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International Gambling Studies


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Problem gambling in poker: money, rationality and control in a skill-based


social game
Ole Bjerga
a
Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark

Online publication date: 15 November 2010

To cite this Article Bjerg, Ole(2010) 'Problem gambling in poker: money, rationality and control in a skill-based social
game', International Gambling Studies, 10: 3, 239 — 254
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URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14459795.2010.520330

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International Gambling Studies
Vol. 10, No. 3, December 2010, 239–254

Problem gambling in poker: money, rationality and control in a skill-


based social game
Ole Bjerg*

Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark

The article explores problem gambling in poker. The distinctions between chance and
skill and between bank games and social games are applied to demonstrate how poker
is structurally different from most other gambling games. Bank games are organised
around a central actor such as the house, the casino or the bookmaker. In social games,
players compete against each other on equal statistical footing. Poker is a skill-based
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social game where players with superior skills may be expected to win even in the long
run. Fourteen poker playing problem gamblers were recruited through a treatment
program and 15 professional and recreational poker players were recruited through
snowball sampling (N ¼ 29). Through qualitative interviews, the paper shows that the
particular structural composition of poker has implications for the ways problem
gambling arises in poker players. It is argued that poker challenges existing theoretical
conceptions about problem gambling relating to money, rationality and control.
Keywords: poker; problem gambling; control; money; game

‘Poker, isn’t that a game of chance.’


‘No my dear, not the way I play it.’
(W.C. Fields and Mae West, In My Little Chickadee)
Over the last decade, an almost explosive growth in the popularity of poker has taken
place. What used to be a typically American game has now become a genuinely global
phenomenon (Wilson, 2007).
This is most markedly reflected in the development in online poker. Since the launch of
poker on the Internet in 1998, global revenues on this particular type of gambling has
increased to US$4.9 billion in 2009 and today poker constitutes 19% of the global Internet
gambling market (H2 Gambling Capital, 2010). The so-called ‘poker boom’ is not only
registered in the turnover figures of online poker rooms. The leading institution for the
treatment of compulsive gambling in Denmark, Centre for Ludomania, reports that the
proportion of poker players in their overall pool of clients has increased from virtually
nothing in 2003 to 33% in 2009 (unpublished internal accounts).
The counsellors at this centre, as well as a number of their colleagues in other Nordic
countries, express in conversation how the impact of the poker boom is not only a matter of
changing the quantitative composition of their clientele. Based on experiences from their
daily practice, they explain how many poker-playing problem gamblers seem to differ
qualitatively from their other clients. Poker players who seek treatment for problem

*Email: ob.lpf@cbs.dk

ISSN 1445-9795 print/ISSN 1479-4276 online


q 2010 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/14459795.2010.520330
http://www.informaworld.com
240 O. Bjerg

gambling, they report, are generally younger than other clients, they seem to have a higher
level of education and they are rarely female. In addition, some of these poker players face
a different composition of problems than other clients, for instance being addicted to
gambling while profiting continuously from the game. Finally, the counsellors express a
sense that the poker playing problem gamblers do not respond equally well to some of the
techniques applied in the treatment.
The counsellors’ observations serve as an indication that there is something particular
about problem gambling in poker compared with other forms of gambling. In this article,
this indication is posed as a hypothesis and the purpose of the article is thus to explore the
differences between poker and other forms of gambling and to develop conceptual tools
for understanding problem gambling in poker.
The first part of the article is a formal analysis of the structural composition of poker in
comparison with other forms of gambling. Through application of distinctions between
games of chance and games of skill and between bank games and social games a
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classification of gambling games is developed. The classification serves to demonstrate


and clarify the particular features of poker.
The second part of the article is a qualitative analysis of interviews with 29 poker
players. The analysis addresses three themes: money, rationality and control, to explore
the implications of the particular structural composition of poker for the way problem
gambling appears in poker.

The classification of games


Although a number of different paradigms exist in the study of problem gambling, the field
is arguably dominated by cognitive and behavioural psychology (Viets & Miller, 1997;
Raylu & Oei, 2002; Toneatto & Ladouceur, 2003). These approaches tend to focus on
aspects of the cognitive, perceptual and emotional constitution of the gambling subject
such as cognitive distortions (Gadboury & Ladouceur, 1989; Griffiths, 1994; Toneatto,
Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, Dragonetti & Tsanos, 1997), irrational thinking (Walker, 1992),
alexithymia (Lumley & Roby, 1995), and reinforcement (Petry & Roll, 2001). By contrast,
less analytical attention is typically directed at the structural composition of gambling
games. Indeed, cognitive and behavioural models have been criticised for operating with
too much of a general and uniform notion of gambling across a number of different
gambling activities and for not being sufficiently sensitive to variation between the levels
of engagement with different forms of gambling activities. Blaszczynski and Nower, for
example, levied an en bloc critique of prevalent approaches (addictions, psychodynamic,
psychobiological, behavioural, cognitive and sociological models) to the study and
understanding of problem gambling:
The pervasive but faulty assumption embedded within each model is that pathological
gamblers form a homogeneous population, and that theoretically derived treatments can be
applied effectively to all pathological gamblers irrespective of gambling form, gender,
developmental history or neurobiology. (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002, p. 489)
There seems, however, to be a growing recognition, within the cognitive and behavioural
paradigms as well as within other paradigms, that more research is needed to explore the
specificity of different gambling games (Raylu & Oei, 2002; Toneatto & Ladouceur, 2003;
Toneatto & Millar, 2004). Most recently, this task has been taken up by Young and
Stevens as they have invoked Roger Callois’ classic concepts of alea, i.e. games based on
decisions independent of the player, and agôn, i.e. competitive games, to distinguish
between gambling games of pure chance and gambling games with an element of skill
International Gambling Studies 241

(Callois, 1958 [2001]; Young & Stevens, 2009; Stevens & Young, 2010). Young and
Stevens do not simply dismiss the notion of skill as a merely erroneous belief on the part of
the gambler. In contrast to typical studies of cognitive distortions, they use the distinction
between chance and skill to designate actual differences in the composition of different
gambling games. As we venture into the study of poker, the distinction between chance
and skill is highly relevant. Nevertheless, it is still too crude to capture the specificities of
the structural composition of poker in comparison with other games. In order to do so
I shall add another distinction to the categorisation of gambling games.
In his account of the history of gambling, Schwartz touches upon the distinction
between bank games and social games (Schwartz, 2006, pp. 73, 152). In social games,
players play against each other and the constitution of the game puts them statistically on
an a priori even footing. In bank games, players play against one central figure: the ‘bank’,
the ‘house’, the ‘casino’, the ‘bookmaker’, etc. Bank games are usually set up to give the
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bank a statistical advantage over the players, often referred to as the ‘house edge’.
In Table 1, the distinction between bank games and social games is combined with the
distinction between games of chance and games of skill to yield a fourfold classification of
games.
In the upper left quadrant, we find bank games of pure chance such as roulette, slot
machines, lottery and bingo. Of course, players may believe that they have special skills in
relation to these games (Walker, 1992). However, any such notion is purely illusory as the
nature of these games allows the player no opportunity to overcome the inherent statistical
advantage of the bank. In mathematical terms, the expected value of the player’s
participation in these games can never exceed zero minus the house edge. This means that
in the long run, the player may expect to lose an amount equivalent to the statistical
advantage of the bank.
In the upper right quadrant, we find social games of pure chance such as coin tossing
and Rock– Paper – Scissors. (It has been argued that Rock– Paper – Scissor is in fact a game
of skill (Walker & Walker, 2004). For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed here that it is a
game of chance.) Since there is no bank, all participants in the game are statistically on an
even footing and because no player has the ability to influence the outcome of the game,
the expected value of participation is always zero. In the long run, the player may expect
his wins and losses to cancel each other out.
In the lower left quadrant, we find skill based bank games such as blackjack, craps, and
sports- and horserace betting, where an element of skill may be applied to decrease yet not

Table 1. Classification of gambling games.


Bank games Social games
Pure chance Roulette Coin tossing
Slot machines Rock– paper– scissors
Lottery
Bingo
Expected value , 0 Expected value ¼ 0

Skill and chance Blackjack Poker


Craps Backgammon
Sports- and horserace Bridge
betting Rummy
Expected value , 0 Expected value variable below and above 0
242 O. Bjerg

eliminate the element of chance. In blackjack, the player is offered different options in the
playing of his hand (‘hit’, ‘stand’, ‘double down’ or ‘split a pair’). These play options are
not equally favourable, which means that the player may increase his chances of winning
through skilful selection of the proper strategic moves. However, if we disregard such
strategies as card counting (prohibited by most casinos or rendered practically impossible
by continuous card shuffling machines) or the shifting between different online casinos to
exploit their sign-up bonus award structure, optimal play in blackjack can minimise the
house edge but never increase the expected value of play above zero. The same applies to
craps where the player may also minimise but never eliminate the house edge through
optimal strategic betting.
Horse race and other forms of sports betting work slightly different than blackjack and
craps because the outcome of the games is not based on technological devices that
generate purely random outcomes (cards and dice) but on sporting events. The house edge
in betting is obtained as the odds offered by the bookmaker to the punters are less
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favourable than the estimated likelihood of the outcome of the underlying sports event.
However, as the estimated likelihood of a football team losing a specific match or a horse
winning a specific race is based on the relevant information available to the bookmaker
and his ability to process this information, it is in principle possible for skilled punters to
outperform the bookmaker. In the case of pari-mutuel betting, which is often used in horse
betting, a similar situation is produced as the odds are dynamically calculated on the basis
of the pool of bets made by all punters. In this calculation, the house takes a fraction of the
pool for itself to ensure its own profit. It could be argued that pari-mutuel betting is in fact
a social game as punters play against each other. Within the framework of this paper,
I would, however, still argue that the situation for the individual gambler in pari-mutuel
betting is still more comparable to that of the bank game.
In betting on horses and other kinds of sport, skill may be used in picking favourable
betting opportunities where odds do not sufficiently reflect the actual likelihood of the
underlying event. Such picks may be based on inside information or just generally superior
knowledge of the sport in question. Whether it is possible to outperform bookmakers, not
only in principle but also in practice, to an extent where the punter gains a positive
expected value is a question that cannot be settled within the context of this article. We
shall be moving on making the assumption that it is not possible. This assumption holds
true at least in the case of the vast majority of players who engage in sports and horserace
betting.
In the lower right quadrant of the classification scheme, we find skill-based social
games such as backgammon, bridge, rummy and most importantly poker. In these games,
players are a priori on a statistically even footing. Two adversaries in backgammon have
equal likelihood of throwing favourable throws with the dice, and all players in a game of
bridge, rummy or poker have equal likelihood of being dealt a favourable hand. As there is
no bank, these games are played out in statistically symmetrical relations between the
players. Even if the game is facilitated by a casino, such as is often the case in poker, the
game provider does not figure as a participant in the game. The game provider may indeed
collect a ‘rake’ from the players, i.e. a small fraction of every pot, but they do not take part
in the actual winning and losing.
The outcome of these games is determined by a combination of random events and the
players’ intentional strategic moves. Not all moves are equally favourable. This means that
even though the average expected value of participation is zero or even negative, it may be
distributed unequally between the players depending on their level of skill so that a
superior player may have a positive expected value of participation. The possibility of
International Gambling Studies 243

engaging in the game with a positive expected value is the main distinguishing feature of
the social skill-based games as opposed to the games of the other three quadrants of the
classification scheme.

Money, rationality and control in poker


The structural composition of a particular game constitutes a set of conditions of
possibility for the way players may interact with the game. If we turn to poker specifically
this means that the structure of the game allows for strategic play, which, in turn, allows
for a more skilled player to improve his or her odds of winning. There is a vast body of
literature explaining how skills may be applied in poker. Standard references include
(Brunson, 1978 [2002]; Sklansky, 1987 [2005]; Chen & Ankenman, 2006) and the
significant relation between the application of skills and the outcome of the game has been
further validated through various scientific studies (Larkey, Kadane, Austin & Zamir,
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1997; Billings, 2006; Croson, Fishman & Pope, 2008; Fiedler & Rock, 2009; Hannum &
Cabot, 2009; Siler, 2009).
The fundamental hypothesis of this article is that the particular structural composition of
poker also has implications for the ways in which problem gambling may evolve and
manifest itself in poker. To explore this hypothesis we move from a formal analysis of the
structure of poker to a qualitative analysis of the experiences of actual poker players. Based
on the preceding formal analysis of poker, I propose three issues to serve as analytical
themes in the exploration of this hypothesis. These themes are money, rationality and
control.
Since poker offers the possibility of a positive expected value of participation, the
circulation and distribution of money in poker differs from other games. Our first research
question for the empirical analysis is: ‘How does the possibility of profitable play effect
problem gambling in poker?’ This question is explored against the backdrop of the usual
image of problem gambling as being intrinsically associated with financial loss.
Skill in poker is to a large degree a matter being able to play rationally. Yet, rational play
does not necessarily preclude problem gambling. Hence, our second research question is:
‘How does rationality and irrationality figure in problem gambling in poker?’ This question
is explored against the backdrop of the usual image of gambling as inherently irrational.
Another dimension of poker skills is related to the management of emotions, i.e. to
self-control. Our third research question is: How are self-control and problem gambling
related in poker? This question is explored against the backdrop of the usual image of
gambling as being associated with loss of control.
Each of these research questions is explored in separate sections below. The headings
of each section refer to the ordinary understanding of problem gambling, which is
challenged by the particular nature of poker.

Method and data


The analysis is based on qualitative in-depth interviews with 29 poker players. Fourteen
players were defined as problem gamblers. With one exception, these players were either
enrolled in a therapy program at the time of the interview or they had previously been
enrolled in such a program. These interviewees were recruited through the Danish Center
for Ludomania. One interviewee was recruited as a recreational player but, during the
interview, he displayed symptoms of problem gambling. Ten players were defined as
professional players with earnings from poker constituting their primary source of income.
244 O. Bjerg

Four of these interviewees were recruited in a shared office space for online players. As
insight into the field grew, other players were contacted directly on the assumption that
they would make interesting contributions to the project. Five players were defined as
recreational players as they only play poker once or twice weekly for insubstantial
amounts of money. These interviewees were recruited through a poker club. Fifteen
interviewees were in their twenties, ten were in their thirties, and the remaining four
interviewees were in their forties. Two interviewees were female, one was a professional
and the other was a problem gambler. None of the interviewees were compensated
financially. They were informed about the purpose of the interview and guaranteed
anonymity in the analysis and reporting of the results. The process for the collection,
analysis and storage of data was officially approved by the Danish Data Protection
Agency.
Interviews typically lasted between one and two hours. They were recorded, transcribed
and eventually analysed using WEFT QDA (RubyForge, 2009) to identify common patterns
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and themes. Excerpts from interviews presented in this article have been translated from
Danish, and the identities of the people involved have been concealed.

‘A problem gambler is a losing gambler’


The usual image of a problem gambler is of someone having gambled away all his or her
money and perhaps even themselves. A key formulation in the WHO definition of
pathological gambling reads: ‘Those who suffer from this disorder may put their jobs at
risk, acquire large debts and lie or break the law to obtain money or evade payment of
debts’ (World Health Organization, 1992, pp. 211– 212). Even though financial loss is not
principally required in the DSM-IV TR diagnosis of pathological gambling, the
assumption of financial loss arguably still underlies four (A2, A6, A8, A10) of the ten
diagnostic criteria in the screening tool (American Psychiatric Association, 2000,
pp. 671– 678).
The image of problem gambling as associated with the loss of money is by no means a
false image. Indeed, it corresponds to the situation of most problem gamblers when they
approach therapy centres and self-help groups for help. Given the structural composition
of most gambling games such as slot machines and sports betting, it is usually correct to
regard financial loss and debt as an inherent part of problem gambling and to assume an
inverse linear correlation between the extent of a gambler’s gambling activity and the
condition of his or her financial circumstances. As the frequency of gambling increases
with the development of a gambling problem, the condition of the gambler’s financial
situation typically deteriorates correspondingly. The linear correlation may be upset by
occasional wins, but the more someone gambles the more he or she is bound to lose.
In poker, the correlation between gambling frequency and financial situation is much
less deterministic. Of course, we find also in poker many cases where increased frequency
and extent of gambling result in increasing financial difficulties. Yet, there are cases of
noteworthy deviations from the pattern. One interviewee recounted his previous gambling
habits:
Now, I play maybe 6 – 7 hours per day. But before, I used to play all the time. Basically, I just
slept and played. I have been running sessions – my record is 42 hours without sleeping –
only on Redbull and coffee. I just had to beat my opponent. And I have had many sessions of
more than 20 hours, only taking breaks to eat or go to the bathroom and otherwise just playing
ahead. It was completely insane. I did not leave the house. When I lived in my old flat, I hardly
left the house for six months. I didn’t even bother emptying my mailbox. Nothing mattered,
but poker. I just wanted to be good. (Male, 38)
International Gambling Studies 245

This behaviour obviously displays the typical symptoms of problem gambling and
conforms to the WHO definition by consisting of ‘frequent, repeated episodes of gambling
which dominate the individual’s life’ (World Health Organization, 1992, p. 211).
However, instead of propelling this gambler into financial ruin, he explained how his
excessive gambling behaviour earned him a significant amount of money and furthermore
trained his skills enough to open up a career path as a professional poker player.
Another interviewee said:
I know people, who play for several hundreds of dollars, just in the blinds. That is not for me, I
just cannot do it. I do not want to. As I said, I do have a family. Maybe you can win $200– 300
and then you can make a profit, but I do not want to risk that kind of money. That is why I am
still playing at the lower levels. I also find it satisfying when I go deep in a tournament or even
win a tournament, even if I play at the lower levels. (Male, 46)
He is moderately skilled and plays primarily in small stakes tournaments. In his local
poker club, he is referred to as ‘bone-dry’, i.e. a very disciplined and cautious player. Over
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the course of 4 years, he has made a profit of approximately US$30,000. He holds a regular
job and the profits from poker do not make a significant difference to his overall economic
situation. In this light, he appears to be a well-balanced, ordinary recreational poker
player.
Yet, he also explained how poker often takes up most of his waking hours, when he
was not working: ‘I do not even dare count the hours I spend on it every week. It is almost
from the moment I step through the door and until I go to bed. But it has actually been
worse than now.’ His wife was present during part of the interview and she elaborated by
explaining how her husband’s gambling habits often prevent him from taking part in
family life. Even though this interviewee did not suffer from financial problems, he still
displayed obvious signs of being a problem gambler.
Another pattern described by several interviewees was how they have been able to
make a steady profit from poker for a period of time of several months or even up to a
couple of years but then at some point they lose control and they are propelled into
problem gambling involving financial, mental and social problems.
Two interviewees described patterns that we might even term ‘chasing wins’ as
opposed to the well-known phenomenon of chasing losses. Continuous earnings from
poker allow them to enjoy a luxurious lifestyle, but these earnings also compel the players
to keep gambling in order to sustain this lifestyle. This resonates with recent findings by
Griffiths, Parke, Wood and Rigbye (2010) suggesting that in poker, we might find a ‘new
breed’ of problem gamblers who may be losing time but winning money. We shall be
returning to this issue later.
The point of this section is to demonstrate that in poker, the emotional and social
aspects of problem gambling on the one hand and the financial aspect on the other are more
decoupled than in relation to other forms of gambling. This allows for greater variability in
the composition of the problems experienced by problem gamblers. Indeed, some problem
gamblers in poker experience the same direct reciprocity between financial loss and
emotional and social problems that we find in other forms of gambling. However, in poker
we find also problem gamblers who break even, or who may even profit continuously from
winning, but still experience that the game has detrimental effects on their mental,
emotional and social life.
It is important here not to jump to the conclusion that all professional gamblers who
sustain a continuous profit from poker are necessarily problem gamblers. Some of them are,
and some are not. The determination depends on the way that gambling fits into the rest of
their life. Griffiths et al. (2010) make a similar argument with respect to computer gamers.
246 O. Bjerg

They propose to distinguish between excessive and addictive gaming and he demonstrates
how the determination of addiction is highly sensitive to the way the gaming behaviour
interacts with the individual’s life context. Hence, the excessive gamer is not necessarily
addicted.
The point here is that researchers as well as health professionals need to develop
diagnostic tools that are more sensitive to non-financial aspects of problem gambling when
dealing with poker players. Furthermore, the GamTest, developed at the Swedish
Spelinstitutet, measures time, money, emotions and social relations independently to
produce a customised profile of the individual gambler (Spelinstitutet, 2008). This is
suggestive of the kind of tool that needs to be developed for the diagnosing of problem
gambling among poker players.

‘Problem gamblers are irrational in their beliefs about the game’


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A key component in much research on problem gambling as well as in many therapeutic


programs is the notion of cognitive distortions (Gadboury & Ladouceur, 1989; Griffiths,
1994; Toneatto et al., 1997; Toneatto, 2002). This concept refers to the phenomenon that
problem gamblers are distinguished from non-problem gamblers through the maintenance
of erroneous beliefs about the objective nature of the games they play (Joukhador,
Maccallum & Blaszczynski, 2003). Examples of typical cognitive distortions include the
gambler’s fallacy and the illusion of control.
In relation to games of pure chance such as slot machines or roulette, it is relatively
simple to determine whether a gambler suffers from cognitive distortions. Invoking Kant’s
distinction between a priori and a posteori knowledge, we can say that the truth-value of a
gambler’s belief or statement about the nature of the outcome of a game of pure chance
can be determined a priori (Kant, 1995 [1787], p. 49). The nature of the game is purely
random thus any deviation from the perception of the outcome of the game as wholly
uncontrollable and unpredictable can be written off as erroneous and the symptom of
cognitive distortion.
As we move to skill based social games, matters become slightly more complicated.
Some of these games offer the gambler the opportunity to have some effect on the outcome
of the game and in principle even to achieve a positive expected value. These
opportunities include strategies such as card counting in blackjack and insider knowledge
in sports betting. Still, it seems reasonable to assume that for the vast majority of gamblers
these strategies are in practice impossible and in most cases beliefs that the gambler is able
to beat the odds are indeed illusory.
In relation to skill-based social games, and to poker in particular, the issue of cognitive
distortions is complicated to a point where we need to reconsider the concept itself. The
problem of applying uniformly the concept of cognitive distortions across different forms of
gambling is illustrated in a recent study on poker. Mitrovic and Brown apply the Gambler’s
Beliefs Questionnaire (Steenbergh, Meyers, May & Whelan, 2002) to measure cognitive
distortions among problem and non-problem gamblers in a sample of poker players (Mitrovic
& Brown, 2009). One of the questions in this instrument is ‘My knowledge and skill in
gambling contributes to the likelihood that I will make money’. An affirmative response to this
question is interpreted as sign of an illusion of control and thus cognitive distortion.
Mitrovic and Brown find that there is no significant correlation between cognitive
distortion and problem gambling in the sample of poker players. This leads them to
conclude: ‘the results suggest that poker players do not strictly adhere to previous research,
which suggests the importance of distorted cognitions in relation to problem gambling’
International Gambling Studies 247

(Mitrovic & Brown, 2009, p. 500). While in fact this conclusion is in concurrence with the
argument of the current paper, we might consider whether Mitrovic and Brown may indeed
be right but for the wrong reasons.
There is a methodological problem in their measurement of illusion of control. In poker,
we cannot a priori write off a positive response to the aforementioned question in the
Gambler’s Belief Questionnaire as erroneous. As we have already discussed, the outcome of a
poker game is not solely determined by chance. Knowledge and skills help players improve
the way they play the game and thus improve their likelihood of winning. Furthermore, several
accounts from the professional players in our study constitute in vivo proof of the role of skill
in poker, as they are able to sustain continuous profits over the course of several years. If asked,
these players would most certainly provide an affirmative response to the question of
knowledge and skill in the Gambler’s Belief Questionnaire. The interpretation of such
responses as mere signs of cognitive distortions would be in itself erroneous and it might even
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be relevant to speak of a ‘researcher’s fallacy’. Mitrovic and Brown are right to conclude that
poker players do not conform to existing gambling theories. Yet, this non-conformity does not
just reside in the fact that we cannot find the same statistical correlation between cognitive
distortion and problem gambling. The problem is the more profound one that we cannot even
apply the same concepts and measurement tools to poker players as we use in other types of
gambling.
The argument is not the simple one that cognitive distortions and erroneous beliefs do not
exist in poker. The point is rather that the truth value of a poker player’s beliefs and statements
about the role of knowledge, skill and chance in poker can most often only be determined a
posteori. This means that we can only a posteori determine whether a gambler’s statement
about poker is the sign of cognitive distortion or not. A proposition such as: ‘My knowledge
and skill in poker contribute to the likelihood that I will make money’ is in fact ambiguous and
simultaneously makes a number of claims.
On the one hand, the proposition seems to make a claim about the general nature of poker,
i.e. that knowledge and skill in poker makes it more likely that a player will make money. This
claim is a priori true given the structural composition of poker.
On the other hand, the proposition also seems to make a particular claim about the
individual player, i.e. that he or she has enough knowledge and skill in poker to make
money. This claim can be either true or false depending on the circumstances of the
particular player uttering the statement and the determination of the truth-value requires an
a posteori investigation of these circumstances.
When poker players talk about poker and their experiences in the game, these two
dimensions, the general and the particular, are often intermingled. The following
statement by a recovered problem gambler is very typical:
IP: The special thing about poker is that you have the idea that it is a game of skill and that you
can be good at it. Then if you three times in a row experience something, where you think:
‘Damn, this is bad luck. There is only one more card to come, I am in a big lead and the
opponent has only three outs and I have thirty five’ and then you lose, then you think: ‘I am
unlucky. I am definitely unlucky. It is not that I’m bad at it. So statistically, if I were to
continue playing, I would win.’
I: So did you feel that you were good at the game?
IP: Yes, or I don’t know if I ever felt good at the game but at least I have felt that those times
when I have lost big things it has been due to bad luck. Since it is a game of cards, of course
you don’t know what card is going to be dealt next time. However, when things happen
against all likelihood, you think that you are unlucky and that it does not have anything to do
with your skills. (Male, 22)
248 O. Bjerg

In the very first sentence, he describes his general perception of the nature of poker. This
perception is accurate. Like several other interviewees, he then he goes on to describe the
phenomenon of attributing wins to skill and losses to bad luck. Whether this attribution is
true or false depends on the circumstances. Since this particular interviewee had
accumulated a debt of more than US$20,000 through gambling, it is reasonable to assume
that there is indeed some form of perceptual distortion at play.
Another interviewee, who was also a problem gambler, tells the following story, which
also represents a common pattern among several of the problem gamblers in our study:
In the beginning, I was more or less even. Then I started winning, though not any enormous
amounts. However, I always ran into the problem that whenever I won some money, I would
go to a higher level. I actually went so high that I might go in with half of the money in my
account. So even if I made up to $2000 in my account, I would play at a $5 – 10 blinds table
with a buyin of $1000. And at some point I was bound to lose it all again, whether it was
because of bad play, variance or something like that. (Male, 29)
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This player was reasonably skilled and he was generally a winning player at some of the
low and medium level poker games. However, his wins had a tendency of inflating
the perception of his own skills to a point where he believed that he is also able to win at
the high stakes games, where the competition is much stronger. He was even reflective
enough to recount this misperception:
I: Have you ever thought about, why you think poker is so exciting and attractive?
IP: It is the idea that it is about being skilled and not about being lucky. But I am well aware
that there are both things in the game. . . . But it was the thought that I was smarter than the
others and that I was going to figure it out. And I am still so thick-headed that I still believe
I am smarter than a part of them. There is just a point where I can’t control it and stop going up
in limits. Because up there, where I was playing, that is where the professionals are, and I don’t
think I am smarter than them. So at that point, I was not smart enough to stay down where I
was able to win. And that’s a big part of it!
This player also demonstrates a very realistic perception of the role of skill and luck in
poker in general. Even his perception of himself as a skilled player, who is able to make
money at the game is not entirely erroneous. Yet, there is a still an aspect of illusion in the
self-perception as he overestimates the level of his own skills. This is where we can start
talking about a cognitive distortion.
Self-evaluation is a key component of strategic poker play. Since the game is a social
game of human players of varying levels of skill rather than a banking game with fixed
odds, strategic poker players constantly evaluate whether they have enough skill to
compete in the game they are playing or whether they should seek out another game with
weaker opponents in which they have an edge. Professional players, who are able to make
continuous profits in the game, are marked by a very accurate sense of their own capacities
and limitations. Professionals among the interviewees explained how they would quit a
game as soon as they experienced a deterioration of their skills as a result of fatigue, lack
of concentration, emotional imbalance (tilt), etc. If they experienced extended periods of
losses they would move to lower stakes, where the possible earnings are lower but where
the opposition is also correspondingly lower, in order to regain their edge in the game.
Several interviewees reported how they had moved from being winning players to being
losing players and in the process also developed into problem gamblers and how a key
component in this transition was loss of the ability to perform accurate self-evaluation and
act according to such evaluation.
On the basis of the analysis of the structural composition of poker and the accounts of
both problem gamblers and professional poker players in the interviews, the following
International Gambling Studies 249

claim is made: ‘Although cognitive distortions in the form of misperceptions of the chance
element incorporated in the structural composition of poker do occur among players of the
game, another form of distortion that regards the player’s perception of his or her own level
of skill in comparison to other players is much more prevalent among poker players in
general and problem gamblers in particular’. Cognitive distortions of the first kind produce
perceptions of the game that are a priori false. The latter kind of distortions I shall term
‘self-imaginary distortions’. These distortions produce self-images that are a posteori false.

‘Self-control is all about being able to quit’


The thrill of gambling comes from delivering ourselves to forces of chance that are
completely beyond our control. Placing a bet on the roulette table, pressing the button on a
slot machine, or engaging in other games of pure chance is to let go of a little piece of self-
control. When we investigate problem gamblers, the relevant question to pose is not: ‘Why
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do they gamble?’ Gambling is a very common activity and a majority of the population
gambles. The difference between problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers, thus, lies
not so much in their decision to gamble but rather in their inability to stop gambling. This
inability is typically identified with a loss of control. We see this for instance in the official
classification of pathological gambling in the category of ‘habit and impulse disorders’
(ICD-10) or ‘impulse control disorders’ (DSM IV). According to the WHO definitions,
such disorders are ‘characterized by repeated acts that have no clear rational motivation,
cannot be controlled, and generally harm the patient’s own interests and those of other
people’ (World Health Organization, 1992, p. 211).
Gambling games of pure chance are structurally composed in a way to preclude any
influence by the gambler over the outcome of the game. The gambler’s control is thus
reduced to the decision of how much to gamble and ultimately of whether to gamble or not.
In other words, the gambler’s possibility of control can be exercised merely in regards to
the quantitative extent of his level of engagement with the game and not the qualitative
nature of the engagement. We shall be referring to this form as extra-game control as it is
exercised on the boundary between inside and outside of the game. The only way of
exercising control in a game of roulette or slot machine is by setting limits to the amount of
time and money spent on the game or ultimately to quit gambling.
If we move to gambling games involving an element of skill and to poker in particular,
the issue of control becomes more complex. Decisions regarding the quantitative
engagement in the game are of course still highly relevant. However, staking money in a
game of poker is not necessarily an unconditional surrender of control. The structural
composition of poker allows the player a certain amount of control over the outcome of the
game. As players are able to influence the game not only through their decision of how
much to gamble but also how to gamble, the extra-game level of control is supplemented
by another form of control. This may be referred to as intra-game control, as it is exercised
within the game.
The excerpt below stems from an interview with a former player who was participating
in a program for the treatment of problem gambling at the time of the interview. For the
first three years of her gambling career, she was playing only small stakes tournaments on
the Internet and no more often than once or twice a week. She was a reasonably skilled
player and for a while, her playing turned out a profit and she managed to win a number of
tournaments with more than thousand players cashing out prices in the range of US$3000 –
6000. Then, she explained that a rather sudden transition in her relation to poker occured.
In retrospect, she identified the transition as the emergence of problem gambling. Not only
250 O. Bjerg

did she drastically increase the amount of time and money spent on poker. She explained
how her way of playing also changed:
IP: Before I became addicted and I was only playing for fun, I had a good feeling after the
game – regardless of whether I had won or lost. . . . However, after I became addicted to it
and I had spent so much money on it, it was a bad feeling – regardless of whether you had won
or lost.
I: What kind of feeling?
IP: A feeling of shame that you are not able to control yourself. . . .
I: Did your way of playing change?
IP: When you are not addicted, you play much better. You are more patient and you have
much more track of the other players. You are not thinking that you just have to get more
chips. That’s what you do when you end up in the addiction. You are not thinking as broadly.
You are only thinking about yourself and that you want more and more. When you are not
addicted, you have more patience. If two players go all in, you think: ‘They are probably going
to hit. We are one too many to go all in, so I pull out. They are damn well going to hit their
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king or their ace.’ But when you are only focused on yourself, you take many stupid chances.
And of course you can be lucky sometimes but the odds are that there will be more times when
your cards do not stand up because they are not good enough. (Female, 23)
In the case of this interviewee, loss of extra-game control and intra-game control go hand
in hand. With the development of her problem gambling, she not only lost control over the
amount of time and money spent on gambling, she also lost the discipline within the game
to play only strategically optimal hands.
It is also possible to lose one form of control while retaining the other. One interviewee
explained how he made a significant profit in the range of US$8000 –10,000 per month by
playing solid poker at low to mid-level stake online-games. In other words, he was able to
exercise a high degree of intra-game control. Yet, playing poker is associated with many
negative emotions such as mood swings, insecurity, depression and social isolation. He
explained how he felt trapped in a lifestyle that he did not really want but he did not have
sufficient extra-game control to stop gambling:
I cannot become happy, if I only play poker. The game is too cynical and it is mentally too
strenuous, still I don’t think that I can quit entirely. Of course, it is difficult suddenly to drop
all the money that I know I can win online. My therapist tells me that I need to quit entirely or
at least throttle down a lot and find the true values of life but I think it is going to be difficult.
I am trapped. (Male, 29)
A typical pattern found in several of the interviews with problem gamblers was that they
have moved from certain poker games, in which they were able to maintain a large degree
of intra-game control and perhaps even be winning players, to other games where this
control is lost. These constitute moves from low to higher stake games, from tournament
play to cash games, or from Texas Hold’Em to the much more volatile and action-filled
variant of poker, Omaha. Some problem gamblers even report that they are able to
maintain intra-game control in poker while at the same time sustaining significant losses in
blackjack, sports betting or even games of pure chance over which they have no control
whatsoever. One of the interviewees offered the following reflections on his prospects of
recovery:
I: Do you think that you can control poker as opposed to the other games [blackjack and
roulette].
IP: Yes, I am fairly confident that I can do that. This is what I’m working on with Karen [the
counsellor] in these consultations at the therapy centre.
I: Working to control poker, that is?
International Gambling Studies 251

IP: No, controlling the other games. I mean controlling them in the sense that they are
completely cut out, controlling not to play them. This is what I’m working towards. But poker,
I will always be able to control. (Male, 21)
Whether this is indeed a viable strategy of recovery for this individual gambler is of course
a therapeutic question. Nevertheless, the statements illustrate the intricacies of the issue of
control in relation to poker and problem gambling. And this is precisely the point of this
section.
In poker, more so than in other gambling games, we should be careful not to write off
any engagement with the game en bloc as ‘irrational’ and an unambiguous ‘loss of control’.
As we have already touched upon in the section on money, the structural composition of
poker allows for great variability in the ways problem gambling is configured. This applies
here also to the issue of control. In order to understand properly the individual problem
gambler we have to allow for several different configurations of the loss of control. This
applies to our theoretical understanding of problem gambling in poker within the field of
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research as well as for the diagnostic understanding of the problem gambler within the field
of therapy.

Conclusion and implications


Our analysis leads to two major claims. First, the structural composition of different
gambling games has a significant effect on the ways problem gambling may develop in
relation to these games. This is particularly pertinent in the case of poker as the
combination of an element of skill and the organisation as a social game allows for the
application of rational strategic play to give the player a positive expected value on his
participation in the game.
Second, even within poker there is a large degree of variability in the way problem
gambling may develop. Problem gamblers in poker may be losing or winning players, they
may be irrational or rational in their perception of the game, and their style of play may be
uncontrolled or controlled. This challenges a series of fundamental assumptions about
problem gambling that are built into many of the theoretical concepts we ordinarily use to
understand, diagnose and treat problem gambling.
The analysis suggests a series of distinctions and conceptual tools to aid a more
nuanced approach to the understanding of problem gambling in poker. To understand the
financial aspect of problem gambling, I propose that we distinguish between losing
players, break-even players and winning players, supplemented with an attention to the
way players might move between these categories in the course of their gambling career –
this distinction is further developed in Bjerg (in press). These different types of problem
gamblers may experience very different kinds of problems that cannot be subsumed under
a uniform theory of problem gambling.
In order to understand the role of rationality and perceptual distortions in poker it is
necessary to distinguish between cognitive perceptions, which are a priori false, and self-
imaginary distortions, which are a posteori false. The truth value of poker players’
perceptions of the game and the role of their own skills in the outcome of the game should
be determined with careful attention to the concrete circumstances of the particular player.
This is to avoid the kind of misinterpretation following from the writing off of any
perception of control over the game through skilful play as erroneous per se.
Finally, I suggest we begin to distinguish between extra-game control and intra-game
control in order to allow for multiple configurations of the ways control is lost in problem
gambling in poker. While some problem gamblers in poker do indeed lose any form of
252 O. Bjerg

control, other players are able to exercise great discipline in their behaviour within the
confines of the game (intra-game control) while not being able to balance their gambling in
relation to life outside the game (extra-game control). In research as well as in therapy, we
should be sensitive to these kinds of nuances.
As poker poses a challenge to our understanding of problem gambling, a series of
questions arises pertaining also to diagnosis and therapy. I shall conclude by listing some
questions that seem pertinent:
(1) If problem gambling in poker is less deterministically connected to financial loss,
can we then still use the same diagnostic tools to discriminate between problem
gambling and non-problem gambling that we apply to other forms of gambling?
(2) If problem gamblers in poker do not necessarily have an irrational perception of
the elements of chance and skill in the game, should we then still approach them in
the therapeutic setting with the intention of ‘correcting’ their alleged ‘erroneous
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beliefs’?
(3) If problem gamblers in poker do not necessarily lose control of themselves within
the game, would it then be possible to devise new strategies of recovery including
elements of controlled gambling?
The issue of controlled gambling vs total abstinence is already a hotly debated topic
(Blaszczynski, McConaghy & Frankova, 1991; Ladouceur, 2005; Dowling & Smith,
2007) and poker just seems to add even more relevance to this debate.

Acknowledgement
Research in this article was conducted in collaboration with the Danish Center for Ludomania. Marie
With Nedergaard provided invaluable assistance in the collection of empirical material. Jakob
Jonsson and Thomas Basbøll have generously commented and corrected the article. The research
was funded by Egmont Fonden.

Notes on contributor
Ole Bjerg is a sociologist and post doc at the Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy at
the Copenhagen Business School. His research interests concern the interrelations between
gambling, addiction and capitalism. Previous publications include ‘Too close to the money—A
theory of compulsive gambling’ in Theory, Culture & Society, 26 (2009) and ‘Drug addiction and
capitalism—Too close to the body’ in Body & Society, 14 (2008). The book Poker – The parody of
capitalis’ is forthcoming at University of Michigan Press in 2011.

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