~
It provides additional capabilities that haue not been arailable
to the Soviets in thepast. This articleprouides a look at this new
element and considers its organ ization and role.
‘btd ‘,;:
New Ele knt in the
Soviet !ibesant
‘!ructure
Force i ‘$
.*.
MILITARY REVIEW
22 October
AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES
I Au Assault 1
L_.._J
I Ant!a#rcraft
Battery
II
# I
Engineer
Company
I
t GElm”
B
D30 122mm towed how!tzer
M1943 120mm mortar
I
L
ir
Meiftcal
Platoon/ Company
18
6
I
I m
Principal Items of Equipment
supply
Company
Ih!s represents a Provisional assessment of the strength, orgamzawm and equtpment of the a!r assault brigade, based
on fragmental mformat)on from several sources
Figure 1
served and individual antitank weapons— battalions and two parachute battalions
the ratio in terms of number of weapons is very intriguing. The BMD battalions
per 1,000 troops is nearly twice that found are totally in keeping with the recent
in a standard motorized rifle division.’ trend toward increased mobility within
However, there are noticeable differences. the VD V where all divisional regiments
The brigade has more combat battalions, are being equipped with the BMD
a mixture of two BMD-equipped and two AA ICV.8 However, the existence of
parachute assault battalions and an standard parachute battalions within the
organic artillery battalion. air assault brigade in contract to the over-
The combination of two BAfD-equipped all transition within the VD V toward
1983 23
MILITARY REVIEW
“heavier” airborne units might seem con- Second, it is assumed that the airlift for
tradictory, The explanation for this is these brigades would be provided primar-
twofold. ily by the front’s tactical air army (TAA).
First, air assault brigades and, in par- Inasmuch as the lift capability at front
ticular, their non-BJ4D-equipped bat- level is limited (a point that will be
talions would, in some cases, be employed discussed in more detail later), it simply is
closer to the forward line of own troops not feasible to equip air assault brigades
{F LO1l. As a front-level asset, these units with more equipment than can be moved
would support armies and di~,isions in the without excessive external support.
front commander’s maneuver plan at In the final analysis, it probably is no
distances favorable for early linkup or fire accident (as the Soviets are fond of eay-
support. As a result, it is less critical for ing) that the air assault brigade sbructure
these battalions to have ~he increased fire- strongly resembles that of a reinforced
power and mobility that l?I?fDs provide airborne regiment. In Soviet exercise play
units operating farther in the enemy’s subsequent to 197o, most airborne units
rear area. supporting frontal operations have been
Awbome
I
I
Regiment (BMtT)
1,455
— I
mE3El
mm
I I
mm
M1943 120mrn mortar
\
6
mlz!$!zl
Principal Items of Equipment
AGS17 30mm automattc grenade launcher 18
SA7 Grad surface-to.alr missile 36 RPKS74 545mm bght machmegun 83
123 23mm antimrcraft gun 6 BMII awborne amphibious infantry combat vehicle 90
BRDA4 AT 315 afmtank gu!ded mmsde launcher 9 BROM and BRDM2 amphibious scout cars 4
RPGJ6D ant!tank grenade launcher 111
Tha represents d prowsonal assessment of the strength, organization and equipment of the aIr assault brigade, based”
on fragmentary mformat,on from several sources
Figure 2
24 October
AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES
i 983 25
MILITARY REVIEW
25 flctober
AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES
vance rates of at least 40 to 50 kilometers aviation, long range artillery, and the ex-
per day.” tensive use of air assault/airborne forces.
The OMG concept is still evolving both (Emphasis added.)”
through discussion in Soviet military . . pn”neipal tasks of the air force are.
journals and in actual practice during ex- to land tactical desants drawn from the
ercises. As Donnelly emphasizes, the raiding and maneu uen”ng forces or from
OM G is not a new formation; it is the use the main forces of ground troops acting in
of existing units in a different way and as support of the operational maneuver
such represents “a concept of the very groups, This task involves transport
greatest importance– a specific design to aircraft or helicopters landing ground
defeat present NATO defensive plans.’ ‘2’ troops. . ..25
the essence of [the theory of a deep
offensiue operation] consisted of the
Air Assault Brigades: simultaneous suppression of the enemy ‘S
An OMGConnection? defense along its entire depth, penetration
of its tactical zone on a selected a;is with
a subsequent rapid extension of tactical
Soviet discussions concerning the success. into the operational zone by intro-
revival of the mobile group concept duczng exploitation forces [tanks,
reportedly started around 1976 and have moton”zed n’fle troops, cavalry] and land-
subsequently intensified, with particu- ings of airbornelair assault forces for the
larly broad coverage in the military press most rapid achievement of the ass?gned
in 1979.2! The time of these discussions, missio n.”
quite apart from other factors, suggests . these [mobile] groups and [forward )
some correlation between air assault and special] detachments together u,ith
brigades and the OMG ccmcept in that it atrborne forces. prouided experience for
represents the approximate lead time re- the Lmprouement on the theory of deep
quired to decide unit formation, organir.a- combat opera tions. ”
tion and then deployment ( 1976-79). Certainly, airborne and air assault
Apart from the time coincidence, forces are considered to be important
however, the key role of forward detach- elements of the OM G force structure. The
ments and raiding operations in the OM G question that remains, however, is: I Iow
concept and the concomitant emphasis in does, the role of the air assault brigades
recent OM G literature on the importance differ from that of conventional airborne
of tacticaf air assaults and desant opera- or heliborne forces? The answer lies in ex-
tions seem to clearly indicate a major role amining the factors that influenced the
for air assault brigades in OIMG opera- creation of the units.
tions, if not an interrelationship. Several Two factors influenced the decisions to
statements from Soviet/Warsaw Pact form and deploy these units. First was the
sources addressing OMGS and airborne/ need to fill what could be termed the
air assault operations may further illus- front’s airborne/heliborne force employ-
trate this: ment “dead zone.’” Doctrinally, the
. in contrast (o the past, [offensive] Soviets have maintained that heliborne
capabilities have nou~ considerably ex- assaults and landings can be conducted as
panded, especially in the depth to which far forwwd of the FLOT as 50 kilometers
blou~s can be deliuered by rocket forces, —that is, tactical depth (see Figure 3). In
1983 27
,
.
MILITARY REVIEW
28
AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES
,
1983 29 ‘
MILITARY REVIEW
size elements on t ergets in front of or was Iauncbed in the enemy’s rear area to
parrdlel to the OMG’e main azis of ad- draw away reserves, while a second air
vance. Raiding operations would disrupt assault was aimed at seizing a river-
enemy forces reacting to the OM G‘s crossing site for the 0MG.98
passage, as well as simply increase the The greater depth in the enemy’s defen-
amount of confusion in the rear area. sive zone to which air assault forces can
Lieutenant General V. G. Reznichenko, be projected and the high mobility of the
assistant commandant of the Frunze BMD battalions make them ideal for re-
Military Academy, in an article citing the connaissance support of OMGS and their
current offensive application of lessons forward detachments. The Soviets envi-
imrmed from the Battle of Moscow, noted sion OM G forward detachments operat-
approvingly the ad hoc formation of rtrid- ing from 20 to 40 kilometers in front of the
ing detachments to attack targets in the main body. The importance Soviet mili-
enemy rear to “destroy personnel and tary writers attach to these detachments
equipment, deny the enemy rest, to sow cannot be overemphasized.sg
panic.’ ‘3’ He went on to add that: One of the lessone prominent in Soviet
. . . these [mobile] groups and detach- literature about World War- H operations
ments together with airborne troops used of mobile groups (and forward detach-
for the first time in the Battle of Moscoro ments) is that reconnaissance of tbe
have provided experience for the improve- enemy and bhe terrain along the group’s
ment of the theory of deep combat opera- main azis of advance must be improved.”
tions.8s Certainly, the insertion of air assault
Other raiding operation cited for their forces at various depthe along the pro.
effectiveness and current applicabilityy in- jetted OMG “main direction” of advance
clude the crossing of the Dnieper River in would be invaluable in providing timely
1943 and the Manchuria Campaign of information on route conditions, as well
1945. During the Dnieper ckossing, as enemy troop movements. Indeed, it is
groups of 600 to 800 airborne troops not unreasonable to characterize such air
operated independently behind German assault reconnaissance elements as the
tines for two months. During the two- “forward detachment’s forward detach-
week Manchuria Campaign in 1945, 20 merit, ” and, when operating as such, en
airborne parties of 50 to 500 personnel OMG might stretch from “head to toe” as
were inserted in the Japanese rear areas’ much as 100 kilometers.
In addition to raid operations in direct Finafly, another poseible air assault
support of OMG movements, air aesault mission is uniquely associated with the
brigades could be useful for various OMG concept. OMGS operating in
economy-of-force missions. As noted N ATO’s rear areas would
previously, a perceived weakness of . . . require considerably more in the way
NATO’e ,active defense strategy is the of support and protection than do forces
need for main thrusts of an attack to be in the first echelon of the battle formation
identified early in the conflict. Landings of the main forces. This coupled with the
of air assault troops could easily be used great uariety and the great importattce of
as feints or deceptions to confuse the the tasks these groups perform makes
defender about the location of the main a widespread use of aviation necessary’
objectives. In Exercise ZAPAD 81, for ex- to snpport them effectively. (Emphasis
ample, a diversionary hetiborne assault added. P’
AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES
Although close air support by fixed- ment this basing option, as Ivfichslak
wing aircraft is included, the primary notes, it would be necessary for OMG
means of air support, as expressed by Ma- units to locate, secure sad defend suitable
jor Wojciech Mlchalak, would be heli- helicopter Ianding zones. Certainly, the
copters. In his discussion of possible bas- reconnaissance of landing zones is a possi-
ing modes for helicopter units supporting ble mission for forward-deployed air
OMGS, these three sh,ernatives were pro- assault tits, and, in fact, the securing and
posed: temporary defense of Iaqding zones aud
8 The creation of EMorganic OMG “air rdrstrips are both very probable tasks.
echelon” that penetrates u,ith OMGS into For example, doring ZAPAD 81, a heti-
the enemy’s rear areas and is based and borne assault was conducted on an air-
operates directly with OMGS. field in the enemy’s rear area. After the
. That helicopters support OMGS by assault force had secured the landing
conventional methods—that is, from strip, transport aircraft followed with
bases sited with the main forces. “combat vehicles ‘ and additional forces.
e That helicopters initially support These forces immediately departed to link
from bases with main forces, but “at deci- up with advancing naval infantry units
sive moments in the operation the heli- which had just carried out au amphibious
copters, after carrying out specific mis- assault.” It is apparent that this type of
sions, land in the gi-oupings of the raiding operation is ideafly suited for air assault
or maneuvering troops. There they are brigades. The parachute battalions can be
serviced and replenished and they return inserted either by airdrop or helicopter
to battle operating jointly with the rsid- landing, with the BMD batttilons landing
ing and maneuvering forces. . .‘“’ shortly thereafter.
Of the three proposals, the last is the Indeed, it is more and more Iikely that
preferred choice. To successfully imple- sir landing, with its shortened time in the
MILITARY REVIEW
landing area, not airdrop operations may Figure 4 shows an example of the use of
be the preferable method of air aesault airborne forces to seize several crossing
force insertion. Lieutenant General N. cites on a breakthrough force’s axis of ad-
Pavlenko, VD V chief of staff, notes that vance, as well as a deeper insertion to
the primary goaf for sirborne forces is to delay enemy reserves. With the exception
“shorten the time needed by units (regi- that a heliborne assault would probably
ments) and subunits (battrrfions and com- be employed today for the first objective,
panies) to prepare for lending and combat this is a very representative schematic of
operations.’”4 And, lest one believe he is how air assault brigadee might be used in
only referring to airdropped forces, eupport of an OMG or any exploitation
Pavlenko emphasizes that “in the name of force.”
;.
our force Vozdushno-Desan tnyye Voyska
the word ‘parachute’ is missing. The
future of tirborne operations looks more Unanswered Questions
impressive than the present.’”5 BY this,
Pavlenko seems to imply an equally im-
portant role for both airlanded and air- The air aesault brigade, psrticulwly in
dropped forces. With the airlanding of air combination with OM Gs, and its pot en-
assault forces either by helicopter or tiaI uses are impressive. But it is impor-
transport aircraft, a significant reduction tant to emphasize that a number of ques-
in deployment time is achieved. As to tions need to be answered before a full
feasibility under combat versus interven. understanding of ite intended employ-
tion conditions, Soviet airborne forces ment is attained. As Donnelly points out
cenied out 20 separate sirborne assault about OMGS, while the concept has been
operations during the 1945 Manchuriarr adopted by Soviet military plannere, the
CrnnpaiFY-afl were airlanded$c implementation details have not been re-
There are, of course, other m&hods of solved.’a Much the same can be said of air
inserting air assault brigade elements assault brigades.
which would take advantage of the per- Soviet military literature has extolled
sonnel’s airborne skills, and there are the past and prospective value of air- ,
situations where air-landing operations borne/air assault forces, both in generaf
are not possible. Any of a number of prac- and in relation to OMGS. However, it hae
tical variations exist. For example, air- not been specific about which kinds of
borne elemente maybe dropped to estab- operations are the most important for air
tish a bridgehead at a river-crossing site assault brigades or the mechanics of their
for the OM G‘s forward detachment with a execution. Indeed, without open acknowl-
follow-on drop of BA4D units for support edgement of their existence, and, in light
if linkup ie expected to take some time. Or of the continuing evolution of the OMG
the BA4D-equipped units could be concept, it is probable that there are no
dropped at a greater depth to secure Soviet answers to these questions at the
snother crossing site rdong the OMG’s present time.
axis of advance. The greater survivability Certainly, the missions and possible
of these units would permit them to per- tactics of air assault brigades outfined
form these missions more readily than previously are within unit capabilities and’
strictly parachute or heliborne assault are based on either tbe resuk.s of exercises
forcee. or a careful reading of Soviet military
32 October
.,
Schematic of How Air Assault Brigades Might Be Used
-5.
Q
legend:
c1
AL
ID
Ikw3tmal
Cmnmrtmen!
Am,
I“f,”tq
Corm
dw,ston
mrborne Lmdmg
literature. That listing of missions and meters end a troop capacity of 40.’g
schemes of maneuver, however, is an ag- Although the theoretical front lift capa-
gregate-air assault brigades would not city appears large, it is, in fact, much
be able to carry out every mission simul- smrdler. The front end army assault heli-
taneously or consecutively in a short con- copter regiments primarily provide fire
flict. This suggests that, as the Soviets ac support and are used for troop transport
quire more experience in the employment only when available. The fron t‘s main lift
of these brigades, certain priority mis. eupport comes from the transport heli-
sions and operationrd profiles should copter regiment. The regiment’s Mi-6
precipitate out of this aggregate-as will Hook heavy lift squadrons are, as a rule,
problems with their execution. used to move artillery, armored vehicles,
What are the problem areas and vulner- heavy equipment, and so forth which, in
abilities of air assault brigades with which practice, reduces the fronr’s lift capability
the Soviets could be expected to cope? to the Mi-8 Hip medium lift squadrons
First and foremost is the problem of lift. and the An-26 Curls. Currently, it is
Figure 5 illustrate the helicopter lift assessed that a front “s organic helicopter
capability normally available to a front or assets can move only a 500-man force in a
army. In addition, there are approxi- single lift.’”
mately 11 light transport aircraft in the As is evident from these figures, a front
front’s TAA–normally the An-26 Curl currently does not have the organic assets
which has a range of 900 to 2,250 kilo- to simultaneously move large elements of
L,
1983 33
MILITARY REVIEW
Soviet
“The M, 26 Halo A armeared m 1978 as the M, 6 replacement The M,.6 can carrv 1 B!#O, The MI.26 can carry 2 BMDs
and 1 BMP
Helicopter Units—Front/Army
“Secondary role IS troop transport, primary rnlsslons are attack/fire support [Hind D) or antdank (H!nd-E)
““Normal{y, one squadron fs ttansport-oriented (HIP C), whale the other IS attack/f!re suppoti-ortented (HIP Q
Not,,
Assault h,l,coder re~,mmt, may be ,It,th,d to ,,.,,, ,, m,ded but ,,, n,! ,,ta”,, to tank m mmb,md arms ,,.,,% by Iabl,, .1 or~a”$zat,m md
W“wne”!
1l,l! wabll! b,, ,r, ,,;cu IXM ,, Ih,,, theoretlc?lly w,,,bl, 1“ ,,l”,! ,1? Ilft w!8bllIt+,$ ,r, much 10.,,. ,%”I!!w fro. wI,,., .,ss,0” (,1!,,1 “,,$”$
,ra,wor,, OW,,,Q,,I ,,,$1, W,,, ,,w,x,m,tel” 80 wce”ti md Other .,ss,0” ,wJ,rem,”t,
Figure5
34 October .
AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES
to deploy a battalion task force, hard Central European conflict, a eimilsr con-
choices concerning mission priority would flict would be waged for control of the 106
have to be made or very careful opera- meters beneath it where helicopter forces
tionef sequence planning conducted. would normafly operate. It remains to be
Looking at the OMG concept, in partic- seen whether the Sotiets would be able to
ular, with its implicit high operational consistently project helicopter nir sup
dynamics and compressed time frame, it port in operational depth for OMGS and
seems likely that the front commander attached units which will be deployed
would eventually receive additions lift over substantial dietsnces in the enemy’s
assets to enable him tc mount additional rear.
operations in support of his army OMGS. Warsaw Pact OMG advocates have al-
This can be done in either of two ways. ready acknowledged that the expected
The front tir assault brigades may be “ sizeable loss rate among helicopters”
directly supported with heavier lift eir- supporting OMGs “seems to hea funds- “
craft for BMDs by Soviet military trans- mental factor when deciding the cppacity
port aviation or uoyenno-transportnaya of the ~ound forces to operate in the
auiatsiya (VTA) units, or front TAAs depth of the enemy formations. ““ This
might be augmented with additional heli- factor may indeed be the fulcrum on
copterhransport aircraft units. which rests the operational success of
The second option would seem more at- failure of OMGS supported by sir assault
tractive if only to reduce the coordination brigades.
problems created by the first option. A third question or factor srisingefrom
Further, if, in fact, sir assault brigades sir assault brigade operations in. support
were created to give tbe fi-on t commander of 0.!4 Gs is command and control. Air
an organic force to influence action deeper assault brigade elements would probably
in bis operational zone, it would only be be assigned in support of armies’ rfivi-
logical that he afso receive organic means sionef OMGS hy the front commander.
for employing it. ~ Further, the front would alao have to alln-
A second, somewhat related factor, cer- cate airlift support for each detached air
tain to affect air assault brigade opera- assault unit elthougb an army might he
tions in support of O.MGS, is air support— able to provide its own fire support if an
in tbe sense of fire eupport and aerial assault helicopter regiment is attached.
resupply. As noted previously, the exten- The planning and coordination problems
sive use of helicopters is envisioned by spanning these echelons of command are
SOviet/tt’srsaw Pact military arrafysts as obvious, but these would be exacerha:ed
a means for providing the fire support in even further by the distances separating
depth that ie vital to the eurvivaf of them.
OMGS and their attached air assault While initisf operational planning end
elements, as well as the resupply of these execution might be successful,~ aubee-
units. Proposed support schemes include quent operations would unavoidably be
temporarily basing helicopter units in the planned and conducted in a fluid end
enemy’s rear area to better assist units rapidly changing combat environment.
operating there. This is ambitious, if not Divisional OMGS, if successful in pene-
audacious, planning to say the least. trating NATO’s operational defense zone,
Even as the sir battle rages above 100 would be attempting to coordinate and
meters’ attitude for control of the sky in a direct the operations of their forward de-
1983 35
1
MILITARY REVIEW
36
,.
AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES
NOTES
, D,cfm”.ry “f B,,>. M,r,,.ry Term, CA Sow.{ V,,WL S.LW,” OPerat! O”, .0..5 ”.,,0 a, d,,,,,.” ,,”,, and lower The SW.!
WIIO.”1OI Documents, uSGOvernm,nl Prrnfr”g Otl,ce, Wa,h,nQ rm!wlq uses an ,Iltemlea!al estage, Iheoperat,ormt 1.,,1, govern.
10”, DC, 1965 067 l.the Sov,elm,l$tar, !ex,con, Oesan,.r,,l.”d t“g the act,.”. of },0.,s .“$ arm,., and, .! lb,, level, Places ,t. em
mg ,.,.,$, ,, Oer, ”ed ,, -troop, ,“lended ‘., ,Mnd,r,g, C,, Wh,ch ph.,,. for tile , . . . . ..!.$ a.hteveme”l of Strateg,c goal$
thaw ,!?.,0” ,ana’ea. 0. enemy.o.c.!ya temtory. m, me p“qm,e 31 C N Do.”elly, ,TheSo,,etO Pe,al,.n,lM anoe””,eG,ouP 6
(JI cons.ct,ng combat .0.,.,,.”s Accocd, ng to lhe tm.,tmr, New Challe”.e 10, NATO.’, !.,erne,,.na! Defense Re.,em. Vol.rne
me!hod”,ed, a,and!”g force ma” beamp.!b,ou, a,rt,oroe 0,.orn 15, Number i 1982, PP 1,177.86 (RePrm@d m M,i!ta,y R,”,,w,
b,ned a“daCC0rG2.0 10ZtSS’a$, ,”QO”rDOSe sue. alorcemavbe March ,983, DD4360 ) U“!es. otherw,,e “01,0, the ,ema,ntier .1 the
Watwy. ODwat>m:t
m lactwa , Omcussmn ,s essentr.lty . s.mmary 01 hey pojmslrom ttv sex.
2 The term a,r .S,,UH !m$gade ,s ,t,,mly of Wesler”.r< g,. .,1 lent am<!,
rel,ect!.rja we,,ern u”der,,and!.g el, ”.s,zeand q.,umed,ole ,! 12 Q",.k,y,, ,"these.set nattneS ov,et, mus,dest,oye"ouSh
IS “.? ,“”W. ho. ,., so”!.!.,,1,>tomes,.“!1s o, NATO, “.c,.3a, w?aPon,, del$”eW SySlem. a”d Pert,”e”t corn.
3 I“ Sov Ief mact,ce I., Meat<.” of brmad, .“G ..,.. s,,, mend ,“6 .0”[,0, “.,worx 10 make tile,, “s.. ,“1,?.s,5). before
..8$s .tth Ihal s!xctft nomenclature c% ritwwly mm such ““.1,,, ,.1..,. ,. .I,thor,zed .4. Donnelly go,”t. .“1, NATO
mga”!zalso.s .S”a!ly Wveellk?r . 9!3,, !11,Wogramcalm!s s!.” Iea.ae.s nave categoncai!y smwa mat m.y WII! c.m.w f,ght wtm
m area 01 r,sm..!ill!!y or can m., a SD.. !*IC COrmal rmsslo. .o.vermonai mea.ons foF.,f,ve.o r,,alew,,oaYs 11x$ mes.mablv
f.?, e.a”’.le .,1., ” W. Sowel $.,,. SNuc!.re .!, ,ewe!.1 .!, W,*W” m,$tmetramet hatIhesovret.wilt.rwtllnot ammlmh
mob,le .3s,..!, Lwqade. .h<’h We O@Olo”ed !“ “IOU”,., ”.., thetr goals See Donnelly ‘The S.,,.1 Opem.tmn.a! Manoe”vre
bord.r rewon, 01 the USSRSU!lgest, ng .Wograoh,. ally relatea Gro.v ANew C..!! engelor NATO,,l nrernat,..atD efenseRe.!ew,
m!, s!on OP c,, , DPl,177a”dl ,181,
4 Th,, Oe.lo,ment “alter” ,, ““I neces,.r,ly .“”s”,! as yet 13 BYdef,.$t,on, fflhe Sovtetleadecs bel!eve survr,;&.ann0lbe
The S.,,,, Gr.uDs .1 For.,. ,GOFS1, ,Parlx.u!.cw ,. East Germany, a.h,evea they wII not attack ..!,$ It ce. tm
We$tern ena Far Eastern M$l$tarb D,str,ct$ lMD.l. .orma11vrece,.e 14 00.”. i, Y.., Tbe SOvt.tOD.rattO. aIM8R0..vG,01DlD AN.w
l,mt pt,.r,?, . ..eweIDmentan dUd!t$t$ generally !.that”orm II. C!m!lenge for NATO: Intem.tm.al Defense Rewew .D .,1, P
h.$,ov, r a>r as.a.lt br,gade. are “01 subseck,enlly clePlow?d 1,179
t.roug”o.t lb, oI!w? MD, $“ the uSSR ?.$. would s.gge,, a 15 10$. .3,78<
s.ec,l,c ope!al!onal role v!sa.v,s NATO forces 16 ,O,d, P1,183
5 The We.,,,. ,healer of war or ,,.,, .0,”, ,lVl, O”.8,t, d 17 Ma,or Gem?rall Kr. oche”ko ,S.osobvR a.vtt!vaUsDekh.v
,P.erfl,
{7vD0
!t!eat.r, of nil, s,aryom-flt!onsor
P?e. umanly, tke Western TVhe.
,ea,r”o,e”n,hh
at lea9t tree
tie”s,v(”
TVDS the
@Pr.t,.~oy
Meklm(,,mva”ny,h
Gmme S;,.m Te.,ri.vkfi “AW.
Ko,Pu..,,
fa..ovYM I
Vowmokfoncheshw Zh.rnal
Western (NATO central reg,onl It!, N.,ttweste, n ,S.andtna,, an iMtl,tarv Hfsrorrc.l Jo.r..n, J.ly 1981, P20
Cou.tr, em ..0 me Sou$htiemler. (Turkey, Greece, 11.1? and me 18 Me,., wo,ctecn Mtctlalak, Av,at,o” ,“ 1., Ra,a Maneuvar
Medt,er,a.can) F“! f,,rt”er ,nlorm.a,o” on Sov,et TV, . . . TvD 00.,, !,.., of Ground %!.,s,’, P.i#.h A,< f.,., .“.s A,, &fe”Se
CO”, IW1. .ePDe”n,. M Rmg So,rel w.wfmIe Command anCI Con. ftev,ee, February ?982 P 1 c,,edby Do”nell), ,TheSo.,e!Ooe,a.
,,., [..!” ,0. ., ,,, ,,,,, Defense Conlm,,,ee ,/7, s,..,., 1$...1 Ma.oe..re Group A New challenge for NATO l.ter”a
7,..,??, s 0, w,, 8.(7 rhea, e,, .fM, ?l,.9ry 00,,,,,0., A,, ““,”,,. ,>ona, De fe”,e Re.,ew w c,, , D 1,182
,$1, Max. ell A,r ForcenBa,e Ala ?976 19 Colonel N K,reye” .nd 0310”.1 Don,yenko, ..fz OP”fa
6 7..., erqa”,,atm”al ,..,1, nave DeP”ex!racleO trOm COOr t?,, ,.”0 Pr!menenwa Peredo””k h OtIVadov T.”” ovwh ,Mek lmmz,
a!natq malt Fwlo Ma.. al IFVI 10023 Sowel .41m, T,00Ps ro.annwh) %JW..SOV,, voye””o lslor,cheskw Zh.ma! (M:lrtary
llrganr,aton a“. fquvmm”, Department of the Arr”, W.,h, ng H)s,or?’al Jo.r”zO, Seotember 1982, P 2S
ton DC 1982 DD4180..O4I88 20 M.rm.lo LOW ,BoyevoveP r,mene.,YeB ro.elanNovYkhl
7 ,. ,,,”’ - d ,... ..1. ..,1,,, ,0,,. m,,,>,,, ,., .,,10 t, ,tde.tia”?z, ro.. ”n”kh VOysk., Vo,mm Istor<ches,,y Zhurn. t
ne.rr. 3 to 1 S,. Ma, or MIct’a.l Cr.tcher. The S0,,,1 A,rborne lM81#tam Hrsr.rtcal Jo.r.an November %982. .48
D,.,,,.. He.,e. 01’ the SovCeI GrO. ”0 Forces Defense 1“ 2? Kr.p.henko, Wwsiby RamWa Uspb.ha . ODeratwnoY
I. 11,LI, ”c, AQency ,DIA), *ash, ”gto”, DC, March <980, D 3 Gluome Smm, TankcWhhArmK Ta.kovykh, Mekh.n,2rrava..yk.
8 see Co.ra,nat, nc Draft FM 10023 SOWW
Arm, rroom voye.no lsmr!chestuy Zh.rn.l owmt.ry Hrslonc.i
Orqdn<,ata *.U Cwir”en,, 0. C!! p. 192 P.e.m. sly SO. (,S ::%”’:P c,, P 13 Both K, UC,Che”kO .“fl K,r,y,” and
.!rbOrn@d,v!$ O”. had””. 8MDw.!M,”l. ”OIW’J LMrschutererm Don venko [see foom.te 191 ,mdcate 40to 50 kdorneters !9., day as
men,, M,” .“,, .“. Bf,4D COmt,a-ny each W,,.!” ,“. D.., few standard .ava..e fates, but they m.. note. baseo on worm War II
year., all %“!.t .,rOOr”, 0,”’.,0., .8”, been t,.”, !t,O”, ”Q Io P.” emer,ence, mat rates .pto80t090 k$lom.ters Der aay may be
al! BMD. .,,,on., con,, gu, a,!on The BMDamDh!OrO”, a,rbOr”, !” feasible
Ia.lry COmb.i?eh,Cle W., f,r,t l“trOduced l”tO!he SOvlet ,,<bOr”, 22 Donnelly, ’TheSov,etO oerat,o.alM a.oeuvreGroup ANe*
Ior,esa, least ase,, !ya, 1970 wbenob3eme0, nExerC&3e DVlNA Challenge for NA1O,. lnrern. t!onal Defense Rewe.. 09 Cit., D
ProDer,, ,ons,.ered, ”ea, rborne forces ve,s!.nof t.e BMP!”fan ,,77
twcornbat.ehc,e ,t,se9.,ccea *$tha73mm m.,. 9 . . . ..tkta.k 23 1.9,0, D1,183
rms$, !e ,,.. ,,,, and ,“reemacn!”eq. ns !Kwe!gh, 75nletr!c!Qns, 24 Kr.c!chenkO, Sposoby R.?tmya UsPekha . Oper.twnoy
,s arr o,oPP.01. anG can s.rm US!ng the .ater,et system Olher Gr.bmes,lamti la.kovvkh Army. Ta.kovvhh !Mehhan,zrro.a.. yKh
BMDva, #ant, ”,, u.ec Omm.”da”OCO”7r01 ma#”E”a”ce,”!JDO. Korcmso, voyenno ls(ortcheskry zh.r.al Wf,l,t,ary H!s!orrcal
and a r.ce”r ,erslon ,0. IDD,O w!,. a 30mm .umma,, c ,,.”.” $“ Jo.r.z%oD o, D20 Theterm for.irborne oratrassa.l! forces
,,.. .+ ,“, 7hVn gun mat Krulmhenk. uses $. vozti.shno aes..lnwe Vo?sk.. which
9 Thela.t kro*ncomPletea .raropo faSo.feta $rBornea, v,s,o. ,I,eral,y ,ra”slated m Russ,,” m.,”, %wr].nd,ng fo,ces. Th!s
m exercme play occurred during Exercise DvINA ,. 1970 sm.. term has commonly been tra.st.teo t“ Western merat.re on SOvmt
men, ,. mamr Sov,et exe!c, ses such as SHrELD 76, BROFHER m,litar, o.eratro.s as,. a!rbornelor.es ,, Throughout th!sart,.le. in
HOOD iN4RMS80a.a2APAD87 .Lrborne reg, mentshavepart$c, vt’aw O; me deployment of .,, assault brrgades,-t!us term, when en.
Da,,. For a“ ,..,l ,’+”, summary.” Postwar Sov, et ,,rbomeexec co. n!ereo m S..,.! sources, has been transmteo to reflecl the
C!S.S see Rlc.ara Oden and Frank Ste!.ert TheSov!et A!rborne greater number of operational .ar,at,o”s rmpltc,t m atrlandt.g
T,00L,s, /7,,,,,+ .1 ,., s.,,,, 0, . . . . force, DIA Washs”gto” forces rather than lust slmmy a$rborne forces
DC Va!ch 1980 cm 517 For a .W.IO,W,I LIe”eh3PrlIe”t of alr 25 Mwha!eh, Avtat,on m the ReCa Mwm.vw Operations of
lands.. iorces m ,Oz..s.nouewnmvve VOVSN. IVDW from the Gro."a Force$,,P ol,shA,rF orcea.dA,rD eFenseRe.rew.o P CIt,
SOV-,et-PerSDeCt, Ve, See Ma, Or Ge”eral’~ KO,iyle”. Sfanovden8 ye! Ilp 54
eezv, t,ve voW. sh.o DesantnW Voysh,., Vorenno lstorlcheskw 26 CoIo.el N Rama.,chev. R.zvlt#veTe .rlvlPr aht!k#Bovevovo
Zh.rn.l lM$l,farv wrsfo,,cal Journal), SeDlember 1975, PP8085 Pr,me.e”, Ye vozti.shfio Desa.tnYkh Voysk Mezfi.ovennyy
10 1. SOV, P! mmtmy art there lsama!or lntermed,ate levelb+ Perma, Voyen.o.fsfor(chesksy Zhur.al tMIIIlarY Wstorlcar Jo.r
1*.en Wat. gy . . .. WX3SS..9 m,l,tary cmeratmns at the global,.. “Wl, October 1982, D72
t,on.1 .! meater 1...1 and fa.ucs enmmnpaswq those combat 27 LCe.@nant General V Rezntche. ho, ,Razvltlye lam?!
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