Ineffective substance/stowaway detectors
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credit to
Maritime Accident Casebook
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Synopsis
A class of detector currently being marketed to and allegedly used within the ports and maritime
industry for the long rang location of explosives, drugs and stowayas have proven ineffective in
functioning according to the manufacturers'/vendors claims. Ship security officers and others with a
safety and security remit should be aware that use of these devices is not conducive to safety of crews,
vessels or cargo, whether used aboard ship or by port security/law enforcement personnel, and that
'false positives' generated using such devices may led to detention of vessels and/or crew on narcotics
charges while 'false nulls' may lead to hazardous substances or stoways being loaded aboard ship.
SSOs and other with a safety remit should take appropriate precautions and actions when these devices
are in use.
Background
In the mid 1990s an American company, Quadro Inc. developed the Quadro Tracker which it claimed
could locate explosives, guns and drugs at a distance. Tests by Sandia National Laboratories and the
FBI showed that the devices woorked no better than chance. The FBI declared them fraudulent and got
an inuction barring the manufacturer and sal of the Quadro Tracker within the United States. Quadro
Inc. went out of business.
A second Americanmade device came onto the market shortly afterwards called the MOLE. This, too,
failed controlled tests and operated no better than chance. The manufacturer went out of business but
two of the the company's directors, Jim McCormick and Roberto Balais, went on to establish two other
companies, ATSC (McCormick) in the UK and Sniffex (Balais) in the US, to make and market
variations of the MOLE device.
The Sniffex, made in Bulgaria, failed controlled tests at Sandia and the US Navy, including one
involving a tonne of explosives in a truck just yards from the device. Later, the Sniffex company and its
directors, including the alleged inventor Yuri Markov, were indicted by the US SEC for a $32m 'pump
anddump' share scheme for which the Sniffex device was a front. Sniffex then moved to Europe.
The design of the Sniffex was sightly modified to become the Sniffex Plus and again later with minor
modificatons to become the HEDD1 now marketed by German firm Unival.
The UK distributor of the device, Colonel John Wyatt of SDS says that the devices should not be used
in a lifethreatening situation. Wyatt claims to be a consult for the British Council and the United
Nations, enquiries by Maritime Accident Casebook received responses that Wyatt is not known as a
consultant and the United Nations stated the claim was fraudulent.
ATSC went on to produce the ADE 651, based on the same principles as the foregoing equipment and
large numbers were sold to Iraq, Thailand and elsewhere. The ADE 651 failed controlled tests in the US
and UK. The ADE 651, together with a locally produced version called the Khoji or Khojee, is in use at
most airports in Pakistan.
The failure of the ADE 651 to function as its makers claim is alleged to have been rsponsible for
hundreds of bombrelated deaths in Baghdad.
Recently, Major General Jihad alJabiri, the commander of the Iraq bomb squad was arrested on
corrupton charges related to purchases of the device.
UK company Global Technologies produced the GT200, again using the same principles as the
discreditted MOLE. Number were sold to developing countries including Mexico, Thailand, the
Philippines, India and Pakistan. Tests of the GT200 disclose that the device consisted of an empty box
with a swivelling telescopic aerial and nothing else. The device has failed controlled tests and its failure
to operate is reportedly responsible for several deaths in Thailand.
Mexico's Pemex uses the device at a number of its facilities.
Following exposes by the BBCs Newnight team which showed, without ambiguity, that the ADE651
and GT200 devices not only did not work but could not work, the UK Government banned all exports
of these and similar devices to Iraq and Afghanistan where they may put UK troops at risk. While the
UK Government has declined to ban exports to other countries it is understood that discussions with
other European governments may be underway.
Note that the ADE 651 and GT200 were heavily promoted by the UK Government, which recruited the
Royal Engineers to support the sales effort. Therefore the recommendation/validation of these devices
by official government agencies and/or military or law enforcement agencies is not a guide to the
effectiveness of the device.
The managing director of ATSC has been charged with fraud by misrepresentation and ATSC and
several makers and sellers of similar devices are under investigation by the City of London Police.
A third device, operating on similar principles is the Chinesemade DKL Lifeguard, which claims to be
able to detect stowaways in containers. This device has failed controlled tests but is said to be in use in
several Chinese ports and in Belgian ports.
An number of similar, equally ineffective devices are on the market with a variety of names and minor
differences in design.
How to identify these devices
While a number of devices and variants exist all share a similar arrangement of a telescopic aerial, of
the kind found on transistor radios, mounted on a handle which allows the aerial to swing freely from
side to side. There is no electrical or other powered mechanical force applied to the aerial to make it
move.
Some devices use a card inserted in an otherise empty box to 'tune' the device. The card are simply
layers of cardboard or may contain an RFID tag. In neither case can the card store information to tune
the device.
Typically, it is claimed that the device will work at long ranges, between 30 metres and 1km or up to
3,200 feet altitude. While makers and sellers use a number of 'scientific' terms to describe how their
devices function, such as vibrational energy, nuclear magnetic resonance, paramagenetism,
diaelectrophoresis and others, none of these phenomenae, where they exist, have the strength or range
to perform as claimed.
The basic identifier of these devices is the swinging telescopic aerial.
What makes these device appear to work?
The movement of the antenna is caused by the ideomotor effect first reported in the 19th century and
which is also responsible for the messages produced by the ouija board and in dowsing. Subconscious
muscle movements drive the motion.
Conjurers use the ideomotor effect in a mindreading technique known as Helstromism.
In this case, the finely balanced antenna will turn to point to where the user knows or thinks the target
is. Whether or not the target is visible or whether the target is covered, the antenna will move to point at
it, even if the operator is trying to be objective. The effective is surprising and evidential to those not
familiar with it.
Dowsers produce the same effec using Lshaped wires made fom coathangers or welding rods. These
are as effective as the devices discussed in this paper.
To studying whether or not it is the belief of the operator or there is some real detection occuring
scientists conduct doubleblind trials. If the number of successful detections is no better than chance
then no detection has occurred.
In the case of the US Navy tests of the Sniffex, now the HEDD1, the operator of the instrument was
taken away from the test site so he could not see which of four boxes an explosive was placed in. Once
experimenters had placed the explosive in a box they were removed from the site. Then the operator
was returned to the test site to determine which box contained explosives.
The operator of the device did not know which box contained explosives while the experimenters did
not know which box had been identified as containing the explosives. Hence the term doubleblind.
Only at the end of testing were notes compared.
In that test, and in every test of its type, the devices covered in this briefing failed to perform as the
manufacturers claimed.
The ideomotor effect is fascinating but only 'works' when the operator of the device already knows the
location of the target. An example of this was a drugbust in Mexico in which the police had been
tipped off that a certain truck would contain drugs. When the truck was stopped, the driver was found
to be under the influence of narcotics. A GT200 detector was then brought in to 'confirm' there were
drugs aboard the truck and since the operator believed drugs were on board, and there had been a tip
off, and the driver was under the influence of drugs, the ideomotor effect caused the GT200 antenna to
respond to the policeman's belief that drugs were in the truck.
When the device was tested under controlled conditions, without a tip off or a drugged driver, it worked
no better than chance.
Basically, then, the movement of the aerial/antenna is produced by the ideomotor effect and only
responds to what you already know.
What are the hazards of these devices?
Since these devices are not fit for purpose, in that they cannot function as claimed by the
manufacturers, the following situations may arise:
1. Explosives or firearms will not be detected when present in containers, vehicles or on persons
carrying them and therefore may be present in ports where these devices are used or loaded onto
ships at such ports.
2. Law enforcement personnel may get 'false positives' when searching for narcotics. Some of
these devices claim to be able to detect drugs in a human body up to two weeks after the drugs
have been taken. Cases exist in which persons subject to 'false positives' have been imprisoned
on suspicion of drugs use/sale. A 'false positive' may therefore lead to detention of crew and
ship and, at the least, great inconvenience and expense.
Note also that these devices can easily be induced to give a 'false false positive' creating the
opportunity for a shakedown by dishonest law enforcement/antinarcotics personnel. Indeed, it
may not be coincidence that these devices are popular in countries in which corruption is
endemic.
3. Since the devices are ineffective at determining the presence or absence of stowaways in
containers or elsewhere, a supposed 'negative' finding using these devices must not be relied
upon to demonstrate the presence or absence of a stowaway, nor should they be relied upon in
other situations in which the preence or absence of a human being is critical.
Response
Alert any crewmember whose duties may include access control at, for instance,
gangway/accomodation ladder, to report to the SSO the use near the ship of any device answering the
description of a telescopic radio aerial/antenna mounted on a handle.
SSOs should be alert for the use of these devices whether in the immediate vicinity of the ship or
anywhere else in the port.
The presence of the device should be recorded, if possible with the name of the device, and the shore
based company person responsible for security matters should be alerted. This may be of value should a
defence be required.
If possible email confidential@maritimeaccident.org with the name of the port or authority using the
device, with, if possible, the name of the device.
Known Devices Manufacturer/Vendor Notes
ADE 651 ATSC
AL6D
Alpha 6 Comstrac (Distrubutor)
DKL Lifeguard Signal Knight Technology, China
GT200 Global Technical (distributor)
Guangdong Somens Electronic
Technology Co., Ltd.
(Manufacturer)
Known Devices Manufacturer/Vendor Notes
HEDD1 Unival
Khoji/Khojee
MOLE
Sniffex
Sniffex Plus
Manufacturer:
Arsenal
Address: 100, Rozova Dolina, Kazanlak, Bulgaria
TSMT102035 Shanghai Tetsuo Trading
Known Devices Manufacturer/Vendor Notes
XK9 Sae Systems (No longer sold)
Quadro Tracker Quadro Inc.
(For comparison purposes)