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ASSIGNMENT # 16 case no 16-17

REBURIANO VS CA, 301 SCRA 342


GR No. 102965 JAN 29, 1999

FACTS: Regional Trial Court, rendered on June 1, 1987 a decision, rendered in favor of plaintiff Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of the
Philippines, Inc. private respondent amended its articles of incorporation to shorten its term of existence to July 8, 1983. The amended
articles of incorporation were approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 2, 1984. The trial court was not notified
of this fact. On February 13, 1991, petitioners moved to quash the writ of execution alleging -That when the trial of this case was
conducted, when the decision was rendered by this Honorable Court, when the said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals,
and when the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the private respondent was no longer in existence and had no more juridical
personality and so, as such, it no longer had the capacity to sue and be sued; That the above-stated change in the situation of parties,
whereby the [private respondent] ceased to exist since 8 July 1983, renders the execution of the decision inequitable or impossible.1
[Petition, Annex D; Rollo, pp. 14-15.]

ISSUE: The question is whether the order of the trial court denying petitioners’ Motion to Quash Writ of Execution is appealable.

HELD: As a general rule, no appeal lies from such an order, otherwise litigation will become interminable. There are exceptions, 1) the
writ of execution varies the judgment; 2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust;
3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; 4) it appears that the controversy has never been
submitted to the judgment of the court; 5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation
thereof; or,6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against
the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority; but this case
does not fall within any of such exceptions. In this case, petitioners anchored their Motion to Quash on the claim that there was a
change in the situation of the parties. However, a perusal of the cases which have recognized such a ground as an exception to the
general rule shows that the change contemplated by such exception is one which occurred subsequent to the judgment of the trial
court. Here, the change in the status of private respondent took place in 1983, when it was dissolved, during the pendency of its case in
the trial court. The change occurred prior to the rendition of judgment by the trial court.

SALIGUMBA VS PALANOG
GR. No. 143365. DEC 4 2008

FACTS: Monica Palanog, assisted by her husband Avelino Palanog filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against
defendants, spouses Valeria Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. before the RTC.In the complaint, spouses Palanogs alleged that
they have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession as owners for more than 50 years of a parcel of land located in
Solido, Nabas, Aklan. The spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from entering and residing on the subject premises and had
destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land.On 7 August 1987, RTC-Branch 3 rendered a judgment declaring spouses Palanogs the
lawful owners of the subject land and ordering spouses Saligumbas, to vacate the premises. A motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution of the said decision was filed but the trial court, in its Order dated 8 May 1997, and ruled that since more than five years had
elapsed after the date of its finality, the decision could no longer be executed by mere motion. Thus, on 9 May 1997, Monica Palanog
(respondent), now a widow, filed a Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the Decision dated 7 August 1987 which she claimed has
not been barred by the statute of limitations. She impleaded petitioners Generoso Saligumba and Ernesto Saligumba, the heirs the
spouses Saligumbas, as defendants. It appears that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984 while Valeria Saligumba died on 2
February 1985. No motion for the substitution of the spouses was filed nor did an order issue for the substitution of the deceased
spouses Saligumbas in Civil Case No. 2570. Atty. Miralles and petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr., despite notices sent to them to appear,
never confirmed the death of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba. The record is bereft of any evidence proving the death of
the spouses, except the mere notations in the envelopes enclosing the trial court’s orders which were returned unserved.

ISSUE: WON the death of the party would affect the validity of the decision.

HELD: Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper
notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or
within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative
shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if
defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.

Under Section 17, in case of death of a party, and upon proper notice, it is the duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir
of the deceased to appear for the deceased. In the instant case, it is true that the trial court, after receiving an informal notice of death
by the mere notation in the envelopes, failed to order the appearance of the legal representative or heir of the deceased. There was no
court order for deceased’s legal representative or heir to appear, nor did any such legal representative ever appear in court to be
substituted for the deceased. Neither did the respondent ever procure the appointment of such legal representative, nor did the heirs
ever ask to be substituted.