in the Caribbean:
A Rethink of Maritime Policing, Coastal Guarding
and the Role of ‘Joined –up’ Intelligence.
The regional defence and police units have traditionally focused their skills
and equipment acquisition programs on the basis that Search and Rescue
and littoral patrols along their respective coast lines is their mainstay.
While the US has advocated SAFEPORT as a new law that covers its
containerized security requirements , the Caribbean does not benefit from
those stringent requirements nor do the countries which receive illegally
containerized contraband, benefit from having 100% point of origin
scanning legislation in place. Even if it was in place affording the scanners
is not at the top of the list of priorities of the majority of countries in the
Caribbean archipelagic chain.
Small Craft Littoral transhipment vs. Large Vessel Transit and
Offshore Asset Incident Response
Given the increasingly acknowledged trend that narcotic and other illegal
substances are transported via the seaways between the islands to the
European and US continents via container then it would seem that the
predilection in the region to focus on small craft transhipment and small
craft delivery is clearly displaced in proportion to what is actually
circulating via other transhipment means. It would appear given this news
that we are only stopping the very, very TIP of the proverbial iceberg
using current methodology.
This paper seeks to establish that the role of the maritime policing units
should expand further from the traditional role currently in operation to
include routine search or inspection of cruise, cargo and energy transport
vessels and regular patrols and visits to offshore energy assets.
This does not involve stopping and delaying vessels in their routine
transits necessarily but it does involve training teams in the special skills
required to do these activities should the day arise when an incident is
unfolding. Visible deterrent is deterrent enough. We don’t develop
expertise in doing a task successfully by doing it once when the world’s
eyes are on us and a live incident is unfolding.
Almost all the regional defence and maritime police forces think
exclusively in terms of littoral drug interdiction operations. Even with
Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad: the three more established countries with
Maritime defence presence of note there is, at best only limited
consideration of blue water capability beyond the shoreline. As a
consequence of this there is limited if any ability to RESPOND to Large
vessel transit threats , which, on balance have a far greater potential to
disrupt the economies and well being of the region.
In the recent past the levels of co-operation achieved with the assistance
of the US in particular were commendable. Today, however, should an
incident occur-the US viewing the region via ROTHR and other
technology, and the co-ordination of all the assets put together from JIATF
will not assist the ability of the local maritime defence forces to
RESPOND in a timely manner to either intelligence or an incident, in their
water, particularly if it falls outside the two mile zone which local maritime
policing units predominantly inhabit. Seeing and knowing about a
potential incident will not address the problem of dealing with it.
The question remains: have the regions’ maritime defence and policing
bodies hardened their response capability? The question involves joint
and multi jurisdictional input and action teams.
These considerations are hard enough within one unit but in a multi-
national context the challenge is immense.
New systems are currently being put in place to ensure that intelligence is
focused and operations driven. Intelligence fusion is coming of age in the
region with the very real and commendable prospect of meaningful, hard
intelligence sharing but without appropriate RESPONSE the end result of
good intelligence becomes the same as no intelligence.
The sudden increase in crime statistics in the last two years, fed in part by
a process of repatriation and rendition of criminals by the US to the
region has necessitated a fast learning curve and created new and
complex challenges which the established and newer law enforcement
agencies have had to meet head on.
Given the realities of the world we live in, consideration has to be given to
the co-ordination and communication issues that actioning good regional
joint intelligence product requires. Moving beyond the requirements of
drug interdiction and the role played by continent destined containerised
cargo; the real threat of an incident involving an LNG, LPG, oil tanker or
cruise ship in the region requires attention. The effects of spill, collision,
explosion, grounding or terrorist attack have disastrous potential for the
region.
The evacuation cost alone has been put at 1million UK pounds. Timely and
appropriate response to a similar incident in the Caribbean, hoax or not
could not even be entertained. The mission critical equipment and assets
simply do not exist. The knock on financial effect, hoax or not, would be
immense.
Such news is not good news to the 365 rigs actively exploring for oil and
natural gas in Latin America and the Caribbean in January 2008. These
rigs are broken down into two categories - 288 rigs are exploring for crude
oil and 72 for natural gas. An incident along this chain could potentially
affect many of these.
Is the region equipped with specialist energy security fast reaction teams?
Does the region have cruise ship fast response teams drilled in confined
space, high contact density operations? Do we have practised platform
and chemical tanker boarding specialists?
Unlike other seaways and with the single exception of the Malacca Straits
an incident in the sea lanes of the Caribbean would impact upon a large
number of sovereign countries located in the archipelago. Over twenty
countries are located in close quarters, along the main shipping routes.
The jurisdictional issues alone would cripple a response if not agreed in
advance.
Contingency planning and regional drilling for counter action teams for
cruise ships and rapid response offshore energy asset incident teams
should be a priority in the region. Currently, it is not.
To this end intelligence led planning that is multi-national in its origination
and regionally relevant is vital in strategic response preparation for
incidents that are potentially multi-national in scale.
Littoral and blue water EEZ patrol assets should regularly work along side
each other. Regular secondments to regional units spread expertise and
experience and broadens the knowledge of individual officers. Regular
regionally focused meetings and outreach engagement and briefings to
the shipping community encourages easy communication and intelligence
gathering for law enforcement.
How long would it take 20 countries and all their agencies to talk to one
another to deal with a hijacked cruise ship or LNG tanker transiting
midway between St Lucia, Barbados, St Vincent, Grenada and Tobago?
What kind of immediate pre-co-ordinated, multi-national response could
be possible?
The basic rule for preparedness applies: The more unlikely the event, the
softer the target, the more attractive the potential atrocity and or
disastrous consequences of planned attack, human error, mis hap or
natural disaster. The incident’s occurrence is often out of our control all
we can do is be prepared and practiced just in case.