Solar Power Satellites Negative

Solar Power Satellites Georgia
Negative Novice Packet

Index
Index............................................................................................................................................................................................................1
Aerospace frontline......................................................................................................................................................................................2
Aerospace frontline......................................................................................................................................................................................3
Aerospace – ext 1 – ITAR............................................................................................................................................................................4
Aerospace – ext 2 – EU subsidies................................................................................................................................................................5
Aerospace – ext 3 – workforce crisis...........................................................................................................................................................6
Aerospace – ext 5 – trade barriers................................................................................................................................................................7
Hegemony doesn’t stop war.........................................................................................................................................................................8
China frontline.............................................................................................................................................................................................9
China frontline...........................................................................................................................................................................................10
China frontline...........................................................................................................................................................................................11
China – ext 2 – won’t happen....................................................................................................................................................................12
China – ext 3 – military would survive......................................................................................................................................................13
Solvency frontline......................................................................................................................................................................................14
Solvency frontline......................................................................................................................................................................................15
Solvency – ext 1 – lack of launch..............................................................................................................................................................16
Solvency – ext 2 – backlash.......................................................................................................................................................................17
Solvency – ext 2 – backlash.......................................................................................................................................................................18
Solvency – ext 3 – tech barriers.................................................................................................................................................................19
Solvency – ext 3 – tech barriers.................................................................................................................................................................20
Solvency – ext 3 – years away...................................................................................................................................................................21
1
Aerospace frontline
1. ITAR blocks U.S. space competitiveness and SSP development
NSSO, 7 (National Security Space Office, Report to the Director, “Space-Based Solar Power As an Opportunity for Strategic
Security; Phase 0 Architecture Feasibility Study” October 10, 2007, http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/final-sbsp-interim-
assessment-release-01.pdf)
FINDING: The SBSP Study Group found in order to successfully address major world problems in energy,
environmental and national security, the U.S. needs to identify and then reduce or eliminate all
unnecessary barriers to effective international cooperation on, and private industry investment in, the
development of SBSP. Regardless of the form of international cooperation, Space‐Based Solar Power
will require modification or special treatment under International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
• Partnerships between U.S. and foreign corporations are often much easier to create and
implement than government to government level partnerships, and more effective when the
purpose is fostering economically affordable goods and services.
• Application of the International Traffic Arms Regulations (ITAR) may constitute a major barrier
to effective partnerships in SBSP and negatively impact national security. Right now ITAR
greatly restricts and complicates all space‐related business, as it treats all launch and satellite
technologies as arms. This has had the effect of causing America’s competitors to develop
ITAR‐free products, and had a negative impact on our domestic space industries, which can no
longer compete on level ground. Many participants in the feasibility study were very vocal that
including satellite and launch technology in ITAR has had a counterproductive and detrimental
effect on the U.S.’s national security and competitiveness—losing control and market share,
and closing our eyes and ears to the innovations of the competition while selling ourselves on a
national illusion of unassailable space superiority. Effective collaboration, even with allies on
something of this level, could not take place effectively without some special consideration or
modification.
o Recommendation: The SBSP Study Group recommends the early inclusion of global
corporations from America’s allies as partners in the development of this new strategic
energy resource. U.S. corporations should be encouraged to develop partnerships with
foreign‐owned corporations of America’s closest and most‐trusted allies. In order to
achieve this objective, U.S. industry should be exempt from ITAR when working with our
closest and most‐trusted allies on SBSP systems. U.S. government funded SBSP
technology maturation efforts should not include “buy America” clauses prohibiting
participation of foreign companies as suppliers to U.S. bidders.
2. European subsidies kill U.S. aerospace competitiveness

Walker et al, 02 - Chair of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners (Robert, Final
Report of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners, November,
http://www.trade.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf)
Foreign government subsidies directly affect the competitiveness of our companies. Subsidized primemanufacturers as well as
suppliers are able to under- cut prices offered by their U.S. competitors, and are better able to weather market downturns.
Subsidized companies are able to secure cheaper commercial financing since their governments share the risk associated with
bringing new products to market. Subsidized production skews the market itself by flooding it with products that are not
commercially viable. Governments providing the subsidies also apply political pressure on customers in an effort to facilitate a
positive return on the governments’ “investments”. In many cases, these government subsidies stifle competition and often slow
the introduc- tion of new technology into the market.
European funding has had the most dramatic impact on U.S. competitiveness because European products directly compete with
U.S. products in most sectors. This problem will be compounded as other governments fund new competitors that will seek to
enter an already saturated market. If we maintain the status quo, U.S. industry will be left to compete against companies that
don’t play by the same rules.
2
Aerospace frontline
3. Workforce crisis will destroy aerospace
Clearly, there is a major workforce crisis in the aero-space industry. Our nation has lost over 600,000 scientific and technical
aerospace jobs in the past 13 years. These layoffs initially began as a result of reduced defense spending following the conclusion
of the Cold War. This led to an industry shift from reliance on defense sales to one dependent upon commercial markets.
Increasing foreign competition in the commercial aerospace market has led to con- tractions in the industry, resulting in mergers
and acquisitions. Job losses from this consolidation have been compounded by the cyclical nature of the industry.
Due to these uncertainties, most of the workers who have lost their jobs are unlikely to return to the industry. These losses, coupled
with pending retire- ments, represent a devastating loss of skill, experi- ence, and intellectual capital to the industry.
4. Agency confusion prevents federal aerospace leadership

The government is not organized to define national aerospace priorities, develop federal aerospace sector plans and budgets,
manage programs that cross multiple departments and agencies, or foster a healthy aerospace sector in a global economy. As
described earlier, no single federal organization is responsible for identifying the appropriate role of aerospace in the context of the
nation’s transportation system and other national needs, including homeland and international security, air transportation, and
space exploitation and exploration. No organization is responsible for defining national aerospace priorities or addressing all of
the factors that will influence national aerospace policy across all stake- holders and all dimensions—international, national and
governmental.
The federal government is organized vertically while national aerospace challenges are becoming more horizontal in nature.
Legacy structures and processes, which were effective in the past, are fundamentally incapable of addressing the system-of-
systems level challenges facing the nation today. These structures and processes simply must be modified and/or replaced by
integrated, crosscutting structures to achieve our goals.
The ability of the United States to compete both militarily and economically requires a government that speaks coherently, can
focus its collective capabilities on national issues, such as terrorism and air transportation, and can respond quickly and flexibly
to rapidly changing global trends. It requires a government that is structured and has the appropriate incentives to provide
system-of-systems solutions to problems that transcend all levels of government, industry, labor and academia and national and
international boundaries.
5. Trade barriers will cripple aerospace

Open global markets are critical to the continued economic health of U.S. aerospace companies and to U.S. national security.
International markets help U.S. companies to grow by providing a broad cus- tomer base. The 2001 U.S. aerospace trade surplus
was nearly $32 billion, the largest surplus of any U.S. manufacturing sector. Over half of all U.S.-manufactured large civil
aircraft are sold to non-U.S. customers, and foreign airlines represent the largestmarket growth prospects for the next 20 years.1
Twenty-five percent of general aviation airplanesproduced in the United States are sold to overseascustomers.2 Overall, exports
consistently account foraround one third of total U.S. aerospace production.
3
Aerospace – ext 1 – ITAR
ITAR restrictions kill aerospace
Sadeh, 08 - an Associate Director for the Center for Space and Defense Studies at the United States Air Force Academy (Eligar,
The Space Review, “Space policy questions and decisions facing a new administration”, 6/9,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1146/1)
The United States government’s approach to export control of commercial space technologies places political, legal, and
bureaucratic restrictions on the aerospace industry in the United States. These restrictions posit a cost to the United States satellite
industry and the space industrial base.
Discussion
•Export controls of commercial space technologies are governed through the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR),
which is administered by the Department of State. These Regulations prevent international partnerships in commercial space by
making it more difficult and bureaucratic to implement.
•As a result of ITAR, domestic manufacturing capabilities for vital space-related hardware and components are reduced. The
regulations, in contrast to the intended goal of retaining preeminence for the United States in the aerospace and defense fields,
brings about the opposite effect.
•The United States has fallen behind and has lost leadership status in global space commerce competition due to its export control
regime.
•Export controls are an impediment to United States competition in the international marketplace. International competition in
space commerce is stiff and growing, and ITAR harms United States industry and limit the ability to access and make use of the
best capabilities. Globalization of space is desirable and ITAR is a barrier.
•ITAR damages national security by placing legal and bureaucratic restrictions on the United States military use of commercial
space assets that rely on a robust satellite industry and space industrial base. The fact is that the United States military is dependent
on commercial space services.
•ITAR directly impacts approaches to national security space whereby the United States is denying allies access to warfighting and
space protection capabilities.
U.S. export controls block aerospace competitiveness

Restrictive Export Controls. One of the primary obstacles to the health and competitiveness of the U.S. aerospace industry is our
own export control regime. Export controls have been and should be an important component of America’s national security. We
believe, however, current export controls are increasingly counterproductive to our national security interests in their current
form and under current practices of implementation. In our judgment, export control reform is crucial to provide better security in
the future and to insure the health and vitality of our aerospace industry.
Export controls undermine U.S. aerospace joint ventures

More importantly, U.S. export controls are under- mining one of the central goals of military planning during the past 30 years—
alliance interoperability. We actively try to get allies to buy American military equipment to improve our ability to fight as an
alliance, yet we bog down that process through net- tlesome export controls. For example, during the Kosovo air war, allies were
petitioning the DoD to intercede with the State Department to expedite license approval of weapon systems needed to arm combat
aircraft flying side-by-side with American pilots.
Export controls are undermin- ing the collaboration between companies in alliance countries on new system developments.
Foreign companies have actually instructed design engineers to avoid American components because of the difficulty of acquiring
license approval from the United States government.
The current approach to export controls is increasingly isolating the American aerospace industry from the commercial sector in an
unproductive cocoon of regulation. The defense industrial base is falling farther and farther behind the commercial market place
because it has to cope with excessive regulation.
4
Aerospace – ext 2 – EU subsidies
EU subsidies crush US aerospace
To the Europeans’ credit, their funding strategy has been very successful. EU companies have developed robust commercial
product lines that are slowly dis- placing U.S.-produced commercial aircraft and heli- copters, aircraft engines and components.
Government subsidies have aided in this rise of European industry competitiveness.
European subsidies to Airbus had a direct impact on the exit of McDonnell-Douglas from the market as an independent large civil
aircraft (LCA) manufac- turer and its subsequent merger with Boeing. European government and industry officials repeat- edly
have cited the goal of Airbus achieving a fifty percent share of the global LCA market. With Airbus surpassing Boeing in terms of
orders and backlog in 2001 and possibly poised to exceed Boeing in deliv- eries in 2003, it appears that the Europeans are
achieving their goal.
Unfortunately, it appears that European officials intend to continue directly subsidizing EU companies. The recently unveiled EU
aerospace policy strategy calls for an increase in subsidies to continue building market share, largely at the expense of U.S.
companies. If trends continue, European companies may soon gain market leadership in other products and technologies as well.
This fundamental mis- match of declining U.S. government R&D funding for basic research and increasing European govern-
ment funding for both basic research and product development is reaching crisis proportions for U.S. industry. This challenge
cannot go unanswered.
5
Aerospace – ext 3 – workforce crisis
Can’t solve competitiveness- bad science education undermines the US
Colwell, 8- President of the University of Maryland Biotechnology Institute, Professor of Microbiology and Biotechnology at the
University Maryland
(Rita, Bioscience “Silent Sputnik” January 2008, pg. 3, Proquest)
A glance at statistics from the Council on Competitiveness is disconcerting: the United States is 20th in the world in broadband
Internet penetration, just after Luxembourg; and whereas Nintendo invested more than $140 million in research and development
in 2002, the US federal government spent less than half that sum on research and innovation in education. With the amount of new
technical information doubling every two years, students in college today will find that much of what they are taught will be
outdated by the time they graduate. Moreover, according to former secretary of Education Richard Riley, the top 10 jobs in
demand in 2010 will not have existed in 2004. So not only are our students falling behind in science and technology, as measured
by standard tests globally, but the training they are getting will be insufficient for survival in the global economy.
There will be a brain drain in the aerospace industry due to Cold War scientists retire
Tessler, 8 (Joelle, Air Force News, “US aerospace and defense sector braces for potential brain drain as Cold War workers retire”
March 4, 2008, http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/03/ap_braindr Ain_030408/)
The aerospace and defense sector is bracing for a potential brain drain over the next decade as a generation of Cold War scientists
and engineers hits retirement age and not enough qualified young Americans seek to take their place.
The problem — almost 60 percent of U.S. aerospace workers in 2007 were 45 or older — could affect national security and even
close the door on commercial products that start out as military technology, industry officials said.
While U.S. universities are awarding two-and-a-half times more engineering, math and computer science degrees than they did 40
years ago, defense companies must compete with the likes of Google, Microsoft and Verizon for the best and the brightest.
6
Aerospace – ext 5 – trade barriers
Global trade barriers in aerospace are increasing
We are greatly concerned, however, where the rise inforeign competition has been aided by persistentgovernment intervention. We
see concerted strate-gies by other governmentsto unseat U.S. companiesfrom their position of world leadership.Interventionist
policies are being used as tools toestablish and support “national champions” protect-ing them from market forces at the expense
of U.S.industry. These policies are described in the “International Playing Field” section later in this chapter.
7
Hegemony doesn’t stop war
Heg doesn’t solve major wars

Eland 02 Director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute
(Ivan,, The Empire Strikes Out The “New Imperialism” and Its Fatal Flaws”, Cato policy analysis no 459, nov 26)
Some advocates of an expansive U.S. foreign policy have argued that actual expenditures on a worldwide U.S. military presence
are less than the potential costs to the United States of future wars resulting from the absence of such U.S. global policing. Two
academics, Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, debunk this myth by using empirical data from major wars—World War I and the Iran- Iraq War—to
demonstrate that neutral countries incur only small costs, or actually profit, from even large conflicts. Because the world economy
—especially in an age of globalization of trade and investment—is flexible and resilient, neutral countries can profit from war by
selling to belligerents, by taking over markets that warring nations have previously served, by lending money at high rates of
return to the fighting countries, and by buying up assets cheaply that have been liquidated by belligerents to fight the war. In addition,
Gholz and Press found that the United States pays much more attempting to ensure global security than it would lose from
instability and war (and that even with the generous implicit assumption that all U.S. military interventions promote rather than detract from global stability). In short,
Gholz and Press demonstrate that the current U.S. policy of being the world’s policeman does not pass the cost/benefit test.84 Such
empirical data confirm the conclusions of the much earlier intuitive cost/benefit analysis done by Earl Ravenal, a former distinguished research professor of international affairs at
Georgetown University.85
Heg doesn’t prevent war, no risk of disaster without heg

Conry 97 foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute
(Barbara, “U.S. "Global Leadership": A Euphemism for World Policeman, Cato Policy Analysis No. 267, February 5, 1997)
Other proponents of U.S. political and military leadership do not point to particular benefits; instead, they warn of near-certain
disaster if the United States relinquishes its leadership role. Christopher paints a bleak picture: Just consider what the world would be like without American
leadership in the last two years alone. We would have four nuclear states in the former Soviet Union, instead of one, with Russian missiles still targeted at our homes. We would have a
full-throttled nuclear program in North Korea; no GATT agreement and no NAFTA; brutal dictators still terrorizing Haiti; very likely, Iraqi troops back in Kuwait; and an unresolved
Mexican economic crisis, which would threaten stability at our border. [55] Gingrich has pronounced a future without American leadership "a big mess." [56]And former British prime
minister Margaret Thatcher has warned, What we are possibly looking at in 2095 [absent U.S. leadership] is an unstable world in which there are more than half a dozen "great
powers," each with its own clients, all vulnerable if they stand alone, all capable of increasing their power and influence if they form the right kind of alliance, and all engaged willy-nilly
in perpetual diplomatic maneuvers to ensure that their relative positions improve rather than deteriorate. In other words, 2095 might look like 1914 played on a somewhat larger stage. [57]
In other words, if America abdicates its role as world leader, we are condemned to repeat the biggest mistakes of the 20th century--
or perhaps do something even worse. Such thinking is seriously flawed, however. First, to assert that U.S. leadership can stave off
otherwise inevitable global chaos vastly overestimates the power of any single country to influence world events. The United
States is powerful, but it still can claim only 5 percent of the world's population and 20 percent of world economic output.
Moreover, regardless of the resources Americans might be willing to devote to leading the world, today's problems often do not
lend themselves well to external solutions. As Maynes has pointed out, Today, the greatest fear of most states is not external
aggression but internal disorder. The United States can do little about the latter, whereas it used to be able to do a great deal about
the former. In other words, the coinage of U.S. power in the world has been devalued by the change in the international agenda. [58]
Indeed, many of the foreign policy problems that have confounded Washington since the demise of the Soviet Union are the kinds of problems that are likely to trouble the world well into
the next century.
"Failed states," such as Somalia, may not be uncommon. But, as the ill-fated U.S. and UN operations in that country
showed, there is very little that outside powers can do about such problems. External powers usually lack the means to prevent or
end civil wars, such as those in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, unless they are willing to make a tremendous effort to do so.
Yet those types of internecine conflicts are likely to be one of the primary sources of international disorder for the foreseeable
future. Despite the doomsayers who prophesy global chaos in the absence of U.S. leadership, however, Washington's limited
ability to dampen such conflicts is not cause for panic. Instability is a normal feature of an international system of sovereign states,
which the United States can tolerate and has tolerated for more than two centuries. If vital American interests are not at stake,
instability itself becomes a serious problem only if the United States blunders into it, as it did in Somalia and Bosnia. [59]
8
China frontline
1. Any Chinese attack has to happen in broad daylight and is easily defendable by the US
Forden, 8—An M.I.T. research associate and a former UN weapons inspector and strategic weapons analyst
Congressional Budget Office
(Geoffrey, PhD, “How China Loses the Coming Space War”, 1-10-08, http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/inside-the-chin.html#more)
Finally, the interceptor needed to track its target, so that it could determine where it should move to place itself in front of the
obsolete weather satellite; we have a good sense of how that was done, too. The most likely method it employed to track the
oncoming satellite was an on-board telescope using visible light. Locking onto a target this way -- as opposed to focusing on the
infrared light emitted by the heat of the target, the way the US missile defense interceptor does -- imposes significant limitations
on the system. In particular, until it develops a far-infrared capability, which is probably decades away, its ASAT will be forced to attack satellites
while they are in bright sunlight. Indeed, even though the site from which the interceptor was launched was cloaked in darkness,
the target satellite was high enough to be brightly illuminated by the sun. Until China does develop better sensors, this imposes a
very severe constraint on how and when it could attack other satellites: it must wait to attack low Earth orbit satellites when they
are in bright sunshine. Attacks against satellites in significantly higher orbits, such as GPS or geostationary satellites, are less constrained by this requirement
since they are almost always in direct sunlight.
2. Many things prevent a Chinese attack on US satellites: targets deep in space, hitting many targets
simultaneously, keeping the whole thing secret, and a US preemption.
Forden, 8—An M.I.T. research associate and a former UN weapons inspector and strategic weapons analyst
Congressional Budget Office
(Geoffrey, PhD, “How China Loses the Coming Space War”, 1-10-08, http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/inside-the-chin.html#more)
But China could not launch the massive attack required to have anything like a significant effect on US ability to utilize space
without months of careful planning and pre-positioning of special, ASAT carrying missiles around the country. It would also have
to utilize its satellite launch facilities to attack any US assets in deep space: the GPS navigation satellites and communications
satellites in geostationary orbit. Most importantly, it would have to time the attack so as to hit as many US satellites as
simultaneously as possible. And, despite all that movement, Beijing would somehow have to keep the whole thing secret. Failure
to do so would undoubtedly result in the US attacking the large, fixed facilities China needs to wage this kind of war before the full
blow had been struck. Even if the United States failed to do so, China would undoubtedly plan for that contingency.
Based on the orbits of US military satellites determined by the worldwide network of amateur observers, there appears to be a large number of low Earth orbit military satellites over China several times each week. To
hit them, China would have to preposition its ASAT-tipped missiles and their mobile launchers in remote areas of China, one position for each satellite. (If reports of low reliabilities for these missiles are correct, two or
more missiles might be assigned to each satellite.) Furthermore, these positions are really only suitable for a particular day. If China’s political and military planners have any uncertainty at all about which day to
launch their space war, they would need to pre-position additional launchers around the country. Thus, attacking nine low Earth orbit satellites could require as many as 36 mobile launchers—enough for two
interceptors fired at each satellite with a contingency day if plans change—moved to remote areas of China; areas determined more by the satellite orbits than China’s network of road. (As will be discussed below, nine
is about the maximum they could reasonably expect to hit on the first day of the space war.) Xslc_launch_pads At the same time that China would be trying to covertly move its mobile missile launchers around the
The more large rockets China uses for this task, the more deep-
country, it would also have to assemble a fleet of large rockets -- ones normally used for launching satellites.
space satellites it can destroy. At present, however, China only has the facilities for assembling and launching a total for four such
rockets nearly simultaneously. Two would have to be assembled out in the open where they could be observed by US spy satellites
and two could be assembled inside a vertical assembly building during the 18 days it takes to stack and fuel the Long March rocket’s stages while preparing to launch. [See right.] Even the two assembled indoors would
need to arrive by train and eventually would have to be moved, one after the other, to the launch pad. Each of these rockets, usually reserved for launching satellites into geostationary orbits, could carry three to four
interceptors and their special orbital maneuver motors to attack either US navigation satellites, at about 12,000 miles altitude, or communications satellites at about 22,000 miles. Four days prior to the attack, China
would launch the first of its Long March rockets carrying deep-space attack ASATs; the same launch pad would have to be used for the second rocket stacked inside the vertical assembly building. As the technicians
renovated that pad, the first rocket’s payload would circle the Earth in a parking orbit at about 200 miles altitude waiting to be joined by the other deep-space ASATs. This would appear to be a tell-tale sign of an
impending strike. But China could explain the delay to the international community by claiming that the third stage, intended to take the payload it its final altitude, had failed to fire and that they were working on it.
Roughly six hours before the first the attack on the US’s low Earth orbit military satellites, the other three Long March rockets would have to be fired since it takes roughly that long to get their payloads up to their
target’s orbits. Delays or failures to launch any of these rockets would strand their interceptors on the launch pad and subject them to possible retaliatory bombing by the US.
9
China frontline
3. Even if China successfully took out all of the US military satellites, the military could still survive on civilian
ones
Forden, 8—An M.I.T. research associate and a former UN weapons inspector and strategic weapons analyst Congressional Budget
Office
(Geoffrey, PhD, “How China Loses the Coming Space War”, 1-10-08, http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/inside-the-
chin.html#more)
While it is possible for China to eliminate the eight US military communications satellites in geostationary orbits that can broadcast to the Taiwan Straits, Beijing
does not have enough the lauch capacity for as many ASATs as it would take to eliminate all 22 civilian communications satellites
that could also be used. However, not all of these satellites have equal capacities for transmitting information; it might be possible for China to destroy
enough of that capacity to limit the US military. During the invasion of Iraq in 2003, US armed forces sent and received a tremendous amount of information via
satellite. This included video conferencing between the Pentagon and the commanders in the field, satellite photographs downloaded to operations planners, orders
directing jets where to drop their bombs, and soldiers emailing their families back home. At its peak, all of this added up to about three billion “bits” per second, a
tremendous amount of information. Bandwidth was – and continues to be – a premium on the battlfield, particularly at the tactical level. And the appetite for
information is only increasing. But the total amount of information transmitted over satellites is certain to increase by the next time we go to war; perhaps it could
triple or even quadruple to twelve billion bits per second in the next ten years. Assuming that the eight military communications satellites are
destroyed first, that leaves at most eight ASATs to destroy the eight most capable civilian communications satellites. If these eight
are removed, then there is still a total capacity of over 14 billion bits per second in US owned and operated civilian
communications satellites. Thus, there should be enough transmission capacity for our military -- even if the demand for satellite
communications increases by a factor of four. And the US military is used to using civilian satellites, as the 2003 invasion of Iraq
showed. The vast majority (84%) of all military communications into and out of the theater of operations went through civilian satellites.
10
China frontline
4. Globalization prevents Chinese aggression and balancing- they don’t want to fight
Garret, 2006; director of the Asia Program at the Atlantic Counci and former DOD consultant
Journal of Contemporary China, Volume 15, Issue 48 August
This analysis is cautiously optimistic that the first path - that toward building more robust Sino-American ties - is possible and that appropriate US
and Chinese
policies can encourage the development of a long-term, stable relationship as well as a US-China strategic partnership on a broad
range of issues of strategic importance to the United States. Such a relationship will not be conflict-free or without competitive
aspects, especially in the political and economic realms. And a robust US presence in East Asia, including strong alliance relationships with
Japan and other traditional US allies, will continue to be important to maintain regional stability, provide reassurance to regional
states during this period of 'China's rise', and to 'hedge' against the possible emergence of a more conflictual relationship with
China as well as possible conflict over Taiwan. But the United States is not likely to conclude that a strategy of containment toward
China is either necessary or feasible. Similarly, China will likely continue to pursue a strategy of seeking close ties with the United
States rather than adopting an anti-hegemonist coalition strategy to counter American power and influence.1 At the same time, the
Chinese will likely seek to develop closer ties and cooperation with the European Union and other powers to bolster China's
bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States and hedge against the possibility of a sharp deterioration in Sino-American
relations. A key factor underlying my optimism is the assessment, argued in this paper, that 'globalization' is reshaping the global strategic
environment. In this new strategic situation, the interests of the United States and China will limit strategic competition between
them and compel closer cooperation to respond to shared strategic threats and challenges. Globalization has led to converging -
though by no means identical - national interests in many critical areas and a common interest in maintaining the overall global system of
regimes, treaties and organizations governing international economic, political and security relations to the benefit of both
countries. This high-level common interest does not preclude sharp differences over specific issues, but it is likely to create
pressure on the United States and China to cooperate in many areas in order to defend, maintain and strengthen the system and to
restrain them from pursuing containment or confrontational strategies toward each other. Globalization has led to what could be called the
'five Cs': increasing constraints on US and Chinese strategic options vis-à-vis each other created by growing strategic
interdependence; expanding common interests on an increasingly wide array of international and global issues; increasing need for
bilateral and multilateral strategic cooperation to meet the twin challenges presented by the globalizing and non-globalized worlds and transnational threats;
inherent contradictions in globalization leading to conflicts over a myriad of issues that are often created by or exacerbated by globalization and the growing
integration, interdependence and mutual vulnerability of globalizing states; and on-going competition for political and economic advantage
between nation-states in the global arena, although not zero-sum strategic competition for overall dominance. 1. Constraints on
US and Chinese strategic options Globalization has created a new 'strategic interdependence' among globalizing states as these states' economic power has become
increasingly dependent on maintaining, deepening and broadening economic ties with other globalizing states and the international system of peace and stability in
which those economic ties thrive. Jockeying among states for political influence and economic advantage will continue, but this is likely to occur almost
exclusively within the parameters of the international system that the major powers, now including China, recognize must be respected and jointly defended to
preserve their own national interests. Thus, although successfully globalizing states may be economic and political competitors in the
future, they are not likely to be strategic competitors in a zero-sum contest in which gains for one power, including economic, are
necessarily a loss for the other, and in which their long-term strategic goal is to weaken if not defeat the other power as was the
case in the US-Soviet strategic competition of the Cold War. Rather, these states will find the growth, prosperity and security of other powers
essential to their own security and economic well-being. This view contradicts the views of prominent Realists, who see a clash between the
established dominant power and a rising power, specifically China, as virtually inevitable, and call for efforts to slow and contain
the growth of Chinese power.2 In my view, however, the use of force or threat of force to gain strategic advantage or to settle disputes
among the globalizing states is likely to be viewed by leaders as potentially high cost/high risk without comparable, if any,
benefits, and thus not likely to be pursued as deliberate policy - although miscalculation can never be ruled out entirely, and in the case of China and
the United States, the Taiwan issue, which is left over from the pre-globalization era, holds the potential for direct military conflict between the two globalizing
powers.
11
China – ext 2 – won’t happen
Commercial space users and Chinese caution prevent a U.S.-Sino space race
Saunders, 7- Senior Research Professor at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies
(Dr. Phillip C., “China’s Future In Space: Implications for U.S. Security,” 2007,
http://www.space.com/adastra/china_implications_0505.html?submit.x=94&submit.y=10&submit=submit)
There are some incentives to avoid confrontation. Proliferation of space weapons would inhibit scientific cooperation and raise
costs of commercial satellites. (The global trend in both sectors is towards international collaboration to reduce costs.) Actual use
of anti-satellite weapons could create space debris that might damage expensive commercial satellites. Commercial users of space
are therefore likely to resist efforts to deploy counter-space capabilities. Beijing's strategic incentives may also change over time.
Mindful of the Soviet Union's demise due to excessive military spending, Chinese leaders are wary of entering into an open-ended
space race with the United States. Moreover, as Chinese military space capabilities improve and are integrated into PLA
operations, the negative impact of losing Chinese space assets may eventually outweigh the potential advantages of attacking U.S.
space capabilities.
12
China – ext 3 – military would survive
China could not even successfully take out all of the US Navigation satellites
Forden, 8—An M.I.T. research associate and a former UN weapons inspector and strategic weapons analyst Congressional Budget
Office
(Geoffrey, PhD, “How China Loses the Coming Space War”, 1-10-08, http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/inside-the-
chin.html#more)
You need a launch pad to attack a target in deep space, like an American GPS satellite. China has just three of these pads. This
really restricts China’s offensive capabilities in space. Assuming that China devotes all its deep-space ASATs on GPS satellites, it
could destroy at most 16 satellites. At the current time, with 32 functioning navigation satellites, that would still leave 16 satellites
still working. Over a period of years, the debris from those collisions would represent a significant threat to more than those
satellites immediately attacked. They would pass, time and time again, through the belts of debris that resulted from the
interceptions. However, it would probably take longer than the military conflict China initiated with these attacks before
additional satellites were destroyed by subsequent collisions. Usually, there are about nine GPS satellites over China at any given
time. If China somehow managed to destroy all of these, it could eliminate America's use of precision-guided munitions—for a
few hours, until the orbits of other GPS satellites take them over the Taiwan Straits. Quite quickly, the constellation’s other 23
satellites would fill in the gap due to their normal orbital movement. Even if it destroyed 16 satellites, China could still only
interrupt GPS over the Straits for about eight hours. During the other 16 hours there would be the four or more satellites present
over the target area for bombing runs, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flights, and ship tracking. This pattern of eight hours off
followed by 16 hours when GPS could be used would be repeated every day until new satellites are launched. This outage would
certainly cause difficulties; GPS not only guides American precision bombs – it helps pilot UAV spy planes, and monitor ships. US
casualties might increase , with air crews forced to fly missions during daylight hours – and conduct some of the "dull, dirty, and
dangerous" missions now flown by robotic planes. It's a situation no American commander would want to face. But it would not
be a catastrophic one. And it would not eliminate precision weaponry, UAVs, or any other American activity that depends on GPS.
Keep in mind, this is the worst of the worst-case scenarios. It is highly unlikely that China could remove all the satellites over the
conflict area at the same time. After all, attacking 16 satellites, all in different orbits with ASATs launched on just four different
rockets involves some fairly complex orbital maneuvers. A much more likely scenario is that, at best, China could destroy four
GPS satellites in the initial wave followed roughly seven hours later by four more, a third wave at roughly 45 minutes after that,
and the final wave two hours later. Thus, the GPS attack is spread over ten hours and never eliminates all the satellites visible over
the area of conflict at the same time. This Chinese attack on US navigation satellites would not eliminate or even significantly
degrade the US’s ability use precision-guided munitions..
13
Solvency frontline
1. The lack of reliable transportation for a solar powered satellite blocks its development
Nansen, 95 - led the Boeing team of engineers in the Satellite Power System Concept Development and Evaluation Program for

the Department of Energy and NASA, and President Solar Space Industries (Ralph, Sun Power,
http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/sunpower/sunpower09.html)
It is the initial development cost that presents the problem. The cost of developing the technology for the solar power satellite as a
power plant is not so much a problem, but rather the infrastructure to launch and assemble it. Much of the infrastructure is unique
because it will be located in a remote site. To date there has been no need for a transportation system capable of launching solar
power satellites, so it does not yet exist. This is the single greatest impediment to the development of solar power satellites. In the
past, costs of this nature were funded by government investment, such as the funding of the railroads as they moved west across
the nation. It is not unreasonable for the government to fund the development cost of the required infrastructure as a national
investment in our future. The magnitude of the development for the necessary infrastructure, beyond what is being developed by
the Space Station, would be considerably less than the Saturn/Apollo lunar landing program.
2. Turn – unilateral U.S. construction causes an international backlash against hegemony

Glaser, 08 - aerospace engineer, vice president at Arthur D. Little, consulting on consulting projects in aerospace, solar energy, and
materials science (Peter, Ad Astra, Interview, “An energy pioneer looks back”, Spring, http://www.nss.org/adastra/AdAstra-SBSP-
2008.pdf) //DH
Glaser: Since it would be such a huge undertaking, I think it would be best accomplished at an international level, perhaps even
managed by the United Nations. Each country could contribute their best effort, and then each country would reap the benefit of
cheap and plentiful power from the sun. We could utilize the knowledge of all the nations that have been researching space- based
solar power. If only one country has the satellites, the international community will worry that the technology will be misused.
With every nation taking part in the planning, building, and operation of the system, there would be inherent transparency,
oversight, and equality. There would be no secrets, and no country would be left in the dark.
On the other hand, if one nation decides to build the system, all hell may break loose. There would be distrust and a huge shift in
the balance of power. Any nation with such a system would not only have an advantage in space, but they would have economic
and military advantages on the ground as well. And there are many countries taking the ideaof solar power from space much more
seriously that we are in the United States. I would prefer to see a network of power satellites built by an international effort.
14
Solvency frontline
3. Technology fails – it’s 40 years away
Day, 08 (Dwayne, “Knights in shining armor,” The Space Review, 6/9,
The NSSO study is remarkably sensible and even-handed and states that we are nowhere near developing practical SSP and that it
is not a viable solution for even the military’s limited requirements. It states that the technology to implement space solar power
does not currently exist… and is unlikely to exist for the next forty years. Substantial technology development must occur before it
is even feasible. Furthermore, the report makes clear that the key technology requirement is cheap access to space, which no longer
seems as achievable as it did three decades ago (perhaps why SSP advocates tend to skip this part of the discussion and hope others
solve it for them). The activists have ignored the message and fallen in love with the messenger.
4. UV rays will destroy satellites

Taylor, 7 – Chief of the Space and International Law Division at Headquarters United States Air Force Space Command; B.A,
Berry College; J.D. University of Georgia; LL.M. (Air and Space Law), McGill University (Michael W. “Trashing the Solar
System One Planet at a Time: Earth’s Orbital Debris Problem,” Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Fall, 2007,
Gale) // DCM
<Without Earth's atmosphere to protect them, satellites are exposed to the full force of solar radiation, including ultraviolet rays,
X-rays, positively charged protons and negatively charged electrons. n16 Ultraviolet rays and X-rays can damage satellites by
degrading solar panels, which many satellites use as a source of energy, thus shortening their useful life. n17 When solar activity
increases, the number of damaging rays also increases. The charged particles can cause even [*5] more damage than the rays
because the particles penetrate the outer layers of the satellite and directly degrade its electronic systems. Unlike the rays, which
are generally evenly distributed around Earth, the particles become trapped in Earth's magnetic field and concentrate in two
doughnut-shaped (torus) areas around the equator. n18 These regions are called the Van Allen radiation belts. n19 The Van Allen
radiation belts significantly limit the operation of satellites.>
15
Solvency – ext 1 – lack of launch
Lack of space launch services inhibit space solar power
Mankins, 8 - president of the Space Power Association, and former Manager, Advanced Concepts Studies, Office of Space Flight
at NASA (John, Ad Astra, “Inexhaustible Energy from Orbit” Spring 2008, pg. 20, http://www.nss.org/adastra/AdAstra-SBSP-
2008.pdf)
A major barrier to all space endeavors also applies to space solar power, and that is affordable access to space. This barrier is one
of compelling importance. The problem of space access includes both low-cost and highly-reliable Earth-to-orbit transportation,
and in-space transportation. (Fortunately, one of the key ingredients in overcoming this barrier is having a market that requires
many flights. It’s hard to imagine how air travel between continents would be affordable if the aircraft were used once or twice per
year rather than once or twice per day!)
Advances that drive down the cost of space operations present significant hurdles, too. These hurdles involve a range of
capabilities, most of which have never been demonstrated in space—but all of which are entirely taken for granted here on Earth.
The kinds of capabilities in question include the highly-autonomous assembly of large structures, the deployment and integration
of modular electronic systems, refu-eling, and repair and maintenance. (The key ingredient is to perform such operations without
large numbers of operators and sustaining engineers on Earth—which drive the high cost of contemporary space operations.)
Lack of low-cost space access blocks SSP

Mankins, 8 - president of the Space Power Association, and former Manager, Advanced Concepts Studies, Office of Space Flight
at NASA (John, Ad Astra, “Inexhaustible Energy from Orbit” Spring 2008, pg. 20, http://www.nss.org/adastra/AdAstra-SBSP-
2008.pdf)
Lower-Cost Space Access. Space launch is a well-known and clas- sic case of the “chicken-and-egg” problem, and one that has
provenextremely hard to overcome. For many concepts, very low recurring costs per pound of payload can be achieved only with
high launch rates (so that the cost of fixed initial investments and annual overhead costs can be spread across many launches).
Achieving high launch rates depends upon the actual revenue-generating traffic to be carried, which depends significantly on
earlier investments in space-utilizing enterprises (for example, investments related to in-space manufacturing capacity). And, as a
result, increased investments in space-utilizing enterprises (government or commercial) will depend upon the prior existence of
assured availability of reliable launch services at the lower prices.
So, in order to make space solar power possible, what has to be done about space transportation? In the case of conventional
transportation infrastructures, low cost has always been achieved through reuse of vehicles and the deployment of general-purpose
infrastructures that can be used many times by multiple customers, such as canals, rail- ways, roads, and airports. It is hard to
imagine how automobiles, aircraft, ships, or any other modern transportation system might somehow be produced so cheaply that
the transport could somehow be “dispos- able” after each use. In order for space solar power systems to be economically viable,
reusable Earth-to-orbit launchers will be essential. In-space transportation advances are also needed. In-space transportation
systems must be very fuel-efficient. Also, transport hardware costs must be dramatically reduced through the development of reus-
able, rather than expendable, systems. Finally, the personnel costs for the transport infrastructure must be drastically reduced: the
system must be largely autonomous, involving neither “marching armies” of operators or maintenance engineers.
16
Solvency – ext 2 – backlash
Unilateral U.S. action in space undermines soft power and international cooperation
Sadeh, 08 - an Associate Director for the Center for Space and Defense Studies at the United States Air Force Academy (Eligar,
The Space Review, “Space policy questions and decisions facing a new administration”, 6/9,
Issue
United States government leadership in space is not seen as productive by others. The United States government cannot be a leader
if no one will follow. Today, the United States is not seen as a good partner in space.
Discussion
•The position of the United States in world affairs is influenced by leadership in space. Given the many issues and challenges the
space community faces, leadership is by no means assured.
•In order to identify and meet the challenges in security, commercial, and civil space productive United States government space
leadership is indispensable.
•Leadership requires that the United States develop a strategic vision for space to guide space policy decisions, which is supported
by strong executive leadership, and effective interagency and government-industry partnerships.
•International participation in security space is important. There is a need for the United States to think more about international
engagement in the strategic response to the domain of space. It is not a “go-it-alone problem.” The United States government has
not given sufficient indication that the strategy is to include allies in national space policy.
•Space represents a “soft power” foreign policy tool. Space is an international drawing card that engenders national prestige,
prevents conflict, and is a domain for international cooperation.
Cooperation is key to make SPS cost effective

Scientific American 8, (Tim Hornyak “Farming Solar Energy in Space: Shrugging off massive costs, Japan pursues space-based
solar arrays” July 2008, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=farming-solar-energy-in-space) // CCH
The total project cost would be enormous—perhaps in the tens of billions of dollars—but Suzuki and his colleagues say they are
not considering the price tag. “We can’t know whether this is feasible or not if we don’t have the basic technology first,” he says.
“We’re aiming to produce stable, cheap power and hydrogen at a target price of 6.5 cents per kilowatt-hour.” That would be in line
with conventional power generation costs of today and might make it more economically attractive. Given current technology,
transporting large-scale structures into space may be feasible only through the cooperation of space agencies on different
continents. Suzuki, though, says countries in the space race are trying to develop their technologies independently while the
potential militarization of space grows. “If JAXA, NASA and the European Space Agency can work together, it would be best,” he
adds.
17
Solvency – ext 2 – backlash
SPS unilateral development risks international conflict

Nansen 2000 - President Solar Space Industries, (Ralph, Statement to the United States Congress Subcommittee on Space Science
“The Technical Feasibility of Space Solar Power” Before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, United States House of
Representatives Committee on Science September 7, 2000, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=2571) // CCH
An inherent feature of solar power satellites is their location in space outside the borders of any individual nation with their energy
delivered to the earth by way of some form of wireless power transmission that must be compatible with other uses of the radio
frequency spectrum. They must also be transported to space. Government involvement to coordinate international agreements
covering frequency assignments, satellite locations, space traffic control and many other features of space operations is mandatory
in order to prevent international conflicts. Solar power satellites will ultimately become part of the commercial electric utility
industry and as such, that industry could be expected to shoulder the majority of the burden of development. However, the utility
industry is not the only one that will benefit from the development of solar power satellites. All of the people of the world will
eventually be the benefactors, through reduced atmospheric pollution and the availability of ample energy in the future. As a result
it makes sense that the development of solar power satellites be accomplished through a partnership of industries and governments
of all the nations that wish to participate.
SPS development violates the Outer Space Treaty – it will be treated as a weapon of mass destruction
Pop, 2k – PhD Student, University of Glasgow Law School (Virgiliu, “SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF NON-TERRESTRIAL
RESOURCE EXPLOITATION”, http://www.geocities.com/virgiliu_pop/publications/security.pdf)
2.1. Mass Destruction Capabilities
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty outlaws placement “in orbit around the Earth” of “any (...) kinds of
weapons of mass destruction (...).” Weapons of mass destruction were defined in 1948 by the UN Commission for Conventional Armaments as
“those which include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future
which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above” [UN document S/C.3/32/Rev.1, August
1948].
Given the “evolution” of the means of warfare since 1948, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 51/37 of 7 January 1997 [A/RES/51/37] in which it
expresses its determination
“to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction that have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of weapons of mass
destruction identified in the definition of weapons of mass destruction adopted by the United Nations in 1948” and it
“[r]eaffirms that effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass
destruction”.
As seen from above, there is no exclusivedefinition of weapons of mass destruction; in 1996, the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher classified the landmines
as “weapons of mass destruction in slow motion”5.
Given the lack of a precise definition, the
Office of Technology Assessment of the United States Congress considers that it is unclear “[w]hether an SPS’s microwave or
laser capabilities would class it as a weapon of
“mass destruction” and hence make it illegal under the 1967 treaty”, but “it is very likely that such charges would be made in the
event of SPS deployment ”6. In order to analyse their (dis)qualification as weapons of mass destruction, one must examine the
possible destructive effects of the SPS technology.
18
Solvency – ext 3 – tech barriers
Prior space solar projects prove the technology will fail
Spencer, 08 (Roy, “Reality Deniers”, National Review, 1/15, lexis)
And now the space-based solar power crowd has returned. These "experts" point to the increase in efficiency that could be
achieved by putting solar collectors in Earth's orbit and beaming the energy down to the ground.
And indeed you probably could get several times the amount of energy from a solar collector in space versus on the ground. Too
bad it would be insanely expensive.
You might have heard of the problems NASA has had with relatively tiny solar collectors attached to the Space Station and Space
Telescope. Now imagine putting a one-square mile collector in space. Even if we could get such a thing designed, built, launched,
and working, it would replace only 1 of the 1,000 one-gigawatt plants I mentioned earlier that the U.S. alone needs.
Incentives for SSP don’t make sense – other technologies have to be developed prior to its competitiveness
Macauley, 2k - analyst with Resources for the Future (Molly, “Can power from space compete?,” Space Policy, November,
science direct)
Our second set of observations pertains specifically to challenges facing SSP:

• The relative immaturity of the technologies required for SSP makes it difficult to assess the validity of estimated costs and the
likely competitiveness of SSP. For this reason, as in many space development initiatives, orders-of-magnitude reductions in the
costs of space launch and deployment and other key technologies are critical. As these reductions occur, the economic viability of
SSP may become more promising. Until then, it is premature for the US government to make commitments such as loan
guarantees or tax incentives specifically for SSP.
Solar power satellites will be impossible in the near future: 10 to 1 technology improvements are needed in several
areas.
Mankins 98 – manager at NASA (John C. Mankins, “The Space Solar Power Option,” Ad Astra Vol 10 No 1 January/February
1008)
<Throughout the systems concepts that emerged from the "Fresh Look" study, however, the common theme is that these systems
cannot be built today. Very aggressive--and successful--technology advances would first be needed if SSP were to become
technically and economically viable in the future. Such advances would have to address a variety of areas, ranging from
exceptionally low-cost space launch (about $400 per kilogram to low Earth orbit) to very low mass solar arrays (about 500 watts
per kilogram) and other areas. Overall, factors of 2:1 to 10:1 improvements would be needed in a number of technologies. Still, far
fewer new technologies appear to be required than were called for in the 1970s and, if those advances were made, the systems
concepts that would be enabled by them appear to hold far greater promise of economic viability.>
19
Solvency – ext 3 – tech barriers
SPS is not cost effective or technologically feasible
David 2000, (Leonard, Senior Science Writer, “Space-Based Power System Needed to Solve Earth’s Energy Woes”
http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/solar_power_satellite_000421.html , 4-21-00) // CCH
WASHINGTON -- Solar power satellites beaming energy to Earth could present daunting technological challenges and offer
questionable economic potential, a NASA-funded study has found. But, the report also recommended that the federal government
should continue to study the concept and put more emphasis on creating a power plant in space that might support Earth-orbiting
spacecraft and deep-space missions. Those are the key points from a study on 21st-century power-beaming satellites released
Friday by a Washington think tank called Resources for the Future. Satellite solar power has been suggested as an alternative to
terrestrial energy resources for electrical generation. The nine-month-long study looked at the market for electricity from the
present to the year 2020, roughly the year when many experts believe satellite solar power actually could be possible. Included
were comments from the Electric Power Research Institute and Texaco.
Among the findings:
• Conventional electricity generation in both developed and developing countries may be more than adequate in terms of cost,
supply and environmental factors.
•Satellite solar power is relatively immature technology. That makes it difficult to estimate costs and the likely competitiveness of
such an idea measured against other energy systems.
•Lower launch costs could help make satellite solar power more promising. But until those costs go down, it is too early for the
U.S. government to commit to related loan guarantees or tax incentives.
•Health risks associated with exposure to electric and magnetic fields generated by satellite solar power are likely to be of
significant public concern.
•Such power may be useful for the International Space Station, moon bases or other space missions.
However, Molly Macauley, an economist who led the study, said the findings should not preclude NASA working on such a
concept.
"But … it's going to be very difficult to make it competitive with terrestrial power," she told SPACE.com. "It's a very hard sell."
"My concern with satellite-solar-power advocates is that they aren't looking over their shoulders to realize that technological
change and innovation in markets is happening within conventional approaches."
SSP technology doesn’t work – it would require major breakthroughs

Day, 08 (Dwayne, “Knights in shining armor,” The Space Review, 6/9,
You may not have noticed, but the space activist community is all worked up about space solar power (see “A renaissance for
space solar power?”, The Space Review, August 13, 2007). It is now the topic of much conversation whenever a group of space
enthusiasts get together. It was recently on the cover of the National Space Society’s magazine Ad Astra. The upcoming NewSpace
2008 conference will feature a panel on it. The International Space Development Conference in Washington, DC featured no less
than three—yes, three—sessions on space solar power, or SSP, to use the shorthand term, plus a dinner speaker who addressed the
same subject. With all of this attention, one would suspect that there has been a fundamental technological breakthrough that now
makes SSP possible, or a major private or government initiative to begin at least preliminary work on a demonstration project. But
there has been none of this. In fact, from a technological standpoint, we are not much closer to space solar power today than we
were when NASA conducted a big study of it in the 1970s.
20
Solvency – ext 3 – years away
SSP is decades away
Foust, 08 - editor of the Space Review (Jeff, “Energy vs. space”, The Space Review, 7/14,
Another common response, of course, is to cite the promise of space solar power (SSP). And, indeed, SSP could go a long way
towards solving the nation’s energy woes—in theory. The problem is that even supporters of SSP acknowledge turning that theory
into reality is still decades away, assuming that technological and financial obstacles can be overcome: little comfort for those
feeling pain at the pump today. Moreover, others are less sanguine about SSP’s prospects (see “Knights in shining armor”, The
Space Review, June 9, 2008).
21

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2. European subsidies kill U.S. aerospace competitiveness

4. Agency confusion prevents federal aerospace leadership

5. Trade barriers will cripple aerospace

U.S. export controls block aerospace competitiveness

Export controls undermine U.S. aerospace joint ventures

Heg doesn’t solve major wars

Heg doesn’t prevent war, no risk of disaster without heg

2. Turn – unilateral U.S. construction causes an international backlash against hegemony

4. UV rays will destroy satellites

Lack of low-cost space access blocks SSP

Cooperation is key to make SPS cost effective

SPS unilateral development risks international conflict

Our second set of observations pertains specifically to challenges facing SSP:

SSP technology doesn’t work – it would require major breakthroughs

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