage fully prepaid, depositing same in a
3.0 01 facility regularly maintained by the United States Postal Service,
N we addressed to the member at the latest address shown on t1
officiaI membership records of the S -te Bar of as

follows:
Zed envelope 3, Lfied mail, wit} a .urn
recefi ~'
ted, to the -C former met -3 A
H
latest address shown on the official membership records of
m
the State Bar.
m
¢
and addressed to:
m
Robert Gerald Markle, Esq.
m"
Pansky & Markle
800.Wi1shire Blvd., #1660
4 Los Angeles, CA 90017
m I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true

0 and correct and that this declaration was executed at
5 [X] Los Angeles
I-‘ I-'
[ 1 San Francisco
)._a
10 on the date shown below.
mu
I—* 01
@€3&®.w3
S DATE
/
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SIGNATURE
,
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JO-AN M. MUEHLHAUSEN
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Z0 Z0
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By
Clerk

Quigg Vincent 108932 State of California Bar Multiple Bar Discipline Binder3

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Quigg Vincent 108932 State of California Bar Multiple Bar Discipline Binder3

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(Do not write above this line.

State Bar Court of California

Counsel For Respondent

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND

In the Matter of:

[] PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED

A Member of the State Bar of California

B. Aggravating Circumstances [Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional

(1) [] Prior record of discipline

(b) [] Date prior discipline effective August 19, 1993

In addition to the discipline imposed against Respondent in case number 87-0-17169,

(Effective January 1, 2014)

(8) [] Restitution: Respondent failed to make restitution.

(g) [] No aggravating circumstances are involved.

Additional aggravating circumstances:

(5) [] Restitution: Respondent paid $ on in restitution to without the threat or force of

(13) [] No mitigating circumstances are involved.

Additional mitigating circumstances:

Mistaken Belief, Pretrial Stipulation, see stipulation, at page 18.

iii. [] and until Respondent does the following:

(b) [] The above-referenced suspension is stayed.

(3) [] Actual Suspension:

(Effective January 1,2014)

iii. [] and until Respondent does the following:

E. Additional Conditions of Probation:

[] No Ethics School recommended. Reason:

(Effective January 1,2014)

(10) [] The following conditions are attached hereto and incorporated:

[] Substance Abuse Conditions [] Law Office Management Conditions

[] Medical Conditions [] Financial Conditions

F. Other Conditions Negotiated by the Parties:

[] No MPRE recommended. Reason:

(5) [] Other Conditions:

(Effective January 1, 2014)

In the Matter of: Case Number(s):

Payee Principal Amount Interest Accrues From

b, Installment Restitution Payments

PayeelCSF (as applicable) Minimum Payment Amount Payment Frequency

c. Client Funds Certificate

(Effective January 1,2011)

b. Respondent has kept and maintained the following:

d. Client Trust Accounting School

(Effective January 1,2011 )

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF: VINCENT J. QUIGG

CASE NUMBERS: 14-O-01717,14-O-02118,14-C-02229

FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Case No. 14-O-01717 (Complainant: Felipe Tolentino)

8. Thereafter, Respondent delayed in paying California Imaging on Tolentino’s behalf pursuant

10. On April 29, 2013, Respondent paid $1,742.18 to California Imaging.

11. In January 2014, Tolentino filed a State Bar complaint.

Case No. 14-O-02118 (Complainant: Marlene Medina)

19. Thereafter, Respondent’s co-counsel drafted a complaint on behalf of the family.

¯ The remaining funds of $210,648.33 ($299,000 - $2,580 - $85,771.67) belonged to the

Respondent failed to adhere to the MICRA limits in violation of Business and

Case No. 14-C-02229 (Conviction Proceedings)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND IN CONVICTION PROCEEDING:

Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.5(a)):

In Respondent’s second record of prior discipline, he entered into a disciplinary stipulation in

Additional Mitigating Circumstances:

AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

(b) If a member has two or more prior records of discipline, disbarment is

Case No. Count Alleged Violation

14-O-01717 Two Business and Professions Code section 6106