World Affairs Institute

THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE AND CONFLICT WITH JAPAN

Author(s): LEON E. BOOTHE
Source: World Affairs, Vol. 135, No. 3 (Winter 1972), pp. 240-259
Published by: World Affairs Institute
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20671383 .
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 THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE AND
CONFLICT WITH JAPAN
By LEON E. BOOTHE

O n July7, 1937,JapaneseandChinesetroopsclashedat theMarco

Polo Bridge. This action on the
belligerent simmering Sino-Japanese
border in China signaled the beginning of general war as Japanese
for war was to be a
troops invaded Chinese territory.' The decision
culmination of Japanese efforts to penetrate and control China both

economically and politically. China's defeat at the hands of Japan in

the Sino-JapaneseWar of 1896 marked the beginning of Japan's overt
efforts to control China. The ease with which a much smaller
Japan,
and supposedly weaker nation, defeated China foredoomed theChinese
Empire. steady path
Japan's
to
empire in China, while successful, was
not, however, always smooth. For example, imperialistic rivalries in
Manchuria led to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. Additionally,

Japan's gains during the early part of the 20th century had been
checked or frustrated by America's paternalistic open-door policies
which sought to prevent the economic and political dismemberment of
China.2
The 1937 invasion was to be far different from other
Japan's
attempts. It had tremendous international significance
imperialistic
because of on the Nine Power of 1922.
Japan's signature Treaty
The of that covenant had pledged to respect the terri
signatories
torial and political sovereignty of China.3 However, the national
interestof Japan had changed considerably in the decade and a half
since the signing of the Nine Power agreement. The Depression had
the militants in Japanese society to convince that
helped Nippon
Japan had a sense of destiny inAsia. By extending her influencepro
gressively, Japan could become a stabilizing force in the Far East.4
Despite the change of interest,Japanese actions were a clear viola
tion of the 1922 agreement. The main question was whether the
other signatories of the pact would take collective action to preserve
the treatycommitments.

240
 BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 241

Reaction inAmerica and Abroad

The first major reaction of the American government came on July

16, 1937. American of State Cordell Hull, a staunch

Secretary
Wilsonian idealist, tried to rise to the tense situation by making his
famous statement of principles for the settlement of the present and

any future international disputes. In brief summary, Hull proposed

maintenance of peace, national and international self-restraint,
abstinence from the use of force, abstinence from interference in the
internal affairs of other nations,
adjustment of problems by peaceful

negotiation and agreement, faithful observance and strengthening of

international agreements and laws, and limitation and reduction of
armaments. While in their general aims, Hull's proposals
laudatory
lacked precision of language and could thus be interpretedin a variety
of ways. Reflective of that inherent failure of precision was the

adoption of these principles by everymajor power. Unfortunately the

so very evident in this lesson was to be ignored generally in
paradox
later American foreign policy.'
Britain also was concerned about the Far Eastern situation. The
British demonstrated this interest to Norman Davis, American delegate
to the International Conference in 1937. In London, Davis
Sugar
conferred with Prime Minister Chamberlain about world events. While
Chamberlain indicated a policy of appeasement in Europe, the British
leader a more in reference to
espoused positive policy Japan.
Chamberlain's fear was that Japan would take advantage of British
weakness in the Orient in case of general war in Europe. The Prime
Minister felt that only a resolute standby theUnited States and Britain
could stem the tide of
Japanese imperialism.6
Britain suggested to the United States government on October 1,
1937, the possibility of a joint boycott against Japan. Officially the
United States ruled out such a course. The basic arguments
policy
supporting this negative response covered the major categories of
legalism,moralism, departure from tradition, and even sheer prag
matism. The American officials agreed that the proposed policy went
beyond existingAmerican legislation,named an aggressorand thuswas
taking sides, and would mean aligning the United States and Great
Britain. The United States also feared that theAmerican fleetwould
bear the brunt of any Japanese retaliation.Britain's proposal showed
the weakness of the League of Nations. England felt it had to go
outside of theLeague forpositive action.7
242 LEON E. BOOTHE

A dramatic chain of events temporarily arrested the uncertainty of

the vacuum. On October 5, 1937, President Franklin
diplomatic
Roosevelt made his famous Quarantine Speech in Chicago. The
President intimated that the United States was throwing the uncom
mitted past to the winds and was instead sounding a clarion call for
concerted action. There could be little doubt that the talk of
was aimed at actions in China.'
quarantine squarely Japanese
Just 24 hours after Roosevelt's speech, the League of Nations
a resolution made its Far Eastern Committee. This
adopted by Advisory
resolution implicated Japan and furthercalled for the signatoriesof the
Nine Power Treaty to initiate consultations. Since the
Washington
contracting nations had pledged to support the integrityof China, a
Nine Power Conference seemed in order. The League's action is more
relevantwhen it is realized that SecretaryHull had notified theLeague
was
before the Chicago address that President Roosevelt going to make
a The American President's call for action
major foreign policy speech.
was acceded to by the League and the United States was to
encouraged
play a full role if it sowilled.9
The S. State Department
U. took a bold step in issuing a statement
that Japan was in fact in violation of existing treaties. The communique
stated in part: "The Government of the United States has been forced
to the conclusion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with
the principles. . .between nations and is contrary to the of
provisions
the Nine Power . ., and to those of the Pact."
Treaty. Kellogg-Briand
American conclusions were in general accord with those of the League
of Nations The fact that the American announcement came
Assembly.
on the same
day that the League adopted its resolution indicates that a
was
joint effort being made.10
The trend of events indicated that theUnited States was devising a
concerted policy that would go beyond moralistic condemnation.

Having taken the initial steps, Roosevelt waited for domestic and
internationalreaction.''1
In Europe reactionwas mixed. The French, who were hard pressed
because of the vulnerabilityof Indochina,were very enthusiastic about
Roosevelt's speech. French officials thought the moves by the
American governmenthad come at a very propitious time.Chamberlain
of England hoped to channel suchmoves. He stated that the firststep
of any concerted action would be the holding of a Nine Power
Conference. Germany and Italy reacted negatively to the speech and
 BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 243

the calling of a Nine Power meeting. The Italian government considered

that the Nine Power Treaty had died with the Japanese seizure of
Manchuria in 1932.1 2

Initial reaction
among Japanese government circles indicated that the
Nine Power Treaty was obsolete and that the Kellogg-Briand Pact was

inapplicable to the "China incident." If invited, Japan's inclination was

to refuse any invitation to a Nine Power Conference. The
proposed
Japanese could not acquiesce in any intervention between China and
herself. The Japanese military, having little understanding of the West,
3
resented American and British intrusion into the Chinese problem.'

American Opinion

While Revisionist studies have indicated strong support for

Roosevelt's quarantine the Roosevelt Administration inter
speech,
the domestic reaction as largely negative to the sudden change of
preted
was a
foreign policy.'" There large outcry of public opinion against any
kind of aggressive action German Ambassador to the
against Japan. The
United States verified the reception of Roosevelt's speech by the
American to Berlin on October 9 that, due to the
citizenry. He reported
overwhelmingly negative response, "the fanfare in Chicago has rather
)
quickly become a call to retreat. . . .
Reaction in the State Department varied. A minority group advised

against strong action. Many feared that the United States would be in a

position similar to that of Britain in the Ethiopian crisis-making a

commitment with no support from other nations. This group
follow-up
feared that the United States would have to bear the brunt in fighting
Britain's battles in the Far East. The New York Times echoed this

general idea in stating that the United States should remain uncom
mitted unless it could be firmly convinced that the other major nations
with interestsin the Far East would actively take part in any adopted
course of concerted action.' 6
Assistant Secretary of State G. S. Messersmithwas the spokesman for
a groupwhich espoused a second viewpoint:

We are witnessing . .. a reversion to the doctrine of force and of might

. .. to an entirely different internationalmorality. . .. This resurrected
law . .. is to replace present international law . . . and a whole new

system of public and private morals . .. is to be imposed on the

world.'"'
244 LEON E. BOOTHE

Patience would only lead the United States to war, and there was no
shelter behind neutrality legislation or ignoring the facts as they
existed.
A notable thirdgroup consistingof Secretary of State Hull, William
Bullitt (Ambassador to France), William Phillips (Ambassador to Italy),
and Hugh Wilson, James Dunn, and J. P. Moffat of the State
met on October 10. This group felt that the situation in
Department
China might not be resolved even if the United States took strong
action and if Japan completely backed down. The Soviet Union might
try to move into the chaotic vacuum and nothing would be gained.1"

Conference at Brussels

Despite evident division of opinion both at home and abroad, an

avenue for possible action was still available in the Nine Power
Conference for which the League had issued a convention call. England,
in communication with the United States, began preparation for such a
conference. The powers first approached the Netherlands to host the
conference. The Dutch government, however, refused because of the
of their Asian to Japanese
susceptibility empire reprisal. The Dutch
announced that it would attend a conference but stated
government
pessimistically that itwas not in favor of coercive measures.

Britain, following American advice, then asked the Belgian govern

ment to serve as conference host. The Belgian Ambassador to
Japan
stronglyadvised his government against the holding of such a meeting
by stating that "no international action short of force could in any way
alter the course of developments in China. . . ." Since such action was

very unlikely, Belgian interests in Japan would necessarily suffer. In

spite of such ominous warnings, Belgium did accept and scheduled the
conference for November 3, 1937.1 9
Because of the magnitude of the crisis, Britain and the United States
agreed to invite certain nonsignatory governments of the Nine Power
Treaty to the conference, notably Germany and the Societ Union.
Trying to bolster the roster of the conference even more, British
Foreign Minister Anthony Eden sent a personal message to Foreign
Minister Ciano of Italy and Reich Foreign Minister Constantin von
Neurath asking each to attend at the head of theirdelegations. Both
later refused.20o
The United States officially accepted the League's invitation on
October 16, 1937. One United States diplomat unofficially remarked
 BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 245

about invitation, "We are damned

the League ifwe do and damned if
we don't." was
There little doubt, that until the time of
though,
Roosevelt's it looked as if the try to
quarantine speech League would
handle the Far Eastern dilemma. The American president's speech thus
was the genesis of the Nine Power Conference.2

Policy Planning
Roosevelt appointed the following to theUnited States delegation:
Norman Davis as the sole as Far Eastern
delegate, Stanley Hornbeck
adviser, J. P. Moffat as adviser, Robert Pell as Press Officer,
European
and Charles as
Bohlen Secretary. Secretary of State Hull could not go
because the President had called the Congress back into special session.
There was a vital need for Hull to stay in
Washington.22
Norman Davis was Roosevelt's and had served
ambassador-at-large
the President at international meetings,
previous especially disarmament
conferences. Ambassador Davis's background indicated that he was in
favor of a stronger approach by the United States to the world
situation. Davis's was an article written
general outlook clearly stated in
in 1934: "It should be possible for the United States. . .to in
cooperate
an endeavor to promote peace and solve such
questions of international
concern as can
only be dealt with effectively by concerted action." He
felt that such as treaties were insufficient. Davis
things nonaggression
had additionally two of the four memoranda for Roosevelt's
prepared
quarantine speech. Those two memoranda contained very strong
statements which Roosevelt toned down in the final draft.23
If Roosevelt selected Davis because of the Ambassador's desire for a

stronger policy, the rest of the delegation was not so firmly convinced.
Divisions in the United States entourage developed between those who
felt that theUnited States should go slow lestJapan retaliate and those
who thought that Japan should be stopped now lestwe be faced by a
stronger threat later. Davis emphasized the importance of the British
Empire toAmerican security.While Davis did not advocate theUnited
States becoming a lackey for Britain, he felt that a prime aim of
American foreign policy should be to prevent the Empire from
becoming endangered.At the other extremewas Moffat's position. His
preoccupation was to prevent American involvement in hostilities
anywhere and to prevent an entangling common front formation of
democratic powers. He felt the destruction of Japan would leave a
power vacuum which could only augment communism.24
246 LEON E. BOOTHE

The division among the delegation was matched by confusion in the

higher foreign policy echelon of Roosevelt's Administration. Secretary

to Davis were
Hull's instructions guided by the outline of principles
The Secretary of State listed national
previously made public. security
and the promotion of the maintenance of peace as the first objective of
American foreign policy. He stated further:

You will bear inmind that public opinion in the United States has
expressed its emphatic determination that the United States keep out
of war. . . . The function of the conference is to a
primary provide
forum for constructive discussion to formulate ... bases of
possible
settlement, and ... the
bring parties together through peaceful
negotiation.25

Davis at Hyde Park to receive

visited Roosevelt instructions.
personal
discussed the courses of action-from
They possible banding together
for collective action to such neutral action as verbally ostracizing Japan.
Roosevelt indicated that the ultimate
guide would be the development
of public In a memorandum Roosevelt told the American
opinion.
"to make it clear at every . .that the United States
delegation step.
policy does not envision theUnited States being pushed out in frontas
the leader, or suggester of future action." The American contingent
was
not to take the lead as Japan might direct its animosity toward the
United States. Additionally, such action would arouse the clamor of the
isolationists. After instructing the delegation not to assume the leading

role, Roosevelt told Davis that if the United States were to avoid an
ultimate clash with Japan some practical means of checking Japanese
conquests had to be found. The sad fact was that Roosevelt also told
Davis that there was a need for collective action but he could only
use
the tools of bland moralism. Another unfortunate aspect was that the
American only had three days to prepare before
delegation officially
6
sailing for the conference.2
The policies of ambivalence continued up to the time the delegation
sailed. Roosevelt told the nation in a fireside chat that the purpose of
the conference was to work with other signatories to find a solution.
Then indicating that theUnited States was thinkingin termsof a more
activist policy, the President said: "I want our great democracy to be
wise enough to realize that aloofness fromwar is not prompted by an
unawareness of war. In a world of mutual suspicions, peace must be

affirmativelyreached for. It cannot just be wished for. It cannot just be

waited for." The President, however, retracted any image of collective
 BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 247

on the eve of the

planning by announcing delegation's sailing that Mr.
Davis would enter the conference "without any commitments on the

part of this government to other governments."27

Undoubtedly Roosevelt was being influenced by developments on

the international scene. Alexis of the French
Secretary-General Leger
Foreign Ministry notifiedWashington on October 16 that due to the
situation in Europe and the
vulnerability of Indochina, it was

impossible for France to

adopt the use of force at the upcoming
conference. France said that the United States would have to protect
the small power from retaliation by Japan if economic sanctions were
to be considered. A pledge of protection for Indochina was
by America
paramount in French minds.2"
The British government in an aide-mimoire on October 19 tried to

pinpoint the American position. Britain felt that if the only result of
the conference was moral condemnation of Japan, this would be
tantamount to in the aggression. Added to this futile
acquiescing
situation would be the creation of frustrated feelings in Japan and an

embedding of their inferiority complex. The only solution was positive

action in the form of active assistance to the Chinese or economic
sanctions against Japan. However, the United States would have to give
assurances of military protection to any countries who would partici
pate in such action against Japan. Britain felt that if assurances
positive
were there would be a good possibility of restraining
forthcoming,
Japan and an settlement.
making early peaceful
The United States considered such action as proposed by Britain to
be outside the bounds of the conference. The United States viewed the

purpose of the conference as to induce an armistice in China,

being
which was to be followed by peaceful negotiation and a stabilizingof
the situation. the Roosevelt Administration realized that
Pragmatically,
there was little public support for a guarantee of American military
support as suggestedby the British and theFrench.29
The initial prerequisites for any strong action were apparently
beyond the limitsof American foreignpolicy.With this realization, it
can be seriously questioned why the United States pursued a course
that could only lead to frustrationfor all parties involved.
Belgium asked theUnited States on October 30 for theproposals and
procedural plans that were to be submitted to the conference. The
American answer was: ".. .we have no proposal worked out to submit
to the conference nor have we any plan of procedurewhich we propose
248 LEON E. BOOTHE

to dryly, the United States suggested

support." Almost that delegates
arrive two or three days early to thrash out the agenda.

Boycott by Japan and Germany

Since no other nation a to lead the conference,
expressed willingness
Belgian official circles panicked at the thought of playing the leading
role by default. Added to this dilemma was the fact that the Belgians
themselves did not know what the conference was to
supposed
accomplish.34
Japan shook the preconference atmosphere by announcing that it
would not attend themeeting. Nippon claimed that itwas fightingin
China out of self-defense and to stamp out the communist menace. The

Japanese reasoned that communist espionage in China had made the

Nine Power Treaty obsolete. Deviating from such excuses, Japan
realistically said that it felt that it could not obtain a fairhearing at the
conference even if itwere to attend. The basis for this viewpoint was
the fact that the convening of the conference was under the
aegis of the
League. Since the League had condemned Japan previously, the
saw the conference as more than a forum to abuse
Japanese nothing
Japan. In the Japanese estimation, the conference added to the
only
belligerency in the Far East because it gave China some hope that they
might receive foreign support and aid."

Germany furtheradded to the difficultyby announcing that itwould

not attend the conference. The Germans declined no
because they felt
to attend (not being a'signatory to the and because
obligation Treaty),
they thought that there was little prospect that the conference would
achieve a successful end
result. Germany concluded that the aim of the
conference was a moral
condemnation of Japan. The Third Reich did
leave open the possibility of later joining the meeting if it appeared that
there was a movement toward the achievement of "practical goals."
As a signatory to the Nine Power Agreement, Italy announced that it
would attend the Brussels Conference. Under German and Japanese
diplomatic pressure, Italy agreed to representand explain the Japanese
viewpoint. ForeignMinister Ciano announced thathe would not attend
the conference because he felt therehad not been adequate preparation
for the conference. Ciano felt that nothing tangible would be
accomplished.3"
The Soviet Union announced its acceptance of the invitation to the
meeting. While Russia expected little in termsof accomplishments, it
 BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 249

did have a faint hope for some sort of a strong stand. Moffat viewed the
Soviet acceptance as an effort to embarrass the powers at
represented
the conference an effort to prevent any sort of a
and peaceful
agreement. The
latter was to keep Japan in a war of
goal occupied
attrition that would resources to threaten
hopefully weaken Nippon's
the Soviet Union.33

Proceedings
With the list of powers now to arrive for
complete, delegates began
the preconference and maneuvering. In a
planning preconference
meeting
on November 2, Eden told Davis that Britain was prepared
to

go as far as the United States but no further. Britain could not afford to
be lefton a diplomatic limb again, especially during this crucial period
in Europe. Eden a to base British actions on
proclaimed willingness
American policy.
Davis replied that Britain and theUnited States should concentrate
every effort on exerting
a moral influence through their diplomacy.
Such a process would crystallizepublic opinion and the forces of peace
and order. These were to be the weapons to combat the lawlessness that

prevailed at that time. Meeting laterwith the French and Belgian

representatives, Davis reiterated this idea. However, Davis complained
to the State Department of the difficultyin convincing the French and
the Belgians of the importance of building up and educating public
opinion because such concepts were
foreign
to them.
Despite such a

roadblock,Davis notified SecretaryHull thathe would continue to urge

the importance of the "constructive part" of the American policy.
In trying to give support to the American delegation, Assistant

Secretary of State Sumner Welles emphasized the American viewpoint

to the British Ambassador inWashington. Welles stated:

Every effort is to be made to rally moral opinion in every other country

of the world in favor of the principles embodied in the Nine Power
Treaty and the effort to make perfectly clear to public opinion
everywhere the attitude which . .. Japan had assumed in connection
therewith. . .. The whole premise of this government in going to the
Brussels Conference was the keeping alive ..,. of international law and
morality. . ..34

With no visible format for conducting the conference and with one
of the belligerents being absent, the Brussels Conference convened on
250 LEON E. BOOTHE

November 3, 1937. Moffat reflected the morale of the delegates under

such gloomy circumstances by stating: "I have never known a conference
even before we meet, are
where people discussing ways to end it."
American delegate Davis opened the working session with a mild

speech calling for a peaceful settlement "within the scope of these

treaty provisions and principles." Britain and France seconded the
American position. Count Aldovandi, Italian delegate, indicated the

cynical view of the Italian government by stating that past attempts at

international settlements had ended in failure, citing such things as the

Lytton Report of the League of Nations. He left very little doubt that
he believed that the Brussels Conference would also end in failure. The
Count said that
Italy deplored the situation, but it was impossible
to
establish the facts in the China problem and, therefore, impossible to
who was the the Italian
judge guilty. Echoing Japanese position,
Delegate said that the best course would be to let the two belligerents
deal directlywith each other.
The course of opening speeches changedwith the address byMaxim
Litvinov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs. His blunt call for
collective concerted action rocked the conference. He stated that unless
there was a strong successful solution arrived at by the assembled

powers, the world was in essence adopting the maxims: "Take your

plunder, take what you have seized by force, and peace be with you.
Love your aggressor, resist not evil."
Dr. Kee of China presented the Chinese position in detail. China
considered the conference as the forces of righteousness
representing
and justice that would correct the wrongs being inflictedupon the
Chinese peoples.
With the initial round of speeches completed, the conferees were at a
loss as to what to do next. Any specific solution that might be arrived
at would be meaningless as as Japan was absent. The conference
long
then decided to send Japan a second invitation, which, in time, Japan
s
would also refuse.3
A diplomatic bombshell hit the conference on November 6, 1937,
with the announcement of Italy's entrance into theAnti-Commintern
Pact. Ciano's absence was clear in perspective. Such news prompted
many smaller nations to propose appointing a negotiating team and
adjourning. However, the major powers were able to keep the
conferencegoing.36s
Negotiations behind the scenes added another dimension to the
 BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 251

conference. Soviet
delegate Litvinov apparently felt that his career was
on trialwith thisgathering.Litvinov had been the ardent supporterof a
Russian policy of collective action with theWest against the rising
Fascist menace. If the Commissar returned home without success, he
would suffer the consequences. His dismissal would mean the waning of
his position of stated that the
working with the democracies. Litvinov
Soviet leaders would replace him and his major advisers with younger
men who had little or no knowledge of Europe and who were very

suspicious of all foreigners.Russia would most likely follow a policy

of the West.37 Litvinov's fears turned out to be a
independent
prophecy of what was to come.
The French government had become disturbed over the driftingof
policy. While consulting with the United States about France's
membership on any negotiating team that might be appointed, the
French Premier lectured the American Ambassador:

What I cannot understand is that you Americans from time to time talk
as if you really intended to act in the International sphere when you
have no intention of acting in any way that can be effective.... Such a

policy on the part of the United States merely leads the dictatorships to
believe that the democracies are full ofwords but are unwilling to back
up theirwords by force, and force is the only thing that counts today
in theworld.38

Davis became restive over

the apparent failure of moralistic diplo
macy. In a with the French and British on
meeting representatives
November 10, the American delegate suggested that the final draft
include a refusal to as well as a
recognize Japanese aggressive gains
refusal to extend loans and credits to Japan. However, Davis said that
he spoke only for himself and not his government.
The American delegate's rebellion showed up on that same day inhis
with the State Department. He assaulted the
communiques verbally
American Neutrality laws as negating "our affirmation of high moral
principles and advocacy ofmoral pressuresupon Japan."Words spoken
outside the realm of power could have little impact upon such a
situation. Davis clearly stated that ifmoral pressure failed "we may find
ourselves embarrassed or impotent." If Japan refused the second
invitation as expected, Davis stated itwould be impossible to keep the
conference going.
Reflecting the lack of a positive atmosphere was the statement of
Canada on November 12: "Condemnation if you will, but no
252 LEON E. BOOTHE

sanctions." The Scandinavian governments who sent second

only
to the conference stated that they were
ranking delegates openly
against anything that was
critical of Japan.
Hull's to Davis was
response completely negative. After conferring
with the President and congressional leaders, Hull said there was no

hope for repealing or suspending theNeutrality legislation in order to

strengthen the American bargaining position. Nonetheless, Hull urged
that the conference be kept in session for world sake. Hull
opinion's
ordered Davis to emphasize the principles and provisions of the Nine
Power Treaty. The American Secretary felt that the conference had
9
clarified a few issues, if only in a negative way.3

Acting according
to orders, Davis in a speech on November 13 stated
that the Sino-Japanese conflict was destroying the "integrity of certain

principleswhich we hold sacred." Davis pointed out that Japan had had
two chances to
explain its case and argued that if Japan really
was
interested in internationalgood will, then the Japanese should take this
opportunity to prove it.
The State soon concluded, however, that
Department nothing
positive could be accomplished by the conference and instructedDavis
on November 13 to make no new initiative, and to confine his speeches
to a discussion of platitudes.40

Being bitterly disappointed in this communique of abandonment,

Davis sent a message to on November 16
strongly-worded Washington
in support of his views. He stated that, unless the United States was

prepared
to in some positive steps, "most countries will lose
participate
their nerve." Anthony Eden supported Davis that "we cannot usefully
and with dignity continue much longer to confine ourselves to an
of principles and pleas to Japan. . . ." Davis outlined what
expression
he felt was the "minimum step" of nonrecognition of gains and

prohibition of loans. The American delegate said there were signs that
was nervous about this conference. However, "if we go on much
Japan
longerwithout any evidence of intention to do anythingmore than
preach. . .," Japan would become satisfied that there was no danger of
any interference
with her plans of expansion.41i

Futile Results

On November 15 the Conference adopted a General Declaration

accusing Japan of violating the principles of theNine Power Treaty and
of international law. The Declaration closed by noting that Japan's
 BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 253

reluctance to with the other powers was in itself a

cooperate
of guilt. Japanese nervousness showed itself when the
recognition
government of Japan notified American Ambassador Joseph Grew that
a foot of Chinese
all they wanted
was a reasonable peace "and not
. . .42 Grew to the State
territory will be taken. realistically noted
on effortstoward peace
Department that, if the United States insisted
within the framework of collective security, force and only force could
be effective.This was a strong statementof the futilityof the policy
3
the United States was pursuing
at Brussels.4
The American government's attitude on the use of force came in a

message from Hull to Davis on November 15. Hull instructed: ". . .we
feel that a strongreaffirmationof the principleswhich should underlie
.would be the best method" of offsetting the vast
relationships..
criticism of the Conference.44 It was clear that Washington would not
back anything other than moralistic enunciations.
Davis answered: "I bow to your judgement." This statement was,

however, a
decoy for a strong plea for more responsible
A
action.
had revealed that most of the powers at Brussels
survey by Davis
believed a mere reaffirmation would not contribute to a solution of the
In noting Japan's past actions, Davis suggested that the matter
problem.
of Japanese actions inChina should be eitherdropped gracefullyor else
a decision should be made to do something "more definite." Again,
Davis repeated his minimum plan of nonrecognition and restrictionof
loanswhich he felt could realisticallybe achieved. He emphasized that
time was a crucial factor lest the situation worsen with delay.
stance
Though the State Department did not take the positive
advocated by Davis, American officials were embarrassed by the
impotency of the conference. Hull issued a public statement trying to
offset the evident fact. He stated that the Conference "sets a precedent
for concerted action to the doctrine of international mor
uphold
. . ." However, disturbed Hull,
ality. press dispatches particularly
reportswhich stated that the United States was primarily responsible
for the lack of success of the conference. Journalists indicated that
other nations waited for action by theUnited States as the signal for
the adoption of positive pressure against Japan. The American
Secretary of State cabled Davis that he wanted the situation arrested
since the pressmade it hard "to maintain a position in defense of our
principles."
Hull sent additional suggestions for bringing the conference to a
254 LEON E. BOOTHE

close. He wanted the conference to a final resolution which

adopt
would serve as a report to the world. Such a report would contain a

listingof eventswhich would implicate Japan as the villain. There was

to be a reaffirmation of the principles of the Nine Power Treaty; plus,
Hull stated,

. . those other which are essential to world peace.... The

principles
theiruniversal
validity of those principles cannot be destroyed by force;
cannot be denied; and their indispensability to civilization
applicability
and cannot be
progress gainsaid.

The recess of the conference was to be on the that itwould

stipulation
'
meet if the situation availed itself.4
again
The controversy between Davis and the State Department, however,
continued. Davis that there were various concepts as to where
reported
measures of persuasion left off and measures of pressure or positive
action The for example, considered the Brussels
began. Japanese,
Conference as a measure of pressure. Even in the minimum program
that had been Davis that "our delegation has at
presented, emphasized
no time or any measures which we would
contemplated suggested
as involving action and we have at no time initiated
regard positive
considerations in Conference circles of any measures of pressure." The
that the other nations had never suggested the United
delegate reported
States act alone or assume outstanding responsibility for any positive
action Now that the Conference every was to a close,
program. coming
to escape the onus
of failure. Although the powers had
power sought
talked of a cooperative effort, Davis noted that the United States would
be blamed for the negative results of the conference.
Hull's answer came in principled language. Trying to salvage some
sort of victory, the American Secretary stated that the Conference
could provide a broader basis for the support of principles governing
international relationships. Hull stated: "I feel that each nation should
make every effort to educate itspeople as to theurgent importanceof
the principles of peace and. . .to build up. . .an understanding of the
principles essential to orderly and healthy relations among nations."
Davis cabled back that he was runninginto resistance from the other
delegations as to the implementationof Hull's instructions.Britain felt
it inadvisable to make any furtherdeclarations of principles as they
could not think of anything furtherto say without being repetitious
and monotonous.4 6
 BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 255

On November 21 Hull rebuked the American

again contingent for
not was over such
handling the press properly. Hull especially indignant
comments as the New York Herald which said: "The
printed by
American and British delegations, with.. .the Belgian Foreign Minister,
were to a first class funeral."
preparing give the Nine Power Treaty
Secretary Hull instructed the delegation to the constructive
emphasize
achievements of the and noted that "the Conference in
gathering
recessing gives each government the opportunity in its own way to take

appropriate measures toward keeping alive and educating its people in

.
regard to the fundamental importance of the. .broader principles and
issues which are of world concern." The rebuke on the press
handling
enraged the delegation. Hornbeck called the censure a "stinkbomb."
Pell considered the press dispatches as being critical of Washington
policy rather than the delegation at Brussels. Moffat indicated surprise
that the news stories were not worse. As the leader of the
delegates,
Davis informed Hull of the attitude news columnists had taken at the

beginning of the Conference. When the delegation had arrived in

the newsmen thought Roosevelt's
Brussels, quarantine speech would
provide the for concrete action the Conference. The
leadership by
initial enthusiasm had faded as the Conference dragged on without
results. Many newspapermen bitterly felt "that American cooperation
was 7
meaningless and consisted exclusively of fine phrases."4
The Conference stumbled along hoping to adjourn on themodified
basis of Hull's Davis to Hull: "To get a meeting of
suggestions. reported
theminds with the British,we had to permit some cuttingdown of the
statements of principles" in the text of the final report. The Brussels
Conference a final
adopted, with Italy abstaining, report on November
24. With this task the Conference recessed. It was never to
completed,
convene
again.48
All the forecasts about the uselessness and failure of the Conference
came true with the of the Conference. The Brussels
recessing
Conference was the height of themoralistic approach to international
problems and at the same timewas the nadir of pragmatic diplomacy.
The vacuum of power that existed in the 1920s and early 1930s was no
longeran internationalfact. The United States could no longerdelude
itself into thinkingthat itwould always be able to settle a situationby
pious rhetoric.A question was asked appropriately at that time as to
what the United States expected to achieve by displays of mass anger
and moralistic lectures.49~Unfortunately, the answer was always the
256 LEON E. BOOTHE

answer alone shows how

arousing of public and world opinion. That far
the American people had strayed from the mainstream of
diplomatic
power politics.
In retrospect, the Roosevelt Administration's handling of the crisis
of 1937 reflects a lack of understanding of the internationalsituation.
The American adherence to the Wilsonian of
government's approach
employing moral verbiage instead of positive concrete action not
only
the national interest but created confusion on the national
neglected
and international scene. Defenders of the Roosevelt Administration
isolationist block in the United States was
argued that the large and
could not have supported a policy aimed at stemming the Japanese by
In addition to this
force if necessary. point of cleavage, there is the
that the Allied was in an
rationalization leadership appeasing mood.
Forceful policies adopted by the American government would not
at home, but would also have the
only have threatened unity required
United States to go it alone internationally.

Weakness of American Policy

The internationalistschool of writers which has tried to vindicate

Roosevelt Administration policy has overlooked the opportunities for
collective action which existed in 1937. In particular, these writers have
failed to examine critically the events surrounding the Brussels
Conference.5 0 Had decisive measures been at this international
adopted
meeting, it seems clear that the United States would not have borne the
brunt of Japanese reaction. Britain, France, and the Soviet Union were

willing to join with the United States in a vigorous program to stem

Japanese intent.
Failure by the United States to seize the initiative was a clear signal
to the aggressive powers. The American nation had long established

diplomatic traditions in China as well as being party to international

agreements concerning that ill-starredcountry.The point overlooked in
past studies is that the Brussels Conference was the one case where the
United States was obligatorily involved by its 'signatureto the Nine
Power Treaty.5' In the other major incidents of the 1930Osprior to
1937, theUnited States was always an outsider observing the crises.s52
In such cases, the role theUnited States might play in the event of a
major conflagration could never by accurately assessed by the aggressor
powers. In failing to respond to Japan's patent violation of historic
 BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 257

American interests, those nations bent on imperialism now felt assured

that the United States would not bring its power to bear against them.
At the same time those nations who sought
to collaborate with the
United States became discouraged by the inaction of the American
government. With the failure to frame a collective at Brussels,
policy
Britain and France resorted to appeasement,eventually and Russia

sought nonagression pacts with the martial

powers. The Brussels
Conference appears not only because it revealed the clear
significant
of moralistic but also because it was a crucial
failings diplomacy,
turning point between peace and war.
The Brussels Conference set the stage for what was to in
happen
Munich in 1938. Brussels dramatically demonstrated the inabilityof the
major powers in the anti-fascist camp to unite against imperialistic
endeavors. Munich a reaffirmation of the evident bank
represented
ruptcy of the anti-fascist powers. at Munich was a
Appeasement
continuation of appeasement at Brussels.
It is not surprisingthat diplomatic historians pay so little attention
3
to the consequences of the Brussels Conference.s Those few writers
who treat the the conference in the wrong frame of
subject place
reference, viewing it as a study of internal American politics, rather
than as one of the major failures of American foreign policy which
culminated inwar.

NOTES
1. A. W. Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York: Yale

University Press, 1938), pp. 454-458.

2. Theodore Roosevelt limited Japanese gains from the Russo-Japanese War by keeping
Russia strong to check and balance Japan; U. S. support of China during World War I helped

nullify Japan's Twenty-One Demands; the Stimson Doctrine refused to recognize Japan's
seizure of Manchuria in 1932.
3. U. S., Department of State, Press Releases, July 3-December 25, 1937 (1938), p. 396.
4. Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan and her Destiny (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1958), pp.
43- 44.
5. U. S., Department of State, Peace and War, U. S. Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (1942), pp.
44- 45.
6. Dorothy Borg, "Notes on Roosevelt's 'Quarantine' Speech," Political Science Quarterly,
Vol. LXXII (September 1957), pp. 409-410. Norman Davis Manuscript Collection (Library of

Congress), Boxes 8, 51, and 55.

7. Nancy H. Hooker, ed., The off at Papers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956),

pp. 152-153.
8. New York Times, October 20, 1937. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1937 (New York, 1941), Vol. VI, pp. 418-423. Norman
Davis Manuscript Collection, op. cit., Box 55.
9. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1954), Vol. IV, pp. 58-61.
258 LEON E. BOOTHE

10. U. S., Department of State, Press Releases, 1937, Vol. XVIII, p. 285. Hooker, op. cit.,
pp. 153-154. Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan Co., 1941), Vol. I,
p. 544.
11. Hooker, op. cit., p. 155.
12. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . .,
op. cit., Vol. I, p. 134; Vol. IV, p. 78.
New York Times, October 9, 1937.
13. U. of State, Foreign Relations. . .,
S., Department op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 56. Shigemitsu,
op. cit., p. 150.
14. Borg, "Notes. . .,"
op. cit. See also, Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far
Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).
15. Hull, op. cit., pp. 552-554. U. S., Department of State, Documents on German
Foreign
Policy, 1918-1945 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), Series D, Vol. I, pp.
634-635. . .,"
Borg, "Notes. op. cit., pp. 426-430.
16. Hooker, op. cit., p. 154. New York Times, October 20, 1937.
17. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . .,
op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 140-141.
18. Hooker, op. cit., pp. 155-156. Norman Davis Manuscript Collection, op. cit., Boxes 27,
41.
19. U. S., Department of State, Relations. . ., cit., Vol. IV, pp. 70, 74-75,
Foreign op.
90-97.
20. Ibid., pp. 67-68, U. S. Department of State, Documents on German . .,
Foreign Policy.
op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 20-21.
21. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . .,
op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 82-83. Hooker,
op. cit., pp. 150-156.
22. of State, Foreign Relations.
U. S., Department . .,
op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 73.
23. New York Times,
July 16, 1937. Hooker, op. cit., pp. 153-154. Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, International Conciliation (Washington, 1934), no. 298, p. 25; no. 308,
p. 34. Norman Davis Manuscript Collection, op. cit., Boxes 8, 47, 55.
24.
Hooker, op. cit., pp. 157, 182-183.
25.
U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., IV, p. 84. Norman
op. cit., Vol. Davis

Manuscript Collection, op. cit., Boxes 4, 5, 27.

26. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . .,
op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 85. Hooker, op.
cit., pp. 156-157. Hull, op. cit., pp. 551-552. Norman Davis Manuscript Collection, op. cit.,
Boxes 4-5.
27. Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 133. Council on Foreign Relations, The U.S. in World Affairs,
1937 (New York: Harper, 1938), p. 226.
28. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., I, p. 422.
op. cit., Vol.
29. Ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 90-91, 97.
30. Ibid., Vol. 1,94-95, 108.
Ibid., pp. 80, 112-113. New York Times, October
31. 28, 1937.
32. U. S., Department of State, Documents on German . ., cit., Vol. I,
Foreign Policy. op.
pp. 26, 764-769.
33. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . .,
op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 119-120.
Hooker, op. cit., pp. 158-159.
34. U. S., Department of State, Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 146-148,
Foreign
154-155, 161-162.
35. Hooker, op. cit., pp. 158-172. U. S., Department of State, Press Releases 1937, op. cit.
Vol. XVII, pp. 352-355. Times (London), November 4, 1937.
36. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . .,
op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 157-158.
Vorman Davis Manuscript Collection, op. cit., Box 41.
37. Hooker, op. cit., p. 174.
38. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . .,
op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 172-174.
39. Ibid., pp. 175-181. Hooker, op. cit., pp. 177-180. Hull, op. cit., p. 556.
40. U. S., Department of State, Press Releases, 1937, op. cit., Vol. XVIII, pp. 376-377.
41. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . .,
op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 184-185.
 BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 259

Hooker, op. cit., p. 182. U. S., Department of State, Press Releases, 1937, op. cit., Vol. XVIII,
pp. 376-377.
. ., 189-193.
42. U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. op. cit., Vol. IV, pp.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid, pp. 184-185, 194-196. U. S., Department of State, Press Releases, 1937, op. cit.,
Vol. XVIII, pp. 380-382.
45. U. of State, Foreign Relations. . ., cit., Vol. IV, pp. 189, 197-210.
S., Department op.
46. Ibid., pp. 212-221.
47.Ibid., pp. 221-226. Hooker, op. cit., pp. 186-187.
48.U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations. . ., op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 226-227.
Norman Davis Manuscript Collection, op. cit., Boxes 4-5.
49. Times (London), November 4, 1937.
Roberty E. Sherwood, Roosevelt
50. Langer and Gleason, The Challenge of Isolationism;
and Hopkins: An Intimate History; Donald F. Drummond, The Passing of American Neutrality;
Basil Rauch, Roosevelt: From Munich to Pearl Harbor.
Far Eastern Crisis. . ., op.
51. Borg, "Notes...," op. cit. Borg, The United States and the
"Roosevelt and the Aftermath of the Quarantine Review
cit.; John McV. Haight, Jr., Speech,"
of Politics, Vol. XXIV (April, 1926).
52. Manchuria, 1931; invasion of Ethiopia, 1935; Spanish Civil War, 1936;
Italy's
occupation of Rhineland, 1936.
Robert H. Ferrell,
53. Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States;
American Diplomacy: A History; Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American
W. A United States Foreign Policy; Alexander DeConde, A
People; Julius Pratt, History of
American Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign
History of Foreign Policy;
Policy.