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Equivalent? Part 2

Jason Turner

Spring 2010

Quine claims that, for a certain class of languages, the substitutional and

model-theoretic definitions of logical truth are equivalent: (EQ-R) ||= P iff |= P

Which languages? Ones that have two properties:

(P1) They are "rich enough for elementary number theory" (Philoso-

phy of Logic, p. 53).

(P2) They are first-order. (In particular, completeness and a specific

version of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem hold for them.)

2. How is this result consistent with the arguments of section 3 of the last

post?

assumptions does it depend?

I won’t tackle these in order, though. I’ll start with 2, and then move on to

3. 1 will be covered at the end.

1 Motivation

Before getting into the nitty gritty, it’s worth taking a step back to ask why we

— or Quine — should care, either about EQ-R or the full EQ.

First, consider Etchemendy’s reaction. Since the EQs hold, at best, only for

a restricted class of languages, Etchemendy will be unimpressed. He wants a

perfectly general analysis that, when thrown an arbitrary language, will gener-

ate proper predictions. Since we know a substitutional account generates bad

predictions for at least some languages, by Etchemendy’s lights there’s no use

continuing to go on about it.

Not so for Quine. As a pragmatist, he has little truck with the notion of an

analysis. (If we could analyze logical consequence, we would have an instance

of synonymy, which he famously decries.) The important question for him is,

“What well-behaved definition will suit us best for our purposes?” And if our

purposes keep us well within the limited class of languages for which an EQ

1

result holds, then this tells us that, if the model-theoretic account works for our

purposes, so does the substitutional.

For Quine, though, the result also goes two steps deeper. For one thing,

Quine thinks there are reasons to use the substitutional account when we can

for — unlike the model-theoretic one — we don’t have to deploy sets for the

substitutional account. The objection here isn’t quite the “there are no sets, so

let’s be substitutionalists” one — Quine believed in sets, after all, thinking them

indispensable to science — but rather that we should do as much as we can with

as little as we can get away with, so when we’re not forced to appeal to sets for

any other reasons, we should also avoid appealing to them in our definition of

logical consequence.

Second, and most importantly for Boolos, Quine thinks the EQ results give

an argument for identifying “logic” with first-order logic. (There is, I think, a

real issue as to just what this identification means — both for us and for Quine —

but set that aside.) We choose a logic just as we choose other theories: by seeing

which does best at the various theoretical virtues. Since the EQ result, as well

as completeness, apply only to first-order theories, only if logic is first-order

can we collapse proof-theoretic, model-theoretic, and substitutional accounts of

consequence. Quine sees this as a virtue, and thus grist for his “logic-is-first-

order” mill.

2 Reconciliation

Ok, next: resolving the last post’s puzzle. There, we saw that a counting sen-

tence like

(E2) ∃ x ∃y( x , y)

will count as a substitutional, but not a model-theoretic, truth, and thus threaten

a counterexample to (EQ-R). How is Quine not worried about this? The answer

comes a few pages after his argument, where we learn “Truths of identity the-

ory [such as ∀ x ( x = x )] do not count as logical truths under the contemplated

definitions of logical truth, since they are falsifiable by substituting other pred-

icates for =.” (p. 61). Quine does not think that all substitution schemes take

(E2) to (E2), for — unlike what Etchemendy assumed — he does not reckon the

identity predicate as one of the logical constants.

That answers one side of the problem. But in standard textbook model-

theoretic treatments of first-order logic with identity, ∀ x ( x = x ) does come out

true on all models. If this is not to be a further counterexample, Quine had

better have a not-quite-so textbook model theory. And indeed he does. How his

differs from the textbook depends on just what the textbook says.

In some textbooks, the interpretation function of a model does not assign

an extension to =. Rather, satisfaction-conditions for sentences of the form

α = β are hard-wired into the definitions of truth and satisfaction on a model.

2

In other textbooks, the definitions of truth and satisfaction on a model don’t

treat identity predicates in any special way. But a set h D, I i only counts as a

model if the interpretation function I assigns the set {h x, x i : x ∈ D } to =.

Quine’s model theory differs from the first textbook’s by not having any special

truth-or-satisfaction clause for identity statements, and differs from the second’s

by allowing models to assign different extensions to =. So on Quine’s model

theory, ∀ x ( x = x ) ends up not being a model-theoretic truth either, and the

potential counterexamples are all blocked.

(For those keeping track: this will, clearly, affect Quine’s overall pro-first-

order argument. If he wants to argue that first-order logic is best on the basis

of its collapsing model-theoretic, proof-theoretic, and substitutional accounts of

logical truth, he’ll have to argue that first-order logic without identity is best —

because with identity, first-order logic doesn’t have this property.)

3 The Argument

Here is Quine’s basic argument for EQ-R:

substitution schemes.

models.

(C) Therefore, P is true on all substitution schemes iff P is true on all models.

standard proof technique to prove a biconditional P iff Q by proving a string of

conditionals that start with P, go through Q, and end up back at P again.) But

what of the premises?

Some of this, of course, will depend on what ‘number-theoretic substitution

scheme’ means. But whatever it means, so long as these are a kind of substitu-

tion scheme (and they are!), I is trivial. II and III not so much, though, so we’ll

look at Quine’s arguments for them in detail.

Quine argues for this by appeal to

(COMPLETENESS) If |= P, then ` P

tem). His reasoning is apparently something like the following. Where S is

any (logical-term-preserving) substitution scheme whatsoever:

3

1. Suppose P is satisfied by every model.

4. Thus, S( P) is provable.

5. Therefore, S( P) is true.

The first thing to note is that the move from 4 to 5 relies on the thought that

falsehoods can’t be proven or, equivalently, that first-order deductive systems are

intuitively sound. ’Intuitive soundness’ is a notion that crops up in eg Kreisel’s

squeezing argument.1 The idea here (as Quine puts it, at any rate) is that, among

the proof systems we can pick, there are some where we can tell, by inspection,

that every individual move takes us from truths to truths. (Or from nothing

at all to truths, as happens when e.g. we write down axioms in an axiomatic

system.) Furthermore, we can tell that stringing together series of moves each of

which preserves truth will also preserve truth. So we can tell, just by inspection,

that there will be no proof of a falsehood. So, since there is a proof of S( P) (line

4), it must be true (line 5).

The second thing to note is that this requires also that, if Pr is a proof, then

S( Pr ) (the result of taking the proof and replacing each sentence Q in it with

S( Q)) is also a proof. This is premise 3. Call proof systems with this property

preservational. Notice that not every proof system we might pick is preserva-

tional. Suppose, for instance, that we chose a truth-tree system where only

contradictions between literals (atomic predications or their negations) were al-

lowed to close branches. A proof of ’R( a) ∨ ∼ R( a)’ will be a tree that starts

with ’∼( R( a) ∨ ∼ R( a))’ and ends with ’R( a)’ and ’∼ R( a)’ closing the (only)

branch. Now consider the substitution scheme that takes ‘R( a)’ to ‘F (b) ∧ G ( a)’.

The tree that you get by taking the above and substituting with this scheme

has ‘F (b) ∧ G ( a)’ and ‘∼( F (b) ∧ G ( a))’ closing, which is not a proper proof of

‘( F (b) ∧ G ( a)) ∨ ∼( F (b) ∧ G ( a))’, because it doesn’t have any contradiction be-

tween literals.

1 Peter Smith <http://www.logicmatters.net/resources/pdfs/KreiselSqueezing.pdf> argues

that there is no genuinely “intuitive” notion of validity (and hence, I imagine, no “intuitive”

notion of soundness); to get Kreisel’s argument off the ground, you need rather a semi-technical

notion first, and then the argument can show some fully technical apparatus sufficient to capture

the semi-technical notion you’ve gotten toward. I think all of that can be accepted while still

accepting that any semi-technical notion of soundness you might end up with has this property:

no proof that is semi-technically sound has all true premises and a false conclusion. And

that’s the strength of premise Quine needs for his argument. Or, to put it differently: call a

proof system materially sound iff there is no proof in that system with true premises and a false

conclusion. (Since the languages are supposed to be interpreted here, if the proof system tells us

which (interpreted) sentences count as proving which, this will be automatically well-defined.)

Every place in the rest of the text where I talk about ‘intuitive soundness’ (including the last

section) would work just as well if I appealed to ‘material soundness’ instead.

4

This isn’t a huge problem: there are preservational proof systems. And there

are intuitively sound proof systems, too. In fact, there seem to be proof systems

that are both — standard axiomatized systems seem to have both properties.2

And good thing, too, because the argument for III goes through only if there are

proof systems with both properties. Otherwise, we might have intuitively sound

proofs turning into intuitively unsound ones under substitution (violating the

move from 4 to 5), or instead intuitively sound proofs turning into things that

aren’t even proofs (falsifying 3).

OK, enough of III. It looks secure enough. On to II. Quine’s argument for

it relies on a remarkable theorem, a strengthening of Löwenheim’s theorem

(the finitistic version of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem), a strengthening first

shown by Hilbert and Bernays:

A model is constructible iff its domain is a subset of the natural numbers, and

each of its predicate extensions is given by a formula of simple arithmetic. That

is to say: if F is an n-placed predicate and M a constructible model, then there

is some formula A of simple arithmetic, open in n variables, where h x1 , . . . xn i

is in F’s extension on M iff x1 , . . . xn satisfy A. (Note: F is a predicate of the

object-language here, but A is an arithmetical formula of the metalanguage.)

What does it mean to say that a formula is a formula of simple arithmetic?

I take it that it’s a formula that uses the primitive vocabulary used in Peano

Arithmetic. And a sequence of numbers x1 , . . . xn will satisfy A if A( x1 , . . . xn )

is provable from PA, the axioms of Peano Arithmetic.

The argument for II goes as follows. Call a substitution scheme number-

theoretic iff every predicate and term gets replaced for some formula or term of

simple arithmetic. We first use HB to argue for

scheme S, S( Q) is true.

The very basic idea is that, if F is given an extension E on the model, and if

A is the formula of simple arithmetic where h x1 , . . . xn i ∈ E iff x1 , . . . xn satisfy

A, then we can replace F for A. (Notice what’s happening here: A appears

both in the metalanguage and the object language, so we use the metalanguage

characterization of the model (in terms of A) to cook up an object-language

substitution scheme (using A)). If we do this for all of the predicates and terms

2 They are preservational because whether something counts as a proof is entirely schematic

— it depends entirely on whether lines of the proof fit certain schemas — and since the substi-

tution schemes preserve logical constants, they can’t make a sentence stop matching a schema

when it did before. They certainly seem to be intuitively sound, too, although this is perhaps a

more controversial matter.

5

in Q, we end up with a sentence S( Q) that basically describes the constructible

model we began with, and is true because S( Q) accurately describes that model.

In other words: since Q is true on the model, and S( Q) says, more or less, that

Q is true on the model, S( Q) is flat-out true.

Since HB* is a general principle, it holds even if Q is of the form ∼ P (for any

sentence P):

tion scheme S, S(∼ P) is true.

∼ P is false on every model.

But S(∼ P) = ∼S( P), and ∼S( P) is false if and only if S( P) is true. Likewise,

∼ P will be false on a model iff P is true on that model. So (HBC) becomes:

true on every model.

HB*.

3.3 The Argument for II, part 2: "Rich Enough for Elementary

Number Theory".

Can we substantiate that move? That depends on just what we assumed when

we assumed that our object language was “rich enough for elementary number

theory”.

Here is, I take it, the strongest thing it could mean: our language has symbols

in it that can be correlated with the symbols of elementary number theory (“is

the product of”, “is the sum of”, “is the successor of”, etc.), and those symbols

in fact mean what they need to mean in order for the sentences to really be

about elementary number theory (“6 is the product of 3 and 2” means that 6 is

the product of 3 and 2, and so on), and elementary number theory is true. (So,

for example, no Science Without Numbers-style antirealism for us here.)

For simplicity, we can formulate these three criteria with respect to a formal

elementary arithmetical system, say that of Peano arithmetic, PA. The first cri-

terion says that the language has sufficient syntactic resources to formulate PA.

The second criterion says that, in the formulation in question, the expressions

in fact mean what they are intended to mean in PA. The third says that PA is

true.

If all the foregoing holds, then indeed the move from HB to HB* follows.

We take the satisfiable Q, construct the constructible model for it, and then look

at the mathematical formulae that describe the extensions of the predicates in

6

that model. If S replaces the predicates for the formulas that describe their

extensions, S( Q) will describe the mathematical structure of the model; since

there really is a model and it really has the mathematical features we think it

does, S( Q) will be a true description of an existing entity, and we’re done.

What if one or more of the various criterion fail? Let’s begin with the case

where we can formulate PA (in our object-language), and this formulation is

true, but doesn’t in fact mean number theory — maybe it’s a true theory de-

scribing, say, a set of points of space and their interrelations, which just happen

to satisfy all of the Peano axioms.

Here’s a strategy for arguing to HB* in this case. The original thought was

that S( Q) was true, because it (more or less) truly described how the con-

structible model was, given that there were numbers and the terms in S( Q)

were talking about these numbers. That is: if PA had been talking about num-

bers, then S( Q) would also have been talking about numbers, and furthermore,

S( Q) would have been true.

PA is true, but it’s not talking about numbers; neither is S( Q). Still, we might

think that S( Q) is true, because we might think that it’s saying something about

it’s actual content (points of space, or whatever) that is structurally isomorphic

to what it would have been saying about numbers if it had been talking about

them, and so should be true about whatever its actual content is if that content is

structurally isomorphic to the numbers. But since PA is actually true (and about

that actual content), S( Q)’s content is structurally isomorphic, and so should be

true.

More precisely, we might try to argue as follows: the reason we thought that

S( Q) would have been true had PA been true and had they both been about

numbers is for the simple reason that PA ⇒ S( Q). The fact that these were

‘about numbers’ didn’t enter into it. But, since PA is in fact true, this means

S( Q) is true, too! Problem solved.

There is, of course, a wrinkle: what do we mean by ‘⇒’ here? We can get

around that wrinkle if we say that PA |= S( Q). Since reality is a model of PA

— that’s one upshot of PA’s being true — reality must also be a model of S( Q),

and so it must be true, too.

This talk of ‘reality’ being a model and so on might be thought a bit too

fluffy to hang a lot of weight on. No worries. By appeal to COMPLETENESS

with respect to an intuitively sound proof system, we can argue as follows:

PA |= S( Q), so there is a proof Pr from PA to S( Q). The proof is intuitively

sound, so if PA is true, so is S( Q). But PA is true; thus, so is S( Q).

This shows us that, so long as PA is true, it doesn’t matter if it ‘means’

number theory or something else. But what if PA isn’t even true? Even though

every model of PA is a model of S( Q), we can’t argue to S( Q)’s truth, because

PA isn’t itself true.

We might be tempted to argue like this. Even though PA is false, it is sat-

isfiable — that is, it has a model. Take a model of PA — call it M — and then

for each predicate F of PA, get an open formula A of our object language that a

7

sequence satisfies if and only if it is in the extension of F on M. Cook up a sub-

stitution scheme, T, from this; then T ( PA) will be true, and (since PA ⇒ S( Q)),

T (S( Q)) will be true, too. So, even in this case, Q will have a true substitution

instance — the one we get by the substitution scheme T (S(_)).

But this won’t work, for it presumes precisely what it’s trying to prove: that

the existence of a model provides the existence of a true-making substitution

scheme. Even if PA has a model, our object language might lack the resources

to describe that model. This is precisely what would happen if, say, every single

predicate used in formulating PA were empty, and the language had no other

predicates. And it’s exactly the kind of thing Quine’s argument is meant to

assure us won’t happen if the language is “rich enough for simple arithmetic”.

So, in the case where PA is just false, we cannot give a general argument that

there is a substitution scheme under which Q is true. But what if PA is false but,

as it happens to turn out, there is a substitution scheme T under which T ( PA)

is true? Can we then argue to the truth of T (S( Q))?

Yes. As before, we do it through the proof theory. Recall from above that

PA |= S( Q), and that by COMPLETENESS, this means there is a proof Pr from

PA to S( Q). Suppose as before that Pr is a proof of an intuitively sound system,

and suppose (as we did not need to in the case where PA was true) that this

proof system is also preservational. Then T ( Pr ) counts as a proof from T ( PA)

to T (S( Q)), and since the system is intuitively sound and T ( PA) true, T (S( Q))

must also be true. But as we noted above, T (S(_)) itself counts as a substitution

scheme, so there is once again a substitution scheme that makes Q true, and

HB* follows.

Can we say anything about the case where the language doesn’t even have

the syntactic resources to formalize PA? We might think this case hopeless.

But, in fact, it’s not. Suppose our object-language L does not have the syntactic

resources to formulate PA, but suppose a certain extension of this language, L+,

does. Suppose also that there is a substitution scheme T on L+ that takes PA

to T ( PA), where the axioms of T ( PA) count not just as sentences of L+, but

also as sentences of L, and where T ( PA) is true. Then S( Q) will be a sentence

of L+, T (S( Q)) a sentence of L (because T takes all the arithmetical formulae

into something that L has), and the arguments from above show that T (S( Q)) is

true. So there is a substitution schema in L — namely, the one we get by pasting

T and S together in this way — that makes Q true.

Of course, we produced T (S(_)) by appeal to a bigger language, L+. But once

we’ve cooked it up, the scheme itself doesn’t have to appeal to L+ in any direct

way: T (S(_)) takes simple expressions of L to complex expressions of L in a way

that gets the same results as a two-part process that takes simple expressions

of L to complex expressions of L+, and then takes those complex expressions

(by way of T) to other complex expressions of L. But just because we can get to

T (S( Q)) from Q by way of the language L+ doesn’t mean we have to.

The foregoing gives us a fairly definite meaning for a language’s being “rich

enough for elementary number theory”. Say that a language L has a true sub-

8

stitution instance of PA iff there is some extension L+ of L that has the syntactic

resources to formulate PA and there is a substitution scheme T where T ( PA) is

true and contained entirely in L. Then we have Quine’s conclusion: EQ-R holds

in every language that has a true substitution instance of PA. Since L+ can (but

doesn’t have to) just be L, this includes cases where the language already has

the syntactic resources to formulate PA. And since T can just be the identity

scheme (where each simple expression gets mapped to itself), this includes lan-

guages with formulations of PA that are just true. If there is no such substitution

scheme, identity or not though, then there is no guarantee that the language can

make all the distinctions needed for HB* to be true of it, and so no argument

for EQ-R to be had.

NB: At some point in the last section — specifically, when I start talking

about the case where PA is true but doesn’t mean arithmetic — I make the

assumption (more or less) that PA ⇒ S( P). But this is very non-obvious.

Gödel’s result shows us that there will be arithmetical truths that are not

provable from PA; why think S( P) isn’t one of these?

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