The Question of the Other

Author(s): Luce Irigaray and Noah Guynn

Source: Yale French Studies, No. 87, Another Look, Another Woman: Retranslations of French
Feminism (1995), pp. 7-19
Published by: Yale University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2930321
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 LUCE IRIGARAY

The Question ofthe Other

Westernphilosophy,perhapsall philosophy,has been constructed

arounda singularsubject.Forcenturies, no oneimaginedthatdifferent
subjectsmightexist,or thatman and womanin particularmightbe
differe'nt
subjects.
Ofcourse,sincetheendofthenineteenth century, moreattention
has beenpaid to thequestionoftheother.The philosophicalsubject,
henceforth morea sociologicalsubject,becamea bitless imperialist,
acknowledging thatidentitiesdifferent fromhis own indeedexisted:
children,themad,"savages,"workers, forexample.
These empiricaldifferenceshad to be respected;noteveryonewas
thesame,anditwasimportant topaya bitmoreattentiontoothersand
Yetthefundamental
to theirdiversity. modelofthehumanbeingre-
mainedunchanged:one,singular, solitary,historically masculine,the
paradigmatic Westernadultmale,rational,capable.The observeddi-
versitywas thusthoughtofand experienced in a hierarchicalmanner,
themanyalwayssubjugatedbytheone.Otherswereonlycopiesofthe
idea of man, a potentiallyperfectidea, which all the more or less
imperfect copieshadtostruggle to equal.Theseimperfect copieswere,
moreover, notdefinedin andofthemselves, in otherwords,as a differ-
but ratherweredefinedin termsofan ideal subjec-
ent subjectivity,
tivityandas a functionoftheirinadequacieswithrespecttothatideal:
age, reason,race,culture,and so on. The model of the subjectthus
remainedsingularand the "others"represented less ideal examples,
hierarchizedwithrespectto the singularsubject.This philosophical
modelcorresponds, furthermore, to thepoliticalmodelofthe leader
consideredto be the best,indeedthe onlyone capable of governing

? 1995byYaleUniversity.
YFS 87,AnotherLook,AnotherWoman,ed. Huffer,

7
8 YaleFrenchStudies
citizensmoreorless worthy
oftheiridentityas humanbeings,moreor
less civil.

This positionrelativeto the notionof othernessno doubtexplains

Simonede Beauvoir'srefusalto identify womanwiththe other.Not
wantingto be "second" withrespectto the masculinesubject,she
asks,as a principleofsubjectivity, tobe man'sequal,tobe thesameas,
or similarto,him.
Fromthepointofviewofphilosophy, thatpositionentailsa return
to thesingular, historicallymasculine,subject,andtheinvalidationof
thepossibilityofa subjectivity otherthanman's.Ifde Beauvoir'scriti-
cal workon thedevalorization ofwomanas "secondary"in cultureis
valid on one level,herrefusalto considerthe questionofwomanas
"other"represents, philosophically and evenpolitically,a significant
regression. In fact,herthinking less advancedthanthat
is historically
of certainphilosopherswho ponderthe notionofpossiblerelation-
shipsbetweentwoormoresubjects:existential, personalist, orpoliti-
cal philosophers. In thesameway,sheis notat theforefront ofwomen's
struggles to be recognizedas havingtheirown identity.
Simonede Beauvoir'spositiveassertionsrepresent, in myview,a
theoreticaland practicalerror,since they imply the negation of
an/other (woman)[d'un[e] autrel] equal in valueto thatofthesubject.
The principalfocusofmyworkon femininesubjectivityis, in a
way,theinverseofde Beauvoir'sas faras the questionoftheotheris
concerned.Insteadof saying,"I do not want to be the otherof the
masculinesubjectand,in orderto avoidbeingthatother,I claimto be
hisequal," I say,"The questionoftheotherhasbeenpoorlyformulated
in theWestern tradition,fortheotheris alwaysseenas theotherofthe
same,theotherofthesubjectitself,ratherthanan/othersubject[un
autresujet2],irreducible to themasculinesubjectand sharingequiva-
lentdignity. It all comesdowntothesamething:in ourtradition there
has neverreallybeen an otherofthephilosophicalsubject,or,more
generally, oftheculturaland politicalsubject.
Theother (OftheOtherWoman,thesecondary titleofSpeculum)must
beunderstood butalsoinother
as a noun.InFrench, suchas
languages,
Italianand English,thisnounis supposedto designate man and
originalsuggestsseveralpossiblereadings:"ofan other,""ofa feminine
1. Irigaray's
other,""ofanothersubject,"and "ofanotherwoman."[Translator's Note]
originalsuggestseither"anothersubject"or"a subjectwhichis other."
2. Irigaray's
[Translator'sNotel
 LUCE IRIGARAY 9
woman.Withthissecondary title,I wishedto showthattheotheris,in
fact,notneutral,neithergramatically, norsemantically, thatit is not,
orthatit is no longer,
possibleto designateindifferently boththemas-
culineand thefeminineusingthesameword.This practiceis current
in philosophy, religion,and politics:we speakoftheexistenceofthe
other,oflovefortheother,ofanxietyabouttheother,etc.Butwe donot
ask the questionof who or what this otherrepresents. This lack of
precisionin thenotionoftheother'salterity has paralyzedthought-
includingthedialecticalmethod-in an idealisticdreamappropriated
bya single(masculine)subject,in theillusionofa singularabsolute,
and has leftreligionand politicsto an empiricism whichfundamen-
tallylacksethicsinsofaras respectforothersis concerned. Infact,ifthe
otheris not definedaccordingto its actualreality, it is no morethan
anotherself,nota trueother;it can thusbe eithermoreorlessthanI,
and it can have eithermoreorless thanI. It can thusrepresent (my)
absolutegreatnessor (my)absoluteperfection, the Other:God, the
Ruler,logos;it can designatethesmallestor themostimpoverished:
children,the sick,the poor,strangers; it can name the one whom I
believeto be myequal. Trulythereis no otherin all this,onlymoreof
thesame: smaller,larger, equal to me.3
Instead ofrefusingto be the othergender[1autre genre4],the other
sex, what I ask is to be considered as actually an/otherwoman [une
autre], irreducibleto the masculine subject. From this point of view,
the secondary title of Speculum might have seemed offensiveto Si-
mone de Beauvoir: Of the Other Woman. At the time of its publica-
tion, I sent her my book in all good faith,hopingforher supportin the
difficultiesI encountered. I never received a response, and it is only
recentlythatI came to understandthe reason forher silence. No doubt
I must have offendedher without wishing to. I had read the "Introduc-
tion" to The Second Sex well beforeI wrote Speculum, and could no
longer recall what was at stake in the problematic of the other in de
Beauvoir's work. Perhaps,forher part,she didn't understandthat for

3. Irigaray,J'aimea toi. Esquisse d'une fflicitWdans 1'histoire(Paris:Editions

Grasset,1992),103-04.
4. The word"genre"corresponds to theEnglishword"gender"onlyinthesenseof
grammatical gender(anelementoftheFrenchlanguagewhichcannotbe translated into
English),and thereis no otherobvioustranslation forIrigaray's
use oftheword.The
words"kind,""type,""category," or "sort"do notnecessarily implygendered alterity
(whether grammatical orotherwise), andtheword"gender"is,strictly speaking, a mis-
translationof"genre"as it is used here.I havethereforetranslatedit in variousways
accordingto contextandhavenotedparenthetically whereverthewordappearsin the
originaltext.ITranslator's
Note]
10 Yale FrenchStudies
me my sex or my gender[genre]werein no way "second,"but that
sexesorgendersare two,withoutbeingfirstor second.
In my own way,and in totalignoranceoftheirwork,I pursueda
problematicclosetothatoftheAmericanpromoters ofNeofeminism,
a feminismthatvalorizesdifference, one morecloselyrelatedto the
culturalrevolution ofMay 1968thantode Beauvoir'segalitarian femi-
nism. Let's recall,briefly, what is at stake in this problematic:the
exploitationofwomantakesplace in thedifference betweenthegen-
ders[genres]and therefore mustbe resolvedwithindifference rather
thanby abolishingit. In Speculum,I interpret and critiquehow the
philosophicalsubject,historicallymasculine,has reducedall other-
ness to a relationshipwithhimself-as complement, projection,flip
side, instrument, nature-inside his world,his horizons.As much
through Freudiantextsas through themajorphilosophicalmethodsof
ourtradition, I showhowtheotheris alwaystheotherofthesameand
notan actualother.
Thus my critiquesofFreudall come downto a singleinterpreta-
tion: you (Freud)onlysee the sexuality, and moregenerallytheiden-
tity,of the littlegirl,the adolescentgirl,or womanin termsof the
sexualityand identityofthelittleboy,theadolescentboy,orman.For
example,in yourview,thelittlegirl'sauto-eroticism lastsonlyas long
as she continuesto confuseherclitoriswitha small penis; in other
words,sheimaginesthatshehas thesamesexualorganas a boy.When
she discovers,through hermother, thatwomandoesn'thavethesame
sexualorganas man, the little renounces
girl thevalueofherfeminine
identityin orderto turntowardthefather, towardman,and seeks to
obtaina penis byprocuration. All hereffortsare directedtowardthe
conquestofthemale sexualorgan.Eventheconceivingand engender-
ingofa childhas onlya singlegoal: theappropriation ofthepenisorof
the phallus; and this beingthe case, a male child is preferable to a
femalechild.Thus, a marriagecannotsucceed,a womancannotbe-
come a goodwife,untilshe givesherhusbanda male child.
These dayssucha description wouldmakemanywomen,andeven
manymen,laugh.Butjust a few yearsago,barelytwentyyearsback,a
woman who directedour attentionto our culture'sstaggering ma-
chismowas laughedat andwas notallowedto teachat theuniversity.
Yettodaythingshavenotbecomeas clearas it mightseem.True,a bit
oflighthas beenshedon thissubject,but,ifFreudiantheoryis macho,
it merelyreproducesan existingsocioculturalorder:Freud,in this
sense,did not inventmachismo;he merelynotedit. Wherehe goes
 LUCE IRIGARAY 11
wrongis in his cures:likede Beauvoir,he doesnotrecognizetheother
as other;and, albeit in different ways,theybothproposethatman
remainthe singularmodelofthe subject,whichwomanmusttryto
equal. Man andwoman,through quitedifferentstrategies,mustthere-
forebecomealike. This ideal conforms to thatoftraditionalphiloso-
phy,whichseeksa singularmodelofsubjectivity, onewhichis histori-
callymasculine.
At best,this singularmodel would allow fora balancingact be-
tweenthe one and the many,but the one remainsthemodelwhich,
moreorless openly,controlsthehierarchy ofmultiplicity:thesingular
is uniqueand/butideal,Man. Concretesingularity is onlya copyofthe
ideal,an image.The Platonicviewoftheworld,itsnotionoftruth,is,
in a certainsense,theinverseofday-to-day empiricalreality:yoube-
lievethatyouarea reality, a singulartruth,butyouareonlya relatively
goodcopyofa perfectidea ofyourself situatedoutsideofyourself.
Heretoo,we can'tlaughtoo soon,forwe mustfirstponderthestill
current pertinence ofsucha conceptionoftheworld:we arechildrenof
thefleshbutalso oftheword,naturebutalso culture.Now,childrenof
culturesignifieschildrenoftheidea,incarnations thatconform, more
orless,to theideal model.Often,in orderto liveup to thismodel,we
mimic,imitatelikechildren, thatwhichwe perceivetobe ideal.These
areall Platonicwaysofbeinganddoing,andall conform toa masculine
notionoftruth.Evenin thereversalconstituted bytheprivilegeofthe
manyovertheone,a verycurrent reversaloftencalleddemocracy, even
in theprivilegeoftheotheroverthesubject,oftheyouovertheI (I am
thinking, forexample,ofcertainworksbyBuberand a certainpartof
Levinas'sworkin whichtheseprivilegesareperhapsmoremoraland
theologicalthanphilosophical), we justendup witha stand-inforthe
modelofthe one and the many,oftheone and the same,in whicha
singularsubjectinflectsone meaningratherthananother.In thesame
way,privileging concretesingularityoverideal singularity does not
allow us to challengetheprivilegeofa universalcategory validforall
menandall women.In fact,eachconcretesingularity cannotdecreean
ideal valid forall men and all women,and, to ensurecohabitation
betweensubjects,notablywithinthe republic,only a minimumof
universality is required.
To get out fromunderthisall-powerful model ofthe one and the
many,we mustmoveon to themodelofthetwo,a twowhichis nota
replicationofthesame,noronelargeandtheothersmall,butmadeup
oftwowhicharetrulydifferent. The paradigmofthetwolies in sexual
12 YaleFrenchStudies
difference. Whythere?Becauseit is therethattwosubjectsexistwho
shouldnotbe placedin a hierarchical relationship,and becausethese
twosubjectssharethecommongoal ofpreserving thehumanspecies
and developing its culture,whilegranting respectto theirdifferences.
My firsttheoreticalgesturewas thusto extricatethetwofromthe
one, the two fromthe many,the otherfromthe same, and to do so
horizontally,suspendingtheauthority oftheOne: ofman,thefather,
theleader,theone god,thesingulartruth,etc.It involvedmakingthe
otherstandout fromthesame,refusing to be reducedto theotherof
thesame,totheother(manorwoman)oftheone,notbybecominghim
orbecominglikehim,butbyinventing myselfas an autonomousand
different subject.
Clearlythisgesturecalls intoquestionour entiretheoreticaland
practicaltradition,particularlyPlatonism,butwithoutsucha gesture
we cannotspeakofwomen'sliberation, norofan ethicalbehaviorwith
respecttotheother,norofdemocracy. Withoutsucha gesture, philoso-
phyitselfrisksitsowndemise,vanquishedalongwithotherthingsby
theuse oftechniquesthat,in theconstruction ofthelogos,undermine
manessubjectivity, an easierand quickervictoryifwomanno longer
maintainsthepole ofnaturestandingoppositeto masculinetechne.
The existenceoftwosubjectsis probablytheonlythingthatcan bring
themasculinesubjectback to his being,and thisthanksto woman's
access to herownbeing.
To accomplishthisgoal,thefemininesubjecthad to be freedfrom
theworldofman to makewayfora philosophicalscandal:thesubject
is not one,noris it singular.

Nextand at thesame time,thisfemininesubject,justbarelydefined,

lackingoutlinesandedges,withoutnormsormediations,neededtobe
mappedout, in orderto nourishher and ensureher becoming[son
devenir].Afterthiscriticalphasein myworkthatwas addressedto a
monosubjective, monosexualized,patriarchal,and phallocraticphi-
losophyandculture,I thusattempted todefinesomecharacteristicsof
thefemininesubject,characteristicswhichwerenecessaryto affirm it
as such,forfearthatit mightsuccumbonceagainto a lack ofdifferen-
tiation,thatit mightonceagainbe subjugatedbythesingularsubject.
One importantdimensionofassistingthebecomingofthefeminine
subject,andthusmyownbecoming,was to escapefroma singlefigure
of genealogicalpower,to maintainthat "I was bornof man and of
woman,and thatgenealogicalauthority belongsbothto man and to
 LUCE IRIGARAY 13
woman."It was thusimportant to retrieve
femininegenealogiesfrom
oblivion,nottorepresstheexistenceofthefather pureandsimple,in a
kindofreversalcherishedbypreviousphilosophicalmethods,but to
returnto therealityofthetwo.Butit'struethatit takestimeto locate
and restorethistwo,and it cannotbe theworkofone womanonly.
Aside fromthe returnto and reconcilationwithgenealogy, with
feminine genealogies-whicharestilla longwayoff-woman,women,
neededa language,images,and representations whichsuitedthem
on a culturallevel,evenon a religiouslevel,godbeingthephilosophi-
cal subject'sgreataccomplice.I begantoworkon thisin Speculumand
Ce sexe qui n'en estpas un andcontinuedtheprojectnotablyin Sexes
etparentes,Le tempsde la difference, andJe,tu,nous.5In thoseworks,
I discusstheparticularities ofthefeminineworld-a worlddifferent
fromthatofman-with respectto language,withrespectto thebody
(toage,to health,to beauty,and,ofcourse,to maternity), withrespect
to work,withrespectto natureand theworldofculture.Two exam-
ples:I attemptto showthatlife'sunfolding forwomanthan
is different
it is forman,since it consistsforwomenofmuchmorepronounced
physicalstages(puberty, loss ofvirginity,
maternity, menopause)and
requiresa subjectivebecomingwhichis farmorecomplexthanman's.
As faras workis concerned, I showthatsocioeconomicjusticedoesnot
consistofmerelyputtinga ruleintopractice-"equal workforequal
pay"-but consistsalso ofrespecting and valorizingwomenin terms
ofchoicein theendsand meansofproduction, professional
qualifica-
tions,relationships in theworkplace,social recognition ofwork,and
so on.
In these works,I also began to speak of the necessityof rights
specificto women.As I havewrittenelsewhere,it is myopinionthat
women'sliberationcannotprogress withouttakingthisstep,as much
on thelevelofsocial recognition as on thelevelofindividualgrowth
and communalrelationships, betweenwomenand betweenwomen
and men.These juridicalproposalswereviewedwithmarkedinterest
and a certainmistrust:intereston thepartofnonspecialist, nonfemi-
nist womenwho understoodthe importanceof what was at stake,
5. Severalofthesebooksexistin Englishlanguageeditions:SpeculumoftheOther
Woman,trans.GillianC. Gill(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1985);ThisSexWhichIs
Not One, trans.CatherinePorter(Ithaca:CornellUniversity Press,1985);Sexes and
Genealogies,trans.GillianC. Gill (NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity Press,1993);andle,
Tuz,
Nous: Tbwarda CultureofDifference, trans.AlisonMartin(NewYork:Routledge,
1993).Le tempsdela difference.
Pourunerevolution pacifique(Paris:Librairie
Generale
Frangaise,1989)doesnotexistin English.(Translator'sNotel
14 YaleFrenchStudies
interestalso onthepartoffeministsin certaincountrieswhohavelong
beenconcernedwiththenecessarymediationofthelaw in thelibera-
tionofhumankind, and particularly
in women'sliberation.
Resistancecamefromwomenoftwodifferent persuasions.Women
in favorof egalitarianismdo not understandthe necessityofspecial
rightsforwomen;theyagreethatequal rightswithmen mustbe ob-
tained;theyare readyto struggleagainstdiscrimination; buttheydo
not payattentionto thefactthatwomenare forcedto make specific
choicesin theirrelationships withmen,and thatthe choicescannot
remainindividualorprivatebutmustbe guaranteedbylaw: thefree-
domofchoicein reproduction, workpatterns, sexuality,
theraisingof
minorsin cases ofdivorceorseparation,keepingin mindthecontext
ofmulticultural marriages,wheretraditionalspousalrightsdiffer be-
tweencultures.In myview,thelack ofspecialrightsforwomendoes
not allow themto move froma stateof natureto a civilizedstate:
the majorityremainnature-bodies, subservientto the State,to the
Church,to fatherand husband,withoutaccess to the statusofcivil-
ians,responsibleforthemselvesand thecommunity.
Womenwhoaremoresensitiveto a cultureorpoliticsofdifference
also contestthenecessityofcivilrightsspecifictowomen,fortheyfear
thelaw as requiring servitudeto theState.Yetcivilrightsforindivid-
ual personsrepresent, on the contrary,a guaranteethatcitizenscan
opposethepoweroftheStateas such;theymaintaina tensionbetween
individualsandtheState,andcan evenensuretheevolutionofa state-
controlledsocietyinto a civil society,whose democraticcharacter
wouldbe supportedbypeople'sindividualrights.
I can onlyhope thatwomenunderstandand promotewhat is at
stakein individualrights,bothbecause theserightsare essentialto
protectthemand to affirm theiridentity,and because as feminine
subjects,theyaremorereadyto takean interestin rightshavingto do
withtheindividualandwithrelationships betweenindividuals,rather
than in rightsdeterminedby assets-possessions, property, belong-
ings-rightswhichmake up the majorityof masculinecivil codes.
Existingcivilcodesand constitutions wouldhaveto be completedby
includingrightsforwomen and rightsdefinedaccordingto women's
spirit[genie],in otherwords,beyondsexual specificity, forcitizens
(bothmen and women)as people.

The unique characteroffemininespirit[genie]also leads me backto

thequestionoftheotherin thisfinalsectionofmyessay.
 LUCE IRIGARAY 15
Havingbecomean autonomoussubject,it is nowwoman'sturnto
situateherselfwith respectto the other,and the specificity of her
identityallows herto paymuchmoreattentionto the dimensionof
alterityin the processof subjectivebecoming[le devenirsubjectif].
Traditiondictatesthatwomanis theguardianofloveandhas imposed
on herthedutyofloving,andoflovingdespitethemisfortunes oflove,
withoutexplainingwhyshe mustperform sucha task.
I certainly
willnotbecomean accomplicetothiskindofimperative
on the subjectof love, nor to the correspondingimperativeof hate
whichseemsto me to be its complementary principle.
Rather,I will pass on to you resultsobtainedfromresearchinto
thewayin whichlittlegirls,adolescentgirls,and womenspeak,and
will propose an interpretation of the characteristicsof feminine
language.6
The languagethemostawareoftheotheris thatofthelittlegirl.
She addressesherselfto the other-in my researchsample,to the
mother-askingforheragreement concerning an activitytheywill do
together:"Mommy,will you playwithme?"; "Mommy,can I comb
yourhair?" In suchstatements, thelittlegirlalwaysrespectstheexis-
tenceoftwosubjects,each havingtherightto speak.Moreover, what
she suggestsis an activitywhichinvolvesthe participationof both
subjects.In thisrespect,the littlegirlmightserveas a modelforall
men and women,includingthe mother,who addressesherdaughter
usingwordslike these: "You'll have to put yourthingsawayif you
want to watchTV"; "Pick up some milk on yourway home from
school." The mothergivesordersto thedaughterwithoutrespecting
therightofbothsubjectsto speak,andsheproposesnothingthatthey
mightdo together, as two [a"deux].Interestingly, the motherspeaks
differently witha boy;she is morerespectful ofhis identity:"Do you
wantme to come to yourroomand kiss you goodnight?" As forthe
littleboy,he alreadyspeakslikea littleleader:"I wanttoplaywiththe
ball"; "I wanta toycar." In a way,themothergivesthelittleboytheyou
whichthelittlegirlhas givenher.
Whydoes thelittlegirllike dialogueso much?Doubtlessbecause
as a woman,bornofwoman,withthequalitiesandcharacteristics ofa
woman,includingtheabilityto givebirth,thelittlegirlfindsherself,
as soonas sheis born,in thepositionofhavingrelationships withtwo
subjects.This would also explainhertastefordolls onto whichshe

6. On thistopic,see myJ'aimea toi.

16 Yale FrenchStudies
projectsa nostalgiafordialoguewhichwas notalwayssatisfiedbythe
mother.
Yet the littlegirlwill lose this,herfirst,femininepartnerin dia-
logue,in thelearningofa culturein whichthesubjectis alwaysstill
masculine-he, He, they[ii,Ii, ils7]-whetherit is a linguisticcate-
gory[genrelinguistique]in the strictsense or various metaphors
which supposedlyrepresenthuman identityand its becoming[son
devenir].
Forall that,neithertheyounggirlnortheadolescentgirlrenounces
herrelationshipwiththeother:theyalmostalwaysprefera relation-
shipwiththe otherovera relationshipwiththe object.Thus, when
asked to givea sentenceusingthe preposition"with" or the adverb
"together," femaleadolescentsand students,and manyadultwomen,
will respondwithstatementssuch as: "I'll go out withhimtonight";
or"We'llalwayslivetogether." Male subjectsinsteadrespond:"I came
withmymotorcycle";"I wrotethissentencewithmypencil";or"Me
and myguitararegoodtogether."
Thisdifference betweenthestatements offemaleandmalesubjects
is expressedin one way or anotherthroughoutthe majorityof re-
sponsesto a seriesofquestionswhichseek to definethe sexualized
characteristics oflanguage.(Theresearchwas conductedin a varietyof
languagesand cultures,mostlyRomanceand Anglo-Saxon.)
Besides the alternationbetweena masculine choice of subject-
object relationsand a femininechoice of subject-subject relations,
thereare otherimportant characteristicsofdifference:womenprefer
the presentand futuretenses,contiguity, a concreteenvironment,
relationsbasedon difference; theypreferbeingwith,beingtwo[l'etre
(a) deux8];men,on the otherhand,preferthe past tense,metaphor,
abstracttransposition, relationshipsbetweenlikes [semblables],but
a
onlythrough relationship withtheobject,relationshipsbetweenthe
one and themany.
Men and womenthus occupydifferent subjectiveconfigurations
and different worlds.And it's not just a questionof sociohistorical
determination or a certainalienationofthefemininewhichcouldbe
done awaywithbymakingit equal to themasculine.True,women's
7. In theFrenchlanguage,thepluralpronomialformis alwaysmasculine-evenif
thepronoundesignates as fewas onemaleoronemasculinesubstantive withina group,
howeverlarge,offemalesorfemininesubstantives-unlessthepronoundesignatesan
exclusivelyfemininecategory. Notel
(Translator's
8. The originalphrasesuggeststhenotionof"beingtogether withanotherperson"
and thatthenatureof"being"itself(existence)involvesduality.ITranslator's
Notel
 LUCE IRIGARAY 17
languagedoes pointto variouskindsofalienationandpassivity, butit
also demonstratesan inherentrichnesswhichleaves nothingto be
desiredfrommen'slanguage,inparticular, a tasteforintersubjectivity,
whichitwouldbe a shametoabandoninfavorofmen'smoreinaccessi-
ble subject-objectrelations.
How thencanthefeminine subject-startingwithme-be brought
to cultivatea sharedexperiencewiththe otherwithoutalienation?
The gesturethatmustbe made is the same gestureI made in Spec-
ulum: we mustbe carefulto treatthe otheras other.To be sure,I as
woman,we as women,have a nostalgiafordialogueand forrelation-
ships,but have we come to the pointthatwe recognizethe otheras
otherandthatwe addresshimorheraccordingly? Notreally,notyet.In
fact,while the wordsofadolescentgirlsand womenshow a definite
leaningtowardrelationships withothers,at thesame timethereis a
desireforan I-yourelationship thatdoesn'talwaysrecognizejustwho
theyouis and whathis orherowndesiresmightbe.
The femininesubjectthusfavorsa relationship withtheothergen-
der['autregenre],whichis something thatthemasculinesubjectdoes
not do. This preferencefora masculinesubjectas partner-in-dialogue
demonstrates on theone handculturalalienation,butit also pointsto
variousotheraspectsofthefemininesubject.Womanknowstheother
gender[1autregenre]betterthanmandoes: shebegetshimwithinher;
she mothershim frombirth;she feedshim fromherown body;she
experiences himinsideofherin theactoflove.Herrelationship to the
transcendence oftheotheris,consequently, differentfromthatexperi-
encedbyman; she alwaysremainsexterior to him,is alwaysinscribed
withthemystery and ambivalenceoftheorigin,whethermaternalor
paternal.Woman'srelationship tomanis linkedmorecloselytoshared
flesh,to a sensual experience,to an immanentlived experience[un
vecu immanent],includingreproduction. No doubtshe experiences
thealterityoftheotherthrough his strangebehavior, his resistanceto
herdreams,to herwishes.Butshe mustconstruct thistranscendence
withinhorizontality itself,in a sharingof lives whichrespectsthe
otheras otherabsolutely, extending beyondall intuitions,sensations,
experiences, or knowledgewhichshe mayhave ofhim.Her tastefor
dialoguecould endup makingtheotheras otherintoa reductiveges-
tureifshedoesnotconstruct thetranscendence oftheotheras such,as
irreducibilitywithrespecttoher:through fusion,contiguity, empathy,
mime.
I havetriedto showhowto movetowarda construction
ofthetran-
18 YaleFrenchStudies
scendenceoftheotherin J'aimea toi and Esseredue (theItalianlan-
guageedition9). I pointedoutthattheoperationofthenegative,which
typically, in orderto move on to a higherlevelin the processofthe
becomingoftheself[devenirsoi-meme]mustengageselfand selfin a
dialecticaloperation,shouldinsteadengagetwosubjects,in ordernot
to reducethe two to the one, the otherto the same. Of coursethe
negativeis appliedyetagainto me,in mysubjectivebecoming,butin
thiscase it servesto marktheirreducibility oftheotherto me andnot
my subsumingofthatexteriority intomyself.Throughthisgesture,
the subjectgivesup beingone and singular.It respectsthe other,the
two,in an intersubjective relation.
This gesturemustfirstofall be appliedtotherelationship between
thegenders[es genres],sincegenderalterityis realand enablesus to
rearticulatenaturein relationto culturein a truerand moreethical
way,thusrisingabovetheessentialflawin ourspiritualbecomingthat
Hegeldenounceswhenhe speaksoftheexileanddeathofAntigonein
The Phenomenology ofSpirit.
This historicmovementfromtheone,singularsubjectto theexis-
tenceoftwosubjectsofequal worthand equal dignityseemsto me to
be rightly the taskofwomen,on botha philosophicaland a political
level.Women,as I havealreadypointedout,are,morethanman,des-
tinedto a relationship oftwo[la relation'a deux],and in particularto
a relationshipwiththe other.As a resultofthisaspectoftheirsub-
jectivity,theycan expandthehorizonsoftheone,thesimilar,andeven
ofthemany,and in so doingaffirm thattheyarean othersubject[su-
jet autre],and imposea twowhichis not a second.By struggling for
theirliberation, theyimply,moreover, thattheyrecognizetheotheras
other,forotherwisetheywill onlyclose thecirclethatsurroundsthe
singularsubject.Recognizing thatmanis otherclearlyconstitutesan
appropriateethical task forwomen,but it is also a necessarystep
towardaffirming theirautonomy.Moreover,the deploymentof the
negativewhichis requiredto completethistaskallowsthemto move
froma naturalidentityto a culturaland civilone,withoutgivingup
(their)nature,sincetheybelongto a gender[genre].Fromnow on,the
negativewill intervene withtheother:in language
in all relationships
of course (hence "j'aime a toi"),'1 but also in perception througheyes
9. Essere due (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri,1994).
modification
10. Irigaray's the"you"froma
hereofje t'aime(I loveyou)transforms
Note]
directobjectintoan indirectobject.[Translator's
 LUCE IRIGARAY 19
and ears,and eventhroughtouch.In Esseredue,I tryto definea new
wayto approachtheother,includingthroughthecaress.
To succeedin thisrevolutionary movefromaffirmation ofselfas
otherto therecognition ofmanas otheris a gesturethatalso allowsus
to promotethe recognitionof all formsofotherswithouthierarchy,
orauthority
privilege, overthem:whetheritbe differences in race,age,
culture,or religion.
Replacingtheone bythetwoin sexualdifference thusconstitutesa
decisivephilosophicalandpoliticalgesture,one whichgivesup a sin-
gularor pluralbeing[1e'treun ou pluriel]in orderto become a dual
being[1'etredeux].Thisis thenecessaryfoundationfora newontology,
a new ethics,and a new politics,in whichthe otheris recognizedas
otherandnotas thesame:biggerorsmallerthanI, orat bestmyequal.

-Translated byNoah Guynn