502.heidt Silber Peterson Keenan - Neg.7week Juniors Space Neg

Michigan 7 Week Juniors
2k6
*****Index****'...................................................................................................................................................................................................................
1
1NC Space Guard Counterplan ........................................................................................................................................................................................
2
1 NC Space Guard Counterplan................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
1NC Air Force Overstretch Net-benefit....................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1NC Air Force Overstretch Net-benefit .............................................................................................................................................................................
5
Space Force + Air Force Overstretch.........................................................................................................................................................................6
Air Force Key to Hegemony..............................................................................................................................................................................................
7
1NC Ban Space Counterplan ....................
...............................................................................................................................................................
8
Ban Space Solves Hegemony ........................
............................................................................................................................................................
9
Ban Space Solves Hegemony ....................
..............................................................................................................................................................
10
.......
Ban Solves China Relations......................... ....................................................................................................................................................
11
Space Ban = Executive Authority ..................... . . ....................................................................................................................................................
12
Space Force Won't Solve ...................... .... ..........................................................................................................................................................
1 3
. .
A2: Mllltarization Inevitable ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 4
..
A2: Mllltarization Inevitable ............................................................................................................................................................................................
15
..
Space MllltarizationBad- HegemonyIArms Race.......................................................................................................................................................... 16
..
Space Mll~tarizationBad- Hegemony........... . . ........................................................................................................................................................17
Space MilitarizationBad- Extinction ........................................................................................................................................................................... 18
..
Space M~lrtarizationBad- Russia ................ . . . .........................................................................................................................................................
19
Space Militarization Bad- China 1NC ........................................................................................................................................................................ 21
Space Militarization Bad- China 1NC ......................................................................................................................................................................... 22
..
Space Mllrtarization Bad- China Extensions ...................................................................................................................................................................
23
..
Space Mtl~tarizationBad- Economy ...............................................................................................................................................................................
24
..
A2: Space Mllltarization Good- Asteroid Deflection..................................................................................................................................................... 25
Spending Links- Industry Trade-off ..............................................................................................................................................................................26
RMA Links ....................... .
........................................................................................................................................................................................
27
..
Space Mllltarization Unpopular......................................................................................................................................................................................
28
1NC Incentives Counterplan..........................................................................................................................................................................................
29
Heidt/KeenanlPeterson/Silber
2k6
1NC Space Guard Counterplan

Counterplan Text: The United States Federal Government should establish a new separate branch of the Armed Forces, The
United States Space Force, and transfer responsibility over all space operations currently tracked under the national space
policy's mission areas of space support, force enhancement, and space control it to it. All personnel should come from NASA,
DOT, FAA, and should be trained by general officers. Funding and enforcement guaranteed.
Solves hegemony better and avoids the net-benefits- establishment of the Space Guard would give the US control over space
without any risk of eroding the Air Force superiority
McKinlev, commander of the 21st Operations Support Squadron, Peterson AFB, Colorado, 2000 (Lt Col Cynthia A. S., USAF, ex-deputy director of
the commander's action group at AFSPC. A graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College, published articles in Aviation
Week and Space Technology, Space News, and an essay in Beyond the Paths of Heaven: The Emergence of Space Power Thought (Air University
Press, 1999) Spring, 'The Guardians of Space: Organizing America's Space Assets for the Twenty-First Century" Aerospace Power Journal,
http://www.airpower.maxwelI.af.mil/airchronicles/apjlapj00/spr00/mckinley,htm)
The Unaed States Coast Guard

Behveen 1915 and 1942, the United Stales govemmt consoldaed the functional responstbiiies of f i e separate governmentservices to form the Unlled States Coast Guard. It combmed the "sea services" types of functmns under one
organizationto provide better service to the natnn and lo ensure that the Navy was not encumbered by responsibilitiesthat lay beyond k core competency of prosecuting campaigns and defeating other navies.
The k s t Guard's r w b reach back to 1789 wlh the formation ofthe Lighthouse Senrice. Although all seafarers depended upon its suppon, the service was not assigned to the Navy. Instead, a separate federal service had the responsibiiy tor
guiding seafarersthroughthe dark ot night and fog of day. Duringthe course of the next one hundred years, the Treasuly and Justice Departments wganized four other sea-relatedfederal services--the Revenue Cutler Service, Steamboat
Inspeclion Service. Life-SavingService, and Bureau of Navigatbn-to satisfy the pressing needs of our nation. Consolidationof these five federalservices began in 1915, when the RevenueCutler Seivice and Life-Saving Servlce combined to form
the Coast Guard. The fmal consoliilwns occurred between 1939 and 1942, when We Coast Guard assumed respons~bilkyfor the Lighthouse Service. Steamboat InspectionSewce, and Bureau of Navgatian.
Throughout its history, the Coast Guard has Rexed wah the needs ofthe nation. In times of peace, it attachedto Ihe Deparhent of the Treasury (from 1915 until 1967) or the Departmemiof Transpoltation (DOT) (from 1967to the present);when the
nation was at war during those spans of time, it served under the commandof the Navy. During each war fmm the War of 1812 b the Persian Gulf War of 1991, Coaa Guardsmen stood shwlder-to-shoulderwith the Navy's sailors to hght far our
nation's interests. Eachtime, they complementedthe Navy's mpabil'iies to providethe ful array of sea-related military tools needed by our nation.
Just as importantas the 0bSe~ationthat the Navy and Coast Guard can complement each other wWm the sam medium (Ihe sea) is the parallel between Coast Guard missions and current or emerging space missions.The evolution and formation
of the Coast Guard's missions reflect the importanceof sea-based trade to the economy, of access to the sea by private citizens, and of the sea itself to national securii. OMal space now has that same level of importanceto America's economy.
standardofliving.andnatio~lsecurity. A quick C O I ~ of
Ptraditional
~ ~ ~ S Coast
O Guard
~ responsibilities and space requirements provides a tellinq Stow (tab1e2).
What lumps out isn?just the s~milariilyin functions, but also the realizationthat the Coast Guard m d e l represents the best organizaiionalstructureto accomplishthese tasks. ~t provides services 10 several
departments of government and Sectors of the economy. asmisscon responsibiMiesrepresentpublitg~ods.Atallfimes,the aovernment retains the option to desiqnate the
Coast Guard as a war-fiqhtinq component when it needs to do so for national security, oiparlicularnote, the Guard bridaes the tenuous area created when
it becomes necessary to ernplov military forces in a zone designated for peaceful exploits. Forexample, no one seriouslv considers that a Coast Guard
pESerICe "militarizes"the Great Lakes. Finally.the Coaa Guard'sabiliy toshilt between DOTand the DepanmentofDefense (DOD) stows hat noseam exists on the water, despite having two sea-faring sewces.
looking at the above list ot Coast Guard missions, one might ask whether ilwould make senseto place those missmns in Ihe Navy if we were lo stall today with a Clean slate. The answer is nwbecause of the same core competency, war fighting
versus must-pay support,and organizationaltensions outlined eadier.
The United States @ace Guard
Should these existinq and emerqinq space functions reside separately across several deoartments?
iooltiigat the space side 01that list, we must ask the inevitable questii,
The answer is no--there must be a better Way, what tol~owsis a suggested organizationalstructure tor the nation'sspace assets. The propodoffers the potential of satistyingm d resohing the competingcivil, military,
and cornmeicralinterests and inherent tensions. #frees the Air Force to realize its vision to become a fully capable aerospaceforce, and it goes well beyond the '$west a program here, outsource a program there" methodscurrently under
considerat~on.
The recommended orqanizational structure for space services is the United States Space Guard (ussc), a fusion of civil, commercial, and military
Space personnel and I ~ ~ s s ~Alhough o ~ san.armed setvice and a ready instrumentof national policy. the USSG would rema~nan operatingadm~nktrationof the DOTfor day-today operations. In times of crisis. lmay be
A I ~F O ~ The
de~igna~edasanarm~ftheunited~tate~ . Space Guard's funding should come not only from DOD coffers, but also from all militarv, civil, and ~0mmercial
enterprises that benefit from its services.
Inthenearterm, the Space Guard's responsibilities should include all space operations currentlv tracked under the national space policy's mission areas of
space support, force enhancement, and space control. It should work existinq issues such as spaceport safetv and securitv, satellite design, debris
minimization, and more. Likethe historical evolutionofits coastatcountetpart, the USSG should soon assume responsibility for missions such as fixinq disabled satellites,
resupplvinq stations, refuelina satellites, eliminatinq space debris, conductina astronaut search and rescue, monitorinq treaties and sovereiqntv
issues, arbitratina spectrum and sovereiantv issues, arbitratins spectrum interference, and controllina sDace lanes.
Its personnel should come from existinq space structures such as those found within the military, NASA, DOT, FAA, and others. Regardingfhecareer~essim
USSG personnel, they will have space services opportunities ranqinq from space launch and ranqe operations, to satellite trackinq and commandinq,
to on-orbit mission specialties. The Space Guard will at all times be commanded by aeneral officers schooled, trained, and experienced in space
~peclalfi s . Space profess~onalsw~llhave a clear and broadenedcareer path, and other space specialists wfll leadthem.
2k6
1NC Space Guard Counterplan

The counterplan solves for civilian military relations, Air Force overstretch, the global economy, and hegemony
McKinley, commander of the 21st Operations Support Squadron, Peterson AFB, Colorado, 2000 (Lt Col Cynthia A. S., USAF, ex-deputy director of
Press, 1999) Spring, "The Guardians of Space: Organizing America's Space Assets for the Twenty-first Centuryi1Aerospace Power Journal,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apjOO/sprOOlmckinley.htm)
Lookingat the spaceskie of that list, we must ask the inevhablequestion, Shouldthese existing and emergingspace functions reside separately across several departments?The answer is no--there must be a better way. What follows is a
The proposal offers the potential of satisfvinq and reso!vinq the competinq civil, military, andcommercial interestsand
suggestedoganizainnalstruclureforthenation'sspaceassets.
tensions. It frees the Air Force to realize its vision to become a fullv capable aerospace force, and it aoes well beyond the "divest a proqram
inherent
here, outsource a proqrarn there" methods currently under consideration.
The reconmended oganizaimnal structure for space services is the Unned States Space Guard (USSG),a fusion of civil. commercial,and manary space personrd and missbns. Although an armed service and a ready instfument of national policy,
the USSG would remain an operattngadministrationoi the DOTfar day-to-day operations. In tlmes of crisis, 1may be designatedas an a n of the United States Air Force. The Space Guard's flndlng should come not only from DOD coffers.but
also from ail military, civil, and commercial enterprisesthat benefit from its selvtces.
In the near term, the Space Guard's responsibilitiesshould include all space operationscurrently tracked under the national space policy'smission areas of space support, force enhancement,and space corrtrol, II should work e x ~ s i i gissues such
as spacepon safety and secuw, satellie design, debris mmimrzation,and more. L~kethe historical evolution of ~tscoastalcounterpan, the USSG should soon assume rwponsibilq for rmssionssuch as fixing disabled satelhtes, resupplying stations,
refuelng satellites, elimnating space debris, conducting astronaut search and rescue, monitoringlreaies and sovereignty issues, arbitratingspectrum and sovereignty issues, arbiiratingspectrum interference,and controlling space lanes.
Its personnel shouid come from existig space structure$ such as those found whhin the miiitary. NASA, WT, FAA, and others. Regating the career pogression of USSG personnel,they will have space sewices oppotlunitiesranging from space
launch and range operations,to satellne hacking and commanding. to on-orbiim~ssonspec~ailies.The Space Guard will at all times be commandedby general officers schooled,trained. and experiencedin space specian'ies. Space professbnals
will have a clear and broadenedcareer path, and other space specialists will lead them.
Pursuinq the above recommendation results in an orqanization dedicated to civil space concerns, acceptabletomanyspacestakeholden, and involved in national
securitv--all the while allowinq other orqanizations to focus on their core competencies.
lmplementingthepropowdmadeland preparin~Our nation's Space forces forthe future require the Air Force to return to its roots, to retocus itsattentionon itscore war-fig~ingre~p~nsibilities,
the Air Force must accept the imperative for a
and to accept the factthat it must kt evelythtng lying outside the framework of global reach and global power find a new hwne. In short. R means that
fundamental divestiture of all space services. BVdivestinq space services, the Air Force will be free to focus on its core war-fiahting rewonsibilities. ~t
will be unencumberedby the enormous financial responsibilaiesof administeringthe nation's space services. Its C U ~ ~ will
U T enCOmpaSS
~ the flvtna and fiqhtinq Corps that has served it SO well
throuqhout its history. And it will be able to dedicate its space efforts to developing the future space force application systems that will finally allow it to
claim the aerospace title. Onabrgerscale, the nation will have reduced the size of its force structure while improvinq its abilitv to exploit space for national
benefit.
Space systems alfect each d us daii. We learn of world events, communicate, and conduct bushes via satellie links, vlew distant galaxies via space-based telescopes: and consider i t inevitable that we will eventually mine asteroids and planets to
improve lhfe on Earth. m ore than ever before, Space is mnecting the far reachesofour planet exponentiallyincreasingthe rate of learning, and becominq the aatewav to world economic qrowth.
The imperative for Our 0riqinal Space team 10 divest ISinescapable. We must do this ~ ~and inla manner y that supporls the needs of our natimand the space sectors. The only remaning decision
entailslintimgthemodelthatoffersthebesthopeforsuccess. The common qround of space ISan internationallv exploited domain, and Our nation needs a multianencv
orqanization to oversee its interests there.
The strenqth of the Space Guard concept lies in the fact that it takes space services in the same direction as space exploitation, resolves long-
standinq challennes, and frees the Air Force and others to refocus on organizational core competencies. It solidifies our space effort, clarifies
orqanitational responsibilities, and unifies the manv, disparate drumbeats demandinq change.
The USSG is the riqht orqanization for S U C C ~ S S ~exploitation
The timeforactinn is now. U~ of space in the twentv-first centurv. AS the expMation of spacechanges,SO must ourspace
The aovernment must retain oversiqht of the space services that both enable warfare and can be viewed as public aoods. The commercial
fwceschange.
sector must stay ahead of its international competitors. A civil-military space service-the Space Guard-is our best hope for satisfvinq the
competinn interests of all aovernment and commercial sectors.
2k6
1NC Air Force Overstretch Net-benefit

US Space Force would overstretch the Air Force- the Space Guard is key to maintaining Air Force strength
m,professor of comparative military studies at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and Mueller, Associate
professor of comparative military studies at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, 2001(Lt Col Peter, Dr. Karl, February, "Going
Boldly-Where? Aerospace Integration, the Space Commission, and the Air Force's Vision for Space"
http:llwww.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicleslapj/apj0l /sprOl lhays.htm#)
One of the most surprising aspects of the At debate is that both its proponents and the advocates of a separate space force or corps are so quick to
assume that militarv space assets ouqht to be centralized in a sinqle organization. After all, US national securitv space assets are currently divided
between the Air Force and the NRO, and whether or not this arranqement is ideal, it is certainlv one that both parties have accepted with little public
complaint for many years.
This tendencv is particularly visible in the debate surroundinq the most innovative concept for future US space orqanization to appear in some
w - L t Col Cynthia McKinley's recent Aerospace Power Journal article titled "The Guardians of Space."46 In a strikingly original proposal,
McKinlev advocates usinq economic criteria to separate the direct war-fiqhtinq and support functions currently performed by US militarv space
assets, retaining the former in the Air Force while makinq the latter into a United States Space Guard closely based on the organizational model of
the US Coast Guard.47 This new oraanization would fall under the management of the Department of Transportation in peacetime and revert to Air
Force control durinq war or national emerqency. McKinley's suggestion in many ways is crafted to promote Al and would remove from the Air Force
a number of current functions (such as operating the GPS sateltite constellation) for which the service seems to have only limited enthusiasm.
Whether or not McKinley's specific proposal is a good idea-and it does have at least as much to recommend it as do the organizational options that
the Space Commission's charter called for it to considerit reminds us how important the development of the commercial aviation sector was to
early airpower theorists such as Billy Mitchell. It also points out that those who simply assume that mititaw space assets must be combined in a
sinqle service or oraanized in wavs similar to existinq military structures are not lookina beyond a verv narrow sDectrum of choice. It is possible that
centralization of military space will promote the most rapid innovation and development of US space power (whatever that turns out to look like), but
it is at least equally plausible to suggest that healthy competition among rival organizations will be far more effective at achieving this goa1.48 It is
worth noting that Al advocates do not typicallv arque that the division of US militarv aviation amona multiple services has retarded the development
of American airpower thouqht and emgloyment.
Air Force power is key to readiness overall, is critical to our strategic flexibility, diplomacy, fighting terrorism, and deterring
conflict
Thomas Drohan, Commander and Permanent Professor in the 34th education group, 20M), Airman Scholar, Vol. 6 Spring giglio
Modem air power can attack strengths or weaknesses bevond the reach. capacitv and responsiveness of friendlv surface and naval forces. In the
previous era, "strategic bombing" was a blunt instrument. Now, in distinct operations, PGMs have transformed the bludgeon into a rapier which, on
many occasions, may be wielded directly in support
of policy with a fraction of the resources previously required. It mav be brandished for deterrence or coercion. It rnav be inserted or withdrawn in
cadence with diplomatic and other coordinated pressures. Distinct, direct air action can be taken at all levels, from response to state inspired
terrorism, to specific strikes in larqe scale conflicts. Its targets rnav range from the centre of government to an isolated and otherwise inaccessible
terrorist trainina base. An air force which is known to have a lona reach, with or without flight re-fueling, can directly influence policy by its very
existence. An increase in alert states and augmentation of front line personnel are the modern equivalent of Mahan's "fleet in being," except that
diplomacy may now be supported without the expense of surface deployment. Deterrence by air power is as relevant to peace inducement as it is to
maior nuclear or conventional confrontation, provided it is accompanied by a manifest determination to use it, if necessary.
1NC Air Force Overstretch Net-benefit

Turns case- air power is key to sustaining hegemony and prevents conflicts from escalating
Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, 9 (John, 7/28, Palm Beach Post, p. lexb)
Killina the F-22 is simplv not acceptable. It is wronn for national securitv. It is bad economics. And it would put American service members at
unnecessary and unacceptable risk. Operation Allied Force in the skies over Kosovo illustrated that air superiority is the foundation for victorv on
land, at sea and in the air. As we rapidlv deplov decisive combat forces from the United States to the scene of hostilities, fiqhter lets will be the first to
arrive. Thev will help us deter an adversary from attackinq and, if deterrence fails, to fiqht on the qround and in the air, and win. The F-22 would
guarantee success in these vital missions for decades to come. Some critics of the F-22 contend that our country's relatively easy victories in the
past 10 years prove that we don't need a new fighter. They insist that our air power is already far superior to that of any potential enemy. TodayA
though, at least six other aircraft - the Russian MiG-29, SU-27 and SU-35, the French Miraqe 2000 and Rafael and the European Consortium's
Eurofiqhter - threaten to surpass the aqinq F-15, our current top-of-the-line air-to-air fiqhter. These aircraft are marketed agnressivelv around the
world to our allies and potential adversaries. Without the F-22, the United States runs the risk of allowino our air superioritv to atrophv to the point
that an adversary could inflict areat harm on our previouslv superior Air Force. Alreadv, manv nations, amonq them Iran, lraa and North Korea, are
constructinq so~histicatedair defenses built around surface-to-air missile systems such as the Russian SA-10, SA-12 and SA-20. All these missile
svstems are available on the market today. Our current aircraft, such as the F-15 and F-16, lack the F-22's stealth and supercruise abilities and will
be unable to evade or destroy these air defenses without riskinn heavv losses.
Space Force + Air Force Overstretch

A single unified Space Force would fracture the Air Force- killing it readiness and space superiority
McKinley, commander of the 21st Operations Support Squadron, Peterson AFB, Colorado, 2000 (Lt Col Cynthia A. S., USAF, ex-deputy director of
Press, 1999) Spring, "The Guardians of Space: Organizing America's Space Assets for the Twenty-First Century" Aerospace Power Journal,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicleslapj/apj001spr00/mckinley.htm)
The third tension occurs among organizations. Orqanitational frictions arise as the domain draws more players and competing interests. As they go
about their business, the players define niches and defend equities. For the space arena, the number of players and their linkaqes depict a tanqled
underqrowth. It is often difficult to know whom to consult to resolve policy issues, answer questions, or qet help. The flip side is equallv difficult. The
orqanization receivinq the call often does not know how to (or even whether it should) respond. For example, is it an Air Force responsibility to
provide orbital collision avoidance data or analysis of satellite malfunctions to commercial interests? If not, to whom should these companies turn?
With the maturing of space exploitation, these three tensions are creating a universal sense of frustration. Commercial oruanizations feel hindered by
government oraanizationsthat are not keepinq pace with their rush to market. Civil organizations feel overburdened by essential operations that lie
beyond their equities. And military visionaries who see future space operations as kev enablers of a revolution in warfare feel tethered by a
seeminqlv unsupportive infrastructure.
The path our nation should follow for successful space exploitation must strike a balance between mission requirements, core competencies, visions,
and qovernment responsibilities. It must account for the "common qround" space environment; reduce inherent tensions; resolve competing civil,
military, and commercial interests; increase opportunities; allow the Air Force to achieve its vision to become an aerospace force; and continue to
provide the space services upon which our nation depends. Arrivino at the optimal orqanizational structure requires analysis of the space functions of
today and the near future (table 1). Space Services Functions * Range Management ' Navigation Spaceport Securitv * Orbital Slot
Protection * Spectrum Use Monitoring * Dealing with Piracy * Dealina with Interference * Space Surveillance * Collision Avoidance *
Debris Mitiqation and Cleanup Space Environment Research Terrestrial Weather * Solar Research * Astronaut Rescue * Satellite Repair
These functions are currently performed by a variety of organizations throughout the three space sectors. As a result, no unifying organizational
structure exists, and there is no possibility of these functions workinq seamlessly toward a national-level space exploitation objective. Interestingly,
for another environmental medium, our nation has pulled similar functions together under the rubric of one organizational structure. This past
success offers a notional organizational guide for our space future.
2k6
Air Force Key to Hegemony

The Air Force Is Key To Us Power Projection And War Fighting Abiiities-Increasing Personnel Is Key To Effectiveness
Stcokbauer 2003 (Bette, "Rebuilding America's Defenses"- A Summary, http:llwww.countercurrents.orglus-stockbauerO70503.h~)
"Although air power remains the most flexible and responsive element of U.S. military power, the Air Force needs to be restructured, repositioned,
revitalized and enlarged to assure continued 'global reach, global power'' (p. 31). "Because of its inherent mobility and flexibility, the Air Force will be
the first U.S. military force to arrive in a theater during times of crisis; as such, the Air Force must retain its ability to deploy and sustain sufficient
numbers of aircraft to deter wars and shape any conflict in its earliest stages. Indeed, it is the Air Force, along with lhe Army, that remains the core of
America's ability to apply decisive military power when its pleases. To dissipate this ability to deliver a rapid hammer blow is to lose the key
component of American military preeminence" (p. 37). "A gradual increase in Air Force spending back to a $110 billion to $1 15 billion level is
required to increase service personnel strength; build new units, especially the composite wings required to perform the 'air constabulary missions'
such as no-fly zones; add the support capabilities necessary to complement the fleet of tactical aircraft; reinvest in space capabilities and begin the
process of transformation" (p. 37). "The ability to have access to, operate in, and dominate the aerospace environment has become the key to
military success in modern, high-technology warfare. Indeed, as will be discussed below, space dominance may become so essential to the
preservation of American military preeminencethat it may require a separate service. How well the Air Force rises to the many challenges it faces -
even should it receive increased budgets - will go far toward determining whether U.S. military forces retain the combat edge they now enjoy" (pp.
38-39).
Air Power Is A Prerequisite To Other Forms Of Power Projection

Goure, VP Lexington Institute, 2005 (Daniel, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW CQ CongressionalTestimony, Sept. 14, p. lexis)
An example of the problem inherent in the conce~tof overmatch is US. tactical air power. Air dominance is the sine qua non of success in modern
military operations.'~ithoutabsolute control of the air operations Enduring reed om and Iraqi Freedom would have been quite different, if they could
have been pursued at all. Without air dominance, the U.S. military can do nothing else. Once air dominance is achieved, the full weiqht of U.S. air
assets can be fully applied as a joint capability. furthermore, tactical air airpower is a fungible asset. It can transition seamlesslv from establishinq air
dominance to interdictinq hostile forces, to providing air and missile defenses and conductina close air support. So-called overmatch capabilities
were created and sustained because they were and remain absolutely vital to DoD's ability to achieve its strategic objectives and to engage in
conflicts in a manner we prefer. Overmatch capabilities can dissuade potential adversaries from acquirinq certain capabilities or channel their
acauisitions in directions we find les threatening. An excellent example of this is the fleet of nuclear attack submarines created during the Cold War.
For years US, and NATO planners worried about the threat that the Soviet submarine fleet would pose to the trans-Atlantic shipping lanes in the
event of hostilities. The United States engaged in a competitive strategy, matching our strength against their weakness, our SSNs against their ASW.
The Navy deployed its superior submarine capability, its overmatch, in Northern waters to threaten the Soviet fleet at home. The Soviet reaction was
to pull back, spending enormous effort to protect bastions that we never planned to attack.
Heidt/Keenan/Peterson/Sil ber
2k6
1NC Ban Space Counterplan

CP Text: The President of the United States should establish an international treaty banning all acts of war and attack in any
space platform
It Solves- the counterplan avoids an arms race and maintains US hegemony- other nations would follow
DeBlois, Division chief of Strategic Studies and Assessments at the National Reconnaissance Office 1998(Lt Col Bruce, Winter, "Space Sanctuary:
A Viable National Strategy" Aerospace Power Journal, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.millairchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois.html)
Who Is in Charge? Before structuring a national space strateav, we must address the issue of command [authority and responsibility to set strategy)
and control (authority and responsibility to execute strategy). The broad impact of space access and the issues it raises clearly warrant top-level
oversight. Because the executive powers of the president were established for just such circumstances,the president should be "in charqe." Vested
in that "charqe" is both responsibilitv of providing vision and authoritv to set strategy to pursue that vision.
What Is the Vision? The president must produce and communicate a clear vision of where the future of the United States in space will be. John F.
Kennedy's vision of an American man on the moon by the close of the 1960s best illustrates a president's ability to focus a nation toward national
goals in space. The twenty-first-century vision should include the United States as world leader in a peaceful space environment characterized by
both extensive, multinational, exploratory ventures and intense commercial endeavors.
What Is the Best Strategy for Pursuing That Vision? To pursue that vision, the president retains the power to set strateqy. Based upon the argument
presented above, the best strateqv for qettinq to that vision is one of space sanctuary. As stated, this is not a do-nothing strategy. We need to
undertake intense diplomatic efforts to convince a world of nations that space as a sanctuary for peaceful and cooperative coexistence and stability
best serves all. Treaties must address exactly what constitutes a space weapon, commitments to not employ them, mechanisms of
verificationlpolicing, and assurances of punitive response for violations. A treatv with the clause "the positioninq of any weapon in space or attackinq
any space platform will be considered an act of war aqainst all sianatories of this treatv" would provide formal and instant coalition (or collective
security) aaainst any actor seekincl the weaponization of space and would be a natural extension of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Clearly, the
United States has the opportunitv and means to lead the diolomatic ventures, as well as the resources to lead in developinn the methods and tools of
verification37 and punitive response.38
2k6
Ban Space Solves Heqemonv

Space weaponization ban is key to US hegemony, and the economy- the alternative will inevitably result in war and arms race
Garwin, Senior Fellow for Science and Technology Council on Foreign Relations, New York and IBM Fellow Emeriius, '49 (Richard, Oct 25, 'Toward
International Security: The Role of Space Weapons, Antisatellite Weapon Tests, and National Missile Defense" http:llwww.fas.orglRLG/102599-
lakhdhir-htm)
Now is the time for nations to discuss and possibly to negotiate a ban on weapons in space and on antisatellite tests. The U.S. Conaress should
think more deeply than it has yet about the threats to the United States and the cost and effectiveness of various defenses. Sincetheresourcesewendedfor
NationalMissile Defensecould have been used for competing m~lilaryneeds, as well as for other needs of the society that NMD is supposed to pmect, major anention shouM be given to cheaper and more ehdive systems such as bwst-phase
intercept (BPI) for National Miss~leDefense.
IHundredsof satellaes now presmt in space benefit the people of the world both economicallyand by their contributi to internationalsecuriiy. Sate!l~tesrange from those that broadcast television and radio. to voice and data communicalion,to
GPS and GLONASS for precision nawgation,to weather and commercialimagery satellites, to high-pedormancereconnaissancesatellites. In addition, satellites routinely detect the launch of ballistic missiles, a capabilty that is increasingiybeing
shared amono nations.Sc~eniiiicsaleilites for astronomy and for Earth 0bse~ationare revolutionizingour understandingof the unrverse a n d d our planet. Thus far, activities in space have proceededwithout much conflict. Means have been found
for regulationandagreementto minimtze htwference in the radio spectrum, while making more eflicht use of limited spectrum resources. The Outer Space Treaty bars the stationtng of nuclear weapons in space, or "other weapons of mass
destruct~on."And nations are responsible for damages that their space activities may cause to others, pehaps including destructionof the space assets of another naiin. The situation is comol~catedbv the fact that there is now so much prlvate
commerctal activity in space, onen in the form of international consortia in large mmplexes of communicationsatellites, in the prcduction of commerc~alimagery, and the like.
The prospect of denial of peaceful use of space is what led the nations of the world to adopt the Outer Space Treaty. Inream. stafioninq a few nuclear
weapons in space is far more costly than providinq for their delivery aqainst targets on Earth, asneeded. Beyondnuclear weapons, there have been
proposals for stationinq thousands of small interceptor rockets in space, to destroy ballistic missiles in fliaht traiectorv, and there is a good deal of
enthusiasm for stationing powerful lasers in space for attack of tarsets in space, in the air, and on the qround. Again, if one had a sinale laser in
space, it miqht take hoursordays for the Earth to rotate and the laser to be at an appropriate point in its orbit to threaten a tarqet on the qround or in the
-
air. However, a subs!anllal number ilweapons in space mtght be able to destroy targets withtn minutes of the command to do so, ifthe largels were visible and not below clouds. The prospect of such weapons in space leads
immediatelv to the consideration of counters to space weapons.
JUS~because space weapons. ~noppo~ed, can have signiintcapabilay, both those con temp la tin^ the deployment of such weapons and those who miqht be on the receivinq side
have long considered how to counter them. In the Cold War era, it was perfectly clear that deployment of space weapons by the Soviet Union would
have led to effective ASAT deployed by the United States; conversely. the Soviet Union was fully capable ot providing the necessaryASATIO counter U.S. space weapons xi was true even in the case of
what were supposed to be relatively low cost 'brilliant pebbles",deployed by the many thousands in order to counter Soviet ICBMs and submarinelaunched ballistic missles (SLBMs). But a simple analysis shaw lhat if is far easier and
cheaper to destroy such satellites by qround-based ASAT. as their population is beina built up in space.(l)Neither the motivation nor the capability is
SO clear ifl a world in which Russia no l0nqer is all enemv of the United States, andvice versa. Therefore,no individual nation has SO stmngamotivation aspreviousiytocounterthe deployment
ofspaceweapons. To the extent that space weaponrv would be seen to confer heqemony, nations orconsofiiaotnations would oppose them. theab~en~e~fadequate
imernationalagreementsto protect its actbit~esin space (andthe United States government is not at present apparently seeking such agreements).the United States Department of Detense has launcheda Space Control Technology Programthat
will include elements of "protection,prevention.negaion. and suweillance" of various space actvities. The goal IS olten stated as "space control." which conjures up the vision of antisatellite w e a n s (ASAT) that could destroy satellites at will. In
1999(2) Bob Bellof the U S. NationalSecurity Council spoke about space wntml as toliows: ''We need not be victim lo old think', The old-think Cold War mentally was that we envision space control as ASAT, and we equate ASAT wilh a dedicated
system that went up and destroyed something.VpparentlyBell emphasizes options such as destroyrng or jammtng the link between an adversary's satellne and the Earlh Unforlunatety,many satellites are extemehj vulnerable to destructionby
weapons launched from the ground- ASAT or antisatelllie weapons. The Sovtet Union tested many times a socalled co-orbhal ASAT, which was launchedinto an orb#similar to that of the quarry satellfie, and afler an oh11or so moved close
enough so that an explosion could propel pellets ol the ASAT wamead to destroy the quarv satellite. The Unled States has had developmemprograms lor ASAT weapons. It had dephyed two nuclear-armedASAT systems but destroyedthem long
ago More recently n developedthe miniaturehommg vehicle (MHV) technology.for a weapm that could be launchedham an F-15 or other aircraft, that would not enter obit but that would simply arrive at the right time to meet asatellite in low-
Earlh orbit (LEO) and colirde with il. This is the same technology that is being deployed wih the Patriot short-rangeTheater M~ssileDefense (TMD) system, and has been chosen for longer-rangeTMD and for the interceptorforthe proposed
Natlonal Missile Defense (NMD) system. Destroying a satellte IS far simpler than destroying a warhead carriedon a reentry vehicle ior several reasons: o The satellite is far more tragile than is a nuclear warhead equipped with reentry vehicle. o The
satellne follows a highly predictableIrajectory. o The satellie is considerably largerthana warhead. o The intercept time can be chosen, lor the most part, at the convenience of the attacker, and the altack can take place within a short range of
around-basedradars or laser svstems to atd ihe attack. The oDtimum ASAT system would be a ground-launchedrocket carrying an MHV- capable simply of rising to an atiude of 500 km or so to be able to reach the satellite lhat would be under
attack. It is not so easy to destroy a satellitem geosmchronous orbit, such as-are most ot the TV broadcaa satellnes, some weather satellites, or even in intermediateEarlhorbit (MEO) such; Ihe navigationsatellies- GPS. But many valuable
svstems are in LEO, and some of them in small numbers and ofthe greatest importance to internationalsecurii. These includethe systems long known as NationalTechnical Means (NTM)that are protecled aqalnst bilateralattack by the ABM
Treatyof 1972 and the SALTAgreements. In 1983, I tetiied to the Senate Foreign Relations camittee in supportof a draft treatv limitins antisatellite weapons, presemedtoihatsame Commiitee in May 1983 by the
Union of Concerned Scient~sts.I had played a roie in drafting the proposedtreaty.(3]The firsttwo ArticlN of the drail Article I "Each Parh, undertakes not to destroy, damacre, render inoperable
or chanqe the fliqht trajectory of space obiects of other States.' s me 11"t. Each Party undertakes not to place in orbit around the Earth weapons for
destroyinq, damaqinq, renderinq inoperable, or chanqina the fliqht traiectorv or space obiects, or for damaqinq obiects in the atmosphere or on the
ground. "2. Each Party undertakes not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. "3.
Each Party undertakes not to test such Weapons in Space Or against Space obiects." ~hhoughsome padicipants in the CDargue thatthere isal present no arms race in space and no reason
tonegoiateoreven~~discuss~pacearmsmntrn~.I believethat the best time to introduce such treaties and ~ e q ~ l a t i is ~ nwhens there is not active conflict or even an
approach to conflict in space. Tothis end. Iquote the final paragraph In mytestlmony of ~ a ia,iga3. y " ... we can urgently neaotiate a treatv alona the lines of the Draft
presented here, or we can see the wealth and security of our nation imperiled by a needless conflict in space, brouqht about by a qreater desire
for advantaqe than for mutual benefit, and fostered by emer~ingdoctrine and organizations which regard soace as an opportunitv for conflict rather
than the marvelous tool and environment which it is. We can trv to make space safe for all non-weapon activities,or we can risk our own
continued militarv and civil use of space. Neqotiation, wfihouttuflhsrASATtests, is an opportunitv we will not have much lonqer." Ibeltevelhatacansensushasevoived
~ ~ a ~weapons
since i 9 8 4 t 0 t h ~ e f l e c i t h a t m i l i t a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ f ~ ~ ~butthat e p e r m i d ~ din
. space are problematical and could be verv destabitizinq. ~yownviewisthatif there are weapons in
space, then there will be extensive development and de~lovmentof ASAT, in order to neqate those weapons. Funhemre, it is relativeiy easy. as I indicated in my previous
writings, to deploy 'space mines' which muld be very small and relatively crude satellies that could provide a rap~dcapability of destroying valuable space assets. I believe that the time is now for the nations capable of
developinq ASAT or of puttino weapons into space to discuss such matters and to draft aareements with the aim of preventinq deployment of space
weapons and of preventinqtests of antisatellite weapons.
Ban S ~ a c eSolves Heaemonv

Banning space weapons and ASATs solves hegemony and US space development
Hitchens, CDI Vice President, 2002 (Theresa, April 18 'Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? The Policy Implications of U.S.
Pursuit of Space-BasedWeapons", http:ilwww.cd~.orglmissile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm)
The potential for strategic consequences of a space race has led many experts, including within the military, to tout a space arms control regime as
an alternative. A ban on space weapons and ASATs could help preserve - at least for some time -the status quo of U.S. advantaoe (especially if
coupled with U.S. moves to shore up passive satellite defenses). In a recent article in Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Jeffrey Lewis, a
graduate research fellow at the Center for International Security Studies at the University of Maryland, makes a good case for an arms control
approach, arguing: "If defensive deplovments in space cannot keep pace with offensive developments on the around, then some measure of
restraininq offensive ca~abilitiesneeds to be found to even the playinq field."
In any event, it is clear that U.S. policy-makers must look at the potential strateaic and direct military risks, and the costs, of weaponizinq space.
Space Weaponization would lead to a global arms race with nuclear super-powers. Only banning the deployment can solve for
international tensions and maintain US hegemony.
Caldicott and Eisendrath 2k5 [Dr. Helen, Craig, 'No Weapons in Space', The Baltimore Sun, May 19&
[http://www.nuclearpolicy.org/fileslnuclearlBaltimore%20Sun%2Oarti~1e%2Oby%2OHe1en%2OCaldi~0tt%2Oand%2OCrai
g%20Eisendrath.doc]
[If one genie is already out of the bottle for space militarization, another genie can and must be contained by preventing
space weaponization. Weapons do not now orbit in outer space. There are powerful reasons why such weapons should be
forbidden. First, placin~weapons in space inevitably would provoke an arms race there. Such a race eventualIy would
consume hundreds of billions of dollars. It is simply inconceivable that the United States could place weapons in outer
space without provoking other nations such as China. Russia, Japan and countries in the European Union to do the same.
Second, most space-based weapons are inefficient in relation to those based on the ground or in the atmosphere. If we
want to destroy a missile site or a troop deployment or bomb a nuclear reactor, it is far more effective to do this with a
ground-based missile or pilotless aircraft. Space-based weapons are also radically more expensive than land-based
weapons or aircraft. Third, the United States is already the dominant military power in the world, spending about $500
billion a year on the defense budget, including money for current wars, with technologv that far exceeds any possible
&,including Russia and China. Adding outer space as a new dimension of our military presence is simply not
necessary. Such a move adds a new gesture to our military posturing without increasing our security. Finally, a resuonse
to any possible arms race in outer space is alreadv available: a draft international treaty forbidding space weaponization
that was proposed by Russia and China in 2002. The United States has been alone among the great powers in refusing to
endorse U.N. General Assembly resolutions on outer space and the draft treaty. Other countries are eager for an
agreement,
- just as they are for a nuclear test ban that includes underground testing, an international criminal court, an
agreement on global warming as well as treaties on land mines, smaIl arms and chemical and biological weapons. In
refusing to sim a treaty on space weaponization and these other significant international accords, the United States is
virtually alone in thwarting the world in its efforts to achieve disarmament and environmental sanity through multilateral
agreements. In 1967, the United States led the world in pursuing the Outer Space Treaty, which forbids the orbiting of
weapons of mass destruction - but not non-WMD. Today, we are the ones obstructing the world in its desire to seal off
space as a potential area of weaponization. U.S. policv is driven not by a need to ensure our security but by lobbyists who
need to secure contracts for their defense industry corporate employers. It is beyond time for the United States to agree to
sign an international treaty to prevent weapons from being deployed in outer space, a policy that would serve the country
and not a select group of corporations. The issue of space weaponization is a test case for this administration to reach out
to other nations and to set the safest and most sensible direction for the nation and, indeed, the world.
Heidt/Keenan/Peterson/Silber
Ban Solves China Relations

Banning Space Weapons is key to US-China Relations
Zhanq 2k5 [Hui, 'Action/Reaction: U .S. Space Weaponization and China', Arms Control Today, December, Accessed at
Proquest.]
Given the possibility of effective and cheap countermeasures, it seems foolish to many Chinese that the United States
would bother to deploy hiphly expensive space-based weapons or anti-satellite technologies. If Washington really wants
to reduce the potential vulnerability of its space assets, there are a number ways to improve space security, including
technical approaches, rules of the road, and arms control agreements. By contrast, weaponizing space can only further
worsen space securitv. As Hu emphasized recently, "[F] or ensuring security in outer space, political and legal
approaches...can still be effective, while resorting to force and the development of space weapons will only be counter-
productive."
In China's view, the most effective wav to secure space assets would be to aqree on a ban on space weaponization. As its working
paper to the CD emphasizes, 'Onlv a treatv-based prohibitionof the deplovment of weapons in outer space and the prevention of the
threat or use of force aqainst outer space obiects can eliminate the emerqinq threat of an arms race in outer space and ensure the
security for outer space assets of all countries which is an essential condition for the maintenance of world ~eace."China's stance on
banninq weapons in outer space has been consistent since 1985 when it first introduced a working paper to the CD on its position on
space weapons. China's most recent working paper on the issue, introduced in June 2002, emphasizes three basic obligations:
2k6
Space Ban = Executive Authority

Space policies are determined by the president, they are his inherent authority
Logsdon, Research Professor of Space Policy and International Affairs at George Washington University (John, Professor Emeritus of Political
Science and International Affairs, No Date "The Politics of Space: Understanding Space Policymaking" http:llwwwl .jsc.nasa,govlerlseh/political.html
As an area of government activity, the U.S. space proqram has been prominent for a quarter centurv. The qovernment has made and implemented
numerous decisions about the objectives, pace, and management of various elements of the US, space proqram, and policymakers continue to
address and resolve many such concerns. (The focus on government decisions does not deny the importance of diverse private sector space-related
decisions, but until recently the government-sponsored activity dominated the U S ,space program.) Political scientists have developed a variety of
approaches to understand and analyze the policymaking process, and such methods can be applied directly to comprehending the formulation of
space policy.
Unfortunately, the public policy decisionmaking process is extremely difficult to study. Space policies, particularly those of hiqhest siqnificance, are
determined within the executive branch of the qovernment, often without public or even Conqressional participation. President John F. Kennedy once
argued that the factors that influence the most prominent national policy discussions never could be completelv understood: "There will alwavs be
the dark and tangled stretches in the decisionmakinq process<mysterious even to those who may be most intimatelv involved , . . " (1).
2k6
Space Force Won't Solve

Increasing the size of the Space Force won't solve- conflicting cultures and identity make it incompetent
m,commander of the 21st Operations Support Squadron, Peterson AFB, Colorado,2000 (Lt Col Cynthia A. S., USAF, ex-deputy director of
Press, 1999) Spring, 'The Guardians of Space: Organizing America's Space Assets for the Twenty-First Century Aerospace Power Journal,
http:llwww.airpower,maxweIl.af.millairchronicleslapj/apjOO/spr00/mckinley,htm)
Organizations are ueatedlo accomplisha unique set of missions. As l s members embrace those responsbilities, a culture that epitomizes~ o ne n sof identity fonns around those core missions. When the organization begms lo
extend ilseil beyond this raison #&re, cultural tensions qulckly emerge.
The Air Force, for example, was formed to "fly and fight," and the words global reach, glcbal power best convey its sense of identity. With its flyand-fight self-hage, a degree of friction has atways existed between the Air Force's air and space
cultures. At the hearl of this discord lies the fact that today's space capab~liiesremam outside the Air Force's sense of identity.
Duringthe past demde and a haH,this &cord has beenthrust into the spotlight each time the service's leadership has attemptedto erase the cultural gap by force-fiing space operations inlo me Ar F ~ c e ' ssense of identity. The Air Force's
methods have included attemptsto operationatze. n o m i u e , and, of late, Integrate space weralions. The first two did not bridge the gap, and the last, despite its far more aggressive execution, will have the same result--butb r reasons lhat bear
explication
First, a fundamental cultural dichotomy separates today's air and space communities: the difference between war fighting and support--between war-
fighting and non-war-fighting cultures. Both war fiahtinq and support are essential for national security, but the world in which each operates @
different demands and expectations. At the most basic level, air warriors think in airpower war-fiahfna terms: operatinq and sustaininq aircraft at
bases, flvina to taraets, accomplishinq a mission, and returning to base. They think in terms of campaign planning, operational art, and tactical
success. Today's space operators think in terms of space services support: placinq a satellite on orbit, continuously exploitinq its data, and sendinq
its critical data to people who need it. These characteristics represent two equally important yet distinct cultures: one based upon a war-fiqhter mind-
set and the other upon a support mind-set. Like trying to mix oil and water, it is, quite simply, unrealistic to expect the two to become one.
The dnve lo rreegelhesp two d,stnd cvtures mrnugh mtegratlmnas ns roots m the fall 10% m o n a meerinc o'lne Ar Force s senor leaders. AHhwgh they criglnallr vieweo lnteg-allon as a methoo by v;hich to guarantee cn!lnued An Force
stewardshipof srace, wInln months of h e meet ng. nlegrat nn was neing interpr44 as tne necessay and sun clent cond~tionby ivnicfi the Air Force could seze t i e oppcrlunly 1c ca; ~tseHan aerospaceforce
At the outset, a's imDonant to note that the Air Force is the premier mil'ilaryorganizahon fw exploiting the aerospace. Na other sewice can cUm to have a war.f~htingculture or vision that so fully embracesaemsoace oaver. From dav one.the Air
Forces culture, core competencies and sense of laen!lty have been wrappedin ns aoil11.ylo provide global react and power on beha?of our national Imerests. Inaeec, the Air Force's transfomlatlon ,nto an aerospacekrce sh3u d ocdr swner
rather than later, sur lo erect the rans sf or ma ti or, the Air Forne must grasp the true meanlng and ~ndcatotonof being an aerospace pober. IPakl't~onto ks ~nabilityto b ~ d g the
e chasm Serheeq war-+~~;hllng
and nowwar-tighmgculures--regardlessof
the level of m i l m e n 1and awareness--mtegrationw~ilnot transformthe Air Force inm an aerospace power for at least two reasons
lntearatinq space capabilities and personnel into mainstream Air Force operations and staffs neither equates to nor creates aerospace power in its
most visionarv sense. We will achieve aerospace power when we take the revolutionary leaps to foster new ways of employing forces and new ways
of conducting warfare. We will achieve it when we directly employ space-warfare platforms to achieve military objectives.
In addn~on,Be Air Force lsnt alone ~nIs quesl to better Integrate Vace capabllles All of the mllary sewlces face sm~larntegratlon challenges and opporluntles the e m state of wn.ci IS spelled o v In Jo~ntVs~on20102 To say that Lsng space
services to lmorcve almvter makes tte Alr Force an aerosaace -orce inpans that us~nqspaceto nnprove land D. sea power makes the k m r a land-space force and 1 k Navy a marnme-space force Crovmmg onlv .
, soace SewIceS and lPlwranno e .
those sewice; ~ n mmainstreamalr operatmns will not create aerospace power Aym, me key to bemmng an aerospacepower l~esIn the operatanal use of space as a war-fighllng med~um.
The Air Force will ach~eveits vision of becomingan aerospace force, but it must firs1have aerospace power capablilies--that is, the anainment of aerospace power must precedethe service's claims of being an aerospace force. Throughoutour
nation's use of orblal space for national security, the Air Force's war-fghling operations have been restricted to atmospheric war hghting. This will change early in the first h l f of the twenty-first century. The capabilitiesthat will allow operational
expbiiationof the entire aerospace medium, create aerospace power, and allow the Air Force to change its monikerto Aerospace Force are already on the drawing board.
The most obvious exampk is the Space Operatmns Vehicle (SOV).3 Wthin two decdes. this vehicle will allow me UniledStates to pmjed power, not in the severalhours it does today but inminvles. It will allow the United States 10 project power.
not just within the atmosphere but in orbital space, in the atmosphere,and to the sulfate of the planet. This, along with other future capabilkies, win naturally extend the war-fighting responsibihtiesof airmen into the enhre aerospace medium. In
short, ~nthe next couple of decades, the Air Force's core competenciesand visionary concepts win transform it from an air force into an aerospace force that operationally employs both air and space platlorms to achieve our nation's military
objectives.
But we are speaking of the future--not the present. Despite valiant efforts to force the Air Force's air and space cultures to merqe, the qap between
the service's sense of identitv and its current space responsibilities remains. For the Air Force to achieve its vision of becoming an Aerospace Force,
it must focus its space efforts on those systems that fit within its olobal reach, alobal power identity. Furthermore, it must relinquish its noncore, non-
war-fighting responsibilitiesfor providing space services.
Although the Air Force's leadership has not realized this fact or the magnitude of its implications, evidence exists that some senior leaders are
beginning to discover it. During the past couple of years, the Air Force's senior leadership has found itself concurrently defending its space
stewardship role white questioning, for example, its primary management of launch ranges--especiallynow that commercial activity outpaces
government launches. It is becoming increasingly obvious that few of todav's s~ace-relatedactivities fall within the Air Force's core competencv of
providinq qlobal reach and power.
Similar cultural tensions are a~parentin other sectors of the space community. NASA faces internal struqqles when it contem~latesroutine shuttle
services, continuous replenishment of the internationalspace station, astronaut rescue, and satellite repair instead of stickinq to its science,
research, and exploration charter. NASA questions how providing routine space shuttle operations--especially to the international space station--fits
with its traditional focus on exploration. Similarly, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) questions its potential role as provider of both air- and
space-traffic control.
These cultural stresses are natural.When organizationsextend themselves beyond their sensed identity, cuRural frictions inevilably arise. These tensions do not lessen the relative value of the missions in question. Qute the cmtrary, the missions
remain vilal and essenltnl. Conductingshuttle flights and managng launch ranges are clear examples.But as the missions extend beyond the organization's ratson d'gtre, cultural tensions will and must emerge.
2k6
A2: Militarization Inevitable

Their militarization and arms race inevitability claims are a self-fulfilling prophecy- we should only plan where and how the
IJS should go into space
A Viable National Strategy" Aerospace Power Journal, http:liwww.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98ldeblois.html)
If we continue to assume that maior qlobal warfare between nations is inevitable and prepare for it accordingly, we condemn ourselves to that future.
Doinq so assumes determinism-that the future will happen and that we have to optimize our position in it. That assumption is not necessarily true
and runs counter to the American spirit. The future is what we make it. Perhaps we need to spend a little less time creatina weapons to protect
ourselves in a future that we are destined to stumble into and a little more time buildinq the future we would want to live in. More than challenqins a
flawed assumption, this article suqqests a replacement-an assumption that is both more optimistic about the nature of people gnJ one that
resonates with the American spirit: "The United States will lead the world into space; we only need to decide where and how to go."
Space weaponization is not inevitable-the ball is in the US court

Mueller, 2k2 [Karl, RAND institute, 'Is the Weaponization of Space inevitable?', March 27, http:llwww.isanet.oralnoarchive/mueller.html~
On the other hand, it is also clear that space weaponization is not inevitable in the very near term for the simple reason that onlv the
United States possesses the resources and capabilities that would be required to deplov space weapons in a serious way before the
end of the decade, and probably for some years beyond 2010. In manv of the historical precedents that tend to be compared to space
weaponization, such as the development of ironclad warships in the 1860s, Dreadnought battleships after 1900, or atomic weapons in
the 1940s, the same technology was being eagerly developed in several major countries at once, so the leading state simply faced a
choice between leadinq the revolution and followinq in its wake.[l I ] In this case, in contrast, the United States can unilaterallv choose
whether space will be weaponized, at least for a while.
Space weaponization is not inevitablethe costs outweigh the benefits-no country will jump on board
Mueller, 2k2 [Karl, RAND institute, 'Is the Weaponization of Space inevitable?', March 27, http:l/www.isanet.orqinoarchive/mueller.html]
The premise that states are selfish rational actors in an anarchic world actually predicts little about what their specific policies will be in
the absence of additional information or assumptions. In fact, warfare and states' preparations for war are often limited by a wide
varietv of rational considerations, most of which have little to do with formal arms control negotiations. Deplovinn space weapons
would involve a variety of potential political costs and benefits, both domestic and international, and is far from unreasonable to think
that states miqht shy awav from such a course even if it promisedto increase their absolute militaw capabilities, depend in^ on the
complete set of incentives and disincentives facina them. As the space weapons debate itself proves, the norm of space as an
unweaponized sanctuaw that has evolved during the past forty-five years is far from politicallv insignificant. Of course, the more
important a military innovation appears to be to a state's security, the more likely it is to be adopted, even if the price for doing so is
fairly high, while it is relatively easy to give up military opportunities of limited value. For example, the longstanding success of the
multilateral 1957 treaty prot-libitingmilitary bases in Antarctica, often cited as an example of an effective sanctuary regime, would be
more impressive if the signatory powers had strong incentives to establish bases on that continent. Yet even so it flies in the face of
the idea that weaponization will follow wherever people go; the argument that space weapons in particular will have military utility too
great to resist is a different propositionfrom the contention that weapons always spread everywhere, and will be later in this e s s a y a
variety of weapons have fallen into disrepute over the last centuw, While they have not yet disappeared, chemical and bioloqical
weapons have been shunned by all but renegade states. Anti-personnel land mines are followinq in their wake. Manv states that could
easily have developed nuclear weapons have opted not to do so, in some cases in spite of apparently vew ~ o o dmilitary reasons to go
nuclear.[l5] Perhaps most strikingly of all, even amonq space weapons advocates one does not find voices arquinq that the placement
of n ~ c k aweapons
r in orbit is inevitable based on the rule that weapons always spread. The fact that this has not happened is due to many factors other
than the Outer Space Treaty's prohibitionon such weaponization, but if some weapons do not necessarily follow wherever people go, the idea that a law of human nature requires that
others will do so should not be taken very seriously.
A2: Militarization Inevitable
~ e a ~ o n i z a t i hisnnot inevitable-the US can protect its interests without space

Mueller, 2k2 [Karl, RAND institute, 'Is the Weaponization of Space inevitable?', March 27, http://www.isanet.orqlnoarchivelmueller.htm~~
These are all reasonable arguments, but to conclude from them that space weaponization is inevitable, rather than merely possible or
even likelv, is unwarranted, for several reasons. There is no question that space systems are a key center of gravity (or perhaps
several) US. militarv capabilities. An enemy that attacked them miqht be able to impair U.S. militaw operations very seriouslv, and
this ranks hiqh amonq threats that concern U.S. strategists. It need not follow from this that the enemies of the United States will do
-
so, or invest in the weapons required to do so, however. The U.S. armed forces possess many important vulnerabilities that
adversaries have often, even consistently, opted not to attack in past conflicts. To cite but one widely-discussed example, during
Operation Allied Force in 1999, Serbia apparently did not attempt to mount special forces attacks against key NATO airbases in Italy or
to use manpoltable missiles to shoot down aircraft operating from them during take-off or landing, although such an action could have
profoundly disrupted the Alliance's bombing campaign.[35] Moreover, it is quite possible that if a potential enemy did want to develop
the ability to attack US. space svstems, it would choose to do so in wavs--such as investing in ground-based ASAT lasers or
computer network attack capabilities-that would not involve weaponizinq space, and against which the logical defensive
countermeasures would not involve placing U.S. weapons in orbit either. For military as well as commercial satellites, "bodyguard
weapons in space would offer protection only from certain sorts of attacks, while the terrestrial links in satellite systems would remain
inviting targets. Again it is the transition to larger networks of smaller satellites that will do the most to reduce vulnerability, perhaps
together with supplementing satellite platforms for some military functions with new types of terrestrial systems, such as high
endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),[36] and improving terrestrial weapons with which to attack ground-based ASATs and
satellite launch and control facilities. Conversely, if the United States decides that it must have the ability to deny an enemy the use of
its satellites, itquite possible that the most attractive means for doins this will prove to involve non-space weapons and, to an even
greater extent, tools that are not weapons in the conventional sense at all.
Space Weaponization inevitable claims are false and do not justify US action
Mueller, 2k2 [Karl, RAND institute, 'Is the Weaponization of Space inevitable?', March 27, htt~:/lwww.isanet.o~lnoarchivelmueller.html~
The weaponization of space is not inevitable, at least insofar as we can discern the future at this point. Whether weaponization will
occur,
-- and if so when and kwhom, is uncertain, and it will certainly be affected by the decisions of U.S. military space policvmakers in
the cominq decade. If these decisions are to be sound ones, it will be vital to base them upon far more solid qround than prophecies of
inevitable weaponization that have been offered too freely, and accepted too uncritically by too manv, often based upon little more than
superficial historical analoqies and glib strategic aphorisms.[44] These must qive way to substantial, detailed arguments and critical
analvsis, for the choices that lie before us are too important to permit anything less.
Space Militarization Bad- HeqemonylArms Race

Space militarization would result in an arms race and killing hegemony- outweighing any potential short term benefits of
developing first, our evidence is comparative
Hitchens, CDI Vice President, 20M (Theresa, April 18 "Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? The Policy Implications of U.S.
Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons", http:llwww.cdi.orglmissile-defenselspaceweapons.cfm)
China and Russia lona have been worried about possible U.S. breakout on space-based weaponry. Officials from both countries have expressed
concern that the U.S. missile defense program is aimed not at what Moscow and Beijing see as a non-credible threat from rogue-nation ballistic
missiles, but rather at launching a long-term U.S. effort to dominate space.
Both Russia and China also are key proponents of negotiations at the UN Conference on Disarmament to expand the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to
ban all types of weapons. The effort to start talks known as PAROS, for "prevention of an arms race in outer space," has been stalled due in large
part to the objection of the United States. For example, in November 2000, the United States was one of three countries (the others were Israel and
Micronesia) to refuse to vote for a UN resolution citing the need for steps to prevent the arming of space.
It is inconceivable that either Russia or China woutd allow the United States to become the sole nation with space-based weapons. "Once a nation
embarks down the road to qain a huae asvmmetric advantage, the natural tendency of others is to close that aap. An arms race tends to develop an
inertia of its own," writes Air Force Lt. Col. Bruce M. DeBlois, in a 1998 article in Airpower Journal.
Chinese moves to put weapons in space would triclaer regional rival India to consider the same, in turn, spurring Pakistan to strive for ~aritvwith
India. Even US, allies in Europe miaht feel pressure to "keep up with the Joneses." It is quite easy to imagine @course of a _newarms race in
space that would be nearlv as destabilizinq as the atomic weapons race proved to be.
Such a strateqic-level space race could have neqative consequences for U S , security in the long run that would outweiqh the obvious (and
tremendous) short-term advantaqe of beinci the first with space-based weapons. There would be direct economic costs to sustaining orbital
weapon systems and keeping ahead of opponents intent on matching US. space-weapon capabilities -raisins the proverbial question of whether
we would be startinq a game we might not be able to win. (It should be remembered that the attacker will always have an advantage in space
warfare, in that space assets are inherently static, moving in predictable orbits. Space weapons, just like satellites, have inherent vulnerabilities.)
Again, the price tag of space weapons systems would not be trivial - with maintenance costs a key issue. For example, it now costs commercial
firms between $300 million and $350 million to replace a single satellite that has a lifespan of about 15 years, according to Ed Comet, vice president
of Booz Allen and Hamilton consulting firm.
Many experts also argue there would be costs, both economic and strategic, stemminq from the need to counter other asvmmetric challenqes from
those who could not afford to be participants in the race itself. Threatened nations or non-state actors miqht well look to terrorism usina chemical or
biological aqents as one alternative.
Karl Mueller, now at RAND, in an analysis for the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, wrote, "The United States would
not be able to maintain unchallenqed heqemonv in the weaponization of space, and while a space-weapons race would threaten international
stability, it would be even more danqerous to US, security and relative power projection capabilitv, due to other states' sianificant ability and
probablv inclination to balance symmetrically and asymmetrically against ascendant U.S. power."
Spurrinq other nations to acquire space-based weapons of their own, especially weapons aimed at terrestrial targets, m c e r t a i n l y undercut the
ability of U.S. forces to operate freely on the around on a worldwide basis - neqatinq what today is a unique advantaqe of beina a military
superpower.
Space Militarization Bad- Heqemony

The best way to protect satellites in space is not to go there- militarization would cause an arms race that only makes problems
more likely to occur
Krepon 01
(Michael Krepon, President Emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center and Co-Editor of Global Confidence Building: New Tools for Troubled
Regions, "Lost in Space; The Misguided Drive Toward Antisatellite Weapons," Foreign Affairs, MayIJune 2001, lexis)
With the qlobal economy so intimately tied to assets in space, space-warfare initiatives bv the Bush administration could also create havoc with
satellite-dependent commerce. The extent of damaqe that the loss of a key satellite could cause was suqqested by the failure of a Galaxy IV satellite
in Mav 1998. When the computer controllinq the satellite broke down, 80 percent of U.S. paqers -- affectinq 37 million users -- went dead. Some
radio and television stations were knocked off the air, while qas stations and retail stores found themselves unable to verify credit card transactions.
The Rumsfeld commission cites this event as a harbinger of America's future vulnerability in space to malefactors and hence as another reason to
implement its recommendations. But the best wav to protect U.S. satellites and U.S. commerce would be to head off such warfare in space before it
ever got started, rather than to lead the charqe. Washinqton can avoid an arms race in space by keepinq national missile defenses limited and
focused on troubled reqions where missile threats abound. But because even properlv confiqured missile defenses would have residual ASAT
capabilities, the Un~tedStates must now pursue new initiatives against space warfare. Treaties on ASATs could take a long time to negotiate and
would still leave many issues unresolved. In the short run, informal agreements to ban all weapons in space and to bar the testinq and deployment of
"dedicated"ASATS would be reassurinq, verifiable -- and very much in the national interest.
Establishing "rules of the road" for activities in space is therefore now essential. Fortunately, a model exists: extant agreements that prevent
dangerous practices at sea. A U.S.-Soviet accord, negotiated in 1972 after a series of provocative naval incidents, has been widely replicated by
other navies. These "IncSea" agreements are designed to prevent collisions, dangerous maneuvers or simulated attacks, blinding the bridges of
naval vessels with lasers, and other reckless acts at sea, They work well and could be made to apply in space. Such rules, moreover, will be
increasingly necessary as missile defense programs mature. The "lncSea\greements were negotiated by senior military officers and were never
codified as treaties, but they are still enormously useful. New accords to avoid incidents in space could take the form of executive agreements
between national authorities -- again avoiding the cumbersome treaty process.
As the Rumsfeld report signifies, pressure is now mountinq on the Bush administration to reassess U.S. space policy. Washinqton must choose one
of two paths: dominance, which means puttin4 more and better weapons in space or on earth than anyone else can afford, or reassurance. Because
of the threat of asymmetrical warfare, dominance would be very hard to achieve and would have many adverse effects. The best way to protect
space commerce and U S , national security, therefore, is to avoid ASATs and weapons in space in the first place.
An arms race in space was avoided during the Cold War due in part to the assumption that the Kremlin would compete with and nullify American
moves. Now the sole remaining superpower may be tempted to slouqh off treatv constraints and to seek protection through unilateral initiatives. If
this strateav is pursued, it will no doubt be couched in flexible and reassurinq language. But US, allies and potential adversaries will see it as
somethino else: the hubris of imperial overstretch. And they will react accordinalv.
Space Militarization Bad- Extinction

Space weaponization will encourage countries to destroy US satellites and cause a global war through accidental launch
including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
Mitchell, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, Ayotte and Helwich,Teaching Fellows
in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, 2
0N
(Dr. Gordon R., Kevin J., David Cram, lSlS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, "Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a
Crossroads", No. 6 July, http:llwww.isisuk.demon.co.uklO811lisis/uk/bmd/no6.htmI)
A buildup of space weapons miqht beqin with noble intentions of 'peace throuqh strenqth' deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency
that . the presence of space weapons...will result in the increased likelihood of their use1.33This drift toward usaqe is strenqthened bv a strategic
I..
fact elucidated by Frank Barnabv: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technoloqies qo hand-in-
-
hand1.34
The interlockinq nature of offense and defense in military space technoloqv stems from the inherent 'dual capabilitv' of spaceborne weapon
components. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something in
space, you could use the same capability to target something on land'. 35 To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors based in space can knock
out enemy missiles in mid-flight,such interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sendins munitions hurtlina throuah the
Earth's atmosphere.
The dizzvinq speed of space warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into strateaic calculations, with the spectre of split-second
attacks creatinq incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair triqqer' devices. In theory, automation would enhance survivability of
vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, bv takinq the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowinq computers with authority
to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict.
Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many
sophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it
impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[tlhe odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that,
given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable1.36Deplovment of space weapons with we-delegated
authoritv to fire death rays or unleash killer proiectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, qiven the susceptibilitv of such systems to 'normal
accidents'.
ItAccordinq to r s
retired l t . Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even a tiny proiectile reenterinq from
space strikes the earth with such hiqh velocity that it can do enormous damaqe - even more than would be done bv a nuclear weapon of the same
-
size!'. 37 In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most
destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people1.38Given this unique potential for
destruction, it is not hard to imanine that anv nation subiected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, includinq use of nuclear,
biological, andlor chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunqe the world into the most destructive
military conflict ever seen.
2k6
Space Militarization Bad- Russia

Poor Russian intelligence warning would result in miscalculation on space debris and nuclear war with the US
Lewis, Post doctorate Fellow in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program, 2004 (Jeffery, July "What if Space Were Weaponized?
Possible Consequences for Conflict Scenarios" Center for Defense Information
U.S. space weapons might create incentives for America's opponents to behave in dangerous ways. The previous scenario
This is the seccndof two scenariosthat consider how
a single accident in Space, such as a piece of
lookedat the systemic risk of accidents that could arise from keeping nuclear weapons on high alert to guard against a space weapons aliack. This section focuses on the risk that
spacedebris strikina a Russian earlv-warnina satellite, miaht be the catalvst for an accidental nuclear war.
As we have noted in an earl~ersection, the United Stalescanceled I s own ASATprogmm in the 1980s over concerns that Ihe deploymentotthese weapons might be deeply destabilbing. For all the talk aboul a "new relationship' between the
United States and Russia, both sides retain thousands of nuclearforces on alert and configuredm figM a nuclear war. When briefedabout the size and status of U.S. nuclearforces.President Geoge W. Bush reportedly asked "What do we need all
these weapons for?"43 The answer: as Iwas during the Cold War. is that the forces remain on alerl to m d u c t a nmber of posslble contingencies,including a nuclearstrike against Russia
Russia dropped its pledae to

This fact. of course, is not lost on the Russian leadership,which has been (rcreasrngits relianceon nuclear weapons tocompensateforthe country's declining militarymight. In the mid-1990s,
refrain from the "first use" of nuclear weapons and conducted a series of exercises in which Russian nuclear forces prepared to use nuclear
weapons to repel a NATO invasion. InOclober2003, Russ~anDefenseMinisterSergeilvanovreiteratedthat MOSCOW
might use nuclear weapons "preemptivelv" inany numberof
contrngencies,inciudinga NATO amck.44
So, it remainsbusinessas usual wlh U.S. and Russian nuharforces. And business as wual includestheoccashal false alarm of a nuclearattack.There have been several of these incidents werthe years
In September 1983, as a relatively new Soviet early-warnina satellite moved into ~ositionto monitor U S , missile fields in North Dakota, the sun lined
up in iust such a way as to fool the Russian satellite into reportinu that half a dozen US, missiles had been launched at the Soviet Union. Pehapsmindlul
lhal a brand new satellie might malunct~on,the officer in charge of the command center that monitoreddata from the early-waming satellites refused to pass the alert to his supenors He reportedly explained his caution by saying: 'When people
stan a war, they don't start it with only five missiles. You can do l'inle damage with just five missiles."45
In Januarv 1995. Norwegian

- scientists launched a soundina rocket on a traiectory similar to one that a U.S. Trident missile miqht take if it were
-
launched to blind Russtan radars with a hiqh altitude n~cleardetonation. Thelncdent was gparentiy semusenough tnat,the nexiday. Russ~anpres~dentBOIS Yeltsln staledthatnehadactwavec
h s 'nu3 ear lootoal'- 2 devlce mat a lows the R ~ s an
s ores %nt to communcate v.tth h ~ mlllarv
s a d r s m acd rev ew h scomns for launchlna h ~ sa-scnal !n Ihs case, the Russ~aneary-wam:ng
. .satell~lescoulo c . e w see that no alack was under
way and the crisis passed without incldent.46
In both cases, Russian observers were confident that what appeared to be a "small" attack was not a fraqmentarv picture of a much larqer one. Inthe
The Russian command svstem, however, is no.longer able to
case of Me Norwegian sounding rockel, space-basedtensors played a crucial rde in assuring the Russian leadershipthat rt was not under anacic.
provide such reliable, earlv warninq. The dissolution of the Soviet Unioncost Moxow several radar stations in newiy independentstates, creating "anack corridors" through whlch Moscow muld not see an attack launchedby
U.S. nuclear submar1nes.47
Further, Russia's constellation of early-warninasatellites has been allowed to decline -only oneortwoofthesix satelii(es remainoperational, leaving Russia with early
warninq for 0nIv six hours a day. Russra is anmptingto reconstitute PS consteilationof eariy-wamhgsatellites, with several lamchesplanned m the next few years. ~ u Russia
t will still have limited
warninq and will depend heavilv on its space-based systems to provide warninq of an American attack.48
Anti-satellite
As the previous section explained,the Pentagon is mntemphting military missions in space that will improve U.S. ability to cripple Russian nuclear forces in a crlsis before they can execute an altack on Ihe United States
weapons, inmisscenam, would blind Russian reconnaissanceand warninq satellites and knock out communications satellites. Such strikes miaht be the
prelude to a full-scale attack, oralimitedefforl,asanemptedinawargarneatSchriiverAirForceBase, 10 conduct earl^ deterrence strikes" 10 sianal U.S. resolve and control
escalation.49
By 2010,the United Stales may, in faa, havem arsenal of ASATs (perhapseven on orbit 2417) ready to condua these knds of missuns- to coerce opponentsand, if necessary, support preemptiveaHacks.Moscow woukl certainty have to worry
that these ASATs could be used in mnimction with other soace-enabled svsterns - for examde
, - -
lono-ranaestrike svstems that could anack taraets in less than 90 minutes -to disable Russia's nuclear deterrent before the Russian leadersho
understood what was p i n g on.
What would happen if a piece of space debris were to disable a Russian early-warnina satellite underhsecondiiions? Could the Russian military distinuuish
between an accident in Space and the first phase of a U.S. attack? ~ o sRussian t early-wammgsatellites are In elliptical Molniyaorbis (a few are in GEO) and thus dfiicuk to anackfmm the gmund or air
nt a mlnmum,MOSCOW would probablyhave some tactical warning of such asuspiGious launch, but@venthe sorry state of Russia's warninq, optical imaqing and signals intelligence
satellites there is reason to ask the question. ~ ~ r f h ethe r , advent of U.S. on-orbit ASATs, as now envisioned50 could make both the more difficult orbital
plane and anv warnina svstems moot.
t he ~np~easanttruthisthat the Russians likely would have to make a judgment call.
No state has the abibty IDdefinitively deternine the cause of the satellfie's lailure. Even the UnIed States does not maintain (nor is it likely to have in place by 2010) a sophisticated space surveillancesystem that would alow fl to dinguish between
a satellie mafunction, a debris strike w a deliberate attack - and Russian Space s~r~eillance
capabilities are much more limited by comparson. Eventhe risk assessmentsforcollision with debris are speculative.
particularlytor the unique orbits in which Rusian early-wamingsatell~tesoperate.
During peacetime, 1 s easy to imaghethat the Russitns would concludet~ the loss of a satelie was either a manunction or a debris strike. ~ u Mt OW confident could U.S. phnners be that the Russians
would be so calm if the accident in space occurred in tandem with a second false alarm, or occurred durinq the middle of a crisis?
the U.S .-Canadian
What mighl happen if the debris strike occurred shotliy after a false alarm showing a missile launch? False alarms are appaH~gh/common -according to informationobtained underthe Freedom ol InformationAct,
North American Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD) experienced 1,172 "moderatelv seriousnfalse alarms between 1977 and 1983 - anaverageofalmost
three false ahrms per week. Comparable inlormation is not availae about the Russian SvStem, but there reasonto believe that it is any mole reliable.51
Heidt/Keenan/Peterson/Silber 19/29
2k6
<continued from above>

Assesshgthe likelihood of these sorts of concidences IS ddicutl because Russia has never provideddata about the heguency or duration ol false alarms; nor jndicated how sefiously early-warningdata is taken by Russian leaders. Morewer there
if the
is no reliable estimateofthe debris risk for Russian satellies in highly ellrpticalorbis.52The impodant point, however, is that S U C ~a coincidence would 0nlv appear SUSP~C~OUS United States
were in the business of disablina satelIite~-i~ofierwo~d~,
there is much less risk if Washinaton does not develop ASATs.
The loss of an early-warningsatellie could Iwk rather minous if it occurred during a perlod of majortensionin the rdatimship. While NATO no longer sees Russia as much of a threat: the same cannot be said of the converse. Despitethe warm
talk. Russian leaders remam wary of NATO expansion. particularly the enect expansionmay have on Ik BaHic pod of Kaliningrad.Although pad of Russia,Kahingrad is separatedfmm the rest of Russra by Lithuania and Poland. Russiahas
already complained about its decreasing lack ol access to the port: particularly the uncooperative attitude of the Lithuanian govern-mmt.53 News reports suggest that an edav Russia mav have moved tactical
Weapons
IIuc~ ? ~ ~ into the enc!ave.54 If the Lnhuanian government were to close access to Kaliningrad in a fit of plque. this would trigger a major crisis between NATO and Russe.
Under these circumstances,the loss of an early-warning satellite w u l d be extremely suspicious. It is any mliary's nature during a nisis to interpret events in their worst-case light. For example. conslder the coincidenceshta-
September 1956, dur~ngthe edraardinanly tense period in internationalrelations marked by the Suez Crisis and Hungarian upnsmg.55 On one evening the Whle House rece~vedmessages ~ndicating:t . the Turkish Air Force had gone on alerl in
responseto unidmtiied aircranpenetrating ns srspace; 2. one hundred Soviet MiG-15swere flyhg over Syma: 3. a Bdt~sbCanberra bamber had been shot down over Syrii most likely by a MiG: and 4. The Russian tket was movlng thmugh the
Dardanelles.Gen. Andrew Goodpaster was reportedto have worrtedthat the confluenceof events 'm@t t r i e r off ... the NATOcperal'ms plan" that called for a nuclear strike on the Soviet Unlon.
Yet, all of these repod were false. The "jets" over Turkey were a Rock of swans; the Soviet MiGs wer S y i i were a smaller, r o u t i i escort returningthe president from a state vsit to Moscow; the bomber crashed due to mechanical d~fleult~es; and
the Soviet fleet was beginning long-scheduledises. In an imporlant sense. these were no1" m i n c i d e n c e s " - human error resulng from extreme tension of an international crisis. As one
author noted, 'The deteclion and mis~nterpretal'ianof Mese events. agamst hec context of world tensions from Hungary and Suez. was the firs1 ma@ example of how the size and ~0mplexitvof worldwide electronic
warnina svstems could, at cel~aincriticaltimes, create momentum of its own."
the United States miqht be blithelv unaware of the dearee to which the Russians were concerned about its actions and inadvertentlv
Perhapsmostworrisome,
escalate a crisis. During f i e early 19805, the Soviet Union suffered a majar "war scarenduring which time as leadershipconcluded that bilateral relations were rapidly declinmg.~ h r swar scare was driven in pan by the metotic of the
Reagan adrninistralion,fortified by the selective reading of intelligence. During this period, NATO conductd a major command post exercise, Able Archer, that caused some elements of the Soviet milary la raise their alert status. American oflicials
were slunned to leam, afterthe fact, that the Kremlin had been acutely nervous about an American first strike dur~ngthis period.56
~ t l d t h e s ~ i n c i d ~ ~ t ~ h ~ ~ e a m n t h e rconfidence
ne-that is often the difference between war and peace. In times of crisis, false alarms can have a momentum of
their Own. AS in the second scenario in this monograph, the lesson is that commanders rely an the steady tlow of reliable information. When that iflforfllati~nflow is disrupted -whether by a deliberate attack or an
accident~~nfidence C O ~ ~ ~ Pand S ~theS result ISpanic and escalation. Introducing ASAT weapons into this mix is all the moredangerous, because such werpons tarqet the elements
of the command system that keep leaders aware, informed and in control. Asaresuti, the mere presence of such weapons is corrosive to the confidence
that altows national nuclear forces to operate safely.
Space militarization collapses relations with Russia and China

Krepon 01
-If the&3j administration does decide to pursue space weapons -- whether to seize the strategic high ground, to protect its missile defenses, or both
-- it can expect American allies, alreadv uncomfortable with missile defenses, to qo their separate ways. Meanwhile, rather than cede the field to
Washington, Moscow and Beiiinq will no doubt respond with their own ASAT programs, hopina to blind U.S. satellites and neqate American missile
defenses in the cheapest possible fashion. Closer strateqic cooperation between Russia and China will also be assured. Furthermore, the pursuit of
space weapons by Washington will accelerate the demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, which will
then weaken nonproliferation accords.
2k6
Space Militarization Bad- China 1NC
A. Uniqueness: US-China relations are climbing as international cooperation grows

Xinhua 2k6 [July 22, People's Daily Online, 'Rice says China-U.S. relations good, complex',
http://english.people.com.cn/200607/22/eng20060722~285S54.html]
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Xinhua on Friday that China-U.S. relations are "really quite ~ o o d but
"
complex and high-level visits between the two countries will help promote better bilateral relations. In addition to Chinese
President Hu Jintao's visit to the United States in April and the ongoing U.S. visit by General Guo Boxiong, vice chairman
of China's Central Military Commission, Rice said that President Hu Jintao and U.S. President George W. Bush also met
during the Group of Eight Summit just concluded in St. Petersburg, Russia earlier this month. "We are having a lot of
high-level visits. They will help promote better, stronger relations," Rice told Xinhua in a roundtable interview that
included journalists from China, South Korea, Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam at the State Department. The United States
and China do not agree on everything and that is not surprising as it shows how complex and big the bilateral relationship
is, Rice said. "The relationship is really good," Rice said, adding that China and the United States are working together at
the United Nations as the world bodv is involved on issues like Iran,the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
&potentially the Middle East. "You have not just the US.-China relationship, but the U.S.- China relationship working
to solve problems in the international politics," Rice said.
B. Link: US space dominance will tank Chinese relations

Martel and Yoshihara 2k3 [William C. and Toshi, 'Averting a Sinp-U.S. Space Race', The Washington Quarterly, The
Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington~quarter1y/vO26/26.4martel.html]
At the same time that the United States views space dominance as a fundamental tenet of its national security. China
evidently views U.S. space dominance as a maior threat to its geostrategic interests. These views inevitably breed a zero-
sum competition, in which one side perceives any loss as a gain for the other. and could ultimately prove destabilizing
for Sino-U.S. relations. First, Beiiing perceives the proposed U.S. missile defense system, which will be supported by an
array of space systems and sensors, as a strategic menace to China and to international security. l 5 Many China watchers
contend that this perception stems from anxietiesthat any conceivable system of missile defenses being develoved by the
Bush administration will undermine China's small nuclear deterrent. 'h Beijing remains wary of the joint research program
on missile defense by the U.S.-Japanese alliance, which the PRC sees as a potential partnership for blocking Chinese regional aspirttions or,
in broader terms, for containing China. Of particular concern for Beijing is the possibility thctt Tokyo's decision forinally to join U.S. plans for
deploying missile defense in Northeast Asia will significantly increase Japan's military capabilities by providing an opportunity for Japanese forces to
enjoy unprecedented military integration with U.S. forces in the areas of space-based intelligence and communications. Second, the military use
of space has profound implications for the uneasy stalemate in the Taiwan Strait. which has always presented the
possibility of a maior confrontation between Washington and Beiiing. One arpment is that U.S. capabilities allow the
United States to project power near Taiwan, while the space-based sensors and weapons for missile defense could blunt
China's arsenal of ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. Moreover, the prospect of transfers of missile defense systems to
Taiwan, which could usher in a period of unprecedented military cooperation between Taipei and Washington, no doubt
deeply troubles Be ing. China, for its part. will increasingly need military space capabilities if it is to improve its ability to coerce Taiwan in a
conflict and counter U.S. intervention to defend the island in a crisis or conflict.
2k6
Space Militarization Bad- China 1NC

C. Impact- Relations solve nuclear war
John Des~eres,Fellow, RAND Corporation, m ( C h i n a ,the United States, and the Global Economy, Shuxun Chen & Charles Wolf, p. 227-8)
Nevertheless, America's main interests in China have been quite constant, namely peace, security, prosperity, and a healthy environment. Chinese
interests in the United States have also been quite constant and largely compatible, notwithstandingsharp differences over Taiwan, strategic
technology transfers, trade, and human rights. Indeed, U.S.-Chinese relations have been consistently driven by strong common interests in
preventing mutually damaging wars in Asia that could involve nuclear weapons; in ensuring that Taiwan's relations with the mainland remain
peaceful; in sustaining the growth of the U.S., China, and other Asian-Pacific economies; and, in preserving natural environments that sustain
healthy and productive lives.
What happens in China matters to Americans. It affects America's prosperity. China's growing economy is a valuable market to many workers,
farmers, and businesses across America, not just to large multinational firms like Boeing, Microsoft, and Motorola, and it could become much more
valuable by opening its markets further. China also affects America's securiiy. It could either help to stabilize or destabilize currently peaceful but
sometimes tense and dangerous situations in Korea, where U.S. troops are on the front line; in the Taiwan Straits, where U.S. democratic values
and strategic credibility may be at stake; and in nuclear-armed South Asia, where renewed warfare could lead to terrible consequences. It also
affects America's environment. Indeed, how China meets its rising energy needs and protects its dwindling habitats will affect the global atmosphere
and currently endangered species.
2k6
Space Militarization Bad- China Extensions

Space militarization collapses relations with Russia and China
Krepon 01
-If the Bush administration does decide to pursue space weapons -- whether to seize the strategic high ground, to protect its missile defenses, or both
-- it can expect American allies, alreadv uncomfortable with missile defenses, to go their separate ways. Meanwhile, rather than cede the field to
Washinaton, Moscow and Beiiins will no doubt respond with their own ASAT prwrams, ho~ingto blind U.S. satellites and nenate American missile
defenses in the cheapest possible fashion. Closer strateqic cooperation between Russia and China will also be assured. Furthermore, the pursuit of
space weapons by Washington will accelerate the demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, which will
then weaken nonproliferation accords.
US-China relations are key to the global economy

Moscaritolo 2k5 [Maria, ' T h e unknown menace1', The Adverfister, October 26, lexis]
IlLonq term, however, the relationship between China and the U.S. will be one to watch. "The functionina of the alobal economv now depends on a
verv svmbiotic, cooperative relationship between China and the U.S.If that breaks down, both of those two maior economies are disadvantaaed," Dr
Edwards says. If they suffer, the flow of the qlobal economv - and Australia's prosperity - also suffers.
"After all, thev're competinq for qlobal influence and there are going to be issues involved as they iostle for predominance in their respective resions
and qloballv," he says. Other experts also question what will happen if China's economv slows its "aanabusters" pace and how robust East Asia will
be in another economic shock. U
2k6
Space Militarization Bad- Economv

Space militarization would devastate the economy
Anzera 05
(Giuseppe Anzera, Lecturer of Sociology of International Relations at La Sapienza University in Rome, PlNR (Power and Interest News
Report) "The Pentagon's B I to
~ Militarize Space," 8-17-05, http:l/www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view~report&repo~~id=347)
The second problem is economic. Orbital weapons -- as the Strategic Defense Initiative showed in the 1980s -- are extremely expensive. It has been
estimated that a space defense system aqainst weak ballistic missile strikes could cost between $220 billion and $1 trillion. A laser-based system to
be used against ballistic missiles would cost about $100 million for each tarqet.
For instance, the Future Imagery Architecture -- a proiect aimed at the implementation of new spy satellites which are vital to identify taraets for
space weapons -- has already reached a cost of US$25 billion. It is a legitimate question, therefore, whether Washington really needs to finance
such projects in today's geostrategic context. Moreover, would these tools be cost-effective in relation to their real operational capability? The first
question raises doubts and the second one remains, at the moment, without answer. Henceforth, such initiatives resemble more and more Reaqan's
cnl
Michigan 7 Week Juniors <<<File Name>>>
A2: Space Militarization Good- Asteroid Deflection

Space militarization is not necessary to stop asteroids- B612's solve
Schweickart, Chairman, 5612 Foundation, Tiburon, California, (Russell "Asteroid Deflection; Hopes and Fears"
www.b612foundation.orglpapers/Asteroid~Deflection.doc)
Acomparative look at the variws asteroid deflection options can only. at this point. prov~depreliminary ins@ts. Neverthelessthere are several distinct differences already in evidence which can inform not onty the technical but also the social and
politicalchoices which must ultimately be made.
The nuclear explosive options will all be stroncllv dependent on the bulk and surface structural characteristics of asteroids, a feature about which we
know verv little todav. It is also likely that we will find substantial variation in these structural characteristics from one asteroid tvpe to another, and
perhaps even within the population of any given type. Therefore the nuclear option may require quite extensive detailed information about each
asteroid to be deflected, an information set not easily acquired. Until much more is known about this subject predictingthe result of a nuclear
explosive deflection effort will be highly unreliable.
In addition to predictinq the result of a nuclear deflection, measurina the actual result of a deflection mission will be challenqinq due to the violent
nature of the operation. A double spacecraft compound mission, with one component serving as the deflector and a second as observer is one
solution to this challenge. However since the velocity change being sought is less than one part in 106 verifying success from a spacecraft flying
past at 10 kmlsec is daunting. If the operation also fragments the asteroid, even partially, the task of determining the result of the operation may well
be impossible.
Finally, any nuclear explosive option is and will remain inextricably intertwined with alobal aeowlitics and, in fact, raise to prominence the spectre of
space nuclear weapons. International treaties ban these obiects in space todav, but if no other deflection technique has been tested and/or
validated when the world experiences either a near miss or perhaps a small but significant impact, the world public demand for action to prevent a
recurrence of such an event mav be sufficient to enable a state, so determined, to iustifv abrogating the treaties aqainst weapons in space on the
grounds of protection of the world public.
It is critical therefore, that the soft options be developed, demonstrated and known to be viable as soon as possible. This task is of utmost
importance in order to avoid a situation in which the public misperception that the nuclear option is the onlv one available to protect the Earth from
asteroid impacts.
In fact, the soft options (and t would argue the 8612 mission in particular) provides not only a viable, but a hi~hlvpreferable alternative for asteroid
deflection. Not only is the technoloay devoid of geopolitical considerations, but it i
s,by its nature, generallv ao~licableto all tvpes of asteroids even
in the absence of detailed information on their characteristics. The total forces applied to the asteroid for successful deflection are in the ranqe of a
few pounds (less than 10 newtons) and can be distributed easilv over an area of several square meters thus assurina that virtuallv anv surface, even
the most fragile, can reliablv be used.
Furthermore, the 8612 technique, in which a soft landing on an asteroid surface is intearal to the desiqn will enable manv other missions to the
asteroids. Given both the scientific and potential future commercial interests in the exploitation of asteroids, the operational techniques integral to
the 6612 mission are useful, and perhaps even necessary, for economic future exploration of the near Earth asteroids.
Regrettably the sluation mday in particular wlhin NASA. is that developvlg such a capbilii, or even exploringfor this purpose the appiication of advanced technologiesthey are currently developing, is not w*in Wenmission. It may therefore
require a direclive to NASA (cfequivalentto ESA or others) from the US Congress before this critical undertaking becomes an actual space mssion.
2k6
Spendinq Links- lndustrv Trade-off

Space militarization causes a spending trade off away from industries- these are key to the global economy
Hitchens, CDI Vice President, 2002 (Theresa, April 18 "Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? The Policy Implications of U.S.
Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons", http:ilwww.cdi.orglmissiIe-defenselspaceweapons.cfm)
While commerchl%ace was a booming market during most of 1990s,the market for low-earthorbit satelwes has collapsed overthe past FM, years. Launchprovidersare predictinga flat marketplacefor a number of years
In addbion, the marketfor large geosynchronous orbit satellies forcommunicati~lsalso is at near rock imnom and is expectedto remain flat through 2011. accordinglo a recent report by Forecast InternationalfDMSlnc.38
The growth in the market is now behg driven by satellite services. such as direct downlinksfor Internet (with high hopes pinned on the developmentOf broadband lntemet services)orTV.
There further is excess capacity in the comrnercnlspace market place, wM five maior manufacturers(three U.S., two European),according ta Christopher E. Kubaski, chief financialofficer of Lockheed Martin Corp.
Kubaski and other U.S. ~ndustryleaders are pr&lmg Mle growth in the c~mmercialsector in Me near t e n
Corporate chieftains at maior defense and space firms alreadv are citinq missile defense as a much more lucrative future market than
commerciallcivil space operations. Such a market assessment bv U.S.industry is not without consequences. As one corporate strategist at a major
U.S. defenseispace firm explained, market assessments drive where corporate research and development dollars qo.
Considering that it is industry, rather than DoD and NASA, that carries the bulk of R&D spendinq in the defense and civil space arena, there is some
possibilitythat an emphasis on space weaponization could shift technoloqv investment from the commercial to the defense world.
Granted, this would hold only for those firms- such as Lockheed Martin Corp., Boeing Co., Raytheon Co., and TRW - that do large percentages
of government businesses, rather than for those companies more vested in the commercial end of space operations (providing telecommunications
and Internet services for example.) Nonetheless, the ramificationsof shiftinq R&D on market edqe in the commercial arena deserve some
consideration.
Inlereshngly,lne U.S. inaustry has not done as well over the past two years as Be ove,al~ma,ke@lace Overan.lne worlbwde markel re~ounoedin 20M wilh a 23 2ercent grcdh III revmue,acmrolq to Me Satellle Industy Assnc ailon The
assoc atlon d&lasnow Mat while Me globalmarket lo. satellie manufacturinggrew ~y 9 percent on 2000. U S revenue jeclioed by 11 percent. Similarly. viorldvvue revewe n the satelwe lacnchsegment grew bv 79 De'cenl m 203.3. wiereas U S
revenue grew only by I7 percent.
(Still, U.S,manufacturerssnagged more lhan hall the satellite orders in 2001, accordingto data from Futmn Cop., a consukingfirm specializing in the Spacemarket.)
US. industry affic~alspartially blame thegavemmenl fortheir recent p w r performance- worried about the effects oi U.S. regulatory requirementsand exparl controls on Iheir bottom line. The global marketplaceis highly competit~ve,and U.S
policy and regulat~onsare a majorfaclor in determining U.S. compeiuiveness.
For example, a RAND study of the remote sensing industry states: "Success for these new U.S. commercial remote sensinq satellite firms heavilv
depends on both understandinqand overcominq various risks (e.g., technical, market, policy and regulatory) that could diminish their prospects in
the hiahlv competitive alobal marketplace for geospatial information products and services. Within this context, U.S. government policies and
regulations exert a maior influence on the abilitv of U.S. remote sensinq satellite firms to realize their competitive potential in both the domestic and
international marketplace."
RMA Links
Space development trades off with modernization in other technologies that solve faster
Zienler, evelopmental engineer with extensive space operations and acquisition experience, 1997_ (David, June, "Safe Heavens: Military Strategy
And Space Sanctuary Thought" https:llresearch.maxwell.af.millviewabstract.aspx?id=1299)
in this budaet-constrainedenvironment, fundina for space weapons could onlv come at the expense of other U.S. defense forces. These forces are
constantly challenged by global competitors for technological and operational superiority. So far, the U.S. has done well to preserve its advantage
through relentless modernization of its systems. Those modernizationsare expensive, however, and todav are stretched out beyond the life cvcle of
the systems thev replace. While acknowledging that today's force can handle today's threats, the current Chief of Staff of the Air Force recognizes
that resources are not available to modernize evervthina at once. His acquisition plan, therefore, calls for "just in time" modernization. F-22s are
phased in to replace today's fighters just as those fighters are made obsolete by foreign developments. The C-17 is delivered just as C-141s retire.
"We are phasing in the capabilities so that they arrive when we need them," he states, but "delays in the modernization will create vulnerabilitiesvery
-
soon." The point is this: why start an arms build up in space when budaet limitations already threaten essential proqrams like the Joint Strike Fiqhter
and the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle? Funds allocated to space weapons undermine the budaet upon which the American services' "lust in
time" modernization is predicated. It qambles that investha in space superiority is worth the resultinq decline in relative advantaae in the other
mediums.
Space weaponization trades off with cheaper alternatives that are as effective- funding kills the RMA
A Viable National Strategy" Aerospace Power Journal, http:l/www.airpower.maxwell.af.millairchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois,html)
8. space-weaponization strategies are expensive. There are siqnificant lona-term-opportunitycosts within the military, particularlv in these times of
diminishina DOD budgets. One can meet the same requirementswith cheaper alternatives, such as combat unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).34
Weaponizinq space will necessarily come at the expense of satisfying documented militan, deficiencies (strategic-liftdeficiencies and the C-17, air-
superiority deficiencies and the F-22 or ioint strike fiqhter, forward-basing deficiencies and carriers, ISR deficiencies and the next qeneration of ISR
satellites,35 etc.).
HeidtlKeenanlPeterson/Silber
Space Militarization Unpopular

Space weaponization would be massively politically unpopular
Mitchell,Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, Avotte and Helwich, Teaching Fellows
in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, 2001
(Dr. Gordon R., Kevin J., David Cram, lSlS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, "Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a
Crossroads", No. 6 July, http:l/www.isisuk.demon.co.uW081 llisisluklbmd/no6.html)
Since anv US attempt to overtlv seize militarv control of outer space would likely stir up massive ~oliticalopposition both home and abroad, defence
analvst James Oberq anticipates that 'the means by which the placement of space-based weapons will likelv occur is under a second US space
policv directive -that of ballistic missile defense...This could preempt anv political umbraqe from most of the world's influential nations while
positioning the US as a auarantor of defense from a universally acclaimed threat'. 32 In this scenario, ABM Treatv breakout, conducted under the
guise of missile defence, functions as a tripwire for unilateral US militarv domination of the heavens.
Heidt/Keenan/Pete~.sun/Sil
ber
2k6
1NC Incentives Counterplan

Creating incentives for promotion in the Air Force on the space front from junior to senior officers solves
m,professor of comparative military studies at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and Mueller, Associate
professor of comparative military studies at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, 2001 (Lt Col Peter, Dr. Karl, February, "Going
Boldly-Where? Aerospace Integration, the Space Commission, and the Air Force's Vision for Space"
http:llwww.airpower.maxwell.af.millairchronicles/apj/apj0lIsprOllhays.htm#)
Third, if the Air Force is serious about fosterinq innovative a~proachesto national security space issues, it must carefully address the human
dimension of this problem. People provide the leadership required to develop and implement vision. In Winning the Next War, Stephen Rosen
explains that peacetime militarv innovation is most likelv when senior militarv leaders develop a new theory of victory and then create "a new
promotion pathwav to the senior ranks, so that Vounq officers iearninq and practicing the new way of war can rise to the top, as part of a qenerational
chanqe.30 There is much the Air Force can do on the space front at both the junior and senior levels to help encouraqe the type of lonq-term
innovation Rosen discusses.51 The Air Force should develop promotion pathways so that iunior space officers can rise to senior levels of command,
not only within the space community but also-and this will be one of the best tests of whether Al is rhetoric or reality-within the air community as
well. The Air Force's ongoing Developing Aerospace Leaders Program is exploring ways to create these types of promotion pathways.

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1NC Space Guard Counterplan

The Unaed States Coast Guard

1NC Space Guard Counterplan

1NC Air Force Overstretch Net-benefit

1NC Air Force Overstretch Net-benefit

Space Force + Air Force Overstretch

Air Force Key to Hegemony

Air Power Is A Prerequisite To Other Forms Of Power Projection

1NC Ban Space Counterplan

Ban Space Solves Heqemonv

Ban S ~ a c eSolves Heaemonv

Ban Solves China Relations

Space Ban = Executive Authority

Space Force Won't Solve

A2: Militarization Inevitable

Space weaponization is not inevitable-the ball is in the US court

A2: Militarization Inevitable

~ e a ~ o n i z a t i hisnnot inevitable-the US can protect its interests without space

Space Militarization Bad- HeqemonylArms Race

Space Militarization Bad- Heqemony

Space Militarization Bad- Extinction

Space Militarization Bad- Russia

Russia dropped its pledae to

In Januarv 1995. Norwegian

<continued from above>

Space militarization collapses relations with Russia and China

Space Militarization Bad- China 1NC

A. Uniqueness: US-China relations are climbing as international cooperation grows

B. Link: US space dominance will tank Chinese relations

Space Militarization Bad- China 1NC

Space Militarization Bad- China Extensions

US-China relations are key to the global economy

Space Militarization Bad- Economv

A2: Space Militarization Good- Asteroid Deflection

Spendinq Links- lndustrv Trade-off

Space Militarization Unpopular

1NC Incentives Counterplan

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