Philosophy as Autobiography
Psychologistic, Reductive, & Non-Immanent Readings of Philosophy
Peter Suber, Philosophy Department, Earlham College
Quotations
Bibliography
Quotations
In chronological order
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford University Press,
1888 (original 1739).
Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre), trans. Heath and
Lachs, Appleton-Century Crofts, 1970 (original 1794, 1797).
[p. 16] What sort of philosophy one chooses depends, therefore, on what sort of
man one is; for a philosophical system is not a dead piece of furniture that we
accept or reject as we wish; it is rather a thing animated by the soul of the person
who holds it.
Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of 'As If', trans. C.K. Ogden, Routledge & Kegan Paul,
second edition, 1935 (original composed 1877-82, published 1911).
[p. 7] [T]he organic function of thought is carried on for the most part
unconsciously. Should the product finally enter consciousness also, or should
consciousness momentarily accompany the processes of logical thought, this light
only penetrates to the shallows, an the actual fundamental processes are carried on
in the darkness of the unconscious. The specifically purposeful operations are
chiefly, and in any case at the beginning, wholly instinctive and unconscious, even if
they later press forward into the luminous circle of consciousness....
Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, trans. Marion Faber, with Stephen Lehmann,
earlham.edu/~peters/…/autobio.htm 1/11
2011/03/02 Peter Suber, "Philosophy as Autobiogr…
University of Nebraska Press, 1984 (original 1878).
[§513] However far man may extend himself with his knowledge, however
objective he may appear to himself ultimately he reaps nothing but his own
biography.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann, Vintage, 1966 (original
1886).
[§6] Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has
been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and
unconscious memoir; also that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every
philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which the whole plant had grown.
In the philosopher [by contrast with the scientist] there is nothing whatsoever that is
impersonal....
[§187] Even apart from the value of such claims as "there is a categorical
imperative in us," one can still always ask: what does such a claim tell us about the
man who makes it?
William James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," The Will To Believe, Dover Publications, 1956
(original 1897).
[p. 92] Pretend what we may, the whole man within us is at work when we form
our philosophical opinions.
[p. 19] The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of
human temperaments. Undignified as such a treatment may seem to some of my
colleagues, I shall have to take account of this clash and explain a good many of
the divergencies of philosophers by it. Of whatever temperament a professional
philosopher is, he tries, when philosophizing, to sink the fact of his temperament.
Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason, so he urges impersonal
reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger
bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidence for him
one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view
of the universe, just as this fact or that principle would. He trusts his temperament.
Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any representation of the universe
that does suit it. He feels men of opposite temper to be out of key with the world's
earlham.edu/~peters/…/autobio.htm 2/11
2011/03/02 Peter Suber, "Philosophy as Autobiogr…
character, and in his heart considers them incompetent and 'not in it,' in the
philosophic business, even though they may far excel him in dialectical ability.
Yet in the forum he can make no claim, on the bare ground of his temperament, to
superior discernment or authority. There arises thus a certain insincerity in our
philosophic discussions: the potentest of all our premises is never mentioned.
Miguel de Unamuno. The Tragic Sense of Life, trans. J.E.C. Flitch, Macmillan, 1921;
reprinted Dover Publications, 1954.
[p. 2] In most of the histories of philosophy that I know, philosophic systems are
presented to us as if growing out of one another spontaneously, and their authors,
the philosophers, appear only as mere pretexts. The inner biography of the
philosophers, of the men who philosophized, occupies only a secondary place.
And yet it is precisely this inner biography that explains for us most things.
F.C.S. Schiller, "Must Philosophers Disagree?" in a collection of his essays of the same title,
London, 1934; first published in 1933.
[pp. 10-11] Actually every philosophy was the offspring, the legitimate offspring,
of an idiosyncracy, and the history and psychology of its author had far more to do
with its development than der Gang der Sache selbst....The naive student insists
on viewing the system from the outside, as a logical structure, and not as a
psychological process extending over a lifetime. And he thereby throws away, or
loses, the key to understanding.
F.C.S Schiller, "Must Philosophy Be Dull?", Our Human Truths, Columbia University Press,
1939.
[p. 98] Philosophy, then, will have the duty of tracing out the consequences of
personality in all our knowing [because science will not do so]. Now as regards
the philosophies, this task is easy enough: they all testify aloud to the often highly
romantic personality of their makers, and the more original they are, the plainer it is
that this is what has determined their every detail.
Robin Collingwood. Essay on Metaphysics, Henry Regnery Co., Gateway Edition, 1972
(original, 1939).
[p. 48] People are not ordinarily aware of their absolute presuppositions..., and
are not, therefore, thus aware of changes in them; such a change, therefore, cannot
be a matter of choice. Nor is there anything superficial or frivolous about it....Why,
asks my friend, do such changes happen? Briefly, because the absolute
presuppositions of any given society, at any given phase of its history, form a
structure which is subject to 'strains'....If the strains are too great, the structure
collapses and is replaced by another, which will be a modification of the old with
the destructive strain removed; a modification not consciously devised but created
by a process of unconscious thought. (Cf. pp. 43, 76.)
Carl Gustav Jung, letter to Arnold Künzli, February 28, 1943, in C.G. Jung, Letters, vol. I:
1906-1950, Princeton University Press, 1973.
earlham.edu/~peters/…/autobio.htm 3/11
2011/03/02 Peter Suber, "Philosophy as Autobiogr…
[p. 331-32] For all its critical analysis philosophy has not yet managed to root out
its psychopaths....Philosophy still has to learn that it is made by human beings and
depends to an alarming degree on their psychic constitution. In the critical
philosophy of the future there will be a chapter on 'The Psychopathology of
Philosophy.' Hegel is fit to bust with presumption and vanity. Nietzsche drips with
outraged sexuality, and so on. There is no thinking qua thinking, at times it is a
pisspot of unconscious devils, just like any other function that lays claim to
hegemony. Often what is thought is less important than who thinks it. But this is
assiduously overlooked. Neurosis addles the brain of every philosopher because
he is at odds with himself. His philosophy is then nothing but a systematized
struggle with his own uncertainty.
[p. 177] The statements of a speculative philosopher do not directly express facts
about the universe but symptomatically express facts about himself they form his
unconscious autobiography.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. G.H. von Wright, trans. Peter Winch, University
of Chicago Press, 1980.
[p. 60] [Philosophers are] people who have been impelled to deal with various
personal problems in their unconscious by making serious efforts to think
consciously; they have intellectualized the emotional conflicts.
John Lange, The Cognitivity Paradox: An Inquiry Concerning the Claims of Philosophy,
Princeton University Press, 1970.
[p. 69] It seems reasonably clear that one's predispositions, however acquired,
one's self-image, one's heroes, one's self-interests, etc., tend to affect the
philosophical proposals to which one commits oneself. Such factors might even
determine the proposals to which one commits oneself, but they presumably could
not determine the set of proposals to which one should commit oneself.
[p. 45.n] Schizophrenics very often hold beliefs which are as rigid, all-pervasive,
and unconnected with reality, as are the best dogmatic philosophies. However,
such beliefs come to them naturally whereas a 'critical' philosopher may sometimes
spend his whole life in attempting to find arguments which create a similar state of
mind.
Bibliography
Agassi, Joseph, "The Zeitgeist and Professor Feuer," Philosophy of Social Science, 7
(Summer 1977) 251-253.
Alford, C. Fred. Narcissism: Socrates, the Frankfurt School, and Psychoanalytic Theory.
Yale University Press, 1988.
Ayers, M.R., "Reason and Psycholinguistics," in Renford Bambrough (ed.), Wisdom: Twelve
Essays, Basil Blackwell, 1974, pp. 107-124. (On John Wisdom.)
Bartlett, Steven J., "Narcissism and Philosophy," Methodology and Science, 19 (1986) 16-26.
Brearley, Mike, "Psycho-Analysis and Philosophy," in Ilham Dilman (ed.), Philosophy and
Life: Essays on John Wisdom, Martinus Nijhoff, 1984, pp. 179-200.
earlham.edu/~peters/…/autobio.htm 5/11
2011/03/02 Peter Suber, "Philosophy as Autobiogr…
Britton, Karl, "About J.O. Wisdom's 'The Unconscious Origin of Berkeley's Philosophy'," Rev.
Int. Phil., 8 (YEAR?) 470-72.
Child, Arthur, "Hiddenness: Simple Concealment and Disguise," Metaphilosophy, 1 (July 1970)
223-257. (On Heidegger, Lazerowitz, Freud.)
Cohen, Avner, "Certainty, Doubt and Anxiety: Towards a Theory of the Psychology of
Metaphysics," Metaphilosophy, 12 (1981) 113-144.
Cohen, Avner, "Scepticism And Angst: The Case Of David Hume," Manuscrito, 11 (Oct.
1988) 49-66.
Cole, John R. The Olympian Dreams and Youthful Rebellion of René Descartes. University
of Illinois Press, 1992.January 5, 2000
[Descartes, René] See: Cohen, A.; Cole, J.R.; Feuer, L.S.; Franz, M. von; Freud, S.; Galdston,
I; Jones, W.T.; Lewin, B.D.; Maritain, J.; Rittmeister, J; Scharfstein, B.-A.; Schönberger, S.;
Wisdom, J.O.
Earle, William, "Philosophy as Autobiography," Chapter 10 of his Public Sorrows and Private
Pleasures, Indiana University Press, 1976.
Feuer, Lewis S., "Anxiety and Philosophy: The Case of Descartes," American Imago, 20
(1963) 411-49.
Feuer, Lewis S., "The Dreams of Descartes," American Imago, 20 (1963) 3-26.
Feuer, Lewis S., Einstein and the Generations of Science, Basic Books, 1974.
earlham.edu/~peters/…/autobio.htm 6/11
2011/03/02 Peter Suber, "Philosophy as Autobiogr…
Feuer, Lewis S., "God, Guilt and Logic: The Psychological Basis of the Ontological Argument,"
Inquiry, 11 (1968) 257-281.
Feuer, Lewis S., "Karl Marx and the Promethean Complex," Encounter, 31, 6 (1968) 15-32.
Feuer, Lewis S., "Lawless Sensations and Categorial Defenses: The Unconscious Sources of
Kant's Philosophy," in Hanly and Lazerowitz (eds.). q.v.
Feuer, Lewis S., "Rejoinder on 'The Role of Sexuality in the Formation of Ideas'," J Ind
Psychology, 17 (1961) 110-11.
Feuer, Lewis S. The Scientific Intellectual: The Psychological and Sociological Origins of
Modern Science. Basic Books, 1963.
[Feuer, Lewis S.] See: Agassi, J.; Sessions, W.L.; Watt, E.D.
Franz, Marie von, "The Dream of Descartes," in Timeless Documents of the Soul, Evanston,
Illinois, 1968, pp. 55-147; originally "Zeitlose Dokumente der Zeele," Studien aus dem Jung-
Institut, 3 (1952).
Freud, Sigmund, "Some Dreams of Descartes," in The Standard Edition of the Writing of
Sigmund Freud, vol. 21 (1953) pp. 203-204.
Galdston, Iago, "Descartes and Modern Psychiatric Thought," Isis, 35 (1944) 118-28.
Hanly, Charles, and Morris Lazerowitz (eds.). Psychoanalysis and Philosophy. International
Universities Press, 1970.
earlham.edu/~peters/…/autobio.htm 7/11
2011/03/02 Peter Suber, "Philosophy as Autobiogr…
Hitschmann, Eduard, "Swedenborg's Paranoia," American Imago, 1949; reprinted in his Great
Men: Psychoanalytic Studies, International Universities Press, 1956, pp. 225-231.
Joad, C.E.M., "Thought and Temperament," Essay VII (pp. 219-52) of his Essays in Common
Sense Philosophy, George Allen & Unwin, 1919.
Jones, W.T., "Somnio Ergo Sum: Descartes's Three Dreams," Philosophy and Literature, 4
(Fall 1980) 145-66.
Juliusburger, O., "Psychotherapie und die Philosophie Schopenhauers," Zentralblatt für Psa.,
III (1912).
[Kant, Immanuel] See: Feuer, L.S.; Loewenberg, R.D.; Schott, R.M.; Settanni, H.; Vaihinger,
H.
Levi, A.W., "The 'Mental Crisis' of John Stuart Mill," The Psychoanalytic Review, 5 (1945)
86-101.
Lewin, Bertram D. Dreams and the Uses of Regression. New York, 1958. (Contains an
analysis of Descartes' dreams.)
Maritain, Jacques. The Dream of Descartes, Together With Some Other Essays. Trans.
Mabelle L. Andison. Philosophical Library, 1944.
[Mill, John Stuart] See: Levi, A.W.; Sawyier, F.H.; Settanni, H.; Wilson, F.
Pieter, Jozef, "Problems and Methods of the Psychology of Philosophizing," Dialectics and
Humanism, 2 (Autumn 1975) 151-166.
Rittmeister, John, "Die Mystische Krise des jungen Descartes," Confinia psychiatrica, 4
(1961) 65-98; reprinted in Zeitschrift für psychosomatische Medezin und Psychoanalyse,
15 (1969) 206-24.
Roeder, Egenolf, "Das Ding an Sich," Imago, Leipzig, IX, iii (1923) 273-99. (On Aristotle.)
Sawyier, Fay Horton, "Philosophy as Autobiography: John Stuart Mill's Case," Philosophy
Research Archives, XI (March 1986) 169-180.
Scharfstein, Ben-Ami. The Philosophers: Their Lives and the Nature of their Thought. Basil
Blackwell, 1980.
Scharfstein, Ben-Ami, and Mortimer Ostow, "The Need to Philosophize," in Hanly and
Lazerowitz (eds.), q.v.
Schmitz, Friedrich Joseph. The Problem of Individualism and the Crises in the Lives of
Lessing and Hamann. University of California Press, 1944.
[Schopenhauer, Arthur] See: Ebstein, W.; Hitschmann, E.; Juliusburger, O.; Sedlitz, C.;
Sondag, Y.; Wisdom, J.O.
Schott, Robin May. Cognition and Eros: A Critique of the Kantian Paradigm. Beacon
Press, 1988.
Sedlitz, C. von. Dr. Arthur Schopenhauer vom medizinischen Standpunkt aus betrachtet.
Dorpat, 1872.
earlham.edu/~peters/…/autobio.htm 9/11
2011/03/02 Peter Suber, "Philosophy as Autobiogr…
Sessions, William Lad, "Feuer, Psychology, and the Ontological Argument," Inquiry, 12
(Winter 1969) 431-434.
Settanni, Harry. Five Philosophers: How Their Lives Influenced Their Thought. University
Press of America, 1992.
Spicker, Stuart, "The Psychiatrist as Philosopher," in H.T. Engelhardt and S.F. Spicker (eds.),
Mental Health: Philosophical Perspectives, D. Reidel, 1977.
Straus, Erwin, "Psychiatry and Philosophy," in Maurice Natanson (ed.), Psychiatry and
Philosophy, Springer-Verlag, 1969, pp. 1-83.
Watt, E.D., "Feuer on Guilt and Logic," Inquiry, 12 (Winter 1969) 427-430.
Wilson, Fred. Psychological Analysis and the Philosophy of John Stuart Mill. University of
Toronta Press, 1990.
Wisdom, John Oulton. The Metamorphosis of Philosophy. Basil Blackwell, 1947. (Esp. Part
III.)
Wisdom, John Oulton. The Unconscious Origin of Berkeley's Philosophy. London: The
Hogarth Press, The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953.
Wisdom, John Oulton, "Three Dreams of Descartes," The International Journal of Psycho-
Analysis, London, 28 (1947) 11-18.
Wisdom, John. Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis, Basil Blackwell, 1964. (Note that this is not
earlham.edu/~peters/…/autobio.htm 10/11
2011/03/02 Peter Suber, "Philosophy as Autobiogr…
the same John Wisdom of the immediately preceding citations.)
earlham.edu/~peters/…/autobio.htm 11/11