DARIO ELEIZEGUI, ET AL., vs.
THE MANILA LAWN TENNIS CLUB, \  When the term has not been fixed for the lease, it is
May 19, 1903 G.R. No. 967
FACTS:
Lessor: Eleizegui
Lessee: Manila Lawn Tennis Club
1. This suit concerns the lease of a piece of land for a fixed
consideration and to endure at the will of the lessee.
2. By the contract of lease the lessee is expressly authorized to
make improvements upon the land, by erecting buildings of
both permanent and temporary character, by making fills,
laying pipes, and making such other improvements as might be
considered desirable for the comfort and amusement of the
members.
3. The rental is fixed at 25 pesos a month. . . . The owners bind
themselves to maintain the club as tenant. . . . Upon the
foregoing conditions they make the present contract of lease. .
4. Term of the lease (happens to be the issue). In its decision three
theories have been presented:
a. One which makes the duration depend upon the will of the
lessor, who, upon one month's notice given to the lessee,
may terminate the lease so stipulated;
b. Makes it dependent upon the will of the lessee, as
stipulated;
c. In accordance with which the right is reversed to the courts
to fix the duration of the term.
5. The first theory is that which has prevailed in the judgment
below
 "The court is of the opinion that the contract of lease was
terminated by the notice given by the plaintiff on August
28 of last year . . . ."
understood to be for years when an annual rental has been
fixed, for months when the rent is monthly. . . ."
 The second clause of the contract provides as follows: "The
rent of the said land is fixed at 25 pesos per month."
6. Here the relief wanted by the complainant is restitution of the
land to the plaintiffs but nevertheless the action which is
maintained can be no other than that of desahucio (meaning
eviction)
7. The lessor may judicially dispossess the lessee upon the
expiration of the conventional term or of the legal term;
a. the conventional term — that is, the one agreed upon by
the parties;
b. the legal term, in defect of the conventional, fixed for leases
by articles 1577 and 1581.
8. Related to the case are the following provisions of the lease
contract
a. "First. . . . They lease the above-described land to Mr.
Williamson, who takes it on lease, . . . for all the time the
members of the said club may desire to use it . . .
b. Third. . . . the owners of the land undertake to maintain the
club as tenant as long as the latter shall see fit, without
altering in the slightest degree the conditions of this
contract, even though the estate be sold."
9. If there was an agreed duration, a conventional term, then the
legal term — the term fixed in article 1581 — has no application
ISSUE: Was there, or was there not, a conventional term, a
duration, agreed upon in the contract in question? CONVENTIONAL
TERM
HELD:
 Without these clauses 1 and 3, the contract would contain no
stipulation with respect to the duration of the lease, and then
 article 1581, in connection with article 1569, would necessarily
be applicable.
 In view of these clauses, however, it can NOT be said that
there is no stipulation with respect to the duration of the
lease, or that, notwithstanding these clauses, article 1581, in
connection with article 1569, can be applied
 It having been demonstrated that the legal term can not be
applied, there being a conventional term, this destroys the
assumption that the contract of lease was wholly terminated
by the notice given by the plaintiffs, this notice being necessary
only when it becomes necessary to have recourse to the legal
term.
 It is evident that they had no intention of stipulating that they
reserved the right to give such notice.
 Clause 3 begins as follows: "Mr. Williamson, or whoever
may succeed him as secretary of said club, may terminate
this lease whenever desired without other formality than
that of giving a month's notice. The owners of the land
undertake to maintain the club as tenant as long as the
latter shall see fit."
 The right of the one and the obligation of the others being
thus placed in antithesis, there is something more, much
more, than the inclusio unius, exclusio alterius (The
inclusion of one is the exclusion of another).
 It is evident that the lessors did not intend to reserve to
themselves the right to rescind that which they expressly
conferred upon the lessee by establishing it exclusively in
favor of the latter.
 It would be the greatest absurdity to conclude that in a
contract by which the lessor has left the termination of the
lease to the will of the lessee, such a lease can or should be
terminated at the will of the lessor.
 There can be no other mode of terminating the lease than by
the will of the lessee, as stipulated in this case.
 Perpetual Lease  this defense is not applicable in this case
 It is not to be understood that we admit that the lease entered
into was stipulated as a life tenancy, and still less as a
perpetual lease. The terms of the contract express nothing to
this effect.
 The lease in question does not fall within any of the cases in
which the rights and obligations arising from a contract can
not be transmitted to heirs, either by its nature, by agreement,
or by provision of law.
 It was repeatedly stated in the document that it was a lease,
and nothing but a lease
So what action should be done?
 The only action which can be maintained under the terms of the
contract is that by which it is sought to obtain from the judge
the determination of this period, and not the unlawful
detainer action which has been brought — an action which
presupposes the expiration of the term and makes it the duty of
the judge to simply decree an eviction.
 To maintain the latter action it is sufficient to show the
expiration of the term of the contract, whether conventional or
legal; in order to decree the relief to be granted in the former
action it is necessary for the judge to look into the character and
conditions of the mutual undertakings with a view to supplying
the lacking element of a time at which the lease is to expire
SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT: The judgment is reversed and the
case will be remanded to the court below with directions to enter a
judgment of dismissal of the action in favor of the defendant, the
Manila Lawn Tennis Club.
Notes:
Usufruct as defined in this case
  Usufruct is a right of superior degree to that which arises
from a lease.
 It is a real right and includes all the jus utendi and jus
fruendi.
 Nevertheless, the utmost period for which a usufruct can
endure, if constituted in favor a natural person, is the
lifetime of the usufructuary (art. 513, sec. 1); and if in favor
of juridical person, it can not be created for more than
thirty years.
Emphyteusis: a long-term lease of land or buildings; 99 years or
such similar long term, or even in perpetuity.
Monseratt vs Ceron
Facts:
 Monseratt was the president and manager or Manila Yellow
Taxicab Co. Inc. and the owner of , 1200 common shares of
stocks thereof.
 Ceron extended a financial aid to him and as payment
Monseratt assigned the usufruct of half of the aforesaid
common shares of stocks with a corresponding certificate.
 The assignment or transfer only gave Ceron the right to
enjoy, during his lifetime, the profits which might be
derived from the assigned shares.
 Ceron was prohibited from selling, mortgaging,
encumbering or alienating the said shares of stocks. Said
prohibition was not annotated in the document or title.
 Ceron mortgaged to Matute some shares of stocks of the
Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. including the shares of stocks in
question.
 When Ceron mortgaged the said stocks, he did not inform
Matute that he is prohibited from selling or mortgaging it.
Issue:
 Was the mortgage valid?
Holding:
 Yes, the Corporation Law provides that it does not require
any entry of transfers of shares of stocks in order that such
transfer may be valid against third person.
 Transfer- any act by which the property of one person is
vested in another.
 Transfer of shares- implies any means whereby one may be
divested of and another acquires of ownership.
 A chattel mortgage accompanied by delivery of the
mortgaged thing, transfers the title and ownership but it is
not absolute since it is a mere security of payment.
 Matute was a purchaser in good faith since when Ceron
mortgaged the said shares of stocks to him her did not
inform the former about its status.
NATIVIDAD vs. DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. L-15267 March 27, 1961
In case of death of the land-holder, his heir or heirs shall likewise
assume his usufructuary rights and obligations.
By Pauline
FACTS: respect to the property ownership of which had been transferred to
Manubag. Manubag is naturally responsible for such obligations, as
 February 26, 1958- Domingo Natividad filed a petition these fall upon the assignee or transferee of the land, not upon the
against Rosendo Cabal and Clodualda C. Manubag, father
other heirs who do not have any claim to such land. Hence, the
and daughter respectively, for damages resulting from the
unlawful and illegal ejectment of the petitioner court erred in dismissing the case, instead of allowing it to proceed
 March 4, 1958- Cabal and Manubag filed an answer alleging against the transferee and owner of the land subject of the tenancy
that the land over which Natividad was a tenant, which was contract, Manubag.
originally owned by Rosendo Cabal, was subsequently
donated by Cabal to his co-respondent Clodualda C.
Manubag, Cabal retaining for himself the use and
enjoyment of the same during his lifetime.
 Cabal died; hence, Natividad moved for a dismissal of the
case against Cabal and for it to proceed against Manubag
only.
 Manubag’s counsel moved for a dismissal of the case.
Natividad amended his petition, making it only against
Manubag. The court dismissed the case.

ISSUE: was the dismissal of the case proper?

HELD: NO. At the time the owner-tenant relationship existed

between Cabal and Natividad, the bare ownership to the land had
already been conveyed by Cabal to his daughter Clodualda C.
Manubag, such that the latter was made party-defendant in the
original petition of Natividad, and the fact of her bare ownership
over the property, with Cabal as the usufructuary, was alleged in the
answer to the petition. Therefore, whatever obligations the
deceased usufructuary, Cabal, had contracted in relation to the
land, such obligations were transmitted to the bare owner of the
land, namely, Manubag. The obligations sought to be enforced in
the case at bar are presumably obligations in favor of the tenant in