1250 IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 26, NO.
7, SEPTEMBER 2008
A Game-Theoretical Study of Robust
Networked Systems
Chi-Kin Chau
Abstract—This paper analyses the robustness of networked
systems from a game-theoretical perspective. Networked systems
often consist of several subsystems sharing resources inter-
dependently based on local preferences. These systems can be
modelled by a dependence game, which is a generalisation
of stable paths problem. A unique pure Nash equilibrium in
a dependence game can characterise the robustness of the
represented networked system, precluding oscillations and non-
determinism. We show that the absence of a structure termed a
generalised dispute wheel is useful to ensure the existence of a
unique pure Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we consider more
sophisticated settings: tie-breaking over non-strict preferences
and asynchronous communications among subsystems. We also
obtain stronger results that the absence of a generalised dispute
wheel can be useful to ensure the consistency of tie-breaking and
asynchronous convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium.
Index Terms—Robustness, Networked Systems, Game Theory
I. I NTRODUCTION
N ETWORKED systems often consist of a collection of
subsystems sharing resources inter-dependently, which
are governed by heterogeneous local preferences. For example,
in inter-domain routing, independent administrative routing
systems (so-called Autonomous Systems) share connectivity
based on local routing policies. In peer-to-peer systems, data
servers may rely on each other for replicas or backups of
data according to local preferences. In decentralised security
systems, a federation of security domains may authenticate
or validate mutually based on local security settings. We
observe that the presence of autonomy coupled with inter-
dependence is common to many networked systems. Gen-
erally, a subsystem (e.g. a routing system, a data server, a
security domain) not only possesses local resources (e.g. local
connectivity, data, trust), but also relies on other subsystems
according to local preferences for additional resources (e.g.
traversing neighbours, retrieving data, authenticating trusted
parties). A major contribution of this paper to establish an
abstract framework that describes these networked systems.
In this paper, we model a networked system as a finite
non-cooperative game, called a dependence game, generalising
stable paths problem in the studies of policy-based routing [2].
The dependence game considers general dependence relations
of resource-sharing given by any acyclic relation (i.e. any
partial order), rather than being restricted to the subpath
relation in stable paths problem.
Manuscript received August 15, 2007; revised March 10, 2008.
The author is with Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering,
University College London and Computer Laboratory, University of Cam-
bridge (e-mail: cchau@ee.ucl.ac.uk).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/JSAC.2008.080921.
0733-8716/08/$25.00 
The interactions between inter-dependent resource-sharing
and heterogeneous local preferences may give rise to detrimen-
tal consequences, such as oscillations and non-determinism.
Specifically, in policy-based routing these two situations are
known as bad gadgets [2] and wedgies [3] respectively.
In a dependence game, a pure Nash equilibrium corresponds
to a settled joint configuration of subsystems without oscilla-
tions. In this regard, the absence of a pure Nash equilibrium
in a dependence game represents the absence of a network-
wide consistent configuration, while the presence of multiple
pure Nash equilibria implies non-deterministic behaviour that
may be observed in the system. Hence, the robustness of
a networked system can be characterised by the existence
and uniqueness of a pure Nash equilibrium in a representing
dependence game.
We introduce the notion of a (generalised) dispute wheel (a
cyclic structure among the inter-dependent resource-sharing
and local preferences), and show that the absence of a dispute
wheel in a dependence game is useful to ensure the existence
of a unique pure Nash equilibrium. Our notion of a dispute
wheel is a generalisation of the one in stable paths problem
[2]. Moreover, we show that a dependence game without a
dispute wheel is a potential game, which is a well-studied
class of non-cooperative games [4].
Besides of a game-theoretical setting, policy-based routing
can also be formulated in an algebraic setting [5]. However, [6]
shows that monotonicity in such an algebraic setting implies
the absence of a dispute wheel in stable paths problem.
Furthermore, we consider two more sophisticated settings
of networked systems:
1) Tie-breaking over non-strict preferences. Subsystems
may select a subset of resources from a set of equally
preferred resources (e.g. paths with the same cost), or
from a set of Pareto-optimal resources (e.g. some paths
with more bandwidth while other paths with less delay).
2) Asynchronous communications among subsystems.
There may be delays, losses and disordered sequences
for the communication messages among subsystems.
Particularly, we provide illustrating examples to explain the
subtlety of these settings:
• It is possible that a pure Nash equilibrium exists when
tie-breaking is not enforced, but is absent when tie-
breaking is enforced (see Example 6). Conversely, it is
also possible that a pure Nash equilibrium exists even
when tie-breaking is enforced blindly or uncoordinatedly
(i.e. no matter how tie-breaking is decided), but is absent
when tie-breaking is not enforced (see Example 7).
• It is possible that a networked system may not settle
down under asynchronous communications, even though
c 2008 IEEE
CHAU: A GAME-THEORETICAL STUDY OF ROBUST NETWORKED SYSTEMS
with a unique pure Nash equilibrium and identical local
preferences (see Example 9).
To address the subtle issues of tie-breaking and asynchronous
communications, we strengthen our results by showing that
the absence of a dispute wheel is also useful to ensure the
consistency of coordinated tie-breaking and asynchronous con-
vergence to the unique pure Nash equilibrium in a dependence
game. We also introduce the notion of a weak dispute wheel,
such that the absence of a weak dispute wheel is sufficient to
ensure the consistency of blind or uncoordinated tie-breaking.
In summary, our contribution is to shed light on the
principles of robust networked systems in a game-theoretical
framework, by generalising the previous results from policy-
based routing [1], [2], with more explicit connections to non-
cooperative game theory.
II. N OTATIONS AND D EFINITIONS
A. Preferences
We first introduce some notations. We model the local
preferences of subsystems by three relations:
1) preorder (denoted as  or ) is a reflexive and transitive
relation,
2) partial order (denoted as ) is an anti-symmetric pre-
order,
3) total order (denoted as ≤) is a complete partial order.
For a preorder  over a set X, if (a, b) ∈  and a, b ∈ X,
we write “a  b”, otherwise we write “a  b”. Here a  b
means that a is at least as preferred or optimal as b.
Given a preorder , we define its strict relation, <, as:
a < b ⇔ (a  b and b  a), for all a, b ∈ X
The minimum set of X with respect to  is defined as:
 
min X  a ∈ X | there exists no b ∈ X such that b < a
For a, b ∈ X, if a  b and b  a, we write “a ≈ b”,
where a and b are said to be equally preferred . If a  b and
b  a, a and b are said to be Pareto-optimal. For instance, in
load balancing paths may be equally preferred by assigning
identical cost, while in multi-objective optimisation paths may
be Pareto-optimal such that some have more bandwidth and
others have less delay.
We refer to non-strict preferences [1] as preferences with
equally preferred or Pareto-optimal elements (i.e. preorders).
Traditionally, only strict preferences were studied in policy-
based routing [2], [7]. Recently, [1] studied the impact of
non-strict preferences in policy-based routing. We extend
these results to more general networked systems modelled by
dependence game.
B. Dependence Game
In this paper, we study dependence game as an abstract
framework of networked systems that share resources inter-
dependently based on local preferences. In this framework,
resources are not longer restricted to forwarding paths (as
in routing), but can be as generally described by an abstract
dependence relation.
1251
Suppose that there are N subsystems. A dependence game
is defined by a tuple as:
D  d , (Ki , i )i=1,...,N 
where
• Ki is a finite set of resources for subsystem i ∈
{1, ..., N }.
• i is a preorder over Ki , which represents the local
preferences of subsystem i over
 its alternative resources.
• d is a partial order over i=1,...,N Ki , called the de-
pendence relation; we write r <d p to represent that p
is dependent on r.
We denote <i (<d resp.) as the strict relation of i (d
resp.). Next, we give two instances of dependence game.
Example 1 (Stable Paths Problem): The stable paths prob-
lem for policy-based routing [2], [7] is a dependence game,
defined as follows. The subsystems are vertices of a network.
Ki is the set of acyclic paths starting at vi , including the
empty path from vi to itself. d is the subpath relation: if
R and P have the same sink, and R is a subpath of P , we
set R <d P . Each resource (a path) depends on a chain of
resources (subpaths).
Example 2 (Second Order Stable Paths Problem): Second
order stable paths problem [1] considers policy-based multi-
casting, as defined as follows. The subsystems are vertices of
a network. Resources are multicast trees: Ki = P (Pi ), where
 at vi and P is a power
Pi is the set of acyclic paths starting
set. For a pair of distinct R, P ∈ i∈{1,...,N } Ki , if every path
in R is a subpath of some path in P with the same sink, we
set R <d P. Unlike stable paths problem, each resource (a
multicast tree) may depend on multiple chains of resources
(multiple multicast subtrees).
One can replace connectivity in Examples 1-2 by other
resources, for instance, data in peer-to-peer systems or trust
in decentralised security systems. The setting of dependence
game is sufficiently generic to capture many resource-sharing
networked systems.
Generally, a finite non-cooperative game is defined as:
G  Xi , i i=1,...,N
where
• Xi is a finite set of configurations for each subsystem i.
i
•  is the local preferences of i as a preorder over the
Cartesian product of all configurations X, where
  X1 × ... × XN
X
We denote <i as the strict relation of i . (We remind the
readers that <i is the strict relation of i , which is only used
in a dependence game over resources).
Formally, the class of non-cooperative games we consider
are called ordinal games [8], in which preferences are repre-
sented by orders, rather than utility functions.
Let a joint configuration be x  xi ∈ Xi i=1,...,N . Let the
projection of x apart from subsystem i be:
x|-i  xj ∈ Xj j∈{1,...,N }\{i}
 1252 IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 26, NO. 7, SEPTEMBER 2008

R3 R1 T2
v3 T1 v1
R2 R1 v1 : T2R2 < R1 < etc.
v1 : T2R2 < R1 < etc. v2 v1
T3 T2 v2 : T3R3 < R2 < etc. v2 : T1R1 < R2 < etc.
T1
v2 v 3 : T1R1 < R3 < etc.
R2 Fig. 2. (Example 4): A stable paths problem with two pure Nash equilibria
(as indicated by arrows of different colours).

Fig. 1. (Example 3): A stable paths problem with no pure Nash equilibrium.
We omit the subscript i of <i in the preferences.
Example 3 (No Equilibrium): Consider Fig. 1 (adopted
from [2]). Assuming there is a pure Nash equilibrium. Then
where x|-i , y denotes the joint configuration that is equal to there are two cases:
R T1 R1 R T2 R2 R1
x except that subsystem i has configuration as y. 1) If v1 1 ⇒ v3  ⇒ v2 2 ⇒ v1  ⇒ v1 

R1 R T3 R3 R
Dependence game is a non-cooperative game. We map the  ⇒ v3 3 ⇒ v2 
2) If v1  ⇒ v1 1
tuple D of a dependence game to a non-cooperative game, Both cases generate contradiction. Therefore, a pure Nash
denoted as G[D]=Xi , i i=1,...,N , as follows: equilibrium does not exist.
(G.1) Configurations are subsets of resources, such that subsys-
tems are required to select locally optimal resources in Example 4 (Multiple Equilibria): Consider Fig. 2. It is
the configuration: easy to check that there are two pure Nash equilibria:
R1 T1 R1 T2 R2 R2
Xi = {x ⊆ Ki | x = ∅, x = mini x} v1 , v2   and v1  , v2  (as coloured in Fig. 2).
So, the system may settle at one of two pure Nash equilibria
(G.2) Define i as a partial order such that x i x for all non-deterministically.
x ∈ X and for distinct x, y ∈ X,
 we set x <i y, if all To characterise robust networked systems, in Section III-A
following are satisfied: we will provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a
(A.1) The joint configurations are equal except at i: unique pure Nash equilibrium in a dependence game.

x|-i = y |-i
C. Tie-breaking over Non-strict Preferences
(A.2) All resources in xi are more preferred than any Sometimes, tie-breaking may be enforced over non-strict
resource in yi , or xi is a superset of yi : preferences by some subsystems, which may induce network-
wide oscillations. Next, we illustrate this subtlety by some
xi = mini xi ∪ yi
examples of stable paths problem.
Thus, this defines i as a partial order.
(A.3) Resources in xi must have their direct depending Example 5 (No Equilibrium when No Tie-breaking): Con-
resources present in x: for all p ∈ xi , sider Fig. 3, if tie-breaking is enforced such that v0 must select
 only one of the equally preferred paths, then the pure Nash
r ∈ Kj | r <d p and  exists no q such that
there 
equilibrium exists (as coloured in Fig. 3):
r <d q <d p ⊆ j∈{1,...,N }\{i} xj
Q3 R3 1 R
3 3 T R
3 R
For example, in stable paths problem, a forward- v0  , v1 , v2  , v3 
ing path can be selected only when the next-hop Suppose v0 does not enforce tie-breaking (namely, it is pos-
neighbour has selected the next-hop subpath. Q3 R3 T1 R1
sible that v0  and v0  simultaneously). Assume that a

A pure Nash equilibrium is a joint configuration, x ∈ X, pure Nash equilibrium exists. Then there are two cases:
that satisfies the consistency of local minimum for all i ∈ 1 1T R R Q1 T1 R1 R
1) If v0  , then v1 1 ⇒ v3  ⇒ v2 2
{1, ..., N } such that T2 R2 R1
  ⇒ v1  ⇒ v1 
T1 R1 R3 T3 R3 R2
x ∈ mini x|-i , y | y ∈ Xi 2) If v0 / , then v3  ⇒ v2  ⇒ v2  
R T1 R1
⇒ v1 1 ⇒ v0 
Note that mini is evaluated in the local sense regarding to
only the local preference of i. In a dependence game, the Both cases generate contradiction. Therefore, a pure Nash
existence of a pure Nash equilibrium implies the existence of equilibrium does not exist.
a network-wide consistent configuration, and the uniqueness
of pure Nash equilibrium implies a unique consistent config- Example 6 (No Equilibrium when Tie-breaking): More
uration. Particularly, we give two simple examples of stable interestingly, consider Fig. 4, if tie-breaking is not enforced,
paths problem without these properties as follows. then the pure Nash equilibrium exists (as coloured in Fig. 4):
In the following examples of stable paths problem, if the T R
2 2 4 4T R 2 R T T R R T T R
{v1  , v1  }, v2 , v3 1 
4 4 4
, v4 , v5 6 
2 2

configuration of vertex v is to traverse path P , then we write
P P
“v ”, otherwise we write “v”. For clarity, the destination Suppose v0 enforces tie-breaking. Assume that a pure Nash
is not drawn in the figures. equilibrium exists. Then there are five cases:
2 2 T R R R
1) If v1  , then v2 2 ⇒ v3 
 3
CHAU: A GAME-THEORETICAL STUDY OF ROBUST NETWORKED SYSTEMS 1253

v0
Q1
T1 v 0 : T1R1 ≈ Q3R3 < etc. R3 R5 v1 : T2R2 ≈ T4R4 < etc.
R3 R1 v3 v5
v3 Q3 v1 v1 : T2R2 < R1 < etc. T1 T6 v2 : T3R3 < R2 < etc.

v2 : T3R3 < R2 < etc. T3 v1 T5 1 4R4 < TT

v 3 : TT 1 4T5R5 <R3 < etc.
T3 T2
T4 v 4 : T5R5 < R4 < etc.
v2 v 3 : Q1T1R1 < R3 < etc. v2 T2 v4
R2 R2 R4 v5 : T6T2R2 < T6T2T3R3 <R5 < etc.

Fig. 3. (Example 5): A stable paths problem with no pure Nash Fig. 4. (Example 6): A stable paths problem with no pure Nash equilibrium if tie-
equilibrium if tie-breaking is not enforced. But if tie-breaking is breaking is enforced. But if tie-breaking is not enforced, a pure Nash equilibrium
enforced, a pure Nash equilibrium exists (as indicated by coloured exists (as indicated by coloured arrows).
arrows).

R3 R5 R3 R5 v 0 : P1 ≈ P4 < etc.
Q3 Q3
v3 v5 v3 v5 v1 : T2R2 < R1P1 < T2T3R3 < etc.
P1 P1 v2 : T3R3 < Q6P6 <R2 < etc.
T1 R1 T5 T1 R1 T5
T3 v1 v0 v4 T6 T3 v1 v0 v4 T6
T2 R4 T2 R4 v 3 : T1R1P1 <R3 < etc.
P4 T4 P4 T4
v2 v6 v2 v6 v 4 : T5R5 < R4P4 < T5T6R6 < etc.
R2 Q6 R2 Q6 v5 : T6R6 < Q3P3 <R5 < etc.
R6 R6
(a) (b) v6 : T4R4P4 <R6 < etc.

Fig. 5. (Example 7): Whatever tie-breaking enforced at v0 , a pure Nash equilibrium exists as be either Figure (a) or Figure (b) (as indicated by coloured
arrows). But there is no pure Nash equilibrium, if v0 does not enforce tie-breaking.

 T T4 R4 T T4 T5 R5  T R R T R R
⇒ v3 1  or v3 1  Also, v1  2 2
/ ⇒ v2   2 and v4  5 5
/ ⇒ v5 ,  5
 T4 R4 T T5 R5  T2 R2 T3 R3 Q6 R6 T6 R6 Q3 R3
⇒ v1  or v1 4  ⇒ v1 / ⇒ (v2  or v2  ) and (v5  or v5  )
T R R R R3 R6 T1 R1 P1 T4 R4 P4
4 4
2) If v1  , then v4 4 ⇒ v5 
 5 ⇒ (v3  or v6 ) ⇒ (v3  / or v6  / )
 T6 T2 R2 T T2 T3 R3  R1 P1 T2 R2 P1 R R3
⇒ v5  or v5 6  2) If v1 
/ , then v1  (since v0 ) ⇒ (v2 2 and v3 )
 T2 R2 T T3 R3  T4 R4 T3 R3 R2
⇒ v1  or v1 2  ⇒ v1 / ⇒ v2  ⇒ v2  
R4 P4 T5 R5 P4 R R6
3) If v1 2  3 3 T T R
, then v5 6  2 3 3 T T T R
⇒ v4 4
R 3) If v4 
/ , then v4  (since v0 ) ⇒ (v5 5 and v6 )
T4 R4 T2 T3 R3 T6 R6 R5
⇒ v1  ⇒ v1  / ⇒ v5  ⇒ v5  
T4 T5 R5 T1 T4 T5 R5 R
4) If v1  , then v3  ⇒ v2 2 All cases generate contradiction. Therefore, a pure Nash
T2 R2 T T5 R5 equilibrium does not exist.
⇒ v1  ⇒ v1 4  /
T2 R2 T4 R4 T2 T3 R3 T T5 R5
5) If v1  / and v1  / and v1  / and v1 4 /,
R T3 R3 R T5 R5 Examples 5-7 show that the local tie-breaking decisions of
then (v3 3 ⇒ v2  ) and (v5 5 ⇒ v4  )
T2 T3 R3 T4 T5 R5 subsystems may induce network-wide oscillations. Different
⇒ (v1  or v1  ) tie-breaking decisions can have very different impacts. In
All cases generate contradiction. Therefore, a pure Nash Section III-B, we will offer sufficient conditions to ensure the
equilibrium does not exist. consistency of tie-breaking.
More generally, we define the notion of tie-breaking for
Example 7 (Blind Tie-breaking ⇒ No Tie-breaking): If dependence game as follows:
there is a pure Nash equilibrium for blind tie-breaking (no mat-
(1) Given a dependence game D = d , (Ki , i )i=1,...,N ,
ter how tie-breaking is decided at equally preferred paths), it is
we define a set of tie-breaking dependence games with
interesting to ask whether there exists a pure Nash equilibrium
respect to D as follows:
when tie-breaking is not enforced. Counter-intuitively, this is
not always true. In Fig. 5, whatever tie-breaking is enforced 
B[D]  d , (Ki , ≤i )i=1,...,N  | ≤i is a total order ∀i,
at v0 , a pure Nash equilibrium exists as either: 
P1 1 1 R P Q6 R6 T R P T T R R T R
and p i q⇒p ≤i q
v0 , v1  , v2  , v3 1 1 1 , v4 5 
6 6 6 6
, v5  6
, v6 , or
P T T R T R R R P Q3 R3 T R P
4
v0 , v1 2 
3 3 3 3
, v2  3
, v3 , 4 4
v4  , v5  , v6 4 4 4  Hence, B[D] contains all instances of tie-breaking, each
as a total order ≤i .
They are coloured in Fig. 5 (a), (b). Suppose v0 does not
P P (2) Let b = bi ∈ Z+ ∪ {∞}i∈{1,...,N } be a collection of
enforce tie-breaking, we obtain v0 1 and v0 4 simultaneously. upper bounds, which allows heterogeneous tie-breaking
Assume that a pure Nash equilibrium exists. Then there are at different subsystems. Set bi = ∞ for no tie-breaking
three (non-exclusive) cases: at i, whereas bi = k for the tie-breaking at k-best alter-
1 1 R P4 4 R P T R P1 T R P4
1) If v1  and v4  , then v3 1 1 and v6 4 4 natives. The set of composite tie-breaking dependence
1254 IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 26, NO. 7, SEPTEMBER 2008

TABLE I
games with respect to D and b is defined as follows: A NON - COOPERATIVE GAME OF 3 SUBSYSTEMS MINIMISING THE
 IDENTICAL COST. T HE BRACKETS REPRESENT THE COSTS FOR

B b [D] d , (Ki , i )i=1,...,N  | i is a partial order ∀i, SUBSYSTEMS 1, 2, 3 RESPECTIVELY. T HE UNIQUE PURE N ASH
 EQUILIBRIUM IS ( RIGHT, LEFT, DOWN ).
and p i q ⇒ p i q, and |min x| ≤ bi ∀x ⊆ Ki
i
3 (DOWN) 3 (UP)
That is, subsystem i is allowed to select at most bi 2 2
optimal resources. LEFT RIGHT LEFT RIGHT
LEFT (1, 1, 1) (4, 4, 4) LEFT (2, 2, 2) (3, 3, 3)
In Section III-B we will characterise the set of composite 1 1
tie-breaking dependence games such that each has a pure Nash RIGHT (0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1) RIGHT (3, 3, 3) (2, 2, 2)
equilibrium.
Fig. 6 for an evolution with delayed communications for the
D. Asynchronous Communications perceived joint configurations of the two vertices. It starts
We next consider the issue of asynchronous communica- R1 R2
with v1 , v2 . But the delays in communications cause
tions in networked systems. For generality, we first consider R1 R2
a loop back to v1 , v2 . It is because that when the joint
the setting of repeated finite non-cooperative games. R1 R2 T2 R2
configuration is v1 , v2 , v1 will reconfigure as v1 
Given a non-cooperative game G = Xi , i i=1,...,N , we R2
 ⇒ P (Xi ) as the best-response for subsystem
define F i : X relying on v2 ’s configuration as v2 . However, v2 will also
T1 R1 R1
i given a joint configuration x: reconfigure as v2  relying on v1 ’s configuration as v1 .
  Because of delays, the communication messages about the
F i [x]  mini x|−i , y | y ∈ Xi . reconfiguration of one subsystem cannot reach others in time,
That is, F i maps a joint configuration x to the best-response causing a loop of unilateral reconfigurations.
reconfigurations of i.
An evolution of the system is defined as a sequence, Example 9: (Asynchronous Oscillations in Games with
 t=0,1,2,... . Ideally, subsystem i should perceive a
xt ∈ X Unique Equilibrium): Consider a non-cooperative game of
synchronous evolution as: three subsystems 1, 2, 3 as tabulated in Table I (illustrated

in Fig. 7 (a)), where all subsystems minimise the identical
xi t + 1 ∈ F i xt . cost. The configuration of subsystems 1 and 2 can be LEFT or
RIGHT, whereas UP or DOWN for subsystem 3. The unique pure
However, there may be distortion such that for some lag τji (t) Nash equilibrium is at cost equal to 0. But an asynchronous
where 0 ≤ τji (t) ≤ t, subsystem i perceives an asynchronous evolution in Fig. 7 (b) can cause a loop. When the joint config-
evolution as: uration is (LEFT, RIGHT, DOWN), subsystem 1 will reconfigure as

RIGHT, relying on the other subsystems’ configurations remain

xi t + 1 ∈ F i xj τji (t)j=1,...,N .
For example:
• If there is a delay in communication message at time t,
subsystem i may perceive that subsystem j has configu-
ration xj τ , for some 0 < τ < t. Alternatively, delayed
communications can be interpreted as unsynchronised
clocks.
• If there is a communication message loss, at any moment
from τ to t, subsystem i may always perceive that
subsystem j has configuration as xj τ .
• If there are out-of-order communication messages, sub-
system i may perceive that subsystem j has configuration
xj τ   at time t , while at time t subsystem i perceives
xj τ , where τ < τ  < t < t.
Next, we give an example of stable paths problem for the
oscillations under asynchronous communication. In general
non-cooperative games, we also show that even the existence
of a unique pure Nash equilibrium and identical local
preferences cannot preclude oscillations under asynchronous
communications.
Example 8 (Asynchronous Oscillations in Stable Paths
Problems): Consider the stable paths problem in Example 4
with delays in communications. Although there are two pure
R1 T1 R1 T2 R2 R2
Nash equilibria: v1 , v2   and v1  , v2 , v1 and
v2 may never converge to the pure Nash equilibria. See
as (RIGHT, DOWN). Again, the delayed communications about
reconfiguration of one subsystem cannot reach others in time,
causing a loop of unilateral reconfigurations.
Although Example 9 shows that the existence of a unique
pure Nash equilibrium and identical local preferences in
general non-cooperative game cannot ensure the asynchronous
convergence, we will show that this case does not occur in
dependence game in Section III-C.
III. R ESULTS
Motivated by Examples 3-8, we observe that the properties
of pure Nash equilibrium in a dependence game are closely
related to a cyclic structure, known as dispute wheel, which
is defined as a collection of some K pairs, pk , rk k=0,...,K−1,
such that each pair pk , rk ∈ Kik for some ik ∈ {1, ..., N },
which gives the following cycle:
r0 <d pK−1 <iK−1 · · · < d p2 <i2 r2 <d p1 <i1 r1 <d p0 <i0 r0
Dispute wheels are present in Examples 3-7 (see Fig. 8).
Our notion of dispute wheel naturally generalises the one in
[2] that only considers subpath relation. We will show that the
absence of a dispute wheel in a dependence game is a useful
sufficient condition for:
1) the existence of a unique pure Nash equilibrium (Theo-
rems 2-3),
2) the consistency of different tie-breaking decisions
(Corollaries 5-6),
CHAU: A GAME-THEORETICAL STUDY OF ROBUST NETWORKED SYSTEMS 1255

R1 R2 R2T2 R2 R2T2 R1T1 R1 R2T2 R1 R2

v1 x, v2 x v1 x , v2 x v1 x , v2 x v1 x, v2 x v1 x, v2 x
Time
v1
Communication
channel
v2
Time
R1 R2 R1 R1T1 R2T2 R1T1 R2T2 R2 R1 R2
v1 x, v2 x v1 x, v2 x v1 x , v2 x v1 x , v2 x v1 x, v2 x

Fig. 6. (Example 8): An asynchronous evolution for Example 4 (Fig. 2), where a dashed arrow represents a communication message and the dialogue box
represents the local knowledge of joint configuration of a subsystem.

1: (RIGHT, RIGHT, DOWN) 1: (LEFT, LEFT, UP)

3 1: (LEFT, RIGHT, DOWN) 1: (RIGHT, LEFT, UP) 1: (LEFT, RIGHT, DOWN)

Cost
2 Time Time
1
2
UP
3 3’s 2:(LEFT, LEFT, DOWN) 2: (RIGHT, RIGHT, UP)
configuration
4 DOWN 2: (LEFT, RIGHT, DOWN) 2: (RIGHT, LEFT, UP) 2: (LEFT, RIGHT, DOWN)
1
1 Time
2

0 RIGHT Communication
LEFT
LEFT channel
RIGHT
3
1’s configuration 2’s configuration Time Time
3: (LEFT, RIGHT, DOWN) 3: (RIGHT, LEFT, UP) 3: (LEFT, RIGHT, DOWN)

3: (LEFT, RIGHT, UP) 3: (RIGHT, LEFT, DOWN)

(a) (b)

Fig. 7. (Example 9): (a) An illustration for Table I, which is a non-cooperative game with three subsystems (1, 2, 3) minimising the identical cost, where the
differently coloured arrows represent the unilateral reconfigurations for different subsystems. There is a unique pure Nash equilibrium at cost equal to 0. (b)
An asynchronous evolution for Example 9, where a dashed arrow represents a communication message and the dialogue box represents the local knowledge
of joint configuration of a subsystem.
T2R2
<i
R2
R1P1 Q6R6
R4
<d TT
1 4 R4 T5R5 T1R1P1
T1R1
TT
1 4T5R5
T1R1 T3R3
R3 R1 R3 R6
T6R6
R3 R5
T4R4R4
R2 R1
T6T2T3R3
T3R3 T2R2 Q3R3 R4P4
T2R2 T3R3 T6T2R2 R5
R2 R2 T5R5
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 8. Dispute wheels: (a) Example 4, (b) Example 3, (c) Example 6, and (d) Example 7.

3) the asynchronous convergence to a pure Nash equilib-
rium (Theorem 8).
A. Existence of Unique Equilibrium
First, we show that a non-cooperative game with the absence
of a structure termed a better-response cycle is equivalent to a
potential game, a well-known class of non-cooperative games
with the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium [4]. Next, we
show that in a dependence game the absence of a dispute
wheel implies the absence of a better-response cycle.
A (finite) potential game [4] is a finite game, G, F ,
 ⇒ Z+ , called a
such that there exists a function, F : X
1256 IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 26, NO. 7, SEPTEMBER 2008
TABLE II
A NON - COOPERATIVE GAME WITH A BETTER - RESPONSE CYCLE . T HE
BRACKETS REPRESENT THE COSTS FOR SUBSYSTEMS 1, 2 RESPECTIVELY.
2
LEFT RIGHT
LEFT (10, 0) ← (0, 10)
1 ↓ ↑ to use the properties of better-response cycle to construct a
RIGHT (0, 10) → (10, 0)
potential function, mapping from the set of joint configurations
to non-negative integers, such that if x|-i = y|-i for some
i ∈ {1, ..., N }, then x <i y ⇔ F (x) < F (y ). For instance,
Example 9 is a potential game, since all subsystems minimise
the identical cost. Note that a pure Nash equilibrium in a
potential game is equivalent to a local minimum of F .
Given a finite game G, a better-response cycle is de-
fined as a collection of some M joint configurations, xh ∈
 h=0,...,M−1, such that for all h ∈ {0, ..., M − 1} and h+ =
X
+ +
h + 1(mod M) satisfying: xh |-ih = xh |-ih and xh <ih xh
for some ih ∈ {1, ..., N }. For example, see Table II.
Theorem 1: Given a finite game G, there exists no better-
response cycle in G, if and only if G is a potential game. Both
imply the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof: If there exists a better-response cycle and a po-
+
tential function F , then we have F (xh ) < F (xh ) (since
+ +
xh <ih xh ), and F (xh ) > F (xh ) (by going around the
better-response cycle in the other direction), for all h ∈
{0, ..., M − 1}. This is a contradiction. Hence, G is not a
potential game, if there exists a better-response cycle.
If there exists no better-response cycle, then we can con-
struct a potential function as follows. First, construct a directed
graph, G = V, E, where the set of vertices V = X  and we
i
set an edge x←y ∈ E, if x|-i = y |-i and x < y for some
i ∈ {1, ..., N }. Since there exists no better-response cycle, G
contains only acyclic components. The set of sinks is defined
 | for all y ∈ X\{x},
 
as {x ∈ X y←x ∈
/ E}. Since each x ∈ X
can reach a sink, we set F (x) as the number of vertices on
 is a finite
the longest path from each x to a sink. Since X
 get back to (p0 , r0 ) after finite steps. Hence, pk , rk k=0,...,K−1
set, F (x) is a finite value for all x ∈ X. Note that F (x)
satisfies the constraint of a potential function: if x←y ∈ E,
then F (x) < F (y ), since all sinks reacheable by x can be
reached by y . If F (y ) ≤ F(x), then F (y ) is not the number
of vertices on the longest path to a sink, as the path of y
traversing x is always longer.
 is finite. Thus, potential
Since G is a finite game, |X|
function F has a finite range, there exists a finite local
minimum, and hence a pure Nash equilibrium.
Property (Default Resource): For each subsystem i, we
denote a special resource in Ki as “i ”, called the default
resource of i, if it satisfies the following two conditions:
(B.1) i is not dependent on others,  such that there exists
no p <d i , for all p ∈ j=1,...,N Kj . This is always
possible because d is a partial order.
(B.2) Subsystem i can only select either i or other resources
in Ki . That is, for all p ∈ Ki \{i }, we have either
p <i i or i <i p.
For example, empty paths are default resources in stable paths
problem, and singleton sets of an empty path are default
resources in second order stable paths problem.
Theorem 2: For a dependence game D, the existence of a
better-response cycle in G[D] implies the existence of a dispute
wheel in D.
Proof: Suppose that there is a better-response cycle in
G[D], say xh ∈ X  h=0,...,M−1 . The basic idea of the proof is
dispute wheel: r0 <d pK−1 <iK−1 · · · <d p0 <i0 r0 .
+
For any h ∈ {0, ..., M − 1}, we have: xh |-ih = xh |-ih
+
and xh <ih xh for some ih ∈ {1, ..., N } where h+ =
h + 1(mod M). By the definition of <i in G[D] (A.2), we
+
have: either (1) xhih  xhih , or (2) p <ih r for some r ∈
+ +
xhih and p ∈ xhih (which implies r ∈ / xhih and p ∈ / xhih by the
definition of G[D] (G.1)).
+
If only xhih  xhih holds for all h ∈ {0, ..., M − 1}, then for
+
all i ∈ {1, ..., N }, we have |xhi | ≤ |xhi |. But we also obtain
+
|xhih | ≥ |xhih |, by going around the better-response cycle. This
+ +
is a contradiction to xhih  xhih (i.e. |xhih | < |xhih |). Hence,
there exists h ∈ {0, ..., M − 1} and ik ∈ {1, ..., N }, such that
+
r ∈ xhih and p ∈ xhih , and p <ih r.

We let r0 = r. There may be more than one p ∈ xkih such
that p <ih r for some k ∈ {0, ..., M − 1}. Pick some p0 ∈
min<ih x0ih ∪ · · · ∪ xM−1ih .
Next, we claim that there exists r ∈ xkik for some k ∈
{0, ..., M − 1} and ik ∈ {1, ..., N }, such that r <d p0 and
+
r ∈ / xkik . It is proved as follows. Note that p0 = ih (the
default resource of ih ). Otherwise, if ih <ih r0 , then r0 ∈ / xhih
for all h ∈ {0, ..., M − 1} (by the property of default resource
(B.2)). Then there exists r <d p0 . We also claim that p0 ∈ / xhih .
0 h
Otherwise, r ∈ / xih (by the definition of G[D] (G.1)). Since
p0 ∈ min<ih x0ih ∪ · · · ∪ xM−1 ih , p0 ∈/ xhih implies that there
exists r <d p0 such that r ∈ / xkik and p <ik r for some
+
k ∈ {0, ..., M − 1} and p ∈ xkik . Then, we let r1 = r and

pick some p1 ∈ min<ik x0ik ∪ · · · ∪ xM−1 ik .
Repeat the same argument inductively, we can obtain a
sequence pk , rk k=0,1,... Since N and M are finite, we can
forms a dispute wheel in dependence game D.
Property (Unique Dependence): A dependence game D is
said to satisfy unique dependence, if for each subsystem i, dif-
ferent resources have different depending resources. Namely,
for all i ∈ {1, ..., N }, p, p ∈ Ki ,
 

(C.1) if r ∈ Kj | r <d p
j=1,...,N  
= r ∈ Kj | r <d p , then p = p .
j=1,...,N
Stable paths problem over simple graphs satisfies unique
dependence.
Theorem 3: Suppose that a dependence game D satisfies
unique dependence and there exists a default resource for
every subsystem i. The absence of a dispute wheel imples
the existence of a unique pure Nash equilibrium in G[D].
Proof: By Theorems 1-2, there exists a pure Nash equi-
librium in G[D]. Consider
 any pair of pure Nashequilibria x
and y. Define I=  i ∈ {1, ..., N } | xi = yi . If x = y,
then I= = ∅. Assume I= = ∅. Since x and y are pure Nash
CHAU: A GAME-THEORETICAL STUDY OF ROBUST NETWORKED SYSTEMS
equilibria, and by the definition of <i in G[D] (A.3), for all
i ∈ {1, ..., N } we have:
   
r∈ Kj | r <d p, p ∈ xi ⊆ xj
j=1,...,N j=1,...,N
   
r∈ Kj | r <d p, p ∈ yi ⊆ yj
j=1,...,N j=1,...,N
Particularly, this implies that there are some i, j ∈ {1, ..., N }
such that xi = {i } and yj = {j }. That is, there are some
subsystems to provide all the necessary default resources for
other subsystems to depend on in pure Nash equilibrium.
We claim that for some i, j ∈ I= , we have xi = {i }
and yj = {j }. It is proved as follows. Suppose there exists
no i ∈ I= such that xi = {i }. Then this implies for all
xi = {i } ⇒ xi = yi .
Next, if p, p ∈ xk for some k ∈ {1, ..., N } such that
i <d p, i <d p , and there exists no q, q  such that
i <d q <d p, i <d q  <d p .
Then by unique dependence (C.1), we obtain p = p .
Deductively, we obtain for all i ∈ I=
 

r∈ Kj | r <d p, p ∈ xi
 j=1,...,N  setting for tie-breaking pairs that creates no dispute wheel.
⊆ r ∈ xj | xj = yj , j ∈ {1, ..., N }
This is a contradiction to i ∈ I= . Similarly, we can show that
there exists j ∈ I= such that yj = {j }.
Next, we pick xi1 such that xi1 = {i1 } and i1 ∈ / I= . We
claim that y <i1 y |-i1 , {i1 }. Otherwise, y is not a pure
Nash equilibrium. Then by the property of default resource
(B.1-B.2), there exists p ∈ yi1 such that p <i1 i1 . We claim
that there also exists i2 ∈ I= such that yi2 = {i2 } and
i2 <d p. Otherwise, suppose that there exists no such i2 ∈
I= . Since yi1 = {i1 }, we have:
   wheel in D . Then we combine the two dispute wheels
r∈ Kj | r <d p, p ∈ yi1
 j=1,...,N  combined dispute wheel must contain at least a tie-
⊆ r ∈ yj | xj = yj , j ∈ {1, ..., N }
By unique dependence (C.1), this implies an contradiction:
yi1 = xi1 . Therefore, there always exist i1 , i2 ∈ I= such that
xi1 = {i1 }, and yi2 = {i2 }, and i2 <d p, p <i1 i1 for
some p ∈ yi1 .
Repeat the same argument inductively, we can obtain a
sequence i1 , i2 , i3 , i4 , ... ∈ I= , where xi1 = {i1 }, yi2 =
{i2 }, xi3 = {i3 }, yi4 = {i4 }, ..., such that we have:
i3 <d p , p <i2 i2 for some p ∈ yi2 ,
i4 <d p , p <i3 i3 for some p ∈ yi3 ,
..
. (S.1): Pick a tie-breaking pair (pk , rk ) in a dispute wheel, and
This sequence must repeat at some ik ∈ I= , because I= is a
finite set, and hence forms a dispute wheel. (See Fig. 9 for an
illustration.) Therefore, if there exists no dispute wheel in D,
then I= = ∅; any pair of pure Nash equilibria are equivalent.
Theorems 2-3 generalise the results in [2] for stable paths
problem in which dependence relation is only as subpath
relation of a network. Moreover, we clarify the connection
to potential games, and the explicit roles of default resources
and unique dependence.
1257
I≠ <i
G
x = 〈{pi1 }, { }, {pi3 }, { },", x j1 , x j2 , x j3 ,"〉
*
i2 i4
<d
G
y = 〈{ }, {pi2 }, { }, {pi4 },", y j1 , y j2 , y j3 ,"〉
*
i1 i3
Fig. 9. An illustration for the proof of Theorem 3. If I= = ∅, then we can
construct a dispute wheel.
B. Tie-breaking over Non-strict Preferences
Theorem 4: Given a dependence game D, if there exists no
dispute wheel in D, then there exists D ∈ B[D] such that
there exists no dispute wheel in D .
Proof: First, we pick a tie-breaking dependence game D
with arbitrary tie-breaking. Let D = d , (Ki , ≤i )i=1,...,N 
∈ B[D], where ≤i is a total order. We call a pair p, r ∈ Ki a
tie-breaking pair, if (p i r or p ≈ r) and p ≤i r. Tie-breaking
pairs are additional to the original D, which can create dispute
wheels in D . The basic idea is to find a proper preference
We will show that it is always possible to con-
struct some total orders ≤i i=1,...,N , such that D =
d , (Ki , ≤i )i=1,...,N  ∈ B[D] with one dispute wheel lesser
than D , if there is any in D , provided that there is no dispute
wheel in D.
First, we observe the two following facts:
(O.1) Any dispute wheel in D must contain at least a tie-
breaking pair. Otherwise, there is a dispute wheel in D.
(O.2) Suppose there exists a tie-breaking pair (p, r) in D
such that either p ≤i r or r ≤i p will create a dispute
by removing the common tie-breaking pair (p, r). This
breaking pair. Otherwise, there exists a dispute wheel
in D. (See an illustration in Fig. 10.)
Next, we describe a systematic process to break a dispute
wheel in D , which flips ≤i in tie-breaking pairs and keeps
track of the flipped tie-breaking pairs.
Init: For each tie-breaking pair (p, r) in D , we assign a
boolean flag Flipped[p, r] to record if (p, r) has been
flipped or not, and a pointer LastFlipped[p, r] to record
the last pair of tie-breaking pair that has been flipped
before flipping (p, r). Set Flipped[p, r] := FALSE and
LastFlipped[p, r] := NIL.
flip the preference by reverse the direction in ≤i . Then
set Flipped[pk , rk ] := TRUE. If this does not generate a
new dispute wheel, then terminate.
(S.2): If there exists a tie-breaking pair (ph , rh ) in the new dis-
pute wheel such that Flipped[ph , rh ] = FALSE, then (1)
flip the preference of (ph , rh ), (2) set Flipped[ph , rh ] :=
TRUE, and (3) set LastFlipped[ph , rh ] := (pk , rk ). Goto
(S.4).
(S.3): If there exists no such a tie-breaking pair (ph , rh ) in the
new dispute wheel such that Flipped[ph , rh ] = FALSE,
then (1) undo the preference flipping in (pk , rk ), (2)
 1258 IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 26, NO. 7, SEPTEMBER 2008
s2 q2
<i
p1 r2 s0 o1
<d
r1 t1
p2 q0
Tie-breaking pair Theorems 1, 2, 4.
p0 r0 t2 o2
Fig. 10. An illustration for the proof of Theorem 4. Combined dispute wheel
always contains a unflipped tie-breaking pair.
backtrack to the last flipped tie-breaking pair using
pointer LastFlipped[pk , rk ], (3) undo the preference flip-
ping in LastFlipped[pk , rk ], (4) select another unflipped
tie-breaking pair other than LastFlipped[pk , rk ] in the
dispute wheel containing LastFlipped[pk , rk ], and repeat
(S.2). If there is no other unflipped tie-breaking pair in
the dispute wheel of LastFlipped[pk , rk ], then backtrack
using pointer LastFlipped[ LastFlipped[pk , rk ]] and re-
peat (S.2), until finding a unflipped tie-breaking pair.
(S.4): If (S.2) or (S.3) generates a new dispute wheel, repeat
(S.2). Otherwise terminate.
We show that (S.2) and (S.3) must terminate. By observa-
tions (O.1-O.2), if we combine all involved dispute wheels in
the process by removing all flipped tie-breaking pairs, there
is always a unflipped tie-breaking pair such that backtracking
can find it. Otherwise, there exists a dispute wheel in D.
Since Ki is a finite set for all i ∈ {1, ..., N } and N is a finite
number, it takes finitely many steps to break a dispute wheel.
Hence, there always exists D  d , (Ki , ≤i )i=1,...,N  ∈
B[D] that has one dispute wheel lesser than D , if there is
no dispute wheel in D. Repeating the same argument, we can
break all dispute wheels in D.
Corollary 5: Given a dependence game D and a collection
of upper bounds b, if there exists no dispute wheel in D, then
  t = Zt × Zt × · · · × Zt .
there exists D ∈ B b [D] with no dispute wheel in D .
Proof: This corollary follows straightforward from The-
orem 4. If there exists D ∈ B[D] with no dispute wheel, then
we can relax the total orders in D to partial orders such that

we attain D ∈ B b [D] with no dispute wheel.
Therefore, by Corollary 5, the absence of a dispute wheel
implies the existence of a unique pure Nash equilibrium for
any b, if we can enforce tie-breaking at all subsystems in a
proper coordinated manner.
However, the notion of dispute wheel is insufficient for
blind tie-breaking, when tie-breaking is enforced uncoordi-
natedly. This needs a weaker notion of dispute wheel. Given
a dependence game D, a weak dispute wheel is defined as a
collection of some K pairs, pk , rk k=0,...,K−1, such that each
pair pk , rk ∈ Kik for some ik ∈ {1, ..., N }, which gives the
following cycle:
r0 <d pK−1 >iK−1 · · · <d p2 >i2 r2 <d p1 >i1 r1 <d p0 >i0 r0 .
Clearly, a dispute wheel is a weak dispute wheel, and the
absence of a weak dispute wheel is a stronger condition than
the absence of a weak dispute wheel.
Corollary 6: Given a dependence game D and a collection
of upper bounds b, if there exists no weak dispute wheel in

D, then every D ∈ B b [D] has no dispute wheel.
Proof: Since the absence of a weak dispute wheel implies
the absence of a dispute wheel under any different decision
of tie-breaking, this corollary follows straightforward from
C. Asynchronous Communications
For general non-cooperative games, not surprisingly,
a game with a better-response cycle may not converge
asynchronously, because it may not converge synchronously.
However, potential game (i.e. with no better-response cycle)
may also not converge asynchronously (see Example 9).
Next, we present a general theorem for the asynchronous
convergence of finite games. This theorem is adopted from [9]
for general iterative systems, requiring the following property.
Let the joint best-response be F [x]  F 1 [x]× · · ·× F N [x].
Property (Continuing Updating): The updates of
configurations are carried out infinitely often, such that
after sufficient time any old information will be overwritten.
That is, for any finite t, there exists finite s ≥ t such that
τji (s) ≥ t for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., N }.
Theorem 7: Consider the joint best response F : X  ⇒
P (X1 ) × · · · × P (XN ), and a sequence of non-empty sets,
Z  =Z
 t t=0,1,...,T where X  0  · · ·  Z
 t  · · ·  Z
 T .
If the following two conditions are satisfied:
1) (Box Condition) For i ∈ {1, ..., N }, there exists a
t
sequence Zi ⊂ Xi t=0,1,...,T such that
 0 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Zt ⊇ · · · ⊇ ZT
Xi = Z i i i
where Z  t is the Cartesian product of Z i=1,...,N .
t
i
Namely, Z 1 2 N
2) (Synchronous Convergence Condition) X  =Z  0 , and
for all t ∈ {0, ..., T − 1},
 t F
Z  ⇒ P (Zt+1 t+1
) × · · · × P (ZN ),
1
 T implies x ∈ F [x] (namely, x is a fixed-
and x ∈ Z
point of F ).
Then, by continuing updating, for any asynchronous evolution
 t=0,1,2,... , there exists t̃ such that for t ≥ t̃,
of xt ∈ X
xt ∈ F xt (i.e. convergence to an equilibrium of F ).
The proof of Theorem 7 can found in [10] or [9] Chapter
6. Intuitively, synchronous convergence condition means the
convergence of synchronous evolutions, while box condition
means that each synchronous evolution of each subsystem can
proceed in a relatively independent manner.
Next, in Theorem 8, we show the asynchronous convergence
for a dependence game, condition on the absence of a dispute
wheel, which generalises the related result of asynchronous
convergence for stable paths problem in [1].
CHAU: A GAME-THEORETICAL STUDY OF ROBUST NETWORKED SYSTEMS
Note that Theorem 8 is even stronger than Theorems 1-3
can show. It is because that Theorems 1-3 only imply that
a dependence game with no dispute wheel can be at best
a potential game with a unique pure Nash equilibrium.
But Example 9 shows that a potential game with a unique
pure Nash equilibrium may not converge asynchronously.
However, a dependence game without a dispute wheel has
more sophisticated structures than a potential game, which
can ensure asynchronous convergence.
Theorem 8: Given a dependence game D, if there exists
a default resource for every subsystem i and no dispute
wheel, then any asynchronous evolution, xt ∈ X  t=0,1,2,... ,
converges to a pure Nash equilibrium, by continuing updating.
Proof: (Sketch): Here we sketch the proof. See [10]
for the complete proof. The basic idea is that for all i ∈
{1, ..., N }, we construct a special sequence of joint con-
t t−1 t
figurations, si ∈ Xi t=0,1,2,..., such that si ⊆ si for
all t ≥ 1, and if there exists no dispute wheel in D, then
this sequence of joint configurations is a stabilised evolution,
such that each iteration of the joint best-response F will
t
only take new resources into si , but will not remove any
t
existing resource in si . We prove by contradiction: if such
a stabilised evolution does not exist, then each iteration of
F always remove a resource on any joint configuration. By
tracing out the resources removed by each iteration of F , we
can construct a dispute wheel in D.
Therefore, when we iterate F starting at the default re-
sources, the size of configurations in a stabilised evolution
must be non-decreasing until reaching a pure Nash equilibrium
(i.e. a fixed-point of F ). Furthermore, we can show that the
existence of a stabilised evolution implies synchronous con-
vergence condition and box condition of Theorem 7. Hence,
the absence of a dispute wheel implies that any asynchronous
evolution converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in D.
IV. C ONCLUSION AND D ISCUSSION
In this paper, we analyse the interactions of the inter-
dependence and heterogeneous local preferences of subsys-
tems in networked systems based on a game theoretical
perspective, using finite games and pure Nash equilibria. A
pure Nash equilibrium represents a network-wide consistent
joint configuration of subsystems in a networked system.
We formalise a particular class of finite non-cooperative
games, called dependence game, which captures the charac-
teristic of inter-dependent resource-sharing subsystems. Our
contribution is to shed light on the principles of robust
networked systems by providing a useful condition (namely,
the absence of a dispute wheel) for the existence and unique-
ness of a pure Nash equilibrium in a dependence game. We
further investigate the subtle consequences under tie-breaking
over non-strict preferences, and asynchronous communications
among subsystems. We also provide a useful condition (also
as the absence of a dispute wheel) for the consistency of
tie-breaking and asynchronous convergence to a pure Nash
equilibrium in a dependence game.
1259
Note that our notion of the absence of a (generalised)
dispute wheel is the same as the notion of irreflexivity of
the policy relation as defined in [6], which is used to unify
several routing algebras. We remark that the absence of dispute
wheel is not a necessary condition for the existence of a pure
Nash equilibrium. For stable paths problem, [11] shows that
the absence of a dispute ring (a particular form of dispute
wheel) is a necessary condition for the existence of a pure
Nash equilibrium under arbitrary path filtering. This may also
hold in more general dependence game.
Furthermore, Theorems 1-2 show that a dependence game
with the absence of a dispute wheel is a potential game. And
[4] has shown that every finite potential game is equivalent
to a congestion game [12]. Hence, it suggests an interesting
connection between dependence game and congestion game,
which will be explored in future work.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Chi-Kin Chau is grateful to The Croucher Foundation for
financial support, and to Richard Gibbens, Jon Crowcroft,
Peter Sewell, Stan Zachary for their helpful suggestions. The
author also would like to thank the reviewers for detailed
comments. This research is continuing through participation in
the International Technology Alliance sponsored by the U.S.
Army Research Laboratory and the U.K. Ministry of Defence.
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Chi-Kin Chau is currently with Electrical and Electronic Department,
University College London, as a Croucher Foundation research fellow. He is
also a visiting scholar at Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge. He
received a Ph.D. from University of Cambridge, and a B.Eng. in Information
Engineering from the Chinese University of Hong Kong.