THE UNITED STATESMARINES

in the

GUADATCANALCAMPAIGN

NSVIEUM AI{IDAPPROYEDT4 JUN 1962

' ,r'. /' 27noz<1r*L

, C. A. YOU}IGDAI,E
A s s l s t a not n o r a l , U . s . l l a r l n o c o r p s
B r l c- a d l o r G
Chlef of Staff' o-3
 Tbe U n l t e d s t a t e s M a r l n e s 1 n the Guadalcanal Sg4Pglgl
by

Henry I. sbaw, Jr.

The flrst Anerlcan ground offenslve 1n the Paclflc durlng

Wortd War II took place at an obscure lsland ln the soulhern

S o l o m o n s - - G u a d a l c a n a l . T h e r e ,t h e h i g h t l d e o f J a p a n e s e c o n q u e a t

lras reached and the ebb began.

Untlf the declslve naval Battle ol Mldway (4-6 June 1942),
Allled forces could do llttle m o r e l h a n h o l d w h a ' l tt h e y i l a d ,

walt, and prepare, After Midway, the U. S' Jolnt Chiefs of

Stalf declded that the strateglc sltuatlon had lnproved e ouglr

to rlsk the mountlng of a llnlted offenslve' The target chosen

w a € T u l a g l , a s m a l - 1l "s l . a n d o n c e t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s o f t h e B r l t I s h
S o l o m o nI € l a n d s P r o t e c t o r a t e , a n d w t t h I t such parts of sur-

r o u n d l n g l s L a n d s a e s e e m e dn e c e s o a r y t o h o l d t h e o b J e c t l v e ' A

f l n e d e e p - w a t e r a n c h o r a g ee x l s t e d b e t w e e n T u l a g l a n d n e l g h b o r -

l n g F l o r l d a T s ] a n d , a n d o n G u a d a l c a n a l , 2 0 m 1 1 e ss o u t b a c t ' o $ a
S e a l . a r kC h a n n e l , k u n a l g r a s E p 1 a 1 n s a m l d s t t h e J u n g l e w e r e
sultable for extenslve alr.fleld development. In Ju1y, wher)
aerlal reconnalsgance showed that bhe Japanese had begun to

bulld an alrlleld o n C u a d a l c a n a l , t h e l a r g e r 1 s l a n d b e c a m et h e
prlnc lpa] target.
The dlvlslon o f t h e P d c l f l c l n t o o p e r a t l o n a l c o n u l a n da r d . ' 3
made by the JcS on 30 Match 1942 placed all of the solomons

c h a l n 1 n G e n e r a l D o u g l a s M a c A r t h u r r s S o u t h w e s tP a c l f l c Area,

In revlewlng lrhe forces avallabfe for the Cuadafcanal -Tu1ag1

- bowever, the Jolnt chlefs deternlned that all of
operatlon,

the $h1ps and most of the assault troops would have to come

from Admlral chestep W. Nlnltz' Paclfic Fleet and Paclflc Ocean

Areas. Accordlngly, on 2 JuLy, the boundary between Nlnitzr and

MacArthurrs comnandswas shlfted west Just far enough to brlng

,the lower Solonons wlthln the admlralrs South Paolflc Area,
At the same t1ne, lthe tcs agreed upon a seriee of operatlons in

tbe Solonons and Blsmarcks that would lead eventuall.y to the

capture of the Japanese gtronghofd of RabauL on New Brlta1n,
oeneral MacArthur was glven resportstrblllty for plannlng and

coordlnatlng the advance and commandof all Its phases after

ouadalcanal r{as secured,

On 25 June, vlce Admlral Rlchard L. Ghornley, Nlnltzl
South Paclflc Area comrnander,was told to begln preparatlons

l o t a k e t h e S o l o m o n so b J e c t l v e s , w l t h a t e n t a t l v e D - D a y o f I
August. At least a dlvlslon o f t r a l n e d a r n p h l b l o u sa s s a u l b
troops was needed for WATCHToWER,
the code-name of the Guadal-
canal-Tulagl operatlon, and only one such unlt was avallabfe
ln the Paclflc--the lst Marlne Dlvls1on. Other dlvlslon8 that

mlght have been asslgned the task lacked the anphlblous experl-
ence or were spread thlnLy to hoLd vltal strateglc bases, The

relnlorcements that vrere tentatively slalred for WArCHTOWER

would
be avallabfe only when garrlson forces came out lrom the States
t o r e l l e v e c o m b a t L r o o p s 1 n N e w C a l e d o n l a , S a m o a ,a n d H a w a 1 1 .

lnltlally, bhe lst Dtvlslon wouldgo 1t alone.

Whenhe got the word that h1s dlvlsloD was headed for ac-
tlon J-n the Solomons, MaJor Ceneral Alexander A. Vandegrlft was
 1st was scheduied
set up 1; iiew Zealand where Lhe
Just gettlng
cornbat tralnlng' l'Ilth
lo undergo s1x months of lntenslve
post' the 5th Marlnes'
vandeErlft at welflngbon were hla comrnand
oea en route to New Zea-
and elements of the lLth Marlnes; at
the lst Marlnes' and the re-
land were the d1vlslon rear echelon,
nalnder of the llth. Since one of the dlvl8lontB lnfantry regl-
nltted to the defense
ments, the 7th MarlneE, waa already cor
was dlspaLched
o f S a m o a 't h e 2 d M a r l n e s o f t h e 2 d D 1 v 1 s 1 o n
up to strength'
from San Dlego to brlng Vandegrlftrs com'nand
Dlvlslon had 1'o be
Olrher naJor elernenls attached to the lst
Battallon from
a s s e m b l e df r o m o v e r s e a s b a s e 6 , t h e 1 s t R a l d e r
from I{awa11'
New Caledontra and the 3d Defense Battal-1on
out a reln-
Faced wlth the task of asserAblLng and loadlng
asked for
forced dlvlslon wlthln a monthrs t1me, Vandegrlft
Feverlsblyn lrn-
and got a weekrs delay of D-Day to 7 August '
prov181ng as necessary' the Marlnes ln I'tell lngtton unloaded
repacked equlprnent
the transports as they arrlved, sorted and
There was not
and supplles for combat, and loaded thlp aglaln'
and n)ost
enough roorn for all the dlvlslonrs motor transporN'
wlbh
of the heavler cargo lrucKs were left behlnd to come up
July and
a rear echelon. Re-embarkatlon was conlpLeted by 22
As fJnally
the ccnvoy salled from we111ngtot1the same day'
l'l rlm-
erlo\r''l
loaded, the Marlnes carrled along 60 daya tuppl1e8'
nunltlon for 10 days of heavy flghtlng, and the rnlnlmun 1rrl:l:l'

vlduaf baggage actually requlred Ito 1lve and flghl' '

Rehearsals, unsatlsfactory and lncomplete' were conducted

ol the
at Koro ln the FlJl Islands, where the varlous componenta
 foiies asslgned to take GuadaLcanaf and Tulag{ .assembled lor
the flrst t1me. Rear Adm{raf Rlchmond K, Turner, the connander
of the amphlbj.ous force whlch ineluded the Mar,tne
dlvl€tsr,r, ,1?s
transports, and lhe bornbardmentand escort ves$e,ls,
wa.Eglven
responslblllty for the oonduct of the,bperatlon. The Mar{ne
Corp$rpolnt of v1ew, one that pfevalled and becarne Ffandand
amphtrtjlousdoctrlne in late!, stages of the war, waF that the
l a n d l n g f o r c e c o m n a n d e rs h o u l d h A v e c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l o l . o p e r _
ations ashore. Durlng WATCHTOWER, however, tbe comnrandsetup
of an earller era hel_d Ilorth, and the.naval conmander conlitnued
to have the.last word ln the ernploJ,,ment
of ground troopE.
The.plan f,or WATCHTOWERcalLed for i;wo separate tandlngsr
.one by the divlslonts maln body neal, [unga pol-nt on Cuadal_
canal and the other on the Florlda €tde of Sea1ark Channel
by
an assaull, group bu1lt around the 2d Battalion, 5th Marlnes,
and the lst Ralder and parachute Battallon8.
Accordlng !o tn_
telflgence of the enemy gleaned from Al_lIed coastwatcher r€porlrs
and reconnalssancef1lghts, the strongest ieststance
cgufd be
expected from JapaneEe defendlng Tulag1 and two nearby
fortl-
fled ls1ets, Gavutu and Tanarnbogo. Enernya1r and naval reac_
tlon to the assault was expected to be vlofent and gtrong,
on 7 August, tbe prelandlng estlmalr€s of Japanese defenses
proved accurate. After a prellmlnary bombardmentby crulsers
and destroyers, the assault waves boated 1n shlps, landlng craft
raced ashore on both Guadalcanal and Tulagl, On the blg l6tand
there was no eneny response; naval gunflre had drlven the
labor
troops worklng on the alnfleld lnto the hlllF that rlnxled the

4
 'lne prlnary obsiacles to the MarJne advance
kunal grass plaln'
effect of the hot' humld
were the Jungle and 1;heenervatlng
troplcs' By nl-ghtfal"l on D-Day'
cllmate on men not used to the
In posltlons Just short
Ceneral Vandegrllt's rnenwere dug 1n
contact thelr flrst enerny
of the alrf1e1d slte and had yet to

soldler.
and lts nelghborlng lslets took
The capture of Tulagl
durlng whlch the three bat-
three desperai,e days of flghtlng
add ltelght to Amer-
tallons of the 2d Mal:Ines were cornmltted to

lcanalttacks'TheJapanesedefenders'aboutl''OOOnavalland-
up In oaves and p111-
1ng, avlatlon, and labor troops, holed
tank-lnfantry attacks'
boxes and fouitht to the death agalnst

polnt-blank artJ.lfery llre, and close-1n grenade and snaLl arms

survlvors
assault$. lwenby-seven prlaoDers and a sprlnklinlg of
was lefli of the enemy
that sltam to Florlda Island vtere all that

garrlson when the last shot had been flred'

launched fron a1r
The siJxongest Japanese countetmoves were

and sea. On D-Day afternoon, eneny bombers -attacked and scored

a h1t on an Alncrlcan destPoyer" Da11y for month'sthereafter'

a resplte or A1l1ed
except when fou1 weather gave the Marlnes
concentratlng on
alrcraft lnter:cepted' Japanese planes ralded'
but turnlng fre-
shLpplng vlhcn 1t was present olf the beaches
Tfe
quent attentlon to the dlvlrjlon beachhead on Guadalcanal'

unwelcome lntruslons of enemy warshlps had an even more lmpor-

on tne course of the carnpalgn' Seven Japanese

tant effect

cruiser$ attacked on the nlght of 8-9 August and the bavoc

Torpedoes and gunllre sank four Allled

wrought vras stallger1ng.
crulsers and badly damaged another and two destroyers. The
attacklng force sa11ed alray lntact.

The grave rlsk posed by enemy alr and naval attacks

pronpted Adnlral Turner to wllhdraw the transports and cargo
veasels gtandlng off the beaAhes late on 9 August. On board
the shlps that left was a good part of the ratlons and amrnunl-
tlon that the 1st Dlvlslon had counted upon havlng 1n lrs
supply dumps and nearly f ,ltoo Marlnes ol shlp8r \rnloadlng de_

ta1ls and reserve unlts. 'I'henen and supplles returned

to
Esplrltu Santo and New Cal.edon1a, ijwo of the nearest forqvard

bases, eventually reachlng Gua(talcanal agaln but not before

bhelr absense was sorely fe]t.

Cast loose, or a, best promlsed oDly a tenuou8 llfeflne

back to rear. ar:eas, the .L$t lvtar,J-ne

D1vl.slon set out to make do
wlth what lL had. o a D 1 , u ) l e de n e n i y n a t e r l e l was used to the
fuflest extenti u € r a p o n $w e r e m a d e p a r t o f t h e d e f e n F e B , f o o d

stocks wer.e added to btte r"atlon dumps, and trucks were pu! ro

work haullng supplles. General Vandegr,ltt posted h:ls troops

t o h o l d p e r l m c L e r d e f c n s e s a . L o n g5 , O O Oy a x d e o f t h e c o a s t b e t r ^ r e e n

Alll8ator Creek and Kuh:m vlllage and along an arc lnland whlch
e n c o m p a s s e dt h e a l r ' f l e l d s1te, Wlthln the perlmeter, englneera

worked arout)d tile clock, flnJshlng bhe Job the Japanese had be-

gun, 1n order to ready an al..sbr1p to handle planes. B y _ t BA u g u 6 t ,

1t wa-s ready, bul; au en(jrjly bon,bl.rrgi:ald l.n{:Jck{r,l1t out, and 1t
w a s t h e 2 o 1 r hb e f o r e t h e I ' l r s t , A : l l 1 e d a 1 r u n l t s tanded.

6
 plans ttas the con-
Irundamental ta succeas of }^IATC}]1'OIJER

cept that alrcralt would form part ol the defendlng lorce and.

eventually the means of caryylng the f1ght up the Solonons

chaln to eneny bases. The 1n1tla1 runway, and the alrfleld

complex thab was gradually bullt wlthln the Marlne perJ-melrer,

w a s n a m e dH e n d e r s o n F l e l d after a Marlne ffyer who was kIlfed

at the Battlle of Mldway, The flr.st flylng unl.ls to reach

Ilendcreon were Marlne Fl8hber Squadron 223 and Marlne Scout-

Sonbel' Squerdr'on23i: whicl, flcw Ln fron the escort carrler Lo-ng

TsIand. [ ; J c 4 o c d t n g f ] l , _ , h L so f M a r l . n c a n d A r m y p l a n e s s t r a g e d

throuigh the New Hebrldes to reach the I'leld, ahd Navy dlve
'uonlbor:,0
from tihe danraged cal.r.ler lln,l-erp_r1s e Jolned the growlng

1'ol]car.

On S liepLember, Ileadquari,er$ of the 1sL Marlne Alrcraft

WIng irnder llrl.gacller General Roy S, 0elger arrlved on Guadal--
{:rrral itnd took conrDand ()1' the conDoslte organlzatl.on that came

lo be known as CACTUSA1r lrorce after the code name of the 1s-

Land. d a s a 1 ! , / a y sp p e d o r n l n e n t l y a
Al.thou8h Gelgerr$ cbmrnanw

i v l a r l - o co u t f l t , 1t never lost ljhe Jolnt servlcd rnake-up of lts

eilrly dayri. T h e J 1 1 g h 1 re c h e l o n s o f 2 1 M a r l n e s q u a d r o n s s e r v e d

:iri the lorward ai:ea dur'lnB the batlrle to hofd Guadalcanal, but

only a few of Lh(: unlt ground echelons reached the lsland. The
l.'csuftlfr8 burdelr thr:'own on lhe unc:erstlength grolurd crews that

k e p t t h e r n l s c e l l a n e o u s c o l . l . e c t 1 o n o f p a 1 ; c h e da n d s h o t - u p a 1 r -

craft flylng was treneDdous, but the Job was accompllshed wlth

Ingenulby and dlspatch. The l$olated nature of the flrst montho

of fightlng on Guadalcanal bred a conlradeshlp of adverstty wlth
an attltude that the Ist Marlne Dlvlslon and lts supportlng

a1r could acconpflsh the lmpos91ble.

The Japanese hlgh conmand at Rabau:L asslgned bhe taak of

elaslng the Amerlcan posltlon on Guadalcanal to the Seventeenth

Army, but rnade the nlstake of undere st lmab1ng. the s|rength and

tenaclty of the Marlnes ashore and ln the a1r. The nirmber of

eneny troops avalfable and unco! nltted In August and September,

ir€ny of them combat veterans of the flghtlng 1n Chlna and the

Phtl1pp1nes, was more than enough to have overwhelmed the Hen-

derson F1eld defenses. But l,he Seventeenth Arny sent 1ts forces

to the lslancl p:teoemeal, a babtallon or a reglment at a the,

never ln sufllclent.force l t o m o u n l ;a n d g r l s t a l n a p l : o f o n g e d

atLack,

Gener:alVanclegrlflt, on lil.s parb, l(ept 8tl:ong ancl agBres-

s l v e c o r n b a t p a l ) . ' o .sl f o l n t a r d o J ' h 1 $ : l i n e s a n d ' l a u r r c h e c l l m l t e d

offenslves to keep the 'Iapanese ofr balance. He never over-

comrnltted hls nen or unclertook taFll(s that would place a severe

straln on hls resources. tle lrad a mJsslcn--hold llenderson

'll ed J.t.
!'lefd. -ar,o I e rIl {
The Japanese meihod ot' bu1ldl.ng up thelr forceo on 0uadal-

canal, and the lnpetuoslty ol .iapanese Ieaders, lurnlshed the

pattern of the slx-mollth-1ong batrtle to retake the 1s1and. A

few thousand men at d tlrne woul(l land from fransports outslde

the perimeter and then would attack almost J.nmed1ately. The

actlon at the threatened poilit would be bltberly fou€iht wlth

focal advantage whlpFawlng bac}: tln{l forth, but wl1-,h the de-

f e n d e r a a l w a y s a b l e l , o c o r r c . r l i r . ' a l , : t - ' e n o L r ig. h

c;jerve strenglh to

beat the Japane$e back w-!lh clrtg8er'1llg Ioirres.

 The ground actlon on Guadalcariaf revolved around a serles

of hlghpolnts of lntense flghtlng wlth lnLervals marked by

vlgorous patrol oonbat. In n1d-August, the Marlnes located

and engaged the ortglnal 1s1and garrlson ln posl.tlons about

6,000 yards west ol Kukum beyond the Matanlkau Rlver- Then on

the 21st, a relnlorced enemy battallon whlch had Just landed

east of the perlmeter rushed the Marlne defenses along Alllgator

Creek, often rnlsnameclthe Tenartr R1ver. The JapaneE-' force was

destroyed.
1 ' h e s a r n ef a N e b e f e l l a brlgade ol 6,000 men whl'ch landdd

on both $lde$ of the per:lmeter ln late Arrgust and early Sep-

tember. Movlng through the June;]e wlth h1s maln body, the

e n e n y c o m m a n d e ra t t e m p t e d t o l a u n c h a t h r e e - p r o n g e d a t t a c k

from lnland and both flanks, The spolt choosen for lthe J-nland

drtve throuelh to fhe alrfleld was a rld8e nlanned by tl)e orlg1nal"

assault troops at Tulagl whon Ceneral VandegrXft had brought

over to relnforce ill.s del'enses, Marlne ralders, parachutlsts,

lnfantryrnen, ploneers, and artltler:ynen all a hand ln the

"had
two-day battl.e to hold tbe rldge, bui when the last enemy sol-

dler wlthdrew on f4 seplenber, the posltlon was stll1 1n tunerl-

can possess-j.on, The enemy flank attack,s planned to accornpany

the maln assault faded away, Ln the face of stronE! Marlne de-

fenses near the coaet.

iihll e Lhe fst Irlvlslor was holdlng lts own, helped along

by the faulLy re lnforcement $trategy of the Japanese, the

A m e r l c a n N a v Y w a s s uf f e r l n g the worst serles of reverees 1n 1ts

hlstory. Ttle Japaneae and t h e A m e r : 1 c a n s ,t h e l a t t e r bolstered

9
on occaslon by Austraflan and New Zealand shlps, tangled re-

peatedly ln the waters off Cuaddlcanal and 1n the Solomon Sea'

Sealark cbannel on a new tltle' lron-Bottor0 Sound, ln dublous

tribute to the number of shlps that sank there durlng frequent

and costlY nlght battles.

The over-al1 score of shlps lost from August through

but ln the flnal analysls hurt the

December vJas staggerl.ng,
dlfferlng re-
Japanese more than the Anerlcans because of the
pfacement potentlaL of the two natlons' Two Anerlcan carrlers'

13 destroyers, and a score of snaller vessels were

6 crulsers,
The Japanese
sunk; many nore ships \rere severel"y damaged'
ltwo battleshlps, three crulsers' and e]even
Losi one carrler,

destroyers and had at l.east an equaL nullber damaged'

The declslve facllor ln the sea baLtles In the Solonons

The CACTUSAlr Force and carrler squadrons
was Al.l-1ed alr.

exacted a heavy to11 of transport$ dur'lng Japar)esereinforce-

ment attempts, and often evened the tally when enemy warshlpa

that had come out ahead 1n an exchange of gunflre and torpedoes

at Guadalcanal were caught retlrlng toward nabaul'

On 18 Septenber, the TtlI Marlnes arrlved on Cuadalcanal

fr:on Samoa,Just 1n tlme to test tbemselves agalnst a Japanese

In a successlon
force lhat had landed wesb of the Matanlkau'
Ocbober' the
of sharply lought engagements Lastlnc bhrough 9
exactlng a heavy
lst Dlvlslon turned back the enemy attackers,
of dead and wounded for the aLtenpt to break through the
, to]1
perlneter. The arrlvztl of tlle dlvlslontB m 1 . s s 1 n gr e g l m e n t w a s f o f -

of tlre flrst lnfantry regl-

lowed on 13 October by the landlng

rnent of the Armyts Aner'lca1 DlvlsloL t() reJnforlce the Marlnes'

IO
 were asslgned thelr owri sector of the defense 11ne
T,he soldlers

to hold itnd took part 1n the repulse of the heavlest Japanese

ol' tl'le campalSn durlng atl,acks whlch lasted fron 21-
offenslve
2 8 0 c L o b ec .
The enerny strength at the start of the October offenslve

h a d r e a c h e d 2 0 , O O Or n e n , w h l 1 e G e n e r a l V a n d e g r l l t r s c o m m a n dh a d

on both sldes were ln

$rown to 23,OOO. Many of the conbatants
poor health, however, and the fl-gures do no1;l:ellect lnen ax
peak cornbat efflclency. Troplcal dlseaEes found easy prey among

m€.:nweakelled by nental and phy$jcal $traln and a shortage of

i.at.1.or)s, both bhe Japane$e and Aflelllcan6 had dlff1cu1l'y keeplng

any nore than a bafe subsl.stence fevel of supplles on the ls'

land. Thousands of {rhe Marlnes wlthtn the perlmeter and 1n

ihc front-l.1ne positlons sulfered repeated attacks ol' nalarla

and other" fevera, yet lrhey held on because they had bo' Fo!"

Uhe Japanese In tbe Jungle, the case was even worse as medlclne

and doctors were ln short suppty, food often I'alled to reach

as$aulb lrroops, and hundreds of the eneny dled of malnutrltlon

and dl.sea$e.

November wa$ tihe crltlcal not)th 1n whlcll the l$sue of the

D a m p a l g nw a s d e c l d e d . Desplte te!'r1b1e fosses, the A1:tled

naval forces, a l d c d b y C A 0 T L I SA l . r F o r c e ' w o n a I ' o u r * d a y s e a a n d

a1!' batt].e lor corltrol of the waters of the lower So\omons'

'l'he lst Dlvlslon receiveal lrrrther relnforcement from the Amerlcal

Dlvlslon and from l,he 2d Marlne Dlvlslon and used these fre8h

troops to hamnler at the Japanese posltlorls. A nonth of contln-

uous flghtlng wlth artlllery, ilr, and uaval gunflre support

11
all. playlng a part In the destructlon, vlrtually flnlshed one

Japanese dlvlslon and elenents of anobher.

On 9 December, General Vandegrlft turned over c ofilnand of

the forces on Ouadalcanal to MaJor General Alexander M. Patch,

corrrnander of the Amerlcal Dlv1,s1on, as the J.st Marlne Dlvlslon

vras offlclally rel1eved. The battl.e-weary Marlnes ol the lst,

many of then badly 1n need of trosplLallzaLlon as a r.esult of

thelr bouts wlth troplcal dlseases, departed 1n the next few

days for Australla a n d a m u c h - n e e d e dr e s t , Durlng December

and the flrst few days of the new year, General Patch regrouped

hls forces for a drlve ca.lcu].ated to push the Japanese off the

lsland. The 25th lnlantry Dlvlslon and the remalnlng unlts of

the 2d Marlne DLvlslon arrlved to .Joln the so1d1erg of the

A,'nerlcal ln the fl-lral ol'fensl.ve.

The Xl.V Ar.rnyL'ori,pswa$ organlzed under Ceneral Palrahrs

c o r u n a n dt o c o n t r o . L [ h e a c l r l o n s o f t h e t h r e e d l v l s l . o n s . On ].0

January, the corps launcled Lts aftack west along the coast to-

ward Cape Esperance, the t1p ot' the Island.. fhe advance wa8

hotly contested ln 1ts flrst days, but the Japanese gave way

steadlly befqre the conblned Arny-Marlne offenslve, Late 1n

January, when lntell.lgence was recelved of a bul.ld*up of enemy

shlpplng at Rabaul, Lhe Amerlcan advance was sfowed, Thlnklng

tbat t h l s n e w s m l g h t p r ? e s a g ea l a r g e - s c a l e rel.nforcenent at-

tempt as It had many tlmes prevlously, Ceneral Patch wanted to

keep hIs conbaL forceg concentrated enough to repel a counter,

fandlng. - Bul ihe Jalraneae rhip8 were l)eir,g readled tor another

rea rJon--the eva* uat J-on qf Gun-d,,..

1:rrlriar'1.,

'1,2
 The enerny had had enough' He wlshed only to rescue tne

alive on the 1s1and to f1ght another day' In the

troops st1]l
durlng a serles of darlng nlght runs
.f 1r,st lteek of February,

by destroyer transports, about 13,oOOJaparlese were taken off

cape Esperance. On 8 February, General PaNch could report

on Guadalcanal' '''
"Tota1 and conrpfete deleat of Japanese forces
fn !'rlnnlng control of the 1sland, Marlne and Arny unlts

had over 1,500 offlcers and men kl1Ied and 4,7oo wounded 1n

actlon. llhe Japanese lost 14,800 kllled and counted another

thousand pr"lsoners' nost

9,OOo clead from wounds or dlgease; a
the
of thenr labor 1,roops, were taken. Both sldes lost about
Fhlps and cre}'rmen 1n the battle for
same number of llghtlng

control of the seas, perhaps the most coatfy naval canpalgn 1n

nodern hlutiory. In the alr, lrhe balance welghed heavlly ln

fervor of the Alj^Ies who accounted for 600 eneny planes and

pllotE and lost less than half as rnany1n tet'urn' tu1 account-

lng of comparatlve fosses durlng the Battte for Guadalcanal

o!r:l.y crnpha€lzcs the lmp;rtance of' the canpalgn. The selzure

of the l5land fror0 the Japanese was tbe aLl-lnportant flr€t

step .fondard on the road to Tokyo, the slgnaL of bhe end to a

)'ear of retreat and thc sl'Iltch to the offenslve'

13
 SNLECTEDBII]LIOGRAPHY

Wesley Frank Craven and Janes Lea Cates, eds. The Paclflc:
O u a d a l c a n a l t o S a l p a n . A u q u s L l 9 / r 2 t o -Jcuhl T , yc a1 s9-1o1: f : - - T h e
T r n r , y - n f r F o r c e s 1 n -h l o r l d - \ , i a r I I , v . t r . unlver-
sTEi or c6rcago-Fieirs, rg5d lp. St-\o.
LtcoL Frank O. Hough, USMCHM , a J U e r l e E . L u d w l g , U S M C ,a n d
Henry L Shaw, Jr. Pearl Harbq! to Cuadalaanal - - -Hls tory*
s! u. !. 4.r1"s_ !,qrpg Qpc! g._a-c -0 ]-E .q,o-rfq l'ai f I, v.-f .
-Is1on,
wasF lng t oni'-H I s-to r-f c a f- er a rrcti, -3 D H;adquarters,
U. S. Marlne Corps, 1958. pp. 235-374.

Jeter A. Isely and Phl1lp A, Crowl . The U. S. Marlnes and

l bL o us w a r , P r l n c e t o n :
A m p h---M Prl;a;ton 0ntv6r"sTlf, Fress,
T.ar 72-r 6c

Rlchard W. Johnsbon. f'of 19!.rygJ lhe_ SLory of -the Second Marlne

Dlvlq1o!1 -!r) ,UqL1{Xar II':- NewYork: Ra;doml{;ft;;-19tr81-
pp. zr-|Jrl-
ceorse McMlllan. f.i-r.._e. -4 IU.q!,Sin.9,_l
9r0 .9r9_e-9_: .Lbgl1.r.S_.r.
Irgtllg
Dlvlsl.on Ln World War'.l:I. l{n$blnqton: frfantrv Journal
Pn6cc .h 2a_Irr?"

John Mllfer, Jr, .qugqqlg_Cla l: the_Flrs! !!len! lye - - -!he_ War

l n t h e P a c l--ifu
flc---Unlted StateE Arny ln World War II.
riEsfr
iiic t on st oiTca1 5Tvr 6loF,'-Debtr.rThent
6f*tfrE nrny,
1 9 4 9 . x v l 1 1 , / l Jl p p .
Samuel ELlot Morlson. Corq! Seq, !{lq_gaJ_.qnd Actlons,
.qU!I]C!-LD_9
tu4yfp42,-Ausu!t-tgtte:-!,f c&IJ- 9!. Uff=q-ttrI9!-I?@-*
--fftTte,
OGrEt-rons iq EoFft-ilqr If;-t.- TV.--BosEoi'r: erown
eiE'Tompanv, r5\,i: w: 745-296.
Ibe ,St Lr.€g-l.e,loJ Grradal.c ana 1- - -H!s,!-S!y
-gnowngpgl1qt.-Lq!1!
o f U n l t e d S t a t e s NgVaI In Worlq Var JI, v. V.
EosEoil--l:iTIIe , a;d cdrnpany, l95Ol- ,(x11,-iB9 pp.
Robert Sherrod. H!p-t_o-f"U of Marlne qSlps 4y_1nt_19nln World War II.
Washlngtonr C o m b a t F orces Pr:ess, 1952. pp. b5-129.

MaJ John L. zlrnmerman, USMCII. Thg q-q3q-e-lqq]141!am!e1g!.

Washlngton: Hlsi,or'lcal Dlvlslon, lleadquarbers, U. S.
Marlne Corps, 1949 v1, 189 pp.

.t/l