HUMAN FREEDOM.

Determinism.
“for everything that happens, there are conditions such that, given them,
nothing else could occur.” (633)
x is determined if the state of affairs in the world plus the laws of nature are
such that they can produce only x. (674)
“For every event that happens, its happening was caused or necessitated by
prior factors such that given these prior factors the event in question had to
occur.” (Craig, 268)

Indeterminism.
“the basic idea of indeterminism is that the state of the world up to a given
point plus all existing natural laws are not sufficient to guarantee only one
possible future.” (626)

Incompatibilism.
“genuine freedom is incompatible with determinism.” (628)

Libertarian Free will [LFW].

“many acts are free, and libertarians contend that they are free because they
are not causally determined; hence, the person could do otherwise.” (628)
This has two criteria: 1) not being determined, 2) ability to do otherwise.

Principle of Alternate Possibilities [PAP].

“A person is free with regard to (or is morally responsible for) an action A
only if he could have done otherwise than A.” (Stump, 299)
Note: PAP is not essential to LFW, but Feinberg treats only PAP LFW.

Clarifications on LFW
“To sum up this point…” (629)
“Focus on more standard views…” (630)

Views of Determinism.

Hard Determinism.
“all that happens is causally determined. As a result, there is no
human free will of any sort.” (635)
Incompatibilists.
 Fatalism.
Associated with inevitability.
1) Strong Inevitability. “every situation, regardless of what we do,
the outcome will be unaffected by our efforts.” (633) E.g.
Minority Report.
2) Weak Inevitability. “there are things I could do to change the
outcome, but I am ignorant of them.” (634) E.G., escaping fire.
3) No Inevitability. “irrespective of antecedent circumstances,
‘nothing that does occur could have been helped and nothing that
has not actually been done could possibly have been done.’” (634)

Soft Determinism.
Everything that happens is causally determined, but some acts are
free. This is not libertarian free will. (635-6)
Compatibilists.

Distinctions on Necessity and Constraint.

Necessity1: an act or event is necessary, if it must occur. E.g.,
events God has decreed.
Necessity2: refers to acting according to one’s internal nature, i.e.,
spontaneously in light of what a thing is. E.g., walking to get
somewhere.
-Incompatibilists allow for necessity2 but not necessity1 and deny
that necessity2 entails necessity1. Compatibilists can allow for
both. (636)
Constraint1: involves a force that doesn’t entirely remove willing
by the person constrained, although what is chosen is contrary
to what they wish to choose. E.g., bank robbery.
Constraint2: removes willing altogether. E.g., movement after
getting hit by a car.
-“Neither form of constraint leaves room for freedom in any
sense.” (637)

So, soft determinism holds genuine human freedom is compatible

with cause causal conditions that decisively incline the will
(necessitate1&2) without constraining1&2 it. (637)

LFW and compatibilism are contradictory views. Last paragraph 637.

So, if libertarian free will then not soft compatibilism.

So, if soft compatibilism then not libertarian free will.