Helicopters and Small Wars: Airpower’s most

important asset in irregular warfare?

Word Count: 9,995

Contents
 Introduction

Chapter 1: Indirect Action: The Helicopter as a Force-Multiplier

Chapter 2: Direct Action: Taking the Fight to the Insurgents

Chapter 3: Trials and Tribulations: Disadvantages of the Helicopter and Possible Solutions

Past, Present & Future: Conclusions

Introduction
 ‘If there is one attitude more dangerous than to assume that a future war will be just like the last
one, it is to assume that it will be so utterly different that we can ignore all of the lessons of the last
one.’1 – Royal Air Force Marshal Sir John Slessor

Airpower is still a relatively new concept by which countries apply force. From rickety and laughable
to complex and indispensible, it has evolved at a truly remarkable rate, and continues to do so. It is
defined as: ‘The ability to project military force in air or space by or from a platform or missile
operating above the surface of the earth. Air platforms are defined as any aircraft, helicopter or
unmanned air vehicle.’2

Of these air platforms, helicopters are perhaps the most peculiar. James Chiles eloquently muses:

‘Of all birds, winged mammals, and insects, very few have mastered the skill of pausing in midair
and going backward as well as forward, so anything capable of such flight is, ipso facto, a rare
beast. The ruby-throated hummingbird, which can hover with sewing-machine-like precision and
also fly more than 500 miles across the Gulf of Mexico without a rest, is one such improbability.
Helicopters are another unlikelihood.’ 3

Indeed, it is the unique versatility of the helicopter which gives it so much value. The ability to take-
off and land vertically, to hover in mid-air and even to move backwards or sideways if necessary
meant that rotary-wing aircraft were always destined to radically change aviation, airpower, and
accordingly the world. The first ‘wave’ of helicopters (1907-1912) 4 could only hop briefly into the air
and it was not until 1942 that the Luftwaffe’s Focke-Achgelis Fa.223 became the first military
helicopter to be ordered into production. 5 However, allied offensive actions limited production and
there is no recorded use of these helicopters performing frontline duties. The first recorded actual
use of a helicopter in war was in 1944, in medical evacuations from Burma by the First Air
Commando Group flying a Sikorsky R-4 Hoverfly. 6 7 It was not until after the Second World War that
helicopters were used in any great numbers, with the French war in Algeria (1954-1962) being the
first war in which helicopters could be truly said to have been used en masse.

To describe the conflicts covered in this dissertation, I have used the terms ‘Small Wars,’ ‘Irregular
warfare,’ and ‘Counterinsurgency’ (COIN). The term ‘Small Wars’ first came into use in the late
nineteenth century to describe any conflict against nonregular forces such as guerrillas, bandits,
1
John Slessor quoted in Arthur Davis: Back to Basics: An Aviation Solution to Counterinsurgent Warfare, Air
Command and Staff College Wright Flyer Paper no.23 (Air University Press, 2005) available online:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Wright_Flyers/Text/wf23.pdf accessed 01/04/09
2
Peach S.W. (Gp Capt): British Air Power Doctrine (Third Edition), (Ministry of Defence, 1999) AP3000 1.2.1
3
James Chiles: The God Machine: From Boomerangs to Black Hawks: The Story of the Helicopter, (Bantam
Books, 2007), p.11
4
Chiles identifies ‘four great waves of helicopter progress’: 1907-1912; early 1920s; late 1930s; the 1950s. Ibid,
p.53
5
David Wragg: Helicopters At War – A Pictorial History (Robert Hale 1983) p.20
6
James Chiles: The God Machine: From Boomerangs to Black Hawks: The Story Of The Helicopter (Bantam
Books 2007) p.113
7
Robert Dorr: Chopper: A History of American Military Helicopter Operations, From WWII to The War On
Terror, (Berkley Books, 2005), p.1-17
rebellious tribes, or insurgents of various stripes. 8 The term soon came to mean any conflict waged
against a nonstate entity by regular military forces. In the post-World War II era, the term ‘small
wars’ was replaced by ‘counterinsurgency’ which has remained in vogue more so than other terms
with similar definitions such as ‘low-intensity conflict’ and ‘military operations other than war.’ 9 All
the conflicts mentioned in this dissertation also come under the umbrella term ‘irregular warfare’ –
meaning a style of warfare which differs in its methods from the ‘traditional’ pitch-battle format.

The ongoing insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq in particular have renewed interest in the subject.
Indeed, the complex nature of such conflicts demands much careful attention. Worryingly, research
carried out by Ivan Arreguín-Toft indicates that ‘strong actors have been losing asymmetric conflicts
more and more over time.’10

Figure 1: Percentage of conflict victories by type of actor over time11

88.2
90 79.2
80 65.1
70
60 48.8 51.2
50 34.9
40
30 20.5
11.8
20
10
0
1800-49 n=34 1850-99 n=78 1900-49 n=43 1950-99 n=43

Strong Actors Insurgent/Guerrilla Actors

This is a disturbing trend. It suggests that lessons from COIN operations are not being learnt.
However, the effective use of airpower could be part of the answer to this problem. Indeed, it is the
flexibility afforded by airpower that provides a modern state’s asymmetric advantage in irregular
conflict. Helicopters are now a central aspect of this asymmetric advantage, providing a third
dimension to what is understood as mobility 12 and, as a development from this, manoeuvre 13.

While it is true to say that modern insurgencies are invariably more complex than the predominantly
Maoist struggles for national independence seen in the post-war period, there are enough constants
8
The first major theoretical work on this subject, and still a classic in the field, is Col. C.E. Callwell: Small Wars:
Their Principles and Practice, (University of Nebraska Press, 1996; reprint, originally published 1896), p.21-22
9
See Corum J & Johnson W., Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (University Press of
Kansas 2003) p.6-7
10
Ivan Arreguín-Toft: How The Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, (Cambridge University Press,
2005), p.4
11
Ibid.
12
Mobility is the ability to move personnel and materiel around the battlespace.
13
Manoeuvre is the ability to deliver combat power to shape the battlespace and influence the enemy’s action.
to make a comprehensive analysis viable. In COIN warfare both sides seek to maintain the freedom
to operate whilst denying the opposition the same luxury. In its crudest form, this can be reduced to
an attempt to control territory. Throughout the history of such conflicts, this has become
characterised by the regular forces mounting patrols and convoys from protected fortresses and
compounds. Insurgents and guerrillas will seek to force the capitulation of the regular forces through
ambushes, sabotage and assassination. In a game of cat and mouse, the COIN forces seek to deter
the guerrillas from operating, and to catch and eliminate those that do. The guerrilla forces will seek
to avoid the COIN forces unless they are in a position to ambush and win an engagement with the
COIN forces.

The operation of COIN forces from fixed bases linked by a fixed network of roads may become a
weakness. Insurgents and local sympathisers may observe such facilities covertly and gather
intelligence on the schedules and routes of patrols and convoys. With this intelligence the insurgents
can time their operations to avoid the COIN forces or plan ambushes to engage them, depending on
their own tactical situation.

Helicopters return a measure of surprise and tactical flexibility to the COIN commander. Patrols need
not start and end in the same place, nor do supply convoys need follow the same roads and
highways. Helicopters can then supply and maintain patrols in the field, evacuating injured troops
and/or civilians if necessary. Attack helicopters can also provide Close Air Support (CAS) for engaged
troops.

This dissertation covers new ground by specifically focusing on the utility of helicopters in irregular
warfare. As Britain and her allies continue to use helicopters as an ever-more central component of
COIN airpower this dissertation seeks to identify the lessons of using helicopters in irregular warfare
and asks; in what roles is the helicopter effective in COIN operations? Where and when has it failed?
What lessons can be deduced and have these lessons been learnt? Is the helicopter airpower’s most
important asset in irregular warfare?

Indirect Action: The Helicopter as a Force-Multiplier

In Corum and Johnson’s book Airpower in Small Wars one of their conclusions is that ‘The support
role of airpower (eg., reconnaissance, transport, and so on) is usually the most important and
effective mission in a guerrilla war.’ 14 Indeed the nature of COIN campaigns often means that there
are few (if any) strategic assets and infrastructure that can be targeted by traditional airpower roles
14
Corum J & Johnson W., Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (University Press of
Kansas 2003) p.427
such as air interdiction and strategic bombing. U.S. Air Force General Weyland made a prophetic
statement to this effect when he said: ‘I feel rather strongly that the most likely conflict in the
immediate future will be the peripheral type. In this event it will be primarily a tactical war.’ 15 The
indirect and tactical-level application of airpower has a force-multiplier effect, and is a role in which
the helicopter excels. For the helicopter component of a COIN force ‘Indirect Action’ includes troop
mobility and supply, Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR) and CASualty EVACuation (CASEVAC),
Command and Control, reconnaissance and various Special Operations.

The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) was the first COIN campaign to feature the helicopter. Its use
as part of the air transport fleet would set an enduring template for future COIN operations. In
Malaya the air transport fleet conducted: supply drops, troop transportation, casualty evacuation,
parachute drops, communications, psychological warfare and crop spraying. All of which were
deemed, to varying degrees, to be a success. 16 However, it was the airborne insertion of troops and
aerial resupply that were universally described as the most effective use of airpower. In particular, it
was the introduction of the helicopter that incrementally improved the way the campaign was
conducted. Helicopters were an instant success and according to one senior officer, ‘almost
revolutionized the jungle war’ giving the ground forces flexibility at a time when a stalemate seemed
likely.17 Later in the campaign the use of the helicopter was acclaimed as responsible for the
systematic elimination of the guerrillas. 18

Helicopters vertical landing and takeoff capability was ideally suited to the jungle environment of
Malaya, vastly enhancing the mobility, flexibility, range and endurance of ground forces. They played
a central role in the establishment and maintenance of jungle forts which were ‘entirely dependent
upon air support.’19 From these forts offensive operations against the insurgents could be launched
and ‘trade, health services and proper administration were brought to the aborigines’ thereby
ensuring they did not succumb to insurgent advances. 20 Parallels can be drawn with the
establishment of ‘platoon houses’ in small Afghan towns (from 2006) such as Sangin, Musa Qala and
Now Zad, which are reliant on the Chinook helicopter fleet for re-supply. 21

However, resolutely occupying such positions generates a number of risks. Firstly aerial re-supply
may be insufficient to prevent the position from being over-run, the classic example being the
French at Dien Bein Phu.22 More importantly, because the aim of counter-insurgency is to provide
security for the population, ‘installing garrisons to protect the population’ 23 is valid, but only if such a
tactic does not afford insurgents the opportunity to carry out (repeated) attacks which endanger the
15
Wendt D: Using a Sledgehammer to Kill a Gnat – The Air Forces failure to comprehend Insurgent Doctrine
during Operation Rolling Thunder, in Air Power Journal, (Summer 1990), p.52-64
16
Malcolm Postgate: Operation Firedog: Air Support in the Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, (HMSO, 1992),
p.150-152
17
Corum J & Johnson W., Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (University Press of
Kansas 2003) p.195
18
Malcolm Postgate: Operation Firedog: Air Support in the Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, (HMSO, 1992),
p.150
19
Group Captain K.R.C. Slater: Air Operations in Malaya, in Journal of the Royal United Services Institute,
(August 1957), p.382
20
Jay Simpson: Not by Bombs Alone: Lessons from Malaya, in Joint Forces Quarterly, (Summer 1999), p.96
21
Tim Ripley: Tacklin’ the Taliban, in Air Forces Monthly, (December 2006), p.29-30
22
Corum J & Johnson W., Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (University Press of
Kansas 2003) p.232
23
David Galula: Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practise, (Praeger / Pall Mall Press, 1964), p.87
local populace. This is likely to cause the local populace to withdraw their support from the
counterinsurgents even if they are not the aggressors. Coalition forces have experienced just this
phenomenon in Iraq and Afghanistan. 24

The other primary role of the helicopters in Malaya was CASualty EVACuation (CASEVAC). 25 This and
the similar Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR) 26 role would also become enduring functions of the
helicopter. Igor Sikorsky once said: ‘If you are in trouble anywhere in the world, an airplane can fly
over and drop flowers, but a helicopter can land and save your life.’ 27 Indeed, the helicopter is ideal
for CASEVAC and CSAR missions because it can hover in order to winch up casualties or stranded
troops/airmen, or if necessary, land almost anywhere big enough to accommodate its rotor blades.
In Vietnam some daring pilots would even cut ‘hover holes’ in the foliage using the rotor blades. 28
Once it has picked up the wounded/stranded a helicopter can then transit rapidly and smoothly back
to base or to a medical facility as appropriate. These characteristics of the helicopter dramatically
increased the survivability of severe battlefield wounds. David Wragg elucidates:

‘Obviously the wounds and injuries requiring the most careful handling and least suited to rides in
a bumpy jeep or field ambulance were the head and stomach wounds...before the arrival of the
helicopter, between 80 and 90 per cent of soldiers with such wounds died, but fast and relatively
smooth helicopter transit to hospital reduced this appalling figure to 10 per cent.’ 29

The use of helicopters for these roles was a particularly important development in COIN warfare, as
the liquidity of the battlefield and the absence of any defined front lines mean that injured troops
can often find themselves many miles from assistance. During the Malayan Emergency CASEVAC
missions ‘assumed great importance.’30 Troops on the ground had previously operated on the
assumption that any injury would probably have to be dealt with in the field because of the
inaccessible nature of the terrain. Helicopters freed troops from the necessity to abandon patrols to
evacuate casualties and allowed them to remain in the jungle and maintain pressure on the
insurgents.31 Furthermore, it provided an ‘immense fillip to the morale of the security forces who
were operating in deep jungle areas.’32

Both the primary effect of allowing the COIN forces to maintain pressure on the insurgents and the
desirable secondary effect of increasing morale of COIN forces is a constant theme. For example:

‘...the UH-60 Blackhawk, a superb machine for transporting men and supplies, is proving to be the
most important single weapon of the war in Colombia. Since their arrival from the United States,

24
Warren Chin: Examining the Application of British Counter-insurgency Doctrine by the American Army in Iraq,
in Small Wars and Insurgencies, (Vol.18, No.1, March 2007), p.16
25
CASEVAC can be defined as ‘emergency patient evacuation of injured or ill people from a combat zone.’
26
CSAR can be defined as ‘operations to retrieve, rescue and provide assistance to personnel in the face of a
threat of enemy interference.’
27
Igor Sikorsky quoted in Francis McGuire: Helicopters 1948-1998 – A Contemporary History, (Helicopter
Association International 1998) p.10
28
James Chiles: The God Machine: From Boomerangs to Black Hawks: The Story of the Helicopter, (Bantam
Books, 2007), p.172
29
David Wragg: Helicopters at War: A Pictorial History, (Robert Hale, 1983), p.67
30
Malcolm Postgate: Operation Firedog: Air Support in the Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, (HMSO, 1992),
p.151
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
 the Blackhawks have enabled the Colombian army to react quickly to guerrilla raids and have
allowed government forces to take the offensive in 2002.’ 33

The enduring beneficial effects on morale can also be easily exemplified by the Aden Emergency 34
(1963-67) and the Dhofar Rebellion (1962-75) where it was considered that ‘the knowledge that
anyone who was hurt would be flown to Salalah for expert surgery and resuscitation, usually within
half an hour of being hit, must have been a factor in the bravery shown by so many people.’ 35 In
short the importance of CASEVAC should not be underestimated in maintaining the morale of
ground troops. Its importance continues to be recognised today; the award of a Distinguished Flying
Cross to Flight Lieutenant Goodman following her actions in evacuating an injured soldier under fire
in Basra in 200736 underscores this view.

Medical aid via helicopter can also form an important component of a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign.
Doctors and nurses can be flown in to remote villages, or very ill patients can be flown out to a
central hospital. This is done to win the support of the local populace, which is the centre of gravity
in any counter-insurgency campaign. One example of where this was done to great effect was
during the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation (1962-1966), where helicopters helped provide
supplies and medical assistance to Malay villages and as a result; ‘At no time did the Indonesian
terrorists find widespread support amongst the Malay villages.’ 37

On the other hand, the evolution of CSAR has been driven primarily by the need to recover downed
pilots and Special Forces, who are, after all, a scare resource – difficult, costly and slow to replace.
Equally, the need to recover them has been driven by the need to avoid having them fall into enemy
hands. ‘Vietnam, in particular, showed all too clearly the ways in which downed pilots and aircrew
could be used by the enemy for propaganda purposes (and indeed for extracting valuable
intelligence).’38 In COIN warfare insurgents see propaganda value in anyone that can be associated
with the COIN forces, even civilians, Kenneth Bigley being one particularly harrowing example. 39 Thus
CSAR has become another crucial capability of COIN forces in which helicopters are of fundamental
importance. Perhaps the most dramatic example of a successful CSAR operation in recent times was
Operation Barras during the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002), during which six British captives
were rescued from the clutches of the notorious irregular rebel group the ‘West Side Boys’. 40

It is interesting to note that most successful insurgencies in history have had outside support from
organizations or even governments in neighbouring countries. One COIN strategy that can therefore
have a significant operational impact is the physical separation of insurgents from outside support.
The first operation of this kind in which helicopters were involved was the building of fortified
33
Corum J & Johnson W., Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (University Press of
Kansas 2003) p.427
34
David Lee: Flight from the Middle East: A History of the Royal Air Force in the Arabian Peninsula and Adjacent
Territories, 1945-1972, (HMSO, 1981), p.207
35
John Akehurst: We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman 1965-1975, (Michael Russell Publishing, 1982), p.37
36
Ministry of Defence, Merlin Pilot is First Woman to Receive Top Flying Honour, [online]
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/HistoryAndHonour/MerlinPilotIsFirstWomanToReceiveTo
pFlyingHonour.htm accessed 30/3/09
37
David Wragg: Helicopters at War: A Pictorial History, (Robert Hale, 1983), p.115
38
Jon Lake: Behind Enemy Lines in Air Forces Monthly, (May 2008), p.52
39
The Mail Online: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-432977/The-sick-propaganda-video.html
accessed 18/4/09
40
See William Fowler: Operation Barras: The SAS rescue mission, Sierra Leone 2000, (Weidenfeld Military 2004)
border line barriers to sever insurgent supply lines during the Algerian War (1954-1962). 41 These
barriers were exceedingly effective:

‘Cut off from their sources of supply, the hard-pressed rebel forces inside Algeria...were forced to
split up into platoon and even squad sized units...and reduce the scale and tempo of their
operations...The inability of the ALN [Armée de Libération Nationale] leaders to evade either the
French interdiction of logistical movements across the barrages or the mopping-up operations
inside Algeria led directly to what can only be considered a French military victory over the
ALN.’42

French troops stationed at key intervals along the border defences received the priority of helicopter
support so they could react quickly to counter any attempt of the ALN to rush through the barrier
lines.43 Such tactics were also used during the Dhofar Campaign (1965-1975) where it was only the
lift afforded by helicopters that allowed the Hornbeam line to be constructed and the piquet points
on it to be re-supplied; this fence of barbed wire and mines intersected and disrupted the
insurgents’ supply lines from South Yemen 44 and significantly reduced the PFLOAG’s (Popular Front
for the Liberation of Oman and the Persian Gulf) capacity to fight. However, such barriers are not
always possible to build. In Vietnam, for example, the nature of the terrain combined with the sheer
length of its borders precluded any such strategy. As a consequence, the range of routes running
down the eastern border of ‘neutral’ Laos, collectively known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, effectively
supplied the Viet Cong (VC) and irregular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units operating in the
South, despite the best efforts of the USAF to bomb the trail out of existence.

Helicopters are also useful in command and control and reconnaissance roles. In the urban
environment of the Aden Colony helicopters were used in a visual reconnaissance role just as they
were later in Northern Ireland; in both cases they provided an over-watch capability, circumscribing
guerrilla actions. One Irish guerrilla leader complained: ‘It is increasingly difficult to operate with
impunity. In Belfast there are three helicopters in the air in touch with plain clothes units on the
streets.’45 Such reconnaissance capabilities continue to be important in the contemporary
environment. For instance, helicopters are used to provide visual reconnaissance and sniper cover in
Basra and other urban locations. 46 Such assets offer greater flexibility than Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs), providing a wider field of view and the opportunity for airborne command and control to be
effected as well as imagery to be generated.

The counter-insurgency campaigns of the last 60 years have also seen the helicopter perform some
unorthodox duties including chemical and psychological warfare operations. In Malaya, helicopters

41
Philip Towle: Pilots and Rebels: The Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare 1918-1988, (Brassey’s, 1989),
p.120
42
Charles Shrader: The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria, 1954-1962, (Praeger, 1999),
p.199
43
Corum J & Johnson W., Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (University Press of
Kansas 2003) p.171
44
Philip Towle: Pilots and Rebels: The Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare 1918-1988, (Brassey’s, 1989),
p.153
45
Ibid, p.207
46
Simon Williams: Airborne Sniper Squad Targets Iraqi Militia, [online]
http://www.mod.uk/defenceinternet/defencenews/militaryoperations/airbornesnipersquadtargetsiraqimilitia.
htm accessed 7/4/09
were used to spray defoliants on insurgent crops as part as a ‘food denial’ strategy and also on the
verges of roads to reduce cover to insurgents preparing to ambush vehicles. 47 Such a strategy is a
dangerous one to employ in counter-insurgency warfare, as indiscriminate use of such chemicals will
likely adversely affect the civilian population. For this strategy to work there needs to be clear
separation between the insurgents and civilians, this is rarely the case. A.J. short says of the British
effort in Malaya: ‘the destruction of the aborigine allotments from the air with chemical sprays was
not very well received by the communities with upturned faces below who had spent months
clearing and planting the hillsides.’ 48 This controversial strategy is therefore unlikely to have much
benefited the British cause in Malaya, yet it was copied on a grander scale by the U.S. in Vietnam 49
and by Russia in Afghanistan50. While the defoliation efforts were undoubtedly successful, it is clear
that the operations were deeply resented by civilians. Consequently, Viet Cong and Mujahideen
recruitment was bolstered.

On the other hand, Psychological warfare has no victim and has consequently proved much more
effective. Helicopters have been used in this role, for instance during the Soviet-Afghanistan War
(1979-1989) Soviet helicopters ‘scattered leaflets over towns and villages to spread information and
propaganda and to deliver threats.’ 51 Of course, the mere presence of helicopters can have a
significant psychological impact, to an insurgent with no understanding of aerodynamics, the sight
and sound of such peculiar machines must be quite overwhelming, and the knowledge that they
belong to the enemy must be quite demoralizing. In the memoirs of one Guatemalan insurgent, who
helped organize the Guerrilla Army of the poor in the 1970s, he spoke of helicopters and aircraft
being constantly over his band and aircraft ‘thundering’ over isolated villages. At one point, he spoke
of ‘the sky dark with helicopters and military planes’ and ‘hundreds’ of soldiers parachuting into
Indian villages.52 Of course, the small Guatemalan air force never had the capability to provide
anything resembling constant air coverage, nor could it ever have dropped more than 150
paratroopers.53 Today we know that the Taliban fear the Apache helicopter, terming it the mosquito:
‘Sometimes all we had to do was turn up…’When the Mosquitoes come, stay underground,’ Taliban
commanders were overheard [via radio intercept] telling their men.’ 54

To summarise this chapter, ‘Indirect Action’ is a vital component of the airpower campaign in any
counterinsurgency effort. This is because guerrilla warfare by its very nature is seldom vulnerable to
strategic air attack. This being the case, traditional airpower roles such as air interdiction and
strategic bombing take a backseat to other roles, such as the rapid insertion and movement of
troops, aerial resupply of isolated units, CASEVAC and CSAR, reconnaissance and intelligence
collection, command and control and special operations such as chemical and psychological warfare.
The helicopter is well suited to such tactical-level ‘indirect’ roles, as it has proven during various
47
Victor Flintham: Air Wars and Aircraft: A Detailed Record of Air Combat, 1945 to the Present, (Arms &
Armour Press, 1989), p.331
48
A.J. Short quoted in Philip Towle: Pilots and Rebels: The Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare 1918-
1988, (Brassey’s, 1989), p.90
49
Victor Flintham: Air Wars and Aircraft: A Detailed Record of Air Combat, 1945 to the Present, (Arms &
Armour Press, 1989), p.291
50
John Everett-Heath: Helicopters in Combat: The First Fifty Years, (Arms & Armour Press, 1993), p.117
51
Ibid, p.128
52
Mario Payeras quoted in Corum J & Johnson W., Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists
(University Press of Kansas 2003) p.358-359
53
Ibid, p.359
54
Ed Macy: Apache, (Harper Press, 2008), p.40
COIN campaigns in the last 60 years. Its ‘indirect’ capabilities alone make it a formidable
counterinsurgent instrument, however, rotorcraft have much additional potential...

Direct Action: Taking the Fight to the Insurgents

As demonstrated in the preceding chapter, helicopters are principally used as transport aircraft.
Unique as they are, they confer great advantages to COIN forces by releasing them from the
restrictions imposed by terrain. Helicopters increase the speed and mobility of men and materiel
dramatically, allowing COIN forces to impose their ‘footprint’ over a much greater area than would
otherwise be possible. As COIN forces are frequently outnumbered, this force multiplier effect can
be of critical importance. However, indirect force projection will be of little value if the COIN forces
make no attempt to expose, uproot and destroy the insurgents. Rapid concentration of troops at
trouble spots, pre-planned surprise assaults on known enemy locations and close air support are
essential for success. The effective exploitation of helicopters in such roles is a capability that
insurgents cannot counter. Collectively, these roles are termed ‘Direct Action.’

The British were first to progress beyond the truck-minded use of helicopters. Infantry Commander
Richard Miers explains in his book Shoot to Kill, how British COIN forces pioneered the use of
helicopters in an offensive role.55 Beginning in 1951, the so-called Ferret Force used helicopters to
help set up an infantry cordon, or ring, with which to trap insurgent forces for capture or aerial
bombing. James Chiles illustrates:

‘Guided by the commander in an orbiting helicopter, Westland and Sikorsky helicopters of the
848 Squadron shifted infantry units to surround the enemy, using jungle clearings when possible.
When the troops needed to make a clearing, they slid down on ropes and cut the trees with saws
and the head-high grass with parang knives. By 1952 the British under Gerald Templer had
insurgent leader Chin Peng on the run, having killed four of his top commanders.’ 56

From 1955 the British were also using helicopters in a similar role to assist in the fight against the
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA): ‘Cyprus was a conflict in which the helicopter came
into its own. Despite the fact that the Sycamores had a limited payload, they were able to place
troops quickly in inaccessible parts of the mountainous countryside, thus keeping EOKA units
constantly on the move.’57 George Grivas, the leader of the EOKA, was obviously impressed by the
utility of the helicopter. He wrote later: ‘I wish to stress the importance of the helicopter in guerrilla
warfare. In my opinion they will play a very effective part in future operations of this kind.’ 58 It is also
notable that the Bristol Sycamores of No.284 Squadron, who provided helicopter support to the
security forces throughout most of the Cypriot emergency, were praised by one governor of Cyprus,
Field Marshal Lord Harding, on his departure in 1958, as having contributed ‘more to fighting
terrorism on the island than any other single unit.’ 59

The infantry encirclement tactics pioneered by the British would later become known as ‘vertical
envelopment’ or alternatively ‘air assault’. The light infantry units that came to specialise in this type
of engagement became known as ‘airmobile’ units. The use of helicopters for such missions became
widespread despite the inherent risks associated with flying in close proximity to the enemy. This
was because airmobile units literally transformed the wars in which they were used. They allowed
COIN forces to take the initiative and surprise the insurgents, temporarily reversing the status quo.
During the Algerian War (1954-1962), for example, it allowed the French forces to take the offensive.
Before the arrival of large numbers of helicopters in Algeria, accounts describe ‘apparently endless
and futile efforts to follow an elusive enemy across dry and very difficult country where
temperatures sometimes rose to 45° Centigrade in the shade.’ 60 As helicopters began to be used,
they so impressed commanders that the numbers in theatre were increased dramatically, going

55
Richard Miers: Shoot to Kill, (Faber, 1959)
56
James Chiles: The God Machine: From Boomerangs to Black Hawks: The Story of the Helicopter, (Bantam
Books, 2007), p.168
57
Victor Flintham: Air Wars and Aircraft: A Detailed Record of Air Combat, 1945 to the Present, (Arms &
Armour Press, 1989), p.15
58
George Grivas quoted in Philip Towle: Pilots and Rebels: The Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare 1918-
1988, (Brassey’s, 1989), p.132
59
Field Marshal Lord Harding quoted in David Wragg: Helicopters at War: A Pictorial History, (Robert Hale,
1983), p.112
60
Philip Towle: Pilots and Rebels: The Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare 1918-1988, (Brassey’s, 1989),
p.123
from just one in 195461 to four hundred in 196062 and over six hundred by 1962. 63 However, French
helicopter operations in Algeria had their critics. Bernard Fall claims that:

‘In spite of the fact that the barren hills of Algeria made aerial surveillance a great deal easier
than the jungle-covered terrain of Vietnam, the results of ‘heliborne’ operations were not overly
successful. The Algerian nationalists soon learned the foibles of the lumbering and noisy craft and
quickly developed effective techniques for helicopter baiting and trapping.’ 64

While the primitive helicopters were indeed vulnerable the French adapted relatively quickly to the
increasing danger from the ground. Firstly, they began to armour their helicopters 65 and secondly
they reconsidered their approach tactics, gradually finding ways of minimizing the danger: ‘They flew
to the landing areas at 1, 500 feet or more which minimized the risk. Before making a landing which
might be opposed, they used B26s to bomb the guerrillas with cluster bombs or napalm, and then
strafed the ground with T-6s or Vampires.’ 66 Later, other helicopters would be used in the close air
support role too.

Indeed, the French led the way in terms of using helicopters as ground attack platform. The first such
incident involved strapping two soldiers into litters attached to the side of an observation helicopter,
from which vantage point they could pour automatic rifle fire into an insurgent position that was
pinning down French soldiers, successfully routing the surprised rebels. 67 Pleased with this
innovative success, the French established a policy whereby every one in six helicopters was armed,
with forward firing machine guns and rockets as well as swivel mounted doorway cannon. The
exclusive purpose of these helicopters was Close Air Support (CAS). 68 As such, they were the first
dedicated attack helicopters, although they were actually converted transports. The effects of CAS
were very significant; ‘the French did not lose any helicopters after employing suppressive and
defensive weapons.’69

However, helicopters would soon come up against insurgents with considerably more firepower at
their disposal. The Vietnam War, or alternatively ‘the helicopter war,’ was primarily a guerrilla
conflict prior to the Easter offensive of 1972. Suitably impressed by the French heliborne operations,
the Americans began to deploy helicopter units in Vietnam from December 1961. 70 The Americans
would go on to use helicopters of all variations on scale never seen before or since. ‘Our tactics in
Vietnam were based on massive use of helicopters,’ General William Westmoreland, commander of
the United States forces in Vietnam, wrote. ‘What would we have done without helicopters? We
61
Ibid, p.121
62
Corum J & Johnson W., Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (University Press of
Kansas 2003) p.166
63
Charles Shrader: The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria, 1954-1962, (Praeger 1999), p.232
64
Bernard Fall quoted in Philip Towle: Pilots and Rebels: The Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare 1918-
1988, (Brassey’s, 1989), p.124
65
Howard Wheeler: Attack Helicopters: A History of Rotary-Wing Combat Aircraft, (The Nautical and Aviation
Publishing Company of America, 1987), p.55
66
Philip Towle: Pilots and Rebels: The Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare 1918-1988, (Brassey’s, 1989),
p.123
67
Howard Wheeler: Attack Helicopters: A History of Rotary-Wing Combat Aircraft, (The Nautical and Aviation
Publishing Company of America, 1987), p.51
68
Ibid, p.52
69
Ibid, p.55
70
John Everett-Heath: Helicopters in Combat: The First Fifty Years, (Arms & Armour Press, 1993), p.68
would be fighting a different war, for a smaller area, at a greater cost, with less effectiveness. We
might as well have asked: What would General Patton have done without his tanks?’ 71

On the flip side, it could be argued that the American forces were over-dependent on the helicopter.
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) reports made clear that the helicopter gave the Americans the
advantage of being able to appear almost anywhere, in force, but also added that ‘most of the U.S.
units appeared to be so dependent on helicopter travel and resupply that they lacked close
knowledge of the terrain and people. When villages provided assistance to the NVA and Vietcong,
American troops had difficulty knowing or doing anything about it.’ 72 However, this shows a general
failing of American strategy, rather than any fault of the helicopter, which if anything enabled more
contact with the various remote villages of Vietnam. Indeed helicopters undoubtedly gave the
Americans a significant asymmetric advantage, with talented young commanders such as Hank
Emerson perfecting the old British tactics from the jungles of Malaya.

Drawing on the lessons of the Ferret Force, Emerson created two techniques which utilised the
helicopter in combination with specially trained infantry (Recondos) to uproot and destroy the VC,
the Checkerboard73 and the Jitterbug.74 The Checkerboard was designed to flush the enemy out of
jungle encampments and into carefully laid ambushes – helicopters were used principally for
positioning artillery on hills or in clearings, which could then fire upon reconnoitred VC camps,
causing a stampede. On the other hand, Jitterbug was designed to work where Checkerboard could
not, on open terrain where people lived and worked. Chiles describes its method:

‘Once the enemy position was identified with a reasonable probability, helicopters moved in and
shifted troops at a rapid pace. This frenetic activity was intended the alarm the enemy and
persuade them that they were nearly surrounded, which prompted them to bring out the 12.7 –
millimeter machine guns to use against the helicopters...If Emerson was satisfied that the enemy
was within the Recondos’ grasp, he transmitted the radio signal “Pile on!” which meant that all
infantry units were to hike to the nearest helicopter pickup zone and move in to create a tight
perimeter around the enemy.’75

Jitterbug was also largely a success as Julian Ewell elaborates: ‘Using this technique in Dinh Tuang
Province, Colonel Emerson, over a period of months, essentially, was able to break up every
Communist battalion in the province.’ Emerson’s men later repeated the achievement in the
notoriously dangerous Long An Province.76

However, Emerson would also experience the vulnerability of the helicopter first hand. On August
the 26th 1968 a helicopter in which he was flying was shot down by an RPG 77 becoming one of the
2,094 helicopters lost to combat causes between January 1966 and December 1971. 78 He survived,

71
William Westmoreland quoted in James Chiles: The God Machine: From Boomerangs to Black Hawks: The
Story of the Helicopter, (Bantam Books, 2007), p.161
72
Ibid, p.166
73
For full details see Ibid, p.168-171
74
For full details see Ibid, p.176-179
75
Ibid, p.177
76
Ibid, p.178
77
Ibid, p.179
78
John Everett-Heath: Helicopters in Combat: The First Fifty Years, (Arms & Armour Press, 1993), p.112
albeit badly burned. Around 3,000 helicopter crew would not be so lucky. 79 Furthermore,
‘statistically, helicopters were the biggest single killer of the highest-ranking officers: helicopter
crashes killed four out of eight generals who died in the war, along with one admiral.’ 80 There is no
doubt therefore that the helicopter losses in Vietnam were significant. However, to put the losses
into perspective, over 36,150,000 sorties were flown by US helicopters during this period, giving a
combat loss rate of one helicopter every 18,193 sorties. 81

Of course, the oldest and most basic solution to protect any vulnerable aircraft is to escort it with a
type capable of engaging and destroying and threats. In the beginning, the transport helicopters
were almost exclusively supported by fixed-wing assets. However, perhaps drawing on the French
lessons from Algeria as much as their own experience, in 1962 a U.S. Army test unit concluded that
‘armed helicopters were the most effective, single, aerial system for counterinsurgency and that
they should provide the additional close support that fixed-wing aircraft could not give.’ 82 On the
other hand the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) irregulars opposing them had also
drawn lessons from Algeria. In an extraordinary exchange of information the Algerian rebels’ lessons
were passed on to the NVA and consequently, as early as December 1961, the NVA were able to
broadcast lessons over the radio on how to identify and destroy American helicopters. 83 The first U.S.
helicopter was shot down on 4th February 1962.84 Single incidents like this could be written off as
‘lucky shots,’ but not the incident at Ap Bac on January 2 nd 1963. Ten U.S. transport helicopters lifted
a South Vietnamese division to assault a well-entrenched VC battalion, while five U.S. armed
helicopters (converted transports) provided CAS – Of the fifteen U.S. helicopters used in the assault,
five were shot down and the remainder were heavily damaged. 85 The U.S. advisers argued over the
cause of the disaster, some suggested the main reason was South Vietnamese tactical
incompetence, but those most in authority concluded that the lack of fixed-wing CAS was the critical
error, with Admiral Felt telling General Harkins that ‘helicopters were no adequate substitute’ for
fixed-wing CAS.86

This sentiment would remain until 1967 when the first true (purpose-built) helicopter gunships – the
Bell-built AH-1G Huey Cobras – arrived. ‘These were the long needed ‘light attack’ helicopters that
had the speed, manoeuvrability and firepower necessary to perform the troop transport escort
mission.’87 The Cobras proved to be very effective: ‘Its introduction to service equipped ground
commanders with immediately available integral fire support that could be provided much more

79
Victor Flintham: Air Wars and Aircraft: A Detailed Record of Air Combat, 1945 to the Present, (Arms &
Armour Press, 1989), p.265
80
James Chiles: The God Machine: From Boomerangs to Black Hawks: The Story of the Helicopter, (Bantam
Books, 2007), p.180
81
John Everett-Heath: Helicopters in Combat: The First Fifty Years, (Arms & Armour Press, 1993), p.112
82
Corum J & Johnson W., Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (University Press of
Kansas 2003) p.244
83
James Chiles: The God Machine: From Boomerangs to Black Hawks: The Story of the Helicopter, (Bantam
Books, 2007), p.165
84
John Everett-Heath: Helicopters in Combat: The First Fifty Years, (Arms & Armour Press, 1993), p.69
85
Corum J & Johnson W., Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (University Press of
Kansas 2003) p.253
86
Ibid, p.254
87
Howard Wheeler: Attack Helicopters: A History of Rotary-Wing Combat Aircraft, (The Nautical and Aviation
Publishing Company of America, 1987), p.66
quickly than by calling on Air Force close support assets.’ 88 Its narrow and robust design combined
with substantial firepower was so successful that variants of the Cobra remain in service around the
world today. In Pakistan, for example, they have recently proved themselves extremely useful in the
fight against militants along the Afghan-Pakistani border, one notable success being the
neutralisation of Nek Mohammed, a notorious pro-Taliban tribal leader and general brigand. 89

Vietnam was the proving ground of the attack helicopter concept. Today, in Afghanistan and Iraq,
the formidable Apache attack helicopter is frequently responsible for escort missions as well as close
air support (CAS). For a highly personal account of such missions, including the extraordinary Apache
rescue mission of January 2007, Ed Macy’s Apache is recommended.90

To summarise this chapter, ‘direct action’ embodies the offensive roles of airpower. Helicopters
were first used in such a capacity in Malaya, where utility helicopters were used to rapidly deploy
airmobile infantry capable of surrounding surprised insurgents. Air assault has since become a key
capability in defeating insurgencies as it allows COIN forces to regain the initiative. In addition,
helicopters have evolved a capability to deliver substantial, yet accurate firepower to the COIN
battlespace. It has often been suggested that attack helicopters compete with fixed-wing aircraft in
this role; however, it is more accurate to say that they complement each other. Some tactical
situations demand the reaction time and payload of a fast-jet, while others require the loiter
capability and pin-point accuracy of an attack helicopter.

Trials and Tribulations: Disadvantages of the Helicopter and Possible Solutions

This chapter reflects on the reasons why, despite its extraordinary utility, the helicopter is not a
perfect platform for delivering tactical-level counterinsurgency airpower. The three central reasons
are speed, vulnerability and cost.

The nature of helicopter design limits them to relatively slow speeds. At high speeds, the force on
the rotors is such that they flap excessively and the retreating blade can reach too high an angle and
stall.91 In addition, because the speed of the rotor-blades relative to the air depends on the speed of
the helicopter as well as on their rotational velocity, the airspeed of the advancing rotor blade is
much higher than that of the helicopter itself. Therefore ‘As helicopter speed increases, the
advancing blade will reach a high forward speed at which normal problems of aerofoils flying at or
near airspeed Mach 1 (the speed of sound) will be met.’ 92 These problems include vastly increased
drag and vibration. Thus, helicopters will remain relatively slow aircraft. One possible solution is tilt-
rotor designs such as the V22-Osprey, which can fly forward like a fixed-wing aircraft but can also tilt
88
Chris Bishop & Jim Laurier: Huey Cobra Gunships, (Osprey Publishing, 2006), p.8
89
Usman Ansari: Cobras over the Frontier, in Air Forces Monthly (April 2008), p.60-66
90
Ed Macy: Apache, (Harper Press, 2008)
91
John Fay: The Helicopter: History, Piloting And How It Flies, 4 th edition, (David & Charles, 1987), p.46
92
Ibid.
their rotors upwards so they can fly like a helicopter. However tilt-rotors have attracted considerable
criticism.93

The vulnerability of the helicopter warrants considerable attention. As Dr. Carlo Kopp says: ‘The
reality which cannot be avoided is that any slow moving, noisy and relatively soft vehicle operating in
close proximity to the ground and hostile ground forces is an inviting target for a wide range of
weapons...’94 There are three aspects to helicopter survivability: (1) detection avoidance (2) avoiding
enemy fire when detected (3) tolerance to hostile fire.

As insurgents do not generally have access to high-tech detection equipment such as radar, the main
ways in which they are alerted to helicopters in the vicinity are the simplest – sight and sound.
Sound is usually the first thing that gives helicopters away – they are noisy, largely due to
phenomenon called blade vortex interaction. For example, the Bell UH-1 Iroquois ‘Huey’, which in
various models accounted for four out of every five helicopters used in Vietnam ‘made a whapping
noise that could be heard easily at a distance of two miles, and farther when the enemy dug
listening holes in a hillside...’ 95 In addition, well-organised insurgencies will usually have intelligence
on aircraft movements, for example Ed Macy explains in his book Apache that many of the local
drivers delivering supplies to Camp Bastion are either employed or forced by the Taliban to report
on aircraft taking off by means of mobile phone. 96

Reduction of a helicopter’s acoustic signature is a complex design problem but ‘might come from
redesigned rotor tips, computer-controlled blades, or even the acoustic trick called “active” noise
cancellation.’97 Extremely quiet helicopters are possible; in 1972 the CIA redesigned the Hughes 500P
for a secret wiretapping mission in North Vietnam, dubbed the Quiet One, the average person would
not be able to hear it when it was 500 feet above his neighbourhood. 98 Such stealth would be ideal
for COIN operations, however, when it comes to heavy transport and attack helicopters noise
reduction on the same scale would be difficult to achieve. Noise reduction can also be achieved by
tactical ‘nap of the earth flying,’ which uses terrain to mask the sound of the helicopter. Obviously,
Nap-of-the earth flying also helps avoid visual detection. In addition, special paints that reflect as
little of the sun’s energy as possible are used.

Tactics for the avoidance of enemy fire once detected depend on the threat, and are subject to
debate. In the counterinsurgency environment the threat is generally from small arms, machine-
guns, mortar, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), artillery rockets and Man Portable Air Defence
Systems (MANPADS, or shoulder launched SAMs). As these are all visually aimed weapons the
obvious solution has been tactical low-level flying: ‘To date the most widely used technique for
avoiding hits on helicopters has been nap-of-the-earth flight and terrain masking, as this denies line
of sight tracking and weapon aiming or guidance.’ 99 Conversely, Colonel Jim Slife argues that High
Altitude flight is more advisable in a COIN environment such as Iraq. Slife argues that in the absence
93
See Carlton Meyer: Why Tiltrotors Fail, [online]: http://www.g2mil.com/tiltrotors.htm accessed 15/4/09 
94
Carlo Kopp: Are Helicopters Vulnerable? In Australian Aviation, (March 2005), p.59 [available online]:
http://www.ausairpower.net/TE-Helo-Mar-05-P.pdf accessed 02/04/09
95
James Chiles: The God Machine: From Boomerangs to Black Hawks: The Story of the Helicopter, (Bantam
Books, 2007), p.172
96
Ed Macy: Apache, (Harper Press, 2008), p.162-163
97
James Chiles: The God Machine: From Boomerangs to Black Hawks: The Story of the Helicopter, (Bantam
Books, 2007), p.270
98
Ibid, p.229
of radar-guided SAMs and AAA threats which would render high level flight inadvisable, helicopters
can overfly most of the threats presented by insurgents: ‘Rocket-propelled grenades are out-ranged
above about 1,500 feet, and small arms/light machine guns can routinely be overflown above 3,000
feet.’100 In addition, the inherent dangers of low-level flight such as terrain, power-cables and towers
are overcome. The MANPADS threat is not eliminated but it is reduced as the geometry of the
MANPADS engagement envelop is reduced, pilot reaction time is increased and the height gives
more room for manoeuvre and affords the possibility of cutting engine power to reduce the infrared
signature of the aircraft, thus making countermeasures more effective. Slife concedes however that
there are a number of factors which make helicopter crews reluctant to fly at high altitude such as
mission requirements, weather, low-level optimised countermeasures, helicopter performance and
blind spots.101 Regardless of the outcome of this tactical debate, it is clear that if helicopters are to
continue to carry out all their current roles, some low-level operation over hostile territory will
continue to be necessary. Thus it is a necessity to equip helicopters with expensive self protection
suites which can contribute ‘a large proportion of the unit cost of a modern military helicopter,’ 102
but are usually capable of defeating the aging MANPADS technology which is occasionally available
to insurgents. As most modern helicopters can also absorb considerable amounts of small arms fire,
the unguided RPG is considered the most dangerous threat to helicopters in the contemporary COIN
environment:

‘The increasing frequency of RPG use against helicopters, especially when used in urban combat,
is a good indication of an evolving threat. As infrared jammers have proliferated, and newer
helicopters with better tolerance to 7.62/14.5/23mm fire have replaced 1960s technology
helicopters, opponents have been progressively shifting to the use of RPGs to overcome
improved survivability measures. The abundance and low cost of RPGs also suggests that evolving
tactics will see increased use of salvo fired RPGs in urban combat, the idea being to maximise the
odds of visually aimed weapons scoring a hit.’ 103

Tolerance to hostile fire varies considerably between types and models of helicopter. One of the
strongest-built helicopters in the world is the Apache gunship. Ed Macy explains: ‘The Apache was
built to be shot...It was designed to absorb incoming fire; it practically invited it...Anything crucial to
the aircraft’s survival had a backup’ 104 However, understandably, a helicopter capable of
withstanding a direct hit from an RPG round is currently implausible: ‘...no helicopter can ever carry
enough armour to defeat an anti-tank weapon built to kill or cripple heavy armoured vehicles.’ 105 It is
fortunate then that these weapons are notoriously inaccurate at anything but short range. Yet, it
would be irresponsible to dismiss the threat as ‘inaccurate’ especially given the aforementioned
abundance of these weapons in trouble spots around the world and the ‘increasing shift to urban

99
Carlo Kopp: Are Helicopters Vulnerable? In Australian Aviation, (March 2005), p.61 [available online]:
http://www.ausairpower.net/TE-Helo-Mar-05-P.pdf accessed 02/04/09
100
Col. Jim Slife: Shootdown Solution, in Armed Forces Journal, (June 2007), [available online]:
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/06/2649720 accessed 14/04/09
101
Ibid.
102
Carlo Kopp: Are Helicopters Vulnerable? In Australian Aviation, (March 2005), p.61 [available online]:
http://www.ausairpower.net/TE-Helo-Mar-05-P.pdf accessed 02/04/09
103
Ibid, p.62
104
Ed Macy: Apache, (Harper Press, 2008), p.173-174
105
Carlo Kopp: Are Helicopters Vulnerable? In Australian Aviation, (March 2005), p.63 [available online]:
http://www.ausairpower.net/TE-Helo-Mar-05-P.pdf accessed 02/04/09
combat, where opponents rely on the use of complex urban terrain for concealment...’ 106 thus
increasing the possibility of a close-range ‘window of opportunity’ for an RPG shot. The best
publicised case study of RPG lethality is the infamous ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident where two US
Army Special Operations MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by RPGs when operating at
low speed and altitude over Mogadishu, Somalia, in October 1993. In an attempt to secure the crash
sites so the dead and wounded could be evacuated, US forces were drawn into a large urban battle
in which resulted in the deaths of 18 US soldiers and around 500 Somali irregulars. 107 This fatally
undermined the US position in Somalia.

Possible solutions include the use of a ‘visible band dazzling laser, designed to sweep the lower
hemisphere of the helicopter,’ however this approach presents problems such as ‘the need to equip
friendlies with anti-dazzle goggles, and the risk of eye damage to civilians.’ 108

‘Another emerging technology is the millimetric band ‘pain beam’ microwave riot control device,
which is a non-lethal weapon producing an intolerable but temporary burning sensation on the
skin of a person illuminated with the beam. Again, problem issues arise with collateral effects,
and also power levels required to sweep an area from which an RPG could be launched.’ 109

In the short-term pilots will have to continue to rely on existing radar based Missile Approach
Warning System (MAWS) technology and their own vigilance in order to have enough warning to be
able to effect an evasive manoeuvre. Close quarters RPG shots will likely produce more insurgent
victories in the future. Dr. Kopp’s sobering conclusion is that ‘For the foreseeable future helicopters
will remain the most susceptible aircraft in military use.’ 110

Helicopters are also susceptible to environmental conditions. Hot, humid and highly elevated areas,
as many of the case studies exhibit, test the performance limits of the aircraft and the aircrew. Such
conditions conspire to produce high-density altitudes: the air is thinner and thus less lift can be
generated than in temperate climates. This, in turn, adversely affects the payload of troops or freight
that can be carried. For example in Malaya ‘the Whirlwind and the S-55 could lift ten passengers in
Europe but at times in Malaya only two.’ 111 It was soon established that only highly experienced
pilots were able to fly the helicopters because ‘operating these aircraft to the extreme limit of their
performance disclosed the existence of so many pitfalls for the unwary or inexperienced.’ 112
Belvedere helicopters too, although highly capable in their day, were operated beyond their
declared performance limits to position 105mm guns on to 4000 foot high summits in the Radfan. 113
Parallels can be drawn to contemporary operations where even though helicopter performance has

106
Ibid, p.60
107
See Mark Bowden: Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War, (Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999)
108
Carlo Kopp: Are Helicopters Vulnerable? In Australian Aviation, (March 2005), p.63 [available online]:
http://www.ausairpower.net/TE-Helo-Mar-05-P.pdf accessed 02/04/09
109
Ibid.
110
Ibid.
111
John Everett-Heath: Helicopters in Combat: The First Fifty Years, (Arms & Armour Press, 1993), p.18
112
Group Captain K.R.C. Slater: Air Operations in Malaya, in Journal of the Royal United Services Institute,
(August 1957), p.385
113
Philip Towle: Pilots and Rebels: The Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare 1918-1988, (Brassey’s, 1989),
p.147
improved significantly they are still operated at the edge of their performance envelop especially in
hot, high and dusty Afghanistan.114

Operating the aircraft in conditions as harsh as the desert and jungle led to ‘maintenance problems
and low serviceability rates.’115 Such was the effort needed to maintain the helicopter fleet in Malaya
that it was considered ‘of paramount importance to achieve the maximum economy of effort
combined with a high rate of utilization [and to resist the] strong temptation to misuse this type of
aircraft in a costly and extravagant manner.’ 116 In Aden, Belvederes generally required two engine
changes per week117 and a similarly demanding situation was experienced in Dhofar by the RAF
Wessex detachment in 1974.118 Many years later the RAF is experiencing remarkably similar issues
with the current ‘level of operations, coupled with Afghanistan’s dusty, hot and high environment,
causing prolific wear and tear’ on the RAF’s Chinook fleet. 119

The difficulty of maintaining helicopters compounds another enduring issue which ensures they do
not escape the ongoing debate over which aircraft are best suited to COIN operations – their cost.
For example, in Malaya the costs of flying the S-55 Whirlwind and the S-51 Dragonfly were £73 and
£53 per hour respectively, whereas the fixed-wing Pioneer and Auster light aircraft were £35 and
£15 per hour.120 Indeed:

‘Helicopters will never match airplanes for speed and fuel efficiency. The reasons for helicopters’
lower efficiency include air resistance from the rotor mast and the rotor hub, and the fact that
the rotor blades can’t pass through the air as smoothly and uniformly as airplane wings. And
some power must always be wasted as a result of the fact that a portion of every rotor blade
spends part of its time flying backward.’121

To summarise this chapter, the helicopter’s three main disadvantages are enduring problems.
Possible solutions have been identified but there implementation remain problematic.

114
Andrew Brookes: Into Battle in Air Forces Monthly, (May 2009), p.44
115
Jay Simpson: Not by Bombs Alone: Lessons from Malaya, in Joint Forces Quarterly, (Summer 1999), p.92
116
Group Captain K.R.C. Slater: Air Operations in Malaya, in Journal of the Royal United Services Institute,
(August 1957), p.385
117
Philip Towle: Pilots and Rebels: The Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare 1918-1988, (Brassey’s, 1989),
p.149
118
Dowling, J.R. & Wood, P.R.: The Wessex Detachment in Oman, (MoD Air Historical Branch, 1977), p.21-24
119
G. Jennings: RAF Chinook Fleet Provides Lift for Coalition Forces in Afghanistan in Janes Defence Weekly,
[Available online] www4.janes.com/subscribe/jdw/doc_view.jsp?
K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/jdw/history/jdw2008/jdw36683.htm@current&Prod_Name=JDW&Que
ryText accessed 28/03/09
120
Victor Flintham: Air Wars and Aircraft: A Detailed Record of Air Combat, 1945 to the Present, (Arms &
Armour Press, 1989), p.332
121
James Chiles: The God Machine: From Boomerangs to Black Hawks: The Story of the Helicopter, (Bantam
Books, 2007), p.16
 Past, Present & Future: Conclusions

In the years following the Second World War, conflict, rebellion and dissension broke out in many
parts of the world. Some required just police action to contain them but others required military
intervention. The importance of helicopters in such campaigns was recognised almost immediately
on their COIN debut in Malaya122, and by the late 1950s the helicopter was figuring prominently in
various struggles to counter insurgency. Experience paid for in blood showed that the centre of
gravity in such campaigns was the uncommitted majority of the population and the battle for their
‘hearts and minds’ was key. The insurgents could then be isolated and denied access to refuge,
sustenance and information. Nearly always able to land close to where it was needed, the helicopter
had a major role to play in winning hearts and minds, besides its more obvious military tasks.

In order for guerrilla forces to prevail, they must seize and keep the initiative, select targets that are
not too big for them and which they can attack when ready, and avoid confrontation with the COIN
forces when the odds are against them. The COIN forces, on the other hand, must also try to gain
the initiative by making contact with the guerrillas as often as possible, to keep them off balance and
122
Malcolm Postgate: Operation Firedog: Air Support in the Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, (HMSO, 1992),
p.30
force them onto the defensive. Cordon, search and destroy operations have been much favoured in
COIN. But the results, when good, are usually short-term and when bad, that is when the innocent
suffer, long-term. Whenever possible, clear and hold operations – and thus continuous domination
of the territory and pacification of the population – are much to be preferred. Whatever methods
are used mobility, flexibility and speed are critical attributes for the COIN forces, and clearly
helicopters have a major part to play in enhancing them and, with good intelligence, achieving all
important surprise.

In short, the helicopter enables the counter-insurgents to pursue insurgents almost with impunity
denying them sanctuary and respite. The mobility afforded by helicopters coupled with light ground
forces, especially Special Forces, has been shown to be a particularly powerful capability that cannot
be countered by insurgents. This model is advocated by current theorists such as Meilinger 123.
Furthermore, CAS provided by attack helicopters is now a critical feature of the use of airpower in
supporting COIN operations as the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq show. The use of CAS ensures
casualties amongst ground forces are minimised which helps preserve both the morale of troops and
political commitment to the campaign.

However, the helicopter continues to be costly to operate, demanding to maintain and vulnerable to
ground fire, especially RPGs. There appears to be no fully satisfactory way of solving these issues.
However given the sheer scope of the helicopter’s utility, in the immediate future they will remain
tolerable flaws.

Any counterinsurgency campaign is a complex effort. Generally speaking, no single element can be
pointed to as having won or lost the war. However, what is certain is that airpower has evolved into
a major player in combating insurgents. This study has specifically highlighted the enduring utility of
the helicopter, which helps COIN forces to negate the guerrilla’s inherent advantages such as his
adaption to the environment. He can move about and hide quickly because he knows the terrain.
The helicopter reduces this advantage by increasing the counterinsurgent’s mobility and his ability to
apply machine gun and rocket firepower quickly and accurately. The bottom line is that helicopter
availability directly affects the tactical options of ground commanders. While the importance of a
good mix of airpower assets should not be in doubt, the helicopter platform is most essential
because it can provide so many different functions, all of which have been shown to have key
applications in COIN warfare.

123
Bratby,M: Airpower in Counter-insurgency: Verities. Legends, Surprises and Suggestions, in The Aerospace
Professional, (March 2008), p.14 [Report on a lecture given to the Royal Aeronautical Society Air Power Group
by Col. P. Meilinger, USAF, ret’d]
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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