Information Warfare: What does Information as a Weapon look like

when applied Beyond the Bubble of Madison Ave.?

James Michael Iddins

Valparaiso University

“Since trade ignores national boundaries and the manufacturer insists on having the world for a

market, the flag of his nation must follow him, and the doors of the nations which are closed

against him must be battered down…even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in

the process.”

-Woodrow Wilson, 1907

“…Information is now the most important element of power because it is the most transferable.

The ability to transfer the power of information is what makes it so useful in the current political

situation.”

–Joint Command Information Warfare School

 2

The above quote, taken from a publication used in training the information-oriented

component of the US-based Military Industrial Complex’s “defense” brigade1, illustrates a

phenomenon that has emerged alongside “first world” trends in advertising and public relations –

information as a weapon or information warfare (IW). Susan Brewer, in her historical account of

domestic American wartime propaganda, states, “In their messages, officials have used appeals

to emotion and self-interest calculated to resonate with public opinion as they perceived that

opinion” (8). After reading Brewer's book, I felt that surely this must be the case in the Military

Industrial Complex’s (MIC) approach to foreign policy as well. I began to wonder what this

“perception management” looks like when applied abroad. In this report I will briefly examine

the inner workings of one division in the above-mentioned Joint Command - ARMY

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). First, I will put this growing MIC trend into context, and

then I will answer the question “What does information as a weapon look like when applied

abroad, specifically in the instance of PSYOPS?”

Over the past century the efficacy of targeted information, or propaganda, on the general

public has become self-evident. It is obvious that a majority of businesses perceive this

phenomenon, hence the fact that we are now living in the “Golden Age” of advertising, where

the typing of a word on the screen issues forth advertisements based on this entered information.

This trend does not look as though it will drop off in the foreseeable future. Fundamental to this

targeting of information are the various media through which the information can be propagated

and an economic system under which these media can be utilized to the greatest extent. Benedict

Anderson, in his ground-breaking discussion of imagined communities (such as religions and

1
I say “defense” brigade because the reader should note that the Complex’s use of the word defense (which it
retains due to its connotation), while carrying out offensive imperialistic attacks is a beautiful example of the typical
doublespeak so often present in propaganda and IW.
 3

nations) calls our attention to the fact that from the very beginning of the “vernacularization” of

print media, this medium has given itself to the propagation of certain targeted ideas. Anderson

discusses how Martin Luther, aided by this “vernacularization” became “the first best-selling

author so known…opening the colossal religious propaganda war that raged across Europe for

the next century” (39-40). As Anderson shows in this example, publishers sought new markets

for better returns on their investments through capitalism. In the process, language became more

concrete. Anderson notes that “Once ‘there’, they could become formal models to be imitated,

and, where expedient, consciously exploited in a Machiavellian spirit” (45).

Throughout the past century, especially in the US, big business and big government have

shared various aspects of information power with each other. The state borrows creative

individuals, ideas, and money from private enterprise and private enterprise utilizes the state’s

higher ground and force of government to secure monopolies and new markets for itself. In fact,

it would not be an understatement to say that targeted information, or propaganda, allowed the

bigness of both these loose entities to take shape. As Public Relations man Edward Bernays put

it, “Whatever of social importance is done today, … must be done with the help of propaganda.

Propaganda is the executive arm of the invisible [economic] government” (20).

Having set the stage for this interlock, through the years, layers and layers were added to

the MCI. Different policies were developed for foreign audiences (I will only focus on one

aspect of foreign policy) versus domestic audiences. Depending on the origins of the specific

operation, it may be classified as Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Information Operations

(IO), Strategic Communications, Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Public Relations, Perception

Management and many other suggestive or elusive titles. The morphing of titles can be

witnessed in all the various government information offices, which all have or have had
 4

operations domestically or abroad, sometimes both (see appendix A for a list). This is to say

nothing of the propaganda, programming, and distraction that flows forth from Madison Ave.

and all the various media conglomerates. Very often, different departments of the government

will hire independent PR firms to market their agendas as well.

It is said, “the definition of IW and IO are still being developed and there is no single

definition available for either of them” (Kazmi & Jones, 2009). Though IW is a field clouded in

mystique, all operations that fall into this broad category tend to have an element of persuasion

or deception to them. Usually, as Brewer (8) and Bernays (Propaganda, 52) note, these come via

emotional appeals utilizing a wide variety of tools and media. Undoubtedly, there are specific

differences that shape the nature of each individual office or operation, but the larger point lies in

the fact that IW is now standard practice. As former Fulbright Scholar and USIA representative,

Nancy Snow puts it, “The crucial issue remains: whether or not the United States government

should continue to export its benign-sounding but essentially undemocratic 'market democracy'

through propaganda vehicles...” (34).

Recently I was given the unique opportunity to interview Joe Hursey, a veteran of the

U.S. Army 7th Psychological Operations Division. Though this division is a reserve unit of the

Army, it was called upon to assist the U.S. Army in virtually every major U.S. conflict in the last

thirty years. Hursey is a fascinating guy, who after 22 years in psychological operations, now

runs a charity with the aid of his wife out of their Chesterton, IN home. Their charity, Loving

House Project, travels to Vietnam a couple times a year to build homes for those in need. After

the travels and vast experience of his Army career in the employ of the “Military Industrial

Complex,” Hursey felt he should, “change the world in the little ways I can.” This sentiment

coincided with his love for the Vietnamese people, and the charity was born. As my visit
 5

interrupted his work on the chimney of a wood-burning furnace in his basement, we sat down

there and chatted for hours about his past profession, his blossoming charity, and the current

state of the U.S.

Hursey says that when he first entered the service, he simply wanted a position in

intelligence, that this was an area of interest to him. His placement officer recommended

Psychological Operations, informing him that this field was very similar in nature to intelligence.

Since accepting that position, Hursey did work in both Gulf Wars, Bosnia, New Guinea, Latin

America, Iraq, and others. He explained to me that he was on the “dissemination” end of the

process. He described how the CIA or State Dept. would employ regional experts, such as

immigrants to the U.S., in order to collect accurate and effective fact-information2 regarding

public opinion and cultural practices in the desired area. The collected fact-information would

then be organized or assembled and a strategic plan developed as to what types of weapon-

information, in the form of emotional or informational appeals, might be made to work. This

strategic plan and the necessary weapon-information would then be passed down to Hursey’s

division, which would then execute the plan, using various media as required.

Hursey noted that the types of media and propaganda to be employed in a campaign

depend very much on whether or not the MIC’s forces occupy the area inside which the

campaign is to take place. If the MIC’s forces occupied the area, more options were available to

the division, such as postering, on-site news management, and face-to-face communication. If

not, the division was limited to more distant approaches, such as leaflet bombs, TV, radio,

motion pictures, etc. If the strategic plan called for leaflet propaganda, the division would pack in

their portable presses, print the desired propaganda, and then hand these off to the Air Force,

2
I find it necessary for my purposes to distinguish between objective information, such as that collected by the CIA
for mission purposes, with information that is intended to deceive or manipulate.
 6

which would pack the leaflet bombs and handle the highly technical aspects of dispersal patterns.

If the strategic plan called for radio or television broadcasts, his division would carry out these

from helicopter via their portable broadcasting equipment. In every situation, the strategic plan

varied widely.

Hursey spoke of propaganda in terms of black, white, and grey. He explained that black

propaganda is “a lie out and out” (weapon-information), whereas white is the truth (fact-

information). Grey is “anything in between”. From our conversation, it seemed that most

emotional appeal would fall more in this grey area, moving into the black occasionally. He gave

the example of distributing leaflets in Iraq with the picture of an Iraqi family weeping at the

funeral of their soldier son. This played, not only to fears of death, but to guilt, tenderness, and

the human being's relational capacities. Examples he gave of the use of white propaganda were

the use of leaflets in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia to inform the general populace in regard to

health & safety, land-mine awareness, and the locations of various food distribution centers.

Hursey said that PSYOPS tends to stay away from religious propaganda and U.S. domestic

propaganda, although the CIA would often plant stories in foreign journals with the aim of

getting them picked up by the Associated Press (AP).

I wondered if there were some circumstances in which IW has simply been pushed too

far or is just flat out ineffective. Hursey said that this is definitely the case, citing the not-too-

distant example of Iraq. He said that having spent time in the country and around the people

there, it was obvious that the US had a certain window inside which to accomplish the mission

successfully. He described how initially the people were elated to be rid of Sadaam. He said that

once this pseudo-mission3 was accomplished, the MIC should have bowed out gracefully and let

the locals resume the fight themselves. He said that it is essential to understand their cultural
3
I say “pseudo-mission” because no one really seems to know what the actual goal was.
 7

context, specifically their religion. He said that “to them, any westerner is an infidel”. Hursey

adds that it is not realistic to think that these people would let infidels run their country. “No

amount of propaganda will change that.” It seems that the US will bankrupt itself before any

solution is reached in the region, so essentially the stated mission in Iraq will now end as a

complete flop.

It was interesting to get an inside look at the process of propagating targeted information

abroad. What struck me most was how much Hursey's account provided new insight, thus

effectively popping the Madison Ave. bubble described by Brewer, Bernays, and Tungate. I

found Hursey's distinction between the various types of propaganda very helpful in

understanding its dissemination. I am sure that as media continue to evolve we will continue to

see changes in method and delivery. After studying this topic and witnessing second hand my tax

dollars at work, I cannot help but keep coming back to a telling passage in Brewer's book:

“Randolph Bourne observed that in the modern era, all the wartime home front really needed was

the efficient cooperation of the “big men,” the industrialists and financiers. Most citizens had

only to acquiesce. They supported the war by going on with their daily lives, working and paying

taxes” (86). Though I am depressed by this thought, I find that the more I investigate, the more it

corresponds highly with reality. I am inspired by Hursey's response to the current American

situation and the madness that the MIC is perpetrating across the globe.
 8

Bibliography

Anderson, Benedict. Origins of National Consciousness. In Imagined Communities: Reflections

on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso. 1991. 37-46.

Brewer, Susan. Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the Philippines to

Iraq. New York: Oxford University Press. 2009.

Bernays, Edward. Propaganda. New York: Horace Liveright.1928.

- Crystallizing Public Opinion. New York: Horace Liveright. 1923.

Hursey, Joe. Personal Interview. 1/31/2010.

Kazmi, Zafar & Jones, Andy. The Importance of Deploying Deception Techniques in an

Information Operations Environment. In Bowdish, Proceedings of the 3rd European

Conference on Information Warfare and Security. 2010.

Snow, Nancy. Propaganda Inc.: Selling America’s Culture to the World. New York: Seven

Stories Press. 1998.

Tungate, Mark. Madison Avenue Aristocracy. In Adland: A Global History of Advertising.

Philadelphia: Kogan Page. 2007.

Appendix A – This list is by no means exhaustive

• Committee on Public Information (CPI)

• Office of War Information (OWI)
• United States Information Service (U.S.I.S.)
• United States Information Agency (USIA)
• Office of Strategic Information (OSI)
• Office of Global Communications (OGC)
• Office of Strategic Communications (OSC)
• Various offices in the State Dept., White House, FBI, CIA, and Homeland Security