North African paper, Dr.

Bruce Maddy-Weitzman 9-2

2011
Lauder School of Government
IDC Herzliya

Qaddafi’s “Great Leap Forward”

and the Libyan post-colonial narrative:
the Libyan-Italian reconciliation as part of a decade-long political and economic
process.

A short essay by Jonathan Kahan

ID: 083616800

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On October 7 th
2008, unlike what had happened for the previous thirty-eight years, the traditional
“Feast of the Vengeance” against the Italian colonizers was not celebrated. Customary billboards
showing Libyan peasants murdered by the Fascists and inviting the people to “struggle and fight
against the oppressors” also disappeared from the streets. Instead, a “Feast of the Amity” was
officially celebrated that year, as it as since then. Billboards now show pictures of the Libyan
premier Mu’ammar Al-Qaddafi shaking hands with the Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi,
and a similar effigy has appeared in the capital’s Museum of Libya (Gazzini, 2010).

These are not just superficial, aesthetic changes: if they cannot be said to be symbolizing a
shift in the Libyans’ collective memory, they do represent a decisive shift in their Leader’s foreign
policy, as well as a peculiar approach to the post-colonial discourse. This is even more clear in the
light of the fact that Libya’s post colonial deal was settled for the incredible sum of five billion
dollars in compensations as well as the tacit consent of the Italian authorities to Libyan investments
in Italy amounting to several hundreds millions of euros (ibid, 2010,et alia).

How does contemporary Libya relate to its colonial past? What has caused its relatively
unexpected foreign policy change? What are the interests involved in the Italian-Libyan connection,
how does such connection fit in the broader scheme of the Jamahirriyya’s policy change and what
are their consequences for Libya and its people? These are some of the questions this paper will try
to address. For this purpose, it shall start with a very brief overview of the Italian-Libyan relations
in the post-colonial era and the role of anti-colonial ideology in shaping the Jamahirriyya’s
institutions; it will then analyze Al-Qaddafi’s historic policy shift in the late 1990s, its economic
motivations and some of its consequences for the relations with the West. It will finally address the
more recent developments of such a problematic, and even paradoxical relationship, with particular
focus on the Italian-Libyan bilateral relations. Methodologically, this paper will refer both to hard
economic data and to analyses concerning political culture and institutions taken from historians
and scholars with a constructivist orientation, in an attempt to paint a picture of Libya’s shift as
holistically as possible.

The lack of literature on Libyan-Italian relations and the currency of some of the events
described are a clear limit to the array of sources used; I will therefore have to rely on newspaper
articles and analyses from academic and non-academic journals. Moreover, room is left for
speculation about the future direction Libyan foreign policy might take, while the Leader’s
temperamental and inscrutable personality makes any possible forecast but an educated guess.

Libya’s postcolonial narrative and stateless society.

This chapter aims at showing how the institutions and the (a-)political culture of the Qaddafian
Jamahiriyya, despite containing some very creative elements, were partly the result of a reaction to
Italian colonialism.
Like many other colonial regimes, the Italian rule in Libya has brought a lot of sufferance as
well as some good – usually in terms of infrastructures - which in the Libyan case were largely
destroyed during the Second World War. In particular, after twenty years of bloody Fascist rule and
five years of war, the situation in the new-born Libyan state looked quite grim: virtually no trade,
extremely high unemployment, a per capita income estimated at $ 25 per year, high mortality rate
and a 94% illiteracy rate (Vanderwalle, 2006). This, together with several other factors, contributed

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to the extreme weakness of the Libyan entity in the years following independence, as well as to a
very high hostility vis à vis the former colonizing state later on.
First, the regions composing modern-day Libya, namely Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan,
were very loosely connected before the Italian rule. After the war, there had even been a proposal
made to the UN by Italy, the United Kingdom and France, to split the three provinces among
themselves (Naylor, 2009, et alia). This resulted in an extremely high fractioning of the Libyan
entity and identity, and with the identification of the idea of unitary state with colonialism, an idea
that deeply influenced the institutional structure of the independent and federal Jamahiriyya
(Vanderwalle, 2006).
Second, particularly during the Fascist age, the Italians had severely restrained every form of
local governance, and, unlike other colonial states, had even been keeping natives away from
bureaucratic administration. Unlike in neighbouring French and British mandates and colonies,
colonial rule in Libya did not produce local commercial, agricultural or bureaucratic classes “whose
fortunes were tied to colonial interests” (ibid, 2006, p.41). The consequence of this fact, which was
felt far beyond the monarchic age, was the absence of a local bourgeoisie, as well as the lack of
consolidated indigenous power structures besides the outdated and almost abandoned ones dating
back the Ottoman era (ibid., 2006).
Third, whereas in the case of the French North African colonies, emigration waves to the
colonizing country had taken place already during the colonial period, and increased after
independence, with Libya the case was very different. Being Italy itself a country of emigration (it
reached the migratory balance only in the Seventies), there was no room for manpower intake. In
fact, the main consideration behind the conquest of Italy’s “fourth shore” had been precisely to
lower unemployment in the peninsula (Andall, 2008, et alia). The lack of a significant Libyan
immigrant population in Italy, had two major consequences: first, the lack of the significant
remittances enjoyed, for example, by Algeria and Tunisia thanks to their migrants in France.
Second, the Italian settlers were the only facet of the west the Libyans knew (besides the very few
who, since ’59, were dealing with the oil business), thus allowing populist Leaders’ demonization
of Italy and the West to impress the population.

The bad experiences of the colonial period deeply influenced Libya’s postcolonial narrative,
not only because they were embedded in the collective memory of the people, but more importantly
because thy were used by Colonel Qaddafi to shape the country according to his own interpretation
of anti-colonialism. “Libyans’ views of the Italian rule, especially official ones, have emphasized
the memory of combat atrocities more than that of everyday life under colonialism” (Fuller, 2008,
p. 303).
Idris was a weak king, largely a puppet in the hands of postcolonial British and American
rulers (Naylor, 2009). Because of the lack of a unifying “independence ideology” the discontinuity
between the three provinces and the lack of a power structure, the institutions characterising Idris’s
rule were loose and weak to the point of near insignificance (Vanderwalle, 2006). Their detailed
description goes beyond the scope of this paper; it will therefore suffice to say that, the policy of
statelessness was inherited by Qaddafi in 1969 from the previous ruler, to which the former added
some peculiar elements, including (changing) ideology (Ibid., 2006).
Since the Qaddafi era, the public discourse in Libya has been clearly anti-colonial and anti-
Italian. By public discourse we clearly do not mean the discourse of the public society, which is
close to nonexistent, but rather the discourse promoted by the ruling leadership. In 1970, Qaddafi
expelled all remaining Italians and confiscated their property. Such property included some of the
most fertile lands in the country, especially in Cyrenaica, and amounted to 400 billion Liras,
according to the Association of Italians Repatriated from Libya (AIRL, 2010).

The theory of a stateless society, which was clearly exposed in The Green Book in 1975,
were expressed in the creation of the Jamahiriyya, a unique economic, political and social

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experiment. Economically, the inspiration was a socialist one, ranging from a generously
distributive state and a public sector which employed 75% of the population to the nationalization
of oil companies and the near abolition of private business (Anderson, 1995, et alia). Socially, it
emphasized the ancient tribal structures and Islam (ibid, 1995). Politically, it aimed at
decentralizing rule and at creating a (formal) “direct democracy” through popular assemblies and
local committees (Naylor, 2009). Vanderwelle writes that the Green Book’s ideas “are simple and,
with their insistence on egalitarianism and the lack of hierarchy, reflect a tribal ethos”.
(Vanderwalle, 2006, p.103). Which means, an anti-colonial ethos.

What is important to underline is that statelessness, which characterized the Libyan society
since the end of the colonial rule and was made a clear policy since the publication of The Green
Book, came as a post colonial reaction to the colonial structures imposed by the Italians. “By
appealing to the rural ideology of statelessness and fear of the urban-centred state (seen as the
colonial state), Qaddafi destroyed institutions of the old monarchy and, at the same time, created the
Jamahiriyya institutions legitimizing a strong state acceptable to most Libyans in the hinterland”
(Ahmida, 2005, p.72). Therefore, we can see that anti-western foreign policy and the anti-western
internal structures of the Jamahiriyya are strongly intertwined, and part of one all-encompassing
ideology-based political scheme, or “experiment” (Anderson, 1995). This has important
consequences if we want to attempt a forecast of future developments of the Jamahiriyya, which
will be discussed further on.

Libya’s Great Leap Forward

The recent policy change in the Libyan-Italian relations is but one further step within a long,
yet unexpected process, which started in the late Nineties. Several events can be considered as
symbolic of such a shift.
- In April 1999, Libya turned over the suspects of the Lockerbie bombing. Together with
this, backchannel negotiations started with the United Kingdom, and later with the
United States, a move which shows some signs of a desire for a rapprochement with the
West (Vanderwalle, 2006).
- In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Libya was one of the first countries to officially
condemn the attacks and to express its support for the American government. Qaddafi
even expressed his support for the invasion of Afghanistan. In parallel, Libya also started
to pursue a less confrontational policy towards the Israeli-Arab conflict and sub-Saharan
Africa (ibid., 2006)
- Most importantly, thanks to negotiations in the early 2000s, in 2003 Libya agreed to
renounce the pursuit of WMD. This allowed the US to gradually eliminate sanctions, lift
travel restrictions, cancel Libya from the list of rogue states, and, indeed, resume
business (Naylor 2009 et alia).

The new course of Libyan foreign policy came together with a series of economic measures aimed
at increasing business with the West, including the resumption to private sector economy, the lifting
of trade barriers, the establishment of a new private banking system and of a stock exchange,
currency devaluation to achieve export competitiveness, the opening a free trade area in Misurata,
and general deregulation of foreign investments (Kawczynski, 2010). Interestingly enough, the goal
of all of these policies was not only to attract more foreign investments, but also to differentiate the
economy, which show the leadership’s understanding of one of the basic tenets of contemporary
liberal economy (as opposed to the OPEC cartel and several Arab oil-based economies).

4
 The policy change that Libya underwent in the Nineties is one of the most radical and
sudden of the decade. According to most of the literature, Qaddafi’s renunciation of terrorism and
his “great leap forward” was motivated mainly by economic reasons.
- Oil production, which constituted around 90% of Libya’s exports, during the nineties
grew under potential compared to the rest of OPEC, while proven reserves were
declining (World Bank, 2006). The primary and the tertiary sectors were weak,
especially agriculture (the country still imports 75% of its food needs) (Kawczynski,
2010).
- The price of oil, steadily fell during the eighties (World Bank, 2006). This caused oil
revenues to fall from $21 billion in 1981 to just 5.4 billion in 1986, with the trend
continuing in the Nineties (Kawczynski, 2010).
- This caused the Jamahirryya’s per capita GDP to fall from $7,311 in 1992 to $5,896 in
1999, with a GDP growth of a mere 0.8% (ibid., 2010).
- The lingering effects of the UN-imposed sanctions and the American embargo were
harshly felt by the economy (Vanderwalle, 2006).

All of the above, together with the lack of employment opportunities for the younger
generations (the oil business employed mostly foreigners), alimented discontent among the
population. In summary, Libya’s economic great leap forward and foreign policy opening was
motivated by the fact “Libya needed both expertise and the financial resources to renew the
country’s aging oil infrastructure, and to encourage exploration in the face of declining proven
reserves” (ibid., p.177). Thanks to the new economic and political measures taken by Qaddafi,
coupled with newly raising oil prices, Libya experienced a real GDP yearly growth averaging 5% in
the 2002-2006 period (Naylor, 2009). Although plans for economic diversification largely failed,
privatization and FDI incentives succeeded in attracting more than 120 foreign oil companies to the
country, among which Occidental, Total, Chevron-Texaco and more (Vanderwalle, 2006).

Among the foreign policy outcomes of Libya’s shift, besides the already mentioned
pacification with the United States and looked-for good relations and leadership position in sub-
Saharan Africa, we can find the achievement of an observatory status in the Euro-Mediterranean
partnership in 1999. On the same year, relationships with Italy were restored, and the Italian foreign
minister was the first Western official to visit Libya once the UN sanctions were lifted, and the
bilateral relations further improved when Libya officially renounced it pursuit of WMD in 2003.

The Treaty of Benghazi and Italian Libyan Amity

After several years of negotiations, the ultimate step was taken by Qaddafi, if not to scrap
Libya’s colonial past, indeed to wash away some of the bad memories with Italian money and
investments. The Treaty of Benghazi, solemnly signed by Qaddafi and the Italian prime minister
Silvio Berlusconi on August 30th 2008, shows an overlap between the two countries’ economic
interests which was able to overcome clashing narratives. In the preamble, the Treaty states: “…
considering the sorrowful “past chapter”, for which Italy has already expressed … its apologies for
the suffering brought to the Libyan people following the Italian colonization ultimately closed, …”
(Repubblica, 2008).
According to the Treaty, Italy committed itself to pay the unprecedented amount of $5 billions
within twenty years, which is the first ever voluntary indemnification paid by a European country to
a former colony (Gazzini, 2010). Yet looking at the small prints, it appears that such funds are
actually money allocations to Italian company, which will be used by the latter to build
infrastructural projects in Libya, tax-free (Repubblica, 2008). Among such projects, we find the
building of 200 housing units and a 1700 kilometres long freeway, from the border with Tunisia to
the one with Egypt (Gazzini, 2010). Italy is today the first importer of Libyan oil, but investments

5
in infrastructure rather than in wells might be a sign that Libya is finally getting the longed-for
differentiation.
The treaty was immediately followed by a massive flow of bilateral investments: Italian
Impregilo and Finmeccanica have invested in the new Libyan infrastructures, and Eni energy
corporation has extended its contract for the exploitation of oil wells in the Jamahiriyya to 2048
(Rotondi, 2009). On their part, Libyan investment companies have acquired 7% of UniCredit
banking company, as well as other Italian banks, insurance companies, and 7.5% of Juventus
football team (Internazionale, 2010). While on his way to the G8 meeting in l’Aquila, the rais, as he
is popularly known in Italy, has decided to build a luxury hotel and a water bottling plant in
Antrodoco, a small and needy town in Latium. Dirk Vanderwalle, who was interviewed on the
occasion, said that “in the eyes of the Libyans, helping a small town in Italy, the state that colonized
them, confers to Qaddafi a great prestige. It is a symbolic act. This way he will be able to say: ‘after
all what Italians have done to us, now they need our help’” (ibid., 2010). Italy is nowadays Libya’s
the first overall trade partner, and mutual trade reaches an amount of $4 billions yearly (ibid. 2010).
Today, also thanks to Italian investments together with general liberalizations, the Libyan
GDP has reached $62 billions in 2009, and non-hydrocarbon GDP grew by 6% in 2009, showing
investment in economic differentiation (IMF, 2010). Libya is also by far the per capita wealthiest
country in the region, and the African country with the largest proven oil reserves (World Bank,
2009).

Conclusion

Did economic need succeed in changing Libya’s post colonial narrative? This paper argues
that this did so only partially. In the international arena, Qaddafi was able to rehabilitate his country
in the eyes of the West, most notably the United States, with the renunciation of terrorism and
WMD, the payment of compensations to the victims of Libyan-sponsored terror attacks and,
arguably amore importantly, with the liberalization of its economy.

For what concerns relations with Italy, signs of change are can be discerned, although
among Qaddafi’s often eccentric displays of power and egocentric behaviour.
Berlusconi played along with the Libyan narrative, by repeatedly asking for “forgiveness for the
pain inflicted to the Libyan people” (Gazzini, 2010, p. 160) and in later meeting of the Arab League
in Sirte, even kissed Qaddafi’s hands. Interestingly enough, both in Libya and in Italy, the leader’s
policy change did not reflect a change in the people’s mindset. In Italian schools, the colonialist
period is still hardly taught, the society at large did not go through a process of collective memory
revision on the matter. Moreover, Qaddafi’s four visits in Italy during the second term of
Berlusconi’s government were always accompanied by large anti-Qaddafi demonstrations,
promoted by both human rights activists and by the Italians repatriated from Libya (Romano, 2010).
On his part Qaddafi did sign the Benghazi Treaty, symbolically pardoning the Italians for
their colonial guilt, has abolished the “feast of the vengeance” and established a “Day of the Amity”
on the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty. Due to his extravagance, Qaddafi still managed to
keep a sort of “postcolonial superiority complex” which embarrassed Italian officials on several
occasions. Yet if Qaddafi on the one hand has recently provocatively preached for a European
conversion to Islam in the middle of Rome, on the other hand anti-Italian billboards have
disappeared from Tripoli, and, most importantly, bilateral investments are flowing in massive
quantities. Gazzini writes that “through the actions of the [Italian] premier, Italy itself was
redeemed in the eyes of the Libyan government, and became a friend country for the Jamahirriyya,
with all the honours and the acknowledgement that followed” (Gazzini, 2010, p.60).

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 Whether this means that Qaddafi, who expelled Italian settlers in 1970, has or has not
pardoned the former colonizers, keeping in mind that their apologies came with a $5 billion check,
it is hard to tell. What matters the most is that Libya, within its process of “shift to the West”, has
decided that not only the former colonizer’s investments were worthy of being received, but that it
could also be fruitful to invest in Italy. Once again, like many other times in history, the power of
the economy prevailed over hostile narratives. As much as in the past anti-Western ideology,
reflected in foreign policy, played an active role in shaping the Libyan institutions (see above), we
can expect a modernizing, trading and ambiguously pro-Western Libya to slowly change its internal
power structures, by effect of functional spill-over. Despite changing his mind in 2008, in 2006
Vanderwalle wrote that “if wholesale restructuring seems unlikely, it does not rule out that it
[Qaddafi’s political experiment] can change, and, incrementally, move toward becoming a more
truly bureaucratic and representative organization” (Vanderwalle, 2006, p. 206).

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