d, like n dings ; more ic cul-collec-e(e.g.

, leu res, r their -(Jelli-Mor-—ones postal iese in

e Fundamental Attribution Error; tomgec TJiari Yo'u AJSjght- Guess
'hpose that you reM ;|t;.shprB:; j&s^;wMt|eii^:b^

i Pi I HI m If
' hi Ifiisa;: iSUS*'-' Its: t. * ^«lsa^w

bective, you;shbuld'realize';that'ih-this.case;thee~ss~ay
^you nothiflg->abbutvth^>^yrit(^!s-true>vie^s;''^er.allj
I writer is merely following instructions.-But :two social

,i£«|s^marmer.^
essay writers actions to internab&eW&i|^K*bftihisltriie: beliefs), even though they knew that
this; wasif.ribt/the case. Clearly, this was a dramatic demonstration ofi;thie fundamental
attribution error in action.

Subsequent research that can also be viewed as classic in die field reached the same
conclusions. Eqrrinstance, in 3 revealing study by Nisbett et.al. (1973)5;paitiiu^ants were shown
a series of twenty paired traits (e;g4;;qtiiet-taJkative, lenient-firm) and were asked to
decida^fiieii of these traits-were true of themselves, their best Fi|Sn|^ their father, a casual
acquaintance, or Walter. ■ Groiiiqte (a famous newscaster at die time). The.participahts.were
also offered a third choice: They couM;ctoosb.Mepends on the situation." Results again on
%repl'Sti|)^eviSeflcfe for
"J
iar^
V
rfH»Of
*4Sartsr^

Participants report their own behavior;

varies (depends on the situation) to a greater
extent than that of other people
,-o .a
c O 11 -C Q.U
Self
Best Father Acquaintance Walter
Friend Cronkite

Target of Attributions
Figure 3.9
The Fundamental Attribution Error in Action: Classic Evidence
Participants in the study shown here were asked to indicate which of the traits in twenty pairs of
traits were true of themselves and several other people (their best friend, fathers, and so on)
They also had the option of choosing another response: depends on the situation. As shown here,
they were much more likely to da this with respect to their own behavior than that of other
people. In other words, they recognized that their own actions were strongly influenced by
external causes but assumed that the actions of other people stem primarily ■from internal
causes, such as their own traits.
{Source: Based on data from Nisbeti, Caputo, Legb;inr, and Majccck, 1973).

the fundamental attribution erro,r:;T^e::partiG'ipan'ts=in;:.the study.chose

"depends/.qndie^situatfo.n'^rni®^^
tion to situation; !whiie#hat m^^B^^^m^&^^it
friend j father, or e\^n:::a;,fambus.4ew^^
primarily personal tWits ;(see Figute-;5^^:.;.',-,:;t^.v;^:;::.;,:.
Together, early'StiidieHi'ke :These":^royidm:p^erful evidente-ifor: die fact: that'our
erfbfts.:fo;unijm^ ers' behavior—-and Oufcown ■acriblis^are'-fibt^tO'.t.ally rratibfl^liS<E)n the
contrary; -they., arcarifluericfeif hyiirum-.■ hi?f' ■JpfjSjilts" or biasesjVand::among#h^:.&
tai;at£frbfction error .is/O^^
Figure 3,10
Attributions about Croups: T he Correspondence Bias Revisited
As shown here, Jewish research participants attributed German atrocities during World War II
to internal causes (Germans' aggressiveness) to a greater extent than did German research
participants. Germans, in contrast, tended to explain these atrocities more in terms of external
causes (e.g., historical events and contexts).
(Source: Based on data from Doosje & Branscombe, 2006).

the World journal, newspaper published in the United States. Careful analysis of the articles
indicated that those written in English attributed both murderers' actions to dispositional factors
(characteristics of the murderers) to a greater extent than the articles written in Chinese.
Similar findings—a correspondence bias in Western, individualistic countries than in Asian and
more collectivistic ones—have been reported in several others studies (e.g., Choi &C Nisbett,
1998; van Boven, White, Kamada, & Gilovich, 2003). In sum, there seems little doubt that
cultural factors play a role even in this basic aspect of attribution.
The Correspondence Bias in Attributions about Groups ' . ;. (7
Not only do we make attributions about the behavior of individual .persons, but we also
sometimes make attributions about the behavior, of groups, too., For,'JAS.fance, we try to
understand why one group seerhs to dislike or everyiate another—wjiy, tpr example, did
Hat:
aw he

pre-World War 11 tjermanyr Are our attributions about why various1 groups rjenave as they do
also subject to the correspondence bias? Research conducted'By Do
ay Doosie an'd *:
Branscombe (2003) suggests that it is,. These researchers asked people who visitld a museum
related to Vverits* auririg the Holocaust (Anne Frank's home in Amsterdam) to
;\ 'rate the extent to which German atrocities against jews,during World War II were the
."•result of the aggressive nature of Germans (an internal cause) or to external factors (e.e.,
the, historical,context in which these actions occurred;. lJarticipants in the study were
■ either ewish'or German. Ihe researchers predicted that Jewish people wouTCrShow a
"greater tendency to, attribute German atrocities to internal causes man would-Germans
.SiZMr'S'/,-".
, and in fact, this is what, was. found" (see Figure .3.10)."While neither group strong tendency to
explain these events in terms or internal causes, Jewish,
/■themselves showed a strong tendency to <e. ___ ____ .
___J. .__,.,
i i^ ^(v^^^ay^, , ,., , A<vut-■■■■.■/^'<•<■
people—whose groyp hag .been harmed—showed this tendencytoa greater; ^xtent tharL.y
Germans, thus demonstrating that attributions can be strongly^itffecteq by group rnem-bership—
an effect we will consider agauxin our discussiO!^r;nrejudic,e;;(Ghapter b) and other group
processes (Chapter 1,2). In any case, it seemV cleai; that attributional processes—and errors—
can operate with respect to social groups of even entire nations as well with respect to
perceptions of individuals. ,""■. '.'., ■''?''.''" 'v
fw-w. y? v>?\ ■■ -h\^ ^.cM^h ^M-. ■■-•■■■■•> ■ ■■■■
The Actor-Observer Effect: "You Fell; I Was Pushed"
The fundamental attribution error, powerful as it is, applies mainly to attributions we make about
others; we don't tend to overly attribute our own actions to external causes. This
<r
M
Jewish research participants attribute
German atrqciti.es^duringVVWII to
internaTcaus.es;mere tbairdb German
research participants
explain another and closely related type of attributional bias known as the actor-
'er effect (Jones & Nisbett, 1971), which is the tendency to attribute our own
to situational (external) causes but that of others to dispositional (internal) ones.
when we see another person trip and fall, we tend to attribute this event to his or
iumsiness. If we trip, however, we are more likely to attribute this event to situational
such as ice on the sidewalk.
Wh/ does the actor-observer effect occur? In part because we are quite aware of the
t y external factors affecting our own actions but are less aware of such factors when
turn our attention to the actions of other people. Thus we tend to perceive our own
avior as arising largely from situational causes but that of others as deriving mainly
their traits or dispositions.

The Self-Serving Bias: "I'm Good; You Are Lucky"

suppose that you write a paper and when you get it back, you find the following com-nt on the
first page: "An outstanding paper—one of the best I've see in years. A+." To wiiat will you
attribute this success? Probably, you will explain it in terms of internal calises your high level of
talent, the effort you invested in writing the paper, and so on.
Now, in contrast, imagine that when you get die paper back, and these comments are
written on it. "Unsatisfactory paper—one of die worst I've seen in years. D-:" How will you
interpret this outcome? The chances are good that you will be tempted to focus mainly on
external (situational factors): the difficulty of the task, your professor's unfairly harsh Vllpf ding
standards, the fact that you didn't have enough cime to do a good job, and so on. This tendency
to attribute our own positive outcomes to internal causes but negative ones to external factors is
known as the self-serving bias, and it appears to be both general in scope and powerful in its
effects (Brown & Rogers, 1991; Miller & Ross, 1976).
Why does this tilt in our attributions occur? Several possibilities have been suggested, but
most of these fall into two categories: cognitive and motivational explanations. The cognitive
model suggests that the seif-serving bias stems mainly from certain tendencies in the way we
process social information (see Chapter 2; Ross, 1977). Specifically, it suggests that we attribute
positive outcomes to internal causes, but negative ones to external causes because we expect to
succeed and have a tendency to attribute expected outcomes to internal causes more than to
external causes. In contrast, the motivational explanation suggests that the self-serving bias stems
from our need to protect and enhance our self-esteem or the related desire to look good to others
(Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1982). Wliile both cognitive and motivational factors may
well play a role in this kind of attributional error, research evidence seems to offer more support
for the motivational view (e.g., Brown & Rogers, 1991).
Regardless of the origins of the self-serving bias, it can be the cause of a great deal of
interpersonal friction. It often leads people working with others on a joint task to perceive that
they, not their partners, have made the major contributions and to blame others in the group for
negative outcomes (see Figure 3.11 on page 94).
Interestingly, the results of several studies indicate that the strength of the self-serving
bias varies across cultures (e.g., Oettingen, 1995; Oettingen &£ Seligman, 1990). In particular, it
is weaker in cultures, such as those in Asia, that place a greater emphasis on group outcomes and
group harmony, than it is in Western cultures, in which individual accomplishments are
emphasized and it is considered appropriate for winners to gloat (at least a litde) over their
victories. For example, Lee and Seligman (1997) found that Americans or European descent
showed a larger self-serving bias than eidier Chinese Americans or mainland Chinese. Once
again, therefore, we see that cultural factors often play an important role even in basic aspects of
social behavior and social thought.
Before concluding the discussion of the many ways in which our attributions depart from
the original "perfectly logical person" described by Kelley (1972), we should note that despite all
the errors described here, growing evidence suggests that social perception

actor-observer effeci
The tendency to attribute our own behavior mainly to situational causes but the behavior of
others mainly to internal (dispositional) causes.

self-serving bias
The tendency to attribute positive outcomes to internal causes (e.g., one's own traits or
characteristics) but negative outcomes or events to external causes (e.g., chance, task difficulty).
Figure 3.11
The Self-Serving Bias in Action: Taking Credit for Success, Blaming Others for Failure The
self-serving bins leads us to take credit for positive outcomes—perhaps more credit than we
deserve—but to blame others for negative results. This is one reason why after experiencing
failure, the members of teams (whether athletic teams or business teams) often blame each other
for the negative outcomes they have experienced.

can be quite accurate; we do, in many cases, reach accurate conclusions about others' traits
and motives from observing their behavior. We'll examine some of the evidence pointing
to this,conclusion as part of our future discussion of the process of impression formation.
&y& ■ Uv^

Magical Thinking Revisited: Why We Sometimes Believe (Irrationally) That Our

Thoughts Influence Events
Be truthful: Do you ever imagine that your thoughts can influence the external world?
For instance, if you imagine harm to another person, do you believe—even just a little— that
your wishes might come true? And when you root for your favorite team, do you ever imagine
that by thinking the "right" thoughts, you can help them win? If so, welcome to the club: As we
saw in our discussion of magical thinking in Chapter 2, most of us do indeed believe tc at least a
minimal degree, that our thoughts can influence the physical world or that other events that
cannot possibly influence each other do so. Does such thinking play a role in our attributions? In
fact, growing evidence indicates that it does. Basically, these beliefs lead us to conclude that we
have produced events or effects that, in fact, we really did not influence. In a sense, then, magical
thinking leads us to overestimate our influence on the external world—an effect that can be
viewed as another kind of attributionaJ error (e.g., Wegner, 2003). What is the basis of such false
beliefs about the impact of our thoughts on the external world? Perhaps it's the fact that our
thoughts precede some physical event, coupled with the fact that we can't see any other clear
potential cause of this event. The result: We jump to the (false) conclusion that our thoughts,
wishes, or intentions caused it (Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005).
Figure 3. 12
Magical Thinking in Our Attributions

When participants in a study stuck pins in the head of a voodoo doll similar to this one, they
concluded 'ffifjtthey had caused another person (an assistant of the researchers) to experience a
headache that he
tetiprted having. This was especially true when the assistant had acted in a rude and irritating
manner, 4Wi$.givingparticipant: in the study a good reason to think angry thoughts about him.
"(Priqto Courtesy Dr. Daniel M. Wegner.)

Convincing evidence for this reasoning—and for the fact that we do often believe our
thoughts have influenced events—is provided by research conducted by Pronin, Wegner,
McCarthy, and Rodriguez (2006). In one of their studies, these researchers had participants stick
pins in a voodoo doll at many locations, including the head, presumably as part of a study of
psychological factors in producing physical symptoms (see Figure 3.12). The doll represented
another person (an assistant of the experimenters) who had either acted in a rude and irritating
manner or in a more neutral manner. After the pins had been stuck in the doll, the assistant
reported that he had a slight headache, and in fact, participants had been asked to stick one of the
pins into the voodoo doll's head. "When asked to rate the extent to which they had produced the
victims headache, people who had seen him act in a rude and irritating manner actually reported
stronger beliefs that they had produced this symptom than people who had seen him act in a
neutral manner. In short, when they had a reason to dislike the assistant and to think negative
thoughts about him, participants believed that they had actually produced his headache. (In fact,
of course, the assistant did not have a headache; he just pretended that he did.)
These findings were confirmed in several other studies, including ones involving actual
sports events. For instance, in one study, participants were asked how much they had thought
about a recent Super Bowl game and various plays during it. Results indicated that the more they
reported thinking about die game and their teams performance in it, the more they felt
responsible for the games outcome. In other words, they believed—to
some extent—that their thoughts had influenced the outcomes of a game they saw on television
and that took place hundreds of miles away. Together, the results of these studies strongly
suggest that attributions, like other aspects of social thought, can sometimes be influenced by
magical thinking.

Applications of Attribution Theory: Insights and Interventions

Kurt Lewin, one of the founders of modern social psychology, often remarked: "There's nothing
as practical as a good theory." By this he meant that once we obtain scientific understanding of
some aspect of social behavior or social thought, we can, potentially, put this knowledge to
practical: use. Where attribution theory is concerned, this has definitely been the case. As basic
knowledge about attribution has grown, so too has the range of practical problems to which such
information has been applied (Graham &C Folkes, 1990; Miller & Rempel, 2004). As an
example of such research, we'll examine how attribution theory has been applied to
understanding one key aspect of mental health—depression.

Attribution and Depression

Depression is the most common psychological disorder. In fact, it has been estimated that almost
half of all human beings experience such problems at some time during their lives (e.g., Blazer,
Kessler, McGonagle, & Swartz, 1994). Although many factors play a role in depression, one that
has received increasing attention is what might be termed a self-defeating pattern of attributions.
In contrast to most people, who show the self-serving bias previously described, depressed
individuals tend to adopt an opposite pattern. They attribute negative outcomes to lasting,
internal causes, such as their own traits or lack of ability, but attribute positive outcomes to
temporary, external causes, such as good luck or special favors from others. As a result, such
people perceive that they have l'ttle or no control over what happens to them; they are simply
being blown about by the winds of unpredictable fate (see Figure 3.13). Little wonder that they
become depressed and tend to give up on life. And once they are depressed, the tendency to
engage in this self-defeating pattern is strengthened, and a vicious cycle is often initiated.
Fortunately, several forms of therapy that focus on changing such attributions have been
developed and appear to be quite successful (e.g., Bruder, et al., 1997; Robinson, Berman, &C
Neimeyer, 1990). These new forms of therapy focus on getting depressed people to change their
attributions, to take personal credit for successful outcomes, to stop

Figure 3.13
Attribution and Depression While most people trend to attribute positive events to lasting
internal causes (e.g., their own talent) and negative events to external, temporary causes (e.g.,
br.-J. luck), depressed people exhibit the opposite pattern. They at' rihute negative outcomes to
lasting internal causes (e.g., their own lack of ability) and attribute positive outcomes to
temporaiy :•■' iernal causes (e.g., good luck). A' in forms of therapy attempt to tn at depression
by changing these b : nnfid patterns of attributions.
Nondepressed (Normal) Persons