v. : AT NEW HAVEN
and pursuant to Practice Book §§ 41-23 et seq., to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and to Article I, § 8 of the State of Connecticut Constitution, and
respectfully this Honorable Court to change the venue of the trial in the above-captioned matter
from New Haven County, specifically the New Haven Judicial District, to the most potentially
neutral site, the Stamford/Norwalk Judicial District, based on the unprecedented, prejudicial
publicity surrounding this case, as exacerbated by the recent trial of Mr. Komisarjevsky’s co-
defendant Steven Hayes. Although Mr. Komisarjevsky questions seriously whether he can
receive a fair trial anywhere in Connecticut, particularly after Steve Hayes’s efforts to deflect
responsibility for his crimes, a survey of four judicial districts – New Haven, Fairfield, Danbury
empanel a qualified jury. Alternatively, Mr. Komisarjevsky asks that the case be transferred to
BY:
JEREMIAH DONOVAN, JN 305346 WALTER C. BANSLEY, III, JN 407581
123 Elm Street--Unit 400 Bansley Law Offices, LLC
P.O. Box 554 20 Academy Street
Old Saybrook, CT 06475-4108 New Haven, CT 06510
(860) 388-3750; Fax: (860) 388-3181 (203) 776-1900; Fax: (203) 773-1904
donolaw@sbcglobal.net Bansley3@BansleyLaw.com
ORDER
THE COURT
By: , J.
2
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
v. : AT NEW HAVEN
Now comes the defendant, Joshua Komisarjevsky, in support of his Motion for a Change
STATEMENT OF FACTS
violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b(7); murder of a victim under 16 years old in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-54b(5); murder of victim of sexual assault in the first degree in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-54b(6); larceny in first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
122; robbery in first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-122; risk of injury to child in
violation of General Statutes § 53-21; illegal sexual contact in violation of General Statutes § 53-
21(2); burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101(a)(2); arson in the
first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111(a)(1); conspiracy to commit arson in the
first degree in violation of General Statutes§§ 53a-111(a)(1) and 53a-48(a); assault in the first
degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59(a)(1); sexual assault in the first degree in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-70a; and six counts of kidnapping in the first degree in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-92. The companion case to this case is State v. Steven Hayes,
Docket No. CR07-241859, wherein Mr. Hayes was convicted of, inter alia, capital murder and
The foregoing charges result from the home invasion of the Cheshire, Connecticut
residence of the family of William Petit during the early morning hours of July 23, 2007. During
the course of the burglary, Dr. Petit was struck in the head with a baseball bat in order to
immobilize him. Dr. Petit’s wife, Jennifer Hawke Petit, and their two children were tied to their
beds in order to restrain movement. Dr. Petit eventually escaped from the home and, around that
time, Steven Hayes raped and strangled Jennifer Hawke Petit. Upon killing Mrs. Hawke Petit,
Steven Hayes doused the Petit home with gasoline and lit the gasoline on fire, knowing the Petit
children were bound to their beds. The Petit daughters died tragically as a result of smoke
inhalation.
Although there are many theories as to why Mr. Komisarjevsky’s and Mr. Hayes’s cases
have generated such widespread attention, it is indisputable that the cases have attracted
unparalleled and unrelenting media coverage within the state of Connecticut and elsewhere.
These cases have also generated extremely significant public interest throughout the state of
Connecticut, the nation and the world. The media coverage has been precedent setting, historic,
unyielding and pervasive. The media reports have also been inflammatory and to some extent
incorrect, misleading and/or confusing with respect to the facts of the case and in particular as to
2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right to trial by
“an impartial jury” in criminal prosecutions. This right is “‘a basic requirement of due process,’
and must be safeguarded with vigilance.” Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 733 (1963)
(Clark, J. dissenting) (quoting In re: Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court has specifically addressed the judiciary’s obligation to
preserve and protect a defendant’s right to an impartial jury against pre-trial publicity:
Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from
outside influence. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the
difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial
court must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed
against the accused. Where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news
prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the
treatment abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity.
Although several methods of ensuring an impartial jury could be proposed, when the
issue is prejudicial pretrial publicity, change of venue is the only constitutionally sufficient
safeguard. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510, (1971) (citing Rideau, supra, at 726). In
Rideau, the Court held, where a motion for change of venue is based on pretrial publicity, its
denial may constitute a violation of due process. Id. In order to establish the denial as such a
violation, the defendant must demonstrate that the publicity created either a specific “identifiable
prejudice” or a “presumption of prejudice” against him that is highly likely to impact his right to
an impartial jury. Brecheen v. Oklahoma, 485 U.S. 909, 910 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissent). In
this regard, the trial court must examine the totality of circumstances surrounding petitioner’s
trial. See, Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799, (1975). If the circumstances indicate a
reasonable likelihood that the defendant’s right to an impartial jury is prejudiced, then the judge
3
should grant a change of venue. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 363; Turner v. Louisiana, 379
In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), the Supreme Court stated “trial by jury in
criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice,” and this right has been
incorporated into state criminal prosecutions by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. States have generally adopted the federal totality of circumstances test
for granting transfer of venue motions when there is ‘a reasonable likelihood that in the absence
of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had.” Brecheen v. Oklahoma, 485 U.S. at 911 (quoting
In Connecticut, the trial court exercises discretion in whether to grant a change of venue
motion. See State v. Miller, 202 Conn. 463, 477 (1987); State v. Piskorski, 177 Conn. 677, 685,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 935 (1979). Practice Book § 41-23 governs this discretion, providing:
“[u]pon motion of the prosecuting authority or the defendant, or upon its own motion, the
judicial authority may order that any pending criminal matter be transferred to any other court
location: (1) If the judicial authority is satisfied that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had where
the case is pending…” Quoted in State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 222 (2003), cert. denied, 541
As the moving party, the defendant bears the burden of showing that he could not receive
a fair and impartial trial. State v. Rogers, 143 Conn. 167, 172, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 952 (1956);
State v. Chapman, 103 Conn. 453, 470 (1925). Further, the right to a fair trial is considered so
fundamental that failure to grant a change of venue can violate due process. A defendant usually
must prove actual juror prejudice to obtain a reversal on the grounds of prejudicial publicity;
however, a defendant does not have to prove actual prejudice in extreme circumstances where
4
there has been inherently prejudicial publicity such as to make the possibility of prejudice highly
likely or almost unavoidable. State v. Townsend, 211 Conn. 215, 225 (1989); State v. Pelletier,
209 Conn. 564, 569 (1989); State v. Piskorski, 177 Conn. at 685-86.
With respect to publicity in the media, the defendant must show that the publicity was
prejudicial and prevents him from being accorded a fair and impartial trial. State v. Hart, 169
Conn. 428, 433 (1975); State v. Rogers, 143 Conn. at 172; State v. Leopold, 110 Conn. 55, 58
(1929); State v. Rocco, 109 Conn. 571, 572, (1929); State v. Chapman, 103 Conn. at 470. In
terms of what constitutes prejudicial publicity, a defendant must demonstrate that the publicity
was so inflammatory or inaccurate that it created a trial atmosphere “utterly corrupted by press
coverage.” Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798 (1975); see State v. Crafts, 226 Conn. 237,
ARGUMENT
There is no doubt that substantial and actual prejudice exists against Joshua
Komisarjevsky within the prospective jury pool in New Haven County and probably throughout
the state of Connecticut, thus making it impossible for him to receive a fair and impartial trial.
As a result of the charged offenses, combined with the extensive and unrelenting media coverage
co-defendant Steven Hayes’s trial received, including Twitter broadcasting from the courtroom,
Joshua Komisarjevsky has been thoroughly “demonized,” leaving the passions of the prospective
Because Joshua Komisarjevsky has been charged with capital crimes, the Court should be
genuinely concerned that New Haven County jurors will not be able to set aside their prejudices
and emotions (notwithstanding whatever they might indicate) to determine first whether Joshua
Komisarjevsky is guilty and then, if guilty of a capital offense, whether the appropriate sanction
5
is life imprisonment without the possibility of release or death. The Court is obliged to ensure
that Joshua Komisarjevsky receive a trial conducted with fundamental fairness and with due
regard for all constitutional requirements. Such bedrock considerations far outweigh any
consideration of whatever inconvenience the granting of this motion may have on any person or
entity (including counsel for Mr. Komisarjevsky, who are likely to have to travel farther than any
In support of this Motion, Mr. Komisarjevsky intends to present the testimony of Dr.
Steven Penrod and/or Dr. Margaret Bull Kovera, who collaborated in the preparation of Dr.
Penrod’s attached affidavit report. Ex. A. (Dr. Penrod’s and Dr. Kovera’s curriculum vitae are
also attached. Ex. B and C, respectively.).1 Drs. Penrod and Kovera, and their graduate
research assistants, conducted and analyzed a survey concerning the pretrial publicity associated
with this case, including the publicity surrounding the Hayes trial, and assessed its effect upon
potential jurors in several judicial districts within the state of Connecticut, specifically, the
It is Dr. Penrod’s professional opinion that the Court should allow a change of venue
from the New Haven Judicial District to the Stamford/Norwalk Judicial District because the
1
Dr. Penrod received a B.A. from Yale College, a J.D. from Harvard Law School and a Ph.D. in
social psychology, also from Harvard University. Dr. Penrod is currently a Distinguished
Professor of Psychology at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the City University of
New York. Prior to this, he was a Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology at the
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, where he also served as director of the Law-Psychology
Graduate Program in which students were trained in law (earning a J.D. or MLS) and psychology
(earning a MA and/or Ph.D.). Over the past 28 years, Dr. Penrod has served as a consulting
expert in numerous jurisdictions on a variety of jury issues in more than 300 cases. Dr. Penrod
has conducted numerous studies and research projects and has also written extensively on the
subject of the influence of pretrial publicity on jury decision-making, jury behavior and jury
psychology. Dr. Penrod has testified as an expert with respect to jury issues in nearly 150 cases
in numerous jurisdictions. In addition to the foregoing, Dr. Penrod has also conducted public
opinion surveys and/or conducted analyses of pretrial publicity in a number of civil and criminal
cases.
6
Stamford/Norwalk J.D. displays “the least evidence of overwhelming media saturation and
Consistent with their survey results, it is anticipated that Dr. Penrod or Dr. Kovera will
testify that while there has been a substantial amount of adverse pretrial publicity pertaining to
Joshua Komisarjevsky, the level of hostility Mr. Komisarjevsky faces is highest in the New
Haven judicial district given the saturation of publicity that objective measures demonstrate has
most influenced citizens there. Although the data shows consistencies across judicial districts,
which is not unexpected given the profile of this case, the survey establishes clearly that of the
four judicial districts surveyed New Haven is resoundingly the least favorable judicial district in
terms of juror taint whereas Stamford/Norwalk (“Stamford”) is the most favorable relative to
affording Mr. Komisarjevsky the best opportunity to empanel a fair and impartial jury. In
relevant part:
• 22.2 percent of New Haven respondents recalled both names of the defendants
(Hayes and Komisarjevsky) without prompting versus 2.5 percent of Stamford
respondents;
• 92.7 percent of New Haven respondents correctly recognized the name of the
surviving victim versus 79.3 percent of Stamford respondents;
• 88.1 percent of New Haven respondents remembered Hayes had been convicted
versus 72.7 percent of Stamford respondents;
• 49.4 percent of New Haven respondents had seen or heard about Dr. Petit’s interview
with Oprah Winfrey versus 30.5 percent of Stamford respondents;
• 30.9 percent of New Haven respondents heard about Komisarjevsky’s journals (as
introduced in the Hayes trial) versus 11.4 percent of Stamford respondents;
• of those respondents who claimed to remember the case, 76.2 percent of New Haven
respondents reported “very negative” impressions of Joshua Komisarjevsky versus
65.1 percent of Stamford respondents;
7
• when only death qualified responses were considered as to whether respondents
believed Komisarjevsky should be executed, 67.4 percent respondents of New Haven
endorsed the death penalty versus 47 percent of Stamford respondents;
• 19.8 percent of New Haven respondents were more likely to say they could not render
a verdict based only on the evidence compared to 11.1 percent of Stamford
respondents; and
• 22.6 percent of New Haven respondents said they could definitely not be a fair and
impartial juror in a case involving charges against Joshua Komisarjevsky compared to
8.6 percent of Stamford respondents.
These objective measures contradict the Court’s stated assumption that the media coverage
renders venue options indistinguishable. The New Haven specific results as well as the stark
differences reflected above mandate that this case be heard elsewhere, namely in Stamford.
Notably, in comparing the responses for the level of recognition of the Komisarjevsky
case with other high profile cases, Dr. Penrod determined that the recognition of
Komisarjevsky’s case in New Haven is higher than 99 percent of the cases that world renowned
change of venue expert Dr. Edward Bronson worked on during his career. The only case that
had similar recognition was the 2003 Oklahoma bombing case of Terry Nichols. As the Court
may recall, the Nichols case was transferred from Lawton, Oklahoma (after already being
transferred from Oklahoma City, the situs of the crime) to Denver, Colorado, some 600 miles
away (where the jury eventually convicted Nichols but sentenced him to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole). In granting Nichols’s motion, the Honorable Richard P.
Matsch (sitting by designation because the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
In this case the repetition of emotionally intense stories of loss and grief and the
valiant efforts to overcome the consequences of this event have developed a
common belief that the citizens of Oklahoma can and must take what many
believe to be the necessary last step on the road to recovery--participation in the
trial of these accused men. The character of the crimes charged is so contrary to
the public expectation of human behavior that there is a prevailing belief that
8
some action must be taken to make things right again. That theme is dominant in
the comments of people interviewed by television reporters asking about their
reactions to court proceedings in this case. The common reference is to ‘seeing
that justice is done. There is a fair inference that only a guilty verdict with a death
sentence could be considered a just result in the minds of many.
The emotional burden of the explosion and its consequences has been intensified
by the repeated and heavy emphasis on the innocence of the victims and the
impact of their loss on their families. The tragic sense is heightened by the deaths
of infants and very young children in the day care center. The horror of that fact
has been powerfully portrayed by the symbols of teddy bears and angels displayed
everywhere in Oklahoma. They were placed on a Christmas Tree at the State
Capitol.…
The intensity of the humanization of the victims in the public mind is in sharp
contrast with the prevalent portrayals of the defendants. They have been
demonized. The videotape footage and fixed photographs of Timothy McVeigh
in Perry have been used regularly in almost all of the television news reports of
developments in this case. All of the Oklahoma television markets have been
saturated with stories suggesting the defendants are associated with ‘right wing
militia groups.’ File film shows people in combat fatigues firing military style
firearms to illustrate the suggested association. That theme has particularly been
emphasized with Terry Nichols and his brother. These films have also been
shown in Denver and on national news programs but not with the frequency of the
use by broadcast outlets in Oklahoma.
New film showing the defendants in restraints and body armor was taken in the
sally port of the jail in Oklahoma City when they were being brought to court for
hearing these motions. It was shown nationally and locally in connection with
reports of the court proceedings.
Although “measuring” tragedy is an impossible if not unseemly task, the Oklahoma City
bombing was obviously of greater magnitude in terms of numbers of victims and persons directly
affected by the crime. That said, striking similarities exist between the foregoing and what has
occurred in Connecticut the past 3.5 years. Dr. William Petit, Jr., the sole survivor of these
crimes and the New Haven Register’s 2010 Person of the Year, has become an iconic figure
whose reach is perhaps best exemplified by his appearance on the Oprah Winfrey show
9
following the Hayes trial, where Ms. Winfrey, in the final season of her highly rated daytime talk
show, travelled to Connecticut to interview Dr. Petit. See Randall Beach, In wake of tragedy,
family foundation helps many causes, NH Register A1 (Dec. 26, 2010); Alaine Griffin, Petit
Talks of God, Fate and ‘What-Ifs’ In Hourlong ‘Oprah’ Interview, Hartford Courant (Dec. 9,
2010). The Petit Family Foundation has correspondingly become a cause célèbre, raising over
five million dollars through, among other things, myriad grassroots fundraising events.2 And, of
course, there is no shortage of individuals to speak about publicly about the case, from the press,
to radio talk show hosts, to members of the defense bar. As evidenced by the press descending
on downtown New Haven last fall, the Cheshire case moves the proverbial dial.
Concurrently, and partly because of Dr. Petit’s persistent public comments and calls for
execution, Mr. Komisarjevsky is, as the Court observed of Steven Hayes, “universally despised”
notwithstanding the utter lack of public appreciation for who Joshua Komisarjevsky is. It is fair
to say that because of the perceived magnitude and “horror” of the tragedy that occurred on July
23, 2007 in the cloistered middle-to-upper middle class bedroom community of Cheshire,
Connecticut, the public at-large, particularly in those counties where residents subscribe most
heavily to the New Haven Register or the Hartford Court, is indifferent-to-disdainful about any
claim that Mr. Komisarjevsky’s life has worth. Do not bother with prayers for leniency, Mr.
Komisarjevsky is “evil” incarnate and deserves to die. Indeed, even the Reverend Richard
Hawke, father and grandfather of the victims, who presents as a most gentle and benevolent
human being, has spoken publicly about his family being “destroyed by evil” as well as about his
2
As but one example, just the other week a prominent New Haven law firm offered employees
the opportunity to wear jeans on Friday in exchange for a $5 donation to the Petit Family
Foundation (as opposed to other organizations, such as the United Way). So pervasive is the
interest in supporting Dr. Petit and the charity he has established in honor of the victims’
memory.
10
belief that death is the appropriate punishment in this case. Such sentiments are entirely
consistent with Dr. Petit’s longstanding position that death equals justice while providing no
closure. Steven Hayes having been sentenced to death, Joshua Komisarjevsky is now Public
Enemy Number One. See, e.g., Randall Beach, 1 down, 1 to go in nightmarish Cheshire triple-
Dr. Penrod notes that official newspaper accounts of the case in the New Haven Register
totaled 440 articles as compared to 81 that were published in the Connecticut Post, in the
Fairfield Citizen and in the Danbury News-Times. It is obvious that respondents in New Haven
had much greater access to newspaper articles and interest about the case compared to
respondents in the other three judicial districts. And, on information and belief derived from
walking out the courthouse daily during the Hayes trial, local television coverage mirrored what
The survey results also highlight the obvious issue of “conformity prejudice,” which Dr.
Penrod explains exists when, as in the Nichols case, a juror perceives that there is a strong
community reaction in favor of a particular outcome of a trial and that he or she is likely to be
influenced in reaching a verdict consistent with the perceived community feelings rather than an
impartial evaluation of the trial evidence. We anticipate that Dr. Penrod will expand upon this
Based upon Dr. Penrod’s findings as well as basic common sense and fundamental
fairness, Joshua Komisarjevsky respectfully contends that there exists a more than reasonable
likelihood that his constitutional right to an impartial jury will be actually prejudiced if he is
forced to proceed to trial in the Judicial District of New Haven. See Sheppard v. Maxwell and
Turner v. Louisiana, supra. Dr. Penrod’s survey and report substantiates that a jury pool from
11
New Haven County would be very hostile to Joshua Komisarjevsky. The statistics cited above
together with Dr. Penrod’s expert opinion clearly establish that there is more than a reasonable
likelihood that Mr. Komisarjevsky’s right to a fair and impartial jury shall be prejudiced if this
Court does not order the transfer of this case to another judicial district. Accordingly, Mr.
Komisarjevsky submits that it is unreasonable, under the totality of the circumstances, for the
court to proceed to trial within the Judicial District of New Haven. It is clear that the
inflammatory pretrial publicity from the news media has tainted the New Haven County jury
pool and the survey data demonstrates that potential jurors in the Judicial District of Stamford
For the record, Mr. Komisarjevsky is still quite concerned as to whether he can receive a
fair and impartial trial even in Stamford, a more neutral and hopefully a less emotionally charged
venue. However, there is no doubt that of the judicial districts surveyed, Stamford is the one
where Mr. Komisarjevsky has the best chance of receiving a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed
(CD) containing over 2,000 media accounts of what has been referred to as the “Cheshire murder
cases.” Many of these media accounts of the cases and Joshua Komisarjevsky have highlighted
Mr. Komisarjevsky’s previous crimes and uncharged bad acts while also treating the case and
media coverage has been consistent since the commission of the offenses in July of 2007.
A defendant need not show actual prejudice “in extreme circumstances where there has
been inherently prejudicial publicity such as to make the possibility of prejudice highly likely or
almost unavoidable.” State v. Piskorski, 177 Conn. at 686 (citations omitted; internal quotations
12
omitted). Dr. Penrod’s report, standing alone, establishes the extreme circumstances regarding
pretrial prejudicial publicity that has taken place. The combination of the results of Dr. Penrod's
report and the highly prejudicial nature of the articles establish clearly that Mr. Komisarjevsky
cannot get a fair and impartial trial in New Haven County. It is significant in this regard that Dr.
Penrod finds the Nichols case the most analogous to Mr. Komisarjevsky’s in terms of extreme.
CONCLUSION
Due to the pretrial publicity in this case, as discussed herein, there is an actual likelihood
that the Joshua Komisarjevsky’s right to an impartial jury is impaired. Society at large, as well
as Mr. Komisarjevsky, has a vital interest in assuring that his constitutional right to an impartial
jury is protected. Given the extent, nature and duration of the pretrial media onslaught
surrounding this case, “it is not requiring too much that petitioner be tried in an atmosphere
undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961).
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court grant his motion
for change of venue to the Judicial District of Stamford/Norwalk, or in the alternative the
13
Respectfully submitted,
JOSHUA KOMISARJEVSKY, Defendant
BY:
JEREMIAH DONOVAN, JN 305346 WALTER C. BANSLEY, III, JN 407581
123 Elm Street--Unit 400 Bansley Law Offices, LLC
P.O. Box 554 20 Academy Street
Old Saybrook, CT 06475-4108 New Haven, CT 06510
(860) 388-3750; Fax: (860) 388-3181 (203) 776-1900; Fax: (203) 773-1904
donolaw@sbcglobal.net Bansley3@BansleyLaw.com
On the Memorandum
TODD A. BUSSERT, JN 420221 Daria Berkowska, Certified Legal Intern
103 Whitney Avenue, Suite 4
New Haven, CT 06510-1229
(203) 495-9790; Fax: (203) 495-9795
tbussert@bussertlaw.com
14
I, Steven Penrod, being duly sworn, say:
I make this affidavit in support of the motion of the defendant Joshua Komisarjevsky, which
seeks a change of trial venue.
Professional Background
I am a Distinguished Professor of Psychology at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the
City University of New York. Prior to my appointment at John Jay in the fall of 2001, I was a
Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (1995-
2001) where I also served as director of the Law-Psychology Graduate Program in which
students are trained in law (earning a J.D. or MLS) and psychology (earning a MA and/or Ph.D.).
I was formerly Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School (1989-1995).
Before moving to the University of Minnesota I was Professor of Psychology at the University of
Wisconsin (1979-1989). I have also taught law at the University of Wisconsin Law School and
at Indiana University Law School-Bloomington. I hold a B.A. degree from Yale College, a J.D.
degree from Harvard Law School, and a Ph.D. degree in social psychology, also from Harvard
University.
As described in detail in my annexed curriculum vitae, in the years since obtaining my law
degree and a doctorate in social psychology, I have conducted numerous studies and research
projects and written extensively on the subjects of the influence of pretrial publicity on jury
decision making, jury behavior and jury psychology in complex trials, problems of juror
comprehension and use of legal instructions, and the mechanisms of jury decision-making in
both civil and criminal trials. I have published approximately seventy-five research articles in
peer-reviewed scientific journals, together with approximately sixty other publications in law
reviews, book chapters and five books. Most of my research has been conducted with the
support of competitively awarded, peer-reviewed research grants from the National Science
Foundation, the National Institute of Justice, and university program grants.
Though not apparent in my curriculum vitae, over the past 30 plus years I have served as a
consulting expert on a variety of jury and memory issues in more than three hundred cases and
have testified as an expert on a variety of social science and law issues in nearly 150 cases in
federal and state venues including Wisconsin, Minnesota, Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, California,
Texas, Oklahoma, New York, New Jersey, Maine, and Pennsylvania. Of particular relevance to
the present case is the fact that in addition to conducing a number of scientific studies on the
effects of pretrial publicity on juries – discussed below – I have also conducted public opinion
surveys and/or conducted analyses of pretrial publicity in a number of civil and criminal cases
including parties as diverse as Timothy McVeigh, the NCAA, and 3M.
Overview
For reasons more fully presented below, it is my opinion that a venue change would substantially
increase the likelihood of impaneling a fair and impartial jury in the state of Connecticut. A
survey of jury eligible adults in the New Haven, Fairfield, Stamford/Norwalk, and Danbury
judicial districts of Connecticut – conducted in accord with scientific standards of opinion survey
research – demonstrates that although recognition of and specific knowledge about the Cheshire
case is extensive across all districts, potential jurors in the Fairfield, Stamford/Norwalk, and
Danbury districts have less knowledge about the case, less negative impressions of the
Defendant, are less inclined to believe the defendant is guilty, less inclined to believe that he
deserves the death penalty and more inclined to believe they can be fair and impartial jurors than
are jury eligible adults in the New Haven district. The survey results show that although nearly
98% of respondents across all districts recognized the case with minimal prompting, there was
slightly less recognition in the Fairfield (97.6%), Stamford/Norwalk (97.2%), and Danbury
(97.0%) districts than in the New Haven District (99.5%).
Closely following the news surrounding the case is associated with the tendency to believe that
1) Komisarjevsky is guilty (r = .37) and 2) should be executed (r = .25). Similarly, familiarity
with the book McDonald wrote about the murders is associated with the tendency to believe that
1) Komisarjevsky is guilty (r = .14) and 2) should be executed (r = .11). Because closely
following the news surrounding the case and familiarity with McDonald’s book distinguished the
New Haven districts from the Stamford/Norwalk, Fairfield and Danbury districts, it is to be
expected that jurors in New Haven are more prejudiced than those in the latter districts. This
expectation is supported by the findings that fewer participants in the Fairfield (76.2%),
Stamford/Norwalk (72.1%), and Danbury (77.4%) districts reported the Defendant as being
“definitely guilty” or “probably guilty” than in the New Haven district (85.3%).
Additionally, seeing Dr. Petit’s interview with Oprah was generally associated with an increased
tendency to believe that 1) Komisarjevsky is guilty (r = .13) and 2) should be executed (r = .09).
Likewise, knowledge of the Komisarjevsky’s journals was generally associated with an increased
tendency to believe that 1) Komisarjevsky is guilty (r = .15) and 2) should be executed (r = .11).
Finally, knowledge of Hayes’ conviction and sentence was also generally associated with an
increased tendency to believe that 1) Komisarjevsky is guilty (r = .25) and 2) should be executed
(r = .15). Because knowledge about Dr. Petit’s interview with Oprah, Komisarjevsky’s journal,
and Hayes’ conviction and sentencing distinguished the New Haven district from Fairfield,
Stamford/Norwalk, and Danbury, it is not surprising that the jurors in the New Haven district are
most prejudiced against the defendant. Potential jurors were more likely to report “very
negative” impressions of Komisarjevsky in the New Haven (76.2%) district than in Fairfield
(66.4%), Stamford/Norwalk (65.1%), and Danbury (65.8%)
Recollection of the defendants’ names was also associated with the tendency to believe that 1)
Komisarjevsky is guilty (r = .30) and 2) should be executed (r = .15). Likewise, recalling the
survivor’s name is associated with the tendency to believe that 1) Komisarjevsky is guilty (r =
.30) and 2) should be executed (r = .19). Finally, correctly recalling the sentence that Hayes,
Komisarjevsky’s co-defendant, received is associated with the tendency to believe that 1)
Komisarjevsky is guilt (r = .22) and 2) should be executed (r = .18). As respondents from
Stamford/Norwalk were less likely to recognize or recall the defendants’ names (58% versus
89% in New Haven), recall the survivor’s name (79% versus 93%), or recall the sentence that
Hayes received (73% versus 88%), there are sound reasons to believe that jurors in the
Stamford/Norwalk district are least prejudiced against the defendant.
Overall, the survey results will show that all four districts were saturated with media information
about the Cheshire case, and more than 75% of potential jurors across all districts already believe
Komisarjevsky is guilty. Nevertheless, there is evidence that knowledge of the crime, negative
impressions of the defendant, and presumption of guilt could be reduced by moving the case to
the Stamford/Norwalk district, or either the Fairfield or Danbury districts as a second choice. A
change of venue appears worthwhile in this case. However, given the high degree of familiarity
with the case and high levels of prejudgment in all the prospective venues, even if the venue is
changed, it is important that the defense has adequate opportunity and latitude to question the
venirepersons about their knowledge about the crime, as those who know more details about the
crime are more likely to have prejudged the guilt of the defendant and the sentence.
I consulted with Dr. Margaret Bull Kovera, a Professor of Psychology at the John Jay College of
Criminal Justice of the City University of New York (CUNY), in developing the survey
instrument we used to measure community prejudice against the defendant. Prior to her
appointment at John Jay in the fall of 2004, Dr. Kovera was on the faculty at Florida
International University (1995-2004), where she served as director of the Legal Psychology
Ph.D. program, and Reed College (1993-1995). She holds a B.A. degree from Northwestern
University and a Ph.D. degree in social psychology from the University of Minnesota. As
evident from her attached curriculum vitae, she has conducted numerous studies and research
projects on jury decision-making, including pretrial publicity. She has published two books and
over fifty scientific journal articles and book chapters. Most of her research has been conducted
with the support of competitively awarded, peer-reviewed research grants from the National
Science Foundation. Dr. Kovera has served as a consulting expert on a variety of social science
and law issues and has testified as an expert in several venues, including New York, Maryland,
Iowa, and Ontario, Canada.
A copy of the survey, including the questions and response categories are reproduced in
Appendix A, along with the frequency report for each response. Global Strategy Group, an
experienced polling organization, conducted the polling for the survey under the supervision of
my staff. Random digit dialing was used to identify a random sample of residents living in the
New Haven, Fairfield, Stamford/Norwalk, and Danbury judicial districts. I performed the
analyses of the data with assistance from five graduate research assistants at John Jay College, all
of whom have substantial experience with data analysis of this type.
This survey was designed to assess community prejudice, if any, among potential jurors in the
New Haven, Fairfield, Stamford/Norwalk, and Danbury judicial districts of Connecticut jury
pool. Twelve indices of potential prejudice were analyzed in the following areas: (1) Case
Knowledge (questions 10-12 and 17); (2) the Defendant (questions 13 and 14); (3) Surviving
Victim (question 15); (4) Book Knowledge (questions 20 and 21); (5) Journal Knowledge
(questions 24 and 25); (6) Impression of Defendant (question 18); (7) Opinion of Guilt (question
27); (8) Knowledge of Hayes’ case (questions 29 and 30); (9) Opinion about Execution
(questions 31 and 32); (10) Fair and Impartial Jurors (questions 28 and 33); and (11) Media and
News (questions 9, 22, 23, and 26). The questionnaire also gathered demographic information
and ensured jury eligibility from the respondents.
Jury Eligibility. Because the goal of the survey was to reach conclusions about people who
could potentially serve as jurors in this case, the initial set of questions concerned jury eligibility.
First, respondents were asked if the interviewer could speak to the person in the household who
is a US citizen, over 18, with the most recent birthday. If respondents were U.S. citizens over
the age of 18, they were asked to name the judicial district in which they resided. The interview
was terminated if the response was a judicial district other than New Haven, Fairfield,
Stamford/Norwalk, or Danbury. Respondents were then asked if they were registered to vote in
that judicial district. Respondents who were not registered to vote were asked whether they had
a Connecticut driver’s license or had filed an income tax return in the previous six years.
Respondents who were U.S. citizens over the age of 18 and who were either registered to vote,
had a valid driver’s license or had filed an income tax return in the previous six years were
considered jury-eligible and continued with the survey. This procedure identified 1,360
respondents who continued with the survey. However, 46 respondents indicated familiarity with
one or more individuals associated with the case and were terminated from the study, leaving a
final sample of 1,314 respondents.
Death Qualification. Because this case is a capital trial, an additional set of questions were
asked to ensure that jury-eligible respondents were also qualified to serve in a capital trial. First
respondents were asked if they would automatically sentence the defendant to death, regardless
of the facts of the case, if the defendant was found guilty. They were then asked if their views of
the death penalty would prevent them from finding the defendant guilty of murder, even if the
facts of the case required the defendant to be found guilty. Finally, they were asked if their views
on the death penalty would prevent them from sentencing the defendant to death if he was found
guilty of capital murder. If the respondent provided an answer of “no” to all three questions, then
they were considered death qualified. If the respondent provided an answer of “yes” to any of the
three questions, they were not considered death qualified, but continued on with the survey in
most cases (to be explained). This procedure identified 548 respondents who were death
qualified.
Case Knowledge (questions 10-12 and 17). These open-ended questions probed for
respondents’ knowledge of any case information.
The Defendant (questions 13 and 14). These questions probed for knowledge of the defendant’s
name.
Surviving Victim (question 15). This question probed for knowledge of the surviving victim’s
name.
Book Knowledge (questions 20 and 21). These questions probed for respondents’ knowledge of
the book “In the middle of the night: The shocking true story of a family killed in cold blood” by
Brian McDonald. Question 20 asked respondents if they had read the book by McDonald.
Question 21 probed for respondents’ knowledge of the book in an open-ended format.
Journal Knowledge (questions 24 and 25). These questions probed for respondents’ knowledge
of Joshua Komisarjevsky’s journals written in prison. Question 24 asked respondents if they had
read or heard about the journals. Question 25 probed for respondents’ knowledge of what
Komisarjevsky wrote in the journals in an open-ended format.
Impression of Defendant (question 18). This question assessed jurors’ perception of defendant
Joshua Komisarjevsky on a scale ranging from very positive (1) to very negative (5).
Opinion of Guilt (question 27). The purpose of this question was to determine if potential
jurors would prejudge the defendant as guilty based on the media surrounding the case.
Opinion about Execution (questions 31 and 32). Question 31 asked respondents if they felt the
defendant Joshua Komisarjevsky should be executed. Question 32 asked whether knowing that
Komisarjevsky had been raped as a child would change respondents’ opinion about whether he
should be executed.
Fair and Impartial Jurors (questions 28 and 33). These questions asked respondents if they felt
they could be fair and impartial jurors if they were called to serve as a juror in this particular
case.
Media and News (questions 9, 22, 23, and 26). These questions probed respondents for how
much information they knew about the case via publicity surrounding the case. Question 9 and
26 asked respondents how closely they followed the news and publicity surrounding the case.
Question 22 asked whether respondents had seen or knew about the surviving victim’s interview
with Oprah Winfrey. Question 23 probed for respondents’ knowledge about the interview in an
open-ended format.
Demographics. The final section of the survey consisted of questions about demographics -
specifically, age, education, ethnicity, and income. Surveyors determined the gender of the
respondent by their voice.
Results
Death Qualification
Once respondents were found to be residents of one of the four judicial districts and part of the
jury pool in those districts, respondents were asked questions to determine if they were death
qualified. Respondents were first asked (question #6), “If a defendant was convicted of
intentional murder in a capital case, would you automatically vote to apply the death
penalty regardless of the facts of the case?” Across all four judicial districts of interest, 68.9%
of respondents answered “no” to this question (see Table 1), indicating they were death qualified.
No significant differences for this item were revealed among judicial districts, 2 (6, N = 1314) =
4.07, p > .05, = .056.
Table 1. Frequency and percentage of respondents answering “no” to whether they would
automatically vote for the death penalty.
Continuing to assess death qualification, respondents were asked (question #7), “Would your
views on the death penalty prevent you from finding a defendant guilty of intentional
murder in a capital trial, even if the evidence in the case and the law required that you find
the defendant guilty?” Across all four judicial districts, 78.0% of the remaining respondents
answered “no” to this question (see Table 2), indicating they were death qualified. Once again,
no significant differences were revealed among judicial districts, 2 (6, N = 905) = 5.31, p > .05,
= .077.
Table 2. Frequency and percentage of respondents answering “no” to whether their death
penalty views would prevent them from finding a defendant guilty in a capital trial.
Last, respondents were asked (question #8), “If you were chosen to be a juror in a capital
case, would your views on the death penalty prevent you from sentencing the defendant to
death, even if the evidence in that case and the law required that the defendant be
sentenced to death?” Across the four judicial districts, 74.6% of the remaining respondents
answered “no” to this question, indicating they were death qualified. No significant differences
were found among the judicial districts, 2 (6, N = 706) = 7.22, p > .05, = .101.
Table 3. Frequency and percentage of respondents answering “no” to whether their views
would prevent them from sentencing a defendant to death.
Overall, 548 of the 1,360 provided a “no” response to all of the death qualification questions
(questions 6, 7, and 8)—meaning that only 40.1% of respondents were death qualified.
Respondents who provided either a “yes” response to at least one of these three questions or
refused to answer a question were considered not death qualified. As demonstrated in the above
analyses, percentages of death qualification did not significantly differ across judicial districts.
See Table 3a below for frequency and percentages of death qualified jurors by district.
Due to the large proportion of respondents who would be potentially excludable because of their
death penalty attitudes (unless they were rehabilitated during voir dire), I report analyses of the
responses from both death qualified and non-death qualified respondents.. Their data are
presented below. The number of respondents answering each question varies because some
respondents were terminated from the survey early because they did not recognize the case.
Results will be presented for the total number of respondents answering each question. Analyses
were also conducted with the death-qualified sample and I note when those analyses produced
slightly different results from the results obtained with the total sample. Overall, the results from
the death-qualified sample and the total sample were very similar.
To assess their knowledge of the case, respondents were asked a series of recall and recognition
questions. These questions were designed to assess respondents’ knowledge of the case, recall
and recognition rates of defendant names, recall and recognition rates of the victim’s name,
knowledge about the book about the murders in Cheshire that was written by Brian McDonald,
knowledge about the survivor’s interview with Oprah Winfrey, and knowledge about the
journals written by Komisarjevsky. We then compared respondents’ answers to these questions,
looking for differences in responding among jurisdictions.
Knowledge of the Case. To assess recognition of this case, respondents were first asked
(question #10), “Do you remember a story in the news in the past few years about a home
invasion that resulted in 3 murders in Cheshire?" In response to this first recognition
question, 95.6% of all questioned respondents from the four judicial districts sampled indicated
that they remembered the case. To test for differences in recognition across districts, we
conducted a chi-square test of independence, yielding no significant difference among the
samples, 2 (9, N = 1314) = 16.49, p = .057, = .112. Recognition levels were near complete
saturation (approx. 94-95%) for each of the judicial districts (see Table 4 below).
Table 4. Percentage of respondents who remembered a story in the news about a home
invasion in Cheshire that results in three murders.
Approximately 96.4% of all death-qualified respondents recognized the case from the first
knowledge prompt. To test for differences in recognition across judicial districts, we conducted
a chi-square test of independence, yielding no significant differences among the samples, 2 (6,
N = 527) = 10.25, p = .115, = .139.
Table 4a. Percentage of death-qualified respondents who remembered a story in the news
over the past few years about a home invasion that results in 3 murders in Cheshire.
The 58 death and non-death qualified respondents who did not remember the case from the first
prompt were then asked a follow-up recognition question (question #11), “If I said that the
deceased were a mother and her two daughters would that sound familiar?” Given the near
saturation level on the first recognition question, only an additional 22 respondents (37.9% of the
respondents to this question) remembered the case after hearing this question. Six of these 22
respondents were death qualified. There were no significant differences among the judicial
districts in recognition after the second prompt for all respondents, 2 (3, N = 58) = .44, p >.05,
= .087 (see Table 5) or death-qualified respondents, 2 (3, N = 19) = 1.54, p >.05, = .285.
Table 5. Percentage of respondents who remembered the case in response to follow-up
question.
Table 5a. Total percentage of respondents who remembered the case after first two
recognition questions.
Respondents who still did not remember the case (N=37) were then asked an additional detailed
follow-up recognition question (question #12), “If I said that there were two men charged
with the murders of the mother and daughters and the two men were recently paroled
inmates would that sound familiar?” An additional 3 respondents (0 of them death qualified)
remembered the case after hearing this recognition question (see Table 6).
Table 6. Percentage of respondents who remembered the case in response to the 3rd
recognition question.
Combining responses to the three recognition questions, 97.5% of the sampled respondents from
the four judicial districts indicated that they remembered hearing or reading about the case (see
Table 7).
Table 7. Percentage of respondents who remembered the case in response to any of the
recognition questions.
Respondents who answered affirmatively that they remembered the case (gave a yes response to
question #10, 11, or 12) were then asked a follow-up open-ended question, “What else do you
recall about the case?" In addition, all respondents were asked (question 17) “What other
things do you remember about the incident?” Responses for these questions have been
combined for analysis. Responses were analyzed for content in eight main categories with up to
six sub-categories. Given the open-ended nature of the question and the opportunity to answer
twice, responses often fit under several categories and were coded as such; therefore, sometimes
the percentages do not sum to 100%. Table 8 displays data for all people who provided
responses that could be coded—some people did not provide a response.
Respondents commonly mentioned information about the victims, with 59.5% of respondents
providing information about the victims. There were a total of 1,217 responses that provided
information about the victims, meaning that the respondents who did report remembering
information about the case often provided more than one piece of information about the victims.
This category contained six sub-categories: the victims’ identity, one of the victims was a wife,
the daughters were victims, the husband escaping, the family name, and the husband’s
profession. Across all judicial districts, 41.7% of respondents reported that the victims were a
wife and daughters (see Table 8).
Table 8. Percentage of respondents who provided information about the case in response to
free recall questions.
Opinions:
Horrible, heinous crime 427 out of 1,284 33.3%
Defendants should be put to death 48 out of 1,284 3.7%
Negative comments about defendants 55 out of 1,284 4.3%
Definitely guilty 26 out of 1,284 2.0%
Murders were intentional 17 out of 1,284 1.3%
Total of all Crime Information 494 out of 1,284 38.5%
A second common category mentioned by respondents was information about the perpetrators,
55.1% of respondents provided information about the perpetrators. There were a total of 953
responses that provided information about perpetrators; thus respondents who did report
information about the perpetrators often provided more than one piece of information.
Responses in this category were coded according to whether the respondent knew how many
perpetrators were present, the defendants’ criminal history, when the perpetrators were caught,
and whether Komisarjevsky’s co-defendant, Steven Hayes, had been convicted and sentenced to
death. Overall, 51.2% of all respondents knew that there were two perpetrators involved in the
crime – the most commonly cited knowledge by sampled respondents.
Answers to the free recall questions were analyzed by judicial district. The percentage of
respondents who replied with knowledge of the coding categories is presented in Table 8a. There
were 7 significant differences among the judicial districts in cited knowledge. These differences
are identified in the table below by an asterisk in the average column. First, respondents in New
Haven were less likely to mention the victims were a mother and her daughters than were
respondents from the other districts, 2 (3, N = 1284) = 9.79, p < .05, = .087. Respondents in
Stamford/Norwalk, on the other hand, were more likely to mention the victim was the wife, 2
(3, N = 1284) = 19.09, p < .001, = .122. Third, respondents in New Haven were more likely,
and respondents from Stamford/Norwalk were least likely, to mention the family name Petit than
were respondents from other judicial districts in response to the open ended recall questions, 2
(3, N = 1284) = 14.36, p < .01, = .106. Fourth, respondents in Fairfield were more likely to fail
to mention that there were multiple perpetrators, 2 (3, N = 1284) = 9.94, p < .05, = .088. Fifth,
respondents in New Haven were more likely, and respondents in Fairfield less likely, to mention
the burned house, 2 (3, N = 1284) = 9.75, p < .05, = .087. Sixth, respondents in Fairfield were
less likely to mention that the family had been brutalized or tortured, 2 (3, N = 1284) = 9.56, p <
.05, = .086. Last, respondents in New Haven were less likely to say they had no further
knowledge of the case, 2 (3, N = 1284) = 17.54, p < .01, = .117. These differences suggest
that respondents in New Haven cited more information overall about the Cheshire murders in
free recall than do respondents in Fairfield, Stamford/Norwalk, and Danbury and were more
likely to mention their beliefs that the defendants were guilty (see Table 8a).
Table 8a. Overall percentage of respondents by judicial district who provided information
about the case in response to free recall questions.
The Defendants. To assess knowledge of the defendant’s names, respondents were asked
(question #13), “Do you recall the names of the men charged with the murders?” An
affirmative answer also required the respondent to provide the names of the defendants. In
response to this question, 10.4% of all respondents sampled from the 4 districts were able to
correctly name the defendants with no prompting. However, there were significant differences
among the judicial districts in their ability to name the defendants such that respondents from
Stamford/Norwalk and Danbury were less likely to reproduce the defendants’ names than were
respondents from New Haven and Fairfield, with respondents from New Haven being most
likely to name the defendants, 2 (12, N = 1314) = 158.35, p < .001, = .347 (see Table 9).
Table 9. Percentage of respondents by district who recalled both names of the defendants
without prompting.
Respondents who could not recall the names of the men charged with the murders without
prompting were then asked (question #14) “Do you recall that the names of the men charged
with the murders are Joshua Komisarjevsky and Steven Hayes?” In response to this
recognition question, 69.2% of the remaining 1206 respondents recognized the names of the
defendants. Again, there was a significant difference among the judicial districts in recognition
rates such that respondents from Stamford/Norwalk and Danbury were less likely to recognize
the names than were respondents from New Haven and Fairfield, 2 (6, N = 1177) = 73.17, p <
.001, = .249 (See Table 10).
Table 10. Percentage of respondents by district who remembered the name of the
defendants with prompting.
Combining the responses from question 13 and question 14 demonstrate that almost three-
quarters of all respondents (72.4%) recognized the names of the defendants. Further, 73.4% of
all death-qualified respondents recognized the names of the defendants. A breakdown by
district is presented below in Table 11. Respondents from New Haven were most likely, and
respondents from Stamford/Norwalk district were the least likely, to recognize or recall the
defendants’ names, 2 (3, N = 1314) = 97.96, p < .001, = .273.
Table 12. Percentage of respondents who correctly recognized the name of the surviving
victim.
Knowledge of Hayes’ case. To assess respondents’ knowledge of the outcome of the case
against Komisarjevsky’s co-defendant, Steven Hayes, respondents were asked (question #29),
“Have you heard that Komisarjevsky’s co-defendant, Steven Hayes, was found guilty?”
Overall 80.4% of respondents across districts indicated they were aware that Hayes had been
found guilty; however, there was a significant difference across districts, 2 (6, N = 1287) =
30.46, p < .001, = .154. Respondents from New Haven were more likely to indicate that they
were aware of Hayes’ conviction (88.1%) than were respondents in the other districts (see Table
13). Specifically, respondents in New Haven were more likely to indicate they were aware of
Hayes’ conviction than were respondents in Stamford/Norwalk (72.7%), 2 (6, N = 709) = 27.35,
p < .001, = .196.
Table 13. Percentage of respondents who remembered Hayes had been convicted.
Respondents were then asked a follow-up question to assess whether they recalled Hayes’
sentence (question #30), “Do you recall the sentence that Steven Hayes received?” Overall,
51.6% of respondents recalled that Hayes had been sentenced to death, but a chi-square analysis
revealed a significant difference across judicial districts, 2 (6, N = 1287) = 58.86, p < .001, =
.214 (see Table 14). Respondents from New Haven judicial district were more likely to
remember the correct sentence (65.7%) than respondents from the other judicial districts,with
respondents from Stamford/Norwalk being least likely to recall that Hayes received a death
sentence. Respondents from Stamford Norwalk were more likely to recall the incorrect sentence
(18.4%) or say they did not know the correct sentence (12.7%) than respondents from the other
judicial districts. New Haven respondents were more likely to recall Hayes was sentenced to
death and less likely to remember an incorrect sentence or report not knowing compared to
respondents from Stamford/Norwalk, 2 (6, N = 709) = 51.40, p < .001, = .269.
Knowledge about “In the Middle of the Night.” To assess knowledge of the book written
about the Cheshire murders, respondents were asked (question #20) “Have you read or heard
about the book “In the middle of the night: The shocking true story of a family killed in cold
blood” by Brian McDonald?” In response to this question, 34.1% of all respondents answered
affirmatively that they had either read or heard about the book. Only 20 respondents reported
that they had read the book – 12 respondents in New Haven and 8 respondents in Danbury.
Again, there was a significant difference in knowledge about the book by district such that
respondents from Fairfield and Stamford/Norwalk were less likely to have heard or read the book
than were respondents Danbury, but respondents from New Haven were most likely to have
heard about or read the book, 2 (3, N = 1314) = 193.87, p < .001, = .384 (see Table 15).
Table 15. Percentage of respondents who had read or heard about the book by McDonald.
Respondents who answered affirmatively to question 20 were then asked a follow-up, open-
ended question (question #21), “What do you remember about the book?" Responses were
coded for content in eleven categories (see Table 16). Given the open-ended nature of the
question, responses often fit under several categories and were coded as containing material from
multiple categories when appropriate (thus percentages will not sum to 100%). Although no
response was overly common, approximately 15% of sampled respondents mentioned the
controversial nature of the book, mentioning either the controversy about the library carrying the
book (6.5%) or the general controversial nature of the book (7.6%; see Table 16). Four
significant differences emerged among districts. Respondents from New Haven were more
likely than respondents from the other three districts to mention the controversy surrounding the
book, 2 (3, N = 447) = 8.33, p < .05, = .137 (see Table 16). Respondents in New Haven were
also more likely to report that the book was written by a journalist who had talked with
Komisarjevsky, 2 (3, N = 447) = 19.18 p < .001, = .207, and less likely to say nothing about
the book, 2 (3, N = 446) = 27.00, p < .001, = .246. Respondents in Danbury were more likely
to have positive opinions about the book, 2 (3, N = 446) = .95, p < .05, = .133.
Table 16. Among all respondents who read or heard about the book, the percentage of
respondents who remembered information about the book
Knowledge of Petit’s Interview with Oprah. To assess knowledge of the interview given by
Dr. Petit to Oprah, respondents were asked (question #22) “Have you seen or heard about the
interview that Dr. Petit gave to Oprah Winfrey?” In response to this question, 37.2% of all
respondents answered affirmatively that they had either seen (12.7%) or heard (24.5%) about the
interview. There was a significant difference in knowledge about the interview by district such
that respondents from New Haven were more likely to have seen or heard about the interview
than respondents from the other districts, 2 (9, N = 1288) = 43.29, p < .001, = .183 (see Table
17). Respondents in Stamford/Norwalk were less likely to have heard about the interview, less
likely to have seen the interview, and more likely to report neither hearing or seeing the
interivew compared to New Haven respondents, 2 (9, N = 709) = 28.09, p < .001, = .199.
Table 17. Percentage of respondents who had seen or heard about Petit’s interview with
Oprah.
Respondents who answered affirmatively to question 22 were then asked a follow-up, open-
ended question (question #23), “What do you remember about the interview?" Responses
were coded for content in fifteen categories (see Table 18). No significant differences emerged.
Table 18. Among all respondents who saw or heard about the interview, the percentage of
respondents who remembered information about the interview
Table 19. Percentage of respondents who had heard about Komisarjevsky’s journals.
Respondents who answered affirmatively to question 24 were then asked a follow-up, open-
ended question (question #25), “What do you remember about what Komisarjevsky wrote in
these journals?" Responses were coded for content in fifteen categories (see Table 20). Given
the open-ended nature of the question, responses often fit under several categories and were
coded as containing material from multiple categories when appropriate (thus percentages will
not sum to 100%). Overall, response levels were low for this question. Only two significant
differences emerged among districts. Respondents in Danbury were more likely to report that
Komisarjevsky admitted his guilt in his journals, 2 (3, N = 257) = 10.54, p < .05, = .202 (see
Table 20), and respondents in Stamford/Norwalk were more likely to report that Komisarjevsky
mentioned wanting the death penalty in his journals, 2 (3, N = 257) = 8.23, p < .05, = .179.
However, all references were overall quite infrequent.
Table 20. Among all respondents who heard about the journals, the percentage of
respondents who remembered information about the journals
Recognition/recall of the case facts was collapsed across knowledge of the defendants (Table
11), the victim (Table 12), Hayes’ conviction (Table 13), Hayes’ sentence (Table 14), knowledge
of the book by McDonald (Table 15), knowledge of Petit’s interview with Oprah (Table 17), and
knowledge of Komisarjevsky’s journals (Table 19). There was a significant difference across
judicial districts, 2 (21, N = 1314) = 239.01, p < .001, = .426. Respondents in New Haven
were more likely to remember five (23.7%), six (27.5, or all seven (12.1%) case details
compared with respondents in the other judicial districts. On the other hand, respondents in
Fairfield were more likely to remember four (28.0%) case details compared to respondents in
other judicial districts. Respondents in Stamford/Norwalk were more likely to remember zero
(9.6%), one (9.3%), or two (19.1%)case details (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Recognition/recall of case facts
across judicial districts
30
25
New Haven
20
15 Fairfield
10 Stamford/Norwalk
5 Danbury
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number of Details
An ANOVA was also conducted to test for differences in the average level of case knowledge by
district. Mean recognition/recall of case facts differed significantly across the judicial districts,
F(3, 1310) = 70.08, p < .001. Tukey post-hoc comparisons of the four judicial districts indicate
respondents in New Haven (M = 4.76, 95% CI [4.59, 4.93]) had significantly more knowledge of
the case facts than did respondents in Fairfield (M = 3.61, CI [3.42, 3.81]), p < .001),
Stamford/Norwalk (M = 3.02, CI [2.89, 3.20], p < .001), and Danbury (M = 3.45, CI [3.26, 3.65].
Case knowledge did not differ between respondents from Fairfield and Danbury, but respondents
in both districts recognized and recalled more facts than respondents in Stamford/Norwalk (p <
.001 and p < .01, respectively) (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Mean number of details recalled or recognized about
the case across judicial districts
5 4.76
4.5
Mean number of details
4 3.61
3.5
3.45
3.02
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
New Haven Fairfield Stamford/Norwalk Danbury
Judicial districts
Respondents who claimed to remember the case were asked about their perceptions of Joshua
Komisarjevsky. Respondents were first asked, (question #18), “What would you say your
impression is of Joshua Komisarjevsky? Would you say your impression is: very positive,
very negative, somewhat positive, somewhat negative, or neutral?" Responses to this
question were significantly different among districts, 2 (15, N = 1288) = 37.98, p = .001, =
.172 (see Table 21). As shown in the table, most jurors hold a “very negative” impression of
Joshua Komisarjevsky; however, a greater percentage of respondents from New Haven (76.2%)
judicial district reported “very negative” impressions of Joshua Komisarjevsky than did
respondents from Fairfield (66.4%), Stamford/Norwalk (65.1%), and Danbury (65.8%) judicial
districts (see Table 23 for percentages). In addition, respondents from New Haven were less
likely to have a neutral impression than were respondents from Fairfield, Stamford/Norwalk, and
Danbury. These data suggest that jurors in the New Haven district have stronger, more negative
impressions of defendant Komisarjevsky (see Table 21). Of those offering opinions, the
opinions were overwhelmingly very negative, especially in the New Haven judicial district.
Overall, negative impressions outnumbered positive impressions 35 to 1.
Table 21. Respondents’ impressions of Joshua Komisarjevsky by judicial district.
Respondents were then asked another follow-up, open-ended question to assess their impressions
of Joshua Komisarjevsky (question 19) “What do you think is the most compelling evidence
against Joshua Komisarjevsky?” Responses were coded for content in nineteen categories (see
Table 22 for complete coding scheme and results). As shown by the responses, almost 20% of
respondents felt that the most compelling evidence against Joshua Komisarjevsky was that he
was caught at the scene of the crime. From the entire sample, differences between judicial
districts were found for five categories. It appears that more respondents in the New Haven
district (26.4%) cited “caught at Petit’s house” as the most compelling evidence than did
respondents in Fairfield (12.6%), Stamford/Norwalk (10.8%), and Danbury (17.9%), 2 (3, N =
1286) = 36.23, p < .001, = .168. Respondents in New Haven were also more likely to cite the
rapes (5.6%) as the most compelling evidence against Komisarjevsky compared to the other
three districts, 2 (15, N = 1286) = 8.65, p < .05, = .082, as well as the book (1.8%), 2 (3, N =
1286) = 12.63, p < .01, = .099. New Haven respondents also were more likely to report
premeditation of the crime as the most compelling evidence in the case, 2 (3, N = 1286) =
10.83, p < .05, = .092, and less likely to not know the most compelling evidence against
Komisarjevsky, 2 (3, N = 1286) = 41.81, p < .001, = .180, compared to respondents in the
other three judicial districts.
Table 22. Percentage of all respondents citing different types of evidence as the most
compelling evidence against Komisarjevsky across judicial districts.
Overall, respondents display a high level of certainty about Komisarjevsky’s guilt. Very few
respondents reported being uncertain of (11.2%), or not knowing (9.2%), Komisarjevsky’s guilt.
This certainty is higher than many other high-profile cases (see Figure 3).
Opinions about execution
To assess respondents’ opinions about the execution of Joshua Komisarjevsky, respondents were
asked (question #31), "Do you believe that the Defendant Joshua Komisarjevsky should be
executed: Definitely yes, definitely no, probably yes, probably no, or not sure?" Overall,
almost 60% of all respondents affirmed and stated that they believed Joshua Komisarjevsky
either "definitely " (38.3%) or "probably" (21.4%) should be executed. Opinions regarding the
appropriateness of executing Komisarjevsky revealed a 2.3 to 1 ratio in favor of execution. There
were significant differences across the judicial districts in opinions about the appropriateness of
execution, 2 (15, N = 1287) = 46.83, p < .001, = .191 (see Table 24). Respondents in New
Haven were more likely to say that Komisarjevsky should definitely be executed and less likely
to be uncertain about whether Komisarjevsky should be executed compared to respondents from
the other judicial districts. Respondents from Stamford/Norwalk were more likely to be unsure
about whether Komisarjevsky should be executed. Respondents in New Haven were overall
more likely to say that Komisarjevsky should be executed compared to respondents in the
Stamford/Norwalk district, 2 (3, N = 709) = 20.66, p < .001, = .171.
When only death qualified responses were considered, there was a difference across judicial
districts as to whether respondents believed Komisarjevsky should be executed, 2 (3, N = 514)
= 7.80, p = .05, = .123 (see Table 24a). Respondents in New Haven were more likely to say
Komiarjevsky should be executed and respondents in Stamford/Norwalk were less likely to
endorse the death penalty for Komisarjevsky. Overall, 57% of death-qualified respondents still
maintained that Komisarjevsky should definitely (36.4%) or probably (20.6%) be executed.
Table 24a. Frequency and percentage of death qualified respondents endorsing the death
penalty for Komisarjevsky across judicial districts.
Table 25. Percentage of respondents who report Komisarjevsky’s childhood rape would not
change their opinion about whether he should be executed by district.
We assessed whether respondents believed they could be a fair juror, by asking (question #28),
“Do you think that you could render a verdict based only on the trial evidence: yes or no?”
A chi-square analysis revealed significant differences among jurisdictions in whether they would
be able to set aside their opinions, 2 (9, N = 1287) = 19.79, p < .02, = .124. Respondents in
New Haven were more likely to say they could not render a verdict based only on the evidence
compared to respondents in the other three judicial districts. Follow-up analysis revealed that
New Haven respondents were more likely to report they could not render a verdict based only the
outside evidence compared to respondents from Stamford/Norwalk, 2 (3, N = 709) = 9.86, p <
.02, = .118. However, approximately 75% of all respondents stated that they would be able to
render a verdict based only on the trial evidence (see Table 26).
Table 26. Percentage of respondents who report they could render a verdict based only on
the evidence by district.
New Haven Fairfield Stamford/Norwalk Danbury Average
Yes 70.6% 73.4% 80.0% 78.8% 75.4%
No 19.8% 15.0% 11.1 11.3% 14.7%
Don’t Know 9.4% 10.5% 7.6% 9.6% 9.2%
Refused 0.3% 1.0% 1.3% 0.3% 0.7%
Total responses 394 286 315 292 1287
As another assessment of impartiality, respondents were also asked (question 33), “Do you
think that you could be a fair and impartial juror in a case involving charges against
Joshua Komisarjevsky: definitely yes, definitely no, probably yes, probably no, or not
sure?” Overall, 59.7% of all respondents affirmed and stated that they believed they could
either "definitely yes" (38.3%) or "probably yes" (21.4%) be a fair and impartial juror in a case
involving charges against Joshua Komisarjevsky. A chi-square analysis showed significant
differences among districts in their reported abilities to be fair and impartial, 2 (15, N = 1287) =
46.83, p < .001, = .191. Respondents in New Haven were more likely to say they could
definitely not be a fair and impartial juror, and respondents in Stamford/Norwalk and Danbury
were less likely to say they could definitely not be a fair and impartial juror (see Table 27). New
Haven respondents were more likely to report that they could not be fair and impartial jurors than
were respondents in Stamford/Norwalk, 2 (3, N = 709) = 25.16, p < .001, = .188
Table 27. Percentage of respondents who believed that they would be a fair and impartial
juror for Joshua Komisarjevsky.
New Haven Fairfield Stamford/Norwalk Danbury Average
Definitely yes 32.2% 39.5% 44.1% 39.0% 38.3%
Probably yes 18.0% 22.0% 22.2% 24.3% 21.4%
Not sure 12.7% 11.5% 12.7% 12.0% 12.3%
Probably no 12.4% 10.5% 9.5% 14.0% 11.7%
Definitely no 22.6% 14.0% 8.6% 9.2% 14.2%
Refused 2.0% 2.4% 2.9% 1.4% 2.2%
Total responses 394 286 315 292 1287
There were a substantial proportion of jurors who reported that they could be fair and impartial
jurors in the trial against Joshua Komisarjevsky who had prejudged the guilt of the defendant
(see Table 28).
Table 28. Percent within each guilt category reporting varying degrees of ability to be fair
and impartial.
Definitely Probably Not Probably Definitely Don’t
Guilty Guilty Sure Not Guilty Not Guilty Know/Refused
Definitely Fair 38.1% 34.2% 43.1% 50.0% 62.5% 42.4%
and Impartial
Probably Fair 15.3% 32.3% 24.3% 10.0% 25.0% 24.6%
and Impartial
Not Sure 12.9% 12.0% 14.6% 20.0% 12.5% 5.9%
Probably Not 13.3% 13.0% 6.2% 0.0% 0.0% 6.8%
Fair and
Impartial
Definitely Not 18.8% 7.9% 9.7% 20.0% 0.0% 10.2%
Fair and
Impartial
Don’t 1.6% 0.6% 2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 10.2%
Know/Refused
Total Count 691 316 144 10 8 118
Similarly, there were a substantial proportion of jurors who reported that they could be fair and
impartial jurors in the trial against Joshua Komisarjevsky who had prejudged that it was
appropriate to execute the defendant (see Table 29).
Table 29. Percent within each execution category reporting varying degrees of ability to be
fair and impartial.
Results were collapsed across attitudes about Komisarjevsky’s guilt (Table 23), execution for
Komisarjevsky (Table 24), the ability to consider only the trial evidence (Table 25) and the
ability to be a fair and impartial juror (Table 26) to create a measure of anti-defendant attitudes.
There was an overall differences across judicial districts, 2 (3, N = 1287) = 30.75, p < .001, =
.155. Respondents in New Haven were less likely to be unbiased compared to respondents in the
other judicial districts. Respondents in Stamford/Norwalk were more likely to be unbiased jurors.
As seen in Figure 4, over 60% of New Haven respondents expressed that they were at least
somewhat biased against the defendant, but over 80% had prejudged the defendant to be guilty
and over 90% had either prejudged the defendant’s guilt, prejudged that the defendant should be
executed, or expressed bias against the defendant. Thus, merely asking venirepersons whether
they are biased will not provide a true estimate of prejudice against the defendant.
Media and News
Question 9 asked, “How closely do you follow the news: very closely, fairly closely, not too
closely, or not closely at all?” Across all judicial districts, 43.7% of respondents reported
following the news “very closely,” and another 46.7% reported following the news “fairly
closely.” Only 9.4% reported following the news “not too closely” and “not at all closely.”
Differences among judicial districts were not statistically significant, 2 (15, N = 1314) = 16.34,
p > .05, = .112. The majority of respondents reported either following the news “very closely”
or “fairly closely,” with similar patterns across judicial districts (see Table 30).
Table 30. Responses (by percentage) regarding the degree to which people follow the news
by district.
Table 31. Responses (by percentage) regarding the degree to which people follow the
Cheshire case by district.
Comparison to other cases. Overall, there is a high level of recognition of this case across the
four districts surveyed. This level of recognition is quite high, even for high-profile cases. Table
32 presents cases that Dr. Edward Bronson, professor of Political Science at Chico State
University, has worked on throughout his extensive career as a change-of-venue expert. The
recognition of Komisarjevsky’s case in New Haven is higher than all of the cases Dr. Bronson
has worked on. For the other three districts, recognition of the case was higher than 90% of the
cases. The percentage of respondents in New Haven that reported belief in the defendant’s guilt
was also higher than 96% of the cases, but respondents’ belief in the defendant’ guilt in
Stamford/Norwalk was only higher than 73% of the cases (see Table 32).
Official newspaper counts were unavailable for each of the judicial districts, but a search on
Nexis revealed that 440 articles about the case had been published in the New Haven Register,
81 in the Danbury News-Times, 81 in the Connecticut Post, and 81 in the Fairfied Citizen. A
further search on Newsbank.com revealed a total of 267 articles had been published in the
Hartford Courant, 31 in the NY Post, 3 in the New York Daily News, 5 in Newsday, 70 in the
New York Times, and 5 in the Boston Globe since the murder occurred in 2007. Overall,
respondents in New Haven have had much greater access to newspaper articles about the event
compared to respondents in the other three districts.
Table 32. Comparison of case recognition and guilt bias in high-profile cases.
Demographics
Item 34 requested respondents’ age in years, with options including “18-25,” “26-40,” “41-60,”
“61-75,” “76+,” and “Refused.” See the Table 33 for raw frequencies and percentages across the
sample.
Item 35 asked, “What is the last grade of formal education you have completed?” Response
options included “less than high school,” “high school graduate,” “some college/vocational
school,” “college graduate,” or “post graduate.” See Table 34 for frequencies and percentages in
the sample.
Table 34. Educational background
Item 36 asked, “What is your ethnic background?” See Table 35 for frequencies and
percentages in the sample.
Question 37 asked, “What is your income level?” Response options included “$0-$10,000,”
“$10,000-$25,000,” “$25,000-$50,000,” “$50,000-$100,000,” and “over $100,000.” See Table
36 for frequencies and percentages.
Experimental Studies.
One major approach to studying the link between pretrial publicity and jury decision making
involves the use of jury simulations. Of course, ideally, the most direct way to test pretrial
publicity effects would be to ascertain the relationship between the occurrence of pretrial
publicity and actual jury verdicts--are verdicts and/or damage awards in civil cases or conviction
rates in criminal cases higher in those cases that receive prejudicial pretrial publicity? The ideal
comparison case is the same trial, unchanged in any way except for the presence and absence of
pretrial publicity. Unfortunately, that ideal cannot be realized in actual jury trials but
approximations to that ideal can be achieved in experimental studies. In laboratory trial
simulations, researchers can assure that the only difference between two sets of jurors or juries is
the nature and extent of their exposure to pretrial publicity. Because other differences are
controlled for by being held constant (e.g., the jurors who have seen pretrial publicity and jurors
not exposed to pretrial publicity see identical trials), the experimenter can draw confident
conclusions about the impact of any pretrial publicity on mock jurors' behavior.
A major advantage of the simulation method is that researchers are able to vary the types and
amount of pretrial publicity given to participants in the experiment. By systematically
manipulating the nature and extent of pretrial publicity it is possible to determine the effects of
different forms of pretrial publicity. Of course, the enhanced control over extraneous variables
that is available in the laboratory comes at the cost of some artificiality. But, despite their
artificiality, experimental simulations shed light on behavior in real trial settings. Furthermore, a
number of studies have determined that the artificialities of the typical trial simulation study
generally do not bias verdicts (e.g., Simon & Mahan, 1971; MacCoun & Kerr, 1988; Kramer &
Kerr, 1989; Miller, 1975; Stasser, Kerr & Bray, 1982; Kerr, Nerenz & Herrick, 1979; Steblay et
al., 1999). For all of these reasons, laboratory research on pretrial publicity effects on mock juror
behavior is highly relevant to "real-world" courtroom settings.
Experimental studies attempt to approximate the trial experience for mock jurors in a controlled
experimental environment. Various methods, ranging from the presentation of actual videotaped
trials (Otto, Penrod & Dexter, 1994) and simulated trials (e.g., Kramer, Kerr, & Carroll, 1990) to
the use of a short written summary of trial proceedings (e.g., Sue, Smith, & Gilbert, 1974), have
been used to simulate the trial process. Psychologists started the empirical investigation of the
effects of pretrial publicity effects with categories of information that would most likely be
inadmissible as evidence in a jury trial. Consequently, past convictions for criminal offenses and
confessions of guilt that may later be recanted or held as inadmissible for technical reasons are
two types of pretrial information that were examined early by experimenters.
Pretrial Publicity Effects in Criminal Cases. Overall, the studies discussed below have
demonstrated that pretrial publicity affects juror decision-making and verdicts in criminal cases
in several ways. First, negative pretrial publicity has the most powerful effect on verdicts and
this appears particularly true for information about the bad character of or related bad acts of the
defendant. Second, greater recall of case information presented in pretrial publicity and biased
recall of that information affects verdicts. Third, pretrial publicity of an emotional nature has a
greater influence on verdicts than does factual pretrial information. In addition, the presentation
of evidence at trial and judicial instructions do not appear to lessen these effects.
In one of the earliest studies of pretrial publicity effects Tans and Chaffee (1966) gave student
participants newspaper stories about crimes that varied by seriousness of crime, favorable or
unfavorable statements by the district attorney, a confession or denial by the suspect, and
defendant release or custody. After reading the stories, participants were asked to evaluate the
defendant on several measures including an item assessing guilt. Results indicated the suspect
was more likely to be judged guilty when all elements of unfavorable information were
presented--which indicates that the effects of additional negative information are cumulative.
In an unpublished study Wilcox and McCombs (1967) tested the effects of a confession and a
prior criminal record in arrest stories on ratings of guilt. Participants were 120 persons randomly
selected from the voter registration list in Los Angeles. The results showed an effect for a
confession by the accused.
In a more elaborate study, Padawer-Singer and Barton (1975) selected jurors at random from a
courthouse and asked them to participate in a jury experiment in which they decided a recorded
reenactment of a murder case. Thirty-three "juries" were formed; some of these read a mock
newspaper story stating the suspect had a criminal background and had retracted an alleged
confession. The remaining juries were exposed to pretrial publicity that did not mention criminal
background or confession. After reading the stories, the jurors listened to a tape recording of an
actual murder trial. More than 72 percent of jurors exposed to the stories containing inadmissible
information voted to convict, whereas less than 44 percent of the jurors not exposed to this
information voted guilty.
Hvistendahl (1979) investigated the impact of identifying a suspect in a news story by four
different techniques: a fictional address, race, gang membership, and a prior criminal record.
Each factor was placed in the lead in some stories and the conclusion of others. Participants
(N=290) read the stories and then assessed the suspects' guilt. The author found no effects for
placement, but reporting the defendant had a prior criminal record in the story produced
significantly more guilty judgments than the name identification condition.
De Luca (1979) administered a survey that contained seven versions of a crime story and
questions about the guilt of the suspect named in the story. The story versions included
statements indicating that the suspect had a prior arrest record, statements in which the suspect
either had or had not made a confession, and information that the suspect passed or failed a lie
detector test. These versions were compared to a story that contained none of these elements.
The results indicated that each of the factors was significantly related to respondent perceptions
of suspect guilt, and that the combination of all three resulted in the highest levels of perceived
guilt.
There has been a renewed research interest in pretrial publicity effects. Otto, Penrod, and Dexter
(1994) used a somewhat different experimental procedure in which they explored the differential
impact of various types of pretrial publicity. Student jurors were presented with one of several
different forms of pretrial publicity concerning a defendant who was accused of disorderly
conduct in an actual case. The jurors then viewed an edited videotape of the actual trial and
registered their verdict preferences both before and after viewing the trial. Penrod, Otto, and
Dexter found that after hearing the trial evidence, the jurors' verdicts were significantly affected
by the pretrial publicity. The strongest effects were for the negative pretrial publicity about the
defendant's character. Participants who saw this type of pretrial publicity were more likely to say
the defendant was guilty prior to seeing the trial. In addition, one version of the pretrial publicity
containing inadmissible statements by a neighbor about the defendant (for which there are
arguably a great many analogues in the present case) had a significant impact on participants'
pretrial judgments--causing participants to believe the defendant was guilty.
The results also indicate that consideration of trial evidence did not significantly diminish the
impact of pretrial publicity. A test of the effect of jury consideration of trial evidence revealed
that evidence slightly reduced (though not to a statistically significant level) the biasing effect of
character pretrial publicity but evidence had no appreciable impact on the biasing effects of other
pretrial publicity. This study provides evidence that pretrial publicity effects operate both
through assessments of the evidence and attributions about the defendant. Each of five tested
mediating variables (persuasiveness of the defendant, likability of the defendant, criminality of
the defendant, strength of the prosecution case, and sympathy for the defendant) was directly
related to final verdicts. Character pretrial publicity, as well as both forms of the inadmissible
statements, influenced participants' pretrial judgments of the guilt of the defendant. This pretrial
judgment had an influence on participants' assessments of the strength of the prosecution case,
and their sympathy for the defendant, both of which were related to final judgments of the
defendant's guilt.
In another study, Penrod, Otto, and Dexter (1990) employed a criminal case arising from a very
well-publicized racial incident (a brawl) involving members of two campus fraternities. One of
the fraternities had been the subject of well-publicized allegations of misconduct in prior
incidents and these incidents received new reporting at the time of the incident in question. The
researchers first assessed participants' exposure to pretrial publicity (e.g., by testing the
recognition of newspaper headlines) and the inferences and judgments participants had made
about the case. Participants were then presented a "pre-enacted" videotaped trial built around the
facts of the case. The videotape was prepared in advance of the actual trial (which was never
held due to pre-trial settlements and dropping of charges), but was based on actual statements
made by witnesses and defendant. After viewing the trial, participants' verdict preferences and
other judgments were measured. Assessments of mock jurors' pre-trial knowledge revealed high
levels of case awareness and well-structured attitudes about fraternities, ethnic jokes and racial
slurs, drinking, and personal experiences with fraternities. Dependent measures assessed such
matters as the defendant's culpability, strength of the defense and prosecution evidence,
assessment of a self-defense claim, injury to the victim, and identification with the defendant.
There were relationships among measures of pretrial publicity recall, measures of bias in recall, a
number of pre-trial attitudes (e.g., attitudes about fraternities), and the ratings of the defendant's
culpability.
In a study by Dexter, Cutler, and Moran (1992), 68 participants received a packet of fictional
newspaper stories (including information about the defendant’s prior criminal record and a
refracted confession) one week prior to their participation in the study. These participants
participated in either a brief voir dire or a voir dire that lasted up to 60 minutes. Following voir
dire the participants viewed a 6-hour videotape of a reenacted trial based on a murder case. In
this instance pretrial publicity increased conviction rates-the conviction rate was more than 15%
higher among jurors exposed to pretrial publicity. Extended voir dire did not eliminate the
negative impact of pretrial publicity-the conviction rate among jurors exposed to pretrial
publicity and administered an extended voir dire was still 15% higher than among jurors not
exposed to pretrial publicity and administered an extended voir dire. This study demonstrates
that voir dire is not capable of eliminating all bias within jurors – additional protective measures
are necessary for a fair trial, which is something we argue for in this case.
The most ambitious investigation of pretrial publicity, a study by Kramer, Kerr, and Carroll
(1990) gave participants pretrial publicity that the researchers characterized as either factual or
emotional. The former consisted of news reports detailing the defendant's previous convictions
for armed robbery and the discovery of incriminating evidence at his girlfriend's apartment. The
“emotional” publicity identified the defendant as a suspect in a fatal hit-and-run of a child
involving the same motor vehicle used in the robbery. Participants then viewed a 51-minute re-
enactment of an actual armed robbery trial. Differences across the pretrial publicity conditions
emerged after deliberation--the emotional pretrial publicity produced a 20% higher conviction
rate--the effects were even stronger when hung juries were not considered in the analysis. The
analysis of deliberations suggested that pretrial publicity increased the persuasiveness of jurors
who argued to convict. Judicial instructions did not reduce the impact of pretrial publicity.
Field Surveys
A number of studies have employed survey methods to assess the level of prejudgment in
potential jurors for actual cases--primarily in criminal cases. These studies provide more “real
world” evidence that potential jurors with more knowledge about a case, especially negative
information such as the potential jurors in New York have been exposed to, can render biased
judgments. Some of these studies are by-products of research akin to the survey reported above
which have been used to support a motion for a change of venue (e.g., Vidmar & Judson, 1981).
For example, Nietzel and Dillehay (1983) provide the results of surveys for five murder trials.
For all five cases they found that a far greater percentage of respondents in the venue counties
had heard or read about the case than those in other counties (with differences of 40% to 90% in
the proportion of respondents reporting some knowledge of cases in venue as opposed to
alternative counties). The respondents in the venues where the cases were scheduled for trial
were more likely to know details about the case, including inadmissible information, and were
more likely to believe defendants were guilty (with differences between the venue and
alternative sites ranging from 16% to as high as 40%. These results clearly indicate that the
danger of bias is greater in the venue counties than in other counties.
Similar results were reported by Simon and Eimermann (1971) who conducted a telephone
survey of 130 potential jurors one week before a heavily publicized murder trial. During the two
months between the murder and the survey, 25 articles about the crime appeared in local
newspapers. A majority of those surveyed (59%) had read or heard about the case and knew
details about the crime. These respondents were more likely to describe their feelings about the
case as pro-prosecution (65% versus 41% in the group that could not recall any information).
Respondents who could recall details were somewhat less likely to think that the defendants
could receive a fair trial and were less willing to be tried by a jury that shared their frame of
mind. Nonetheless, 59% of the members of both groups believed they personally could hear the
evidence with an open mind and more than two-thirds of both groups believed the defendant
could receive a fair trial.
Costantini and King (1980/1981) surveyed jury eligible adults concerning their general attitudes
toward crime and punishment, their social background, their exposure to pretrial publicity, and
their level of prejudgment. In each of these cases, Costantini and King found a strong
relationship between the amount of information a participant could supply for a case and the
measures of prejudice. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they had formed an opinion
about the defendant’s guilt in the cases. These judgments were correlated with several variables
including general attitudes about crime, gender, educational level, and knowledge about the
specific case. Although the results suggested that each of these variables was a significant
indicator of the respondents' tendencies to presume defendant's guilt, by far the best predictor
was knowledge about the case--most of which was presumably gained through newspaper and
television pretrial publicity. For example, in three different cases 30%, 2% and 2% of “poorly
informed” respondents thought the defendants were guilty versus 54%, 66%, and 61% of “well
informed” respondents. Indeed, the more media sources the respondent mentioned attending to,
the more he or she knew about the case. Respondents with greater knowledge about a case were
found to be more pro-prosecution. Costantini and King concluded from these results that pretrial
knowledge was the best predictor of prejudgment.
More recently Moran and Cutler (1991) asked 604 potential jurors for two separate cases (504
individuals in one case and 100 in the second) about their knowledge of the case, attitudes
toward crime generally, and about the case in particular. Once again, pretrial knowledge of the
case was related to prejudgment about the case. The proportion of respondents who said there
was “A lot of evidence” against the defendant rose fairly uniformly as a function of the number
of items of information the respondent was aware of. Moran and Cutler went a couple steps
further with their research and found, unfortunately, that participants' knowledge of the case was
not correlated with their self-reported ability to be impartial. The group that most strongly
endorsed the proposition that there was a lot of evidence against the defendant also had the
highest proportion of respondents who thought they could be fair and could set aside the news.
The lack of linkage between willingness to prejudge a case and willingness (or ability) to
recognize that bias is obviously problematic to the extent that we rely upon juror representations
of the impartiality as a basis for determining whether they are impartial.
Meta-Analysis
In 1999, Steblay et al. conducted a meta-analysis of the prior research on pretrial publicity
effects. Meta-analysis is a statistical technique in which the results of several studies are
combined to determine the overall effect of the topic being investigated. In this meta-analysis,
the different influences of pretrial publicity on verdicts were investigated. All of the published
and unpublished studies that investigated the relationship between pretrial publicity and guilt
determinations were included in the study, including both experimental studies and field surveys.
The study included 44 empirical tests representing 5,755 subjects and results confirmed the
above summaries of previous findings-- research participants exposed to negative PTP were
significantly more likely to judge defendants guilty compared to participants exposed to less or
no negative PTP. Steblay et al also found that larger PTP effects were produced in studies which:
used potential juror pool rather than students as mock jurors, used multiple points of negative
information in the PTP, used real PTP, and employed a greater length of time between PTP
exposure and judgment. Larger, biasing PTP effects were observed in the more naturalistic field
surveys -- which confirms experimental findings and also underscores that PTP effects would be
observed in real trials and not just in the laboratory. They observed the greatest effects of pretrial
publicity prior to the presentation of trial evidence, but the effects persisted through pre-
deliberation judgments and in verdict decisions. Furthermore, their analyses indicated that
traditional legal safeguards against jurors’ inappropriate use of pretrial information may be
ineffective, including brief continuances, expanded voir dire of potential venire members,
exposure to trial evidence, and judicial instructions. Steblay et al. concluded that change of
venue would be appropriate to avoid the negative effects of pretrial publicity on juror decision-
making.
The overall effects observed in the meta-analysis and the effects observed in the previously
discussed studies provide cause for concern about the effects of pretrial publicity on verdicts.
Conformity Prejudice
Cases like the present case raise particular concerns about the impact of what Neil Vidmar
(2002) has termed “conformity prejudice.”. In his words: “Conformity prejudice exists when the
juror perceives that there is such strong community reaction in favor of a particular outcome of a
trial that he or she is likely to be influenced in reaching a verdict consistent with the perceived
community feelings rather than an impartial evaluation of the trial evidence.” In McVeigh…
Judge Matsch concluded that the whole state of Oklahoma was united as a family to the disaster
and that the strong emotional responses that it generated fit into a pattern of normative values.
He went on to assert that independently of jurors’ personal stake in the trial outcome,
identification with a community point of view can result in jurors feeling “a sense of obligation
to reach a result which will find general acceptance in the relevant audience” (U.S. v. McVeigh,
1996, p. 1473).” (Vidmar, pp. 73-74).
Vidmar cites a number of cases in which venue-change decisions and individual juror responses
during voir dire reflected a concern about acquitting in cases in which community members and
friends were hostile to defendants. The U. S. Supreme Court has acknowledged the dangers of
conformity prejudice. In Irvin v Dowd (1961) the Court emphasized the role of the media in
creating a “huge wave of public passion” (p.728). In their 1966 Sheppard v. Maxwell decision
the Court specifically emphasized concerns that the jury might be pressured to deliver a popular
verdict. The concern is not merely that specific knowledge about a case may bias potential
jurors, but that they may also feel pressure from the community itself to convict.
A large body of research has shown that rejection from an important social group can have broad
negative consequences including depression and anxiety (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Mathes,
Adams, & Davies, 1985); increased aggressive behavior (Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke,
2001) and reductions in intelligent thought (e.g., reduced IQ scores: Baumeister, Twenge, &
Nuss, 2002). Given the costs of actual and anticipated social rejection, it is no surprise that
people are highly motivated to abide by group norms. A relevant illustration of these effects
comes from a study by Hazelwood and Brigham (1998) who examined the role of public
exposure versus anonymity on juror decision-making. Student research participants were led to
believe that they would make decisions about disciplining another student and the decision
would either be anonymous and they would not have to account for their decisions, or they might
possibly questioned in the future. The study clearly demonstrates that potential future
interactions can influence judgments of culpability and punishment.
Summary
The experimental studies, when considered together, offer clear and consistent evidence that PTP
has an impact on jury decision making. This conclusion is especially reinforced by the results
from the Steblay et al. meta-analysis of PTP studies involving more than 5700 research
participants. Of particular relevance to the current case is the research demonstrating that recall
of case information from pretrial publicity affects verdicts, as more respondents recalled crime
details in the New Haven district than in the other three districts, with the respondents from
Stamford/Norwalk recalling the fewest details.
Voir dire and judicial admonitions appear to be the most commonly used remedies for prejudicial
PTP (Weaver, 1983). Use of voir dire reflects a widespread belief that voir dire can effectively
identify and eliminate jurors influenced by exposure to PTP. In some cases it may be difficult to
find jurors who have seen or heard nothing about the case—nevertheless, it is often assumed that
jurors who assert they can disregard any PTP are capable of disregarding information acquired
outside trial and will do so. Furthermore, peremptory challenges may be used to remove those
whose bias does not warrant a challenge for cause. In such cases it is likely that causal challenges
will turn upon a juror's own judgment of his or her impartiality. The research suggests that
participants assertions of impartiality cannot be trusted and that it may be necessary for more
extensive questioning in an environment that is less fraught with demands for socially desirable
responding—the situation provided by expanded voir dire and the use of juror questionnaires.
Can potential jurors’ assertions of impartiality be trusted? Sue, Smith, and Pedroza (1975) asked
mock jurors who had been exposed to PTP the standard question, "Can you, in view of the
publicity you have seen, judge the defendant in a fair and unbiased manner?" Jurors who
answered "no" were more likely to find the defendant guilty. But jurors who answered "yes"
were also much more likely to convict than the jurors never exposed to PTP (53% guilty versus
23% guilty). In short, jurors who claimed that they could put aside the PTP simply did not—
despite their apparent belief that they could.
Kerr, Kramer, Carroll, and Alfini (1991) examined the same issue. Mock jurors who had been
exposed to PTP were asked in a simulated voir dire, "Can you put out of your mind any
information you might have received from the newspapers or television and decide this case
solely upon the evidence to be presented in court?" Juror responses to this question were
unrelated to their subsequent verdicts—jurors who doubted their impartiality were no less or
more likely to convict the defendant than jurors who had no such doubts. In both of these studies,
it is unclear whether the jurors were unaware that they had been biased as a result of their
exposure to PTP, knew they had been influenced and believed (incorrectly) that they could
somehow adjust for the effects of the PTP, or were simply not admitting a bias. Clearly, jurors'
simple assertions of impartiality were not sufficient to identify and eliminate bias due to
exposure to PTP.
Do peremptory challenges catch and eliminate jurors who fail to admit or recognize their bias?
Research has examined the effectiveness of attorney use of peremptory challenges in cases
where PTP is not an issue and there is little evidence that peremptory challenges are reliably
related to jurors' verdict preferences (Fulero and Penrod, 1990; Olczak, Kaplan, and Penrod,
1991; Zeisel and Diamond, 1978). But, perhaps PTP-induced bias is easier to detect, or perhaps
more extensive voir dire may aid attorney effectiveness.
In the study by Kramer et al., many of the mock jurors were videotaped as they responded to voir
dire questions and these tapes were then mailed to a national sample of experienced defense
attorneys, prosecutors, and trial judges. The tapes were accompanied by other information
including summaries of the PTP that jurors might have been exposed to, background
questionnaires collected by the jury commissioner, and outlines of the prosecution and defense
cases. The attorneys and judges were asked to indicate which prospective jurors they would
excuse in their usual professional trial role. Unfortunately, neither the judges' causal challenges
nor the defense attorneys' peremptory challenges were related to jurors' verdicts—excused jurors
were no more or less likely to convict than jurors accepted by the judges and defense attorneys.
Prosecutors did somewhat better in identifying jurors sympathetic to their case. However,
acceptable jurors exposed to PTP who survived voir dire were no more or less likely to convict
than those who were excused (by the judges or the attorneys)—and both groups were more likely
to convict than unexposed jurors. In short, the voir dire exercise had no net effect on the bias of
seated jurors.
Lest these results seem a fluke, a study by Dexter, Cutler, and Moran (1992) may rest the case. In
that study mock jurors exposed (or not exposed) to PTP were administered an extensive voir dire
(60 minutes) or minimal voir dire (15 minutes) designed to reduce possible juror biases. PTP had
an equal effect on jurors whether they were exposed to the minimal or the extended voir dire.
As Carroll et al., (1986) note, the effectiveness of voir dire as a remedy for PTP rests on at least
two assumptions: first, that jurors have cognitive access to their source of bias-that they can
remember having seen or heard news accounts of the trial accurately; and second, that
prospective jurors are willing to report on any bias that may have arisen from exposure to PTP.
In light of the research findings, both these assumptions appear extremely tenuous and highlight
the need for juror questionnaires.
If very general questions are asked it is much less likely that jurors will volunteer biasing
information (and if they do, they may contaminate other jurors). And, one certainly could not ask
more pointed or leading questions to test whether a juror has heard, for example, that there have
been allegations that the defendant called someone “white trash” or allegations she had been
drinking or using drugs—such questions could produce precisely the effect that PTP has
produced. Furthermore, even if the question was asked, and the juror said, “I didn’t know that”
and then was asked whether they could put it put of their mind, the research indicates that most
jurors would say they could ignore it when in fact they could not. If jurors fail to report or
acknowledge familiarity with biasing information, there is also the danger that they will be
seated and contaminate other jurors during deliberations.
In addition to lacking the awareness of PTP effects on their judgments, jurors’ self-
reports of bias may also be influenced by social desirability concerns. During a recent gang rape
case in California containing a great deal of local media coverage, the presiding judge was
concerned about the potential biasing effect of the media coverage and allowed a large number
of community members, 250, to comprise the venire (Chrzanowski, 2006). All members of the
venire completed an informational questionnaire that assessed their knowledge of the case, as
well as their ability to hear the case fairly. A telephone survey was also conducted in the local
county, and community members were questioned about their knowledge of the case and their
ability to hear the case fairly. Large differences were observed between the community
members in the telephone survey and venire members who reported having heard about the case.
Of those community members in the telephone survey who reported hearing about the case, 70 %
reported an inability to hear the case fairly. In contrast, of those venire members who reported
prior knowledge of the case, 10% stated in court that they could not hear the case fairly. Perhaps
because jurors are told that it is their duty to put aside bias, jurors are more willing to report that
they can in court because they do not wish to displease the judge. These findings point to the
need for a juror questionnaire that assesses juror bias in a less public forum, minimizing the
chance that questioning for specific bias will contaminate other prospective jurors but
maximizing the possibility for uncovering bias that jurors may not even know that they hold.
It has been suggested that juries may police themselves during deliberation and if someone starts
to discuss anything proscribed by judge's instructions, other jurors will point this out, and steer
deliberations back to appropriate matters. This argument suggests that any biasing effect PTP
might have on an individual juror will be reduced through the process of jury deliberation.
Alternatively, deliberation may have the effect of accentuating any biases jurors bring to the
deliberation room. Unfortunately, existing research is most consistent with the accentuation
theory--jury deliberation appears to strengthen, not reduce, bias. As noted earlier, Otto, Penrod,
and Dexter (1994) found that deliberation did not significantly reduce PTP-induced biases.
Similarly, in the Kramer et al. study, the difference in juror conviction rates prior to deliberation
was only 5.9% for those exposed versus not exposed to PTP; after deliberation the difference for
non-hung juries was 43.3%. Rather than remedying the effects of exposure to PTP, deliberation
may magnify its effect. This magnification occurred despite the fact that careful study of the
deliberations revealed that whenever a juror mentioned the PTP, other jurors noted that the jury
should not consider it.
In their review of five studies that tested the effects of deliberations on PTP-induced biases,
Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying and Pryce (2001) conclude:
In sum, … the consistent findings in the existing research point convincingly toward the
conclusion that juror-level bias induced by negative pretrial publicity is not ameliorated
by jury deliberation and may, in some instances, even be enhanced by it. (p. 688)
In short, it appears that the effects of PTP are probably brought to the courtroom, probably
persevere through deliberation, and may even grow despite the fact that few juries exposed to
PTP spend much time discussing the PTP and mentions of PTP are followed by admonitions
from other jurors that such information should not be considered.
In cases with substantial PTP, the judge will often instruct jurors to ignore the publicity. There
have been several empirical studies of the effectiveness of this remedy for eliminating juror bias.
An early study by Simon (1966) suggested that such instructions might be a safeguard against
PTP effects and an unpublished dissertation study of sensational news stories by Nelson (1973)
reported similar results. Nelson found, as did Simon (1966), that initially, those who had read the
sensational statements were more likely to rate the defendant as guilty than those who had read
non-sensational stories, but after an admonition from the judge those who had read the
sensational stories reduced their assessments of guilt.
In contrast to these positive results, Sue, Smith and Gilbert (1974) found that judicial instructions
did little to mitigate the effects of PTP. These authors systematically varied the following:
damaging (a report of a gun found in the suspect's apartment and ballistics tests showing the gun
was used in the murder) versus irrelevant PTP; student versus nonstudent sample; and, judge's
instructions to disregard the PTP or neutral instructions. Participants in this study read newspaper
accounts and read summaries of evidence presented at trial as well as judge's instructions. The
results showed PTP strongly influenced verdicts but no effects for judge's instructions on
verdicts, recommendations for sentencing or ratings of the strength of the prosecution and
defenses case. Likewise, there were no effects for type of sample on decision making.
In the study by Kramer et al--arguably the best of these studies in terms of its methods, trial
materials, PTP, and participants, half the jurors were given a pattern jury instruction about PTP
while the other half was exposed to no mention of PTP, although it did include a standard
instruction to disregard anything seen or heard when the court was not in session. Receipt of the
PTP instruction did not reduce the biasing effect of exposure to either the factually or
emotionally biasing PTP.
In short, the instruction research evidence indicates that reliance on standard PTP instructions, as
a remedy for exposure to PTP, is not warranted. The lack of efficacy for PTP limiting/curative
instructions is consistent with a larger body of research on the effects of jury instructions--
indeed, in some situations instructions can actually aggravate the problems they are intended to
remedy.
Conclusions
As noted at the outset of this report, Defendant Komisarjevsky faces a very hostile jury pool in
every judicial district surveyed. 98% of all respondents were able to recognize the case, around
69% reported very negative impressions of Komisarjevsky, and around 60% of respondents
believed that Defendant Komisarjevsky should be executed. Although Defendant
Komisarjevsky faces a difficult jury pool in any district, results revealed more recognition of the
case and knowledge aspects of the case in the New Haven and Danbury districts as compared to
Stamford/Norwalk and Fairfield. It is my opinion that the Court should allow a change of venue
from the New Haven judicial district to the Stamford/Norwalk district, as the latter district
displayed the least evidence of overwhelming media saturation and prejudice against this
Defendant. If the venue cannot be changed to Stamford/Norwalk, moving the trial to the Fairfield
district would be the preferred second choice.
Support for this opinion comes from survey results demonstrating that Defendant Komisarjevsky
appears more likely to face a presumption of guilt in the New Haven and Danbury districts than
in Stamford/Norwalk or Fairfield, despite evidence of saturation across all of these districts.
This appears to be a function of increased case knowledge in New Haven (and to a somewhat
lesser extent Danbury), as research has demonstrated that knowledge of the case results in
prejudice against defendants. Further, scientific studies on the effects of pretrial publicity make
it clear that PTP can stack the deck of potential jurors against the Defendants in a case. Given
the observed levels of knowledge and prejudice in the New Haven district, it is my
recommendation that the Court allow a change of venue to the Stamford/Norwalk or Fairfield
judicial districts and that attorneys be given enough latitude in their voir dire questioning to
uncover any bias that remains in these less biased venues.
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Appendix A
ID NUMBER _________INTERVIEWER_____________COUNTY______________
We are conducting phone interviews with Connecticut area residents about an issue that
has been in the news. The questions should only take a few minutes, and I think you will
find them interesting. Your phone number was randomly selected and your answers will be
entirely anonymous. I don't have your name and your phone number will not be on the
questionnaire.
I need to speak with the person living in your household who is a US citizen, is over
eighteen, and who most recently celebrated their birthday. Are you that person?
6. Refused
5. Is there someone else who lives in the household, who is over 18 and is a registered
voter, has filed an income tax return in Connecticut, or has a Connecticut driver's
license?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Refused
6. A capital trial is a trial in which the jury is asked to consider whether the defendant
should be sentenced to death if the defendant is found guilty of intentional murder.
If a defendant was convicted of intentional murder in a capital case, would you
automatically vote to apply the death penalty regardless of the facts of the case?
8. If you were chosen to be a juror in a capital case, would your views on the death
penalty prevent you from sentencing the defendant to death, even if the evidence in
that case and the law required that the defendant be sentenced to death?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Refused
1. Very closely
2. Fairly closely
3. Not too closely
4. Not at all closely
5. Don’t know (DO NOT READ)
6. Refused (DO NOT READ)
10. Do you remember a story in the news in the past few years about a home invasion
that resulted in 3 murders in Cheshire? (READ RESPONSES)
12. If I said that there were two men charged with the murders of the mother and
daughters and the two men were recently paroled inmates would that sound
familiar? (READ RESPONSES)
13. Do you recall the names of the men charged with the murders? DO NOT READ
RESPONSES
14. Do you recall that the names of the men charged with the murders are Joshua
Komisarjevsky and Steven Hayes? (READ RESPONSES)
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know/Refused (DO NOT READ)
15. Do you recall the survivor’s name, Dr. William Petit? (READ RESPONSES)
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know/Refused (DO NOT READ)
(IF “NO” ON ALL OF Qs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, AND 15 SKIP TO Q34)
16. Do you personally know any of the attorneys, police officers, firemen, victims, or
witnesses associated with this case? (DO NOT READ RESPONSES)
17. What other things do you remember about the incident? (OPEN ENDED, SPECIFY)
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
18. What would you say your impression is of Joshua Komisarjevsky? Would you say
your impression is: (READ RESPONSES)
19. What do you think is the most compelling evidence against Joshua Komisarjevsky?
(OPEN ENDED, SPECIFY)
________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
20. Have you read or heard about the book “In the middle of the night: the shocking
true story of a family killed in cold blood” by Brian McDonald? (READ
RESPONSES)
22. Have you seen or heard about the interview that Dr. Petit gave to Oprah Winfrey?
(READ RESPONSES)
23. What do you remember about the interview? (OPEN ENDED, SPECIFY)
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
24. Have you heard about the journals that Joshua Komisarjevsky wrote while in
prison? (READ RESPONSES)
25. What do you remember about what Komisarjevsky wrote in these journals? (OPEN
ENDED, SPECIFY)
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
26. How closely would you say you have followed the media surrounding this case?
(READ RESPONSES)
1. Very closely
2. Somewhat closely
3. Not that closely
4. Not closely at all
5. Don’t know/Refused (DO NOT READ)
27. What is your opinion about whether Joshua Komisarjevsky is guilty of murder?
Would you say he is: (READ RESPONSES)
28. If you were a juror in this case, do you think that you could render a verdict based
only on the trial evidence? (READ RESPONSES)
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't Know (DO NOT READ)
4. Refused (DO NOT READ)
29. Have you heard that Komisarjevsky’s co-defendant, Steven Hayes, was found guilty?
(READ RESPONSES)
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know/Refused (DO NOT READ)
30. Do you recall the sentence that Steven Hayes received? (DO NOT READ
RESPONSES)
31. Do you believe that the defendant Joshua Komisarjevsky should be executed? (READ
RESPONSES)
33. Do you think that you could be a fair and impartial juror in a case involving charges
against Joshua Komisarjevsky? (READ RESPONSES)
Just a few more questions so that we can compare your answers with those of other
residents:
1. 18-25 4. 61-75
2. 26-40 5. 76+
3. 41-60 6. Refused (DO NOT READ)
35. What is the last grade of formal education you have completed? (READ
RESPONSES)
1. $0 - $10,000
2. $10,000 - $25,000
3. $25,000 - $50,000
4. $50,000 - $100,000
5. Over $100,000
That’s all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your time.
**********************************************
DO NOT ASK UNLESS AMBIGUOUS: Sex: 1. Female 2. Male
**********************************************
CURRICULUM VITAE November 23, 2010
STEVEN PENROD
445 West 59th Street N2131 Website: http://tinyurl.com/spenrod
John Jay College of Criminal Justice email:spenrod@jjay.cuny.edu
New York, NY 10019-1199 Office: 212-237-8877
EDUCATION PUBLICATIONS
PhD Harvard University, 1979, Social Psychology. Dissertation: Bornstein, B. H.; Deffenbacher, K. A.; McGorty, K. & Penrod, S.
Evaluation of social scientific and traditional attorney D. (in press). Effects of exposure time and cognitive operations on
methods of jury selection. Committee: Reid Hastie, Thomas facial identification accuracy: A meta-analysis of two variables
Pettigrew, Charles Judd, and Charles Nesson associated with initial memory strength. Psychology, Crime and
J.D. Harvard Law School, 1974. Third Year Paper: Intention and Law.
causation: A psychological critique. Advisor: Charles Fried
B.A. Yale College, 1969, Poli. Sci. Thesis Advisor: Robert Dahl Rosenfeld, B. & Penrod, S. D. (Eds.). (In press). Research
Methods in Forensic Psychology. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
HONORS AND AWARDS Rosenfeld, B. & Penrod, S. D. (In press). Introduction. In
Rosenfeld, B. & Penrod, S. D. (Eds.). Research Methods in
2001--Distinguished Professorship, John Jay College, CUNY Forensic Psychology. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
1999--Award for Distinguished Contributions to Psychology and
Penrod, S. D., Kovera, M. & Groscup, J. (In press). Jury research
the Law—American Psychology-Law Society
methods. In Rosenfeld, B. & Penrod, S. D. (Eds.). Research
1999-2000--Gallup Professorship—University of Nebraska
Methods in Forensic Psychology. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
1994-1995--Davis Professorship in Law, Univ of Minnesota
1986--American Psychological Association Distinguished Spano, L, Daftary-Kapur, T. & Penrod, S. D. (In press). Trial
Scientific Award for an Early Career Contribution to Applied consulting in high publicity cases. In Rosenfeld, B. & Penrod, S.
Psychology (Citation: American Psychologist, 42, 300-303). D. (Eds.). Research Methods in Forensic Psychology. New York:
1981--Second Prize American Psychological Association Division John Wiley & Sons.
13 Meltzer Research Award Wells, G. & Penrod, S. D. (In press). Eyewitness Research:
1980--Cattell Dissertation Award, NY Academy of Sciences. Strengths and Weaknesses of Alternative Methods. In Rosenfeld,
1980--Soc. for Experimental Social Psych Dissertation Award. B. & Penrod, S. D (Eds.). Research Methods in Forensic
1980--Co-winner of Society for the Psychological Study of Social Psychology. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Issues Dissertation Award
Daftary-Kapur, T., Dumas, R. & Penrod, S.D. (In press). Jury
Harvard University: National Science Foundation Dissertation decision-making biases and methods to counter them. Legal and
Research Grant: Law and Social Sciences Criminological Psychology.
Harvard Law School: Taft Scholarship.
Yale College: Political Science Honor Society; NSF Summer Spano, L. M., Groscup, J. L. & Penrod, S .D. (In press). Pretrial
Research Grant; Griffin Scholarship, Alcoa Scholarship. publicity and the jury: Research and methods. In Wiener, R. L. &
Bornstein, B. H. (Eds.). Handbook of Trial Consulting. NY:
Springer.
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Groscup, J. & Penrod, S. D. (2009). Appellate Review and
2001- Distinguished Professor of Psychology, John Jay--CUNY Eyewitness Experts. In Brian Cutler (Ed.). Expert Testimony on
1999-2000 Gallup Professorship—University of Nebraska the Psychology of Eyewitness Identification. NY: Oxford.
1995-2001 Dir of Law and Psychology Program-Univ of NE
Penrod, S. & Kovera, M. B. (2009). Recent developments in North
1995-2001 Prof of Psychology & Prof of Law-Univ of Nebraska
American identification science and practice. In: Bull, R.,
1994-1995 Adjunct Prof: Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs-MN Valentine, T. & Williamson, T., (Eds.). Handbook of Psychology of
1993-1995 Dir of Grad Studies in Conflict Management-U of MN Investigative Interviewing. Current Developments and Future
1992-1993 Grievance Officer, University of Minnesota Directions. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
1991-1995 Director, Conflict and Change Center, Univ of Minn
1990-1995 Adjunct Professor of Psychology, Univ of Minnesota Penrod, S. & Kurosawa, K. (2008). Eyewitness errors: Assessing
1989-1996 Professor of Law, University of Minnesota their extent, causes, and solutions. Japanese Journal of
1988-1989 Visiting Prof, Law and Psychology, Univ of Minnesota Psychology, 7, 36-62.
1988-Professor of Psychology, University of Wisconsin
Bornstein, B. H. & Penrod, S.D. (2008). Hugo Who? G.F. Arnold’s
1986 Research Consultant, Judicial Council of California
Alternative Early Approach to Psychology and Law. Applied
1985-1988 Associate Prof of Psychology, Univ of Wisconsin Cognitive Psychology, 22, 759-768.
1985 Visiting Professor of Law, Indiana University
1983 Visiting Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Deffenbacher, K. A.; Bornstein, B. H.; McGorty, K. & Penrod, S.
1979-1985 Asst Professor of Psychology, Univ of Wisconsin D. (2008). Forgetting the once-seen face: Estimating the strength
1975-1979 Research/Teaching Asst--Psychology, Harvard Univ of an eyewitness’s memory representation. Journal of
1975 (summer) Staff-Hartford Inst for Criminal & Social Justice Experimental Psychology: Applied, 14, 139-150.
1974 (summer) Asst Ombudsman for Connecticut Corrections
1971-1973 Naval Judge Advocate General Corps Heuer, L., Penrod, S., & Kattan, A. (2007). The role of societal
benefits and fairness concerns among decision makers and
1970 (summer) Research Assistant, Sociology Dept, Harvard Univ
decision recipients. Law and Human Behavior, 31, 573-610.
Penrod, S. D. & Bornstein, B. H. (2007). Generalizing Eyewitness Heuer, L., Penrod, S. Hafer, C. & Cohn, I. (2002). The role of
Reliability Research. In R.C.L. Lindsay, D. Ross, D Read & M. resource and relational concerns for procedural justice.
Toglia, (Eds.), Handbook of eyewitness psychology (Vol. II): Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 1468-1482.
Memory for people. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Groscup, J. L.; Penrod, S. D.; Studebaker, C. A.; Huss, M. T.;
Van Wallendael, L.R., Devenport, J., Cutler, B.L. & Penrod, S. O'Neil, K. M. (2002). The effects of Daubert on the admissibility of
(2007). Mistaken Identification=Erroneous Convictions? expert testimony in state and federal criminal cases. Psychology,
Assessing and Improving Legal Safeguards. In R.C.L. Lindsay, Public Policy, & Law, 8, 339-372.
D. Ross, D Read & M. Toglia, (Eds.), Handbook of eyewitness
psychology (Vol. II): Memory for people. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. van Koppen, P.J., & Penrod, S.D. (Eds.). (2002). Adversarial
versus inquisitorial justice: Psychological perspectives on criminal
Wells, G. L., Memon, A. & Penrod, S. D. (2006). Eyewitness justice systems. New York: Plenum.
Evidence: Improving its Probative Value. Psychological Science
van Koppen, P.J., & Penrod, S.D. (2002). Adversarial or
in the Public Interest, 7, 45-75.
Inquisitorial: Comparing Systems. In van Koppen, P.J., & Penrod,
Deffenbacher, K. A.; Bornstein, B. H.; & Penrod, S. D. (2006). S.D. (Eds.). Adversarial versus inquisitorial justice: Psychological
Mugshot exposure effects: retroactive interference, mugshot perspectives on criminal justice systems. New York: Plenum.
commitment, source confusion, and unconscious transference.
van Koppen, P.J., & Penrod, S.D. (2002). The John Wayne and
Law and Human Behavior, 30, 287-307.
Judge Dee Versions of Justice. In van Koppen, P.J., & Penrod,
Robbennolt, J., Groscup, J. & Penrod, S. & Heuer, L. (2006). S.D. (Eds.). Adversarial versus inquisitorial justice: Psychological
Evaluating and assisting jury competence in civil and criminal perspectives on criminal justice systems. New York: Plenum.
cases. In I. Weiner & A. Hess (ed.), Handbook of Forensic
Stolle, D. P, Robbennolt, J. K, Patry, M. & Penrod, S.D. Fractional
Psychology (3rd Ed.). New York: Wiley.
Factorial Designs for Legal Psychology. (2002). Behavioral
Doyle, J. M., Penrod, S., Kovera, M. B. & Dysart, J. (2006). The Sciences and Law. 20, 5-17.
street, the lab, the courtroom, the meeting room. Public Interest
Greene, E., Chopra, S., Kovera, M. B., Penrod, S., Rose, V. G.,
Law Reporter, 11, 13-16, 31, 46.
Schuller, R., & Studebaker, C. (2002). Jurors and juries: A review
Studebaker, C. A. & Penrod, S. D. (2005). Pretrial publicity and of the field. In J. R. P. Ogloff, Ed. Taking Psychology and Law into
its influence on juror decision making. In N. Brewer & K. D. the Twenty First Century. New York: Kluwer.
Williams, Psychology and Law: An Empirical Perspective. New
Studebaker, C. A., Robbennolt, J. K., Penrod, S. D., Pathak-
York: Guilford.
Sharma, M. K., Groscup, J. L. and Devenport, J. L. (2002).
Penrod, S. (2005). Eyewitnesses. In L. E. Sullivan & M. S. Rosen Studying pretrial publicity effects: New methods for improving
(Eds.). Encyclopedia of Law Enforcement, Vol. 1. Thousand ecological validity and testing external validity. Law and Human
Oaks: Sage. Behavior, 26, 19-41.
Penrod, S. (2005). Lineups. In L. E. Sullivan & M. S. Rosen O'Neil, K. M.; Penrod, S. D. (2001). Methodological variables in
(Eds.). Encyclopedia of Law Enforcement, Vol. 1. Thousand Web-based research that may affect results: Sample type,
Oaks: Sage. monetary incentives, and personal information. Behavior
Research Methods, Instruments & Computers. 33, 226-233.
Deffenbacher, K. A.; Bornstein, B. H.; Penrod, S. D. & McGorty,
K. (2004). A meta-analytic review of the effects of high stress on Studebaker, C. A., Robbennolt, J. K., Pathak-Sharma, M. K., &
eyewitness memory. Law and Human Behavior, 28, 687-706. Penrod S. D. (2000). Assessing Pretrial Publicity Effects:
Integrating Content Analytic Results. Law and Human Behavior,
O'Neil, K.M., Patry, M. W., & Penrod, S. D. (2004). Exploring the 24, 317-336. Reprinted in Hans, V. (2006). The Jury System:
effects of attitudes toward the death penalty on capital sentencing Contemporary Research, Ashgate.
verdicts. Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 10, 443-470.
Vidmar, N., Lempert, R. O., Diamond, S. S., Hans, V. P.,
Hollin, C., van Koppen, P., Penrod, S. (2004). Editorial. Landsman, S., MacCoun, R., Sanders, J., Hosch, H. M., Kassin,
Psychology, Crime & Law, 10, 1-3. S., Galanter, M., Eisenberg, T., Daniels, S., Greene, E., Martin,
The nature and scope of the problem of sexual abuse of minors J., Penrod , S., Richardson, J., Heuer, L., Horowitz, I. (2000).
by catholic priests and deacons in the United States: The John Amicus brief: Kumho Tire v. Carmichael. Law & Human Behavior.
Jay Study (2004). http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/churchstudy/ 24, 387-400
Groscup, J.L. & Penrod, S. D. (2003). Battle of the standards for Studebaker, C., Devenport, J. & Penrod, S. (1999). Perspectives
experts in criminal cases: police vs. psychologists. Seton Hall Law on Jury Decisionmaking: Cases with Pretrial Publicity and Cases
Review, 33, 1141-1165. Based on Eyewitness Identifications. In F. T. Durso & R. S.
Nickerson (eds.), Handbook of Applied Cognition. New York:
O'Neil, K.M., Penrod, S. D., & Bornstein, B. H. (2003). Web- Wiley.
based research: methodological variables' effects on dropout and
sample characteristics. Behavior Research Methods, Penrod, S. & Cutler, B.L. (1999). The case against traditional
Instruments, and Computers, 35. 217-236. safeguards: Preventing mistaken convictions in eyewitness
identification trials. In R. Roesch & S. Hart, Psychology and Law:
McAuliff, B. D., Nemeth, R. J., Bornstein, B. H., Penrod, S.D. State of the Discipline. Plenum: New York.
(2003). Juror decision-making in the 21st century: confronting
science and technology in court. In D. Carson & R. Bull (Eds.), Robbennolt, J., Penrod, S. & Heuer, L. (1999). Assessing and
Handbook of psychology in legal contexts (2nd ed.). New York: Aiding Jury Competence. In I. Weiner & A. Hess (ed.), Handbook
Wiley of Forensic Psychology (2nd Ed.). New York: Wiley.
Penrod, S. (2003). Eyewitness identification evidence: how well Penrod, S. & Heuer, L.B. (1998). Improving group performance:
are witnesses and police performing? Criminal Justice, Spring, The case of the jury. In R. S. Tindale, L. Heath, J. Edwards, E. J.
36-47, 54. Posavac, F. B. Bryant, Y. Suarez-Balacazar, E. Henderson-King
& J. Meyers, Theory and Research on Small Groups. Plenum: Penrod, S. (1994). The psychology of criminal justice.
New York. Contemporary Psychology, 39, 897-898.
Wells, G.L., Small. M., Penrod, S., Malpass, R. S., Fulero, S. M. & Heuer, L.B. & Penrod, S.D. (1994). Predicting the outcomes of
Brimacombe, C. A. E. (1998). Eyewitness identification disputes: Consequences for disputant reactions to procedures
procedures: Recommendations for lineups and photospreads. and outcomes. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 24, 260-
Law and Human Behavior, 22, 603-647. 283.
Dexter, H.R., Penrod, S. D., Linz, D. & Saunders, D. (1997). Otto, A. L., Penrod, S. & Dexter, H. (1994). The biasing impact of
Attributing responsibility to female victims after exposure to pretrial publicity on juror judgments. Law and Human Behavior,
sexually violent films. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 27, 18, 453-470.
2149-2171.
Heuer, L.B. & Penrod, S. (1994). Juror notetaking and question
Penrod, S. & Heuer, L.B. (1997). Tweaking commonsense: asking during trials: A national field experiment. Law and Human
Assessing Aids to Jury Decision Making. Psychology, Public Behavior, 18, 121-150.
Policy & Law, 3, 259-284.
Kovera, M.B, Levy, R.J., Borgida, E. & Penrod, S.D. (1994).
Devenport, J. L., Penrod, S. D., & Cutler, B. L. (1997). Eyewitness Expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases: Effects of expert
identification evidence: Evaluating commonsense evaluations. evidence type and cross-examination. Law and Human Behavior,
Psychology, Public Policy & Law, 3, 338-361. 18, 653- 674.
Studebaker, C. A & Penrod, S. D. (1997). Pretrial publicity: The Heuer, L.B. & Penrod, S. (1994). Trial complexity: A field
media, the law and common sense. Psychology, Public Policy & investigation of its meaning and its effects. Law and Human
Law, 3, 428-460. Behavior, 18, 29-52.
Krafka, C., Linz, D., Donnerstein, E.,& Penrod, S. (1997). Cutler, B.L., Berman, G.L., Penrod, S.D., & Fisher, R.P. (1994).
Women’s reactions to sexually aggressive mass media Conceptual, practical and empirical issues associated with
depictions. Violence Against Women, 3, 149-181. eyewitness identification test media. In Ross, D., Read, J.D. &
Toglia, M., (Eds.). Adult Eyewitness Testimony: Current Trends
Kovera, M., Penrod, S.D., Pappas, C. & Thill, D. (1997). and Developments. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Identification of computer-generated facial composites Journal of
Applied Psychology, 82, 235-246. Penrod, S. (1993). The child witness, the courts, and
psychological research. Minnesota Nelson, C. (Ed.). Memory and
Heuer, L.B. & Penrod, S. (1996). Increasing juror participation in Affect in Development: Symposia on Child Psychology, Vol. 26.
trials through notetaking and question asking. Judicature, 79. 256- Hilldale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
262.
Penrod, S. & Cutler, B.L. (1992). Eyewitnesses, experts, and
Smith, B., Penrod, S.D., Park, R., & Otto, A. (1996). Jurors’ use of jurors: Improving the quality of jury decision-making in eyewitness
probabilistic evidence. Law and Human Behavior, 20. 49-82. cases. In J. Misumi, B. Wilpert, & H. Motoaki (Eds.),
Narby, D.J., Cutler, B.L., & Penrod, S. (1996). The effects of Organizational and Work Psychology. Hilldale, N.J.; Erlbaum.
witness, target, and situational factors on eyewitness Kovera, M.B., Park, R.C., & Penrod, S. (1992). Jurors'
identifications. In Sporer, S.L., Malpass, R. & Koehnken, G. perceptions of eyewitness and hearsay evidence. University of
(Eds.). Psychological Issues in Eyewitness Identification. Minnesota Law Review, 76, 703-722.
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Linz, D. & Penrod, S.D. (1992). Exploring the First and Sixth
Penrod, S.D., Fulero, S. & Cutler, B. (1995). Expert psychological Amendments: Pretrial publicity and jury decisionmaking. In
testimony on eyewitness reliability before and after Daubert. Kagehiro, D. K. & Laufer, W. S. (Eds.). Handbook of Psychology
Behavioral Sciences and the Law 13, 229-260. and Law. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Penrod, S. & Cutler, B. (1995). Witness confidence and witness Olczak, P. V., Kaplan, M. F., & Penrod, S.D. (1991). Attorney's lay
accuracy: Assessing their forensic relation. Psychology, Public psychology and its effectiveness in selecting jurors: Three
Policy & Law, 1, 817-845. empirical studies. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 6,
Sporer, S., Penrod, S.D., Read, D. & Cutler, B.L. (1995). Gaining 431-452.
confidence in confidence: A new meta-analysis on the confidence- Cutler, B.L., Penrod, S.D., & Dexter, H.R. (1990). Nonadversarial
accuracy relationship in eyewitness identification studies. methods for sensitizing jurors to eyewitness evidence. Journal of
Psychological Bulletin, 118, 315-327. Applied Social Psychology, 20, 1197-1207.
Cutler, B.L. & Penrod, S.D. (1995). Mistaken Identifications: the Penrod, S.D. (1990). Predictors of jury decisionmaking in criminal
Eyewitness, Psychology, and Law. New York: Cambridge and civil cases: A field experiment. Forensic Reports, 3, 261-277.
University Press.
Fulero, S.M. & Penrod, S.D. (1990). The myths and realities of
Heuer, L.B. & Penrod, S. (1995). Jury decisionmaking in complex attorney jury selection folklore and scientific jury selection: What
trials. In R. Bull & D. Carson (Eds.), Handbook of Psychology in works? Ohio Northern University Law Review, XVII, 229-253.
Legal Contexts. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
Cutler, B.L., & Penrod, S.D. (1990). Estimator Variables and
Cutler, B.L. & Penrod, S. (1995). Assessing the accuracy of Eyewitness Identification. In G. Kohnken and S.L. Sporer (Eds.),
eyewitness identifications. In R. Bull & D. Carson (Eds.), Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Knowledge, Problems,
Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts. Chichester: John and Perspectives. Verlag fur Angewandte Psychologie: Stuttgart.
Wiley & Sons. (In German).
Penrod, S.D., Fulero, S. & Cutler, B. (1995). Expert psychological Heuer, L., & Penrod, S. D. (1990). Some suggestions for the
testimony in the United States: A new playing field? European critical appraisal of a more active jury. Northwestern Law Review,
Journal of Psychological Assessment, 11, 65-72. 85, 301- 314.
Fulero, S.M., & Penrod, S.D. (1990). Attorney jury selection Heuer, L. B., & Penrod, S. D. (1988). Increasing jurors'
folklore: What do they think and how can psychologists help? participation in trials: A field experiment with jury notetaking and
Forensic Reports, 3, 233-259. question asking. Law and Human Behavior, 12, 231-262.
Cutler, B.L., Dexter, H.R., & Penrod, S.D. (1990). Juror sensitivity Cutler, B. & Penrod, S. (1988). Context reinstatement and
to eyewitness identification evidence. Law and Human Behavior, eyewitness identification. In G. Davies & D. Thomson (Eds.),
14, 185-191. Memory in Context: Context in Memory. Chichester: Wiley. pp.
231- 244.
Tanford, S. & Penrod, S. (1990). Las deliberaciones del jurado:
Contenido de la discusion y procesos de influencia en la toma de Cutler, B. L., & Penrod, S. D. (1988). Improving the reliability of
decisiones de un jurado. /Jury deliberations: Discussion contents eyewitness identification: Lineup construction and presentation.
and processes influencing a jury's decision making. Estudios de Journal of Applied Psychology, 73, 281-290.
Psicologia, 42, 75-98
Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., & Stuve, T. E. (1988). Juror
Penrod, S.D. & Cutler, B.L. (1989). Eyewitness expert testimony decisionmaking in eyewitness identification cases. Law and
and jury decisionmaking. Law and Contemporary Problems, 52, Human Behavior, 12, 41-55.
1001-1041.
Spear, P. Penrod, S, & Baker, T. (1988). Psychology. New York:
Heuer, L.B., & Penrod, S.D. (1989). Instructing jurors: A field Wiley.
experiment with written and preliminary instructions. Law and
Human Behavior, 13, 409-430. Cutler, B.L., Penrod, S.D., & Martens, T.K. (1987). Improving the
reliability of eyewitness identifications: Putting context into
Penrod, S., Bull, M., and Lengnick, S. (1989). Children as context. Journal of Applied Psychology, 72, 629-637.
observers and witnesses: The empirical data. Family Law
Quarterly, XXIII, 411-431. Penrod, S. D. (1987). Covert facilitation: A necessary adjunct to
overt facilitation? Journal of Social Issues, 43, 71-78.
O'Rourke, T., Penrod, S.D., Cutler, B.L., & Stuve, T.E. (1989).
The external validity of eyewitness identification research: Linz, D., Donnerstein, E., Penrod, S. D. (1987). The findings and
Generalizing across age groups. Law and Human Behavior, 13, recommendations of the Attorney General's Commission on
385-396. pornography: Do the psychological "facts" fit the political fury?
American Psychologist, 42, 946-953.
Cutler, B.L. & Penrod, S.D. (1989). Forensically relevant
moderators of the relation between eyewitness identification Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., & Martens, T. K. (1987). The
accuracy and confidence. Journal of Applied Psychology, 74, 650- reliability of eyewitness identifications: The Role of System and
653. Estimator Variables. Law and Human Behavior, 11, 233-258.
Heuer, L.B. & Penrod, S.D. (1989). Trial lawyers in the box? Linz, D., Donnerstein, E., & Penrod, S. (1987). The Attorney
Jurors question witnesses. The Docket. General's Commission on Pornography: The gaps between
"findings" and facts. American Bar Foundation Research Journal,
Cutler, B.L., Penrod, S.D., & Dexter, H.R. (1989). The eyewitness, 1987, 713-736.
the expert psychologist, and the jury. Law and Human Behavior,
13, 311-332. Donnerstein, E., Linz, D., & Penrod, S. (1987). The Question of
Pornography: Scientific Findings and Policy Implications. New
Penrod, S. (1989). Shedding empirical light on legal York: Free Press.
controversies. Contemporary Psychology, 34. 738-739.
Penrod, S. D., & Cutler, B. L. (1987). Assessing the competency
Cutler, B.L., Dexter, H.R., & Penrod, S.D. (1989). Expert of juries. In I. Weiner & A. Hess (Eds.), The Handbook of Forensic
testimony and jury decision making: An empirical analysis. Psychology. New York: Wiley.
Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 7, 215-225.
Linz, D., Donnerstein, E., & Penrod, S. (1987). Sexual violence in
Cutler, B.L., & Penrod, S.D. (1989). Moderators of the the mass media: Social psychological implications. P. Shaver &
confidence- accuracy correlation in eyewitness identifications: C. Hendrick (Eds.), Research in Personality and Social
The role of information processing and base-rates. Applied Psychology (Vol. 7). Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage.
Cognitive Psychology, 3, 95-107.
Linz, D., Penrod, S., & Donnerstein, E. (1986). Issues bearing on
Linz, D., Penrod, S., & Donnerstein, E. (1988). Effects of long- the legal regulation of violent and sexually violent media. Journal
term exposure to violent and sexually degrading depictions of of Social Issues, 42, 171-193.
women. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 758-
768. Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., O'Rourke, T. E., & Martens, T. K.
(1986). Unconfounding the effects of contextual cues on
Penrod, S. D. (1988). Psychology in court: The child witness. eyewitness identification accuracy. Social Behavior, 1, 113-134.
Contemporary Psychology, 33, 655-657.
Heuer, L. & Penrod, S. (1986). Procedural preference as a
Sharp, G.L., Cutler, B.L., & Penrod, S.D. (1988). Performance function of conflict intensity. Journal of Personality and Social
feedback improves the resolution of confidence judgments. Psychology, 51, 700-710.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 42,
271- 283. Shapiro, P. & Penrod, S. (1986). A meta-analysis of facial
identification studies. Psychological Bulletin, 100, 139-156.
Cutler, B. L., Stocklein, C. J., & Penrod, S. D. (1988). An
empirical examination of a computerized facial composite Tanford, S. & Penrod, S. (1986). Jury deliberations: Discussion
production system. Forensic Reports, 1, 207-218. content and influence processes in jury decision making. Journal
of Applied Social Psychology, 16, 322-347.
Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., & Schmolesky, J. M. (1988).
Presumption instructions and juror decision making. Forensic Linz, D., Penrod, S., & McDonald, E. (1986). Attorney
Reports, 1, 165-192. communications in the courtroom: Views from and off the bench.
Law and Human Behavior, 10, 281-302.
Penrod, S. (1986). Social psychology. 2nd Ed. New York: Hastie, R., Penrod, S., & Pennington, N. (1983). What goes on in
Prentice- Hall. a jury deliberation. American Bar Association Journal, 69, 1848-
1853.
Pavitt, C. & Penrod, S. (1986). A test of two implicit assumptions
of algebraic modeling: Salience and familiarity effects in affective Penrod, S. (1983). Social psychology. New York: Prentice-Hall.
evaluations of national leaders. Journal of Social Psychology,
126, 291-304. Tanford, S., & Penrod, S. (1982). Biases in trials involving
defendants charged with multiple offenses. Journal of Applied
Penrod, S. (1985). The growth of social science in the law. Social Psychology, 12, 453-470.
Contemporary Psychology, 30, 959-960.
Penrod, S.D., Donnerstein, E., & Linz, D. (1982). Scientific
Donnerstein, E., Linz, D., & Penrod, S. (1985). Massive exposure research on pornography and violence: implications for American
to media violence and desensitization. Aggressive Behavior, 11, law. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 35, 100
161 (abstract). (abstract).
Tanford, S., Penrod, S., & Collins, R. (1985). Decisionmaking in Penrod, S., Loftus, E. F., & Winkler, J. (1982). The reliability of
joined criminal trials: The influence of charge similarity, evidence eyewitness testimony: A psychological perspective. In N. Kerr &
similarity, and limiting instructions. Law and Human Behavior, 9, R. Bray (Eds.), The psychology of the courtroom. New York:
319-337. Academic Press.
Krafka, C., & Penrod, S. (1985). Reinstatement of context in a Coates, D., & Penrod, S. (1981-82). The social psychology of
field experiment on eyewitness identification. Journal of dispute resolution. Law and Society Review, 15, 701-726.
Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 58-69.
Penrod, S., & Hastie, R. (1980). A computer simulation of jury
Penrod, S., & Linz, D. (1985). Voir dire: Its uses and abuses. In decision making. Psychological Review, 87, 133-159.
M. Kaplan, (Ed.), The impact of social psychology on procedural
justice. Springfield, IL: C. C. Thomas. Penrod, S., & Hastie, R. (1979). Models of jury decision-making:
A critical review. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 462-492.
Tanford, S., & Penrod S. (1984). Social Influence Model: A formal
integration of research on majority and minority influence
processes. Psychological Bulletin, 95, 189-225. RESEARCH AND PROGRAM GRANTS
Tanford, S., & Penrod, S. (1984). Social inference processes in National Science Foundation. Factors influencing plea bargaining
juror judgments of multiple-offense trials. Journal of Personality decisions by prosecutors and defense attorneys 09/2009-
and Social Psychology, 47, 749-765. 08/2011. $93,200.00
Linz, D., & Penrod, S. (1984). Increasing attorney persuasiveness National Science Foundation. Understanding the Impact On
in the courtroom. Law and Psychology Review, 8, 1-47. Juries Of Defense Responses To Victim Impact Statements.
Linz, D., Donnerstein, E., & Penrod, S. (1984). The effects of ($245,813—8/08-8/11).
long- term exposure to filmed violence against women. Journal of National Science Foundation, Field and Lab Studies of the Effects
Communication, 34, 130-147. Reprinted in Media in Society: of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors’ Trial Judgments. ($275,000,
Readings in Mass Communication, Deming & Becker (Eds.), 8/1/06-7/31/08).
1988.
National Science Foundation, Eyewitness Guessing and
Penrod, S., & Linz, D. (1984). Using psychological research on Accuracy: Subjective Experience and Objective Determinants
violent pornography to inform legal change. In N. Malamuth & E. ($212,836, 9/1/2004-8/31/06) With Lisette Garcia.
Donnerstein (Eds.), Pornography and sexual aggression. New
York: Academic Press. National Science Foundation, Reducing Eyewitness Identification
Errors: Procedural Strategies, ($298,398, 7/15/03-1/15/06).
Penrod, S., Coates, D., Linz, D., Herzberg, S. Atkinson, M., &
Heuer, L. (1984). The implications of social science research for National Science Foundation, Risk Management and Juries: How
trial practice attorneys. In D. J. Muller, D. G. Blackman, & A. J. Jurors React to Cost-Benefit Analyses. ($260,000, 2/02-2/04).
Chapman (Eds.), Perspectives in psychology and law. London: With Kevin O'Neil.
Wiley. National Science Foundation, Meta-Analysis of Facial
Linz, D., Turner, C., Hesse, B., & Penrod, S. (1984). Using Identification Research: A Reappraisal ($140,669, 5/01-4/03).
psychological research on violent pornography in civil litigation. In With Brian Bornstein.
N. Malamuth & Donnerstein (Eds.), Pornography and sexual National Science Foundation, A Continuing Empirical Analysis of
aggression. New York: Academic Press. the Admissibility of Expert Testimony: Investigating the Effects of
Penrod, S., & Borgida, E. (1983). Legal rules and lay inference. In Kumho Tire v. Carmichael. ($102,307, 01/15/00 - 09/15/02).
L. Wheeler (Ed.), Review of personality and social psychology CUNY Research Foundation, Sequential vs. Serial Lineup
(Vol. 4). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Identification Procedures. ($4800, 03/01/2002-06/30/2003)
Tanford, S., & Penrod, S. (1983). Computer modeling of influence National Science Foundation, How Expert Are Factfinders?
in the jury: The role of the consistent juror. Social Psychology Evaluating the Reliability of Interviews in Child Sexual Abuse
Quarterly, 46, 200-212. Cases ($77,309, 09/01/99 - 05/31/01). With Nancy Walker.
Hastie, R., Penrod, S., & Pennington, N. (1983). Inside the jury. National Institute of Mental Health, Training Grant in Mental
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Health Policy and Research ($620,000, 7/1/99-6/30/01).
Penrod, S. (1983). Jury decision making models. In H. H. National Science Foundation, The Death Equation:
Blumberg, P. Hare, V. Kent, & M. Davies (Eds.), Small groups Decisionmaking in Death Penalty Cases ($172,021, Aug 1998-
and social interaction (Vol. 2). Chichester, England: Wiley. Feb 2001).
National Science Foundation, A Scientific Examination of the Decisionmaking ($2,730).
Admissibility of Scientific Expert Testimony Under Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. ($78,000, Sept 1997-March 1999). University of Wisconsin Alumni Research Fund, 1984-1985,
Modeling Social Influence Processes. ($7,959).
Hewlett Foundation, Center for Conflict and Change, ($125,000,
July 1994-June 1996). University of Wisconsin Bio-Medical Research Fund, 1984-1985,
Physiological Desensitization from Exposure to Media Violence.
National Science Foundation, Meta-Analysis of Jury ($5,000).
Decisionmaking Studies, ($65,456, August 1993-March 1996).
University of Wisconsin Alumni Research Fund, 1983-1984,
Hewlett Foundation, Center for Conflict and Change, ($200,000, Effects of Exposure to Sexually Violent Images. ($2,600).
November 1991-October 1993).
University of Wisconsin Bio-Medical Research Fund, 1983-1984,
National Science Foundation (with Eugene Borgida), Cameras in An Inoculation Procedure for Exposure to Violent Media
the Courtroom: A Field Experiment ($150,000, July 1990-June Portrayals. ($2,600).
1992).
University of Wisconsin Alumni Research Fund, 1982-1983,
State Justice Institute (with American Judicature Society and Eyewitness Reliability: Closing the Generalization Gap. ($5,922).
Larry Heuer), Assessing the Impact of Juror Notetaking and
Question- asking on Juror Performance: A National Experiment University of Wisconsin Alumni Research Fund, 1981-1982,
($111,201, November 1988-May 1990). Script- Based Inferencing and Decision Making. ($10,229).
National Science Foundation (with Daniel Linz), Pretrial Mass University of Wisconsin Alumni Research Fund, 1980-1981,
Media Exposure and Jury Decisionmaking ($135,000, July 1988- Models of Jury Decision Making. ($5,964).
March 1991). University of Wisconsin Bio-Medical Research Fund, 1980-1981,
National Institute of Mental Health (with Daniel Linz and Edward Social Cognition and Patient-Physician Communication. ($7,300).
Donnerstein), Sexual Violence in the Media: Mental Health University of Wisconsin Bio-Medical Research Fund, 1979-1980,
Implications ($350,824, July 1986-July 1989). Cognitive Models of Symptoms and Diseases. ($5,000).
National Science Foundation, Assessing and Calibrating Juror Wisconsin Graduate Research Committee, General Research
Sensitivity to Eyewitness Evidence ($131,290, Sept 1984-Feb Support, 1979-1980.
1988)
National Science Foundation (Law & Social Sciences)
National Institute of Justice, Improving Eyewitness Performance Dissertation Research Award 1979, Evaluation of Traditional and
($119,767, March 1984-September 1986). 'Scientific' Jury Selection Methods. ($5,960).
National Science Foundation (with Edward Donnerstein). Effects
of Long-term Exposure to Sexually Violent Images. ($202,503,
June 1983-May 1986). CONVENTION PRESENTATIONS (2001-present )
National Institute of Justice, Guidelines for Joinder in Criminal Tallon, J. . Daftary-Kapur, T., Lindsey Rhead, L.; Jon Carbone, J.;
Cases ($117,000, September 1981-January 1984). Groscup, J.,; Penrod, S. (March 2010). Underlying Affective
Processes in Mock Jurors' Use of Victim Impact Statements. AP-
National Institute of Health, Social Cognition and Patient- LS, Vancouver.
Physician Communication ($98,003, January 1981-July 1983).
Rhead, L.; D'Antuono, D., Daftary-Kapur, T., Tallon, J. A.,Penrod,
National Science Foundation (Joint Funding from Law & Social S. (March 2010). The Death Penalty Attitudes Scale as a
Sciences & Social and Developmental) Empirically Based Models Moderator of Pre-trial Publicity. AP-LS, Vancouver.
of Juror and Jury Decision Making. ($76,549, January 1981-
December 1983). Daftary-Kapur, T., Tallon, J. A.,Penrod, S. (Sept 2009). Assessing
the Impact of New Research on the Formation of a Scientific
National Institute of Justice, 1981-1982, (with Dan Coates). The Consensus Concerning Eyewitness Research Findings. EAPL,
Implications of Social Science Research for Criminal Trial Sorrento, Italy.
Advocacy ($203,045, January 1981-July 1983).
Kim, M & Penrod, S. (May 2009). A Comparison of an
National Institute of Justice, Validation of a Measure of Assaultive Adversarial and an Inquisitorial Trial in South Korea: Judges vs.
Risk. Principal Investigator/Advisor on Dissertation Research by Juries. Law and Society, Denver.
Marlowe Embree. ($10,500, 1981-1982).
Kim, M & Penrod, S. (May 2009). A Comparison of Legal
National Science Foundation, Evidence in Civil Commitment Decisions between American and Korean Mock Jurors in an
Cases. Faculty Advisor on Student Originated Study with Terri Adversarial and an Inquisitorial Trial. Law and Society, Denver.
Finesmith. ($5,828, Summer 1981).
Penrod, S. (March, 2009). Discussant: Plenary: Psychological
University of Nebraska Visiting Scholar Grant (John Michon). Perspectives on Wrongful Conviction. AP-LS, San Antonio.
1996. $795.
Kapur, T. D., Wallace, B., & Penrod, S. (March, 2009). The
University of Minnesota Graduate School, 1991-1992, External Influence of Pretrial Publicity: Field vs. Laboratory Effects. AP-
Validity of Jury Research, ($9,056). LS, San Antonio.
University of Minnesota Graduate School, 1990-1991, Juror Rhead, L. M., Andiloro, N. R., Carbone, J.m Kapur, T. D., &
Decisions in Joined Trials, ($10,000). Penrod, S. (March, 2009). What Are They Saying?: The Effects of
University of Minnesota Graduate School, 1989-1990, Legal Pretrial Publicity on Jurors' Story and Jury Deliberations. AP-LS,
Decisionmaking, ($10,000). San Antonio.
University of Wisconsin Alumni Research Fund, 1986-1987, Legal Alberts, W., Penrod, S., Wallace, B. & Duncan, J. (July 2008).
Steering Witnesses in an Identification Procedure. EAPL,
Maastrict. Shlosberg, A., Garcia, L. & Penrod, S. (March 2006).
Misinformation Effect Revisited Using RKG Judgments. AP-LS,
Daftary-Kapur, T., Smith, K., Rhead, L., &S. Penrod, S. (July St. Petersburg, FL.
2008). The influence of pre-trial publicity on juror decision making
in a product liability case. EAPL, Maastrict. Bostaph, R., Garcia, L. & Penrod, S. (March 2006). The Effects of
Exposure Time, Type of Exposure, and Change in Appearance on
Penrod, S. (March 2008). Issues and Advice for Expert the Remember, Know, Guess Paradigm. AP-LS, St. Petersburg,
Witnesses and Eyewitness Identification Researchers. AP-LS, FL.
Jacksonville, FL.
Garcia, L., Robertson, R., & Penrod, S. (March 2006). The Effects
Smith, K. & Penrod, S. (March 2008). Field Survey of Juror Of Lineup Size and Serial position under Alternative Lineup
Misconduct. AP-LS, Jacksonville, FL. Instructions.
Hoy, C., Donovan, M., Daftary, T. & Penrod, S. (March 2008). Penrod, S. (March 2006). Chair: Paper Session: Eyewitnesses.
The Influence of Pre-Trial Publicity and Legal Authoritarianism on AP-LS, St. Petersburg, FL. AP-LS, St. Petersburg, FL.
Juror Decision Making. AP-LS, Jacksonville, FL.
Kim, M. Penrod, S..Park, K.-B. (March 2006). Chair Deliberation
Daftary, T, Smith, K. & Penrod, S. (March 2008). Influence of Content Analysis of Juries and Lay Participants in the South
Predecisional Distortion and Bias on Juror Decision Making. AP- Korean Legal Context. AP-LS, St. Petersburg, FL.
LS, Jacksonville, FL.
Smith, K., Garcia, L. & Penrod, S. (March 2006). Rate of Lineup
Penrod, S. (July 2007). Discussant on Symposium: Issues with Identification Guessing and RKG Sensitivity to Bias., AP-LS, St.
Sequential and Simultaneous Lineups. SARMAC, Lewistown, Petersburg, FL.
ME.
Chrzanowski, L., McAuliff, B. D., Steblay, N. & Penrod, S. (March
Smith, K., Rhead, L., & Penrod, S. (May 2007). Effect of Extrinsic 2006). Mediational effects of pretrial publicity on jurors’
Evidence on Jurors' Judgments. APS, Washington D.C. judgments of defendant. AP-LS, St. Petersburg, FL.
Pekhman, Y., Smith, K., Rhead, L., Cassandra, H., & Penrod, S. Chrzanowski, L., Solomonson, J., McAuliff, B. D., & Penrod, S.
(May 2007). Are jurors' story construction influenced by pretrial (March 2006). Pretrial Judgments of Defendant Guilt: Integrating
publicity? APS, Washington D.C. Content Analysis with Case Survey Methodologies. AP-LS, St.
Penrod, S., Wells, G. & Memon, A. (May 2007). Eyewitness Petersburg, FL.
Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value. APS, Washington D.C. Hyman, A., Garcia, L.. & Penrod, S. (March 2006). Eyewitness
Daftary, T., Smith, K., Rhead, L., & Penrod, S. (March 2007). The Misidentification and Unconscious Transference: Fact or Fiction?
influence of pre-trial publicity and participant gender on defendant AP-LS, St. Petersburg, FL.
guilt judgments in a rape case mediated by rape empathy. Penrod, S., Garcia, L. & Robertson, R. (July 2005). Assessing
Eastern Psychological Association, Philadelphia, PA. the Impact of Eyewitness Guessing and Lineup Bias on
Penrod, S. & Sporer. S. (March 2007). What Do Recent Meta- Eyewitness Performance. 29th International Congress on Law
analyses Tell Us about Eyewitness Accuracy and Deception. . Off and Mental Health, Paris
the Witness Stand, New York, New York. Penrod, S., Garcia, L. & Robertson, R. (June 2005). Assessing
Wallace, D. B., Garcia, L. & Penrod, S. (March 2007). The Effect the Impact of Verbal Instructions and Simultaneous versus
of a Biased Lineup Re-examination and Lineup Size Using Sequential Lineups on Cross-Ethnic Eyewitness Identifications.
Alternate Instructions. Off the Witness Stand, New York, New XVth European Conference on Psychology and Law. Vilnius.
York. Penrod, S., Bornstein, B., Deffenbacher, K., McGorty, K. & Adya,
Penrod, S. (March 2007).Symposium Chair: Symposium: One M. (June 2005). Meta-Analyses of the Effects of Estimator and
Hundred Years of Eyewitness Testimony Research. Off the System Variables in 469 Eyewitness and Facial Recognition
Witness Stand, New York, New York. Studies. XVth European Conference on Psychology and Law.
Vilnius.
Smith, K., Daftary, T., Penrod, S. (March 2007). The influence of
pretrial publicity and story construction on jurors' perception of McGorty, E. K., Bornstein, B. & Penrod, S. (Mar 2005). The Effect
defendants guilt pre- and post-trial mediated by attitudes. Paper of Cognitive Processing on Facial Identification Accuracy: A Meta-
presentation, Off the Witness Stand, New York, New York. analysis. American Psychology-Law Society, La Jolla, CA.
Penrod, S. (July 2006). Modeling eyewitness guessing. IAAP, Penrod, S. D,. Bornstein, B. ,McGorty, E. K., & Adya M. (Mar
Athens. 2005). Determinants of Identification Accuracy in 469 Eyewitness
and Facial Recognition Studies. American Psychology-Law
Penrod, S. (July 2006). Eyewitness reliability: The state of the Society, La Jolla, CA.
science and its status in the law. IAAP, Athens.
Chrzanowski, L., Groscup, J., Penrod, S., Giresi, S. Schwartz, S.,
Kim, M, Park, K. & Penrod, S. (July, 2006) Lay Participation in & Solomonson, J. (Mar 2005). Ultimate Issue Testimony and Its
South Korea: The Content Analysis of Jury Deliberations. Law Relationship to Juror Inferences and Information Processing in
and Society, Baltimore, MD. Forensic Cases. American Psychology-Law Society, La Jolla,
Penrod, S. (June 2006). Eyewitness and Calculated Guessing. CA.
European Association of Psychology and Law. Liverpool, UK. Garcia, L., Robertson, R., & Penrod, S. (Mar 2005). Lineup
DiGiovanni, L., Garcia, L. & Penrod, S. (May 2006). The Instructions and Exposure Time: Effects on Witness Decision
Remember-Know-Guess Paradigm: Understanding the Effects of Criteria, Subjective Experience, and Confidence-Accuracy.
Race on Eyewitness. APS, NY, NY. American Psychology-Law Society, La Jolla, CA.
Education
Ph.D. University of Minnesota (1994)
Major Program: Social Psychology; Supporting Program: Statistics
B.A. Northwestern University (1988), with Departmental Honors
Major: Psychology
Academic Positions
Professor of Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY (2004-present)
Professor, Criminal Justice Ph.D. Program, Graduate Center, CUNY (2005-present)
Professor, Social/Personality PhD Program, Graduate Center, CUNY, (2008-present)
Professor, Forensic Psychology Ph.D. Program, Graduate Center, CUNY (2004-present)
Associate Professor of Psychology, Florida International University (2000-2005)
Assistant Professor of Psychology, Florida International University (1995-2000)
Visiting Assistant Professor, Reed College (1993-1995)
John Jay College Faculty Scholarly Excellence Award (2006-2007; 2007-2008; 2008-2009;
2009-2010; 2010-2011)
Ursa Major Award for Outstanding Professional Contributions, Alpha Phi Fraternity (2008)
February 4, 2011
M. B. Kovera
Page 2
RESEARCH
Grant Summary Data
Type Number Amount
Federal grants 9 $ 1,631,799
Other external grants 1 $ 2,000
Internal grants 2 $ 12,476
Total Funded 12 $ 1,646,275
Research Grants
Bottoms, B. L., Kovera, M. B., & McAuliff, B. D. (Eds.) (2002). Children, social science, and
the law. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Penrod, S. D., Kovera, M. B., & Groscup, J. L. (in press). Jury research methods. In B.
Rosenfeld and S. Penrod (Eds.), Research methods in forensic psychology. New York:
Wiley.
Zimmerman, D., Austin, J., & Kovera, M. B. (in press). Suggestive eyewitness identification
procedures. In B. L. Cutler (Ed.), Conviction of the innocent: Lessons from psychological
research. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Kassin, S., & Kovera, M. B. (in press). Psychology and law. In K. Deaux & M. Snyder (Eds.),
Oxford handbook of personality and social psychology. New York: Oxford University
Press.
M. B. Kovera
Page 5
Crocker, C., & Kovera, M. B. (in press). Systematic jury selection. In R. L. Wiener and B. H.
Bornstein (Eds.), Handbook of Trial Consulting. New York: Springer.
Greathouse, S. M., Sothmann, F. C., Levett, L. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2010). The potentially
biasing effects of voir dire in juvenile waiver cases. Law and Human Behavior. DOI
10.1007/s10979-010-9247-z
Austin, J., & Kovera, M. B. (2010). Expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases. In M. Paludi
& F. Denmark (Eds.), Victims of sexual assault and abuse: Resources and responses for
individuals and families, Vol. 2. Praeger.
Cass, S. A., Levett, L. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2010). The effects of harassment severity and
organizational behavior on damage awards. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 28, 303-321.
DOI: 10.1002/bsl.886.
Crocker, C. B., & Kovera, M. B. (2010). The effects of rehabilitative voir dire on juror bias and
decision making. Law and Human Behavior, 34, 212-226. DOI 10.1007/s10979-009-9193-9
Kovera, M. B. & Borgida, E. (2010). Social psychology and law. In S. T. Fiske, D. Gilbert, &
G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology, Fifth Edition (pp. 1343-1385). Oxford
University Press.
Levett, L. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2009). Psychological mediators of the effects of opposing
expert testimony on juror decisions. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 15, 124-148.
Greathouse, S. M., Levett, L. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2009). Sexual harassment: Antecedents,
consequences, and juror decisions. In D. Krauss & J. Lieberman (Eds.), Psychological
expertise in court (Vol. 2, pp. 151-174). Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing.
McAuliff, B. D., Kovera, M. B., & Nunez, G. (2009). Can jurors recognize missing control
groups, confounds, and experimenter bias in psychological science? Law and Human
Behavior, 33, 247-257.
McAuliff, B. D., Kovera, M. B., & Gilstrap, L. L. (2009). An updated review of the effects of
system and estimator variables on child witness accuracy in custody cases. In R. Galatzer-
Levy, L. Kraus, & J. Galatzer-Levy (Eds.), The scientific basis of child custody decisions (2nd
Ed., pp. 125-164). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
M. B. Kovera
Page 6
Greathouse, S. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2009). Instruction bias and lineup presentation moderate
the effects of administrator knowledge on eyewitness identification. Law and Human
Behavior, 33, 70-82.
Levett, L. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2008). The effectiveness of educating jurors about unreliable
expert evidence using an opposing witness. Law and Human Behavior, 32, 363-374.
McAuliff, B. D., & Kovera, M. B. (2008). Juror Need for Cognition and sensitivity to
methodological flaws in expert evidence. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 38, 385-
408.
Cutler, B. L., & Kovera, M. B. (2008). Introduction to commentaries on the Illinois field study
of lineup reforms. Law and Human Behavior, 32, 1-2.
Kovera, M. B., & Greathouse, S. M. (2008). Pretrial publicity: Effects, remedies, and judicial
knowledge. In E. Borgida and S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Beyond Common Sense: Psychological
Science in the Courtroom (pp. 261-280). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
McAuliff, B. D., & Kovera, M. B. (2007). Estimating the effects of misleading information on
witness accuracy: Can experts tell jurors something they don’t already know? Applied
Cognitive Psychology, 21, 849-870.
Mitchell, T., & Kovera, M. B. (2006). The Americans with Disabilities Act: What is a
reasonable accommodation? Law and Human Behavior, 30, 733-748.
Russano, M. B., Dickinson, J. J., Greathouse, S. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2006). “Why don’t
you take another look at number three?” Investigator knowledge and its effects on
eyewitness confidence and identification decisions. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, and Ethics
Journal, 4, 355-379.
Doyle, J. M., Penrod, S., Kovera, M. B., & Dysart, J. (2006). The Street, The Lab, The
Courtroom, The Meeting Room. Public Interest Law Reporter, 11, 13-46.
Levett, L., Danielsen, E., & Kovera, M. B., Cutler, B. L. (2005). Juror decision making. In N.
Brewer & K. Williams (Eds.), Psychology and law: An empirical perspective (pp. 365-406).
New York: Guilford.
M. B. Kovera
Page 7
Kovera, M. B. (2004). Psychology, law, and the workplace: An overview and introduction to
the special issue. Law and Human Behavior, 28, 1-7.
Collett, M. E., & Kovera, M. B. (2003). The effects of British and American trial procedures on
the quality of juror decision making. Law and Human Behavior, 27, 403-422.
Reprinted in Roesch, R., & Gagnon, N. (Eds.) (2007). Psychology and law: Criminal and
civil perspectives (pp. 257-276). Hampshire, UK: Ashgate.
Kovera, M. B., Dickinson, J., & Cutler, B. L. (2003). Voir dire and jury selection. In A. M.
Goldstein (Ed.), Comprehensive Handbook of Psychology, Volume 11: Forensic Psychology
(pp. 161-175). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Kovera, M. B., & Cass, S. A. (2002). Compelled mental health examinations, liability decisions,
and damage awards in sexual harassment cases: Issues for jury research. Psychology, Public
Policy, and Law, 8, 96-114.
Kovera, M. B., Russano, M. B., & McAuliff, B. D. (2002). Assessment of the commonsense
psychology underlying Daubert: Legal decision makers’ abilities to evaluate expert evidence
in hostile work environment cases. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 8, 180-200.
Reprinted in Roesch, R., & Gagnon, N. (Eds.) (2007). Psychology and law: Criminal and
civil perspectives (pp. 397-420). Hampshire, UK: Ashgate.
Bottoms, B. L., Kovera, M. B., & McAuliff, B. D. (2002). Children, law, social science, and
policy: An introduction to the issues. In B.L. Bottoms, M. B. Kovera, & B. D. McAuliff
(Eds.), Children, social science, and the law (p. 1-12). New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Greene, E., Chopra, S., Kovera, M. B., Penrod, S. D., Rose, V. G., Schuller, R., & Studebaker.,
C. (2002). Jurors and juries: A review of the field. In J. Ogloff (Ed.), Taking psychology and
law into the 21st century. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
McAuliff, B. D., & Kovera, M. B. (2002). The status of evidentiary and procedural innovations
in child abuse proceedings. In B.L. Bottoms, M. B. Kovera, & B. D. McAuliff (Eds.),
Children, social science, and the law (p. 412-445). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kovera, M. B., & McAuliff. B. D. (2000). The effects of peer review and evidence quality on
judge evaluations of psychological science: Are judges effective gatekeepers? Journal of
Applied Psychology, 85, 574-586.
M. B. Kovera
Page 8
Phillips, M., McAuliff, B. D., Kovera, M. B., & Cutler, B. L. (1999). Double-blind photoarray
administration as a safeguard against investigator bias. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84,
940-951.
Kovera, M. B., McAuliff, B. D., & Hebert, K. S. (1999). Reasoning about scientific evidence:
Effects of juror gender and evidence quality on juror decisions in a hostile work environment
case. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 362-375.
Kovera, M. B., & McAuliff, B. D. (1999). Child witnesses in custody cases: The effects of
system and estimator variables on the accuracy of their reports. In R. Galatzer-Levy & L.
Kraus (Eds.), The scientific basis of child custody decisions (pp. 157-187). New York: John
Wiley & Sons.
Kovera, M. B. & Borgida, E. (1998). Expert scientific testimony on child witnesses in the age of
Daubert. In S. J. Ceci & H. Hembrooke (Eds.), Expert witnesses in child abuse cases: What
can and should be said in court (p. 185-215). Washington, DC: American Psychological
Association.
Kovera, M. B., & Borgida, E. (1997). Expert testimony in child sexual abuse trials: The
admissibility of psychological science. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 11, S105-S129.
Kovera, M. B., Penrod, S. D., Pappas, C., & Thill, D. L. (1997). Identification of computer-
generated facial composites. Journal of Applied Psychology, 82, 235-246.
Kovera, M. B., Gresham, A. W., Borgida, E., Gray, E., & Regan, P. C. (1997). Does expert
testimony inform or influence juror decision-making? A social cognitive analysis. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 82, 178-191.
Kovera, M. B., & Borgida, E. (1996). Children on the witness stand: The use of expert
testimony and other procedural innovations in U.S. child sexual abuse cases. In B. L.
Bottoms & G. S. Goodman (Eds.), International perspectives on child abuse and children’s
testimony: Psychological research and law (p. 201-220). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Gonzales, M. H., Kovera, M. B., Sullivan, J. L., & Chanley, V. (1995). Private reactions to
public transgressions: Predictors of evaluative responses to allegations of political
misconduct. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 136-148.
Kovera, M. B., Levy, R. J., Borgida, E., & Penrod, S. D. (1994). Expert witnesses in child
sexual abuse cases: Effects of expert testimony and cross-examination. Law and Human
Behavior, 18, 653-674.
Chanley, V., Sullivan, J. L., Gonzales, M. H., & Kovera, M. B. (1994). Lust and avarice in
politics: Damage-control for four politicians accused of wrongdoing (or, politics as usual).
American Politics Quarterly, 22, 297-333.
M. B. Kovera
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Kovera, M. B, Borgida, E., Gresham, A. W., Swim, J., & Gray, E. (1993). Do child sexual abuse
experts hold pro-child beliefs? A survey of the International Society for Traumatic Stress
Studies. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 6, 383-404.
Kovera, M. B., Park, R. C., & Penrod, S. (1992). Jurors’ perceptions of eyewitness and hearsay
evidence. Minnesota Law Review, 76, 703-722.
Borgida, E., Gresham, A. W., Kovera, M. B., & Regan, P. C. (1992). Children as witnesses in
court: The influence of expert psychological testimony. In A. W. Burgess (ed.), Child
trauma, Volume 1: Issues and research, (p.131-165). New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.
Borgida, E., Gresham, A. W., Swim, J., Bull (Kovera), M. A. & Gray, E. (1989). Expert
testimony in child sexual abuse cases: An empirical investigation of partisan orientation.
Family Law Quarterly, 23, 432-445.
Penrod, S., Bull (Kovera), M. A., & Lengnick, S. (1989). Children as observers and witnesses:
The empirical data. Family Law Quarterly, 23, 411-431.
Barnard, D. D., & Kovera, M. B. (2008). Juries and joined trials. In B. L. Cutler (Ed.), The
encyclopedia of psychology and law (pp. 392-395). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Copple, R., Torkildson, J., & Kovera, M. B. (2008). Expert psychological testimony:
Admissibility standards. In B. L. Cutler (Ed.), The encyclopedia of psychology and law (pp.
271-275). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Crocker, C., Sothmann, F. C., & Kovera, M. B. (2008). Voir dire. In B. L. Cutler (Ed.), The
encyclopedia of psychology and law (pp. 855-858). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Greathouse, S. M., Busso, J., & Kovera, M. B. (2008). Pretrial publicity, impact on juries. In
B. L. Cutler (Ed.), The encyclopedia of psychology and law (pp. 615-618). Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
M. B. Kovera
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Greathouse, S. M., Copple, R., & Kovera, M. B. (2008). Double-blind lineup administration.
In B. L. Cutler (Ed.), The encyclopedia of psychology and law (pp. 242-244). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Sothmann, F. C., Crocker, C., & Kovera, M. B. (2008). Jury selection. In B. L. Cutler (Ed.),
The encyclopedia of psychology and law (pp. 420-423). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Kovera, M. B. (2005, April 20). Can the truth be captured? [Review of the film Capturing the
Friedmans]. PsycCRITIQUES -- Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 50 (No.
16), Article 20. Retrieved April 20, 2005, from the PsycCRITIQUES database.
Danielsen, E. M., Levett, E. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2004, May). Supreme Court to review
juvenile execution. APA Monitor, 35(5), 86.
Kovera, M. B. (2002). Psychology and law. In K. L. Hall (Ed.), The Oxford companion to
American law (pp. 677-678). New York: Oxford University Press.
Levett, L. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2002, December). Psychologists battle over the general
acceptance of eyewitness research. APA Monitor, 33(12), 23.
Haw, R. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2002, May). Court considers conditions required for voluntary
consent to police search. APA Monitor, 33(5).
Cass, S. A., & Kovera, M. B. (2001, April). Research on the effects of child pornography is
needed. APA Monitor, 32(4), 21.
Phillips, M. R., & Kovera, M. B. (2000, November). Implications of the Boy Scouts of America
case. APA Monitor, 31(10), 77.
Russano, M. & Kovera, M. B. (2000, March). Supreme Court revisits Miranda warnings. APA
Monitor, 31(3), 77.
McAuliff, B. D., & Kovera, M. B. (1999, May). Murder case may alter hearsay rules. APA
Monitor, 30(5), 44.
McAuliff, B. D., & Kovera, M. B. (1998, November). Reviewing nonscientific expert evidence.
APA Monitor, 29(10), 43.
M. B. Kovera
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Phillips, M. R., & Kovera, M. B. (1997, November). Instructions on death. APA Monitor,
28(10), 43.
McAuliff, B. D., & Kovera, M. B. (1997, May). Child-abuse test ruled inadmissible. APA
Monitor, 28(5), 25.
Kovera, M. B., & McAuliff, B. D. (1996, November). Same-sex cases pose legal problems.
APA Monitor, 27(10), 24.
Kovera, M. B., Borgida, E., Gresham, A. W., Swim, J. K., & Gray, E. (1995). Child Sexual
Abuse Questionnaire. [On-line]. [CD-ROM]. Abstract from: CDP file: HaPI-CD: HaPI
Item 38018.
Cutler, B. L., & Kovera, M. B. (in preparation). Evaluating eyewitness evidence. In R. Roesch
& P. A. Zapf (Eds.), Forensic Assessments in Criminal and Civil Law: A Handbook for
Lawyers. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kovera, M. B. & Crocker, C. B. (in preparation). Voir dire and jury selection. In R.K. Otto
(Ed.), Comprehensive Handbook of Psychology, Volume 11: Forensic Psychology (2nd ed.).
New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Kovera, M. B., & Cutler, B. L. (in preparation). Jury selection. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Kovera, M. B., & Cutler, B. L. (in preparation). Jury selection. In R. Roesch & P. A. Zapf
(Eds.), Forensic Assessments in Criminal and Civil Law: A Handbook for Lawyers. New
York: Oxford University Press.
McAuliff, B. D., & Kovera, M. B. (under review). Accommodating children in court: How do
jurors view alternative testimony? Manuscript under review.
Conference Presentations
Austin, J. A., Zimmerman, D. M., Gundrum, L., & Kovera, M. B. (2011, March). Moderators
of administrator steering effects on eyewitness identification accuracy. Paper to be presented
at the meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society/4th International Congress of
Psychology and Law, Miami, FL.
Crocker, C. B., & Kovera, M. B. (2011, March). The efficacy of juror rehabilitation for
reducing attitudinal bias against the insanity defense. Paper to be presented at the meeting of
M. B. Kovera
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Crocker, C. B., & Kovera, M. B. (2011, March). The psychological mechanisms underlying the
effect of juror rehabilitation for pretrial publicity bias on judgments. Paper to be presented at
the meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society/4th International Congress of
Psychology and Law, Miami, FL.
Zimmerman, D. M., Yip, J., Przegienda, K., Baerga, C., & Kovera, M. B. (2011, March).
Behavioral confirmation during voir dire: Does questioning style differentially affect
cognitive dissonance and verdicts? Paper to be presented at the meeting of the American
Psychology-Law Society/4th International Congress of Psychology and Law, Miami, FL.
Appleby, S. C., & Kovera, M. B. (2010, August). Generic prejudice in jury trials. Paper
presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, San Diego, CA.
Levett, L. M., Crocker, C. B., & Kovera, M. B. (2010, August). Attitudes toward juvenile
waiver and juror decisions in waiver cases. Paper presented at the meeting of the American
Psychological Association, San Diego, CA.
Perillo, J. T., & Kovera, M. B. (2010, August). Expert witness trustworthiness and juror
decisions. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, San
Diego, CA.
Austin, J. L., & Kovera, M. B. (2010, March). The effects of inquisitorial versus adversarial
cross-examination on juror evaluations of expert evidence validity. Paper presented at the
meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, Vancouver, BC, Canada.
Crocker, C. B., Kennard, J. B., Austin, J. L., Zimmerman, D. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2010,
March). The effects of biased voir dire questions on juror decision-making. Paper presented
at the meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, Vancouver, BC, Canada.
Greathouse, S. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2010, March). Can cross-examination assist jurors in
detecting deception? Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychology-Law
Society, Vancouver, BC, Canada.
Kennard, J. B., Crocker, C. B., Austin, J. L., Zimmerman, D. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2010,
March). Behavioral confirmation in voir dire: Effects on jury selection and verdict choices.
M. B. Kovera
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Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, Vancouver, BC,
Canada.
Vitriol, J., & Kovera, M. B. (2010, March). Death qualification and jurors’ evidentiary
requirements for conviction. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychology-
Law Society, Vancouver, BC, Canada.
Kovera, M. B. (2009, October). Biased hypothesis testing and behavioral confirmation in jury
selection procedures. In N. Kerr (Chair), Current research at the social psychology/law
interface. Symposium presented at the meeting of the Society for Experimental Social
Psychology, Portland, ME.
Vitriol, J. A., & Kovera, M. B. (2009, May). Capital voir dire: Pre and post-trial effects of death
qualification. Paper presented at the meeting of the Association for Psychological Science,
San Francisco, CA.
Austin, J., & Kovera, M. B. (2009, March). The effects of judge versus attorney cross-
examination of experts on juror evaluations of evidence quality. Paper presented at the
meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, San Antonio, TX.
*winner of the APLS Student Section Poster Award
Crocker, C. B., Kennard, J. B., Greathouse, S. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2009, March). An
investigation of attorneys' questioning strategies during voir dire. Paper presented at the
meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, San Antonio, TX.
Forbes, A., Kovera, M. B., & Glasford, D. (2009, March). Racial disparities in punishment and
guilt judgments for defendants accused of terrorism. Paper presented at the meeting of the
American Psychology-Law Society, San Antonio, TX.
Greathouse, S. M., Crocker, C. B., & Kovera, M. B. (2009, March). Effects of harassment
severity and reporting behavior on juror decision making in sexual harassment cases. Paper
presented at the meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, San Antonio, TX.
Kennard, J, B., Zimmerman, D. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2009, March). The general acceptance of
pretrial publicity phenomena. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychology-
Law Society, San Antonio, TX.
Kovera, M. B., & Greathouse, S. M. (2008, October). Social influence in lineup procedures: The
role of lineup administrator knowledge in mistaken eyewitness identifications. In M. R.
Leippe and M. B. Kovera (Co-chairs), Social psychology of the eyewitness: Social influences
and meta-cognitive processes in choosing from a lineup and being confident about it.
Symposium presented at the meeting of the Society for Experimental Social Psychology,
Sacramento, CA.
M. B. Kovera
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Busso, J. B., & Kovera, M. B. (2008, August). Effect of defendant race and age on verdict
choice. Paper presented at the 116th Annual Convention of the American Psychological
Association, Boston, MA.
Crocker, C. B., & Kovera, M. B. (2008, August). The effects of watching juror rehabilitation on
juror judgments. Paper presented at the 116th Annual Convention of the American
Psychological Association, Boston, MA.
Greathouse, S. M., Levett, L. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2008, August). The effects of voir dire on
juror decisions in juvenile waiver cases. Paper presented at the 116th Annual Convention of
the American Psychological Association, Boston, MA.
Busso, J. B., Greathouse, S. M., Crocker, C. B., Austin, J., Vitriol, J., Torkildson, J., & Kovera,
M. B. (2008, March). Do attorneys' expectations influence juror behavior in voir dire?
Paper presented at the meetings of the American Psychology-Law Society, Jacksonville, FL.
Crocker, C. B., Busso, J. B., Greathouse, S. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2008, March). Hypothesis
testing in voir dire: Information gathering and inference. Paper presented at the meetings of
the American Psychology-Law Society, Jacksonville, FL.
Crocker, C. B., & Kovera, M. B. (2008, March). An empirical investigation of the legal
assumptions underlying juror rehabilitation during voir dire. Paper presented at the meetings
of the American Psychology-Law Society, Jacksonville, FL.
Greathouse, S. M., Crocker, C. B., Busso, J., Austin, J., Vitriol, J., Torkildson, J., & Kovera, M.
B. (2008, March). Do attorney expectations influence the voir dire process? Paper
presented at the meetings of the American Psychology-Law Society, Jacksonville, FL.
Sothmann, F. C., & Kovera, M. B. (2008, March). Do jurors follow the law when evaluating
accomplice testimony? Paper presented at the meetings of the American Psychology-Law
Society, Jacksonville, FL.
DeAngelis, R., Kovera, M. B., Busso, J., & Sothmann, F. C. (2007, August). Narrative
construction of hate crime prototypes. Paper presented at the 115th Annual Convention of the
American Psychological Association, San Francisco, CA.
Levett, L. M., Greathouse, S. M., Sothmann, F. C., Copple, R., & Kovera, M. B. (2007, August).
When juveniles are tried as adults: Does the juvenile qualification process result in a biased
jury? Paper presented at the 115th Annual Convention of the American Psychological
Association, San Francisco, CA.
Levett, L. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2006, November). Improving the opposing expert safeguard
against junk science: Does a non-adversarial expert work? Paper presented at the meetings
of the American Society of Criminology, Los Angeles, CA.
Kovera, M. B. & Greathouse, S. M. (2006, July). Why don't you take another look at number
three? Moderators and mediators of the investigator bias effect on eyewitness accuracy. In L.
M. B. Kovera
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Greathouse, S. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2006, May). Effects of single-blind lineup administration
on administrator behavior and perceived lineup fairness. In A. Crossman (Chair), Making an
eyewitness identification: How and when and why do we choose? Symposium presented at
the meetings of the Association for Psychological Science, New York, NY.
Crocker, C. B., Levett, L. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2006, March). The predictive validity of the
Juvenile Waiver Scale and its generalizability across participant groups. Paper presented at
the meetings of the American Psychology-Law Society, St. Petersburg, FL.
Greathouse, S. M., Levett, L. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2006, March). The effects of voir dire on
juror decisions in juvenile waiver cases. Paper presented at the meetings of the American
Psychology-Law Society, St. Petersburg, FL.
Levett, L. M., Greathouse, S. M., Sothmann, F. C., Copple, R., & Kovera, M. B. (2006, March).
When juveniles are tried as adults: Does the juvenile qualification process result in a biased
jury? In E. Brank & L. M. Levett (Co-chairs), Players in the juvenile justice puzzle: From
public sentiment to putting it into practice. Symposium presented at the meetings of the
American Psychology-Law Society, St. Petersburg, FL.
Levett, L. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2006, March). Psychological mediators in the relationship
between opposing expert testimony and juror decisions. In L. M. Levett (Chair), Juror
decision making about expert evidence. Symposium presented at the meetings of the
American Psychology-Law Society, St. Petersburg, FL.
Sothmann, F. C., & Kovera, M. B. (2006, March). Does accomplice testimony make a
difference? An evaluation of accomplice testimony in court. Paper presented at the meetings
of the American Psychology-Law Society, St. Petersburg, FL.
Sothmann, F. C., Rosenthal, M., Greathouse, S. M., Levett, L. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2006,
March). Effects of voir dire questions on a juvenile waiver case. Paper presented at the
meetings of the American Psychology-Law Society, St. Petersburg, FL.
Levett, L. M., Greathouse, S. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2005, November). Racial differences in
attitude toward juvenile waiver to adult court: A meta-analysis. Paper presented at the
meetings of the American Society of Criminology, Toronto, Ontario.
Greathouse, S. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2005, July). The effects of litigation strategies on
decision-making in sexual harassment cases: Theory and practice. Paper presented at the 29th
International Congress on Law and Mental Health, Paris, France.
Levett, L. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2005, July). Juror reasoning about expert psychological
testimony. Paper presented at the 29th International Congress on Law and Mental Health,
Paris, France.
M. B. Kovera
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Danielsen, E., & Kovera, M. B. (2005, June). The role of repeated attitudinal expressions in
predicting juror behavior. Paper presented at the meetings of the American Society of Trial
Consultants, Philadelphia, PA.
Danielsen, E., & Kovera, M. B. (2005, March). The role of repeated attitudinal expressions in
predicting juror behavior. Paper presented at the meetings of the American Psychology-Law
Society, La Jolla, CA.
Greathouse, S. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2005, March). Blind administration of lineups: Effects on
identification accuracy. In G. L. Wells (Chair), Advances in eyewitness system-variable
research. Symposium presented at the meetings of the American Psychology-Law Society,
La Jolla, CA.
Greathouse, S. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2005, March). Does self-referencing mediate the effects of
expert testimony on judgments in a sexual harassment case? Paper presented at the meetings
of the American Psychology-Law Society, La Jolla, CA.
Levett, L. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2005, March). Do attitudes toward juvenile waiver affect juror
decisions? An evaluation of the Juvenile Waiver Scale. Paper presented at the meetings of
the American Psychology-Law Society, La Jolla, CA.
Levett, L. M., & Kovera, M. B., Goodman-Delahunty, J. (2005, March). Juror common
understanding of workplace harm. Paper presented at the meetings of the American
Psychology-Law Society, La Jolla, CA.
Samis, A., Vargas, J., Gonzalez, K., McAuliff, B. D., & Kovera, M. B. (2005, March). Can
jurors recognize missing control groups, confounds, and experimenter bias in expert
evidence? Poster presented at the meetings of the American Psychology-Law Society, La
Jolla, CA.
Greathouse, S. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2004, July). Effects of litigation strategies on decision
making in sexual harassment cases. In L. M. Levett, S. M., Greathouse, & M. B. Kovera
(Co-Chairs), Consequences of sexual harassment: Legal and cultural considerations.
Symposium presented at the 112th Annual Convention of the American Psychological
Association, Honolulu, HI.
Levett, L. M., Kovera, M. B., & Goodman-Delahunty, J. (2004, July). Clinical psychologists’
beliefs about the sequelae of sexual harassment. In L. M. Levett, S. M., Greathouse, & M. B.
Kovera (Co-Chairs), Consequences of sexual harassment: Legal and cultural considerations.
Symposium presented at the 112th Annual Convention of the American Psychological
Association, Honolulu, HI.
McAuliff, B. D., & Kovera, M. B. (2004, July). Juror Need for Cognition and sensitivity to
internal validity threats. Paper presented at the 112th Annual Convention of the American
Psychological Association, Honolulu, HI.
M. B. Kovera
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Danielsen, E., Levett, L. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2004, March). When juveniles are tried as
adults: What happens during voir dire? Paper presented at the meetings of the American
Psychology-Law Society, Scottsdale, AZ.
Greathouse, S. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2004, March). The effects of lineup administrator
knowledge on eyewitness identifications. Paper presented at the meetings of the American
Psychology-Law Society, Scottsdale, AZ.
Levett, L. M., Danielsen, E., & Kovera, M. B. (2004, March). Assessing the convergent and
discriminant validity of the juvenile waiver scale. Paper presented at the meetings of the
American Psychology-Law Society, Scottsdale, AZ.
Levett, L. M., Danielsen, E., & Kovera, M. B. (2004, March). The predictive validity of the
juvenile waiver scale. In M. B. Kovera & L. M. Levett (Co-chairs), New directions in jury
selection and trial consulting research. Symposium presented at the meetings of the
American Psychology-Law Society, Scottsdale, AZ.
Steighner, N., & Kovera, M. B. (2004, March). Biased hypothesis testing during traditional
attorney voir dire. In M. B. Kovera & L. M. Levett (Co-chairs), New directions in jury
selection and trial consulting research. Symposium presented at the meetings of the
American Psychology-Law Society, Scottsdale, AZ.
Narchet, F. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2003, August). Hostile and benevolent prejudice: A new
perspective on racism. Poster presented at the 111th Annual Convention of the American
Psychological Association, Toronto, Canada.
Kovera, M. B. (2003, July). Considering the relationships among ecological, external, and
internal validity. In S. Penrod (Chair), Applications of jury research: A debate on the
selection of research questions and methods. Symposium presented at the Psychology and
Law International, Interdisciplinary Conference, Edinburgh, Scotland.
Levett, L. M., Danielsen, E., & Kovera, M. B. (2003, July). Racial differences in attitudes
toward juvenile waiver to adult court. Paper presented at the Psychology and Law
International, Interdisciplinary Conference, Edinburgh, Scotland.
Levett, L. M., & Kovera, M. B. (2003, July). Can opposing experts educate jurors about
unreliable expert evidence on child eyewitness memory? In B. L. Cutler & L. Van
Wallandael (Chairs), Expert psychological testimony on eyewitness memory. Symposium
presented at the Psychology and Law International, Interdisciplinary Conference, Edinburgh,
Scotland.
Levett, L. M, Kovera, M. B., & Goodman-Delahunty, J. (2003, July). U.S. jurors' beliefs about
the psychological sequelae of sexual harassment. In R. L. Wiener (Chair), Advances in
empirical research on gender and the law: People’s errors and misconceptions. Symposium
M. B. Kovera
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Kovera, M. B. (2002, August). New directions for jury deliberation research. In A. Claussen-
Schultz (Chair), Current research on the jury deliberation process. Symposium presented at
the 110th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Chicago.
Carpenter, T. & Kovera, M. B. (2002, March). The effects of defendant accounts on damage
award decisions. Paper presented at the biennial meeting of the American Psychology-Law
Society, Austin, Texas.
Cass., S. A., & Kovera, M. B. (2002, March). The influence of harassment severity, frequency,
and company response on juror decisions. Paper presented at the biennial meeting of the
American Psychology-Law Society, Austin, Texas.
Collett, M. E., & Kovera, M. B. (2002, March). The differential effects of American versus
British trial procedures on juror decision-making. Paper presented at the biennial meeting of
the American Psychology-Law Society, Austin, Texas.
Devenport, J. L., Stinson, V., & Kovera, M. B. (2002, March). Should we call in an expert?
Using meta-analysis to examine the impact of expert testimony on juror verdicts. Paper
presented at the biennial meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, Austin, Texas.
Mitchell, T., & Kovera, M. B. (2002, March). The effects of attribution of responsibility and
work history on perceptions of reasonable accommodations. Paper presented at the biennial
meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, Austin, Texas.
Russano, M. B., Dickinson, J. J., Cass, S. A., Kovera, M. B., & Cutler, B. L. (2002, March).
Testing the effects of lineup administrator knowledge in simultaneous and sequential lineups.
Paper presented at the biennial meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, Austin,
Texas.
Kovera, M. B. (2001, August). Recent research and the NIJ guidelines for eyewitness evidence.
Paper presented at the 109th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association,
San Francisco.
Russano, M. B., & Kovera, M. B. (2001, August). Psychologists’ evaluations of valid and
flawed psychological science. Paper presented at the 109th Annual Convention of the
American Psychological Association, San Francisco.
M. B. Kovera
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McAuliff, B. D., & Kovera, M. B. (2000, August). Effects of age, crime, and cross-examination
on children’s credibility. Paper presented at the 108th Annual Convention of the American
Psychological Association, Washington, DC.
McAuliff, B. D., & Kovera, M. B. (2000, August). Juror attitudes toward innovative testimonial
procedures in child abuse proceedings. Paper presented at the 108th Annual Convention of
the American Psychological Association, Washington, DC.
Hebert, K. S. & Kovera, M. B. (2000, March). Jurors’ use of social framework evidence. Paper
presented at the biennial meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, New Orleans,
LA.
Kovera, C. A., Kovera, M. B., Pablo, J., Ervin, F. R., Williams, I. C., & Mash, D. C. (1999,
November). Anti-addiction benefits of ibogaine: Mood elevation and drug craving
reduction. Paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Neuroscience, Miami, FL.
McAuliff, B. D., & Kovera, M. B. (1999, August). Can jurors detect methodological flaws in
scientific evidence? Paper presented at the 107th Annual Convention of the American
Psychological Association, Boston, MA.
McAuliff, B. D., & Kovera, M. B. (1999, July). Juror sensitivity to methodological flaws in
expert evidence. In S. D. Penrod (Chair), The use of scientific evidence: Empirical, legal, and
comparative perspectives. Symposium conducted at the meeting of the European
Association for Psychology and Law, Dublin, Ireland.
Phillips, M. R., McAuliff, B. D., Kovera, M. B. & Cutler, B. L. (1999, July). Investigator bias
and witness confidence. In K. McClure (Chair), Eyewitness identifications of suspects: New
views on the relationship between confidence and accuracy. Symposium conducted at the
meeting of the European Association for Psychology and Law, Dublin, Ireland.
Kovera, M. B., & McAuliff. B. D. (1998, August). Judge evaluations of expert evidence: Are
they effective gatekeepers? Paper presented at the 106th Annual Convention of the American
Psychological Association, San Francisco, CA.
McAuliff, B. D., & Kovera, M. B. (1998, August). Juror beliefs about witness suggestibility: Is
there common understanding? Paper presented at the 106th Annual Convention of the
American Psychological Association, San Francisco, CA.
Kovera, M. B., & McAuliff, B. D. (1998, August). Judge and juror evaluations of scientific
evidence. In J. L. Jackson (Chair), Judge and jury decision-making. Symposium conducted
at the International Congress for Applied Psychology, San Francisco, CA.
Kovera, C. A., Kovera, M. B., Singleton, E. G., Ervin, F. R., Williams, I. C. & Mash, D. C.
(1998, June). Decreased drug craving during inpatient detoxification with ibogaine. Paper
presented at the meeting of the College on Problems of Drug Dependence, Scottsdale, AZ.
Phillips, M., McAuliff, B. D., Kovera, M. B., & Cutler, B. L. (1998, March). Investigator bias
in photoarrays. Paper presented at the Florida Cognition Conference, North Miami, FL.
McAuliff, B. D., Kovera, M. B., & Viswesvaran, C. (1998, March). Methodological issues in
child witness suggestibility research. In B. L. Bottoms & J. A. Quas (Chairs), Situational
and individual sources of variability in children’s suggestibility and false memories.
Symposium conducted at the biennial meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society,
Redondo Beach, CA.
McAuliff, B. D., & Kovera, M. B. (1998, March). A survey of expert beliefs about witness
suggestibility. Paper presented at the biennial meeting of the American Psychology-Law
Society, Redondo Beach, CA.
Phillips, M., McAuliff, B. D., Kovera, M. B., & Cutler, B. L. (1998, March). Investigator bias
in photoarrays. Paper presented at the biennial meeting of the American Psychology-Law
Society, Redondo Beach, CA.
Kovera, M. B., McAuliff, B. D., & Hebert, K. S. (1997, August). Juror evaluations of expert
evidence validity. Paper presented at the 105th Annual Convention of the American
Psychological Association, Chicago.
McAuliff, B. D. & Kovera, M. B. (1997, August). Cognitive, social, and developmental factors
in suggestibility: A meta-analysis. Paper presented at the 105th Annual Convention of the
American Psychological Association, Chicago.
Devenport, J. L., Stinson, V., & Kovera, M. B. (1996, March). How much impact does expert
testimony have on juror decisions? A meta-analysis. Paper presented at the biennial meeting
of the American Psychology-Law Society, Hilton Head, SC.
Kovera, M. B. (1996, March). “If it does not fit, you must acquit”: General pretrial publicity,
rape, and evidence plausibility. Paper presented at the biennial meeting of the American
Psychology-Law Society, Hilton Head, SC.
Kovera, M. B., Borgida, E., & Gresham, A. W. (1996, March). The impact of child witness
preparation and expert testimony on juror decision making. In B. L. Bottoms & M. A.
Epstein (Chairs), Jurors’ decisions in child sexual assault cases. Symposium conducted at
the biennial meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, Hilton Head, SC.
Park, R. C., Kovera, M. B., & Penrod, S. D. (1992, September). Jurors’ perceptions of hearsay
evidence. Paper presented at the third European Law and Psychology Conference, Oxford,
England.
Kovera, M. B., & Borgida, E. (1992, August). Children on the witness stand: A persuasion
analysis of jurors’ perceptions. Paper presented at the 100th Annual Convention of the
American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C.
Borgida, E., & Kovera, M. B. (1992, May). Expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases: The
use and abuse of psychological data. Paper presented at the NATO Advanced Study
Institute, Lucca, Italy.
Kovera, M. B., Levy, R. J., Borgida, E., & Penrod, S. (1992, March). Expert witnesses in child
sexual abuse cases: Effects of expert testimony and cross-examination. Paper presented at
the biennial meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, San Diego, California.
Bull (Kovera), M. A., Park, R. C., & Penrod, S. (1991, September). Jurors’ perceptions of
eyewitness and hearsay evidence. Paper presented at the Hearsay Reform Conference,
Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Gresham, A. W., Bull (Kovera), M. A., Regan, P. C., & Borgida, E. (1991, June). The influence
of expert testimony and child witness demeanor on jury decision making. Paper presented at
the meeting of the American Psychological Society, Washington, D. C.
Bull (Kovera), M. A., Borgida, E., Gresham, A. W., & Swim, J. (1990, May). Expert testimony
in child sexual abuse cases: An empirical investigation of partisan orientation. Paper
presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, Illinois.
M. B. Kovera
Page 22
Gresham, A., Borgida, E., Swim, J., French, S. & Bull (Kovera), M. (1989, May). Juror
common understanding of child sexual abuse and children as witnesses. Paper presented at
the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago, Illinois.
Kovera, M. B. (2009, April). The psychology of voir dire: The effects of jury selection on
jurors’ decisions. Keynote address presented at the Behavioral Sciences of the North
Conference, University of Alaska at Anchorage.
Kovera, M. B. (2008, October). Identifying juror bias: Moving from assessment and prediction
to a new generation of jury selection research. Paper presented at Perspectives on
Psychology and the Law: Celebrating the Contributions of Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Jr.
University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS.
Kovera, M. B. (2008, August). Choosing what is right versus what is easy: A reflection on
methodology in jury simulations and Law and Human Behavior. Presidential address
presented at the 116th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association,
Boston, MA.
Kovera, M. B., & Kucharski, L. T. (2006, July). The expert, the lawyer, and the jury. Paper
presented at the Short Course for Prosecuting Attorneys and Defense Lawyers in Criminal
Cases. Northwestern University Law School, Chicago, IL.
Kovera, M. B., & Greathouse, S. M. (2004, September). The effects of lineup administrator
knowledge on eyewitness identification accuracy. Paper presented at the conference
Reforming eyewitness identification: Convicting the guilty, protecting the innocent. Cardozo
Law School, New York, NY.
Kovera, M. B. (2000, August). Law, psychology, and gender in the workplace: Compelled
mental health evaluations. Roundtable discussion held at the 108th Annual Convention of the
American Psychological Association, Washington, DC.
M. B. Kovera
Page 23
Kovera, M. B. (1997, November). Jury persuasion strategies for expert witnesses. Invited
address at the 14th annual meeting of the National Forensic Center, Tampa, FL.
Kovera, M. B. (1996, April). Invited participant in Families and law: Changing values, rights
and obligations. Conference sponsored by the American Bar Association Commission on
College and University Legal Studies, Denver, CO.
Kovera, M. B. (1996, March). The media and allegations of sexual misconduct: The effects of
agenda setting on credibility appraisals. Paper presented at the biennial meeting of the
American Psychology-Law Society, Hilton Head, SC.
Workshops
Kovera, M. B. (2009, February). Litigation Consulting: Research and Practice. Workshop
sponsored by the American Academy of Forensic Psychology, Fairfax, VA.
Kovera, M. B. (2005, September). Jury Selection: Research and Practice. Workshop sponsored
by the American Academy of Forensic Psychology, St. Louis, MO.
Kovera, M. B. (2005, April). Jury Selection: Research and Practice. Workshop sponsored by the
American Academy of Forensic Psychology, St. Petersburg, FL.
Kovera, M. B. (2003, June). Jury Selection: Research and Practice. Workshop sponsored by the
American Academy of Forensic Psychology, San Juan, PR.
Invited Colloquia
American Bar Foundation, Amherst College, City University of New York-Graduate Center,
College of the Holy Cross, Florida Atlantic University; Fordham University; Lewis and Clark
College, Oregon State University, Rutgers University, Scripps College, St. Thomas University
(Miami), University of Alaska at Anchorage, University of Florida, University of Minnesota,
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, University of New South Wales (Australia), University of
North Florida.
SERVICE
Ad-hoc Reviewer
American Psychologist
Applied Cognitive Psychology
Basic and Applied Social Psychology
M. B. Kovera
Page 24
Secretary-Treasurer (2009-2012)
Executive Committee (2009-present)
Audit and Finance Committee (Chair, 2009-present)
M. B. Kovera
Page 26
Community Service
Member, Continuo Arts Symphonic Chorus (2008-present)
European premiere of Stephen Edwards' Requiem for My Mother, Festival Internazionale di
Musica e Arte Sacra, Basilica of St. Ignatius, Rome, November 2008
World premiere of Stephen Edwards’ A Carol Fantasy, Carnegie Hall, November 2009
Deacon, Central Presbyterian Church, Summit, NJ
Docent, Art-in-the-Classroom Program, Brayton Elementary School, Summit, NJ (2004-2010)
Member, Motet Choir, Central Presbyterian Church, Summit, NJ (2006-2008)
Assistant Coach, Summit Soccer Club (2007)
Coach, Summit Recreational Soccer (2010)
Assistant Coach, Summit Youth Basketball (2010)
Theses Supervised
Bradley D. McAuliff (1998)
Melissa Russano (2001)
Stacie Cass (2002)
Tara Mitchell (2002)
Fadia Narchet (2003)
Lora Levett (2004)
Sarah Greathouse (2004)
Nina Steighner (2004)
Erin Danielsen (2005) — Outstanding Student Research Award, American Society of Trial
Consultants
Frances (Katy) Sothmann (2006)
Rosa DeAngelis (2006)
Caroline Crocker (2008)
Joseph Vitriol (2010)
Alexis [Forbes] Robinson (2010)
Jacqueline Austin (2011)
Marlee Berman (in progress)
Lauren Gundrum (in progress)
Jimmy Yip (in progress)
M. B. Kovera
Page 28
Dissertations Supervised
Bradley D. McAuliff (2000) — American Psychology-Law Society (APA Division 41)
Dissertation Award (1st place)
Kellye S. Hebert (2000)
Marisa Collett (2001)
Tracey R. Carpenter (2001)
Lora M. Levett (2005) — American Psychology-Law Society (APA Division 41) Dissertation
Award (3rd place)
Sarah M. Greathouse (2009)
Caroline B. Crocker (2010) — American Psychology-Law Society (APA Division 41)
Dissertation Award (2rn place)
Julia Busso Kennard (in progress)
Lindsey Rhead (in progress)
David M. Zimmerman (in progress)
TEACHING
I hereby certify that, in accordance with Connecticut Practice Book §§ 10-12, 10-13 and
10-14, a copy of the foregoing was served via hand this 4th day of February 2011 on the
following:
_______________________________________
Todd Bussert
Commissioner of the Superior Court
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