BETWEEN "A"
Plaintiff
On papers
JUDGMENT OF DOBSON J
[1] The plaintiff in this proceeding (A) is the young man who has made a
complaint of sexual offending against him by Mr Darren Hughes, who has recently
resigned from his position as a Member of Parliament. The fact of that complaint,
[3] A has deposed that his complaint to the Police was made in circumstances
where his name and identifying details would not be reported in the media as a
result. He deposes he was told that by the Police, and is now aware that in the event
that charges are laid against Mr Hughes, there would be automatic suppression of his
name under s 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985.
[4] The essential thrust of his claim is that the present circumstances of his
complaint to the Police and, in the period until the Police decide whether to lay
charges in relation to his complaint, the fact that he has made such complaint is a
matter of private information with a reasonable expectation of respect for that
privacy. Further, that publicity given to the private facts would be considered highly
offensive to an objective, reasonable person. In this regard, a Memorandum of
Counsel on his behalf cites Hosking v Runting.1
1
Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 at [117].
[6] Here, I am persuaded on the relatively thorough analysis set out in the
Memorandum of Counsel filed with the application that a case at least for a holding
injunction is made out. The case for moving with urgency is obvious. Once A’s
identity is published in any form, it will most likely be pointless to thereafter attempt
any constraint on publication of his name in any context. Secondly, the larger
element of public interest is in the fact of a complaint against a person in Mr Hughes’
former position, rather than the individual identity of the complainant. His identity
is not a matter on which the public’s interest in knowing can claim urgency. If
criminal charges do ensue, then publication now would render nugatory the
unqualified statutory protection that A would then have from protection of his name.
[7] If, on the other hand, the Police decide not to pursue charges (and in the event
that there is no application to set aside this present order made without notice before
then), that circumstance would certainly warrant reconsideration of the basis for the
present order.
[8] One matter of concern is that A’s proceedings have targeted just six
defendants, and obvious anomalies would arise if other media organisations (or
informal internet commentators), without notice of the orders being made, publish
A’s name or identifying details. To minimise the prospect of that, the Memorandum
of Counsel argues for an extension of the effect of the orders to “…anyone else with
notice of this order”, citing an analogy with the House of Lords decision in Attorney-
General v Times Newspapers Ltd.2 I accept that that is appropriate, but it can by no
means guarantee complete obedience.
[9] If, notwithstanding the terms in which I am making these orders, there is
publication of any material extent of circulation, then that would also be a
circumstance warranting reconsideration of the orders now made.
(a) prohibiting the defendants (or anyone else with notice of this order)
from publishing A’s name or particulars likely to lead to the
2
Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1992] 1 AC 191 (HL).
identification of A as the person who has laid a complaint of sexual
assault against the former Member of Parliament, Darren Hughes;
(c) that the Court file in respect of this proceeding may not be searched
by any person without the leave of a Judge; and
(d) that in the first instance, and until further order of the Court, service of
the Statement of Claim, interlocutory application, affidavit of A and
Memorandum of Counsel be confined to the solicitors and counsel for
the defendants;
(e) that the defendants are at liberty to apply to have the interlocutory
orders made varied or rescinded at short notice.
Dobson J
Solicitors:
Hazelton Law, Wellington for plaintiff