I, Ben Windust, Senior Vice President, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., do hereby declare under
oath as follows based on my personal knowledge, except where indicated, and on my review and
familiarity with the business records of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”):
Moines, Iowa. I have been in this position for two years. I am responsible for risk management
and industry/client relations for the Default Servicing business group. Prior to becoming Senior
Vice President, Servicing/Default Operations, I was Senior Vice President of Customer Service
operations for mortgage servicing. I have been employed by Wells Fargo since 1998.
review data and reports regarding Wells Fargo’s performance under the U.S. Treasury’s Home
management, industry and client relations, and community housing assistance programs. I am
BOS-1434538 v2
Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 2 of 41
familiar with Wells Fargo’s policies and practices regarding implementation of the HAMP
program. I am also familiar with Wells Fargo’s policies and practices with respect to the referral
of loans to foreclosure, including in connection with borrowers who are (or have been)
participating in HAMP.
3. Wells Fargo is the nation’s largest mortgage lender, and the second largest home
loan servicer. Approximately 80% of the home loans in Wells Fargo’s servicing portfolio are
serviced for other investors such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, or private securities.
4. Wells Fargo has long practiced responsible lending and servicing principles,
including never having originated negative amortizing or Option ARM loans. Because of the
product choices Wells Fargo made, its disciplined underwriting, and the manner in which Wells
Fargo approaches foreclosure prevention, Wells Fargo’s delinquency and foreclosure rates in the
second quarter of 2010 were 75% of the industry average. Approximately 92% of our first- and
second-mortgage customers were current in their payments as of the second quarter of 2010 and
less than 2% of our owner-occupied servicing portfolio had gone to a foreclosure sale over the
5. From January 2009 through September 30, 2010, Wells Fargo has provided
homeowners with 556,868 active trial or completed modifications. Approximately 88% of the
modifications provided by Wells Fargo were made outside of HAMP. Wells Fargo has also
assisted more than 100,000 unemployed customers with short-term forbearance modifications.
6. Wells Fargo considers itself a leader in the challenge to find solutions for borrowers
negatively affected by the recent economic downturn. Wells Fargo’s focus has been to do
everything reasonably possible to prevent foreclosure for people facing financial hardships who
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Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 3 of 41
are willing to manage their overall debt and who can afford to be in their homes once their home
7. On February 18, 2009, the Obama Administration announced the creation of the
Making Home Affordable (“MHA”) Program, which included as one of its several components
the HAMP program for loans held by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (“GSE loans”). As
expressed by the U.S. Treasury, HAMP encourages loan servicers to modify eligible first-lien
mortgages for homeowners in default or imminent default so that monthly payments will be
reduced to affordable levels (not more than 31% of the borrower’s monthly gross income).
8. Monetary incentives are paid to servicers for permanent modifications that become
effective under the program. In particular, Wells Fargo receives a one-time payment of $1,000
for each completed permanent modification under HAMP. Wells Fargo will receive an
additional $500 if the loan was current but under risk of imminent default prior to the trial period
plan. Wells Fargo will also receive, on an annual basis, a “pay-for-success” fee of up to $1,000
for three years if the borrower stays less than 90 days delinquent on the modified loan.
Borrowers and investors are also eligible for incentive payments through the HAMP program.
Incentives are only paid after the loan has been permanently modified.
9. In April 2009, HAMP was extended to servicers of non-GSE loans, such as loans held
loans is voluntary, and a servicer that chooses to participate in HAMP as to such loans is
required to execute a Servicer Participation Agreement (“SPA”) with Fannie Mae as agent for
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Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 4 of 41
the United States. On April 13, 2009, Wells Fargo was one of the first major servicers to execute
an SPA with the U.S. Treasury. (Wells Fargo executed an Amended SPA on March 16, 2010.)1
10. Not all loans serviced by Wells Fargo are eligible for consideration under HAMP, and
the participating servicer is not required to modify every HAMP-eligible loan. HAMP
guidelines outline the manner in which servicers are to determine borrower eligibility for a
permanent modification. See, e.g., HAMP Supplemental Directive (“SD”) 09-01 at 2-12.
11. Several months after the HAMP program was initiated, the U.S. Treasury expressed
frustration to Wells Fargo and other servicers based on the relatively low numbers of borrowers
who were being placed on HAMP trial plans (or trial period plans (TPPs) or “starts”).
Government policy as expressed to participating servicers, including Wells Fargo, was to get
borrowers on trial plans with limited discussion as to whether the borrowers would ultimately
qualify for a permanent modification. In other words, we were directed to get borrowers on trial
plans first, and determine final qualification for a permanent modification thereafter.
November 2009, the Treasury Department encouraged servicers in July 2009 to place customers
into HAMP trial modifications before the customer had provided the servicer with all the
documentation necessary for the servicer to verify the accuracy of the customer’s income and
13. Wells Fargo had not previously supported this approach for loans covered by the
Treasury program because we were concerned about the potential outcomes. These types of trial
plans are referred to as “stated” trial plans, and they were not a guarantee that the borrower
1
Wells Fargo’s SPA and Amended SPA are available publicly at:
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/HAMP/Wells%20Fargo%20Bank%20Servicer%20Participation%20Agreem
ent.pdf and http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/HAMP/093010wellsfargobanknaSPA(incltransmittal)-r.pdf.
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Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 5 of 41
would receive a permanent modification if they simply made the three or more scheduled
14. Before a customer could obtain a stated trial plan, they were screened to determine if
they satisfied the following HAMP baseline eligibility requirements: (1) the property must be
owner-occupied and it must be the borrower’s primary residence; (2) the property must be a
single-family residence with a maximum unpaid principal balance of not more than $729,750;
(3) the loan must have been originated on or before January 1, 2009; (4) the borrower must
verbally state a qualifying hardship ; and (5) the first-lien mortgage payment must be more than
31% of the homeowner’s stated gross monthly income. To be placed on a stated trial plan (prior
to June 1, 2010 under HAMP guidelines), a borrower needed to provide only verbal confirmation
that they met these requirements; they were required to provide documentation to verify the
accuracy of the eligibility criteria during the trial period. The documentation that the borrower is
required to provide to Wells Fargo, pursuant to HAMP guidance (see SD 09-01), includes
financial information establishing the source of his or her hardship, signed and completed
requests for tax return transcripts (or the most recent Federal income tax return, including all
schedules and forms), and income verification documentation showing, for example,
employment and rental income. (Wells Fargo is required by HAMP guidance to maintain
documentation of its HAMP activities with respect to each borrower screened and it must
provide such documentation to Freddie Mac, the U.S. Treasury’s compliance agent, upon
request.)
15. Once the documentation is received, Wells Fargo will determine whether a borrower
is eligible for a permanent HAMP modification. Wells Fargo first capitalizes interest and fees by
adding them to the outstanding principal balance of the mortgage. Wells Fargo then applies a
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series of steps known as the “waterfall” in an effort to obtain an affordable monthly payment for
the borrower (31% or less of their gross monthly income). First, we will reduce the interest rate
to as low as 2%. Next, if necessary, we will extend the loan term to 40 years. Finally, if
necessary, we will forebear repayment of a portion of the principal until the loan is paid off and
16. If application of the waterfall does not produce an affordable payment, the loan does
not qualify for a permanent HAMP modification under HAMP guidelines. If application of the
waterfall does produce an affordable payment, Wells Fargo performs a “net present value”
(“NPV”) test through a Treasury-approved model to determine whether the modification is in the
best interest of the investor. Generally speaking, the NPV test compares the expected cash flows
from a modified loan to the same loan with no modification, based on certain assumptions. If the
expected investor cash flow with a modification is greater than the expected cash flow without a
modification, Wells Fargo is required to modify the loan. If the NPV test produces a “negative”
result (that is, losses from foreclosure are less than losses from modification), Wells Fargo is not
17. Whether a borrower is eligible for a permanent modification under HAMP also
depends on whether there are investor restrictions that apply to the loan. Pooling and Servicing
Agreements (“PSAs”) set forth Wells Fargo’s contractual obligations, as servicer, for loans in
privately-issued mortgage backed securities. Some of these agreements restrict Wells Fargo
from offering HAMP modifications and some restrict any form of permanent loan modification.
2
The servicer may also forgive principal, but it is not required to do so. Through 2009 and
into the first half of 2010, Wells Fargo completed approximately 60,000 HAMP and non-HAMP
modifications that involved principal forgiveness, with a total reduction of principal of more than
$3.2 billion. Principal forgiveness, however, is not an across-the-board solution. Payment
affordability is the key component to a successful modification.
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Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 7 of 41
As of April 31, 2010, nearly 15% of privately-securitized loans that were serviced by Wells
approval and the applicable PSA contained limitations on what loan terms could be modified.
under any circumstances. Wells Fargo made an effort to avoid placing borrowers in HAMP trial
18. Trial period plans were originally intended to last 90 days. However, statistics
provided by the U.S. Treasury have shown that, through June 2010, approximately 46% of active
trial plans for all participants were more than six months old. See Making Home Affordable
Program, Servicer Performance Report Through June 2010 attached to this declaration as Exhibit
1 (also available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/June%20MHA%20Public%20FINAL%20072010.pdf)
(“June 2010 Servicer Performance Report”). These are commonly referred to as “aged” trial
plans. Government statistics also show that the TPPs for a significant number of borrowers
placed on stated trial plans were cancelled and thus were not converted into a permanent
19. On January 28, 2010, the Treasury Department reversed its policy on stated trial plans
because significant numbers of trial plans were not being converted to permanent modifications.
See HAMP Supplemental Directive 10-01 (“SD 10-01”), effective June 1, 2010. The policy had
caused numerous customers to be placed on trial plans by servicers, including Wells Fargo –
giving them the expectation that they would get a permanent HAMP modification – when, in
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Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 8 of 41
fact, the customers ultimately did not qualify for a permanent modification. The primary reasons
that customers were canceled out of HAMP trial modifications include the following: (1) the
customer’s current payment was already below 31%; (2) the customer was unresponsive and/or
unable or unwilling to provide Wells Fargo with all necessary documentation; (3) HAMP
program guidelines, when applied to the customer’s loan, were unable to achieve a debt-to-
income ratio of 31%; (4) the customer was not imminently in default; and (5) the customer’s loan
failed the NPV test. Accordingly, on January 28, 2010, the U.S. Treasury issued SD 10-01,
which signaled a major program change by requiring that servicers verify borrower eligibility for
20. As stated above, a stated trial plan was never intended to be a guarantee by Wells
Fargo, or to the best of my knowledge the U.S. Treasury, that the borrower would qualify for a
permanent modification. This is borne out by HAMP guidance, Treasury policy3 encouraging
servicers to place borrowers on stated TPPs, and the statistics showing how many borrowers who
obtained stated trial plans from Wells Fargo (and the major servicers) actually obtained
permanent modifications.
21. As of the June 2010 Servicer Performance Report, Wells Fargo’s percentage of aged
trial plans nationally was 42%. At the same time, the average percentage of aged trials for all
servicers was 46%. For more information on the aged HAMP trial population, see June 2010
3
The Congressional Oversight Panel’s Report states that “[SD 10-01] followed Treasury’s initial decision to
allow servicers to offer trial period plans based on stated or verified income so that the program could reach a larger
number of borrowers in the shortest amount of time in order to stem the flood of foreclosures that many saw coming.
This was part of a general decision to roll out HAMP very quickly.” See the Congressional Oversight Panel’s April
Oversight Report: Evaluating Progress on TARP Foreclosure Mitigation Programs, at 12 (Apr. 14, 2010), Dckt. 17-
3.
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Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 9 of 41
22. As of June 2010, 43% of trial plans started under HAMP by Wells Fargo have been
cancelled and not converted into permanent modifications. Statistics provided by the U.S.
Treasury show that, as of June 30, 2010, approximately 41% of trial plans started under HAMP
by all participating servicers have been cancelled and not converted into permanent
modifications. See Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (“SIGTARP”), Quarterly Report to Congress, July 21, 2010 at 59. (The SIGTARP
report is publicly-available at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2010/July2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf).
23. The government’s policy of getting borrowers into stated trial plans for temporary
payment relief caused more problems for all servicers, including Wells Fargo, than it solved.
Wells Fargo came to the conclusion in early 2010 that it would only place a borrower on a trial
plan if it could verify their eligibility for a permanent modification prior to placing the borrower
on a trial plan. These trial plans are referred to as “verified” trial plans. As of March 1, 2010,
Wells Fargo changed its policy ahead of the Treasury and began issuing trial plans only after
fully verifying that the borrower was eligible for a permanent modification.
24. In order to get more borrowers who had been placed in stated trial plans into
campaign. Each of the major servicers, including Wells Fargo, were required to submit a
conversion action plan that included strategies including having people knock on doors to collect
missing documentation from borrowers and developing call scripts to include a description of the
25. During the conversion campaign, the number of borrowers moved each month into
permanent modifications by Wells Fargo increased from November 2009 through January 2010.
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Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 10 of 41
However, converting stated trial plans into permanent modifications continues to be a challenge
even though the numbers of borrowers who remain on aged stated trial plans has substantially
26. Significantly, for loans referred to foreclosure prior to the initiation of a HAMP trial
plan, homeowners whose loans remain active in HAMP (regardless of the age of the trial plan)
with Wells Fargo will not be subject to a foreclosure sale while they are awaiting a decision from
Wells Fargo as to whether their loans are eligible for permanent modification. It is Wells
Fargo’s policy not to initiate a referral to foreclosure or complete a foreclosure sale for
borrowers who are participating in a HAMP trial plan while they are awaiting a decision from
27. To ensure Wells Fargo is materially in compliance with the spirit and requirements of
the Treasury directives, we complete a quality assurance review of all owner-occupied loans
thirty (30) days prior to scheduled foreclosure sale dates. This review is designed to validate that
all loss mitigation options have been exhausted and that borrower outreach programs have been
executed. Any loan determined to have not met the test criteria are referred back to the home
preservation team for remediation. Additionally, Wells Fargo performs a quality assurance
review of loans referred to foreclosure to ensure we have made all required borrower contacts
and solicitations, we validate that correct income and expense information has been captured, we
validate that there is evidence that retention or liquidation (short sale/deed in lieu) have been
offered and that the loan was not actively being reviewed for a workout solution at the time of
referral.
28. For quality assurance purposes, Wells Fargo developed a peer review process for
loans that are reviewed for HAMP eligibility. Once financial data is received from the borrower
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Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 11 of 41
and Wells Fargo’s employees perform calculations to determine the borrower’s overall monthly
income and expenses, Wells Fargo will submit those calculations to peer review to ensure that
the information that Wells Fargo is relying upon is correct. Currently, peer review is performed
on five loans per Home Preservation Specialist per month. Up until several months ago, peer
29. In addition to peer review, certain loans receive a second level review, which may be
performed by the investor. Like the peer review process, the second level review is another step
that is taken for certain loans to assure that Wells Fargo’s determination that a particular loan
does not satisfy HAMP’s eligibility requirements is correct. Second level reviews are performed
for any loan that is declined for a HAMP modification and, also, if the borrower is self-employed
30. Cancellation of a stated trial plan by Wells Fargo, however, does not lead inexorably
to foreclosure. The June 2010 HAMP Servicer Performance Report (Exhibit 1) shows various
outcomes for the numerous borrowers who were in a HAMP trial modification with Wells Fargo
that was cancelled (due to, for example, trial plan payment default, insufficient documentation,
or borrower ineligibility). Some of those borrowers have brought their loans current, entered
into an alternative modification from Wells Fargo, entered into a payment plan or paid off their
loan, or engaged in a short sale or deed in lieu of foreclosure. A very small percentage of Wells
Fargo’s borrowers (1,774 out of 86,607 nationally) had their home sold in foreclosure after their
31. When a foreclosure sale occurs everyone loses, the customer, the investor, the
servicer, and the public. Accordingly, Wells Fargo’s focus from the beginning has been on
doing everything reasonably possible to prevent foreclosure. The unfortunate reality is, and
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Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 12 of 41
Treasury itself recognizes that, not every borrower can be helped and some borrowers are in
homes that they simply cannot afford, even with substantially reduced payments. In those cases,
which represent a very small percentage of the loans serviced by Wells Fargo, there is no
32. Through the first half of 2010, 91% of Wells Fargo’s servicing customers in
Massachusetts remain current on their mortgage payments. From 2009 through the first half of
2010, in Massachusetts, Wells Fargo provided its customers more than 7,400 trial or permanent
modifications, which was an increase on a monthly basis of over 250% from 2008. Of the
modifications that it has provided to Massachusetts borrowers in 2009 through the first half of
2010, over 83% resulted in payment reductions, which increases the probability that borrowers
will sustain their payments, which, in turn, lowers re-default rates and foreclosures.
33. In the first half of 2010, Wells Fargo completed foreclosures on 1.7% of its
or Wells Fargo was never able to make contact with the borrower despite persistent, repeated
attempts. Of the 6% of our Massachusetts customers who are seriously delinquent, nearly 51%,
or 4,110, are actively engaged with us to find a workout solution or are currently in a trial
program. Of the remaining borrowers, 26% were actively engaged with us but did not follow
through, 10% have been contacted by Wells Fargo but have not provided their financial
information, and 13% are non-owner occupied, vacant or we have been unable to contact them.
34. Wells Fargo is continuing to work to resolve permanent HAMP eligibility for its
Massachusetts borrowers who were placed on stated trial plans, that is, trial plans provided by
Wells Fargo before March 1, 2010. I understand that plaintiffs are asking the Court to
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Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 13 of 41
provisionally certify a class of Wells Fargo’s borrowers in Massachusetts who entered into a
HAMP TPP, who made the payments identified in their plan, but to whom Wells Fargo did not
send a written denial of eligibility for HAMP prior to the Modification Effective Date4 in the
TPP and to whom Wells Fargo also did not send a permanent HAMP modification agreement.
35. Under my supervision, members of Wells Fargo’s Servicing Data & Analytics
department have reviewed Wells Fargo’s data for its Massachusetts customers to determine how
many borrowers may fall within plaintiffs’ provisional class definition. I have been informed of
the following data: as of October 12, 2010, Wells Fargo had 93 Massachusetts customers who
Wells considers in “active” stated trial plans. In other words, those borrowers received their
HAMP TPP from Wells Fargo before March 1, 2010. Of those 93 borrowers, Wells Fargo has
determined that 58 are eligible for a permanent modification and therefore those borrowers are at
varying stages of having their modifications finalized. The remaining 35 borrowers are in stated
trial plans, but have not yet been determined eligible for a permanent modification or been
denied a modification. Of those 35, 17 borrowers are in bankruptcy and their eligibility
determination has been delayed due to the bankruptcy process. Accordingly, there are 18
borrowers in Massachusetts, who are not in bankruptcy, on aged stated trial plans whose
4
The form TPP that Wells Fargo used for its customers that entered into the HAMP
program on stated trial plans was provided to Wells Fargo by the U.S. Treasury. Wells Fargo did
not draft the language in the form TPP; it simply fills in the blanks as appropriate. Each TPP has
a “Modification Effective Date.” The Modification Effective Date is the date on which a
borrower’s permanent modification becomes effective and, according to the MHA Handbook
(section 9.1), occurs “when: (i) the borrower has satisfied all of the requirements of the TPP
Notice, (ii) the borrower and the servicer have executed the Modification Agreement, (iii) the
servicer has returned a fully executed copy of the Modification Agreement to the borrower, and
(iv) the Modification Effective Date provided in the Modification Agreement has occurred.” The
Modification Effective Date is also defined in the MHA Handbook as “the due date for the first
payment under the permanent modification.” Section 6.3.3. A sample form TPP used by Wells
Fargo prior to March 1, 2010 is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
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Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 14 of 41
eligibility determination for a permanent modification has not yet been made by Wells Fargo.
The reasons why they are in that category can only be determined by a file-by-file review but it
is likely that Wells Fargo is awaiting documentation from some borrowers and that other
borrowers are awaiting a decision from Wells Fargo or the applicable investor for their loan.
Wells Fargo will not proceed with a foreclosure sale as to any of those borrowers while they are
36. I understand that plaintiffs have defined their putative, provisional class as including
borrowers who may have been denied a permanent HAMP modification but did not receive their
denial before the Modification Effective Date stated in the TPP. Accordingly, it appears that
plaintiffs intend to include borrowers in their provisional class who – like hundreds of thousands
of other borrowers whose loans have been serviced by Wells Fargo and other servicers, were in
aged trial plans and did not receive a HAMP denial until after they completed the trial payment
37. Wells Fargo cannot determine the date upon which a borrower in a stated trial plan
received a denial notice from Wells Fargo without performing a file-by-file review of the
borrower’s servicing records. Moreover, Well Fargo cannot determine the Modification
Effective Date for any borrower if that borrower was determined ineligible for a permanent
38. Again, as stated above, there are numerous reasons why borrowers may not have
converted to a permanent modification from a stated TPP, including, for example, missed or late
TPP payments, failure to provide documentation that verifies their income and expenses, a
mortgage payment that is below 31% of their monthly income, their home no longer serving as
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Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 15 of 41
Accordingly, while Wells Fargo – as stated above – can determine the numbers of Massachusetts
borrowers who are still active in HAMP and who have not yet received a denial or a permanent
modification, it cannot determine the number of borrowers who did not receive their denial letter
on or before their “Modification Effective Date.” The number of Massachusetts borrowers who
were on stated TPPs and who have already received a HAMP denial letter, regardless of when
they received the denial letter, is approximately 2,600. Of this group of borrowers, the majority
are working with Wells Fargo to find an alternative modification, 25% are now current (many
with the assistance of Wells Fargo), 2% are in bankruptcy and 3% have completed a foreclosure
sale.
39. Wells Fargo has in place Responsible Servicing Practices, which the company has
lived by for many years and formalized in 2007, long before HAMP was created. The principles
underlying Wells Fargo’s Responsible Servicing Practices include to: (1) approach every
interaction from the customer’s point of view, (2) provide clear and timely information to
consumers, (3) provide tools, products, services and information that can help our customers
manage their credit; and (4) do all we can to help keep people in their homes whenever possible.
Wells Fargo works everyday to achieve these principles and our team members are held
40. As with any large scale customer service operation, Wells Fargo recognizes that
mistakes are occasionally made and customers are sometimes provided with information or
requests that are not accurate. The demands and pressures of the mortgage crisis coupled with
the numerous government programs, like HAMP, designed to help borrowers, but which are
complex and frequently changing, has caused all of the major servicers to dramatically ramp up
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Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 16 of 41
their operations, hire quantities of new employees, and develop new procedures and programs
41. Since the initiation of HAMP, Wells Fargo has worked aggressively with the
government to implement the program. We have continuously taken steps to improve service
levels for Wells Fargo customers facing financial hardships. The average inventory of borrowers
seeking assistance has increased approximately 160% from the first half of 2009 to the first half
of 2010. To handle this increase in borrowers seeking assistance, Wells Fargo has trained an
additional 10,900 U.S.-based home retention staff for a total of more than 18,000 team members.
Since the beginning of 2009 alone, staffing peaked at an approximate 150% increase to Wells
Fargo’s home retention staff on top of increased usage of outsourced collections and document
collection resources. This has required the development of new processes to rapidly onboard,
train, and retrain people to manage the evolving, complex guidelines inherent in home retention
programs.
42. We have further enhanced our support systems and our training and re-training to aid
guidelines that have continually changed and expanded to help more borrowers. Wells Fargo’s
practical training from our most seasoned representatives. We actively rotate our representatives
so that they are working at the appropriate level in light of the skills that they have. Wells Fargo
also performs internal quality assurance, including recording and listening to phone calls, to
ensure that our team members communicate appropriately and consistently with our customers.
43. We have also improved how we obtain the extensive documentation the government
requires for HAMP from borrowers, and we continue to work to ensure all documents are
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Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 17 of 41
processed in a timely manner. For example, Wells Fargo has streamlined the receipt, imaging,
and processing of the required documents. According to recent Treasury statistics, for all calls
into the Home Preservation Foundation HAMP Hotline through April 2010, less than 0.5% of the
Wells Fargo calls were complaints stating that Wells Fargo lost the caller’s paperwork.
44. Earlier this year, Wells Fargo transitioned to assigning one person to manage one loan
modification from beginning to end. This improved process has been in place since the end of
June 2010 and we hope that it is beginning to have a positive impact on our customers’
experiences. In addition, we have been working with other industry collaborators, such as
investors and appraisers, to institute a 5-day credit decision turn-around for customers in need
45. Wells Fargo also has a dedicated phone line for Congressional staff members and
case workers to use in the event that their constituents, who are Wells Fargo customers, have
46. Notably, the June 2010 Servicer Performance Report reflects that, of the four major
servicers, Wells Fargo had the lowest servicer complaint rate to the Homeowner’s HOPE Hotline
from the beginning of the program through May 2010. Similarly, of the four major servicers,
Wells Fargo had the second lowest answer time for homeowner calls. Finally, Wells Fargo had
the shortest response time of the four major servicers for responding to third-party escalations.
47. We understand the frustration some borrowers feel in getting clear, timely
communications from us as HAMP guidelines and the requirements for the various modification
programs have continued to change. Wells Fargo holds itself to a high level of accountability for
improving communication and providing the highest possible level of service to each of our
customers. Wells Fargo is continuing to seek ways to improve the process to address the
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Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 18 of 41
constant challenges facing our customers and our investors, and we continually seek to
implement improvements to the process as they are developed. We also have met with staff at
the U.S. Treasury on numerous occasions to discuss the challenges presented by HAMP and we
have offered suggestions and opportunities to make the HAMP program more effective.
HAMP Alternatives
48. While HAMP has been an important option for borrowers, HAMP will not help all
borrowers, in Massachusetts or elsewhere, find payment relief. For the customers who are
ineligible for HAMP, Wells Fargo also provides customized loan modifications.
49. Since the beginning of 2009 through the first half of 2010, 85% of the modifications
that Wells Fargo initiated or completed were done outside of HAMP. We believe this is
primarily associated with our strong loan origination underwriting guidelines because many of
the borrowers seeking assistance already have payment-to-income percentages below 31%, the
targeted payment ratio established by the HAMP program. Since 2009 through the first half of
2010, at the same time that Wells Fargo was providing HAMP modifications to eligible
50. The crisis of unemployment and under-employment has placed limits on what
servicers, including Wells Fargo, can do to help borrowers attain an affordable mortgage
payment. Wells Fargo has offered forbearance programs where appropriate and we have done
all we can to place borrowers in permanent modifications once the borrower becomes fully
employed again.
51. Under certain circumstances, Wells Fargo has placed borrowers on non-HAMP (or
“alternative”) modifications. As the June 2010 Servicer Performance Report reflects, since the
HAMP program was initiated, Wells Fargo has worked with 56,821 borrowers who were
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Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 19 of 41
cancelled from HAMP by finding alternative modifications. Wells Fargo receives no financial
incentive from the U.S. Treasury for placing borrowers on non-HAMP modifications. It
foreclosure. Wells Fargo’s relatively lower percentage of aged trial plans, as well as the
substantial number of borrowers who Wells Fargo has placed in alternative modifications reflects
Wells Fargo’s commitment and capabilities for helping borrowers stay in their homes and avoid
foreclosure.
52. I am familiar with the claims made by plaintiffs in the above-captioned action, and I
have reviewed the Expert Report of Christopher Wyatt, which I understand was filed with the
Court on September 15, 2010. To my knowledge, Mr. Wyatt has never worked for Wells Fargo,
including in its capacity as a mortgage loan servicer, and he does not have first-hand or personal
53. Mr. Wyatt makes a number of statements regarding Wells Fargo’s HAMP activities
that are not accurate. First, Mr. Wyatt states that the putative class members in this case were all
determined eligible for a permanent HAMP modification by Wells Fargo “because they received
a TPP.” Wyatt Report at 5. As stated above, however, Wells Fargo placed thousands of
borrowers on stated trial plans prior to March 1, 2010 where Wells Fargo did not yet have
sufficient information to determine the borrower’s final eligibility for a permanent modification.
Accordingly, it is not correct to state, as Mr. Wyatt does, that any borrower who received a trial
plan from Wells Fargo was determined to have met all HAMP eligibility requirements. All that
can be said about the borrowers’ receipt of a trial plan, prior to March 1, 2010, is that the
borrowers satisfied Wells Fargo’s initial screening, as set forth in paragraph 14 above.
– 19 –
Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 20 of 41
54. To support his opinion that Wells Fargo “failed to timely convert eligible
homeowners in an active Trial Period Plan into a permanent loan modification,” Mr. Wyatt
references (at page 15 of his report) comments made in August 2009 by Bill Merrill, Senior Vice
President of Wells Fargo, to the California Mortgage Bankers Association (“CMBA”). The
apparent source for Mr. Wyatt’s testimony regarding Mr. Merrill is at www.mortgageorb.com
(October 14, 2009). See Wyatt Report at 15 & n. 23. Mr. Wyatt’s rendition of the description of
Mr. Merrill’s comments to the CMBA is not accurate as is apparent from a review of the
reported article.
55. In particular, Mr. Merrill accurately commented that Wells Fargo had retained six
Sigma consultants in order to assist Wells Fargo in facing the numerous challenges presented by
the structure of the HAMP program. The consultants found, and Mr. Merrill observed, that the
HAMP process itself – as of August 2009 – was the challenge, not, as Mr. Wyatt recounts, the
particular conduct of Wells Fargo. Specifically, the article that Mr. Wyatt references states:
Bill Merrill, senior vice president of Wells Fargo’s default servicing operations,
noted at the CMBA conference that return rates on pre-approved modification
packages have been particularly difficult to manage because servicers aren’t
always in control of the process.
Six Sigma experts, brought in by the bank as consultants, “were going crazy”
when they reviewed the typical loan modification process and found servicers
only looked at a file for 45 minutes in a 30-day time period. And while the
package sits with the borrower for the better part of a month, outreach campaigns
- which include phone calls and letters - ratchet up costs.
“It’s a very broken process in the sense that you move quick, stop. Move quick,
stop,” Merrill said, pointing out that investors and insurance companies have to
sign off on packages. “The time we actually touch the files is pretty limited when
you look at just one file.”
nor anything else relied upon by Mr. Wyatt supports his conclusions that Wells Fargo has failed
– 20 –
Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 21 of 41
HAMP TPP agreements, and that Wells Fargo’s alleged failure “is directly caused by inadequate
staffing and procedures.” In fact, as discussed at length above, Wells Fargo has diligently and
aggressively worked to implement and comply with the HAMP program. I am not aware of any
information in my position at Wells Fargo that would support Mr. Wyatt’s conclusion that Wells
Foreclosure moratorium
57. It is my understanding that plaintiffs seek a foreclosure moratorium for loans that
Wells Fargo is reviewing but for which Wells Fargo has not yet determined eligibility for a
permanent HAMP modification and for loans that Wells Fargo has reviewed for a HAMP
permanent modification but for which the borrower did not receive a HAMP denial letter before
58. As previously mentioned, any borrower who is in an extended HAMP trial plan is
not referred to foreclosure or allowed to proceed to foreclosure sale until such time as the HAMP
negative NPV result, the borrower is provided a 30-day period to contest the NPV results.
Additionally, Wells also reviews borrowers for any available alternative modifications before
59. Moreover, as discussed above, the foreclosures that plaintiffs seek to halt would only
occur in the small percentage of cases where Wells Fargo has carefully determined that the loan
is not eligible for either a HAMP or non-HAMP modification nor would the loan have qualified
for another pre-foreclosure work out, such as a deed in lieu of foreclosure or short sale.
– 21 –
Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 22 of 41
60. In light of Wells Fargo’s extensive and proven efforts to keep every borrower out of
foreclosure whenever another alternative is present, Wells Fargo strongly believes that the
foreclosure moratorium that plaintiffs ask this Court to impose on Wells Fargo as to the small
number of borrowers in Massachusetts for whom Wells Fargo is already committed to placing in
inappropriate. Wells Fargo believes that forced moratoriums should only be mandated in very
61. Wells Fargo has made extensive, credible efforts to modify the loans of its customers
in Massachusetts and nationally, and the results establish why a foreclosure moratorium, for any
limited purpose, is not appropriate in this case. Wells Fargo believes that its loan workout
processes are some of the most robust in the country and Wells Fargo is committed to continuing
– 22 –
Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 23 of 41
Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 24 of 41
EXHIBIT 1
Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 25 of 41
837,446
429,321
Trial 400,000
Trials Reported Since May 2010 Report4 38,728 284,209
Modifications
200,000 164,696
Permanent Modifications Begun Since
51,205 Permanent Modifications Started (Cumulative)
Permanent May 2010 Report
500,000
Modifications
Permanent Modifications Canceled5 8,823
398,021
400,000
346,816
Active Permanent Modifications 389,198
299,092
1 Estimated eligible 60+ day delinquent loans as reported by servicers as of May 31, 2010, include conventional loans:
300,000
in foreclosure and bankruptcy.
with a current unpaid principal balance less than $729,750 on a one‐unit property, $934,200 on a two‐unit property, $1,129,250 on a
230,801
three‐unit property and $1,403,400 on a four‐unit property.
on a property that was owner‐occupied at origination. 200,000 170,207
originated on or before January 1, 2009.
Estimated eligible 60+ day delinquent loans exclude:
FHA and VA loans. 117,302
loans that are current or less than 60 days delinquent, which may be eligible for HAMP if a borrower is in imminent default. 100,000
For servicers enrolling after April 1, 2010 that did not participate in the 60+ day delinquency survey, the delinquency count is from the 66,938
servicer registration form.
2 The estimated eligible 60+ day delinquent borrowers are those in HAMP‐eligible loans, minus estimated exclusions of loans on vacant 31,424
properties, loans with borrower debt‐to‐income ratio below 31%, loans that fail the NPV test, properties no longer owner‐occupied, 4,742 15,649
manufactured housing loans with title/chattel issues that exclude them from HAMP, and loans where the investor pooling and service 0
agreements preclude modification. Exclusions for DTI and NPV results are estimated using market analytics.
3 As reported in the weekly servicer survey through July 1, 2010.
Sep and Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June
4 Servicers may enter new trial modifications anytime before the loan converts to a permanent modification.
5 Includes 195 loans paid off. Earlier
• 76.8% of homeowners in permanent modifications were 60 days delinquent or Principal Forbearance 29.1%
more at trial entry; the remainder were up to 59 days late or in imminent default.
Q3 2009 3,643 10.5% 4.4% 4,152 7.8% 2.3% 4,151 7.7% 2.4%
ALL 174,785 4.5% 1.4% 50,662 5.9% 1.7% 4,151 7.7% 2.4%
* The 60+ day delinquent population includes the 90+ day delinquent population. This table highlights the
number of permanent modifications that were delinquent at the end of 3 months, 6 months and 9 months.
Does not include permanent modifications that have been paid off.
A HAMP permanent modification is canceled for nonpayment if it is more than 90 days delinquent.
Select Median Characteristics of Permanent Modifications
Estimated
Eligible 60+ Day Trial Plan 100%
Delinquent Offers All HAMP Trials Active Trial Permanent 89% Trial Evaluation :
Servicer Borrowers1 Extended2 Started3 Modifications3 Modifications3 80% 77%
American Home Mortgage Verified Income Stated Income2
51,745 24,274 19,906 9,494 9,504 75% 71%
Servicing Inc 66%
62% 60%
Aurora Loan Services, LLC 39,253 47,640 44,099 7,263 12,562 57%
Bank of America, NA4 469,905 405,861 311,801 121,369 72,232 47%
50% 45% 44%
Carrington Mortgage Services 41%
5,180 3,611 2,933 710 2,019 37% 35%
LLC 31% 29%
28% 27% 26%
CitiMortgage, Inc. 143,074 155,955 146,857 27,965 40,813 25%
25%
GMAC Mortgage, Inc. 20,459 57,244 46,917 6,083 27,505 14%
Green Tree Servicing LLC 6,912 7,290 6,144 2,133 2,347
0%
HomEq Servicing 16,089 6,669 5,479 1,450 3,793 Trial Length at
Conversion 3.2 4.6 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.1 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.6 3.6 5.4 4.0 6.3 4.4 7.5 4.5 4.9 5.4 3.4 3.3
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA5 233,180 256,775 202,831 63,259 54,722 (months):
Freddie Mac.
1 Active
trials initiated at least six months ago. 4
Note: Excludes Wachovia Mortgage, FSB at 0%.
For servicers enrolling after April 1, 2010 that did not participate in the
Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 29 of 41
Disposition Path
Homeowners in Canceled HAMP Trial Modifications
Through May 2010 (8 Largest Servicers) 1
Homeowners Whose HAMP Trial Modification Was Canceled in the Process of: The most common causes
of trial cancellations are:
• Missing documentation
Short Sale/ Total
Action Borrower Alternative Payment Deed in Foreclosure Foreclosure (As of May • Trial plan default
Servicer Pending2 Bankruptcy Current Modification Plan3 Loan Payoff Lieu Starts Completions 2010)
American Home
• Ineligible borrower: debt‐
60 9 26 16 8 1 0 6 3 129 to‐income ratio is already
Mortgage Servicing Inc.
below 31%
Bank of America, NA4 69,653 2,154 3,009 20,564 761 392 1,248 2,440 192 100,413
CitiMortgage Inc. 16,863 6,232 7,471 30,145 1,063 232 1,017 5,286 509 68,818
GMAC Mortgage Inc. 1,053 202 877 4,310 226 239 223 651 275 8,056
JP Morgan Chase Bank
12,462 205 712 31,973 58 246 903 10,927 1,119 58,605
NA5
Litton Loan Servicing LP 2,726 334 1,286 8,259 363 61 591 1,814 218 15,652
OneWest Bank 1,816 174 173 2,785 40 8 360 883 350 6,589
Wells Fargo Bank NA6 6,229 435 6,592 56,821 544 1,699 3,903 8,610 1,774 86,607
TOTAL 110,862 9,745 20,146 154,873 3,063 2,878 8,245 30,617 4,440 344,869
(These 8 Servicers) 32.1% 2.8% 5.8% 44.9% 0.9% 0.8% 2.4% 8.9% 1.3% 100%
Note: Data is as reported by servicers for actions completed through May 31, 2010.
1 As defined by cap amount.
2 Trial loans that have been canceled, but no further action has yet been taken.
3 An arrangement with the borrower and servicer that does not involve a formal loan modification.
4 Bank of America, NA includes Bank of America, NA, BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, Home Loan Services and Wilshire Credit Corporation.
5 J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA includes EMC Mortgage Corporation.
6 Wells Fargo Bank, NA includes a portion of the loans previously included in Wachovia Mortgage, FSB. Excludes Wachovia Mortgage FSB Pick-a-Payment Loans.
Note: Excludes cancellations pending data corrections. 5
Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 30 of 41
Disposition Path
Homeowners Not Accepted for HAMP Trial Modifications
Through May 2010 (8 Largest Servicers) 1
Homeowners Not Accepted for a HAMP Trial Modification in the Process of: The most common causes
of trials not accepted are:
• Ineligible borrower: debt‐
Short Sale/ Total
Action Borrower Alternative Payment Deed in Foreclosure Foreclosure (As of May to‐income ratio is already
Servicer Pending2 Bankruptcy Current Modification Plan3 Loan Payoff Lieu Starts Completions 2010) below 31%
American Home
1,209 529 2,096 12,851 395 313 1,116 2,463 18 20,990 • Missing documentation
Mortgage Servicing Inc.
• Imminent default not
Bank of America, NA4 29,070 2,264 1,922 8,729 690 265 8,768 13,588 1,097 66,393 evidenced by borrower
CitiMortgage Inc. 33,881 8,282 8,912 24,316 4,165 13,470 1,382 11,414 4,068 109,890
GMAC Mortgage Inc. 13,076 2,721 15,664 25,653 3,411 3,221 2,536 8,043 3,223 77,548
JP Morgan Chase Bank
16,467 537 43,401 32,504 110 400 908 4,765 446 99,538
NA5
Litton Loan Servicing LP 7,806 3,009 6,856 8,432 1,273 174 2,651 6,894 1,274 38,369
OneWest Bank 7,530 1,331 4,562 3,844 509 102 2,284 3,338 3,839 27,339
Wells Fargo Bank NA6 12,657 1,021 18,951 41,334 1,676 2,630 3,236 12,119 4,886 98,510
TOTAL 121,696 19,694 102,364 157,663 12,229 20,575 22,881 62,624 18,851 538,577
(These 8 Servicers) 22.6% 3.7% 19.0% 29.3% 2.3% 3.8% 4.2% 11.6% 3.5% 100%
Note: Data is as reported by servicers for actions completed through May 31, 2010.
1 As defined by cap amount.
2 Homeowners who were not approved for a HAMP trial modification, but no further action has yet been taken.
3 An arrangement with the borrower and servicer that does not involve a formal loan modification.
4 Bank of America, NA includes Bank of America, NA, BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, Home Loan Services and Wilshire Credit Corporation.
5 J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA includes EMC Mortgage Corporation.
6 Wells Fargo Bank, NA includes a portion of the loans previously included in Wachovia Mortgage, FSB. Excludes Wachovia Mortgage FSB Pick-a-Payment Loans.
6
Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 31 of 41
Servicers had the option to use verified income at any time. produced during the trial period.
3 HAFA guidelines enable short-sale and deed-in-lieu transactions for borrowers at risk of foreclosure. 8 J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA includes EMC Mortgage Corporation.
4 Operationally ready means that servicers have implemented the program as outlined in Supplemental Directive 09-09. Dates after May 31, 2010 are 9 Wells Fargo Bank, NA includes a portion of the loans previously included in Wachovia Mortgage, FSB. Excludes Wachovia Mortgage FSB Pick-a-
estimated.
5 Treasury’s Second Lien Modification Program was revised in March 2010. Servicers participating in HAMP are not required to sign up for Revised
Payment Loans. Wachovia Mortgage FSB began verified income trials at signup in July 2009. 7
2MP.
Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 32 of 41
Average Speed to Answer Homeowner Calls (May) Servicer Complaint Rate to Homeowner’s HOPETM Hotline
(Program to Date, Through June)
60 Program to date, there have been 598,486 calls to the Homeowner’s HOPETM
Homeowner’s HOPETM Hotline regarding a specific servicer, of which 3.9% included complaints.
50 Hotline Average for May: Below
6% shows specific complaint rates, adjusted for volume:
2.8 Seconds
% of Calls for Specific Servicer
40
Program to Date Average: 3.9%
5%
That Are Complaints
Seconds
30
4%
20
3%
10
2%
0 Litton JP Morgan OneWest Am. Home Bank of GMAC CitiMortgage Wells Fargo
Bank of Litton JP Morgan GMAC OneWest Am. Home Wells Fargo CitiMortgage Chase NA Servicing America NA
Source: Homeowner’s HOPETM Hotline.
America NA Chase NA Servicing
Note: Complaint rate is the share of a specific servicer’s call volume that are complaints (i.e., for all calls about
Source: Survey data through May 31, 2010, from servicers on call volume to loss mitigation lines. Litton, 5.3% included complaints.)
3%
20
2%
10
1%
0
0% JP Morgan Bank of OneWest CitiMortgage Am. Home Wells Fargo GMAC Litton
Chase NA America NA Servicing
Bank of Litton JP Morgan GMAC Am. Home Wells Fargo OneWest CitiMortgage
America Chase NA Servicing Resolved: 755 1,038 208 330 139 766 277 234
Cases (PTD)
Source: Survey data through May 31, 2010, from servicers on call volume to loss mitigation lines.
Source: HAMP Solutions Center. Target of 25 calendar days includes an estimated 5 days
8
*As defined by cap amount. processing by HAMP Solutions Center.
Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 33 of 41
15 Metropolitan Areas With Highest HAMP Activity Modifications by Investor Type (Large Servicers)
Total % of All
Active Permanent HAMP HAMP
Metropolitan Statistical Area Trials Modifications Activity Activity Servicer GSE Private Portfolio Total
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa
24,783 24,063 48,846 6.5% Bank of America, NA1 127,908 56,313 9,380 193,601
Ana, CA
New York-Northern New Jersey- JP Morgan Chase NA2 54,462 46,290 17,229 117,981
22,974 22,365 45,339 6.0%
Long Island, NY-NJ-PA Wells Fargo Bank, NA 3 53,599 16,361 5,617 75,577
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, CitiMortgage, Inc. 46,991 4,473 17,314 68,778
18,150 20,004 38,154 5.1%
IL-IN-WI OneWest Bank 16,979 14,249 2,421 33,649
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario,
17,417 20,722 38,139 5.1% GMAC Mortgage, Inc. 20,272 7,729 5,587 33,588
CA
Ocwen Financial Corporation, Inc. 5,679 16,286 372 22,337
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano
18,241 17,380 35,621 4.7% Aurora Loan Services, LLC 11,397 8,185 243 19,825
Beach, FL
Select Portfolio Servicing 450 16,790 2,551 19,791
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 13,850 17,116 30,966 4.1%
American Home Mortgage
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, 1,127 17,871 -- 18,998
12,628 13,917 26,545 3.5% Servicing Inc
DC-VA-MD-WV Saxon Mortgage Services Inc. 1,200 13,173 914 15,287
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 11,448 11,771 23,219 3.1% Nationstar Mortgage LLC 9,628 4,127 5 13,760
Litton Loan Servicing LP 1,151 11,605 -- 12,756
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 8,027 8,608 16,635 2.2%
Wachovia Mortgage, FSB4 142 145 10,906 11,193
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 7,170 8,169 15,339 2.0% US Bank NA 5,361 21 2,873 8,255
PNC Mortgage5 5,680 192 590 6,462
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL 7,282 7,848 15,130 2.0%
HomEq Servicing 2 5,025 216 5,243
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, Green Tree Servicing LLC 4,207 264 9 4,480
5,701 7,019 12,720 1.7%
MA-NH
Carrington Mortgage Services LLC -- 2,729 -- 2,729
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington,
5,904 6,522 12,426 1.6% Remainder of HAMP Servicers 60,743 3,470 4,772 68,985
PA-NJ-DE-MD
Sacramento-Arden-Arcade- Total 426,978 245,298 80,999 753,275
5,624 6,638 12,262 1.6%
Roseville, CA 1 Bank of America, NA includes Bank of America, NA, BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, Home Loans Services and
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, Wilshire Credit Corporation.
6,471 5,590 12,061 1.6% 2 J.P.Morgan Chase Bank, NA includes EMC Mortgage Corporation.
CA 3 Wells Fargo Bank, NA includes a portion of the loans previously included in Wachovia Mortgage, FSB.
4 Wachovia Mortgage, FSB consists of Wachovia Mortgage FSB Pick-a-Payment loans.
A complete list of HAMP activity for all MSAs is available at 5 Formerly National City Bank.
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/MSA%20HAMP%20Data%20June%202010.pdf
Note: Figures reflect active trials and permanent modifications.
10
Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 35 of 41
Exhibit 2
Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 38 of 41
Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 39 of 41
Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 40 of 41
Case 4:10-cv-10311-FDS Document 43 Filed 11/03/10 Page 41 of 41