‘LNG: Benefits and Risks, a European and

Dutch Perspective’

Hans Pasman
Emeritus Delft University of Technology, NL
Research Professor MKOPSC, Texas A&M

• Benefits of LNG
• LNG in Europe and in Rotterdam, the Netherlands
• Example of Dutch QRA for license of terminal
• Uncertainties in hazard and risk analysis

WCCE8, Montreal, Canada, 24-27 Aug 2009

Benefits natural gas seen by Dutch eyes

• 1940s Cold winters, no gas, no heating

• 1950s Coal shoveling, few houses with central heating in the Netherlands
• 1960s Groningen gas; distribution network built
• 1970s Plans for terminal + tank ships but only peak shaving realized
• 1980s Continuous flow of income Dutch government; social security
• 1990s Ever higher efficient household heaters: central heating/hot water
• 2000s Alternative sources: Norway, Russia, LNG from other sources
European terminals:
• Graph according to
Weems and Beck of
King & Spalding, 2006

• Spain, France and

Belgium have
considerable
experience.

•Delays in realization of
proposed terminals due
to long authorization
trajectories and credit
crunch
Rotterdam Rijnmond projects: GATE and LionGas

Location Papegaaiebek

Maasvlakte at the mouth of the Nieuwe Waterweg, Hoek van Holland

Rotterdam GATE and LionGas terminal projections
reproduced with courtesy to Port of Rotterdam

Gate terminal

Design LNG terminals

LionGas terminal

Looking West towards North Sea Looking East towards city of

Rotterdam and industrial harbor area

Note the oil depots and chemical

plants
Situation ship entry, separation dams, Maasvlakte
Nearest towns: Hook of Holland, Oostvoorne; beach recreational area

2 km
LionGas:
Two terrain
parts, separated
by a PET plant,
connected by
pipelines.
LionGas

Port of Rotterdam port signposting system map 2005

Actual situation
 Port of Rotterdam Ship admission policy

MARIN institute and Delft University of Technology conducted:

• Ship maneuvering and collision avoidance studies
• Detailed investigation of consequences of collision on ship hull
and damage to tanks

Results:
 Optimization of routing system Rotterdam approach (model SAMSON)
 Avoid cross-traffic at high speed
 Policy plan with projection of three stages:
 Stage 1 (gaining experience, 15 calls or half a year) LNG ships shall
arrive between 0:00 – 4:00 A.M.
 Stage 2 (100 calls or two years) more arrival windows
 Stage 3 (final) LNG carrier considered as normal traffic
 License procedure LionGas terminal: Seveso II Directive.
Safety report, incl standard QRA as part of Env. Impact Assessment
• Submission of application to Competent authority: Prov. South-Holland, DCMR
(Rijnmond Central Environmental Protection Agency). License granted Sep 2006
• Analysis of nautical grounding and collision risks performed by MARIN and Delft
University of Technology:
– Event frequency by Ship Traffic Models (30 yr data + model SAMSON)
– Penetration depth distribution by model MARCOL
• QRA of spills at ship maneuvering, berthing, unloading, terminal operations and
re-gasification carried out by Royal Haskoning:
– Purple Book for accident scenarios (today Bevi Manual + SAFETI-NL); safety measures
– TNO EFFECTS 5.5 model for LNG spill and evaporation on water with check against
Sandia report 2004-6558
– Gas dispersion: Heavy gas model (1st part); neutral gas (2nd part; Gaussian model)
– RPT effects and BLEVEs disregarded
– When LNG cloud with no confinement present: no overpressure, only fire or flash fire
– Exceptions: limited amount of gas (1000 m3) can explode under unloading platform or at
re-gasification plant (15% methane-air; MEM strength 5)
– Flame envelope determined by LFL contour at ignition
– Heat radiation threshold for 100% lethality: 35 kW/m2
 Dutch risk acceptance criteria
• Individual risk: <10-6 /yr for new installations with respect to
residents (= incl. beach visitors)
• Group risk: Event with 10 fatalities (residents + people in
neighboring plants) < 10-5 /yr, 100 fatalities < 10-7/yr,
1000 < 10-8 /yr
N.B. Group risk value gives guidance and is not a criterion. Competent
authority has to decide after advice by emergency response organization

Closest residents are in Hoek van Holland on 1600 m of terminal

QRA result:
All scenarios considered produced risk figures/contours which
remained far below the criteria and guidance values
Max Cred Acc (MCA), MNonCA and Domino effects:
1. MCA scenarios were calculated: IR and GR remained within limits.

2. MNCA (<10-8 /yr): terroristic act (Sandia report, hole size up to 12 m2), crash
of A/C in storage tank: again no problem. Dug-in tanks offer no advantage.
3. Domino effects, see Table, no significant influence on IR and GR by LNG.

Mutual domino effects of LNG terminal/tanks with neighboring installations

Installation/activity Distance Mishap/Effect on LNG Effect LNG terminal
m tank on neighbor
PET plant installations >100 Fire, no effect Fire and explosion cause
damage
Propylene spheres, 450 ≥1150 BLEVE: 0.2 bar at 1036 Possible damage, no
tonnes, NEREFCO (now m, see Purple Book, detailed investigation
BP) terrain 2005, hence LNG tank
survives
Wind mill turbines Ca.100 Failure of blade; no Certainly damage
penetration of concrete
tank hull
Helicopter platform pilots Location not Crash, pool fire 0.5 km Not determined
decided radius
 The QRA report mentions
uncertainties but states that in case
of doubt a conservative solution was
chosen

EIA with QRA resulted in granting of

license by Prov. South-Holland in 2006
 What about uncertainties in QRA?
• EU benchmark project ASSURANCE 2000 has confirmed wide spread in QRA
results (orders of magnitude): scenarios large source of variability.

Largest and smallest 10-5 Comparison of Group Risk results of 6 (experienced)

IR risk contour teams participating in the exercise.

Other sources dispersion and explosion models, and failure frequencies

 What about uncertainties in QRA? (2)

•EU project ARAMIS tried to remedy scenario definition: bowties: FTA-CE-ET

•Even then difficult to predict escalations: small fire large leak  big
release; damaged tanks / ship hull presents confinement.
Can BLEVE be excluded?
•Failure rates: Influences by management quality and human error; data
availability including confidence intervals
•Source terms, consequence models produce spread in results. Which model
is sufficiently accurate: (FLACS, LES), model certification?
•Fire: SEP 250 kW/m2, decrease with scale?
•Explosion effects: increase with scale?
Uncertainty explosion effects:
• Largest uncertainty is effect after delayed
ignition. 1981 Coyote test: No flash-back
to the source
• Cold LNG vapor is not very reactive, but what
Project SAFEKINEX, 20 l vessel
about scale effects? 0
100
10

• Scale effects in VCE have been investigated in

90
20
80

2O
H
30

3
the 90s – MERGE, EMERGE, JIP – with only

2 +

2O
70

CO

H
3
3

+
40

>
]

O2
e

2 -
l.-%
ativ

(41
O
ton 60

so l.-%
5
de

>

vo
ot
4.

2 -
of sion

[Vo
[Vo
yellow range:

limited success (Buncefield VCE was again a

O
H2

6 +

is f up to
e
50 g plo
ran ex
3

3
3H
+

orm 75
6 +
possibly heat

l.
CO 50

-%
3H
ric
3

ed vo
2

C
N
explosion ->

et

]
ric

he l.-%
m
60 5O
2

et
io

re
1.

m
ch
+ 40

io
oi
surprise – not a reactive substance, no wide

ch
H6

st

oi
C3

)
st
70 ric range of
et
iom deflagrative explosion,
30
ich 5 bar abs, 200 °C
sto
80

explosion limits, not much confinement). Do we 90 propen

e/air-m
ixtures
20

10

know all mechanisms involved?

100
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Propene C3H6 [Vol.-%]

• Does CH4 differ that much from C4H10 or C8H18?

0
100
10
90
20
yellow range: 80

• It differs quantitatively not qualitatively.

possibly heat
explosion 30
70 range of detonative
explosion
40

]
l.-%
Reactivity, run-up distances, flame-turbulence
60

O2
O O
2H
2
2H
2
+

[Vo
50 +

[Vo
2
CO CO

so 55 v
-> -> 50

at
ot ol.
l.-%
5O
2 2
2O

for -%
2
1.

N
60 +

ma CH
+

interaction

]
4
CH CH

tio
4
40

ns
ric etric
et

tar
m iom

4
70

ts
io
ch ich of
range plosion,
toi sto 2H 2 30
s ative ex O+
deflagr abs, 25 °CO 2 -> C
80 5 bar + 0.5
ic CH 4

• Many researchers feel that tests so far have

etr 20
hiom
stoic
90
metha
ne/air-
mixture 10
s
100

been on too small a scale: J HazMat 140 (2007) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Methane CH4 [Vol.-%]
80 90 100
0
 Conclusions
• The scale of LNG operations in the world is rapidly growing to fulfill the need of
energy supply.
• The process of liquefying, transportation, storage and re-gasification has been
so far without significant incidents and the technology is considered safe.
• Risk assessments are conducted at various places building on existing
knowledge gained for a large part in the early 80s in relatively small scale tests.
• Methane is a low reactive hydrocarbon but shows all the features of its ‘fellow’
hydrocarbons when ‘pressed’ hard enough.
• In view of the huge quantities present and corresponding combustion energy
potential it is recommendable to test present assumptions in larger scale tests.
• Scenarios should be thought through in a multi-disciplinary team with an open
mind and paying attention to possible escalation of at first insignificant failure.
• High quality safety management offers of course good protection but we have
to safeguard against ‘drift’ in organizations