January 2011
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to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that
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Agenda
Country overview 32
2
While G-3 growth will pick up in 2011, unemployment rates will still remain elevated
and justify the maintenance of policy stimulus
Real GDP (%q/q, saar) 1Q10 2Q10 3Q10 4Q10 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11
Developed market economies 3.3 3.0 2.4 1.7 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.6
United States 3.7 1.7 2.6 2.9 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.0
Japan 6.8 3.0 4.5 -1.5 1.0 2.0 2.5 2.0
Euro area 1.5 4.1 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.8 2.0
OUTPUT GAPS CLOSE AS GROWTH REMAINS ABOVE POTENTIAL
10
4
1Q05 1Q06 1Q07 1Q08 1Q09 1Q10 1Q11
3
EM growth will average a still high 5.9% in 2011, with Emerging Asia (7.4%) once
again leading the pack, followed by Latin America (4.5%)
8.1 8.4
7.5 7.1 7.0
5.7 5.5 5.9 6.0
-3.8
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
-0.8
-3.1
-10.9
-13.6
1Q09 2Q09 3Q09 4Q09 1Q10 2Q10 3Q10 4Q10 1Q11 2Q11 3Q11 4Q11
4
Latin America’s growth will slow in 2011 relative to 2010’s high 6%, but will remain
above potential at 4.5%; Argentina, Chile and Peru will display growth of 5-7%
Venezuela -3.4 6.7 0.1 1.0 -1.5 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 3.0 3.0
Latin America 4.9 8.7 2.6 3.9 6.0 4.4 5.6 3.9 4.3 4.5 4.1 3.6
Central America and Caribbean - - - - 4.0 - - - - 4.4 4.9 -
5
Latin America’s growth will continue to be driven by domestic consumption and
investment in 2011, with net exports remaining a drag factor amid rising imports
OUTPUT GAPS CLOSE AS GROWTH REMAINS ABOVE POTENTIAL
6
On the supply side, IP has been moderating across Latin America since mid-2010
along with global manufacturing, but signs of reacceleration emerged in November
7
On the demand side, retail sales continue to grow strongly in Brazil, Chile and Peru,
with Colombia catching up and Mexico still lagging
Index level, January 2007 = 100, sa Index level, January 2007 = 100, sa
130 145
Brazil Chile Colombia Brazil Chile Colombia
Mexico Peru* Mexico Peru
140
120
135
130
110
OUTPUT GAPS CLOSE AS GROWTH REMAINS ABOVE POTENTIAL
125
100 120
115
90
110
105
80
100
70 95
Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10
*The manufacturing index from INEI serves as a proxy for Peru IP.
Source: J.P. Morgan
8
Agenda
Country overview 32
9
Core inflation is joining the ride up across Latin America, as headline inflation has
risen to or above the mid-points of target
Latin America: Headline CPI (%oya) Latin America: Core CPI (%oya)
6 6
4
4
2
0 2
-2
0
-4
-6 -2
Jan-08 Jun-08 Nov-08 Apr-09 Sep-09 Feb-10 Jul-10 Dec-10 Jan-08 Jun-08 Nov-08 Apr-09 Sep-09 Feb-10 Jul-10 Dec-10
10
The global commodity price rally is no longer being offset by currency appreciation,
so higher agricultural prices measured in local currency is pushing food prices up
Latin America: Agriculture & energy prices in LACI terms Latin America: Food inflation
130
120 15
110
10
100
90 5
80
0
70
60 -5
Jan-08 Jun-08 Nov-08 Apr-09 Sep-09 Feb-10 Jul-10 Dec-10 Jan-08 Jun-08 Nov-08 Apr-09 Sep-09 Feb-10 Jul-10 Dec-10
11
Although inflation targeters are expected to meet targets in 2011, inflation will stay
close to the upper bound of target ranges in most countries, with risks to the upside
2010 2011
Dec (%m/m) %Dec/Dec 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q %Dec/Dec Inflation Target (%)
Argentina1 0.84 10.5 10.5 10.5 11.0 11.5 12.0 12.0 …
Brazil 0.63 5.9 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.4 5.6 5.4 4.5 ( 2)
Chile 0.12 3.0 3.2 3.4 4.0 4.9 5.5 5.5 3.0 ( 1)
Colombia 0.65 3.2 2.7 3.4 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.2 3.0 (+1)
0.51
INFLATION ACCELERATION TO TRIGGER POLICY TIGHTENING IN 2011
12
Tightening in Latin America of 125bp during 2011 will be highest among EM regions,
but cumulative hikes in 2010-2011 will only reverse 50% of cuts since Lehman
13
Latin America is reversing the fiscal stimulus adopted in response to the crisis only
gradually, so the task of containing inflation will rest mostly on monetary policy
INFLATION ACCELERATION TO TRIGGER POLICY TIGHTENING IN 2011
14
Although fiscal policy will not be tightened aggressively in Latin America during 2011,
external borrowing needs will be lower than in 2010; net issuance will be negative
15
Agenda
Country overview 32
16
Risk to monitor #1: China growth: Latin America’s terms of trade and exports are
heavily driven by commodity prices, which in turn are driven by China’s growth cycle
Latin America: Export growth and commodity prices China growth cycle closely related to commodity demand
60 25 60
China IP
Export growth Commodity prices J.P. Morgan commodity price index (rhs)
50
40
40 20
30
20
20 15
10 0
0 10
-20
-10
-20 5
-40
-30
-40 0 -60
1999 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
RISKS TO MONITOR:
17
Indeed, China is among the top destinations for exports from Brazil, Chile and Peru,
with trade links between China and other Latin American countries also growing fast
2005 2009
23.1
15.8
13.2
10.9 11.4
7.9 7.5
7.1
RISKS TO MONITOR:
5.8
2.9
2.2
0.9 0.5 1.0 1.1
0.1
18
Resilient terms of trade are particularly important for Latin America because export
volume growth is relatively low and current account deficits will widen further in 2011
Latin America export volume behind other EM regions Latin America (ex Mex): current account is back in deficit
300 2
Latin America
Emerging Asia
1
Central and Eastern Europe
250
0
-1
200
-2
150
-3
-4
100
-5
50 -6
2000 2003 2006 2009 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
RISKS TO MONITOR:
19
The good news is that FDI will continue to finance current account deficits in 2011,
with the notable exception of Brazil where reliance on portfolio flows is increasing
CA balance FDI
CHINA GROWTH, EUROPE CONTAGION, AND FX INTERVENTION
20
Risk to monitor #2: Contagion from Europe: Latin America’s trade links with peripheral
Europe are highest with Spain but small overall; Spanish FDI is no longer as dominant
Latin America: exports to the EU and Spain Latin America trade balance with Spain
Stock of Spanish FDI in Latin America (% of total stock) Spanish FDI flows to Latin America (% of total flows)
40
5
5 10
20
0 0 0 0
1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
21
Large claims of Spanish banks in Latin America do not mean big outflow risks if bank
conditions in Europe deteriorate; Latin bank loans are mostly funded by local deposits
Claims of foreign banks in Latin America Latin America: credit profile (% of GDP)
Source: J.P. Morgan
Source: J.P. Morgan
RISKS TO MONITOR:
22
Risk to monitor #3: FX intervention: Growth, commodity prices and rate differentials
still support Latin FX and put pressure on policymakers to contain more appreciation
REER: Current versus 30-year average (except CEE3 12-year average and Peru since Jan 91)
24.2
21.0
17.8
15.2 14.0
13.3 13.2
10.2
7.0
4.3 3.5 3.2 3.1
1.6
-1.2 -3.1
-3.9
-5.9
-9.1 -9.8
-12.8
-21.4
-24.9
AUD BRL NOK NZD IDR CZK CHF INR COP ZAR CLP THB PLN HUF TRY PEN EUR JPY MXN PHP CAD MYR SEK GBP TWD KRW
23
Policymakers are trying to contain FX appreciation through aggressive intervention;
after Chile’s recent measures, the next country of market focus is Mexico
State of current FX regime, capital controls, and possible future intervention measures
Reserve Accumulation
CHINA GROWTH, EUROPE CONTAGION, AND FX INTERVENTION
11.9
Peru Non Convertible. Reserve Requirements USD purchases in the spot FX intervention should 11 33%
on foreign deposits (120%), 30% tax on market, increase in reserve remain high. Although tax
interest paid to non-residents. Limits on requirements on inflows from measures are unlikely, this
pension fund short USD positions abroad and sells PEN-linked possibility is still in the cards
USD CDs
24
Agenda
Country overview 32
25
Growth in the Central America and Caribbean (CAC) region fared better than the
Latin American average during the 2009 recession…
CENTRAL AMERICA & CARIBBEAN: CONSOLIDATING THE RECOVERY
26
… But the CAC region has underperformed during the recovery phase in 2010 and
will likely perform in line with the Latin American average in 2011
27
Regional inflation should remain broadly stable in the Caribbean and increase
moderately in Central America, but surging global food prices suggests upside risks
CENTRAL AMERICA & CARIBBEAN: CONSOLIDATING THE RECOVERY
28
Fiscal deficits in the CAC region should narrow in 2011 as countercyclical policies
are phased out and growth accelerates
CENTRAL AMERICA & CARIBBEAN: CONSOLIDATING THE RECOVERY
29
External public debt ratios will remain stable in 2011 as higher growth offsets
increased borrowing
CENTRAL AMERICA & CARIBBEAN: CONSOLIDATING THE RECOVERY
30
Increased external borrowing and FDI inflows should cover the CAC region’s
current account deficits, which will widen in 2011
CENTRAL AMERICA & CARIBBEAN: CONSOLIDATING THE RECOVERY
31
Agenda
Country overview 32
32
Brazil: Full 2010 GDP growth revised up to 7.7% (from 7.5%)
Brazil’s Central Bank has begun the tightening cycle with
liquidity and credit measures, following with an adjustment
in the policy interest rate. The reserve requirement ratios
on demand and time deposits have been increased, and
the capital requirements on household loans with
maturities above two years have also been lifted. It is hard
to evaluate exactly the final impact of the measures, but
they should contribute to the impact of the “traditional”
tightening cycle via reference rate increase.
After remaining on hold for six months, the COPOM
resumed its tightening cycle this week with a 50bp hike in
the Selic rate to 11.25%, as expected. The accompanying
statement stressed that this hike was designed to
contribute to the convergence of inflation to the targeted
trajectory, in tandem with the effects of macroprudential
measures (credit tightening measures). We understand
that the mention of the effects of macroprudential
measures in the statement sends a signal that further
credit tightening, rather than an acceleration in the pace of
rate hikes, may be announced if inflation dynamics
continue to deteriorate..
On the inflation front, the already high inflation level and
the combination of underlying pressures from above-trend
growth along with supply shocks derived from rising
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
The upsurge in tax collection with above-trend growth
has been offset by the strong pace of fiscal
expenditures. Even considering the strong
performance of the economy in the recent months,
expenditures have still been growing firmly, indicating
that the 3.1% target for the primary surplus will be
35
Brazil: BRL should be quite sensitive to portfolio flows and risk assets ebbs and flows
assumption for corporate external debt issuance
(150% of amortizations), the final result for net FX
inflows for this year will depend critically on short-term
capital inflows and the pace of Brazilian investment
abroad.
We think that strong capital inflows in the pipeline
should keep USD/BRL toward 1.70, but FX
intervention (amid existing concerns about BRL
overvaluation) should prevent significant appreciation
beyond that level. That said, we do not see the
government intervening in a way to push the spot to
levels close to or above 1.90.
The J.P. Morgan commodities group sees most
commodity prices roughly flat or slightly higher in
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
36
Brazil: A popular president elects his successor; eyes on the cabinet formation
37
Brazil: Economic projections
After a sharp and short recession, Brazil’s GDP will
grow at an above-trend pace of 7.5% in 2010. This
remarkable recovery is already resulting in inflationary
pressures, and we reckon that the initial monetary
tightening implemented in 2010 will be extended this
year.
The reduction in sovereign vulnerabilities opened room
for aggressive fiscal and monetary policy actions that
soothed last year’s liquidity squeeze, and provided an
important boost to final demand.
In response to local growth and the global recovery,
inflation accelerated in 2010, triggering tightening
policies, mainly on the monetary front.
In the long term, a more stable macro scenario and
lower rates should boost private sector investments
(with the development of capital markets) and
household consumption (with the expansion of credit to
consumers)
The lack of structural reforms reducing fiscal constraints
and enhancing private sector competitiveness remains
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
38
Mexico: A more promising scenario in the US has prompted us to rise our 2011
GDP growth forecast to 4.5%
39
Mexico: A reinvigorated auto industry will continue to be the main driver of
manufacturing activity
-20
Volkswagen 1Q10 1,000 Puebla
-30
Mazda 4Q10 500 --
-40 Volkswagen 4Q10 550 Guanajuato
Jan-05 Mar-06 May-07 Jul-08 Sep-09 Nov-10
Toyota 4Q10 150 Coahuila
Source: AMIA Source: J.P.Morgan
40
Mexico: The credit system could be a key driver for domestic consumption
Total commercial bank credit to the private sector Capitalization indices of major commercial banks
represents less than 15% of GDP Index
Banamex
Inbursa
Scotiabank
IXE
Santander
Banorte
Bancomer
Azteca
Afirme
up' their credit balances and employment conditions
HSBC
BBVA
have improved significantly over the past 12 months
We believe that it is highly likely that all these factors
Source: National banking Commission (CNVB), Oct. 2010
will probably lead to an ascending trend in the
country's domestic credit cycle
0 0
-20 -10 Housing credit
5
-20 Credit to firms
-40
-60 0 -30
Jan-00 Jun-10 Nov-10 Apr-10 Sep-10 Feb-10 Jul-10 Dec-10 Jan-07 Oct-07 Jul-08 Apr-09 Jan-10 Nov-10
Source: J.P.Morgan with data from Banxico Source: J.P.Morgan with data from Banxico
41
Mexico: We highlight three risks to our optimistic growth outlook
In our view, there are three important risks to our Elections in 2011
positive appraisal of Mexico’s growth in 2011: Governor Local Congress Date
2. More potentially negative issues emerging from the Baja California Sur X X 6-Feb
empower antitrust officials to dilute monopolies and México), we believe it is going to be difficult to secure
foster competitiveness. We strongly believe that the congressional approval for these key reforms that the
lack of these structural reforms is restraining country truly needs
domestic demand, and Mexico’s potential GDP
42
Mexico: The US Fed’s long pause, moderate inflation, and well-anchored inflation
expectations will keep Banxico on hold until 2Q12
All the indications are that global grain prices will remain Headline inflation
high throughout 2011. This is an important risk to our %oya
Banxico's inlfation target
inflation call for end-2011 of 3.7%oya 7.0
Forecasts
6.0
Nevertheless, well-anchored medium-term inflation
5.0
expectations (around 3.6%), and moderate wage increases
4.0
clearly support our 'low-for-long' monetary policy call, in
3.0
which we anticipate that the first hike will not take place
2.0
until 2Q12 (Consensus: 1Q12)
1.0
Jan-07 Jul-08 Jan-10 Jul-11
On the inflation front, we have observed an important
Source: J.P.Morgan with data from Banxico
structural change coming from two sources: ‘the Wal-Mart
effect’, and the ‘Viva Aerobus effect’
Inflation expectations and wages in Mexico
but have actually declined. We attribute this 'new' dynamic 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008 2010 2011
to Viva Aerobus, a somewhat newly created 'low-cost' Source: Banxico, Ministry of Labor, CONASAMI, and J.P.Morgan.
*The series was moved 1-year forward
airline that, in our view, has taken Mexicana’s bankruptcy
as a strategic opportunity to gain market share
43
Mexico: CPI calculation improvements could partially isolate inflation from
commodity price swings
Banxico has announced important modifications to the CPI goods and services components
methodology for calculating the CPI Contribution to 12-month headline inflation
7.0
We highlight that the central bank will publish the new
6.0
component weights for the new CPI on January 24
5.0
1.0
The new way to calculate housing prices could reduce the Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10
influence of commodity price swings in the new CPI Source: J.P.Morgan with data from Banxico
In this new framework, Banxico will calculate the use of Most important modifications to the CPI calculation
housing price inflation using rental prices, instead of input 1 Change of CPI base year to 2H-Dec 2010, from 2H-Jun 2002
prices (e.g. cement, copper, iron, etc.) 2 Use of INEGI’s income-expenditure survey (ENIGH) of 2008,
instead of the one conducted back in year 2000. This could have
On the other hand, we note that rental prices have a very important changes in the CPI weights as the income shares
assigned to different goods and services have changed in time
low variance compared to commodity prices. In Mexico, for 3 Some ‘specific items’ will be grouped as ‘generic items’ in order to
reduce any potential bias emerging from regional differences
example, rental prices are usually modified once a year by 4 Some ‘generic items’ will be ungrouped with ‘specific items’
landlords. As a result, this change could help inflation to be
5 Some items will be moved to other groups
less responsive to the recent rise in global commodity
6 Some groups will be renamed to become more transparent,
prices, and provides support to our current 3.7% inflation
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
44
Mexico: Still positive on the peso, we expect USD/MXN at 12.25 by year-end.
However, we believe it could trade at lower levels in the short-term
Major emerging currencies index
Market participants should continue to look to countries with
relatively positive growth potential and no fiscal problems Index Jan (2000 = 100) Mexican peso South Korean won
140 Peruvian sol Brazilian real
Colombian peso Southafrican rand
Healthy public finances, low rates for an extended period of 130
time worldwide, and the inclusion of Mbonos into the Citigroup’s 120
110
World Government Bond Index (WGBI), suggest that Mexico
100
should continue to benefit from foreign flows in 2011
90
80
In this context we expect USD/MXN at 12.25 by year, but we
70
believe it will trade stronger in the short-term
60
50
In our view, while the uncertainty on the US economy
40
‘punished’ the peso since the crisis started back in 2008, a Jan-00 Jan-02 Jan-04 Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10
more constructive growth scenario for the US with Mexico's
Source: Bloomberg and J.P.Morgan
prudent fiscal stance and healthy external accounts may
support the peso’s strength MXN net long positioning vis-à-vis the US dollar1
Going forward, the fact that other EM currencies have US$, billion
6
strengthened more than the peso vis-à-vis the US dollar, as
5
well as the US Fed’s QE2 and the market-friendlier FX stance
4
of the Mexican authorities, could continue to allow the Mexican 3
peso to gain ground 2
1
In this context, we believe USD/MXN could reach 11.50 by end- 0
2012 -1
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
-2
However, we acknowledge that the main risk to our call would -3
be a significant escalation in drug-related violence, as the Jan-00 Feb-02 Mar-04 Apr-06 May-08 Jun-10
USD/MXN market has proved very sensitive 1. Calculated using CME non-commercial positions
Source: J.P. Morgan with data from Bloomberg
45
Mexico: Economic projections
anchored inflation expectations will keep Banxico on hold
46
Argentina: After having peaked, growth remains strong and inflation is accelerating
again but the President’s positive image is recovered
47
Argentina: Trade surplus is still providing a solid cushion for the balance of payments;
ARS is the nominal anchor ahead of elections
48
Argentina: Fiscal accounts get cyclical uplift; Treasury relies on BCRA; liability
management may lag due to politics
49
Argentina: Economic projections
The economy has fully recovered to pre-global crisis levels. The slowing of
activity in 3Q was followed by a rebound in 4Q.
50
Chile: The economy is growing strong and the administration has the benefit of the
doubt from the business community
GDP growth should average 5.2% in 2010 and 6.0% in 2011.
Yet it is the high double-digit domestic demand boom that is the
most eye-catching. Activity will accelerate sharply to an 8-9% %change
pace on an over-year-ago basis in 1Q due to base effects from
the earthquake earlier this year.
Real retail sales
The backbone of the recovery is domestic: a substantial
monetary and fiscal stimulus. The earthquake reconstruction
effort will further boost domestic demand for non-tradable goods.
Mood among businesses picked up visibly as president Pieras
pro-growth agenda raises expectations. In fact, the positive mood Activity
persisted despite the earthquake.
Mood among consumers has been affected negatively by the
earthquake but is now fully recovered, although some slippage
ocurred a the end of 2010. Tightening labor markets and benign
inflation have helped support a recovery in household confidence
yet inflation could pick up more visibly ahead.
Pieras original plans were to provide macroeconomic
incentives for investment (accelerated amortization) and level
reinvestment (shifting of income tax to distributed, rather than
Consumer confidence Business confidence
accrued, profits) as well as microeconomic incentives for raising
efficiency in the public (reorganizing state companies) and
private sector (environmental and labor reforms). The
administration, however, does not have a majority in Congress.
Fiscal policy will make room for reconstruction spending but will
Earthquake
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
51
Chile: Inflation remains within the target band but in 2011, but in the aftermath of FX
intervention, inflation risks are rising and BCCh may not meet its target
developments.
We expect that BCCh will continue tightening The forecast sees a
3.75% policy rate by 1Q11, 4.5% by 2Q11, 6.0% by 3Q11 and
6.5% by 4Q11.
52
Chile: Economic projections
GDP growth should average 5.2% in 2010 (with downside risk
given weak October) and 6.0% in 2011. Yet it is the high double-
digit domestic demand boom that is the most eye-catching. The
acceleration of activity can be partly attributed to the temporary
boost from post-earthquake spending but business and
household confidence is strong and notwithstanding a
deceleration, demand should remain strong.
Fiscal policy will make room for reconstruction spending but will
shift to a tightening bias earlier than expected as the government
redefines the fiscal rule and targets narrowing the structural
deficit
Inflation has remained benign but in 2011 domestic and external
factors risk pushing CPI to 5.5% (above the 3% target).
BCCh’s intervention in the FX market and the “tactical” rate
pause in the january policy meeting highlight the challenge that
multiple objectives could present for BCCh if inflation does
accelerate as forecasted. BCCh can calibrate FX intervention
through adjustments to daily purchases even as the annual
target is fixed at $12 billion reserve accumulation.
Given the updated CPI inflation forecast, we expect that BCCh
will continue tightening to 6.5% by end 2010 and the peso to
appreciate to 455. This scenario prompted a revision to 2012
growth to 4.5%
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
53
Colombia: Mixed messages from activity readings, but growth should regain
traction in 2011
GDP growth came in at an underwhelming 3.6%oya pace in 3Q10,
with the drag coming largely from a -10.5%oya performance in
construction due to a fall in public works.
Supply-side data suggest that manufacturing remains subdued,
while domestic demand gains momentum. The gradual recovery in
employment, credit expansion and improving consumer confidence
have been supporting a strong expansion in retail sales. In the
opposite direction, industrial production growth continues to fade
(first chart).. Our assessment is that the increasing perception of
“high” inventories along with the strong COP in 3Q and the start of
4Q have hurt the manufacturing sector, despite relatively high
business confidence.
The weak 3Q10 result prompted us to change the full-year 2010
growth forecast to 4.0% (from 4.3%). Public investment should not
improve much in 4Q, even though it will likely be less of a drag
compared to 3Q. At the same time we should continue to see the
retail sector flourishing and IP underperforming.
We maintain our 4.5% growth forecast for 2011. Recent floods
should drive higher public investments in 1Q11, while the inventory
cycle and some modest recovery of exports to Venezuela could
help boost the manufacturing sector in 1H11. Finally, we expect
private consumption to remain supported by a gradual
improvement in the labor market and credit expansion
(underpinned by loose monetary policy). Therefore it remains
reasonable to expect some reacceleration in activity next year.
54
Colombia: BanRep on hold during 1Q11, but will likely hike rates in 2Q11
Colombian domestic demand has been rebounding in recent
quarters, while both inflation and inflation expectations had—until
December—been subdued. Despite end-year food price
pressure, core inflation remains contained and economic activity
is showing some mixed signals (namely, lagging manufacturing
activity). This should lead BanRep to keep the policy rate at its
current (admittedly stimulative) level over the near term.
55
Colombia: Should get the Investment Grade stamp this year
Reforms point to a better fiscal outlook, but Congress may still
water down key projects. The Santos administration has
presented a full plate of inter-related fiscal reforms to Congress,
including constitutional reforms to the royalties system and to
elevate fiscal stability to a constitutional right (on par with health
care); a fiscal rule proposal; and a so-called “mini-fiscal reform”
to reduce tax exemptions and eliminate loopholes. The originally
stated goal of the fiscal rule would be to reduce Colombia’s
central government debt from 39.4% of GDP in 2010 to 28.4% in
2015 via a very gradual move toward a primary surplus by the
end of Santos’ term.
The reform of laws governing energy/mining sector royalties
intends to better channel and manage the expected boom in the
coming years, including the creation of a centrally managed
counter-cyclical stabilization fund. The constitutional reforms
passed both houses of Congress in the 2H10 legislative session,
and now, as required under Colombian law, must be taken up
again in the 1H11 session. Royalties reform has good
momentum but could face further watering down, as local
interests push back against centralized control of the windfall.
The constitutional reform on fiscal stability is more controversial
and could face stepped up opposition. Overall, many crucial
details are set to be defined this year.
All three major rating agencies have Colombia’s rating one notch
below Investment Grade, with a positive outlook. The approval
and implementation of fiscal reforms may be a catalyst of rating
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
56
Colombia: Government has been fighting COP gains, but oil boom helps keep
external accounts robust
The constitution tilted the balance of power toward the executive; the
concern is that Ecuador is following a familiar illiberal model that has
undermined checks and balances and left institutions highly politicized
Public investment and popular social initiatives have helped keep a
floor under Correa’s approval ratings. Indeed, despite some erosion,
no Ecuadorean president in recent memory has had popularity this
resilient this far into his mandate
Correas popularity has declined in 2010 given corruption scandals,
tensions with specific social groups (teachers, indigenous,
environmentalists), and most importantly a sluggish economy.
The police mutiny of September 2010 (characterized by Correa as a
coup attempt) puts traditional Ecuadorean political turbulence back
in the spotlight. The confrontation with rebel police units, who had
rejected benefit cuts in the context of a larger civil service reform, was
the first major institutional challenge of Ecuadors new constitution
Correa survived the episode thanks to loyalists in the armed forces,
and his popularity even improved. But the presidents confrontational
style and relentless drive to take on what he perceives to be overly
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
58
Ecuador: Current account is deteriorating, but dollarization supported by
reserves, China lending
The political commitment to dollarization seems strong but depends on
oil-generated current account surpluses or foreign lending. Structural
weaknesses in the balance of payments (ie an increasingly large non-oil
trade deficit) are exacerbated by loose fiscal policy.
The 2011 budget reveals an aggressive fiscal stance. The budget’s large
outlays for public investment and growing current expenditure leave
US$5.4 bon (9.5% of GDP) of financing needs—US$3.7 bn deficit plus
another US$1.6 bn of amortizations. US$1.1 bn of this would be raised
domestically while US$3.9 bn would be multilateral and bilateral lending.
Ecuador has also signed more than US$3.6 bn of lending deals since
2009 with China, which are paid with flows of crude. In 2010 these
include a US$1.7 bn loan for a large hydroelectric project, and a 4-year
US$1 bn loan to the Finance Ministry.
The government also continues to tap the liquidity in the public sector,
mainly from the state social security institute (IESS). This practice
impacts CB “reserves”, which are actually assets of the Treasury, local
governments, the IESS, and the private banking system.
All told, Ecuador’s lack of market access will constrain the ability to run $m n
such large deficits. Correa has stated in recent interviews that Ecuador
could look to return to international bond markets, but lingering ill-will
from the 2009 default makes this unlikely in the short term.
The trade deficit, which was almost zero at the end of 1H10, has swung
into a US$1.1 billion deficit during 3Q. Imports are soaring, with growth in
non-oil imports accelerating from a 22%oya growth pace in 1H10 to
44%oya in 3Q10. Exports are not keeping up with imports’ torrid pace.
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
60
Peru: Elections dominates the political landscape, but risks seem subdued
The first round of presidential elections will take place on April
10, 2011, with a likely second round taking place on June 5
The early frontrunners in electoral polls (Keiko Fujimori, Luis
Castañeda and ex-President Toledo) are unlikely to make
meaningful changes to Peru’s market-oriented
macroeconomic policy. Moreover, even if nationalist candidate
Humala (currently with 10-12% in the polls) does make it to a
second round, he has been trying to distance himself from
Chavez-style policies, highlighting instead that he would
respect private property, preserve the independence of the
BCRP, not pursue expropriations, not seek reelection, etc.
Other candidates to watch include former finance minister
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, who joined ranks with prominent
political leaders of northern Peru, as well as a candidate from
the center-left Fuerza Social party of the newly elected mayor
of Lima Susana Villaran. At this point, however, they seem
unlikely to make it to a second round.
51 55 51
We recognize that polling trends can still change dramatically Castaneda
in the months ahead, but at this point we see a relatively low 38
risk of exaggerated political noise around the 2011 vote. Toledo
31 32
61
Peru: BCRP took a “preventive” 25bp hike; policy rate to reach 4.5% by year-end
62
Peru: PEN should strengthen amid low volatility; further rating upgrades likely
63
Venezuela: Politics have become more competitive—and thus will be even
noisier than usual heading toward 2012 presidential elections
Polls now show Chavezs popularity below 50%, and most
pollsters show the public remains skeptical of radicalization.
64
Venezuela: Despite operational concerns, oil price rebound provides oxygen and
Orinoco reopening provides a long-term anchor
Oil accounts for over 90% of exports and half of government revenues
into the governments budget (though in practice more cash may be
flowing into parallel budget structures).
66
Venezuela: Growth should turn modestly positive in 2011 after two years of recession,
but capital flight remains a drag on GDP and the BoP
Venezuela was the last and the slowest country in Latin America to exit
recession. A return to the double-digit growth pace seen earlier in the
decade is unlikely. Loose fiscal and monetary policies are no longer
getting much traction, given stubbornly high inflation (close to 30%),
ongoing supply side constraints from restrictive price controls and the
FX regime, and a prevailing environment of private sector fear and
uncertainty stemming from the government’s ongoing nationalization
campaign.
GDP fell 0.4%oya in 3Q10. This was the sixth consecutive quarter
posting an oya decline, but a smaller contraction than the 3.5%oya fall
in 1H10.
Domestic demand is rebounding—4.1%oya in 3Q was the first positive
print since 1Q09—led by public sector consumption (+3.4%oya) and
investment (+4.4%oya). However, private consumption remains
depressed and net exports have swung from a cushion to GDP to a
drag as export volumes stagnate and imports recover.
With the release of the 3Q data, we have tweaked our 2010 outlook to a
1.5% decline in GDP (from -2.2% previously and compared to the
BCV’s preview of -1.9%). Our 2011 GDP forecast stands at 1.5%
meager increase. Supply side bottlenecks and loose monetary policy
leave inflation entrenched at close to 30% despite the recession
We expect a full-year US$15 billion current account surplus in 2010, or
some 7.5% of GDP. Our 9.5% of GDP surplus forecast for 2011
depends on J.P. Morgan’s positive scenario for oil prices (over $90/bbl)
Current account surpluses have been more than consumed by capital
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
account deficits. Unlike the 2006-08 period, when the government was
exporting capital on a net basis to off-budget funds, the capital account
deficit is now a story of private sector capital flight financed by a
deterioration of the sovereign balance sheet.
67
Uruguay: Consolidating its fundamental outperformance
Real GDP continues to exceed expectations and post impressive numbers, with
growth reaching 8.8%oya in January-September 2010 supported by all economic
sectors. Based on the latest trends, we have raised our real GDP growth forecast to 0.0
8.5% for 2010, a level that would mark a significant improvement on last year’s 0.0
2.9%, and to 6.2% for 2011
-0.5
-0.5 -0.5
Consumer prices rose 0.5%m/m in December, matching the level posted a year
earlier, causing annual inflation to remain unchanged at 6.9% from November. Our -0.7
-0.8
current forecast calls for inflation to moderate to 6.5% in 2011, an improvement on -1.0
last year, but not enough to meet the official 5% (+/-1%) target
The unemployment rate fell to a record low 6.1% in November from 6.2% in October -1.5
-1.5
and 7.0% a year earlier. While the decline in November was driven largely by
-1.7
improved labor market conditions in Montevideo, it is in the interior regions of the
-2.0 -1.9
country where the improvement has been more pronounced. We view the steady 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009E 2010F 2011F
decline in unemployment as a testament to the strength of the economy
Sources: MEF, J.P. Morgan
The consolidated fiscal deficit for the 12 months through November came in at 1.1%
of GDP (US$449 million), lower than the 1.3% of GDP shortfall posted in October. Uruguay 2008 2009 2010F 2011F
As both the economy and fiscal revenues expanded and the government returned to
a neutral fiscal stance after absorbing extraordinary one-off expenses related to a Nominal GDP (US$MM) 31,199 31,553 40,050 43,728
severe drought, we believe the fiscal deficit likely moderated to around 0.8% of GDP Real GDP (% change) 8.5 2.9 8.5 6.2
in full 2010. We expect positive economic and fiscal momentum to underpin a
Inflation (% change y/y) 9.2 5.9 6.9 6.5
further decline in the deficit to 0.5% of GDP in 2011
FX Rate (Pesos/US$, eop) 24.4 19.6 20.1 20.4
The trade deficit narrowed 0.7%oya in the first ten months of 2010, underpinned by
a 23.4%oya surge in exports and an 18.6%oya increase in imports. Exports totaled Fiscal Balance (% GDP) -1.5 -1.7 -0.8 -0.5
US$5.56 billion, and imports amounted to US$6.67 billion between January and Trade Balance (US$MM) -3,128 -1,521 -1,491 -2,750
October, resulting in a trade deficit of US$1.11 billion, down from a US$1.12 billion
shortfall during the corresponding period of 2009. While we expect a 2%y/y Current Account (US$MM) -1,486 215 175 -850
narrowing to US$1.49 billion (3.7% of GDP) in last year’s trade deficit to contribute Current Account /GDP (%) -4.8 0.7 0.4 -1.9
to a 0.4% of GDP full-2010 current account surplus, we believe this year's trade
shortfall will almost double to US$2.75 billion (6.3% of GDP), contributing to a 1.9% Pub. Sec. Ext. Debt (% GDP) 34.4 40.5 32.7 30.5
of GDP current account deficit in 2011
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
Bolstered by a 14.9%oya rise to 1.7 million in tourist arrivals, tourism revenues Pub. Sec. Total Debt (% GDP) 53.0 69.4 57.4 53.6
surged 15.2%oya to US$1.1 billion during the first nine months of 2010. The year-
Net Int. Reserves (US$MM) 6,360 7,987 7,650 7,875
to-date totals put the tourism sector on track to extend the favorable performance it
registered in 2009, when tourist arrivals climbed 5%y/y to 2.1 million and tourism
Sources: MEF, BCU, J.P. Morgan
earnings jumped 26% to US$1.3 billion.
68
Dominican Republic: Outlook improves
Fitch on January 5 revised the outlook on DomRep’s B rating to positive from stable.
The revision was prompted by three factors: (1) the economy’s resilience during the
global financial crisis, which was supported by a Stand-by Arrangement with the IMF,
12 10.7
(2) improving export prospects, and (3) structural improvements in public debt
management. Following the favorable rating action, DomRep now has positive 10 9.3
outlooks from Fitch and S&P, both of which have a B rating on the country, one notch 8.5
7.8
lower than Moody’s B1 (stable outlook). Given DomRep’s recent fundamental 8
outperformance, like Fitch, we too view the country as an improving credit story 6.0
6 5.3
Real GDP grew by a higher-than-expected 7.8% in 2010. While all major sectors of 3.5
the economy registered positive growth last year, the strongest performance was 4
posted by the commerce (+12.1%y/y), financial services (+11.3%y/y), local
manufacturing (+8.6%y/y), and communications (+8.4%y/y) categories. Positive
2
momentum and an improvement in the external environment should enable the
0
Dominican economy to expand by a robust 6%y/y in 2011
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010F 2011F
Tourism revenues surged US$188 million (4.6%y/y) to US$4.24 billion in 2010,
registering a significant improvement on the US$115 million (2.8%y/y) contraction to
US$4.06 billion they posted in 2009. Last year’s increase in earnings was supported
Dominican Republic 2008 2009 2010F 2011F
by a recovery in foreign tourist arrivals, which rose 3.3%oya through November after
falling 0.9%y/y to 3.42 million in 2009. Official estimates call for growth in travel Nominal GDP (US$MM) 45,718 46,712 51,900 55,800
receipts to strengthen in 2011, boosting them to US$4.54 billion, up 7.1%y/y
Real GDP (% change) 5.3 3.5 7.8 6.0
Remittances shrank 2.8% (US$85 million) to US$2.96 billion in 2010 from US$3.04 Inflation (% change y/y) 4.5 5.8 6.2 6.0
billion in 2009. The deterioration was driven primarily by declines in the second FX Rate (Pesos/US$) 35.4 36.1 37.6 38.9
(-6.2%oya) and third (-8.1%oya) quarters, with figures for the first quarter showing a
Fiscal Balance (% GDP)* -4.4 -4.5 -3.8 -3.0
negligible 0.1%oya drop and the final tally for the fourth quarter likely to show a
3.3%oya expansion. Based on recent trends, we expect remittances to increase Trade Balance (US$MM) -9,245 -6,741 -8,191 -8,220
5.0%y/y to US$3.07 billion this year Current Account (US$MM) -4,519 -2,159 -3,865 -3,542
Foreign direct investment (FDI) fell 26.0% to US$1.53 billion (2.9 of GDP) in 2010 Current Account /GDP (%) -9.9 -4.6 -7.4 -6.3
from US$2.07 billion (4.4% of GDP) in 2009, when inflows had already contracted Pub. Sec. Ext. Debt (% GDP)* 15.8 17.6 18.2 17.9
28%y/y. The government expects FDI to surge 30%y/y to US$1.99 billion (3.6% of
Pub. Sec. Dom. Debt (% GDP)* 20.0 22.3 21.2 20.1
projected GDP) in 2011
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
*Consolidated public sector deficit. **NIR. Sources: Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, J.P. Morgan
69
El Salvador: Recovering slowly but surely
The central bank’s monthly index of economic activity (IVAE) rose 2.5%oya (sa) in
October, bouncing back significantly from the 5.8%oya (sa) decline it posted a year
earlier. The latest monthly reading took the 12-month moving average to 0.4%oya,
up from -0.3%oya in September. Real GDP shrank 3.5% in 2009, in line with our 4.2 4.3
5
forecast. Hopeful that a US recovery will provide a boost to the domestic economy, 3.3
4
the government expects real GDP to expand 1% in 2010 and 2.5% in 2011, higher 2.4
3
than our projections of 0.5% and 1.8%, respectively 1.8
2
1 0.5
A 0.1%m/m fall in the December CPI, compared with a 0.4%m/m contraction a year
earlier, led annual inflation to rise to 2.1% from 1.8% in November. Boosted by a 0
recovery, albeit modest, in domestic demand, the full 2010 reading was higher than -1
2009’s -0.2% annual print, yet still lower than the official 2.5-3.5% projection. We -2
expect annual inflation to remain relatively low (~2.8%) in 2011, owing largely to -3
below-potential real GDP growth (~1.8%) and anticipated USD strength in the near -4
-3.5
term -5
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010F 2011F
The deficit of the non-financial public sector (NFPS) narrowed 25.9% to US$673
million (3.1% of GDP) during the first eleven months of 2010 from US$909 million
(4.3% of GDP) a year earlier. The NFPS deficit climbed to 5.6% of GDP in 2009 from
3.1% of GDP in 2008 amid the global financial crisis. The Funes administration El Salvador 2008 2009 2010F 2011F
believes the fiscal shortfall likely declined to 4.8% of GDP last year supported by a
recovery in economic activity (which contracted 3.5%y/y in 2009) and tax revenues Nominal GDP (US$MM) 22,107 21,101 21,796 22,953
(which shrank 9.6%y/y in 2009), and expects it to fall to 3.5% of GDP in 2011
Real GDP (% change) 2.4 -3.5 0.5 1.8
Remittances rose 4.0% to US$273 million in November from US$263 million a year Inflation (% change y/y) 5.5 -0.2 2.1 2.8
earlier, boosting the tally for the first eleven months of 2010 to US$3.2 billion, 2.3%
FX Rate (US$/US$) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
higher than during the corresponding period of 2009. Remittances totaled US$3.47
billion in 2009, posting an 8.5%y/y decrease, compared with a 2.5%y/y increase in Fiscal Balance (% GDP) -3.1 -5.6 -4.8 -3.5
2008. Prompted by a recovery in economic activity in the US, where an estimated Trade Balance (US$MM) -5,205 -3,457 -4,011 -4,667
2.5 million Salvadorans reside, we project remittances to increase 2.5%y/y to
Current Account (US$MM) -1,682 -374 -605 -710
US$3.55 billion in 2010 and by a further 4.5%y/y to US$3.71 billion in 2011
Current Account/GDP (%) -7.6 -1.8 -2.8 -3.1
The trade deficit widened 17.3%oya during the first eleven months of 2010,
Pub. Sec. Ext. Debt (% GDP)* 26.4 31.0 31.7 31.6
underpinned by a 16.9%oya rise in exports and a 17.1%oya increase in imports. The
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
trade deficit shrank 33.6%y/y to US$3.5 billion (16.4% of GDP) in 2009, as a Pub. Sec. Dom. Debt (% GDP)* 17.6 21.9 22.5 22.4
25.6%y/y plunge in imports outweighed a 16.5%y/y decrease in exports. As a
Total Pub. Sec. Debt (% GDP)* 44.0 53.0 54.1 54.0
recovery in global and domestic demand boosts both exports and imports, we expect
the trade deficit to increase 16.0%y/y to US$4.0 billion (18.4% of GDP) in 2010 and Foreign Reserves (US$MM) 2,541 2,985 2,815 2,935
by an additional 16.4%y/y to US$4.7 billion (20.3% of GDP) in 2011 *NFPS. Sources: BCR, MinFin, EIU, J.P. Morgan
70
Jamaica: IMF program still on track
Real GDP contracted 1.3%oya through September 2010 owing to the slow
pace of global recovery and a drop in activity due to the security operations
in Kingston in 2Q10. We believe the economy contracted again in the
Real GDP CPI
fourth quarter mostly due to the damage caused by the recent tropical 5 20
3.5 3.0 1.4
storms, resulting in a full-year contraction of 1-1.5%, marking the third
3 1.4
consecutive year of recession. A recovery in remittances, which would 1.1 1.0 15
boost private consumption, and a rebound in the mining and tourism 1
10
sectors should aid growth in 2011. However, we expect growth to be -1
lackluster and project weak positive growth of 1.0% in 2011 owing to the -0.9
-3 -1.0 5
still gradual global recovery and the IMF-mandated austerity measures
-3.0
-5 0
Fiscal consolidation may be challenging in 2011. The central government
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010F 2011F
posted a deficit of US$585 million, or 4.3% of GDP, through the first eight
months of FY10/11. Fiscal accounts have outperformed in recent months,
mostly on the back of expenditure restraint, but the recent tropical storms
and the still-weak economy suggest that this outperformance is unlikely to
last. After posting a deficit of 10.8% in FY09/10 and an expected 7.5% in
FY10/11, we expect the deficit to narrow further, to 5.5% of GDP, in
FY11/12. Our estimates are higher than what is programmed in the IMF
SBA given our less optimistic growth forecasts
Overall Fiscal B alance (FY)
Jamaica comfortably met its third set of quarterly targets under the IMF Current A cco unt B alance
program at the end of November, but the risk of noncompliance in 2011, -2.0
especially with fiscal targets, is rising given the costs related to storm -3.3
-6.0 -4.3-5.0
damage, weak tax collections and potential inability to implement public -5.2 -5.5 -5.5 -5.5
-6.4
sector job cuts. Program disbursements so far amount to US$838 million, -10.0 -6.9-8.1 -6.8
-7.2-7.5
or 66% of the total loan. The next disbursement of US$200 million, in -9.6 -9.9
-14.0 -10.8
February 2011, will be based on end-December targets
-18.0 -15.7
The CAD will likely widen in 2011, in line with rising import demand. We
-22.0 -20.0
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
expect the CAD to narrow from US$912 million (7.2% of GDP) in 2009 to
US$725 million (5.5% of GDP) in 2010 but to widen to US$930 million 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011F
(6.4% of GDP) in 2011 as oil prices remain high and exports weak on
sluggish external demand
71
Panama: Shining bright
Seasonally-adjusted growth in the monthly index of economic activity (IMAE) came
in at 7.0%oya in October, a considerable improvement on the modest 0.5%oya
expansion it posted a year earlier. Real GDP growth averaged 9.1% between 2004
6.0
and 2008 and while it slowed to 3.2% in 2009 amid the global recession, the
government estimates that the economy expanded more than 7% in 2010 bolstered 3.5
4.0
by the ongoing expansion of the Canal and an ambitious public investment
program. We expect positive momentum to underpin growth of 6.3% in 2011 2.0 0.5 0.5
0.4 0.0
The non-financial public sector (NFPS) deficit came in at 1.8% of GDP (US$489 0.0
million) in January-September 2010, down from 2.4% (US$575 million) during the
first nine months of 2009. We believe that higher revenues (including sizeable year- -2.0 -1.1
end public transfers) and tight expenditure controls will enable the Martinelli
administration to deliver a balanced result for full 2010, which we expect to become -4.0 -3.2
a small surplus (0.5% of GDP) in 2011 -6.0
A 6.6%oya increase in cargo tonnage traveling through the Canal drove toll 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010F 2011F
revenues to expand 6.8%oya in October to US$144 million. October’s favorable
performance took the toll tally for the first ten months of 2010 to US$1.24 billion,
2.1% higher than in the same period of 2009. Toll revenues totaled US$1.47 billion
in 2009, posting a 7.9% improvement on 2008. Increased canal traffic, which
Panama 2008 2009 2010F 2011F
according to ACP estimates may grow 1.5%y/y in 2011 as global trade recovers,
and higher toll rates should boost revenues going forward. The government
Nominal GDP (US$MM) 23,184 24,349 26,541 29,062
expects to receive US$839 million (2.9% of GDP) in transfers from the ACP in 2011
Real GDP (% change) 10.1 3.2 7.2 6.3
Tourist arrivals rose 4.4%oya to 134,000 in October, taking the total number of
Inflation (% change eop) 6.8 1.9 4.9 4.5
visitors for the first ten months of 2010 to 1.35 million, or 10.1%oya higher than a
year earlier. Bolstered by a significant increase in arrivals for the month, tourism FX Rate (Balboas/US$) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
revenues rose 9.7%oya to US$141 million in October, taking the year-to-date tally Fiscal Balance (% GDP)* 0.4 -1.1 0.0 0.5
to US$1.37 billion, or 14.2% higher than in January-October 2009. While the
Trade Balance (US$MM) -4,546 -2,123 -4,750 -4,350
number of visitors fell 0.8%y/y in 2009 to 1.56 million, tourism earnings increased to
a record US$1.48 billion last year, 5.3% higher than the year before. Based on Current Account (US$MM) -2,722 -44 -3,125 -2,275
recent trends, we expect the number of foreign visitors to increase ~10%y/y in Current Account /GDP (%) -11.7 -0.2 -11.8 -7.8
2010, boosting tourism revenues by 13.5%y/y to US$1.7 billion
Pub. Sec. Ext. Debt (% GDP) 36.6 41.7 38.4 36.5
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
*NFPS. Sources: Comptroller General's Office, Ministry of Economy and Finance, J.P. Morgan
72
Latin America economic forecasts
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
73
Latin America economic forecasts (cont.)
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
74
Disclosures
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COUNTRY OVERVIEW
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75
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COUNTRY OVERVIEW
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