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2011/03/02 Peter Suber, "Philosophy as Autobiogr…

Philosophy as Autobiography
Psychologistic, Reductive, & Non-Immanent Readings of Philosophy
Peter Suber, Philosophy Department, Earlham College

Quotations
Bibliography

Quotations
In chronological order

David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford University Press,
1888 (original 1739).

[p. 219] Several moralists have recommended it as an excellent method of


becoming acquainted with our own hearts, and knowing our progress in virtue, to
recollect our dreams in a morning, and examine them with the same rigour, that we
wou'd our most serious and most deliberate actions. Our character is the same
throughout, they say, and appears best where artifice, fear, and policy have no
place, and men can neither be hypocrites with themselves nor others. The
generosity, or baseness of our temper, our meekness or cruelty, our courage or
pusilanimity, influence the fictions of the imagination with the most unbounded
liberty, and discover themselves in the most glaring colours. In like manner, I am
persuaded, there might be several useful discoveries made from a criticism of the
fictions of the antient [sic] philosophy, concerning substances and substantial
forms, and accidents, and occult qualities; which, however unreasonable and
capricious, have a very intimate connexion with the principles of human nature.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre), trans. Heath and
Lachs, Appleton-Century Crofts, 1970 (original 1794, 1797).

[p. 16] What sort of philosophy one chooses depends, therefore, on what sort of
man one is; for a philosophical system is not a dead piece of furniture that we
accept or reject as we wish; it is rather a thing animated by the soul of the person
who holds it.

Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of 'As If', trans. C.K. Ogden, Routledge & Kegan Paul,
second edition, 1935 (original composed 1877-82, published 1911).

[p. 1] Scientific thought is a function of the psyche....Psychical actions and


reactions are, like every event known to us, necessary occurrences; that is to say,
they result with compulsory regularity from their conditions and causes.

[p. 7] [T]he organic function of thought is carried on for the most part
unconsciously. Should the product finally enter consciousness also, or should
consciousness momentarily accompany the processes of logical thought, this light
only penetrates to the shallows, an the actual fundamental processes are carried on
in the darkness of the unconscious. The specifically purposeful operations are
chiefly, and in any case at the beginning, wholly instinctive and unconscious, even if
they later press forward into the luminous circle of consciousness....

Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, trans. Marion Faber, with Stephen Lehmann,
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University of Nebraska Press, 1984 (original 1878).

[§513] However far man may extend himself with his knowledge, however
objective he may appear to himself ultimately he reaps nothing but his own
biography.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann, Vintage, 1966 (original
1886).

[§6] Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has
been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and
unconscious memoir; also that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every
philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which the whole plant had grown.

Indeed, if one would explain how the abstrusest metaphysical claims of a


philosopher really came about, it is always well (and wise) to ask first: at what
morality does all this (does he) aim? Accordingly, I do not believe that a "drive to
knowledge" is the father of philosophy; but rather that another drive has, here as
elsewhere, employed understanding (and misunderstanding) as a mere
instrument....

In the philosopher [by contrast with the scientist] there is nothing whatsoever that is
impersonal....

[§43] ..."My judgment is my judgment": no one else is easily entitled to it --that is


what such a philosopher of the future may perhaps say of himself.

[§187] Even apart from the value of such claims as "there is a categorical
imperative in us," one can still always ask: what does such a claim tell us about the
man who makes it?

William James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," The Will To Believe, Dover Publications, 1956
(original 1897).

[p. 92] Pretend what we may, the whole man within us is at work when we form
our philosophical opinions.

William James, Pragmatism, World Publishing Co., 1970 (original 1907).

[p. 19] The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of
human temperaments. Undignified as such a treatment may seem to some of my
colleagues, I shall have to take account of this clash and explain a good many of
the divergencies of philosophers by it. Of whatever temperament a professional
philosopher is, he tries, when philosophizing, to sink the fact of his temperament.
Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason, so he urges impersonal
reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger
bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidence for him
one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view
of the universe, just as this fact or that principle would. He trusts his temperament.
Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any representation of the universe
that does suit it. He feels men of opposite temper to be out of key with the world's
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character, and in his heart considers them incompetent and 'not in it,' in the
philosophic business, even though they may far excel him in dialectical ability.

Yet in the forum he can make no claim, on the bare ground of his temperament, to
superior discernment or authority. There arises thus a certain insincerity in our
philosophic discussions: the potentest of all our premises is never mentioned.

Miguel de Unamuno. The Tragic Sense of Life, trans. J.E.C. Flitch, Macmillan, 1921;
reprinted Dover Publications, 1954.

[p. 2] In most of the histories of philosophy that I know, philosophic systems are
presented to us as if growing out of one another spontaneously, and their authors,
the philosophers, appear only as mere pretexts. The inner biography of the
philosophers, of the men who philosophized, occupies only a secondary place.
And yet it is precisely this inner biography that explains for us most things.

F.C.S. Schiller, "Must Philosophers Disagree?" in a collection of his essays of the same title,
London, 1934; first published in 1933.

[pp. 10-11] Actually every philosophy was the offspring, the legitimate offspring,
of an idiosyncracy, and the history and psychology of its author had far more to do
with its development than der Gang der Sache selbst....The naive student insists
on viewing the system from the outside, as a logical structure, and not as a
psychological process extending over a lifetime. And he thereby throws away, or
loses, the key to understanding.

F.C.S Schiller, "Must Philosophy Be Dull?", Our Human Truths, Columbia University Press,
1939.

[p. 98] Philosophy, then, will have the duty of tracing out the consequences of
personality in all our knowing [because science will not do so]. Now as regards
the philosophies, this task is easy enough: they all testify aloud to the often highly
romantic personality of their makers, and the more original they are, the plainer it is
that this is what has determined their every detail.

Robin Collingwood. Essay on Metaphysics, Henry Regnery Co., Gateway Edition, 1972
(original, 1939).

[p. 48] People are not ordinarily aware of their absolute presuppositions..., and
are not, therefore, thus aware of changes in them; such a change, therefore, cannot
be a matter of choice. Nor is there anything superficial or frivolous about it....Why,
asks my friend, do such changes happen? Briefly, because the absolute
presuppositions of any given society, at any given phase of its history, form a
structure which is subject to 'strains'....If the strains are too great, the structure
collapses and is replaced by another, which will be a modification of the old with
the destructive strain removed; a modification not consciously devised but created
by a process of unconscious thought. (Cf. pp. 43, 76.)

Carl Gustav Jung, letter to Arnold Künzli, February 28, 1943, in C.G. Jung, Letters, vol. I:
1906-1950, Princeton University Press, 1973.

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[p. 331-32] For all its critical analysis philosophy has not yet managed to root out
its psychopaths....Philosophy still has to learn that it is made by human beings and
depends to an alarming degree on their psychic constitution. In the critical
philosophy of the future there will be a chapter on 'The Psychopathology of
Philosophy.' Hegel is fit to bust with presumption and vanity. Nietzsche drips with
outraged sexuality, and so on. There is no thinking qua thinking, at times it is a
pisspot of unconscious devils, just like any other function that lays claim to
hegemony. Often what is thought is less important than who thinks it. But this is
assiduously overlooked. Neurosis addles the brain of every philosopher because
he is at odds with himself. His philosophy is then nothing but a systematized
struggle with his own uncertainty.

John Oulton Wisdom, The Metamorphosis of Philosophy. Basil Blackwell, 1947.

[p. 177] The statements of a speculative philosopher do not directly express facts
about the universe but symptomatically express facts about himself they form his
unconscious autobiography.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. G.H. von Wright, trans. Peter Winch, University
of Chicago Press, 1980.

[p. 20] It is sometimes said that a man's philosophy is a matter of temperament,


and there is something in this. A preference for certain similes could be called a
matter of temperament and it underlies far more disagreements than you might
think.

Ernest Jones, Free Associations: Memoirs of a Psychoanalyst, Basic Books, 1959.

[p. 60] [Philosophers are] people who have been impelled to deal with various
personal problems in their unconscious by making serious efforts to think
consciously; they have intellectualized the emotional conflicts.

John Lange, The Cognitivity Paradox: An Inquiry Concerning the Claims of Philosophy,
Princeton University Press, 1970.

[p. 69] It seems reasonably clear that one's predispositions, however acquired,
one's self-image, one's heroes, one's self-interests, etc., tend to affect the
philosophical proposals to which one commits oneself. Such factors might even
determine the proposals to which one commits oneself, but they presumably could
not determine the set of proposals to which one should commit oneself.

Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, NLB, first ed., 1975.

[p. 45.n] Schizophrenics very often hold beliefs which are as rigid, all-pervasive,
and unconnected with reality, as are the best dogmatic philosophies. However,
such beliefs come to them naturally whereas a 'critical' philosopher may sometimes
spend his whole life in attempting to find arguments which create a similar state of
mind.

William Earle, "Philosophy as Autobiography," Public Sorrows and Private Pleasures,


Indiana University Press, 1976.
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[pp. 173-74] Philosophy properly taken is the articulation in thought of one man's
deepest concerns. Those concerns traditionally are named reality, truth, and the
good, meaning of course that few persons seriously wish to become unreal,
fraudulent, spurious beings themselves....The history of philosophy is the history,
then, of the most profound choices men have made. If they talk as if a single, literal
truth were at stake, were statable, that some approached it and others receded
from it, or that there is a single line of general progress, it may be possible to
understand these naive claims with some charity. Autobiographically understood,
we see no more progress or development than we see among the various souls of
whom these are the deepest confessions.

Jane Flax, "Political Philosophy and the Patriarchical Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic


Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics," in S. Harding and M. Hintikka (eds.),
Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology,
and the Philosophy of Science. D. Reidel, 1983.

[pp. 248-49] Thinking is a form of human activity which cannot be treated in


isolation from other forms of human activity, including the forms of human activity
which in turn shape the humans who think. Consequently philosophies will
inevitably bear the imprint of the social relations out of which they and their
creators arose....The very persistence and continuing importance of certain
philosophies and philosophic issues can be treated as evidence of their congruence
with fundamental social experiences and problems. Philosophy must at least
resonate with central social and individual wishes and offer some solution to deeply
felt problematics.

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Wisdom, John. Philosophy and Psycho-Analysis, Basil Blackwell, 1964. (Note that this is not

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the same John Wisdom of the immediately preceding citations.)

[Wisdom, John] See: Ayers, M.R.; Brearly, M.

[Wittgenstein, Ludwig] See: Crittenden, C.

Return to the Metaphilosophy course home-page.

Peter Suber, Department of Philosophy, Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana, 47374.


peters@earlham.edu. Copyright © 1999-2003, Peter Suber.

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