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Atlanta Division

Plaintiffs FILE NO: 1:08-CV-1971-WSD






COMES NOW, Plaintiffs James B. Stegeman and Janet D. McDonald and

file Plaintiffs’ Brief In Response To Defendants Georgia Power, Brian P. Watt and

Scott A. Farrow’s1 Motion To Dismiss.


Plaintiffs filed this action, not as an appeal as the Defendants attempt to have

this Court believe, but as a separate action resulting from “extrinsic fraud”, and

other “illegal acts” Plaintiffs are not claiming a legal error by the state court, they

are claiming “fraud upon the court” by the opposing parties.

These defendants claim that Plaintiffs have failed to state a valid cause of
Referred to hereinafter as “GA Power Defendants” or “these Defendants”
action. Although Plaintiffs believe they have properly plead, should this Court

decide that defendants are correct, Plaintiffs MOVE this Honorable Court for a

chance to amend their pleading in order to plead the causes of action correctly

rather than dismiss this case.

Matters Irrelevant To This Case

In Defendant’s Memorandum of Law In Support Of Motion To Dismiss,2

they attempt to cloud the issues with matters wholly irrelevant to this case. They

make immaterial, irrelevant statements to discredit, bring bias toward and

prejudice against the Plaintiffs and thereby manipulate the Court and it’s processes.

These defendants begin their “Memorandum of Law…” with “No possible

construction of the rambling allegations…”; “With this action, … perpetuate a

disturbing trend … pro se litigants, …individual unfortunate enough…”; “Indeed

Plaintiffs themselves are no strangers to this very tactic”; “…should not allow

Plaintiffs’ misuse of the judicial system…” (MTD pg.2) These Defendants make

several unsubstantiated, false statements with the intent to mislead this Court. (See

“Background” of MTD, pgs. 2-5.) NOTE: incorrectly references Plaintiffs.

These defendants would have Courts of Georgia and the United States

violate the Rights of the disabled, the Rights of pro se litigants, as well as all the

Motion to Dismiss referred to hereinafter as “MTD”

Rights of any other citizen with whom they disagree. Denying disabled, pro se3

litigants meaningful access to the Courts falls within violations of Constitutionally

guaranteed Rights see Tennessee v. Lane 541 U.S. 513 (2004); U.S. v. Georgia,

“…interference with access to the judicial process, and procedural due process


These defendants reference this Court’s denial of Plaintiff Stegeman’s

Motion To Proceed On Appeal In Forma Pauperis,4 (MTD-pg.2-*fn1) which is

meant to prejudice this Court and has no relevance to this case. These defendants

should take note that the 11th Circuit Appeal has not been dismissed or denied, but

is currently pending,.


A. The Superior Court Action

Plaintiffs were forced to file the Superior Court action because of Matt

Goff’s allegations to the State Patrol Troopers. Plaintiffs discussed the matter with

law enforcement personnel, who assured them that should anything happen to Matt

Plaintiffs are pro se litigants, Plaintiff Stegeman is a disabled adult as recognized
by The Social Security Act and The Health and Welfare Act and U.S.C. Title 42
§12101 thereby a member of a protected class.
§1915 IFP cases and fee-paid cases are viewed differently by the Court in that IFP
cases can be dismissed much more easily than a fee paid case and are “held to
different standards and may be dismissed sua sponte” Vanderberg v. Donaldson,
259 F.3d at 1323 (11th Cir. 2001; Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483 (11th Cir.
1997); Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2003)

Goff,5 Plaintiffs would be the major suspect. Plaintiffs have also discussed Matt

Goff’s allegation with Duluth Deputy Chief of Police – Colonel Brian Carney6 who

agreed that Plaintiffs would be the major suspects, and that should there be no

other suspects, Plaintiffs would be prosecuted.

B. The Easement Documents

The 1937 easement document has the name as then landowner as Dr. R. F.

Wells; the 1941 document has the name as R. F. Wells; There was neither a Dr. R.

F. Wells (GA Power’s Verified Answers pg. 31, ¶6 “Dr. R. F. Wells”), nor R. F.

Wells (GA Power’s Verified Answers pg. 33 ¶15 “Mr. R. F. Wells”) in Stone

Mountain at any time and neither document has proper information on it. (Comp.

Pg. 8). George Riley Wells was the one who had owned land in Stone Mountain,

but not as far down as Sheppard Road. (Response to Superior Court and Judge

Becker’s MTD, pgs. 11-12, and attached thereto “Exhibit C” )

Plaintiffs’ had gone to the Wells-Brown House hoping to obtain an original

signature of R. F. Wells or Dr. R. F. Wells so that Colonel Brain Carney would have

something to go by when examining the easement documents. Colonel Carney had

No Police Report or evidence has been submitted to support Goff’s claim, GA
Power claimed the event took place in 2004 for statute of limitations(MTD-Exhibit
C, pg.44 ¶69) .
Colonel Carney is also President of the American Board of Forensic Document
Examiners, who Plaintiffs had contacted originally about having the “easement
documents” examined.

advised on the proper procedure of photographing the signature in case there was

no way to get a copy of it. Plaintiffs had already filled out the agreement to have

the procedure of examination performed. Plaintiffs have attached as “Exhibit 1”

hereto emails, agreement, and credentials concerning Colonel Carney.

Due to Defendants’ fraudulent easement document Plaintiffs filed Motion to

Strike Defendants’ Verified Answers and Counterclaim; attached hereto is a true

and correct copy of the Motion as “Exhibit 2”. Defendants, to date have refused

to address the document. Five months after being served with Summons and

complaint, GA Power Amended their counter-suit to include Motion For

Reformation of the easement document,7 which legally was admission to Plaintiffs’

allegations in their complaint; Defendants had no easement concerning Plaintiffs’

property. The Verified Answers and counterclaim8 were never and amended to the

Verified Answers.

Georgia laws on Amending pleadings allows the amendment of pleadings to

conform to the evidence, not evidence to be amended to conform to the pleadings;

MTD exhibit C is GA Power’s counterclaim pg.31¶¶6,7,8,9,10; pg.32¶14;
pg.33¶18; pg.34¶22; pg.35¶¶24,25 GA Power stated 10 times they have a valid
easement; the rest of the counterclaim asks for the Court to grant different kinds of.
which swore that the matter had been thoroughly investigated and were true
including the easement document which was attached as their proof

not the answers to be amended to include a reformation9 of fraudulent evidence;

Plaintiffs did object to the Amendment, see the following:

O.G.C.A. §9-11-15:
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading …before the
entry of a pretrial order…A party may plead or move in response
to an amended pleading… (b) Amendments to conform to the
evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties,…Such amendment …
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence…

C. Fictional Discovery Dispute

These defendants make false representation to this Court MTD pg.4: “As

Georgia Power undertook discovery,.. refused to cooperate, claiming that they…

proven their case (Complaint ¶¶43,44,125,127)”. “…any discovery by Georgia

Power would be unnecessary. (Id. at ¶¶33,34,65). The statements are lies. These

Defendants further state: “…noticed depositions, but Plaintiffs refused to appear.

(Id. at ¶¶58-60,76)”; “…merits of the case decided before any significant discovery

had occurred.10 (See generally, id. at Exhibit 12; ¶¶31, 43, 44).” “…inundated…

with motions…” Obviously, as was done in Superior Court, defendants take things

Which is prohibited by Ga. Law in this circumstance as evidenced by the Ga.
Statutes previously provided in Plaintiffs’ complaint and as an Exhibit to Plaintiffs’
Response to Superior Court and Judge Becker’s MTD.
There was only one (1) ultimate issue in the case, whether or not GA Power had a
legal easement agreement that pertained to Plaintiffs property. According to rules
of all courts, the main objective is to have the case complete as efficiently as
possible. Once the issue is settled, there is nothing left to discover, it was proven
GA Power did not have a legal easement pertaining to Plaintiffs’ property!

out of context as to what is said to manipulate the Court, and looking at the Docket

Report clearly shows that Georgia Power over-burdened the Court with filings, see

complaint Exhibit 12.

The Factual Events:

Plaintiffs properly answered GA Power discovery requests, and stated to

contact Plaintiffs to make arrangements for inspecting, viewing and copying of

photographs, video, etc. Rather than contact Plaintiffs, defendants sent a discovery

dispute letter dated February 19th attached hereto is the original letter “Exhibit

3”;11 on the 1st page, there are four items, Plaintiffs called Watt, and complied with

the demands of the Feb. 19th letter. Defendants then claimed that the letter made

requests for copy of video tape, which was not in the Feb. 19th letter.12

The original letter from Defendant Watt dated February 27 attached hereto

as “Exhibit 4” pg.2 shows that there had been agreement that there would be no

depositions set for March.

Plaintiffs have attached “original” letters or other documents unless the “original”
letter has already been provided as an Exhibit in Plaintiffs’ complaint, which if the
original was used in the Complaint, Plaintiffs have attached a true and correct copy
of the letter and shall so state.
Later, in Defendants’ Motion for Continuance the preposterous claim was made
that Plaintiffs refused to allow inspection of the videotape (plaintiffs had said to
contact them for inspection and copying, defendants refused to do so) and that the
videotape gave rise to the lawsuit (a false representation which defendants refused
to address when challenged).

Plaintiffs filed Motion to Strike (3/12/2008)13 and filed for a protective order

Motion to Stay Discovery (3/20/2008) showing that Defendants had orchestrated a

fictional discovery dispute; these defendants filed Motion For Continuance

(03/28/2008)14 claiming to need to investigate and depose before responding15,

and Motions to Compel (3/31/2008) and (4/15/2008);16 Plaintiffs’ responded to

both Motions and showed that Court that:

1) There was no Discovery Dispute, the items in the letter had been
complied with;
2) Discovery requests were in violation of O.C.G.A. §§9-11-26
through 9-11-37, and U.S.C.R.. Rules 5.3, and 6.4;
3) that the same 6.4 letter was used for both Motions to Compel;
4) and that the Watt had perjured himself in both Certifications

Plaintiffs have attached as “Exhibit 5” true and correct copies of Plaintiffs’

Responsive…Motion To Dismiss…and…Counsel’s Certification…, (Exhibit A

Plaintiffs mailed the Motion U.S.P.S. Priority, Certified Mail, the Court received
the Motion on March 8, 2008 but held without filing until March 12th and didn’t
mail back Plaintiffs’ copy although there was postage pre-paid, self-addressed
envelope to do so; no explanation was given.
Plaintiffs Objected to Continuance; Motion to Strike, Motion to Stay were not
ruled on until the Order dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint, Motion for Continuance
has never been ruled on.
Plaintiffs responded to Motion for Continuance citing bad-faith attempt to delay
and that depositions will not legitimize a falsified fraudulent document.
Without ruling on any other Motions Judge Becker jumped to Defendant’s
Motion to Compel filed 03/31/2008 and their second Motion to Compel filed
04/15/2008, without a hearing scheduled and denying Plaintiffs their Rights of due
process, ruled on both Motions in the same Order, in favor of Defendants on May
05/28/2008, then didn’t notify Plaintiffs of the decision.

attached to that is) Plaintiffs’ Consolidated…Objections …Motion to Compel …

AND …Certification of Compliance…. Defendants discovery requests were in

violation of Georgia statutes which require a definite date and time for response.

Plaintiffs further showed that defendants and their attorneys had perjured

themselves in every Verification, Affidavit, and Certification filed with the court

and were doing so to manipulate the Court and the Court’s process which in turn

violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights and asked to have the offensive documents


“It is the responsibility of the trial court to ensure that the system is
not manipulated by any party…” Carson v. State, Ga. App. (SE2d)
(Case No. A031403, 2003);
“A trial court also is authorized “[t]o preserve and enforce order…
to prevent…and hindrance to its proceedings.” Robinson v. Becker,
Ga. App. (SE2d) (Case No. A03A2524, 2004).
See also judicial estoppel:
“is directed against those who would attempt to manipulate the
court system through the calculated assertion of divergent sworn
positions…” Johnson Service Co. v. Transamerica Insurance
Co., 485 F.2d 164, 174 (5th Cir. 1973); Chrysler Credit Corp. v.
Rebhan, 842 F.2d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 1988);
“The doctrine is designed to prevent parties from making a
mockery of justice by inconsistent pleadings.” American Nat’l
Bank of Jacksonville v. FDIC, 710 F.2d 1528, 1536 (11th Cir.

The case was stayed, there could be no ruling on Motion to Compel without

The Motions to Strike the offensive, perjured filings was ignored by the Court.

first denying the Stay and granting the continuance. 18

D. Hearing Not On Motion Calendar or Scheduled

These defendants attempt to make Plaintiffs at fault for not appearing at a

hearing that was neither on the Motion Calendar, nor shown in “Scheduled Events”

on the Docket. Plaintiffs Petitioned the Court For a Docket Correction a true and

correct copy is attached as “Exhibit 6” on pg.3 Plaintiffs complain that neither the

Docket Report nor the Scheduled Events showed the hearing. 19 After filing the

Petition, several entries were corrected, there still was no scheduled events and the

Motion calendar still showed no hearing. . See the following:

Home Owners Warranty Corp. v. Pinewood Builders, 188 Ga.

App. 324, 326 (373 S.E.2d 34) (1988). “That concurrence states
that the rule requires that the parties and counsel in all cases on the
calendar be present … the Court of Appeals in Fulton v. State of
Ga., 183 Ga. App. 570 (359 S.E.2d 726) (1987), that only the first
five *fn2 cases on the published calendar were required to be
present…we believe to state the better interpretation of USCR

To Plaintiffs’ knowledge, to date there still has been no ruling on the Motion for
Continuance. Of course, there is no guarantee that Plaintiffs would have been
informed as shown by the Superior Court’s actions in that case.
U.S.C.R. Rule 2.4 “…the person who is charged with the responsibility of setting
and scheduling all hearings and trials …a particular judge. Each calendar clerk
carries out those duties under the supervision of the assigned judge,…” See also
Internal Operating Procedures DeKalb County Superior Court Stone Mountain
Judicial Circuit 8.C. Duties of Court Clerk and Calendar Clerk “…The
scheduling of any hearing …shall be the responsibility of the assigned judge’s
calendar clerk, acting under the direction of the assigned judge.”

The case of Brown v. C & S Nat. Bank, 245 Ga. 515 (265 S.E.2d
791) (1980), provides “…this Court held that publishing a trial
calendar with the case name on it but without the attorney's name
on it did not meet the trial court's duty … Id. at 518.”
“This Court has held that notice by publication in the Fulton
County Daily Report is … Spyropoulos v. John Linard Estate, 243
Ga. 518 (255 S.E.2d 40) (1979)...”

Plaintiffs have already addressed this issue, Compl. ¶130, Exhibit 9.

Plaintiffs cannot be at fault for missing a hearing that was neither on the Motion

Calendar, nor showing as “Scheduled Events” on the Docket Report



“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted

by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaun v. United

States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). See also the following:

“(A) motion to dismiss a complaint, including… a civil rights

complaint, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted is subject to a very strict standard.’ Gray v. Cramer, 465
F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1973); [Storm Systems, Inc. v. Kidd, 157 Ga.
App. 527, 528 (3) (278 S.E.2d 109); Wright & Miller Fed. Practice
& Procedure: Civil §1357.] A pro se complaint is not held to
stringent standards of formal pleadings, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed.2d 652 (1972) [Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550
F.2d 926 (1) (4th Cir. 1977)], and the complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.’ Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41,
45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2L. Ed.2d 80 (1957). See also J. Moore, 2A
Moore’s Federal Practice, para. 12.08 at 2265-86 (1972).”

Hughes v. Roth, 371 F. Supp. 740, 741 (D.C. Pa. 1974).

These defendants have attached to their MTD documents purportedly in

support of their MTD and state “While the Court construes…, the Court is

permitted to take judicial notice of documents…, as well as pleadings and orders

issued in other legal proceedings…” (MTD pg. 3 fn2) Just as these defendants did

in Superior Court, by their actions they ask for Summary Judgment, but by their

words attempt to prevent Summary Judgment: “In examining the merits of the

claims, the court must… ‘look only to the facts alleged in the complaint and not

beyond.’” (MTD pg. 5).

“[w]henever a judge considers matters outside the pleadings in a

12(b)(6) motion, that motion is thereby converted into a Rule 56
Summary Judgment motion.” Trustmark Ins. Co. v. ESLU, Inc.,
299 F.3d 1265, 1267 (11th Cir. 2002)

Of course, proceeding as pro se, Plaintiffs are unsure whether or not this

case will be converted and requests this Court to make the determination whether

or not such conversion will take place and inform the parties if conversion is taking

place so that these Plaintiffs can take the appropriate steps for Summary Judgment.


Plaintiffs have shown that GA Power has never had an easement concerning

Plaintiffs’ property, yet continue to claim they do. (MTD pg. 3: “…Georgia Power

possesses a valid easement…”).

A. Under Color Of State Law

It has been held that where as here, the allegations are that these defendants

conspired with Judge Becker, her law clerk and calendar clerk. Judge Becker and

her clerks performed official acts, the acts were the product of a corrupt conspiracy

with these defendants, the acts were performed without consequence were illegal

acts designed to have Plaintiffs’ case dismissed for a fictional discovery dispute.;

which is exactly what happened.

Although these defendants appear to claim that Plaintiffs failed to allege or

link the illegal acts that plagued the Superior Court proceedings, Plaintiffs believe

they showed the link. (Compl. pgs. 8-16) Plaintiffs have attached a true and

correct copy Plaintiffs’ Statements For The Record… as “Exhibit 7”20. Judge

Becker’s having ignored the illegal acts resulted in Defendants’ manipulation of

the Court and it’s process without interference, which resulted in Plaintiffs’

complaint being dismissed. Clearly this shows corruption, conspiracy, and

intentional gross violations of Plaintiffs’ right to due process of law and ultimately

resulted in Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint.

Private parties who corruptly conspire with a judge in connection with such

conduct are thus acting under color of state law within the meaning of §1983.

Plaintiffs attempted to have Judge Becker address the illegal acts numerous

“… ‘under color of’ state law for §1983 purposes does not requite
that the defendant be an officer of the state. It is enough that he is a
willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.
Private persons, jointly engaged with State officials in the
challenged action, are acting “under color” of law for purposes of
§1983 actions.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U/S/ 144, 152
(1970); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)
See also
Sparks v. Sparks, et., al., 101 S. Ct. 183, 449 U.S. 24 (U.S. 1980)
“Title U.S.C. §242, the criminal analog of §1983, also contains a
color-of-state-law requirement and we have interpreted the color-
of-state-law requirement in these sections coextensively. Adickes
v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra, at 152, n. 7. A state judge can be found
criminally liable under §242…See Imbler v. Pachtman, 242 U.S.
409, 429 (1976); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974). In
either case, the judge has acted under color of law.”

These defendants’ MTD pgs. 11-12 show seven of the instances referenced

by Plaintiffs complaint starting with “Superior Court failed …” see the following:

O.C.G.A. § 44-2-77
While the cause is pending before the examiner of titles or at any
time before final decree, the judge, or the examiner with the approval
of the judge, may require the land to be surveyed by some competent
surveyor and may order durable bounds to be set and a plat thereof to
be filed among the papers of the suit. Before such survey is made, all
adjoining landowners shall be given at least five days' notice. The
petitioner or any adjoining owner dissatisfied with the survey may file
a protest with the court within ten days from the time the plat is filed;
and thereupon an issue shall be made up and tried as in case of protest
to the return of land processioners.

“Superior Court…failing to act…fraudulent documents…”

O.C.G.A. § 44-2-43
Any person who: (1) fraudulently obtains or attempts to obtain a
decree of registration of title to any land or interest therein; (2)

knowingly offers in evidence any forged or fraudulent document
in the course of any proceedings with regard to registered lands or any
interest therein; (3) makes or utters any forged instrument of
transfer or instrument of mortgage or any other paper, writing, or
document used in connection with any of the proceedings required
for the registration of lands or the notation of entries upon the
register of titles; (4) steals or fraudulently conceals any owner's
certificate, creditor's certificate, or other certificate of title provided
for under this article; (5) fraudulently alters, changes, or mutilates
any writing, instrument, document, record, registration, or register
provided for under this article; (6) makes any false oath or affidavit
with respect to any matter or thing provided for in this article; or (7)
makes or knowingly uses any counterfeit of any certificate provided
for by this article shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years.
Title 44, Chapter 2, Section 44 (44-2-44)
Any clerk, deputy clerk, special clerk, or other person performing the
duties of the office of clerk who: (1) fraudulently enters a decree of
registration without authority of the court; (2) fraudulently registers
any title; (3) fraudulently makes any notation or entry upon the
title register; (4) fraudulently issues any certificate of title, creditor's
certificate, or other instrument provided for by this article; or (5)
knowingly, intentionally, and fraudulently does any act of omission
or commission under color of his office in relation to the matters
provided for by this article shall be guilty of a felony and shall be
removed from office and be permanently disqualified from holding
any public office and shall be punished by imprisonment for not
less than one nor more than ten years.

B. Deprivation of A Constitutionally Protected Right

These defendants state that Plaintiffs have failed to “articulate the

constitutionally-protected right…”(MTD pg.13).

Pavesich v. New England Life Ins Co., 122 Ga. 190, 197 (50 S.E.
68) (1905) held:
“… that Georgia citizens have a "liberty of privacy" guaranteed by

the Georgia constitutional provision which declares that no person
shall be deprived of liberty except by due process of law”

These defendants also reference Plaintiffs’ claims about the Fourth and Fifth

Amendments (MTD pg.13). The Supreme Court has explained, “[c]ertain wrongs

effect more than a single right and accordingly, can implicate more than one of the

Constitution’s commands.” Solodal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 70 (1992);

Accord James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. at 50-52.

The Supreme Court has held that a seizure of property occurs whenever

“there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in

that property” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).

In James Daniel Good Real Property and Soldal, “the seizure of property

implicates two explicit textual sources of constitutional protection, the Fourth

Amendment and the Fifth.” James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 50

(internal quotation marks omitted); Soldal, 506 U.S. at 70.

O.C.G.A. §44-2-64
The petition and amendments thereto shall be signed and sworn to
by each petitioner, or, in the case of a corporation, by some officer
thereof, …. It shall contain a full description of the land, its
valuation, and its last assessment for county taxation; shall show
when, how, and from whom it was acquired, a description of the
title by which he claims the land, …all known liens, interests, and
claims, adverse or otherwise, vested or contingent. Full names and
addresses, if known, of all persons …including adjoining owners
and occupants,… The description of the land given in the petition
shall be in terms which will identify the same fully and … describe

the same as permanently …If the land is in a portion of the state in
which land is divided into land districts and lot numbers by state
survey, the petition shall state the number of the land district and
the lot number or numbers in which the tract is located. Before
passing a decree upon any petition for registration, the judge, on his
own motion or upon the recommendation of the examiner, may
require a fuller and more adequate description or one tending more
permanently to identify the tract in question to be included in the
petition by amendment; and if, in the discretion of the court, it shall
be necessary, the judge may for that purpose require a survey of the
premises to be made and the boundaries marked by permanent
monuments. The acreage… shall be stated with approximate
accuracy; and where reasonably practicable the court may require
the metes and bounds to be stated.
O.C.G.A. §44-2-67
(a)(1) Upon the petition being filed in the office of the clerk of the
superior court in the county where the land is located, the clerk
shall issue a process directed to the sheriffs … requiring all of the
defendants named … and all other persons "whom it may concern"
to show cause before the court on a named day not less than 40 nor
more than 50 days from the date thereof why the prayers of the
petition should not be granted and why the court should not proceed
to judgment in such cause. The clerk shall make the necessary
copies of the petition and process for service….
O.C.G.A. §44-2-77
While the cause is pending before the examiner of titles or at any
time before final decree, the judge, or the examiner with the
approval of the judge, may require the land to be surveyed by some
competent surveyor and may order durable bounds to be set and a
plat thereof to be filed among the papers of the suit. Before such
survey is made, all adjoining landowners shall be given at least five
days' notice. The petitioner or any adjoining owner dissatisfied with
the survey may file a protest with the court within ten days from the
time the plat is filed; and thereupon an issue shall be made up and
tried as in case of protest to the return of land processioners.
C. Constitutionally-Inadequate Process

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees “an

impartial and disinterested tribunal”. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 466 U.S. 238, 242

(1980); “an absence of actual bias” In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).

“Redress for such a violation is available under 42 U.S.C. §1983 when the

constitutional right is violated under color of state law. A private attorney who

conspires with a state judge is within §1983’s purview.” Casa Marie, Inc. v.

Superior Court, 988 F. 2d 252, 258-89 (1st Cir. 1993).

Ga. Statues are clear on property, the Court’s responsibilities concerning real

property, and the methods by which it is to be “taken”, punishment for falsifying

documents pertaining to real property, the proper challenges and remedies in

property disputes. The facts are clear, Plaintiffs’ property was prior to filing suit in

Superior Court, the Court and attorneys refused to abide by Ga. Statutes which

shows that there was a conspiracy, an agreement was made to have Plaintiffs’

complaint dismissed, the plan was carried out through a fictional discovery dispute,

Plaintiffs’ case was dismissed without a hearing having been scheduled. Looking

at the Ga. Statutes concerning what would have had to take place before GA Power

could have attempted to claim part of Plaintiffs’ property together with the fact that

R. F. Wells never existed, proves there clearly was a conspiracy.


Because Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants “conspired to commit a

Fourth Amendment seizure they have stated a claim for a conspiracy to violate

their constitutional rights”. See e.g., Mendocino Envt’l Ctr. V. Mendocino

County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999).

Further, defendants complain that “requires a showing of some ‘racial, or

perhaps otherwise class-based, …”21 The statement is facially perjury, see

Plaintiffs Verified Complaint pgs. 2,6. Plaintiff Stegeman is 100% Federally

disabled recognized by the State of Georgia as well as The United States under

U.S.C. 42 §12101. Clearly, Plaintiff Stegeman, a disabled adult and he has been

denied meaningful access and meaningful opportunity to be heard, see the


Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 513 (2004)

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
“Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or
Act), 104 Stat. 337, 42 U. S. C. §§12131–12165, provides that “no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public entity, or
be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”’
“The Due Process Clause also requires the States to afford certain
civil litigants a “meaningful opportunity to be heard” …’ Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971); M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U.
S. 102 (1996).
Pg.20: “The unequal treatment of disabled persons in the
administration of judicial services has a long history, and has

Plaintiffs also point out that the Supreme Court has recognized the “class of one”
claim, first expressly recognized by the Supreme Court in Village of Willowbrook
v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).

persisted despite several legislative efforts to remedy the problem
of disability discrimination.”
Pg.21 *fn 20 “Because this case implicates the right of access to
the courts, we need not consider whether Title II’s duty to
accommodate exceeds what the Constitution requires in the class of
cases that implicate only Cleburne’s prohibition on irrational
discrimination. See Garrett, 531 U. S., at 372.”
See also:
U.S. v. Georgia 04-1203 (2006), Goodman v. Georgia 04-1236
(2006) Justice Stevens with Justice Ginsberg concurring: “…
interference with access to the judicial process, and procedural due
process violations…”

Plaintiffs have been unable to find caselaw with exact or similar

circumstances where a disabled adult, has been refused assistance of Georgia’s

legal-aid program to protect their Rights and property, has gone before the Superior

Court as pro se Plaintiff attempting to protect their Rights and property, and where

the defendants and Judge conspired to violate those rights in order to allow the

already performed illegal acts of falsifying and taking or seizure of real property.


“In congressional contemplation, the pendency of state civil

proceedings was to be wholly irrelevant. The very purpose of
§1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and
the people, as guardian of the people’s federal rights (quoting
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 407 U.S. 242 (1972)” see Justice
Brennan dissenting, Pennzoil v. Texaco, Inc. 481 U.S. 1 (1987),
page 481 at 19.

As was the case in Miofsky v. Superior Court of California, 703 F.2d 332,

(9th Cir. 1983), Plaintiffs seek the enforcement of that which The United States

Constitution guarantees them and that which GA Power, Superior Court Judge

Becker along with her Law Clerk and Calendar Clerk, acting under color of state

law threaten to deny them.

There are no grounds for exempting from the broad reach of §1983 actions

taken by persons acting under color of state law in judicial proceedings, whether

they are judges or others acting on behalf of the court, see the following:

“…we know of no ground for exempting from the broad reach of

Sec. 1983 actions taken by persons acting under color of state law
in judicial proceedings, whether those persons are judges or others
appointed by judges to act on behalf of the court.” Miofsky v.
Superior Court of California, 703 F.2d 332, (9th Cir. 1983):
“However, civil rights actions under Sec. 1983 are among the
exceptions … that have been "expressly authorized by Act of
Congress," id. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151,
32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972).”
“Thus, as Mitchum makes clear, Congress has not rendered federal
courts impotent in the face of an infringement of constitutional
rights by the judicial arm of state government. As the Court said in
Mitchum, "[t]he very purpose of Sec. 1983 was to interpose the
federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of
the people's federal rights--to protect the people from
unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that action
be executive, legislative, or judicial.' " 407 U.S. at 242, 92 S.Ct. at
2162 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346, 25 L.Ed. 676
(1879) (emphasis added)).”
“In light of Mitchum, we conclude that district courts have subject
matter jurisdiction over suits brought under Sec. 1983 even when
the state action allegedly violating plaintiff's federally protected
rights takes the form of state court proceedings. 3 Accordingly, we
hold that the district court erred in dismissing Miofsky's claim …”

GA Power has the right to properly condemn real property. In this case the

private property belonging to Plaintiffs was seized and taken by fraudulent means,

without just compensation. Five months after being served with Summons and

complaint, GA Power Amended to add Motion For Reformation of the falsified

easement document without having ever addressed the fact that the document was

a fraud and did not ever pertain to Plaintiffs’ property.


Plaintiffs in the case at bar are claiming “extrinsic fraud” and other “illegal

acts” which prevented them from presenting their claim in court, Rooker-Feldman

does not apply. Plaintiffs are not claiming a legal error by the court, they are

claiming fraud upon the court by the opposing parties.

“Extrinsic fraud is conduct which prevents a party from presenting

his claim in court.” Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir.
See also:
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., No. 02-56781 (9th Cir. 2003) at 2549:
“Similarly, if the ‘inextricably intertwined’ test means that a federal
plaintiff cannot raise issues that are ‘inextricably-intertwined’ with
issues raised in simultaneous ongoing state court litigation,
Rooker-Feldman would prevent the parallel state and federal
litigation that is one of the hallmarks of our federal system. See:
e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970); Green v, City of Tucson, 255
F.3d 1086, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Noel, 341 F.3d at

Much like the claim made by Trust in Weis Builders, Inc. v. Kay S. Brown

Living Trust, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1202, 1204 (D. Colo. 2002) which appealed

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply so as to deprive the district court

of subject matter jurisdiction, and that dismissal should be denied, The appellate

Court went on to explain:

“…Rooker-Feldman does not apply because these state court

orders are separable from and collateral to the federal complaint,
and the federal court is not being asked to sit in appellate review of
either state court ruling. Weis, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1200-02.”
“There are however, significant limitations on the scope of the
doctrine. ‘If the purpose of federal action is separable from and
collateral to a state court judgment, then the claim is not
‘inextricably intertwined’ merely because the action necessitates
some consideration of the merits of the state court judgment.”
Kiowa, 150 F.3d at 1170 (quotation omitted). We have cautioned
that “Supreme Court jurisprudence … compel[s] a narrow reading
of the ‘inextricably intertwined’ test.” Id at 1169.”
“The court in the TBL Action did not order …until after Weis had
filed his complaint in federal court. See Weis, 236 F. Supp. 2d at
1200 (noting that Weis could not be seeking review of the order…
the federal action was filed before the state court ruled).”
“…the state court did not actually decide the issue presented…”

The Plaintiffs in this case do not seek to set aside judgment of Superior

Court based on legal errors by the court; they seek to set aside the judgment based

on extrinsic fraud by the defendants that produced the judgment. Plaintiffs also do

not seek damages based on legal error by the court; they seek damages based on

the wrongful, illegal acts of the defendants.


A. Malicious Abuse of Process

Plaintiffs have shown that what the Defendants attempted to do and have

done concerning real property could not be done either through “Reformation” or

“Declaratory Judgment”; but could only be done using proper process of O.C.G.A.

§§ 44-2-1 through 44-2-77. In fact, without following the procedure, the Superior

Court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ private property. Defendants could not

use the proper procedure due to the “punishments” involved for falsifying real

property documents and or fraudulent land documents.

B. Obstruction

Clearly perjured statements in Verifications, Affidavits and Certifications22 is

willful intent to obstruct justice of the illegal acts shows throughout the Response.

Jowers v. State, 225 Ga. App. 809 (2) (484 SE2d 803) (1997), the
language therein unambiguously prohibits an individual from
making or using any false writing or document, without regard to
the identity of the individual who initially made or subsequently
used the false document. . Because there is no limitation placed on
the prohibited conduct of "making or using" false documents in
OCGA 16-10-20, the statutory language does not support the Court
of Appeals' holding that prosecution for use of a false document is
limited to those situations in which an accused uses false
documents prepared by another. State v. Johnson, supra at 837.

C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiffs believe that the above paragraphs show that:

1) These Defendants’ actions were illegal and intentional 2) that

All sworn

society would find their acts extreme and outrageous; 4) the acts
caused distress 5) the distress was severe especially to a disabled


These Pro Se Plaintiffs believe that they properly plead their complaint, have

properly addressed MTD and MOVE this Honorable Court to DENY Defendants’

MTD. Further, should this Court decide that Plaintiffs failed to properly plead,

Plaintiffs MOVE this Court to be lenient and allow them to Amend their complaint.

Respectfully submitted this 9th day of July, 2008,

By: __________________________
821 Sheppard Rd
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
(770) 879-8737

By: __________________________
821 Sheppard Rd
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
(770) 879-8737

In compliance with LR 7.1D, N.D. Ga., I certify that the foregoing Motion

has been prepared in conformity with LR 5.1, N.D. GA. This Motion was prepared

with Times New Roman (14 point) type, with a top margin of one and one-half

(1.5”) inches and a left margin of one (1”) inch, is proportionately spaced.

This 9th day of July, 2008

821 Sheppard Rd
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
(770) 879-8737

Atlanta Division


FILE NO: 1:08-CV-1971-WSD




I Certify that I have this 9th day of July, 2008, served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Plaintiffs’ Brief In Response To Defendants Georgia Power
Company, Brian P Watt, and Scott A Farrow’s Motion To Dismiss upon
Defendants, through their attorney on file by causing to be deposited with U.S.P.S.,
First Class Mail, proper postage affixed thereto, addressed as follows:
Daniel S. Reinhardt Devon Orland
Troutman Sanders, LLP State of Georgia Dept. of Law
Bank of America Plaza – Suite 5200 40 Capitol Square, S.W.
600 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, GA 30334-1300
Atlanta, GA 30308-2216


821 Sheppard Rd
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
(770) 879-8737