1 Introduction
Philosophical research on conditionals is a complex topic. Since Ram-
sey, philosophers have noticed that the degree of assertability of an ut-
terance of the form “if p then q” may be measured by its probability
. However, involves two propositions while natural lan-
guage suggests that “if p then q” is a single proposition. Can we regard
‘|’ as a genuine connective? Clearly, standard material implication is not
suitable to represent ‘|’, since from the laws of probability it follows that
except in very special cases . Since there is no other
decent Boolean candidate for conditional except material implication, it
follows that ‘|’ cannot be seen as a Boolean connective. David Lewis
(1976) argued that it cannot be an iterable connective at all (let alone a
Boolean one). Lewis’s reasoning convinced many philosophers, like Ad-
ams (1975), that conditionals are not propositions (capable of being ei-
ther true or false) and that asserting a conditional amounts to maintain-
ing that has a very high value. In more recent times, researchers
in the field of AI tried to challenge Lewis’s result, by merging the Boo-
lean algebra of ordinary two-valued propositions in a larger non-Boolean
lattice (where they are represented by elements) and adopting a
three-valued semantics. In these settings ‘|’ is dealt with as a three-valued
truth-functional connective. Probability functions defined on the Boolean
structure may be extended to the larger lattice. Since, in this setting, con-
Bruno de Finetti, Radical Probabilist
Maria Carla Galavotti (ed.).
Copyright © 2009
201
202 / ALBERTO MURA
Conditioning Implication
(A | B) A (A → B) A
t u f t u f
t t u f t t t t
B u u u u B u u u t
f u u u f f u t
([1986] 2002) who had in mind the same kind of three-valued semantics
that inspired de Finetti.
Łukasiewicz’s Łukasiewicz’s
Implication Biconditional
A B A (A B) A
t u f t u f
t t t t t t u f
B u u t t B u u t u
f f u t f f u t
by the “gap view” of the null truth-value, which rules out any “if-then”
connective that renders a conditional assertion true when both the ante-
cedent and the consequent are null. Monotonicity is nothing but the for-
mal counterpart of the intuitive idea of a three-valued logic where the
third value means “null”, namely absence of truth-value. Intuition of a
gap interpretation of the third truth-value is a sufficiently reliable guide
for finding the right truth-tables even if the abstract notion of
monotonicity is not clear in one’s mind.
So we may assert that in 1935 de Finetti achieved the system of
Blamey’s partial propositional logic, although he did not explicitly for-
mulate the formal property that differentiates partial logic from other
approaches, like Łukasiewicz’s one.
It should be noticed that de Finetti’s interpretation of the null truth-
value is not epistemic. Trievents may be objectively either true or false
or devoid of any truth-value. But this objective character is purely logi-
cal (and derives from conventional stipulation) and has nothing to do
with Łukasiewicz’s ontological motivation about Aristotelian future
contingents and determinism. Moreover, the objective attitude of de Fi-
netti should be contrasted with the epistemological motivation of
Kleene, by whom ‘u’ represents a kind of uncertainty about the value of
a partial recursive function due to algorithmic limitations.
A
t t t
u f f
f f t
De Finetti himself gives a metalinguistic interpretation of these con-
nectives: according to him ‘ ’ means “X is true”, while ‘ ’ means
“X is not null”.
It is clear from what de Finetti says that these two connectives are
meant not to be part of his logic of trievents. Rather, their business, ac-
cording to de Finetti, is just “[t]o return from the logic of trievents to
standard logic”. This is provided by the following noticeable result (that
I shall call de Finetti’s Decomposition Theorem):
(1)
5 Functional Completeness
Although there is strong textual evidence that de Finetti confined the logic
of trievents to monotonic logic, which is a closed lattice, we may ask
whether de Finetti’s larger logic (i.e. three-valued logic equipped with
the “metalinguistic” unary operators ‘ ’ and ‘ ’) (a) encompasses Łu-
kasiewicz’s logic and, in such a case, (b) whether it is functionally com-
plete (i.e. all finitary truth functions can be rep-
210 / ALBERTO MURA
6 Algebraic approach
De Finetti speaks about the notion of conditional probability as a
matter of extending the definition of probability originally defined
over a Boolean algebra to trievents. By this extension what we obtain
is just a definition of a probability function over , not a probability
function confined to the monotonic algebra of Blamey. On the other
hand we may argue, from a philosophical point of view, that consider-
ing ‘ ’ and ‘ ’ as “metalinguistic” connectives does not violate the
view of the null truth-value as truth-gap. What would be in contrast
with de Finetti’s view is to introduce among the primitive truth-
functions a non-monotonic material implication (like Łukasiewicz’s or
Gödel’s implication) as the correct generalization of two-valued mate-
rial implication in the spirit of the logic of trievents. So, while much
appreciating Peter Milne’s Logic of conditional assertions — as well
as its algebraic counterpart, ‘de Finetti algebra’ — (Milne 2004), I
cannot endorse it as being in agreement with de Finetti’s view of
trievents.
To reconstruct de Finetti’s unified views of trievents we have to con-
sider a sentential language with a denumerable set of atomic sentences
equipped with the internal as well as external de Finetti connectives
(namely ‘ ’, ‘ ’, ‘ ’, ‘ ’, ‘ ’, ‘ ’, ‘ ’). Since identity of truth conditions
211/ PROBABILITY AND THE LOGIC OF DE FINETTI’S TRIEVENTS
7 Assertion
Asserting a sentence p equipped with the classical semantics consists
of a linguistic act by which it is unconditionally claimed that p is true.
Obviously, the same may not be said about sentences interpreted as
trievents. Trievents may lack a truth-value, so that the unconditional as-
sertion of their truth makes no sense. Asserting a trievent X is that lin-
guistic act that consists of asserting that X is true provided X is not null.
This is in accordance with the truth-functional identities
.
The different assertability conditions between sentences expressing
trievents and ordinary sentences should be taken into account in inter-
preting compound sentences. For example, to assert a set of ordinary
sentences is the same as asserting their conjunction
. This property cannot be extended in general to trievents.
To assert separately trievents and is not in general the same act as
asserting the compound trievent . In fact, the proviso under which
the assertion of the truth of is made is not that both and
are not null but that is not null. This difference should be kept in
mind to avoid fallacies and paradoxes. Most certainly, the proper use of
trievents departs from the use of conditionals as made in natural language.
Trievents should be used iuxta propria principia. To assert both and
is the same as asserting the trievent . This may
be considered as the definition of a conjunction connective, say ‘ ’ whose
truth table turns out to coincide with Kleene’s weak conjunction:
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Kleene’s weak
Conjunction
(A B) A
t u f
t t u f
B u u u u
f f u f
8 Logical consequence
A central notion in deductive logic is without question the notion of
logical consequence. We may ask when a trievent q is a logical conse-
quence of a trievent p, and, more generally, when a trievent q is a logical
consequence of a set of trievents. De Finetti did not address this point.
However, we may try to find the best answer in the spirit of his ideas. In
the literature there are several alternative definitions that generalise to
three-valued logics the notion of logical consequence. Łukasiewicz (and
many others after him) simply required preservation of truth. This prima
facie appears to be a natural choice. However, there are strong reasons to
maintain that this requirement is inadequate. In two-valued logic, when
two propositions entail each other they have the same truth-conditions and
convey the same content. A reasonable requirement of adequacy for the
idea of logical consequence for trievents is that this property is preserved.
More formally:
213/ PROBABILITY AND THE LOGIC OF DE FINETTI’S TRIEVENTS
9 Probability
To define a probability function on the quotient lattice we may
first define a probability function on the Boolean algebra of ordinary
events and then uniquely extend it by means of de Finetti’s Decomposi-
tion Theorem. Indeed for every element X of there are two elements
E, H belonging to such that . By putting:
provided ,
A1. If then
A2.
A3. If then
A4.
215/ PROBABILITY AND THE LOGIC OF DE FINETTI’S TRIEVENTS
A5. If then
(2)
(3)
(5)
entail:
(6)
which, in turn, is satisfied only in special cases of little interest. This
would prove that ‘ ’ cannot be a genuine (let alone truth-functional) iter-
able conditional connective.
Now (4) is clearly satisfied by de Finetti’s conditioning, so Lewis’s
result shows that (5) cannot hold in general for trievents. However, we
may easily derive from axioms A1-A6 the following formula for
trievents, supposing :
(7)
(8)
The conclusion we may draw is that Lewis’s result was really ante
litteram refuted by de Finetti’s approach to trievents in 1935.
218 / ALBERTO MURA
11 Difficulties
Outcome Pay-offs
t Won Won 0 0
u Won Called for 0 0
f Won Called for 0 0
otherwise.
as true and every contradiction as false. All the rest remains unchanged.
Can we resort to supervaluations in the context of trievents? The answer
is in the negative. The reasons for this negative answer are the follow-
ing:
c. otherwise.
4. If then
a. if at least one of the following conditions are satis-
fied:
i. and ;
ii. All the following conditions are satisfied:
01. for every valuation and
;
02. there exist a valuation such that and
.
224 / ALBERTO MURA
c. otherwise.
7. If then
a.
b. otherwise.
8. If then
a. if either or ;
b. otherwise.
form is not valid if (and only if) is a nullity. We may again use
schemas with appropriate provisos: “if is not a nullity then is a
tautology”. The clause “if is not a nullity” cannot in general be imme-
diately decided by inspecting . What, however is essential is that this
property is algorithmically decidable, and this turns out to be the case 1.
The second difference with the traditional approach lies in the fact
that the truth-conditions of sentences are not given by simple truth-
tables. A modal component (i.e. a reference to the set of all valuations)
is essentially present in definition 3. In spite of this, the truth-value of a
sentence depends only on the valuations of the atomic sentences that oc-
cur in it. This is shown by the following result:
t t t u f t u f t t
u u u u u u u u u u
f u f u t f t t f f
t t t t f t ut f t t
u ut u t u u ut u u u
f ut f t t f t t f f
2 By the way, we notice that the generalized sense was what Wittgenstein actually de-
fined in Tractatus logico-philosophicus, 5: “Propositions are truth-functions of elemen-
tary propositions”, in spite of the fact that he considered only truth-functions in the strict
sense.
229/ PROBABILITY AND THE LOGIC OF DE FINETTI’S TRIEVENTS
13 Back to algebra
Let be the set of the sentences of . Let be the set of equiva-
lence classes induced by the relation . Let us introduce in the
operations , by putting:
and . Let the re-
sulting quotient algebra. The first step in our attempt to prove the ade-
quacy of our semantics is to prove that is a lattice. Before going on to
prove this I shall prove some auxiliary result.
d. , and
e. and
f. , and
g. , and
h. , and .
In the case (a) (iii) is obviously satisfied by the well-known properties of
maximum.
In the case (b), and since it holds that
,
(iii) is satisfied too.
In the case (c), since and ,
.
On the other hand .
In the case (d) and
d. , and
e. and
f. , and
g. , and
h. , and .
In the case (a) (iv) is obviously satisfied by the well-known properties of
minimum.
In the case (b), and since
, (iv) is satisfied too.
In the case (c), since and ,
. On the other hand
.
In the case (d) and
b. and
c. and
d. and
In case that (a) the thesis is obvious by standard properties of maxi-
mum and minimum.
In case that (b) if , then ,
so that . If then
so that if also and by defini-
tion 3 in no case . So . If
then but then in every case by definition 3
. It follows that in which case
.
In the case that (c) the thesis is trivially satisfied.
In the case (d) may be satisfied only if .
vi. Let . We have first to prove that for every valuation it
holds that . Let and
as in (iii). Let us distinguish the following ex-
haustive list of cases:
a. and
b. and
c. and
d. and
In case that (a) the thesis is obvious by standard properties of maxi-
mum and minimum.
In case that (b) if , then ,
so that . If then
so that if also and by defini-
tion 3 in no case . So . If
, also but then in every case by definition 3
. It follows that in which case
.
In the case that (c) the thesis is trivially satisfied.
In the case (d) may be satisfied only if .
vii. Clearly and for every , .
234 / ALBERTO MURA
b∨c
⊥
We may ask whether is a semidistributive lattice. Recall that a lat-
tice is said to be semidistributive if and only if the two following impli-
cations are satisfied (see Grätzer 2000: 353)
17 Orthomodularity
Departing from complementation or distributivity calls for minimiz-
ing such a departure if possible. We have seen that is an almost ortho-
complemented lattice. We have also seen that neither modularity nor
semidistributivity are satisfied by . Orthomodularity is a weaker form
of modularity defined on an orthocomplemented lattice. A perfectly ana-
logue condition may be defined for almost orthocomplemented lattices
as follows:
if and then .
We may ask whether is almost orthomodular. The answer is no. To
show this it suffices to pick a hypervaluation that assign the truth-value
238 / ALBERTO MURA
19 Probability defined on
every .
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