Running Header: SUDANESE SECESSION REFERENDUMS 1

All Eyes On the Sudanese Secession Referendums

SFC Raymond L. Nearhood II

SLC Class 11-001

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Abstract

This paper explores the possibility of civil war re-emerging in the Sudan following the

referendum votes for secession of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and the oil rich

Abyei province from the government of Sudan. The referendum votes, scheduled for January 9th,

2011, are part of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the twenty-one

year civil war between the predominately Arab-Islamic north and the predominately Black

African-Animist/Christian south. This paper will briefly discuss the history of cultural clashes in

the Sudan with emphasis on arabization and economic considerations. It will also discuss the

dynamics of the two major parties involved in the north and south: The National Congress Party

(NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), respectively. The intent

of this paper is to inform the reader of the continued struggle for control in one of the most

volatile countries in a volatile region of Africa and to make the reader aware of current United

Nations Missions in Sudan (UNMIS) and the possible effects on the United States (US) interests

and policies towards the country – united or divided.

Keywords: Government of Southern Sudan, secession, referendum vote, civil war, Sudan
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All Eyes On the Sudanese Secession Referendums

In 2005, a twenty-one year conflict in the Sudan that left over two million dead, four

million uprooted, and over 600,000 seeking shelter outside of the country (UNMIS, 2010), ended

with the signing of the CPA. That agreement provided for a deadline in which the southern

province, under the provincial GoSS, as well as the oil rich province of Abyei, votes to remain

united with the current government of Sudan or secede for independence. With these words, the

agreement (Comprehensive Peace Agreement Commission [CPAC], 2005) was made:

At the end of the six (6) year Interim Period there shall be an internationally monitored

referendum, organized jointly by the GOS and the SPLM/A, for the people of South

Sudan to: confirm the unity of Sudan by voting to adopt the system of Government

established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession. (p. 8)

Simultaneously with the referendum for southern Sudan, the residents of Abyei will cast

a separate ballot. The proposition voted on in the separate ballot will present the residents

of Abyei with the following choices, irrespective of the results of the southern

referendum:

a. That Abyei retain its special administrative status in the north;

b. That Abyei be part of Bahr el Ghazal. (p. 65)

January 9th, 2011 marks the end of the agreed upon Interim Period, and possibly the end of a

tenuous peace that could throw the Sudan back into civil war. With the intent of informing the

reader of the continued struggle for control in the Sudan, this paper will discuss the likelihood of
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civil war in the Sudan and the effects that a Sudanese civil war may have on US interests and

policy in the region.

There has been a long struggle for identity and power in the Sudan. As Dr. Fadallah

(2004) describes:

Throughout its history Sudan has been divided between its Arabian heritage, identified

with northern Sudan, and its African heritage in the south. The two groups are divided

along linguistic, religious, racial, and economic lines, and the cleavage has generated

ethnic tensions and clashes. (p. 17)

Perhaps most notable, and most fresh in the minds of the World, is the twenty-one year civil war

between the northern Arabian Sudanese and the southern African Sudanese that culminated in

the Darfur conflict and ended in 2005 with the signing of the CPA. However, the struggle that

came to a head in the longest civil war in African history (The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2008)

has a long history of its own.

Nubians - Black Africans of a borderless region that spans through southern Egypt and

northern Sudan (Ammar, 1996) - have had long contact with Arabs. Though the contact has

been long, due mostly to Arab Egyptian rule north of Nubia, the coming of Islam greatly

contributed to the arabization of Sudan. As Christianity amongst the Nubians began to grow

weak, Islam began to replace it. Although Arabic culture and language was not initially forced,

further expansion of Islam, trade with Arab countries, intermarriage between Arabs and Nubians,

and the settling of Arabs in Nubia eventually furthered the arabization of the region and northern

Sudan (Fadallah, 2004, pp. 18-21).

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With the arabization of what is today northern Sudan came many social and economic

benefits. Islam brought to the region government, culture, urbanization, science, and education

that was previously rare or unknown to Sudan (Library of Congress [LOC], 1991). However,

Dr. Fadallah (2004) notes, “these benefits were restricted largely to urban and commercial

centres (p. 15).” The result was the cultural isolation of the peoples of southern Sudan that

remained rural farmers, tribal, racially Black African, and religiously Christian or Animistic.

From the time that Islam overcame the Christianity of the Nubians in the 14th century

until the 19th century the south remained mostly isolated from the northern Arab Sudanese. The

changing of empirical control in the north played very little into the lives of the people in the

south. Geographic obstacles and a monarchal system of government over the tribes protected the

tribal integrity of the south from external influences and seriously retarded the spread of Islam in

the region for hundreds of years (LOC, 1991).

This isolation changed dramatically in the 19th century while the north was under the rule

of the Egyptian Turkiyah monarchy. In the early 1800s the most profitable business undertaking

in Sudan, and the focus of the Turkiyah monarchy, was slave trading. Southern Sudan, where

slavery flourished, was seen as out of reach by Egypt for a long time. But, because the

expanding British Empire was suppressing the slave trade in sub-Saharan Africa, Sudan under

Egypt’s rule, looked elsewhere for a consumer market and slaves to trade. The market was

found in Sudan’s proximity and access to Arabian Peninsula slave markets, and the slaves were

found in southern Sudan. Dr. Fadallah (2004) relates, “Annual raids resulted in the capture of

countless thousands of southern Sudanese, and the destruction of the region's stability and

economy. The horrors associated with the slave trade generated European interest in Sudan (p.
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26).” The result of the slave trade, the raids, and the economic and social destruction was a deep

seated hatred for the Arab-Sudanese of the north (LOC, 1991).

That hatred continued over the next 100 years. As the Suez Canal opened, the British

government sought greater control in the area which they gained by joint rule with an Arab-

Sudanese government centered at Khartoum. The southern provinces were neglected under this

joint rule. The British justified the policy of neglect by claiming that the south would not be able

to handle modernization (LOC, 1991). The result was that the south remained well behind the

north in developing. But, because of the agricultural uses of the south, the northern Sudanese

attempted to unite the south with the north. At the 1946 Sudan Administrative Conference, the

joint British/Sudanese government determined that all of Sudan, north and south, should be

governed as one country. Fear and anger in the south culminated in mutiny as southern military

units were put under the command of Arab-Sudanese officers from the north. The result was

several hundred dead northern merchants, government officials, and officers as well as a swift

response and the legal execution of seventy southern mutineers (LOC, 1991).

In 1955 Sudan was granted its independence as Britain pulled back its empire post World

War II. The earliest government of an independent Sudan was completely ineffective and

overthrown by a coup in 1958. This new government under General Ibrahim Abbud proved to

be successful early on. However, the greatest economic crop of the united Sudan was cotton,

grown primarily in the south, and pursuance of the cotton proved to be the government’s

downfall. Abbud, in an attempt to gain and hold absolute control over the crop producing south,

enacted laws of forced Islamization and forced arabization (Fadallah, 2004, p. 40). The result

was southern rebellion and years of violent upheaval that ended with change of government after

change of government.
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Similar situations arose over the following decades, culminating in the twenty-one year

civil war that ended with the signing of the CPA in 2005. Now, the discussion is centered on the

questions of the referendum votes scheduled to take place on January 9th, 2011: What will

happen next? Will the Sudan fall into another war between the north and the south?

Civil war in the Sudan is most probable if the Abyei province votes to unite with the

GoSS or; if the Sudanese Government blocks a completely open vote from occurring in the

Abyei province or; if the GoSS believes that the Sudanese Government is stealing the vote from

Abyei by adding Bedouin voters to the polls.

This position assumes two things. Firstly, it assumes that the GoSS will, in fact, vote for

independence from the north. This appears to be the likely outcome of the GoSS referendum

vote. During the twenty-one year civil war it was the SPLA that fought against the Government

of Sudan against what they viewed as economic, social, and religious oppression. Now, it is the

SPLM, the political party that came from the SPLA, who controls a united GoSS. Further, the

SPLM maintains a minority status in the Sudanese legislature, holding 28% representation, while

their opponent, the NCP, and other northern parties have a combined representation of 66%

(CPAC, 2005, p. 20).

Secondly, this position assumes that the oil resources of the Abyei province are the

proverbial “spark” that will relight the fires of war in the Sudan. The Abyei province contains

an estimated 600 million to 1.2 billion barrels of recoverable oil and Sudan has invested

resources to the recovery of oil in the province in the past twenty years, even building a refinery

in Khartoum (American Physical Society, 2007). Understanding these facts, the position’s
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assumption is based on the historical causes of the clashes between the northern Arab-Sudanese

and the southern Black African-Sudanese.

Although one cannot discount the role that religious and ethnic differences play in the

fights between the north and the south, one can safely relegate those differences to secondary

causes behind the primary cause, namely economic power. Dr. Horowitz (2009) describes

religion as “a proxy for materialist variables such as land grabs or wealth creation.” This

principle appears true for the tension and violence in Sudan since arabization began affecting the

southern provinces. This theory is supportable by what is generally understood as the core

causes of conflict in the Sudan. Firstly, there was the cultural isolationism of the 14th through

19th century, solidified by geography and the tribal monarchy of the south. This isolationism left

the south behind the north in the progress experienced due to the spread of Islam. Although the

Arab-Sudanese north tried expanding south, they failed due to the causes of the solidified

isolationism. Next, conflict and general hatred began because of the 19th century slave trade and

economic decimation of the south by the north. Again, although ethnic and religious differences

played a role, the primary cause of the invasions into the south was to bolster the north’s share in

the slave trade on the Arabian Peninsula. Later, the British/Arab-Sudanese attempts to unite the

Sudan in order to gain access to the agricultural uses of the south failed after years of neglecting

the south’s modernization. Finally, after Sudanese independence was secured, the Arab-

Sudanese of the north continually used over aggressive techniques of forced Islamization and

arabization in order to control the economic benefits from the south, exampled by the aggressive

techniques of the Sudanese government under the control of General Ibrahim Abbud in the mid-

20th century. Should the historical patterns hold true, the oil reserves of the Abyei province will

be cause for a fight between Sudan and the GoSS.

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Further, the situation is, as of the time of the writing this paper, that the referendum vote

of the Abyei province is a point of contention in the continued peace process since the signing of

the CPA. Each side has taken a position in opposition to the other. The Government of Sudan

has raised issues of voting rights for the Missiriya, a cattle-herding tribe of Bedouins that enter

into Abyei for a few months every year. The Missiriya have aligned their tribe with the NCP,

which controls the north (Sudan Tribune, 2010a). In order to bolster the position of the NCP in

the continuing debate, Professor Ibrahim Ghandour, secretary for political affairs of the NCP

said:

Unfortunately, our partners, brothers and sisters in SPLM see Abyei only as an oil rich

area and they don’t see the human face of the conflict. [But], we in NCP look at the

interest of the communities they [include] the Misseriya. (Clottey, 2010)

The GoSS has opposed that claim, insisting that the issue at hand is one of constitutional voting

rights. Michael Makuei Lueth, Minister of Parliamentary Affairs for the SPLM, has declared:

[T]he SPLM leadership will not trade Abyei with independence of South Sudan because

Comprehensive Peace Agreement is very clear to all including the two parties in

reference to the National Congress Party and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement.

In the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the right for people of South Sudan and Abyei

to vote during the internationally monitored and separate referenda exists. If there are

people who think that SPLM will concede Abyei for independence of South Sudan, they

should know that SPLM has repeatedly rejected attempts by the National Congress Party

to include Missiriya in the referendum vote, because their arguments lack references.

(Sudan Tribune, 2010a)

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However, the SPLM raised the issue of border demarcation, insisting that Abyei should be

declared a part of the GoSS by presidential order. Such a declaration would negate the Abyei

provinces cause to vote and deny them of the same right that the SPLM is insisting upon.

UNMIS is taking notice of the debate and the process surrounding the Abyei province. In

response to the ongoing disputes, Alain Le Roy, chief of United Nations peacekeeping missions

in Sudan, has considered an increase in peacekeeping forces in case of erupting violence between

the north and the south. However, Le Roy says that an “increase in number of troops would not

enable UNMIS either to prevent or contain a clash between the two armies (Lederer, 2010).”

UNMIS concludes that the way to avoid conflict is to “continue promoting agreement between

the two sides on key issues that include borders, voting rights and control of oil-rich Abyei

(Lederer, 2010).”

Also paying attention to the referendum process and the outcome of the votes is the U.S.

Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ended a weeklong

visit to Sudan on October 24, 2010 after receiving reassurance from the Government of Sudan

that they will respect the outcome of the referendum vote, no matter the outcome (Butty, 2010).

However, Sudan expert Fouad Hikmat concludes that despite the assurance paid to Senator

Kerry, the issue of the Abyei remains to be resolved (Butty, 2010).

U.S. President Barak Obama has also expressed concern about the referendum process in

Sudan, and has urged that Sudan stick to the timetable for the referendum codified in the CPA

(Reuters, 2010). Further, the U.S. has threatened stronger sanctions against Sudan should the

government of the north take actions to interfere with the vote on January 9th (Butty, 2010).
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Given that the U.S. has already taken a position on the referendum, though it has not yet

taken a definitive position on the Abyei dispute, it is very likely that there would be U.S. reaction

to Sudan should fighting breakout. Though it appears now that the most likely response would

be stronger sanctions against Sudan and a formal denouncement of violence from either party,

there is the possibility of further U.S. policy involvement in Sudan. If there were to be any

further involvement, it is likely that there would be reaction against any party that appeared to

subvert the constitutional process as codified in the CPA. The U.S. is also likely to be involved

in peace keeping through UNMIS, as well as take part in further relief efforts through the United

Nations and support to Non-Government Organizations, like the International Red Cross/Red

Crescent.

Regardless of possible U.S. involvement or international reaction to the outcome of the

votes in the Sudan, the possibility of more war within the Sudan looms as the January 9th

referendum approaches. As of 31 October 2010, the inability of the NCP and the SPLM to reach

an agreement over voting rights and border demarcation issue appears to some to indicate the

inevitability of a delay in the referendum vote for Abyei (Sudan Tribune, 2010b). If the delay is

to happen, the possibility of another war between the north and south increases as the fight over

the oil rich Abyei grows more immediate and more intense. All eyes in the international

community will be on the Sudanese secession referendum votes on January 9th, 2010, waiting on

the possibility of violence on par with the recently ended twenty-one year civil war that left

nearly seven million people dead or displaced.

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References

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article36776
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