Corporate Finance

Corporate Finance
B40.2302
Lecture Note: Packet 1

Aswath Damodaran

Aswath Damodaran! 1!
The Objective in Corporate Finance

If you don t know where you are going, it does not matter how you get
there

First Principles

The Classical Viewpoint

  Van Horne: "In this book, we assume that the objective of the firm is to
maximize its value to its stockholders"

  Brealey & Myers: "Success is usually judged by value: Shareholders are
made better off by any decision which increases the value of their stake in the
firm... The secret of success in financial management is to increase value."

  Copeland & Weston: The most important theme is that the objective of the
firm is to maximize the wealth of its stockholders."

  Brigham and Gapenski: Throughout this book we operate on the assumption
that the management's primary goal is stockholder wealth maximization which
translates into maximizing the price of the common stock.

The Objective in Decision Making

 In traditional corporate finance, the objective in decision making is to

maximize the value of the firm.

  A narrower objective is to maximize stockholder wealth. When the stock is
traded and markets are viewed to be efficient, the objective is to maximize the
stock price.

Maximize equity Maximize market
Maximize value
estimate of equity
firm value

value

Assets Liabilities
Existing Investments Fixed Claim on cash flows
Generate cashflows today Assets in Place Debt Little or No role in management
Includes long lived (fixed) and Fixed Maturity
short-lived(working Tax Deductible
capital) assets
Expected Value that will be Growth Assets Equity Residual Claim on cash flows
created by future investments Significant Role in management
Perpetual Lives
Maximizing Stock Prices is too narrow an objective: A
preliminary response

  Maximizing stock price is not incompatible with meeting employee needs/

objectives. In particular:

•  - Employees are often stockholders in many firms

•  - Firms that maximize stock price generally are profitable firms that can afford to
treat employees well.

  Maximizing stock price does not mean that customers are not critical to
success. In most businesses, keeping customers happy is the route to stock
price maximization.

  Maximizing stock price does not imply that a company has to be a social
outlaw.

Why traditional corporate financial theory focuses on
maximizing stockholder wealth.

  Stock price is easily observable and constantly updated (unlike other measures
of performance, which may not be as easily observable, and certainly not
updated as frequently).

  If investors are rational (are they?), stock prices reflect the wisdom of
decisions, short term and long term, instantaneously.

  The objective of stock price performance provides some very elegant theory
on:

•  Allocating resources across scarce uses (which investments to take and which ones
to reject)

•  how to finance these investments

•  how much to pay in dividends

The Classical Objective Function

STOCKHOLDERS

Hire & fire

Maximize

managers
stockholder
- Board
wealth

- Annual Meeting

Lend Money
No Social Costs

BONDHOLDERS
Managers
SOCIETY

Protect
Costs can be

bondholder
traced to firm

Interests

Reveal
Markets are

information
efficient and

honestly and
assess effect on

on time
value

FINANCIAL MARKETS

What can go wrong?

STOCKHOLDERS

Managers put

Have little control
their interests

over managers
above stockholders

Lend Money
Significant Social Costs

BONDHOLDERS
Managers
SOCIETY

Bondholders can
Some costs cannot be

get ripped off
traced to firm

Delay bad

news or
Markets make

provide
mistakes and

misleading
can over react

information

FINANCIAL MARKETS

I. Stockholder Interests vs. Management Interests

  In theory: The stockholders have significant control over management. The

mechanisms for disciplining management are the annual meeting and the
board of directors.

  In Practice: Neither mechanism is as effective in disciplining management as
theory posits.


The Annual Meeting as a disciplinary venue

  The power of stockholders to act at annual meetings is diluted by three factors

•  Most small stockholders do not go to meetings because the cost of going to the
meeting exceeds the value of their holdings.

•  Incumbent management starts off with a clear advantage when it comes to the
exercise of proxies. Proxies that are not voted becomes votes for incumbent
management.

•  For large stockholders, the path of least resistance, when confronted by managers
that they do not like, is to vote with their feet.


And institutional investors go along with incumbent
managers…


Board of Directors as a disciplinary mechanism


The CEO often hand-picks directors..

  A 1992 survey by Korn/Ferry revealed that 74% of companies relied on

recommendations from the CEO to come up with new directors; Only 16%
used an outside search firm. While that number has changed in recent years,
CEOs still determine who sits on their boards. While more companies have
outsiders involved in picking directors now, CEOs still exercise significant
influence over the process.

  Directors often hold only token stakes in their companies. The Korn/Ferry
survey found that 5% of all directors in 1992 owned less than five shares in
their firms. Most directors in companies today still receive more compensation
as directors than they gain from their stockholdings. While share ownership is
up among directors today, they usually get these shares from the firm (rather
than buy them).

  Many directors are themselves CEOs of other firms. Worse still, there are
cases where CEOs sit on each other s boards.


Directors lack the expertise (and the willingness) to ask the
necessary tough questions..

  In most boards, the CEO continues to be the chair. Not surprisingly, the CEO
sets the agenda, chairs the meeting and controls the information provided to
directors.

  The search for consensus overwhelms any attempts at confrontation.


Who s on Board? The Disney Experience - 1997


The Calpers Tests for Independent Boards

  Calpers, the California Employees Pension fund, suggested three tests in 1997
of an independent board

•  Are a majority of the directors outside directors?

•  Is the chairman of the board independent of the company (and not the CEO of the
company)?

•  Are the compensation and audit committees composed entirely of outsiders?

  Disney was the only S&P 500 company to fail all three tests.


Business Week piles on… The Worst Boards in 1997..


Application Test: Who s on board?

  Look at the board of directors for your firm. Analyze

•  How many of the directors are inside directors (Employees of the firm, ex-
managers)?

•  Is there any information on how independent the directors in the firm are from the
managers?

  Are there any external measures of the quality of corporate governance of your
firm?

•  Yahoo! Finance now reports on a corporate governance score for firms, where it
ranks firms against the rest of the market and against their sectors.


So, what next? When the cat is idle, the mice will play ....

  When managers do not fear stockholders, they will often put their interests
No stockholder approval needed….. Stockholder Approval needed

over stockholder interests

•  Greenmail: The (managers of ) target of a hostile takeover buy out the potential
acquirer's existing stake, at a price much greater than the price paid by the raider, in
return for the signing of a 'standstill' agreement.

•  Golden Parachutes: Provisions in employment contracts, that allows for the
payment of a lump-sum or cash flows over a period, if managers covered by these
contracts lose their jobs in a takeover.

•  Poison Pills: A security, the rights or cashflows on which are triggered by an
outside event, generally a hostile takeover, is called a poison pill.

•  Shark Repellents: Anti-takeover amendments are also aimed at dissuading hostile
takeovers, but differ on one very important count. They require the assent of
stockholders to be instituted.

•  Overpaying on takeovers: Acquisitions often are driven by management interests
rather than stockholder interests.


Overpaying on takeovers

  The quickest and perhaps the most decisive way to impoverish stockholders is
to overpay on a takeover.

  The stockholders in acquiring firms do not seem to share the enthusiasm of the
managers in these firms. Stock prices of bidding firms decline on the takeover
announcements a significant proportion of the time.

  Many mergers do not work, as evidenced by a number of measures.

•  The profitability of merged firms relative to their peer groups, does not increase
significantly after mergers.

•  An even more damning indictment is that a large number of mergers are reversed
within a few years, which is a clear admission that the acquisitions did not work.


A Case Study: Kodak - Sterling Drugs

  Eastman Kodak s Great Victory


Earnings and Revenues at Sterling Drugs

Sterling Drug under Eastman Kodak: Where is the synergy?

5,000

4,500

4,000

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

Revenue
Operating Earnings


Kodak Says Drug Unit Is Not for Sale … but…

  An article in the NY Times in August of 1993 suggested that Kodak was eager to shed
its drug unit.

•  In response, Eastman Kodak officials say they have no plans to sell Kodak s Sterling Winthrop
drug unit.

•  Louis Mattis, Chairman of Sterling Winthrop, dismissed the rumors as massive speculation,
which flies in the face of the stated intent of Kodak that it is committed to be in the health
business.

  A few months later…Taking a stride out of the drug business, Eastman Kodak said that
the Sanofi Group, a French pharmaceutical company, agreed to buy the prescription drug
business of Sterling Winthrop for $1.68 billion.

•  Shares of Eastman Kodak rose 75 cents yesterday, closing at $47.50 on the New York Stock
Exchange.

•  Samuel D. Isaly an analyst , said the announcement was very good for Sanofi and very good
for Kodak.

•  When the divestitures are complete, Kodak will be entirely focused on imaging, said George
M. C. Fisher, the company's chief executive.

•  The rest of the Sterling Winthrop was sold to Smithkline for $2.9 billion.


Application Test: Who owns/runs your firm?

Look at: Bloomberg printout HDS for your firm

  Who are the top stockholders in your firm?

  What are the potential conflicts of interests that you see emerging from this stockholding
structure?

Government
Outside stockholders Managers
- Size of holding - Length of tenure
- Active or Passive? - Links to insiders
- Short or Long term? Control of the firm
Employees Lenders
Inside stockholders
% of stock held
Voting and non-voting shares
Control structure

Case 1: Splintering of Stockholders
Disney s top stockholders in 2003


Case 2: Voting versus Non-voting Shares:
Aracruz

  Aracruz Cellulose, like most Brazilian companies, had multiple classes of

shares.

•  The common shares had all of the voting rights and were held by incumbent
management, lenders to the company and the Brazilian government.

•  Outside investors held the non-voting shares, which were called preferred shares,
and had no say in the election of the board of directors. At the end of 2002,

  Aracruz was managed by a board of seven directors, composed primarily of
representatives of those who own the common (voting) shares, and an
executive board, composed of three managers of the company.


Case 3: Cross and Pyramid Holdings
Tata Chemical s top stockholders in 2008


Things change.. Disney s top stockholders in 2009


II. Stockholders' objectives vs. Bondholders' objectives

  In theory: there is no conflict of interests between stockholders and

bondholders.

  In practice: Stockholder and bondholders have different objectives.
Bondholders are concerned most about safety and ensuring that they get paid
their claims. Stockholders are more likely to think about upside potential


Examples of the conflict..

  Increasing dividends significantly: When firms pay cash out as dividends,

lenders to the firm are hurt and stockholders may be helped. This is because
the firm becomes riskier without the cash.

  Taking riskier projects than those agreed to at the outset: Lenders base interest
rates on their perceptions of how risky a firm s investments are. If
stockholders then take on riskier investments, lenders will be hurt.

  Borrowing more on the same assets: If lenders do not protect themselves, a
firm can borrow more money and make all existing lenders worse off.


An Extreme Example: Unprotected Lenders?


III. Firms and Financial Markets

  In theory: Financial markets are efficient. Managers convey information

honestly and and in a timely manner to financial markets, and financial
markets make reasoned judgments of the effects of this information on 'true
value'. As a consequence-

•  A company that invests in good long term projects will be rewarded.

•  Short term accounting gimmicks will not lead to increases in market value.

•  Stock price performance is a good measure of company performance.

  In practice: There are some holes in the 'Efficient Markets' assumption.


Managers control the release of information to the general
public

  Information (especially negative) is sometimes suppressed or delayed by

managers seeking a better time to release it.

  In some cases, firms release intentionally misleading information about their
current conditions and future prospects to financial markets.


Evidence that managers delay bad news?

DO MANAGERS DELAY BAD NEWS?: EPS and DPS Changes- by

Weekday
8.00%
6.00%
4.00%
2.00%
0.00%
-2.00%
-4.00%
-6.00%
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday
% Chg(EPS) % Chg(DPS)

Some critiques of market efficiency..

  Investors are irrational and prices often move for not reason at all. As a
consequence, prices are much more volatile than justified by the underlying
fundamentals. Earnings and dividends are much less volatile than stock prices.

  Investors overreact to news, both good and bad.

  Financial markets are manipulated by insiders; Prices do not have any
relationship to value.

  Investors are short-sighted, and do not consider the long-term implications of
actions taken by the firm


Are Markets Short term?

  Focusing on market prices will lead companies towards short term decisions
at the expense of long term value.

a.
I agree with the statement

b.
I do not agree with this statement

  Allowing managers to make decisions without having to worry about the
effect on market prices will lead to better long term decisions.

a.
I agree with this statement

b.  I do not agree with this statement

  Neither managers nor markets are trustworthy. Regulations/laws should be
written that force firms to make long term decisions.

a.
I agree with this statement

b.  I do not agree with this statement


Are Markets short term? Some evidence that they are
not..

  There are hundreds of start-up and small firms, with no earnings

expected in the near future, that raise money on financial markets. Why
would a myopic market that cares only about short term earnings attach
high prices to these firms?

  If the evidence suggests anything, it is that markets do not value current
earnings and cashflows enough and value future earnings and cashflows
too much. After all, studies suggest that low PE stocks are under priced
relative to high PE stocks

  The market response to research and development and investment
expenditures is generally positive.


Market Reaction to Investment Announcements


But what about market crises?

  Many critics of markets point to market bubbles and crises as evidence that
markets do not work. For instance, the market turmoil between September and
December 2008 is pointed to as backing for the statement that free markets are
the source of the problem and not the solution.

  There are two counter arguments that can be offered:

•  The events of the last quarter illustrate that we are more dependent on functioning,
liquid markets, with risk taking investors, than ever before in history. As we saw,
no government or other entity (bank, Buffett) is big enough to step in and save the
day.

•  The firms that caused the market collapse (banks, investment banks) were among
the most regulated businesses in the market place. If anything, their failures can be
traced to their attempts to take advantage of regulatory loopholes (badly designed
insurance programs… capital measurements that miss risky assets, especially
derivatives)


IV. Firms and Society

  In theory: All costs and benefits associated with a firm s decisions can be
traced back to the firm.

  In practice: Financial decisions can create social costs and benefits.

•  A social cost or benefit is a cost or benefit that accrues to society as a whole and not
to the firm making the decision.

–  Environmental costs (pollution, health costs, etc..)

–  Quality of Life' costs (traffic, housing, safety, etc.)

•  Examples of social benefits include:

–  creating employment in areas with high unemployment

–  supporting development in inner cities

–  creating access to goods in areas where such access does not exist


Social Costs and Benefits are difficult to quantify because ..

  They might not be known at the time of the decision. In other words, a firm
may think that it is delivering a product that enhances society, at the time it
delivers the product but discover afterwards that there are very large costs.
(Asbestos was a wonderful product, when it was devised, light and easy to
work with… It is only after decades that the health consequences came to
light)

  They are 'person-specific . (different decision makers weight them differently)

  They can be paralyzing if carried to extremes.


A test of your social consciousness:
Put your money where you mouth is…

Assume that you work for Disney and that you have an opportunity to open a store
in an inner-city neighborhood. The store is expected to lose about $100,000 a
year, but it will create much-needed employment in the area, and may help
revitalize it.

  Would you open the store?

a)  Yes

b)  No

  If yes, would you tell your stockholders and let them vote on the issue?

a)  Yes

b)  No

  If no, how would you respond to a stockholder query on why you were not
living up to your social responsibilities?


So this is what can go wrong...

STOCKHOLDERS

Managers put

Have little control
their interests

over managers
above stockholders

Lend Money
Significant Social Costs

BONDHOLDERS
Managers
SOCIETY

Bondholders can
Some costs cannot be

get ripped off
traced to firm

Delay bad

news or
Markets make

provide
mistakes and

misleading
can over react

information

FINANCIAL MARKETS


Traditional corporate financial theory breaks down when ...

  The interests/objectives of the decision makers in the firm conflict with the
interests of stockholders.

  Bondholders (Lenders) are not protected against expropriation by
stockholders.

  Financial markets do not operate efficiently, and stock prices do not reflect the
underlying value of the firm.

  Significant social costs can be created as a by-product of stock price
maximization.


When traditional corporate financial theory breaks down, the
solution is:

  To choose a different mechanism for corporate governance, i.e, assign the

responsibility for monitoring managers to someone other than stockholders.

  To choose a different objective for the firm.

  To maximize stock price, but reduce the potential for conflict and breakdown:

•  Making managers (decision makers) and employees into stockholders

•  Protect lenders from expropriation

•  By providing information honestly and promptly to financial markets

•  Minimize social costs


An Alternative Corporate Governance System

  Germany and Japan developed a different mechanism for corporate

governance, based upon corporate cross holdings.

•  In Germany, the banks form the core of this system.

•  In Japan, it is the keiretsus

•  Other Asian countries have modeled their system after Japan, with family
companies forming the core of the new corporate families

  At their best, the most efficient firms in the group work at bringing the less
efficient firms up to par. They provide a corporate welfare system that makes
for a more stable corporate structure

  At their worst, the least efficient and poorly run firms in the group pull down
the most efficient and best run firms down. The nature of the cross holdings
makes its very difficult for outsiders (including investors in these firms) to
figure out how well or badly the group is doing.


Choose a Different Objective Function

  Firms can always focus on a different objective function. Examples would

include

•  maximizing earnings

•  maximizing revenues

•  maximizing firm size

•  maximizing market share

•  maximizing EVA

  The key thing to remember is that these are intermediate objective functions.

•  To the degree that they are correlated with the long term health and value of the
company, they work well.

•  To the degree that they do not, the firm can end up with a disaster


Maximize Stock Price, subject to ..

  The strength of the stock price maximization objective function is its internal
self correction mechanism. Excesses on any of the linkages lead, if
unregulated, to counter actions which reduce or eliminate these excesses

  In the context of our discussion,

•  managers taking advantage of stockholders has lead to a much more active market
for corporate control.

•  stockholders taking advantage of bondholders has lead to bondholders protecting
themselves at the time of the issue.

•  firms revealing incorrect or delayed information to markets has lead to markets
becoming more skeptical and punitive

•  firms creating social costs has lead to more regulations, as well as investor and
customer backlashes.


The Stockholder Backlash

  Institutional investors such as Calpers and the Lens Funds have become much
more active in monitoring companies that they invest in and demanding
changes in the way in which business is done

  Individuals like Carl Icahn specialize in taking large positions in companies
which they feel need to change their ways (Blockbuster, Time Warner and
Motorola) and push for change

  At annual meetings, stockholders have taken to expressing their displeasure
with incumbent management by voting against their compensation contracts or
their board of directors


The Hostile Acquisition Threat

  The typical target firm in a hostile takeover has

•  a return on equity almost 5% lower than its peer group

•  had a stock that has significantly under performed the peer group over the previous
2 years

•  has managers who hold little or no stock in the firm

  In other words, the best defense against a hostile takeover is to run your firm
well and earn good returns for your stockholders

  Conversely, when you do not allow hostile takeovers, this is the firm that you
are most likely protecting (and not a well run or well managed firm)


In response, boards are becoming more independent…

  Boards have become smaller over time. The median size of a board of directors has
decreased from 16 to 20 in the 1970s to between 9 and 11 in 1998. The smaller boards
are less unwieldy and more effective than the larger boards.

  There are fewer insiders on the board. In contrast to the 6 or more insiders that many
boards had in the 1970s, only two directors in most boards in 1998 were insiders.

  Directors are increasingly compensated with stock and options in the company, instead
of cash. In 1973, only 4% of directors received compensation in the form of stock or
options, whereas 78% did so in 1998.

  More directors are identified and selected by a nominating committee rather than being
chosen by the CEO of the firm. In 1998, 75% of boards had nominating committees; the
comparable statistic in 1973 was 2%.


Eisner s concession: Disney s Board in 2003

Board Members Occupation

Reveta Bowers Head of school for the Center for Early Education,
John Bryson CEO and Chairman of Con Edison
Roy Disney Head of Disney Animation
Michael Eisner CEO of Disney
Judith Estrin CEO of Packet Design (an internet company)
Stanley Gold CEO of Shamrock Holdings
Robert Iger Chief Operating Officer, Disney
Monica Lozano Chief Operation Officer, La Opinion (Spanish newspaper)
George Mitchell Chairman of law firm (Verner, Liipfert, et al.)
Thomas S. Murphy Ex-CEO, Capital Cities ABC
Leo O’Donovan Professor of Theology, Georgetown University
Sidney Poitier Actor, Writer and Director
Robert A.M. Stern Senior Partner of Robert A.M. Stern Architects of New York
Andrea L. Van de Kamp Chairman of Sotheby's West Coast
Raymond L. Watson Chairman of Irvine Company (a real estate corporation)
Gary L. Wilson Chairman of the board, Northwest Airlines.

Changes in corporate governance at Disney

  Required at least two executive sessions of the board, without the CEO or
other members of management present, each year.

  Created the position of non-management presiding director, and appointed
Senator George Mitchell to lead those executive sessions and assist in setting
the work agenda of the board.

  Adopted a new and more rigorous definition of director independence.

  Required that a substantial majority of the board be comprised of directors
meeting the new independence standards.

  Provided for a reduction in committee size and the rotation of committee and
chairmanship assignments among independent directors.

  Added new provisions for management succession planning and evaluations of
both management and board performance

  Provided for enhanced continuing education and training for board members.


Eisner s exit… and a new age dawns? Disney s board in
2008


What about legislation?

  Every corporate scandal creates impetus for a legislative response. The

scandals at Enron and WorldCom laid the groundwork for Sarbanes-Oxley.

  You cannot legislate good corporate governance.

•  The costs of meeting legal requirements exceed the benefits

•  Laws always have unintended consequences

•  In general, laws tend to be blunderbusses that penalize good companies more than
they punish the bad companies.


Is there a payoff to better corporate governance?

  In the most comprehensive study of the effect of corporate governance on value, a

governance index was created for each of 1500 firms based upon 24 distinct corporate
governance provisions.

•  Buying stocks that had the strongest investor protections while simultaneously selling shares
with the weakest protections generated an annual excess return of 8.5%.

•  Every one point increase in the index towards fewer investor protections decreased market
value by 8.9% in 1999

•  Firms that scored high in investor protections also had higher profits, higher sales growth and
made fewer acquisitions.

  The link between the composition of the board of directors and firm value is weak.
Smaller boards do tend to be more effective.

  On a purely anecdotal basis, a common theme at problem companies is an ineffective
board that fails to ask tough questions of an imperial CEO.


The Bondholders Defense Against Stockholder Excesses

  More restrictive covenants on investment, financing and dividend policy have

been incorporated into both private lending agreements and into bond issues,
to prevent future Nabiscos .

  New types of bonds have been created to explicitly protect bondholders
against sudden increases in leverage or other actions that increase lender risk
substantially. Two examples of such bonds

•  Puttable Bonds, where the bondholder can put the bond back to the firm and get
face value, if the firm takes actions that hurt bondholders

•  Ratings Sensitive Notes, where the interest rate on the notes adjusts to that
appropriate for the rating of the firm

  More hybrid bonds (with an equity component, usually in the form of a
conversion option or warrant) have been used. This allows bondholders to
become equity investors, if they feel it is in their best interests to do so.


The Financial Market Response

  While analysts are more likely still to issue buy rather than sell
recommendations, the payoff to uncovering negative news about a firm is
large enough that such news is eagerly sought and quickly revealed (at least to
a limited group of investors).

  As investor access to information improves, it is becoming much more
difficult for firms to control when and how information gets out to markets.

  As option trading has become more common, it has become much easier to
trade on bad news. In the process, it is revealed to the rest of the market.

  When firms mislead markets, the punishment is not only quick but it is savage.


The Societal Response

  If firms consistently flout societal norms and create large social costs, the
governmental response (especially in a democracy) is for laws and regulations
to be passed against such behavior.

  For firms catering to a more socially conscious clientele, the failure to meet
societal norms (even if it is legal) can lead to loss of business and value.

  Finally, investors may choose not to invest in stocks of firms that they view as
socially irresponsible.


The Counter Reaction

STOCKHOLDERS

1. More activist
Managers of poorly

investors
run firms are put

2. Hostile takeovers
on notice.

Protect themselves
Corporate Good Citizen Constraints

BONDHOLDERS
Managers
SOCIETY

1. Covenants
1. More laws

2. New Types
2. Investor/Customer Backlash

Firms are

punished
Investors and

for misleading
analysts become

markets
more skeptical

FINANCIAL MARKETS


So what do you think?

  At this point in time, the following statement best describes where I stand in
terms of the right objective function for decision making in a business

a)  Maximize stock price, with no constraints

b)  Maximize stock price, with constraints on being a good social citizen.

c)  Maximize stockholder wealth, with good citizen constraints, and hope/pray that the
market catches up with you.

d)  Maximize profits or profitability

e)  Maximize earnings growth

f)  Maximize market share

g)  Maximize revenues

h)  Maximize social good

i)  None of the above


The Modified Objective Function

  For publicly traded firms in reasonably efficient markets, where bondholders

(lenders) are protected:

•  Maximize Stock Price: This will also maximize firm value

  For publicly traded firms in inefficient markets, where bondholders are
protected:

•  Maximize stockholder wealth: This will also maximize firm value, but might not
maximize the stock price

  For publicly traded firms in inefficient markets, where bondholders are not
fully protected

•  Maximize firm value, though stockholder wealth and stock prices may not be
maximized at the same point.

  For private firms, maximize stockholder wealth (if lenders are protected) or
firm value (if they are not)


The Investment Principle: Risk and Return
Models

You cannot swing upon a rope that is attached only to your

own belt.

First Principles


The notion of a benchmark

  Since financial resources are finite, there is a hurdle that projects have to cross
before being deemed acceptable.

  This hurdle will be higher for riskier projects than for safer projects.

  A simple representation of the hurdle rate is as follows:

Hurdle rate =
Riskless Rate + Risk Premium

  The two basic questions that every risk and return model in finance tries to
answer are:

•  How do you measure risk?

•  How do you translate this risk measure into a risk premium?


What is Risk?

  Risk, in traditional terms, is viewed as a negative . Webster s dictionary, for

instance, defines risk as exposing to danger or hazard . The Chinese symbols
for risk, reproduced below, give a much better description of risk

  The first symbol is the symbol for danger , while the second is the symbol
for opportunity , making risk a mix of danger and opportunity. You cannot
have one, without the other.


A good risk and return model should…

1. It should come up with a measure of risk that applies to all assets and not be
asset-specific.

2. It should clearly delineate what types of risk are rewarded and what are not, and
provide a rationale for the delineation.

3. It should come up with standardized risk measures, i.e., an investor presented
with a risk measure for an individual asset should be able to draw conclusions
about whether the asset is above-average or below-average risk.

4. It should translate the measure of risk into a rate of return that the investor
should demand as compensation for bearing the risk.

5. It should work well not only at explaining past returns, but also in predicting
future expected returns.


The Capital Asset Pricing Model

  Uses variance of actual returns around an expected return as a measure of risk.

  Specifies that a portion of variance can be diversified away, and that is only
the non-diversifiable portion that is rewarded.

  Measures the non-diversifiable risk with beta, which is standardized around
one.

  Translates beta into expected return -

Expected Return = Riskfree rate + Beta * Risk Premium

  Works as well as the next best alternative in most cases.


The Mean-Variance Framework

  The variance on any investment measures the disparity between actual and
expected returns.
Low Variance Investment

High Variance Investment

Expected Return


How risky is Disney? A look at the past…


Do you live in a mean-variance world?

  Assume that you had to pick between two investments. They have the same
expected return of 15% and the same standard deviation of 25%; however,
investment A offers a very small possibility that you could quadruple your
money, while investment B s highest possible payoff is a 60% return. Would
you

a.
be indifferent between the two investments, since they have the same expected
return and standard deviation?

b.
prefer investment A, because of the possibility of a high payoff?

c.  prefer investment B, because it is safer?

Would your answer change if you were not told that there is a small
possibility that you could lose 100% of your money on investment A
but that your worst case scenario with investment B is -50%?


The Importance of Diversification: Risk Types

Figure 3.5: A Break Down of Risk
Competition
may be stronger
or weaker than Exchange rate
anticipated and Political
risk
Projects may
do better or Interest rate,
worse than Entire Sector Inflation &
may be affected news about
expected
by action economy
Firm-specific Market
Actions/Risk that Actions/Risk that

affect only one Affects few Affects many affect all investments
firm firms firms
Firm can Investing in lots Acquiring Diversifying Diversifying Cannot affect

reduce by of projects competitors across sectors across countries
Investors Diversifying across domestic stocks Diversifying globally Diversifying across

can asset classes
mitigate by

The Effects of Diversification

  Firm-specific risk can be reduced, if not eliminated, by increasing the number

of investments in your portfolio (i.e., by being diversified). Market-wide risk
cannot. This can be justified on either economic or statistical grounds.

  On economic grounds, diversifying and holding a larger portfolio eliminates
firm-specific risk for two reasons-

(a) Each investment is a much smaller percentage of the portfolio, muting the effect
(positive or negative) on the overall portfolio.

(b) Firm-specific actions can be either positive or negative. In a large portfolio, it is
argued, these effects will average out to zero. (For every firm, where something bad
happens, there will be some other firm, where something good happens.)


The Role of the Marginal Investor

  The marginal investor in a firm is the investor who is most likely to be the
buyer or seller on the next trade and to influence the stock price.

  Generally speaking, the marginal investor in a stock has to own a lot of stock
and also trade a lot.

  Since trading is required, the largest investor may not be the marginal investor,
especially if he or she is a founder/manager of the firm (Michael Dell at Dell
Computers or Bill Gates at Microsoft)

  In all risk and return models in finance, we assume that the marginal investor
is well diversified.


Identifying the Marginal Investor in your firm…

Percent of Stock held by Percent of Stock held by Marginal Investor

Institutions Insiders
High Low Institutional Investora
High High Institutional Investor, with
insider influence
Low High (held by Tough to tell; Could be
founder/manager of firm) insiders but only if they
trade. If not, it could be
individual investors.
Low High (held by wealthy Wealthy individual
individual investor) investor, fairly diversified
Low Low Small individual investor
with restricted
diversification

Analyzing the investor bases…


Looking at Disney s top stockholders in 2009 (again)


And the top investors in Deutsche and Aracruz…


Taking a closer look at Tata Chemicals…

Tata companies and trusts: 31.6%

Institutions & Funds: 34.68%

Foreign Funds: 5.91%

The Market Portfolio

  Assuming diversification costs nothing (in terms of transactions costs),

and that all assets can be traded, the limit of diversification is to hold a
portfolio of every single asset in the economy (in proportion to market
value). This portfolio is called the market portfolio.

  Individual investors will adjust for risk, by adjusting their allocations
to this market portfolio and a riskless asset (such as a T-Bill)

Preferred risk level

Allocation decision

No risk

100% in T-Bills

Some risk

50% in T-Bills; 50% in Market Portfolio;

A little more risk
25% in T-Bills; 75% in Market Portfolio

Even more risk

100% in Market Portfolio

A risk hog..

Borrow money; Invest in market portfolio

  Every investor holds some combination of the risk free asset and the
market portfolio.


The Risk of an Individual Asset

  The risk of any asset is the risk that it adds to the market portfolio Statistically,
this risk can be measured by how much an asset moves with the market (called
the covariance)

  Beta is a standardized measure of this covariance, obtained by dividing the
covariance of any asset with the market by the variance of the market. It is a
measure of the non-diversifiable risk for any asset can be measured by the
covariance of its returns with returns on a market index, which is defined to be
the asset's beta.

  The required return on an investment will be a linear function of its beta:

Expected Return = Riskfree Rate+ Beta * (Expected Return on the Market Portfolio -
Riskfree Rate)


Limitations of the CAPM

1. The model makes unrealistic assumptions

2. The parameters of the model cannot be estimated precisely

- Definition of a market index

- Firm may have changed during the 'estimation' period'

3. The model does not work well

- If the model is right, there should be

a linear relationship between returns and betas

the only variable that should explain returns is betas

- The reality is that

the relationship between betas and returns is weak

Other variables (size, price/book value) seem to explain differences in returns better.


Alternatives to the CAPM

Step 1: Defining Risk

The risk in an investment can be measured by the variance in actual returns around an
expected return
Riskless Investment Low Risk Investment High Risk Investment
E(R) E(R) E(R)

Step 2: Differentiating between Rewarded and Unrewarded Risk
Risk that is specific to investment (Firm Specific) Risk that affects all investments (Market Risk)
Can be diversified away in a diversified portfolio Cannot be diversified away since most assets
1. each investment is a small proportion of portfolio are affected by it.
2. risk averages out across investments in portfolio
The marginal investor is assumed to hold a “diversified” portfolio. Thus, only market risk will
be rewarded and priced.
Step 3: Measuring Market Risk
The CAPM The APM Multi-Factor Models Proxy Models
If there is If there are no Since market risk affects In an efficient market,
1. no private information arbitrage opportunities most or all investments, differences in returns
2. no transactions cost then the market risk of it must come from across long periods must
the optimal diversified any asset must be macro economic factors. be due to market risk
portfolio includes every captured by betas Market Risk = Risk differences. Looking for
traded asset. Everyone relative to factors that exposures of any variables correlated with
will hold thismarket portfolio affect all investments. asset to macro returns should then give
Market Risk = Risk Market Risk = Risk economic factors. us proxies for this risk.
added by any investment exposures of any Market Risk =
to the market portfolio: asset to market Captured by the
factors Proxy Variable(s)
Beta of asset relative to Betas of asset relative Betas of assets relative Equation relating
Market portfolio (from to unspecified market to specified macro returns to proxy
a regression) factors (from a factor economic factors (from variables (from a
analysis) a regression) regression)

Why the CAPM persists…

  The CAPM, notwithstanding its many critics and limitations, has survived as
the default model for risk in equity valuation and corporate finance. The
alternative models that have been presented as better models (APM,
Multifactor model..) have made inroads in performance evaluation but not in
prospective analysis because:

•  The alternative models (which are richer) do a much better job than the CAPM in
explaining past return, but their effectiveness drops off when it comes to estimating
expected future returns (because the models tend to shift and change).

•  The alternative models are more complicated and require more information than the
CAPM.

•  For most companies, the expected returns you get with the the alternative models is
not different enough to be worth the extra trouble of estimating four additional
betas.


Application Test: Who is the marginal investor in your
firm?

You can get information on insider and institutional holdings in your firm from:

http://finance.yahoo.com/

Enter your company s symbol and choose profile.

  Looking at the breakdown of stockholders in your firm, consider whether the
marginal investor is

a)  An institutional investor

b)  An individual investor

c)  An insider


From Risk & Return Models to Hurdle Rates:
Estimation Challenges

The price of purity is purists…

Anonymous


Inputs required to use the CAPM -

  The capital asset pricing model yields the following expected return:

Expected Return = Riskfree Rate+ Beta * (Expected Return on the Market Portfolio -
Riskfree Rate)

§  To use the model we need three inputs:

(a)  The current risk-free rate

(b) The expected market risk premium (the premium expected for investing in risky
assets (market portfolio) over the riskless asset)

(c) The beta of the asset being analyzed.


The Riskfree Rate and Time Horizon

  On a riskfree asset, the actual return is equal to the expected return. Therefore,
there is no variance around the expected return.

  For an investment to be riskfree, i.e., to have an actual return be equal to the
expected return, two conditions have to be met –

•  There has to be no default risk, which generally implies that the security has to be
issued by the government. Note, however, that not all governments can be viewed
as default free.

•  There can be no uncertainty about reinvestment rates, which implies that it is a zero
coupon security with the same maturity as the cash flow being analyzed.


Riskfree Rate in Practice

  The riskfree rate is the rate on a zero coupon government bond matching the
time horizon of the cash flow being analyzed.

  Theoretically, this translates into using different riskfree rates for each cash
flow - the 1 year zero coupon rate for the cash flow in year 1, the 2-year zero
coupon rate for the cash flow in year 2 ...

  Practically speaking, if there is substantial uncertainty about expected cash
flows, the present value effect of using time varying riskfree rates is small
enough that it may not be worth it.


The Bottom Line on Riskfree Rates

  Using a long term government rate (even on a coupon bond) as the riskfree
rate on all of the cash flows in a long term analysis will yield a close
approximation of the true value. For short term analysis, it is entirely
appropriate to use a short term government security rate as the riskfree rate.

  The riskfree rate that you use in an analysis should be in the same currency
that your cashflows are estimated in.

•  In other words, if your cashflows are in U.S. dollars, your riskfree rate has to be in
U.S. dollars as well.

•  If your cash flows are in Euros, your riskfree rate should be a Euro riskfree rate.

  The conventional practice of estimating riskfree rates is to use the
government bond rate, with the government being the one that is in
control of issuing that currency. In US dollars, this has translated into
using the US treasury rate as the riskfree rate. In May 2009, for
instance, the ten-year US treasury bond rate was 3.5%.


What is the Euro riskfree rate?


What if there is no default-free entity?

  If the government is perceived to have default risk, the government bond rate
will have a default spread component in it and not be riskfree. There are three
choices we have, when this is the case.

•  Adjust the local currency government borrowing rate for default risk to get a
riskless local currency rate.

–  In May 2009, the Indian government rupee bond rate was 7%. the local currency rating
from Moody s was Ba2 and the default spread for a Ba2 rated country bond was 3%.

Riskfree rate in Rupees = 7% - 3% = 4%

–  In May 2009, the Brazilian government $R bond rate was 11% and the local currency
rating was Ba1, with a default spread of 2.5%.

Riskfree rate in $R = 11% - 2.5% = 8.5%

•  Do the analysis in an alternate currency, where getting the riskfree rate is easier.
With Aracruz in 2009, we could chose to do the analysis in US dollars (rather than
estimate a riskfree rate in R$). The riskfree rate is then the US treasury bond rate.

•  Do your analysis in real terms, in which case the riskfree rate has to be a real
riskfree rate. The inflation-indexed treasury rate is a measure of a real riskfree rate.

Measurement of the risk premium

  The risk premium is the premium that investors demand for investing in an
average risk investment, relative to the riskfree rate.

  As a general proposition, this premium should be

•  greater than zero

•  increase with the risk aversion of the investors in that market

•  increase with the riskiness of the average risk investment


What is your risk premium?

  Assume that stocks are the only risky assets and that you are offered two investment
options:

•  a riskless investment (say a Government Security), on which you can make 5%

•  a mutual fund of all stocks, on which the returns are uncertain

How much of an expected return would you demand to shift your money from the riskless
asset to the mutual fund?

a)  Less than 5%

b)  Between 5 - 7%

c)  Between 7 - 9%

d)  Between 9 - 11%

e)  Between 11- 13%

f)  More than 13%

Check your premium against the survey premium on my web site.


Risk Aversion and Risk Premiums

  If this were the entire market, the risk premium would be a weighted average
of the risk premiums demanded by each and every investor.

  The weights will be determined by the wealth that each investor brings to the
market. Thus, Warren Buffett s risk aversion counts more towards
determining the equilibrium premium than yours and mine.

  As investors become more risk averse, you would expect the equilibrium
premium to increase.


Risk Premiums do change..

Go back to the previous example. Assume now that you are making the same
choice but that you are making it in the aftermath of a stock market crash (it
has dropped 25% in the last month). Would you change your answer?

a)  I would demand a larger premium

b)  I would demand a smaller premium

c)  I would demand the same premium


Estimating Risk Premiums in Practice

  Survey investors on their desired risk premiums and use the average premium
from these surveys.

  Assume that the actual premium delivered over long time periods is equal to
the expected premium - i.e., use historical data

  Estimate the implied premium in today s asset prices.


The Survey Approach

  Surveying all investors in a market place is impractical.

  However, you can survey a few individuals and use these results. In practice,
this translates into surveys of the following:

  The limitations of this approach are:

•  there are no constraints on reasonability (the survey could produce negative risk
premiums or risk premiums of 50%)

•  The survey results are extremely volatile

•  they tend to be short term; even the longest surveys do not go beyond one year.


The Historical Premium Approach

  This is the default approach used by most to arrive at the premium to use in
the model

  In most cases, this approach does the following

•  Defines a time period for the estimation (1928-Present, 1962-Present....)

•  Calculates average returns on a stock index during the period

•  Calculates average returns on a riskless security over the period

•  Calculates the difference between the two averages and uses it as a premium
looking forward.

  The limitations of this approach are:

•  it assumes that the risk aversion of investors has not changed in a systematic way
across time. (The risk aversion may change from year to year, but it reverts back to
historical averages)

•  it assumes that the riskiness of the risky portfolio (stock index) has not changed
in a systematic way across time.


The Historical Risk Premium:
Evidence from the United States

What is the right premium?

  Go back as far as you can. Otherwise, the standard error in the estimate will be large.

Annualized Std deviation in Stock prices

Std Error in estimate = )
Number of years of historical data
  Be consistent in your use of a riskfree rate.

  Use arithmetic premiums for one-year estimates of costs of equity and geometric
!
premiums for estimates of long term costs of equity.


What about historical premiums for other markets?

  Historical data for markets outside the United States is available for much
shorter time periods. The problem is even greater in emerging markets.

  The historical premiums that emerge from this data reflects this data problem
and there is much greater error associated with the estimates of the premiums.


One solution: Look at a country s bond rating and default
spreads as a start

  Ratings agencies assign ratings to countries that reflect their assessment of the
default risk of these countries. These ratings reflect the political and economic
stability of these countries and thus provide a useful measure of country risk.
In May 2009, the local currency rating, from Moody s, for Brazil was Ba1.

  If a country issues bonds denominated in a different currency (say dollars or
euros), we can assess how the bond market views the risk in that country. In
May 2009, Brazil had dollar denominated 10-year Bonds, trading at an interest
rate of 6%. The US treasury bond rate that day was 3.5%, yielding a default
spread of 2.50% for Brazil.

  India has a rating of Ba2 from Moody s but has no dollar denominated bonds.
The typical default spread for Ba2 rated sovereign bonds is 3%.

  Many analysts add this default spread to the US risk premium to come up with
a risk premium for a country. This would yield a risk premium of 6.38% for
Brazil and 6.88% for India, if we use 3.88% as the premium for the US
(3.88% was the historical risk premium for the US from 1928-2008)


Beyond the default spread

  While default risk spreads and equity risk premiums are highly correlated, one
would expect equity spreads to be higher than debt spreads.

  Risk Premium for Brazil in 2009

•  Standard Deviation in Bovespa (Equity) = 34%

•  Standard Deviation in Brazil $ denominated Bond = 21.5%

•  Default spread on $ denominated Bond = 2.5%

•  Country Risk Premium (CRP) for Brazil = 2.5% (34%/21.5%) = 3.95%

•  Total Risk Premium for Brazil = US risk premium (in 09) + CRP for Brazil

= 3.88% + 3.95% = 7.83%

  Risk Premium for India in May 2009

•  Standard Deviation in Sensex (Equity) = 32%

•  Standard Deviation in Indian government bond = 21.3%

•  Default spread based upon rating= 3%

•  Country Risk Premium for India = 3% (32%/21.3%) = 4.51%

•  Total Risk Premium for India = US risk premium (in 09) + CRP for India

= 3.88% + 4.51%= 8.39%


An alternate view of ERP: Watch what I pay, not what I say..
January 2008

Year Dividend Yield Buybacks/Index Yield

2001 1.37% 1.25% 2.62%
2002 1.81% 1.58% 3.39%
2003 1.61% 1.23% 2.84%
2004 1.57% 1.78% 3.35%
2005 1.79% 3.11% 4.90%
2006 1.77% 3.38% 5.15%
2007 1.89% 4.00% 5.89%
Average yield between 2001-2007 = 4.02%
After year 5, we will assume that

earnings on the index will grow at
Between 2001 and 2007 Analysts expect earnings to grow 5% a year for the next 5 years. We 4.02%, the same rate as the entire
dividends and stock will assume that dividends & buybacks will keep pace.. economy (= riskfree rate).
buybacks averaged 4.02% Last year’s cashflow (59.03) growing at 5% a year
of the index each year.
61.98 65.08 68.33 71.75 75.34
January 1, 2008
S&P 500 is at 1468.36
4.02% of 1468.36 = 59.03

Solving for the implied premium…

  If we know what investors paid for equities at the beginning of 2007 and we
can estimate the expected cash flows from equities, we can solve for the rate of
return that they expect to make (IRR):

61.98 65.08 68.33 71.75 75.34 75.35(1.0402)
1468.36 = + + + + +
(1+ r) (1+ r) 2 (1+ r) 3 (1+ r) 4 (1+ r) 5 (r " .0402)(1+ r) 5
  Expected Return on Stocks = 8.39%

  Implied Equity Risk Premium = Expected Return on Stocks - T.Bond Rate
! =8.39% - 4.02% = 4.37%


A year that made a difference.. The implied premium in
January 2009

Year! Market value of index! Dividends! Buybacks! Cash to equity!Dividend yield! Buyback yield! Total yield!
2001! 1148.09
15.74! 14.34! 30.08! 1.37%! 1.25%! 2.62%!
2002! 879.82
15.96! 13.87! 29.83! 1.81%! 1.58%! 3.39%!
2003! 1111.91
17.88! 13.70! 31.58! 1.61%! 1.23%! 2.84%!
2004! 1211.92
19.01! 21.59! 40.60! 1.57%! 1.78%! 3.35%!
2005! 1248.29
22.34! 38.82! 61.17! 1.79%! 3.11%! 4.90%!
2006! 1418.30
25.04! 48.12! 73.16! 1.77%! 3.39%! 5.16%!
2007! 1468.36! 28.14! 67.22! 95.36! 1.92%! 4.58%! 6.49%!
2008! 903.25
28.47! 40.25! 68.72! 3.15%! 4.61%! 7.77%!
Normalized! 903.25! 28.47! 24.11! 52.584! 3.15%! 2.67%! 5.82%!
In 2008, the actual cash

returned to stockholders was After year 5, we will assume that
68.72. However, there was a earnings on the index will grow at
41% dropoff in buybacks in Analysts expect earnings to grow 4% a year for the next 5 years. We 2.21%, the same rate as the entire
Q4. We reduced the total will assume that dividends & buybacks will keep pace.. economy (= riskfree rate).
buybacks for the year by that Last year’s cashflow (52.58) growing at 4% a year
amount.
54.69 56.87 59.15 61.52 63.98
January 1, 2009
S&P 500 is at 903.25
Adjusted Dividends & Expected Return on Stocks (1/1/09) = 8.64%
Buybacks for 2008 = 52.58 Equity Risk Premium = 8.64% - 2.21% = 6.43%

The Anatomy of a Crisis: Implied ERP from September 12,
2008 to January 1, 2009


The bottom line on Equity Risk Premiums in early 2009

  Mature Markets: In May 2009, the number that we chose to use as the
equity risk premium for all mature markets was 6%. While lower than
the implied premium at the start of the year 6.43%, it is still much
higher than the historical risk premium of 3.88%. It reflected our
beliefs then that while the crisis was abating, it would leave a longer
term impact on risk premiums.

  For emerging markets, we will use the melded default spread approach
(where default spreads are scaled up to reflect additional equity risk) to
come up with the additional risk premium.

•  ERP for Brazil = Mature market premium + CRP for Brazil = 6% + 3.95%
= 9.95%

•  ERP for India = Mature market premium + CRP for India = 6% + 4.51%
= 10.51%


An Updated Equity Risk Premium:

  By January 1, 2011, the worst of the crisis seemed to be behind us. Fears of a
depression had receded and banks looked like they were struggling back to a
more stable setting. Default spreads started to drop and risk was no longer
front and center in pricing.

In 2010, the actual cash

returned to stockholders was After year 5, we will assume that
Analysts expect earnings to grow 13% in 2011, 8% in 2012, 6% in
53.96. That was up about earnings on the index will grow at
2013 and 4% therafter, resulting in a compounded annual growth
30% from 2009 levels. 3.29%, the same rate as the entire
rate of 6.95% over the next 5 years. We will assume that dividends
& buybacks will tgrow 6.95% a year for the next 5 years. economy (= riskfree rate).
57.72 61.73 66.02 70.60 75.51 Data Sources:

Dividends and Buybacks
last year: S&P
57.72 61.73 66.02 70.60 75.51 75.51(1.0329) Expected growth rate:
January 1, 2011 1257.64= + + + + +
(1+r) (1+r)2 (1+r)3 (1+r)4 (1+r)5 (r-.0329)(1+r)5 News stories, Yahoo!
S&P 500 is at 1257.64 Finance, Zacks
Adjusted Dividends & Expected Return on Stocks (1/1/11) = 8.49%
Buybacks for 2010 = 53.96 T.Bond rate on 1/1/11 = 3.29%
Equity Risk Premium = 8.03% - 3.29% = 5.20%

111!
2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

Implied Premiums in the US: 1960-2010

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

Implied Premium for US Equity Market

1989

1988

1987

1986

Year

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

1977

1976

1975

1974

1973

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

1967

1966

1965

1964

1963

1962

1961

1960

7.00%

6.00%

5.00%

4.00%

3.00%

2.00%

1.00%

0.00%

Aswath Damodaran!
Implied Premium

 Application Test: Estimating a Market Risk Premium

  In early 2011, the implied equity risk premium in the US was 5.20% and the
historical risk premium was 4.31%. Which would you use as your equity risk
premium?

a)  The historical risk premium (4.31%)

b)  The current implied equity risk premium (4.74%)

c)  Something else!

  What would you use for another developed market (say Germany or France)?

a)  The historical risk premium for that market

b)  The risk premium for the United States

  What would you use for an emerging market?

a)  The historical risk premium for that market

b)  The risk premium for the United States

c)  The risk premium for the United States + Country Risk premium


Estimating Beta

  The standard procedure for estimating betas is to regress stock returns (Rj)
against market returns (Rm) -

Rj = a + b Rm

•  where a is the intercept and b is the slope of the regression.

  The slope of the regression corresponds to the beta of the stock, and measures
the riskiness of the stock.


Estimating Performance

  The intercept of the regression provides a simple measure of performance

during the period of the regression, relative to the capital asset pricing model.

Rj
= Rf + b (Rm - Rf)

= Rf (1-b)
+ b Rm
...........
Capital Asset Pricing Model

Rj
= a
+ b Rm
...........

Regression Equation

  If

a > Rf (1-b) ....
Stock did better than expected during regression period

a = Rf (1-b) ....
Stock did as well as expected during regression period

a < Rf (1-b) ....
Stock did worse than expected during regression period

  The difference between the intercept and Rf (1-b) is Jensen's alpha. If it is
positive, your stock did perform better than expected during the period of the
regression.


Firm Specific and Market Risk

  The R squared (R2) of the regression provides an estimate of the proportion of

the risk (variance) of a firm that can be attributed to market risk.

  The balance (1 - R2) can be attributed to firm specific risk.


Setting up for the Estimation

  Decide on an estimation period

•  Services use periods ranging from 2 to 5 years for the regression

•  Longer estimation period provides more data, but firms change.

•  Shorter periods can be affected more easily by significant firm-specific event that
occurred during the period (Example: ITT for 1995-1997)

  Decide on a return interval - daily, weekly, monthly

•  Shorter intervals yield more observations, but suffer from more noise.

•  Noise is created by stocks not trading and biases all betas towards one.

  Estimate returns (including dividends) on stock

•  Return = (PriceEnd - PriceBeginning + DividendsPeriod)/ PriceBeginning

•  Included dividends only in ex-dividend month

  Choose a market index, and estimate returns (inclusive of dividends) on the
index for each interval for the period.


Choosing the Parameters: Disney

  Period used: 5 years

  Return Interval = Monthly

  Market Index: S&P 500 Index.

  For instance, to calculate returns on Disney in December 2004,

•  Price for Disney at end of November 2004 = $ 26.52

•  Price for Disney at end of December 2004 = $ 27.43

•  Dividends during month = $0.237 (It was an ex-dividend month)

•  Return =($27.43 - $26.52 + $ 0.237)/$26.52= 4.33%

  To estimate returns on the index in the same month

•  Index level at end of November 2004 = 1173.92

•  Index level at end of December 2004 = 1211.92

•  Dividends on index in December 2004 = 1.831

•  Return =(1211.92 – 1173.92+1.831)/ 1173.92= 3.25%


Disney s Historical Beta


The Regression Output

  Using monthly returns from 2004 to 2008, we ran a regression of returns on

Disney stock against the S&P 500. The output is below:

ReturnsDisney = 0.47%
+ 0.95 ReturnsS & P 500 (R squared= 41%)

(0.16)


Analyzing Disney s Performance

  Intercept = 0.47%

•  This is an intercept based on monthly returns. Thus, it has to be compared to a
monthly riskfree rate.

•  Between 2004 and 2008

–  Average Annualized T.Bill rate = 3.27%

–  Monthly Riskfree Rate = 0.272% (=3.27%/12)

–  Riskfree Rate (1-Beta) = 0.272% (1-0.95) = 0.01%

  The Comparison is then between

What you expected to make

What you actually made

Intercept

versus
Riskfree Rate (1 - Beta)

0.47%

versus
0.01%

•  Jensen s Alpha = 0.47% -0.01% = 0.46%

  Disney did 0.46% better than expected, per month, between 2004 and 2008.

•  Annualized, Disney s annual excess return = (1.0046)12-1= 5.62%


More on Jensen s Alpha

If you did this analysis on every stock listed on an exchange, what would the
average Jensen s alpha be across all stocks?

a)  Depend upon whether the market went up or down during the period

b)  Should be zero

c)  Should be greater than zero, because stocks tend to go up more often than down


A positive Jensen s alpha… Who is responsible?

  Disney has a positive Jensen s alpha of 5.62% a year between 2004 and 2008.
This can be viewed as a sign that management in the firm did a good job,
managing the firm during the period.

a)  True

b)  False


Estimating Disney s Beta

  Slope of the Regression of 0.95 is the beta

  Regression parameters are always estimated with error. The error is captured
in the standard error of the beta estimate, which in the case of Disney is 0.16.

  Assume that I asked you what Disney s true beta is, after this regression.

•  What is your best point estimate?

•  What range would you give me, with 67% confidence?

•  What range would you give me, with 95% confidence?


The Dirty Secret of Standard Error

Distribution of Standard Errors: Beta Estimates for U.S. stocks!
1600!
1400!
1200!
Number of Firms!
1000!
800!
600!
400!
200!
0!
<.10! .10 - .20! .20 - .30! .30 - .40! .40 -.50! .50 - .75! > .75!
Standard Error in Beta Estimate!

Breaking down Disney s Risk

  R Squared = 41%

  This implies that

•  41% of the risk at Disney comes from market sources

•  59%, therefore, comes from firm-specific sources

  The firm-specific risk is diversifiable and will not be rewarded


The Relevance of R Squared

You are a diversified investor trying to decide whether you should invest in
Disney or Amgen. They both have betas of 0.95, but Disney has an R Squared
of 41% while Amgen s R squared of only 20.5%. Which one would you
invest in?

a)  Amgen, because it has the lower R squared

b)  Disney, because it has the higher R squared

c)  You would be indifferent

Would your answer be different if you were an undiversified investor?


Beta Estimation: Using a Service (Bloomberg)


Estimating Expected Returns for Disney in May 2009

  Inputs to the expected return calculation

•  Disney s Beta = 0.95

•  Riskfree Rate = 3.50% (U.S. ten-year T.Bond rate in May 2009)

•  Risk Premium = 6% (Based on updated implied premium at the start of 2009)

  Expected Return
= Riskfree Rate + Beta (Risk Premium)

= 3.50% + 0.95 (6.00%) = 9.2%


Use to a Potential Investor in Disney

As a potential investor in Disney, what does this expected return of 9.2% tell you?

a)  This is the return that I can expect to make in the long term on Disney, if the stock
is correctly priced and the CAPM is the right model for risk,

b)  This is the return that I need to make on Disney in the long term to break even on
my investment in the stock

c)  Both

Assume now that you are an active investor and that your research suggests that
an investment in Disney will yield 12.5% a year for the next 5 years. Based
upon the expected return of 9.2%, you would

a)  Buy the stock

b)  Sell the stock


How managers use this expected return

  Managers at Disney

•  need to make at least 9.2% as a return for their equity investors to break even.

•  this is the hurdle rate for projects, when the investment is analyzed from an equity
standpoint

  In other words, Disney s cost of equity is 9.2%.

  What is the cost of not delivering this cost of equity?


 Application Test: Analyzing the Risk Regression

  Using your Bloomberg risk and return print out, answer the following
questions:

•  How well or badly did your stock do, relative to the market, during the period of
the regression?

Intercept - (Riskfree Rate/n) (1- Beta) = Jensen s Alpha

where n is the number of return periods in a year (12 if monthly; 52 if weekly)

•  What proportion of the risk in your stock is attributable to the market? What
proportion is firm-specific?

•  What is the historical estimate of beta for your stock? What is the range on this
estimate with 67% probability? With 95% probability?

•  Based upon this beta, what is your estimate of the required return on this stock?

Riskless Rate + Beta * Risk Premium


A Quick Test

You are advising a very risky software firm on the right cost of equity to use in
project analysis. You estimate a beta of 3.0 for the firm and come up with a
cost of equity of 21.5%. The CFO of the firm is concerned about the high cost
of equity and wants to know whether there is anything he can do to lower his
beta.

How do you bring your beta down?

Should you focus your attention on bringing your beta down?

a)  Yes

b)  No


Disney s Beta Calculation: An Updated Value!!

Jensen s alpha = 0.33% -

(2%/52) (1 – 1.08) = 0.34%

Annualized = (1+.0034)^52-1
= 19.30%

This is a weekly regression


Jensen s α
Expected Return

= -0.44% - 5%/12 (1-1.18) = -0.37%
= Riskfree Rate+ Beta*Risk premium

Annualized = (1-.0037)12-1= -4.29%
= 4%+ 1.18 (6%+4.51%) = 19.40%

Regression Diagnostics for Tata Chemicals

Beta = 1.18

67% range

1.04-1.32

56% market risk

44% firm specific


Beta Estimation and Index Choice: Deutsche Bank


A Few Questions

  The R squared for Deutsche Bank is very high (67%). Why is that?

  The beta for Deutsche Bank is 1.69.

•  Is this an appropriate measure of risk?

•  If not, why not?

  If you were an investor in primarily U.S. stocks, would this be an appropriate
measure of risk?


Deutsche Bank: Alternate views of Risk


Aracruz s Beta?


Beta: Exploring Fundamentals

Real Networks: 3.24
Qwest Communications: 2.60
Beta > 1
Microsoft: 1..25
General Electric: 1.10

Beta = 1
Enron: 0.95
Philip Morris: 0.65

Beta < 1
Exxon Mobil: 0.40
Beta = 0
Harmony Gold Mining: - 0.10

Determinant 1: Product Type

  Industry Effects: The beta value for a firm depends upon the sensitivity of the
demand for its products and services and of its costs to macroeconomic factors
that affect the overall market.

•  Cyclical companies have higher betas than non-cyclical firms

•  Firms which sell more discretionary products will have higher betas than firms that
sell less discretionary products


A Simple Test

Phone service is close to being non-discretionary in the United States and Western
Europe. However, in much of Asia and Latin America, there are large
segments of the population for which phone service is a luxury. Given our
discussion of discretionary and non-discretionary products, which of the
following conclusions would you be willing to draw:

a)  Emerging market telecom companies should have higher betas than developed
market telecom companies.

b)  Developed market telecom companies should have higher betas than emerging
market telecom companies

c)  The two groups of companies should have similar betas


Determinant 2: Operating Leverage Effects

  Operating leverage refers to the proportion of the total costs of the firm that
are fixed.

  Other things remaining equal, higher operating leverage results in greater
earnings variability which in turn results in higher betas.


Measures of Operating Leverage

Fixed Costs Measure = Fixed Costs / Variable Costs

  This measures the relationship between fixed and variable costs. The higher
the proportion, the higher the operating leverage.

EBIT Variability Measure = % Change in EBIT / % Change in Revenues

  This measures how quickly the earnings before interest and taxes changes as
revenue changes. The higher this number, the greater the operating leverage.


Disney s Operating Leverage: 1987- 2008


Reading Disney s Operating Leverage

  Operating Leverage
= % Change in EBIT/ % Change in Sales

= 13.26% / 13.73% = 0.97

  This is lower than the operating leverage for other entertainment firms, which
we computed to be 1.15. This would suggest that Disney has lower fixed costs
than its competitors.

  The acquisition of Capital Cities by Disney in 1996 may be skewing the
operating leverage. Looking at the changes since then:

Operating Leverage1996-08 = 11.72%/9.91% = 1.18

Looks like Disney s operating leverage has increased since 1996. In fact, it is higher
than the average for the sector.


Determinant 3: Financial Leverage

  As firms borrow, they create fixed costs (interest payments) that make their
earnings to equity investors more volatile.

  This increased earnings volatility which increases the equity beta.


Equity Betas and Leverage

  The beta of equity alone can be written as a function of the unlevered beta and
the debt-equity ratio

βL = βu (1+ ((1-t)D/E))

where

βL = Levered or Equity Beta

βu = Unlevered or Asset Beta

t = Marginal tax rate

D = Market Value of Debt

E = Market Value of Equity


Effects of leverage on betas: Disney

  The regression beta for Disney is 0.95. This beta is a levered beta (because it is
based on stock prices, which reflect leverage) and the leverage implicit in the
beta estimate is the average market debt equity ratio during the period of the
regression (2004 to 2008)

  The average debt equity ratio during this period was 24.64%.

  The unlevered beta for Disney can then be estimated (using a marginal tax rate
of 38%)

= Current Beta / (1 + (1 - tax rate) (Average Debt/Equity))

= 0.95 / (1 + (1 - 0.38)(0.2464))= 0.8241


Disney : Beta and Leverage


Betas are weighted Averages

  The beta of a portfolio is always the market-value weighted average of the

betas of the individual investments in that portfolio.

  Thus,

•  the beta of a mutual fund is the weighted average of the betas of the stocks and
other investment in that portfolio

•  the beta of a firm after a merger is the market-value weighted average of the betas
of the companies involved in the merger.


The Disney/Cap Cities Merger: Pre-Merger

Disney: The Acquirer
Debt = $3,186 million

Equity Beta Market value of equity = $31,100 million
1.15 Debt + Equity = Firm value = $31,100
+ $3186 = $34,286 million
D/E Ratio = 3186/31100 = 0.10
+
Capital Cities: The Target
Debt = $ 615 million
Equity Beta Market value of equity = $18, 500 million
0.95 Debt + Equity = Firm value = $18,500 +
$615 = $19,115 million
D/E Ratio = 615/18500 = 0.03

Disney Cap Cities Beta Estimation: Step 1

  Calculate the unlevered betas for both firms

•  Disney s unlevered beta = 1.15/(1+0.64*0.10) = 1.08

•  Cap Cities unlevered beta = 0.95/(1+0.64*0.03) = 0.93

  Calculate the unlevered beta for the combined firm

•  Unlevered Beta for combined firm

= 1.08 (34286/53401) + 0.93 (19115/53401)

= 1.026

The weights used are the firm values (and not just the equity values) of the two firms,
since these are unlevered betas and thus reflects the risks of the entire businesses
and not just the equity]


Disney Cap Cities Beta Estimation: Step 2

  If Disney had used all equity to buy Cap Cities equity, while assuming Cap
Cities debt, the consolidated numbers would have looked as follows:

•  Debt = $ 3,186+ $615 = $ 3,801 million

•  Equity = $ 31,100 + $18,500 = $ 49,600 m (Disney issues $18.5 billion in equity)

•  D/E Ratio = 3,801/49600 = 7.66%

•  New Beta = 1.026 (1 + 0.64 (.0766)) = 1.08

  Since Disney borrowed $ 10 billion to buy Cap Cities/ABC, funded the rest
with new equity and assumed Cap Cities debt:

•  The market value of Cap Cities equity is $18.5 billion. If $ 10 billion comes from
debt, the balance ($8.5 billion) has to come from new equity.

•  Debt = $ 3,186 + $615 million + $ 10,000 = $ 13,801 million

•  Equity = $ 31,100 + $8,500 = $39,600 million

•  D/E Ratio = 13,801/39600 = 34.82%

•  New Beta = 1.026 (1 + 0.64 (.3482)) = 1.25


Firm Betas versus divisional Betas

  Firm Betas as weighted averages: The beta of a firm is the weighted average of
the betas of its individual projects.

  At a broader level of aggregation, the beta of a firm is the weighted average of
the betas of its individual division.


Bottom-up versus Top-down Beta

  The top-down beta for a firm comes from a regression

  The bottom up beta can be estimated by doing the following:

•  Find out the businesses that a firm operates in

•  Find the unlevered betas of other firms in these businesses

•  Take a weighted (by sales or operating income) average of these unlevered betas

•  Lever up using the firm s debt/equity ratio

  The bottom up beta is a better estimate than the top down beta for the
following reasons

•  The standard error of the beta estimate will be much lower

•  The betas can reflect the current (and even expected future) mix of businesses that
the firm is in rather than the historical mix


Unlevered Beta
Disney s business breakdown
(1 - Cash/ Firm Value)
!
Unlevered
beta
Number of Median Median D/ Unlevered Median Cash/ corrected for
Business
Comparable firms
firms
levered beta
E
beta
Firm Value
cash

Radio and TV
Media broadcasting
Networks
companies -US
19
0.83
38.71%
0.6735
4.54%
0.7056

Parks and Theme park & Resort
Resorts
companies - Global
26
0.80
65.10%
0.5753
1.64%
0.5849

Studio Movie companies -

Entertainment
US
19
1.57
53.89%
1.1864
8.93%
1.3027

Consumer
Products
Toy companies- US
12
0.83
27.21%
0.7092
33.66%
1.0690


A closer look at the process…
Studio Entertainment Betas


Disney s bottom up beta

  Estimate the bottom up unlevered beta for Disney s operating assets.

Step 1: Start with Disney s revenues by business.

Step 2: Estimate the value as a multiple of revenues by looking at what the market value of
publicly traded firms in each business is, relative to revenues.

Mkt Equity + Debt - Cash

EV/Sales =

Revenues
Step 3: Multiply the revenues in step 1 by the industry average multiple in step 2.

  Disney has
!
a cash balance of $3,795 million. If we wanted a beta for
all of Disney s assets (and not just the operating assets), we would
compute a weighted average:

" 58,259 % " 3,795 %
Beta for Disney's assets = 0.7333$ ' + 0$ ' = 0.6885
# (58,259 + 3,795) & # (58,259 + 3,795) &

!
Disney s Cost of Equity

  Step 1: Allocate debt across businesses

  Step 2: Compute levered betas and costs of equity for Disney s
operating businesses.

  Step 2a: Compute the cost of equity for all of Disney s assets:

Equity BetaDisney as company = 0.6885 (1 + (1 – 0.38)(0.3691)) = 0.8460

Riskfree Rate = 3.5%

Risk Premium = 6%

Discussion Issue

  Assume now that you are the CFO of Disney. The head of the movie business
has come to you with a new big budget movie that he would like you to fund.
He claims that his analysis of the movie indicates that it will generate a return
on equity of 12%. Would you fund it?

a)  Yes. It is higher than the cost of equity for Disney as a company

b)  No. It is lower than the cost of equity for the movie business.

What are the broader implications of your choice?


Estimating Aracruz s Bottom Up Beta

Bottom up Betas for Paper & Pulp

  The beta for emerging market paper and pulp companies of 1.01 was used as
the unlevered beta for Aracruz.

  When computing the levered beta for Aracruz s paper and pulp business, we
used the gross debt outstanding of 9,805 million BR and the market value of
equity of 8907 million BR, in conjunction with the marginal tax rate of 34%
for Brazil:

•  Gross Debt to Equity ratio = Debt/Equity = 9805/8907 = 110.08%

•  Levered Beta for Aracruz Paper business = 1.01 (1+(1-.34)(1.1008)) = 1.74

Aracruz: Cost of Equity Calculation

  We will use a risk premium of 9.95% in computing the cost of equity, composed of the
mature market equity risk premium (6%) and the Brazil country risk premium of 3.95%
(estimated earlier).

  U.S. $ Cost of Equity

Cost of Equity = 10-yr T.Bond rate + Beta * Risk Premium

= 3.5% + 1.74 (9.95%) = 20.82%

  To convert to a Nominal $R Cost of Equity

Cost of Equity =
(1+ Inflation Rate Brazil )

(1+ $ Cost of Equity) "1

(1+ Inflation Rate US )

= 1.2082 (1.07/1.02) -1 = .2675 or 26.75%

(Alternatively, you could just replace the riskfree rate with a nominal $R riskfree rate, but you
would then be keeping risk premiums which were computed in dollar terms fixed while moving
to a higher
! inflation currency)


The bottom up beta for Tata Chemicals

Unlevered betas for Tata Chemical s Businesses

Emerging Market companies

Cost of Equity

Rupee Riskfree rate =4%; Indian ERP = 6% + 4.51%


Estimating Bottom-up Beta: Deutsche Bank

  Deutsche Bank is in two different segments of business - commercial banking

and investment banking.

•  To estimate its commercial banking beta, we will use the average beta of European
commercial banks.

•  To estimate the investment banking beta, we will use the average beta of
investment banks (primarily US and UK based).

•  The weights are based on revenues in each division.

  To estimate the cost of equity in Euros, we will use the German 10-year bond
rate of 3.6% as the riskfree rate and the 6% as the mature market premium.


Estimating Betas for Non-Traded Assets

  The conventional approaches of estimating betas from regressions do not work

for assets that are not traded. There are no stock prices or historical returns
that can be used to compute regression betas.

  There are two ways in which betas can be estimated for non-traded assets

•  Using comparable firms

•  Using accounting earnings


Using comparable firms to estimate beta for Bookscape


Estimating Bookscape Levered Beta and Cost of Equity

  Because the debt/equity ratios used in computing levered betas are market debt
equity ratios, and the only debt equity ratio we can compute for Bookscape is a
book value debt equity ratio, we have assumed that Bookscape is close to the
book industry median debt to equity ratio of 53.47 percent.

  Using a marginal tax rate of 40 percent for Bookscape, we get a levered beta
of 1.35.

Levered beta for Bookscape = 1.02 [1 + (1 – 0.40) (0.5347)] = 1.35

  Using a riskfree rate of 3.5% (US treasury bond rate) and an equity risk
premium of 6%:

Cost of Equity = 3.5% + 1.35 (6%) = 11.60%


Using Accounting Earnings to Estimate Beta


The Accounting Beta for Bookscape

  Regressing the changes in equity earnings at Bookscape against changes in

equity earnings for the S&P 500 yields the following:

Bookscape Earnings Change = 0.08 + 0.8211 (S&P 500 Earnings Change)

Based upon this regression, the beta for Bookscape s equity is 0.82.

•  Using changes in operating earnings for both the firm and the S&P 500 should yield
the equivalent of an unlevered beta.

  The cost of equity based upon the accounting beta is:

Cost of equity = 3.5% + 0.82 (6%) = 8.42%


Is Beta an Adequate Measure of Risk for a Private Firm?

  Beta measures the risk added on to a diversified portfolio. The owners of most
private firms are not diversified. Therefore, using beta to arrive at a cost of
equity for a private firm will

a)  Under estimate the cost of equity for the private firm

b)  Over estimate the cost of equity for the private firm

c)  Could under or over estimate the cost of equity for the private firm


Total Risk versus Market Risk

  Adjust the beta to reflect total risk rather than market risk. This adjustment is a
relatively simple one, since the R squared of the regression measures the
proportion of the risk that is market risk.

Total Beta = Market Beta / Correlation of the sector with the market

  In the Bookscape example, where the market beta is 1.35 and the average R-
squared of the comparable publicly traded firms is 21.58%; the correlation
with the market is 46.45%.

Market Beta 1.35
= = 2.91
R squared .4645
•  Total Cost of Equity = 3.5% + 2.91 (6%) = 20.94%


 Application Test: Estimating a Bottom-up Beta

  Based upon the business or businesses that your firm is in right now, and its
current financial leverage, estimate the bottom-up unlevered beta for your
firm.

  Data Source: You can get a listing of unlevered betas by industry on my web
site by going to updated data.


From Cost of Equity to Cost of Capital

  The cost of capital is a composite cost to the firm of raising financing to fund
its projects.

  In addition to equity, firms can raise capital from debt


What is debt?

  General Rule: Debt generally has the following characteristics:

•  Commitment to make fixed payments in the future

•  The fixed payments are tax deductible

•  Failure to make the payments can lead to either default or loss of control of the firm
to the party to whom payments are due.

  As a consequence, debt should include

•  Any interest-bearing liability, whether short term or long term.

•  Any lease obligation, whether operating or capital.


Estimating the Cost of Debt

  If the firm has bonds outstanding, and the bonds are traded, the yield to
maturity on a long-term, straight (no special features) bond can be used as the
interest rate.

  If the firm is rated, use the rating and a typical default spread on bonds with
that rating to estimate the cost of debt.

  If the firm is not rated,

•  and it has recently borrowed long term from a bank, use the interest rate on the
borrowing or

•  estimate a synthetic rating for the company, and use the synthetic rating to arrive at
a default spread and a cost of debt

  The cost of debt has to be estimated in the same currency as the cost of equity
and the cash flows in the valuation.


Estimating Synthetic Ratings

  The rating for a firm can be estimated using the financial characteristics of the
firm. In its simplest form, we can use just the interest coverage ratio:

Interest Coverage Ratio = EBIT / Interest Expenses

  For the four non-financial service companies, we obtain the following:


Interest Coverage Ratios, Ratings and Default Spreads- Early
2009

Disney, Market Cap > $ 5 billion:

8.31

AA

Aracruz: Market Cap< $5 billion:
3.70

BB+

Tata: Market Cap< $ 5 billion:
5.15

A-

Bookscape: Market Cap<$5 billion:
6.22

A

Synthetic versus Actual Ratings: Disney and Aracruz

  Disney and Aracruz are rated companies and their actual ratings are different
from the synthetic rating.

  Disney s synthetic rating is AA, whereas its actual rating is A. The difference
can be attributed to any of the following:

•  Synthetic ratings reflect only the interest coverage ratio whereas actual ratings
incorporate all of the other ratios and qualitative factors

•  Synthetic ratings do not allow for sector-wide biases in ratings

•  Synthetic rating was based on 2008 operating income whereas actual rating reflects
normalized earnings

  Aracruz s synthetic rating is BB+, but the actual rating for dollar debt is BB.
The biggest factor behind the difference is the presence of country risk but the
derivatives losses at the firm in 2008 may also be playing a role.

  Deutsche Bank had an A+ rating. We will not try to estimate a synthetic rating
for the bank. Defining interest expenses on debt for a bank is difficult…


Estimating Cost of Debt

  For Bookscape, we will use the synthetic rating (A) to estimate the cost of debt:

•  Default Spread based upon A rating = 2.50%

•  Pre-tax cost of debt = Riskfree Rate + Default Spread = 3.5% + 2.50% = 6.00%

•  After-tax cost of debt = Pre-tax cost of debt (1- tax rate) = 6.00% (1-.40) = 3.60%

  For the three publicly traded firms that are rated in our sample, we will use the actual
bond ratings to estimate the costs of debt:

  For Tata Chemicals, we will use the synthetic rating of A-, but we also
consider the fact that India faces default risk (and a spread of 3%).

•  Pre-tax cost of debt = Riskfree Rate(Rs) + Country Spread + Company spread

= 4% + 3% + 3% = 10%

•  After-tax cost of debt = Pre-tax cost of debt (1- tax rate) = 10% (1-.34) = 6.6%

Default looms larger.. And spreads widen.. The effect of the
market crisis – January 2008 to January 2009


Updated Default Spreads

Rating
Default Spread: Over 10-year riskfree rate in January 2011

AAA
0.50%

AA
0.65%

A+
0.85%

A
1.00%

A-
1.10%

BBB
1.60%

BB
3.35%

B+
3.75%

B
5.00%

B-
5.25%

CCC
8.00%

CC
10.00%

C
12.00%

D
15.00%

 Application Test: Estimating a Cost of Debt

  Based upon your firm s current earnings before interest and taxes, its interest
expenses, estimate

•  An interest coverage ratio for your firm

•  A synthetic rating for your firm (use the tables from prior pages)

•  A pre-tax cost of debt for your firm

•  An after-tax cost of debt for your firm


Costs of Hybrids

  Preferred stock shares some of the characteristics of debt - the preferred

dividend is pre-specified at the time of the issue and is paid out before
common dividend -- and some of the characteristics of equity - the payments
of preferred dividend are not tax deductible. If preferred stock is viewed as
perpetual, the cost of preferred stock can be written as follows:

• 
kps = Preferred Dividend per share/ Market Price per preferred share

  Convertible debt is part debt (the bond part) and part equity (the conversion
option). It is best to break it up into its component parts and eliminate it from
the mix altogether.


Weights for Cost of Capital Calculation

  The weights used in the cost of capital computation should be market values.

  There are three specious arguments used against market value

•  Book value is more reliable than market value because it is not as volatile: While it
is true that book value does not change as much as market value, this is more a
reflection of weakness than strength

•  Using book value rather than market value is a more conservative approach to
estimating debt ratios: For most companies, using book values will yield a lower
cost of capital than using market value weights.

•  Since accounting returns are computed based upon book value, consistency
requires the use of book value in computing cost of capital: While it may seem
consistent to use book values for both accounting return and cost of capital
calculations, it does not make economic sense.


Disney: From book value to market value for debt…

  In Disney s 2008 financial statements, the debt due over time was footnoted.

No maturity was given for debt

due after 5 years. I assumed 10
years.

  Disney s total debt due, in book value terms, on the balance sheet is $16,003
million and the total interest expense for the year was $728 million. Assuming
that the maturity that we computed above still holds and using 6% as the pre-
tax cost of debt:

# 1 &
Estimated MV of Disney Debt =
% (1 " ( 16,003
(1.06)5.38
728% (+ = $14,962 million

% .06 ( (1.06)5.38
%$ ('

!
And operating leases…

  The pre-tax cost of debt at Disney is 6%.

Year
Commitment
Present Value

Disney reported $619 million in
1
$392.00
$369.81
commitments after year 5. Given
2
$351.00
$312.39
that their average commitment
3
$305.00
$256.08
over the first 5 years of $302
4
$265.00
$209.90

million, we assumed two years @
5
$198.00
$147.96

$309.5 million each.

6 & 7
$309.50
$424.02

Debt Value of
leases =

$1,720.17

  Debt outstanding at Disney

= MV of Interest bearing Debt + PV of Operating Leases

= $14,962 + $ 1,720= $16,682 million


 Application Test: Estimating Market Value

  Estimate the

•  Market value of equity at your firm and Book Value of equity

•  Market value of debt and book value of debt (If you cannot find the average
maturity of your debt, use 3 years): Remember to capitalize the value of operating
leases and add them on to both the book value and the market value of debt.

  Estimate the

•  Weights for equity and debt based upon market value

•  Weights for equity and debt based upon book value


Current Cost of Capital: Disney

  Equity

•  Cost of Equity = Riskfree rate + Beta * Risk Premium

= 3.5% + 0.9011 (6%) = 8.91%

•  Market Value of Equity =

$45.193 Billion

•  Equity/(Debt+Equity ) =

73.04%

  Debt

•  After-tax Cost of debt =(Riskfree rate + Default Spread) (1-t)

= (3.5%+2.5%) (1-.38) =
3.72%

•  Market Value of Debt =

$ 16.682 Billion

•  Debt/(Debt +Equity) =

26.96%

  Cost of Capital = 8.91%(.7304)+3.72%(.2696) = 7.51%

45.193/ (45.193+16.682)


Divisional Costs of Capital: Disney and Tata Chemicals

Disney

Tata Chemicals

Tata Chemicals


Aracruz : Currency effects.. And a side bar on Deutsche
Bank..

Aracruz

Inf

Inflation rate in US $ = 2%

Cost of capital in $R =
1.1284 (1.07) "1 = 18.37% Inflation rate in $R = 7%

(1.02)

(1)
Real Cost of capital =
1.1284 "1 = 10.63%
! (1.02)

!
  Earlier we computed a cost of equity of 10.55% for Deutsche Bank. We won t
even try to estimate the cost of capital. Why?


Bookscape s Cost of Capital

  Earlier, we noted that the cost of equity would be much higher for an
undiversified investor than a diversified one and use a contrast between total
and market beta to illustrate the point.

  The cost of capital illustrates the divide:


 Application Test: Estimating Cost of Capital

  Using the bottom-up unlevered beta that you computed for your firm, and the
values of debt and equity you have estimated for your firm, estimate a bottom-
up levered beta and cost of equity for your firm.

  Based upon the costs of equity and debt that you have estimated, and the
weights for each, estimate the cost of capital for your firm.

  How different would your cost of capital have been, if you used book value
weights?


Choosing a Hurdle Rate

  Either the cost of equity or the cost of capital can be used as a hurdle rate,
depending upon whether the returns measured are to equity investors or to all
claimholders on the firm (capital)

  If returns are measured to equity investors, the appropriate hurdle rate is the
cost of equity.

  If returns are measured to capital (or the firm), the appropriate hurdle rate is
the cost of capital.


Back to First Principles


Measuring Investment Returns
I: The Mechanics of Investment Analysis

Show me the money

from Jerry Maguire


First Principles


Measures of return: earnings versus cash flows

  Principles Governing Accounting Earnings Measurement

•  Accrual Accounting: Show revenues when products and services are sold or
provided, not when they are paid for. Show expenses associated with these
revenues rather than cash expenses.

•  Operating versus Capital Expenditures: Only expenses associated with creating
revenues in the current period should be treated as operating expenses. Expenses
that create benefits over several periods are written off over multiple periods (as
depreciation or amortization)

  To get from accounting earnings to cash flows:

•  you have to add back non-cash expenses (like depreciation)

•  you have to subtract out cash outflows which are not expensed (such as capital
expenditures)

•  you have to make accrual revenues and expenses into cash revenues and expenses
(by considering changes in working capital).


Measuring Returns Right: The Basic Principles

  Use cash flows rather than earnings. You cannot spend earnings.

  Use incremental cash flows relating to the investment decision, i.e.,
cashflows that occur as a consequence of the decision, rather than total cash
flows.

  Use time weighted returns, i.e., value cash flows that occur earlier more
than cash flows that occur later.

The Return Mantra: Time-weighted, Incremental Cash Flow Return


Setting the table: What is an investment/project?

  An investment/project can range the spectrum from big to small,

money making to cost saving:

•  Major strategic decisions to enter new areas of business or new markets.

•  Acquisitions of other firms are projects as well, notwithstanding attempts
to create separate sets of rules for them.

•  Decisions on new ventures within existing businesses or markets.

•  Decisions that may change the way existing ventures and projects are run.

•  Decisions on how best to deliver a service that is necessary for the
business to run smoothly.

  Put in broader terms, every choice made by a firm can be framed as an
investment.


Here are four examples…

  Rio Disney: We will consider whether Disney should invest in its first theme
parks in South America. These parks, while similar to those that Disney has in
other parts of the world, will require us to consider the effects of country risk
and currency issues in project analysis.

  New Paper Plant for Aracruz: Aracruz, as a paper and pulp company, is
examining whether to invest in a new paper plant in Brazil.

  An Online Store for Bookscape: Bookscape is evaluating whether it should
create an online store to sell books. While it is an extension of their basis
business, it will require different investments (and potentially expose them to
different types of risk).

  Acquisition of Sentient by Tata Chemicals: Sentient is a US firm that
manufactures chemicals for the food processing business. This cross-border
acquisition by Tata Chemicals will allow us to examine currency and risk
issues in such a transaction.


Earnings versus Cash Flows: A Disney Theme Park

  The theme parks to be built near Rio, modeled on Euro Disney in Paris and
Disney World in Orlando.

  The complex will include a Magic Kingdom to be constructed, beginning
immediately, and becoming operational at the beginning of the second year,
and a second theme park modeled on Epcot Center at Orlando to be
constructed in the second and third year and becoming operational at the
beginning of the fourth year.

  The earnings and cash flows are estimated in nominal U.S. Dollars.


Key Assumptions on Start Up and Construction

  The cost of constructing Magic Kingdom will be $3 billion, with $ 2 billion to

be spent right now, and $1 Billion to be spent one year from now.

  Disney has already spent $0.5 Billion researching the proposal and getting the
necessary licenses for the park; none of this investment can be recovered if the
park is not built.

  The cost of constructing Epcot II will be $ 1.5 billion, with $ 1 billion to be
spent at the end of the second year and $0.5 billion at the end of the third year.


Key Revenue Assumptions

Revenue estimates for the parks and resort properties (in millions)

Year
Magic Kingdom
Epcot II
Resort Properties
Total

1
$0
$0
$0
$0

2
$1,000
$0
$250
$1,250

3
$1,400
$0
$350
$1.750

4
$1,700
$300
$500
$2.500

5
$2,000
$500
$625
$3.125

6
$2,200
$550
$688
$3,438

7
$2,420
$605
$756
$3,781

8
$2,662
$666
$832
$4,159

9
$2,928
$732
$915
$4,575

10
$2,987
$747
$933
$4,667


Key Expense Assumptions

  The operating expenses are assumed to be 60% of the revenues at the parks,
and 75% of revenues at the resort properties.

  Disney will also allocate corporate general and administrative costs to this
project, based upon revenues; the G&A allocation will be 15% of the revenues
each year. It is worth noting that a recent analysis of these expenses found
that only one-third of these expenses are variable (and a function of total
revenue) and that two-thirds are fixed.


Depreciation and Capital Maintenance

 The capital maintenance expenditures are low in the early years, when the parks are still new but
increase as the parks age.


Other Assumptions

  Disney will have to maintain non-cash working capital (primarily consisting of

inventory at the theme parks and the resort properties, netted against accounts
payable) of 5% of revenues, with the investments being made at the end of
each year.

  The income from the investment will be taxed at Disney s marginal tax rate of
38%.


Laying the groundwork:
Book Capital, Working Capital and Depreciation

12.5% of book
value at end of
prior year
($3,000)


Step 1: Estimate Accounting Earnings on Project


And the Accounting View of Return

  a

(a)  Based upon book capital at the start of each year

(b)  Based upon average book capital over the year


What should this return be compared to?

  The computed return on capital on this investment is about 4%. To make a

judgment on whether this is a sufficient return, we need to compare this return
to a hurdle rate . Which of the following is the right hurdle rate? Why or
why not?

  The riskfree rate of 3.5% (T. Bond rate)

  The cost of equity for Disney as a company (8.91%)

  The cost of equity for Disney theme parks (8.20%)

  The cost of capital for Disney as a company (7.51%)

  The cost of capital for Disney theme parks (6.62%)

  None of the above


Should there be a risk premium for foreign projects?

  The exchange rate risk should be diversifiable risk (and hence should not
command a premium) if

•  the company has projects is a large number of countries (or)

•  the investors in the company are globally diversified.

For Disney, this risk should not affect the cost of capital used. Consequently, we would
not adjust the cost of capital for Disney s investments in other mature markets
(Germany, UK, France)

  The same diversification argument can also be applied against some political
risk, which would mean that it too should not affect the discount rate.
However, there are aspects of political risk especially in emerging markets that
will be difficult to diversify and may affect the cash flows, by reducing the
expected life or cash flows on the project.

For Disney, this is the risk that we are incorporating into the cost of capital when
it invests in Brazil (or any other emerging market)


Estimating a hurdle rate for Rio Disney

  We did estimate a cost of capital of 6.62% for the Disney theme park business,
using a bottom-up levered beta of 0.7829 for the business.

  This cost of equity may not adequately reflect the additional risk associated
with the theme park being in an emerging market.

  The only concern we would have with using this cost of equity for this project
is that it may not adequately reflect the additional risk associated with the
theme park being in an emerging market (Brazil).

Country risk premium for Brazil = 2.50% (34/21.5) = 3.95%

Cost of Equity in US$= 3.5% + 0.7829 (6%+3.95%) = 11.29%

We multiplied the default spread for Brazil (2.50%) by the relative volatility of
Brazil s equity index to the Brazilian government bond. (34%/21.5%)

  Using this estimate of the cost of equity, Disney s theme park debt ratio of
35.32% and its after-tax cost of debt of 3.72% (see chapter 4), we can estimate
the cost of capital for the project:

Cost of Capital in US$ = 11.29% (0.6468) + 3.72% (0.3532) = 8.62%


Would lead us to conclude that...

  Do not invest in this park. The return on capital of 4.05% is lower than the
cost of capital for theme parks of 8.62%; This would suggest that the
project should not be taken.

  Given that we have computed the average over an arbitrary period of 10 years,
while the theme park itself would have a life greater than 10 years, would you
feel comfortable with this conclusion?

a)  Yes

b)  No


A Tangent: From New to Existing Investments: ROC for the
entire firm

Assets Liabilities
Existing Investments Fixed Claim on cash flows
Generate cashflows today Assets in Place Debt Little or No role in management
How good are the Includes long lived (fixed) and Fixed Maturity
short-lived(working Tax Deductible
existing investments capital) assets
of the firm?

Expected Value that will be Growth Assets Equity Residual Claim on cash flows
created by future investments Significant Role in management
Perpetual Lives
Measuring ROC for existing investments..


Old wine in a new bottle.. Another way of presenting the
same results…

  The key to value is earning excess returns. Over time, there have been
attempts to restate this obvious fact in new and different ways. For instance,
Economic Value Added (EVA) developed a wide following in the the 1990s:

EVA = (ROC – Cost of Capital ) (Book Value of Capital Invested)

  The excess returns for the four firms can be restated as follows:


 Application Test: Assessing Investment Quality

  For the most recent period for which you have data, compute the after-tax
return on capital earned by your firm, where after-tax return on capital is
computed to be

After-tax ROC = EBIT (1-tax rate)/ (BV of debt + BV of Equity-Cash)previous year

  For the most recent period for which you have data, compute the return spread
earned by your firm:

Return Spread = After-tax ROC - Cost of Capital

  For the most recent period, compute the EVA earned by your firm

EVA = Return Spread * ((BV of debt + BV of Equity-Cash)previous year


The cash flow view of this project..

To get from income to cash flow, we

 added back all non-cash charges such as depreciation

 subtracted out the capital expenditures

 subtracted out the change in non-cash working capital


The Depreciation Tax Benefit

  While depreciation reduces taxable income and taxes, it does not reduce the
cash flows.

  The benefit of depreciation is therefore the tax benefit. In general, the tax
benefit from depreciation can be written as:

Tax Benefit = Depreciation * Tax Rate

Disney Theme Park: Depreciation tax savings (Tax rate = 38%)

Proposition 1: The tax benefit from depreciation and other non-cash charges is
greater, the higher your tax rate.

Proposition 2: Non-cash charges that are not tax deductible (such as amortization
of goodwill) and thus provide no tax benefits have no effect on cash flows.


Depreciation Methods

  Broadly categorizing, depreciation methods can be classified as straight line or

accelerated methods. In straight line depreciation, the capital expense is
spread evenly over time, In accelerated depreciation, the capital expense is
depreciated more in earlier years and less in later years. Assume that you
made a large investment this year, and that you are choosing between straight
line and accelerated depreciation methods. Which will result in higher net
income this year?

a)  Straight Line Depreciation

b)  Accelerated Depreciation

Which will result in higher cash flows this year?

a)  Straight Line Depreciation

b)  Accelerated Depreciation


The Capital Expenditures Effect

  Capital expenditures are not treated as accounting expenses but they do cause
cash outflows.

  Capital expenditures can generally be categorized into two groups

•  New (or Growth) capital expenditures are capital expenditures designed to create
new assets and future growth

•  Maintenance capital expenditures refer to capital expenditures designed to keep
existing assets.

  Both initial and maintenance capital expenditures reduce cash flows

  The need for maintenance capital expenditures will increase with the life of
the project. In other words, a 25-year project will require more maintenance
capital expenditures than a 2-year project.


To cap ex or not to cap ex

  Assume that you run your own software business, and that you have an
expense this year of $ 100 million from producing and distribution
promotional CDs in software magazines. Your accountant tells you that you
can expense this item or capitalize and depreciate it over three years. Which
will have a more positive effect on income?

a)  Expense it

b)  Capitalize and Depreciate it

Which will have a more positive effect on cash flows?

a)  Expense it

b)  Capitalize and Depreciate it


The Working Capital Effect

  Intuitively, money invested in inventory or in accounts receivable cannot be used

elsewhere. It, thus, represents a drain on cash flows

  To the degree that some of these investments can be financed using supplier credit
(accounts payable), the cash flow drain is reduced.

  Investments in working capital are thus cash outflows

•  Any increase in working capital reduces cash flows in that year

•  Any decrease in working capital increases cash flows in that year

  To provide closure, working capital investments need to be salvaged at the end of the
project life.

  Proposition 1: The failure to consider working capital in a capital budgeting project will
overstate cash flows on that project and make it look more attractive than it really is.

  Proposition 2: Other things held equal, a reduction in working capital requirements will
increase the cash flows on all projects for a firm.


$ 500 million has
already been spent & $ The incremental cash flows on the project

50 million in
depreciation will exist
anyway

2/3rd of allocated G&A is fixed.

Add back this amount (1-t)

Tax rate = 38%

A more direct way of getting to incremental cash flows..


Sunk Costs

  Any expenditure that has already been incurred, and cannot be recovered (even
if a project is rejected) is called a sunk cost. A test market for a consumer
product and R&D expenses for a drug (for a pharmaceutical company) would
be good examples.

  When analyzing a project, sunk costs should not be considered since they are
not incremental.

A Behavioral Aside: It is a well established finding in psychological and

behavioral research that managers find it almost impossible to ignore sunk
costs.


Test Marketing and R&D: The Quandary of Sunk Costs

  A consumer product company has spent $ 100 million on test marketing.

Looking at only the incremental cash flows (and ignoring the test marketing),
the project looks like it will create $25 million in value for the company.
Should it take the investment?

  Yes

  No

  Now assume that every investment that this company has shares the same
characteristics (Sunk costs > Value Added). The firm will clearly not be able
to survive. What is the solution to this problem?


Allocated Costs

  Firms allocate costs to individual projects from a centralized pool (such as

general and administrative expenses) based upon some characteristic of the
project (sales is a common choice, as is earnings)

  For large firms, these allocated costs can be significant and result in the
rejection of projects

  To the degree that these costs are not incremental (and would exist anyway),
this makes the firm worse off. Thus, it is only the incremental component of
allocated costs that should show up in project analysis.


Breaking out G&A Costs into fixed and variable
components: A simple example

  Assume that you have a time series of revenues and G&A costs for a
company.

What percentage of the G&A cost is variable?


To Time-Weighted Cash Flows

  Incremental cash flows in the earlier years are worth more than incremental
cash flows in later years.

  In fact, cash flows across time cannot be added up. They have to be brought to
the same point in time before aggregation.

  This process of moving cash flows through time is

•  discounting, when future cash flows are brought to the present

•  compounding, when present cash flows are taken to the future


Present Value Mechanics

Cash Flow Type

Discounting Formula
Compounding Formula

1. Simple CF
CFn / (1+r)n
CF0 (1+r)n

2. Annuity
"
1 -
1 %

$ " (1 + r) - 1 %
n

(1 + r) n ' A$ '

A$ '
# r &
$ r '
# &

3. Growing Annuity
" (1 + g) n % !
$1 - n '

!
A(1 + g) $
(1 + r) '
$ r-g '

$# '&
4. Perpetuity
A/r

5. Growing Perpetuity
Expected Cashflow next year/(r-g)

!

Discounted cash flow measures of return

  Net Present Value (NPV): The net present value is the sum of the present
values of all cash flows from the project (including initial investment).

NPV = Sum of the present values of all cash flows on the project, including the initial
investment, with the cash flows being discounted at the appropriate hurdle rate (cost
of capital, if cash flow is cash flow to the firm, and cost of equity, if cash flow is to
equity investors)

•  Decision Rule: Accept if NPV > 0

  Internal Rate of Return (IRR): The internal rate of return is the discount rate
that sets the net present value equal to zero. It is the percentage rate of return,
based upon incremental time-weighted cash flows.

•  Decision Rule: Accept if IRR > hurdle rate


Closure on Cash Flows

  In a project with a finite and short life, you would need to compute a salvage
value, which is the expected proceeds from selling all of the investment in the
project at the end of the project life. It is usually set equal to book value of
fixed assets and working capital

  In a project with an infinite or very long life, we compute cash flows for a
reasonable period, and then compute a terminal value for this project, which
is the present value of all cash flows that occur after the estimation period
ends..

  Assuming the project lasts forever, and that cash flows after year 10 grow 2%
(the inflation rate) forever, the present value at the end of year 10 of cash flows
after that can be written as:

•  Terminal Value in year 10= CF in year 11/(Cost of Capital - Growth Rate)

=692 (1.02) /(.0862-.02) = $ 10,669 million


Which yields a NPV of..

Discounted at Rio Disney cost
of capital of 8.62%


Which makes the argument that..

  The project should be accepted. The positive net present value suggests that
the project will add value to the firm, and earn a return in excess of the cost of
capital.

  By taking the project, Disney will increase its value as a firm by $2,877
million.


The IRR of this project


The IRR suggests..

  The project is a good one. Using time-weighted, incremental cash flows, this
project provides a return of 12.35%. This is greater than the cost of capital of
8.62%.

  The IRR and the NPV will yield similar results most of the time, though there
are differences between the two approaches that may cause project rankings to
vary depending upon the approach used.


Does the currency matter?

  The analysis was done in dollars. Would the conclusions have been any
different if we had done the analysis in Brazilian Reais?

a)  Yes

b)  No


The Consistency Rule for Cash Flows

  The cash flows on a project and the discount rate used should be defined in the
same terms.

•  If cash flows are in dollars ($R), the discount rate has to be a dollar ($R) discount
rate

•  If the cash flows are nominal (real), the discount rate has to be nominal (real).

  If consistency is maintained, the project conclusions should be identical, no
matter what cash flows are used.


Disney Theme Park: Project Analysis in $R

  The inflation rates were assumed to be 7% in Brazil and 2% in the United

States. The $R/dollar rate at the time of the analysis was 2.04 $R/dollar.

  The expected exchange rate was derived assuming purchasing power parity.

Expected Exchange Ratet = Exchange Rate today * (1.07/1.02)t

  The expected growth rate after year 10 is still expected to be the inflation rate,
but it is the 7% $R inflation rate.

  The cost of capital in $R was derived from the cost of capital in dollars and the
differences in inflation rates:

$R Cost of Capital =
(1+ Exp InflationBrazil )

(1+ US $ Cost of Capital) "1
(1+ Exp InflationUS )

= (1.0862) (1.07/1.02) – 1 = 13.94%


Disney Theme Park: $R NPV

Discount
back at
13.94%

NPV = R$ 5,870/2.04= $ 2,877 Million

NPV is equal to NPV in dollar terms


Uncertainty in Project Analysis: What can we do?

  Based on our expected cash flows and the estimated cost of capital, the
proposed theme park looks like a very good investment for Disney.
Which of the following may affect your assessment of value?

a)  Revenues may be over estimated (crowds may be smaller and spend less)

b)  Actual costs may be higher than estimated costs

c)  Tax rates may go up

d)  Interest rates may rise

e)  Risk premiums and default spreads may increase

f)  All of the above

  How would you respond to this uncertainty?

a)  Will wait for the uncertainty to be resolved

b)  Will not take the investment

c)  Ignore it.

d)  Other


One simplistic (but effective) solution: See how quickly you
can get your money back…

  If your biggest fear is losing the billions that you invested in the project, one
simple measure that you can compute is the number of years it will take you to
get your money back.

Payback = 10.5 years

Discounted Payback
= 17.7 years


A slightly more sophisticated approach: Sensitivity Analysis
and What-if Questions…

  The NPV, IRR and accounting returns for an investment will change as we
change the values that we use for different variables.

  One way of analyzing uncertainty is to check to see how sensitive the decision
measure (NPV, IRR..) is to changes in key assumptions. While this has
become easier and easier to do over time, there are caveats that we would
offer.

Caveat 1: When analyzing the effects of changing a variable, we often hold all
else constant. In the real world, variables move together.

Caveat 2: The objective in sensitivity analysis is that we make better decisions,
not churn out more tables and numbers.

Corollary 1: Less is more. Not everything is worth varying…

Corollary 2: A picture is worth a thousand numbers (and tables).


And here is a really good picture…


The final step up: Incorporate probabilistic estimates.. Rather
than expected values..

Actual Revenues as % of Forecasted Revenues (Base case = 100%)

  Eq

Equity Risk Premium (Base Case = 6%

(US)+ 3.95% (Brazil) = 9.95%

Operating Expenses at Parks as % of

Revenues (Base Case = 60%)


The resulting simulation…

Average = $2.95 billion

Median = $2.73 billion

NPV ranges from -$4 billion to +$14 billion. NPV is negative 12% of the
time.


You are the decision maker…

  Assume that you are the person at Disney who is given the results of
the simulation. The average and median NPV are close to your base
case values of $2.877 billion. However, there is a 12% probability that
the project could have a negative NPV and that the NPV could be a
large negative value? How would you use this information?

a)  I would accept the investment and print the results of this simulation and file them
away to show that I exercised due diligence.

b)  I would reject the investment, because 12% is higher than my threshold value for
losing on a project.

c)  Other


Equity Analysis: The Parallels

  The investment analysis can be done entirely in equity terms, as well. The
returns, cashflows and hurdle rates will all be defined from the perspective of
equity investors.

  If using accounting returns,

•  Return will be Return on Equity (ROE) = Net Income/BV of Equity

•  ROE has to be greater than cost of equity

  If using discounted cashflow models,

•  Cashflows will be cashflows after debt payments to equity investors

•  Hurdle rate will be cost of equity


A Brief Example: A Paper Plant for Aracruz - Investment
Assumptions

  The plant is expected to have a capacity of 750,000 tons and will have the
following characteristics:

  It will require an initial investment of 250 Million BR. At the end of the fifth
year, an additional investment of 50 Million BR will be needed to update the
plant.

  Aracruz plans to borrow 100 Million BR, at a real interest rate of 6.3725%,
using a 10-year term loan (where the loan will be paid off in equal annual
increments).

  The plant will have a life of 10 years. During that period, the plant (and the
additional investment in year 5) will be depreciated using double declining
balance depreciation, with a life of 10 years. At the end of the tenth year, the
plant is expected to be sold for its remaining book value.

Operating Assumptions

  The plant will be partly in commission in a couple of months, but will have a
capacity of only 650,000 tons in the first year, 700,000 tons in the second year
before getting to its full capacity of 750,000 tons in the third year.

  The capacity utilization rate will be 90% for the first 3 years, and rise to 95%
after that.

  The price per ton of linerboard is currently $400, and is expected to keep pace
with inflation for the life of the plant.

  The variable cost of production, primarily labor and material, is expected to be
55% of total revenues; there is a fixed cost of 50 Million BR, which will grow
at the inflation rate.

  The working capital requirements are estimated to be 15% of total revenues,
and the investments have to be made at the beginning of each year. At the end
of the tenth year, it is anticipated that the entire working capital will be
salvaged.


The Hurdle Rate

  The analysis is done in real terms and to equity investors. Thus, the hurdle rate
has to be a real cost of equity.

  In the earlier section, we estimated costs of equity, debt and capital in US
dollars, $R and real terms for Aracruz s paper business.


Breaking down debt payments by year


Net Income: Paper Plant


A ROE Analysis

Real ROE of 36.19% is greater than

Real Cost of Equity of 18.45%


From Project ROE to Firm ROE

  As with the earlier analysis, where we used return on capital and cost of
capital to measure the overall quality of projects at firms, we can compute
return on equity and cost of equity to pass judgment on whether firms are
creating value to its equity investors.

Equity Excess Returns and EVA: 2008


An Incremental CF Analysis


An Equity NPV
Discounted at real
cost of equity of
18.45%


An Equity IRR


Real versus Nominal Analysis

  In computing the NPV of the plant, we estimated real cash flows and
discounted them at the real cost of equity. We could have estimated
the cash flows in nominal terms (either US dollars or $R) and
discounted them at a nominal cost of equity (either US dollar or $R).
Would the answer be different?

a)  Yes

b)  No

Explain


Dealing with Macro Uncertainty: The Effect of Paper Prices..

  Like the Disney Theme Park, the Aracruz paper plant s actual value will be
buffeted as the variables change. The biggest source of variability is an
external factor –the price of paper and pulp.


And Exchange Rates…


Should you hedge?

  The value of this plant is very much a function of paper and pulp
prices. There are futures, forward and option markets on paper and
pulp that Aracruz can use to hedge against paper price movements.
Should it?

a)  Yes

b)  No

Explain.

  The value of the plant is also a function of exchange rates. There are
forward, futures and options markets on currency. Should Aracruz
hedge against exchange rate risk?

a)  Yes

b)  No

Explain.


Acquisitions and Projects

  An acquisition is an investment/project like any other and all of the

rules that apply to traditional investments should apply to acquisitions
as well. In other words, for an acquisition to make sense:

•  It should have positive NPV. The present value of the expected cash flows from the
acquisition should exceed the price paid on the acquisition.

•  The IRR of the cash flows to the firm (equity) from the acquisition > Cost of capital
(equity) on the acquisition

  In estimating the cash flows on the acquisition, we should count in any
possible cash flows from synergy.

  The discount rate to assess the present value should be based upon the
risk of the investment (target company) and not the entity considering
the investment (acquiring company).


Tata Chemicals and Sensient Technologies

  Sensient Technologies is a publicly traded US firm that manufactures

color, flavor and fragrance additives for the food business. Tata
Chemicals is an Indian company that manufactures fertilizers and
chemicals.

  Based upon 2008 financial statements, the firm reported

•  Operating income of $162 million on revenues of $1.23 billion for the year

•  A tax rate of 37% of its income as taxes in 2008

•  Depreciation of $44 million and capital expenditures of $54 million.

•  An Increase in Non-cash working capital of$16 million during the year.

  Sensient currently has a debt to capital ratio of 28.57% (translating
into a debt to equity ratio of 40%) and faces a pre-tax cost of debt of
5.5%.


Estimating the Cost of Capital for the Acquisition

  In assessing the cost of capital for the acquisition, we will

•  Estimate all values in US dollar terms (rather than rupees)

•  Use Sensient s risk, debt and tax characteristics in making our assessments.

  While Sensient Technologies is classified as a specialty chemical company, its
revenues are derived almost entirely from the food processing business.
Consequently, we feel that the unlevered beta of food processing companies in
the United States is a better measure of risk; in January 2009, we estimated an
unlevered beta of 0.65 for this sector.

  Using the US corporate tax rate of 37% (to reflect the fact that Sensient s
income will be taxed in the US), Sensient s current debt to capital ratio of
28.57% (D/E=40%) and its pre-tax cost of debt of 5.5%:

•  Levered Beta = 0.65 (1+ (1-.37) (.40)) = 0.8138

•  Cost of Equity= 3.5% + 0.8138 (6%) = 8.38%

•  Cost of capital = 8.38% (1-.2857) + 5.5% (1-.37) (.2857) = 6.98%


Estimating the Cash Flow to the Firm and Growth for
Sensient

  Using the operating income ($162 million), capital expenditures ($44

million), depreciation ($54 million) and increase in non-cash working capital
($16 million), we estimate the cash flow to the firm for Sensient Technologies
in 2008 :

Cash Flow to the firm = After-tax Operating Income + Depreciation – Capital
Expenditures – Change in Non-cash Working Capital = 162 (1-.37) + 44 – 54 – 16
= $76.06 million

  We will assume that the firm is mature and that all of the inputs to this
computation – earnings, capital expenditures, depreciation and working capital
– will grow 2% a year in perpetuity.


Value of Sensient Technologies: Before Synergy

  We can estimate the value of the firm, based on these inputs:

Value of Operating Assets Expected

=
Cashflow to the firm next year

(Cost

of Capital - Stable growth rate)

$76.06

=
(1.02) = $1,559 million
(.0698 - .02)
!
  Adding the cash balance of the firm ($8 million) and subtracting out the
existing debt ($460 million) yields the value of equity in the firm:

Value of Equity !
= Value of Operating Assets + Cash – Debt

= $1,559 + $ 8 - $460 million = $1,107 million

  The market value of equity in Sensient Technologies in May 2009 was $1,150
million.

  To the extent that Tata Chemicals pays the market price, it will have to
generate benefits from synergy that exceed $43 million.


Measuring Investment Returns
II. Investment Interactions, Options and
Remorse…


Independent investments are the exception…

  In all of the examples we have used so far, the investments that we

have analyzed have stood alone. Thus, our job was a simple one.
Assess the expected cash flows on the investment and discount them at
the right discount rate.

  In the real world, most investments are not independent. Taking an
investment can often mean rejecting another investment at one
extreme (mutually exclusive) to being locked in to take an investment
in the future (pre-requisite).

  More generally, accepting an investment can create side costs for a
firm s existing investments in some cases and benefits for others.


I. Mutually Exclusive Investments

  We have looked at how best to assess a stand-alone investment and

concluded that a good investment will have positive NPV and generate
accounting returns (ROC and ROE) and IRR that exceed your costs
(capital and equity).

  In some cases, though, firms may have to choose between investments
because

•  They are mutually exclusive: Taking one investment makes the other one redundant
because they both serve the same purpose

•  The firm has limited capital and cannot take every good investment (i.e.,
investments with positive NPV or high IRR).

  Using the two standard discounted cash flow measures, NPV and IRR,
can yield different choices when choosing between investments.


Comparing Projects with the same (or similar) lives..

  When comparing and choosing between investments with the same

lives, we can

•  Compute the accounting returns (ROC, ROE) of the investments and pick the one
with the higher returns

•  Compute the NPV of the investments and pick the one with the higher NPV

•  Compute the IRR of the investments and pick the one with the higher IRR

  While it is easy to see why accounting return measures can give
different rankings (and choices) than the discounted cash flow
approaches, you would expect NPV and IRR to yield consistent results
since they are both time-weighted, incremental cash flow return
measures.


Case 1: IRR versus NPV

  Consider two projects with the following cash flows:

Year
Project 1 CF
Project 2 CF

0

-1000

-1000

1

800

200

2

1000

300

3

1300

400

4

-2200

500


Project s NPV Profile


What do we do now?

  Project 1 has two internal rates of return. The first is 6.60%, whereas the
second is 36.55%. Project 2 has one internal rate of return, about 12.8%.

  Why are there two internal rates of return on project 1?

  If your cost of capital is 12%, which investment would you accept?

a)  Project 1

b)  Project 2

Explain.


Case 2: NPV versus IRR

Project A

Cash Flow
$ 350,000
$ 450,000
$ 600,000
$ 750,000

Investment
$ 1,000,000

NPV = $467,937

IRR= 33.66%

Project B

Cash Flow
$ 3,000,000
$ 3,500,000
$ 4,500,000
$ 5,500,000

Investment
$ 10,000,000

NPV = $1,358,664

IRR=20.88%


Which one would you pick?

  Assume that you can pick only one of these two projects. Your choice will
clearly vary depending upon whether you look at NPV or IRR. You have
enough money currently on hand to take either. Which one would you pick?

a)  Project A. It gives me the bigger bang for the buck and more margin for
error.

b)  Project B. It creates more dollar value in my business.

If you pick A, what would your biggest concern be?

If you pick B, what would your biggest concern be?


Capital Rationing, Uncertainty and Choosing a Rule

  If a business has limited access to capital, has a stream of surplus value

projects and faces more uncertainty in its project cash flows, it is much more
likely to use IRR as its decision rule.

Small, high-growth companies and private businesses are much more likely to use
IRR.

  If a business has substantial funds on hand, access to capital, limited surplus
value projects, and more certainty on its project cash flows, it is much more
likely to use NPV as its decision rule.

As firms go public and grow, they are much more likely to gain from using NPV.


The sources of capital rationing…

Cause Number of firms Percent of total

Debt limit imposed by outside agreement 10 10.7
Debt limit placed by management external 3 3.2
to firm
Limit placed on borrowing by internal 65 69.1
management
Restrictive policy imposed on retained 2 2.1
earnings
Maintenance of target EPS or PE ratio 14 14.9

An Alternative to IRR with Capital Rationing

  The problem with the NPV rule, when there is capital rationing, is that it is a
dollar value. It measures success in absolute terms.

  The NPV can be converted into a relative measure by dividing by the initial
investment. This is called the profitability index.

•  Profitability Index (PI) = NPV/Initial Investment

  In the example described, the PI of the two projects would have been:

•  PI of Project A = $467,937/1,000,000 = 46.79%

•  PI of Project B = $1,358,664/10,000,000 = 13.59%

Project A would have scored higher.


Case 3: NPV versus IRR

Project A

Cash Flow
$ 5,000,000
$ 4,000,000
$ 3,200,000
$ 3,000,000

Investment
$ 10,000,000

NPV = $1,191,712

IRR=21.41%

Project B

Cash Flow
$ 3,000,000
$ 3,500,000
$ 4,500,000
$ 5,500,000

Investment
$ 10,000,000

NPV = $1,358,664

IRR=20.88%


Why the difference?

These projects are of the same scale. Both the NPV and IRR use time-weighted
cash flows. Yet, the rankings are different. Why?

Which one would you pick?

a)  Project A. It gives me the bigger bang for the buck and more margin for error.

b)  Project B. It creates more dollar value in my business.


NPV, IRR and the Reinvestment Rate Assumption

  The NPV rule assumes that intermediate cash flows on the project get
reinvested at the hurdle rate (which is based upon what projects of comparable
risk should earn).

  The IRR rule assumes that intermediate cash flows on the project get
reinvested at the IRR. Implicit is the assumption that the firm has an infinite
stream of projects yielding similar IRRs.

  Conclusion: When the IRR is high (the project is creating significant surplus
value) and the project life is long, the IRR will overstate the true return on the
project.


Solution to Reinvestment Rate Problem


Why NPV and IRR may differ.. Even if projects have the
same lives

  A project can have only one NPV, whereas it can have more than one IRR.

  The NPV is a dollar surplus value, whereas the IRR is a percentage measure of
return. The NPV is therefore likely to be larger for large scale projects,
while the IRR is higher for small-scale projects.

  The NPV assumes that intermediate cash flows get reinvested at the hurdle
rate , which is based upon what you can make on investments of comparable
risk, while the IRR assumes that intermediate cash flows get reinvested at the
IRR .


Comparing projects with different lives..

Project A

$400
$400
$400
$400
$400

-$1000

NPV of Project A = $ 442

IRR of Project A = 28.7%

Project B

$350
$350
$350
$350
$350
$350
$350
$350
$350
$350

-$1500
NPV of Project B = $ 478

IRR for Project B = 19.4%

Hurdle Rate for Both Projects = 12%


Why NPVs cannot be compared.. When projects have
different lives.

  The net present values of mutually exclusive projects with different lives
cannot be compared, since there is a bias towards longer-life projects. To
compare the NPV, we have to

•  replicate the projects till they have the same life (or)

•  convert the net present values into annuities

  The IRR is unaffected by project life. We can choose the project with
the higher IRR.


Solution 1: Project Replication

Project A: Replicated

$400
$400
$400
$400
$400
$400
$400
$400
$400
$400

-$1000
-$1000 (Replication)

NPV of Project A replicated = $ 693

Project B

$350
$350
$350
$350
$350
$350
$350
$350
$350
$350

-$1500

NPV of Project B= $ 478


Solution 2: Equivalent Annuities

  Equivalent Annuity for 5-year project

= $442 * PV(A,12%,5 years)

= $ 122.62

  Equivalent Annuity for 10-year project

= $478 * PV(A,12%,10 years)

= $ 84.60


What would you choose as your investment tool?

  Given the advantages/disadvantages outlined for each of the different decision

rules, which one would you choose to adopt?

a)  Return on Investment (ROE, ROC)

b)  Payback or Discounted Payback

c)  Net Present Value

d)  Internal Rate of Return

e)  Profitability Index

  Do you think your choice has been affected by the events of the last
quarter of 2008? If so, why? If not, why not?


What firms actually use ..

Decision Rule
% of Firms using as primary decision rule in

1976
1986

1998

IRR
53.6%
49.0%
42.0%

Accounting Return
25.0%
8.0%
7.0%

NPV
9.8%
21.0%
34.0%

Payback Period
8.9%
19.0%
14.0%

Profitability Index
2.7%
3.0%
3.0%


II. Side Costs and Benefits

  Most projects considered by any business create side costs and benefits for that
business.

•  The side costs include the costs created by the use of resources that the business
already owns (opportunity costs) and lost revenues for other projects that the firm
may have.

•  The benefits that may not be captured in the traditional capital budgeting analysis
include project synergies (where cash flow benefits may accrue to other projects)
and options embedded in projects (including the options to delay, expand or
abandon a project).

  The returns on a project should incorporate these costs and benefits.


A. Opportunity Cost

  An opportunity cost arises when a project uses a resource that may already
have been paid for by the firm.

  When a resource that is already owned by a firm is being considered for use in
a project, this resource has to be priced on its next best alternative use, which
may be

•  a sale of the asset, in which case the opportunity cost is the expected proceeds from
the sale, net of any capital gains taxes

•  renting or leasing the asset out, in which case the opportunity cost is the expected
present value of the after-tax rental or lease revenues.

•  use elsewhere in the business, in which case the opportunity cost is the cost of
replacing it.


Case 1: Foregone Sale?

  Assume that Disney owns land in Bangkok already. This land is undeveloped
and was acquired several years ago for $ 5 million for a hotel that was never
built. It is anticipated, if this theme park is built, that this land will be used to
build the offices for Disney Bangkok. The land currently can be sold for $ 40
million, though that would create a capital gain (which will be taxed at 20%).
In assessing the theme park, which of the following would you do:

a)  Ignore the cost of the land, since Disney owns its already

b)  Use the book value of the land, which is $ 5 million

c)  Use the market value of the land, which is $ 40 million

d)  Other:


Case 2: Incremental Cost?
An Online Retailing Venture for Bookscape

  The initial investment needed to start the service, including the installation of
additional phone lines and computer equipment, will be $1 million. These
investments are expected to have a life of four years, at which point they will
have no salvage value. The investments will be depreciated straight line over
the four-year life.

  The revenues in the first year are expected to be $1.5 million, growing 20% in
year two, and 10% in the two years following.

  The salaries and other benefits for the employees are estimated to be $150,000
in year one, and grow 10% a year for the following three years.

  The cost of the books will be 60% of the revenues in each of the four years.

  The working capital, which includes the inventory of books needed for the
service and the accounts receivable will be10% of the revenues; the
investments in working capital have to be made at the beginning of each year.
At the end of year 4, the entire working capital is assumed to be salvaged.

  The tax rate on income is expected to be 40%.


Cost of capital for investment

  Wee will re-estimate the beta for this online project by looking at publicly
traded Internet retailers. The unlevered total beta of internet retailers is 4.25,
and we assume that this project will be funded with the same mix of debt and
equity (D/E = 53.47%, Debt/Capital = 34.84%) that Bookscape uses in the rest
of the business. We will assume that Bookscape s tax rate (40%) and pretax
cost of debt (6%) apply to this project.

Levered Beta Online Service = 4.25 [1 + (1 – 0.4) (0.5357)] = 5.61

Cost of Equity Online Service = 3.5% + 5.61 (6%) = 37.18%

Cost of CapitalOnline Service= 37.18% (0.6516) + 6% (1 – 0.4) (0.3484) = 25.48%


Incremental Cash flows on Investment

NPV of investment = -$98,775


The side costs…

  It is estimated that the additional business associated with online

ordering and the administration of the service itself will add to the
workload for the current general manager of the bookstore. As a
consequence, the salary of the general manager will be increased from
$100,000 to $120,000 next year; it is expected to grow 5 percent a year
after that for the remaining three years of the online venture. After the
online venture is ended in the fourth year, the manager s salary will
revert back to its old levels.

  It is also estimated that Bookscape Online will utilize an office that is
currently used to store financial records. The records will be moved to
a bank vault, which will cost $1000 a year to rent.


NPV with side costs…

Additional salary costs

Office Costs

NPV adjusted for side costs= -98,775- $29,865 - $1405 = $130,045

Opportunity costs aggregated into cash flows


Case 3: Excess Capacity

  In the Aracruz example, assume that the firm will use its existing distribution
system to service the production out of the new paper plant. The new plant
manager argues that there is no cost associated with using this system, since it
has been paid for already and cannot be sold or leased to a competitor (and
thus has no competing current use). Do you agree?

a)  Yes

b)  No


Case 4: Excess Capacity: A More Complicated Example

  Assume that a cereal company has a factory with a capacity to produce

100,000 boxes of cereal and that it expects to uses only 50% of capacity to
produce its existing product (Bran Banana) next year. This product s sales are
expected to grow 10% a year in the long term and the company has an after-
tax contribution margin (Sales price - Variable cost) of $4 a unit.

  It is considering introducing a new cereal (Bran Raisin) and plans to use the
excess capacity to produce the product. The sales in year 1 are expected to be
30,000 units and grow 5% a year in the long term; the after-tax contribution
margin on this product is $5 a unit.

  The book value of the factory is $ 1 million. The cost of building a new
factory with the same capacity is $1.5 million. The company s cost of capital
is 12%.


A Framework for Assessing The Cost of Using Excess
Capacity

  If I do not add the new product, when will I run out of capacity?

  If I add the new product, when will I run out of capacity?

  When I run out of capacity, what will I do?

1.  Cut back on production: cost is PV of after-tax cash flows from lost sales

2.  Buy new capacity: cost is difference in PV between earlier & later investment


Opportunity Cost of Excess Capacity

Year
Old
New
Old + New
Lost ATCF
PV(ATCF)

1
50.00%
30.00%
80.00%
$0

2
55.00%
31.50%
86.50%
$0

3
60.50%
33.08%
93.58%
$0

4
66.55%
34.73%
101.28%
$5,115
$ 3,251

5
73.21%
36.47%
109.67%
$38,681
$ 21,949

6
80.53%
38.29%
118.81%
$75,256
$ 38,127

7
88.58%
40.20%
128.78%
$115,124
$ 52,076

8
97.44%
42.21%
139.65%
$158,595
$ 64,054

9
100%
44.32%
144.32%
$177,280
$ 63,929

10
100%
46.54%
146.54%
$186,160
$ 59,939

PV(Lost Sales)=
$ 303,324

  PV (Building Capacity In Year 3 Instead Of Year 8) = 1,500,000/1.123
-1,500,000/1.128 = $ 461,846

  Opportunity Cost of Excess Capacity = $ 303,324


Product and Project Cannibalization: A Real Cost?

Assume that in the Disney theme park example, 20% of the revenues at the Rio
Disney park are expected to come from people who would have gone to
Disney theme parks in the US. In doing the analysis of the park, you would

a)  Look at only incremental revenues (i.e. 80% of the total revenue)

b)  Look at total revenues at the park

c)  Choose an intermediate number

Would your answer be different if you were analyzing whether to introduce a new
show on the Disney cable channel on Saturday mornings that is expected to
attract 20% of its viewers from ABC (which is also owned by Disney)?

a)  Yes

b)  No


B. Project Synergies

  A project may provide benefits for other projects within the firm. Consider, for
instance, a typical Disney animated movie. Assume that it costs $ 50 million to
produce and promote. This movie, in addition to theatrical revenues, also
produces revenues from

•  the sale of merchandise (stuffed toys, plastic figures, clothes ..)

•  increased attendance at the theme parks

•  stage shows (see Beauty and the Beast and the Lion King )

•  television series based upon the movie

  In investment analysis, however, these synergies are either left unquantified
and used to justify overriding the results of investment analysis, i.e,, used as
justification for investing in negative NPV projects.

  If synergies exist and they often do, these benefits have to be valued and
shown in the initial project analysis.


Example 1: Adding a Café to a bookstore: Bookscape

  Assume that you are considering adding a café to the bookstore. Assume also
that based upon the expected revenues and expenses, the café standing alone is
expected to have a net present value of -$91,097.

  The cafe will increase revenues at the book store by $500,000 in year 1,
growing at 10% a year for the following 4 years. In addition, assume that the
pre-tax operating margin on these sales is 10%.

  The net present value of the added benefits is $115,882. Added to the NPV of
the standalone Café of -$91,097 yields a net present value of $24,785.

Case 2: Synergy in a merger..

  Earlier, we valued Sensient Technologies for an acquisition by Tata

Chemicals and estimated a value of $ 1,559 million for the operating
assets and $ 1,107 million for the equity in the firm. In estimating this
value, though, we treated Sensient Technologies as a stand-alone firm.

  Assume that Tata Chemicals foresees potential synergies in the
combination of the two firms, primarily from using its distribution and
marketing facilities in India to market Sensient s food additive
products to India s rapidly growing processed food industry.

•  It will take Tata Chemicals approximately 3 years to adapt Sensient s products to
match the needs of the Indian processed food sector – more spice, less color.

•  Tata Chemicals will be able to generate Rs 1,500 million in after-tax operating
income in year 4 from Sensient s Indian sales, growing at a rate of 4% a year after
that in perpetuity from Sensient s products in India.


Estimating the cost of capital to use in valuing synergy..

  To estimate the cost of equity:

•  All of the perceived synergies flow from Sensient s products. We will use the
levered beta of 0.8138 of Sensient in estimating cost of equity.

•  The synergies are expected to come from India; consequently, we will add the
country risk premium of 4.51% for India.

  We will assume that Sensient will maintain its existing debt to capital
ratio of 28.57%, its current dollar cost of debt of 5.5% and its marginal
tax rate of 37%.

•  Cost of debt in US $ = 5.5% (1-.37) = 3.47%

•  Cost of capital in US $ = 12.05% (1-.2857) + 5.5% (1-.37)= 9.60%

  Cost of capital in Rs
=
(1 + Cost of Capital ) (1 + Inflation RateRs ) - 1
US $

(1 + Inflation RateUS $ )

=
(1.03)
(1.096) - 1 = 10.67%
(1.02)
!
!
Estimating the value of synergy… and what Tata can pay for
Sensient…

  We can now discount the expected cash flows back at the cost of
capital to derive the value of synergy:

•  Value of synergyYear 3 =
Expected Cash FlowYear 4 1500
= = Rs 22,476 million
(Cost of Capital - g) (.1067 -.04)
•  Value of synergy today =
Value of Synergy year 3 22,476
= = Rs 16,580 million

(1 + Cost of Capital)3 (1.1067)3
!
  Earlier, we estimated the value of equity in Sensient Technologies,
with no synergy, to be $1,107 million. Converting the synergy value
into dollar terms at! the current exchange rate of Rs 47.50/$, the total
value that Tata Chemicals can pay for Sensient s equity:

•  Value of synergy in US $ = Rs 16,580/47.50 = $ 349 million

•  Value of Sensient Technologies = $1,107 million + $349 million = $1,456 million


III. Project Options

  One of the limitations of traditional investment analysis is that it is static and

does not do a good job of capturing the options embedded in investment.

•  The first of these options is the option to delay taking a project, when a firm has
exclusive rights to it, until a later date.

•  The second of these options is taking one project may allow us to take advantage of
other opportunities (projects) in the future

•  The last option that is embedded in projects is the option to abandon a project, if the
cash flows do not measure up.

  These options all add value to projects and may make a bad project (from
traditional analysis) into a good one.


The Option to Delay

  When a firm has exclusive rights to a project or product for a specific period, it
can delay taking this project or product until a later date. A traditional
investment analysis just answers the question of whether the project is a
good one if taken today. The rights to a bad project can still have value.

PV of Cash Flows

Initial Investment in

Project
NPV is positive in this section

Present Value of Expected

Cash Flows on Product


Insights for Investment Analyses

  Having the exclusive rights to a product or project is valuable, even if the

product or project is not viable today.

  The value of these rights increases with the volatility of the underlying
business.

  The cost of acquiring these rights (by buying them or spending money on
development - R&D, for instance) has to be weighed off against these benefits.


The Option to Expand/Take Other Projects

  Taking a project today may allow a firm to consider and take other valuable
projects in the future. Thus, even though a project may have a negative NPV,
it may be a project worth taking if the option it provides the firm (to take other
projects in the future) has a more-than-compensating value.

PV of Cash Flows

from Expansion

Additional Investment

to Expand

Cash Flows on Expansion

Expansion becomes

Firm will not expand in
attractive in this section

this

section


The Option to Abandon

  A firm may sometimes have the option to abandon a project, if the cash flows
do not measure up to expectations.

  If abandoning the project allows the firm to save itself from further losses, this
option can make a project more valuable.

PV of Cash Flows

from Project

Cost of Abandonment

Present Value of Expected

Cash Flows on Project


IV. Assessing Existing or Past investments…

  While much of our discussion has been focused on analyzing new

investments, the techniques and principles enunciated apply just as
strongly to existing investments.

  With existing investments, we can try to address one of two questions:

•  Post –mortem: We can look back at existing investments and see if they
have created value for the firm.

•  What next? We can also use the tools of investment analysis to see
whether we should keep, expand or abandon existing investments.


Analyzing an Existing Investment

In a post-mortem, you look at the actual cash You can also reassess your expected cash
flows, relative to forecasts.
flows, based upon what you have learned,
and decide whether you should expand,
continue or divest (abandon) an investment


a. Post Mortem Analysis

  The actual cash flows from an investment can be greater than or less than
originally forecast for a number of reasons but all these reasons can be
categorized into two groups:

•  Chance: The nature of risk is that actual outcomes can be different from
expectations. Even when forecasts are based upon the best of information, they will
invariably be wrong in hindsight because of unexpected shifts in both macro
(inflation, interest rates, economic growth) and micro (competitors, company)
variables.

•  Bias: If the original forecasts were biased, the actual numbers will be different from
expectations. The evidence on capital budgeting is that managers tend to be over-
optimistic about cash flows and the bias is worse with over-confident managers.

  While it is impossible to tell on an individual project whether chance or bias is
to blame, there is a way to tell across projects and across time. If chance is the
culprit, there should be symmetry in the errors – actuals should be about as
likely to beat forecasts as they are to come under forecasts. If bias is the
reason, the errors will tend to be in one direction.


b. What should we do next?

t =n
NFn

"
<0
n

........
Liquidate the project

t =0 (1 + r)

t =n

NFn

........
Terminate the project

"
t =0 (1 + r)
n
< Salvage Value
!

t =n
NFn
!

"

t =0 (1 + r)
n
<
Divestiture

Value

........
Divest the project

t =n

NFn > 0
> Divestiture

........
Continue the project

!
"
t =0 (1 + r)
n
Value

Aswath!
Damodaran! 317!
Example: Disney California Adventure

  Disney opened the Disney California Adventure (DCA) Park in 2001, at a cost
of $1.5 billion, with a mix of roller coaster ridesand movie nostalgia. Disney
expected about 60% of its visitors to Disneyland to come across to DCA and
generate about $ 100 million in annual after-cash flows for the firm.

  By 2008, DCA had not performed up to expectations. Of the 15 million people
who came to Disneyland in 2007, only 6 million visited California Adventure,
and the cash flow averaged out to only $ 50 million between 2001 and 2007.

In early 2008, Disney faced three choices:

  Shut down California Adventure and try to recover whatever it can of its initial
investment. It is estimated that the firm recover about $ 500 million of its investment.

  Continue with the status quo, recognizing that future cash flows will be closer to the
actual values ($ 50 million) than the original projections.

  Invest about $ 600 million to expand and modify the par, with the intent of increasing
the number of attractions for families with children, is expected to increase the
percentage of Disneyland visitors who come to DCA from 40% to 60% and increase the
annual after tax cash flow by 60% (from $ 50 million to $ 80 million) at the park.


DCA: Evaluating the alternatives…

  Continuing Operation: Assuming the current after-tax cash flow of $

50 million will continue in perpetuity, growing at the inflation rate of
2% and discounting back at the theme park cost of capital of 6.62%
yields a value for continuing with the status quo

Expected Cash Flow next year 50(1.02)

Value of DCA =
(Cost of capital - g) = (.0662 " .02) = $1.103 billion
  Abandonment: Abandoning this investment currently would allow
Disney to recover
! only $ 500 million of its original investment.

Abandonment value of DCA = $ 500 million

  Expansion: The up-front cost of $ 600 million will lead to more
visitors in the park and an increase in the existing cash flows from $ 50
to $ 80 million.

Increase in CF next year 30(1.02)

Value of CF from expansion =
(Cost of capital - g) (.0662 " .02) = $662 million
=
!
First Principles


Corporate Finance

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Corporate Finance

 In traditional corporate finance, the objective in decision making is to

 Maximizing stock price is not incompatible with meeting employee needs/

Hire & fire

 In theory: The stockholders have significant control over management. The

Aswath Damodaran! 10!

 The power of stockholders to act at annual meetings is diluted by three factors

Aswath Damodaran! 11!

Aswath Damodaran! 12!

Aswath Damodaran! 13!

 A 1992 survey by Korn/Ferry revealed that 74% of companies relied on

Aswath Damodaran! 14!

Aswath Damodaran! 15!

Aswath Damodaran! 16!

Aswath Damodaran! 17!

Aswath Damodaran! 18!

 Look at the board of directors for your firm. Analyze

Aswath Damodaran! 19!

over stockholder interests

Aswath Damodaran! 20!

Aswath Damodaran! 21!

 Eastman Kodak s Great Victory

Aswath Damodaran! 22!

Sterling Drug under Eastman Kodak: Where is the synergy?

Aswath Damodaran! 23!

Aswath Damodaran! 24!

Look at: Bloomberg printout HDS for your firm

Aswath Damodaran! 25!

Aswath Damodaran! 26!

 Aracruz Cellulose, like most Brazilian companies, had multiple classes of

Aswath Damodaran! 27!

Aswath Damodaran! 28!

Aswath Damodaran! 29!

 In theory: there is no conflict of interests between stockholders and

Aswath Damodaran! 30!

 Increasing dividends significantly: When firms pay cash out as dividends,

Aswath Damodaran! 31!

Aswath Damodaran! 32!

 In theory: Financial markets are efficient. Managers convey information

Aswath Damodaran! 33!

 Information (especially negative) is sometimes suppressed or delayed by

Aswath Damodaran! 34!

DO MANAGERS DELAY BAD NEWS?: EPS and DPS Changes- by

Aswath Damodaran! 35!

Aswath Damodaran! 36!

Aswath Damodaran! 37!

 There are hundreds of start-up and small firms, with no earnings

Aswath Damodaran! 38!

Aswath Damodaran! 39!

Aswath Damodaran! 40!

Aswath Damodaran! 41!

Aswath Damodaran! 42!

Aswath Damodaran! 43!

Aswath Damodaran! 44!

Aswath Damodaran! 45!

 To choose a different mechanism for corporate governance, i.e, assign the

Aswath Damodaran! 46!

 Germany and Japan developed a different mechanism for corporate

Aswath Damodaran! 47!

 Firms can always focus on a different objective function. Examples would

Aswath Damodaran! 48!

Aswath Damodaran! 49!

Corporate Finance

 In traditional corporate finance, the objective in decision making is to

  Maximizing stock price is not incompatible with meeting employee needs/

  In theory: The stockholders have significant control over management. The

  The power of stockholders to act at annual meetings is diluted by three factors

  A 1992 survey by Korn/Ferry revealed that 74% of companies relied on

  Look at the board of directors for your firm. Analyze

  Eastman Kodak s Great Victory

  Aracruz Cellulose, like most Brazilian companies, had multiple classes of

  In theory: there is no conflict of interests between stockholders and

  Increasing dividends significantly: When firms pay cash out as dividends,

  In theory: Financial markets are efficient. Managers convey information

  Information (especially negative) is sometimes suppressed or delayed by

  There are hundreds of start-up and small firms, with no earnings

  To choose a different mechanism for corporate governance, i.e, assign the

  Germany and Japan developed a different mechanism for corporate

  Firms can always focus on a different objective function. Examples would

  The typical target firm in a hostile takeover has

  Every corporate scandal creates impetus for a legislative response. The

  In the most comprehensive study of the effect of corporate governance on value, a

  More restrictive covenants on investment, financing and dividend policy have

  For publicly traded firms in reasonably efficient markets, where bondholders

  Risk, in traditional terms, is viewed as a negative . Webster s dictionary, for

  Uses variance of actual returns around an expected return as a measure of risk.

  Firm-specific risk can be reduced, if not eliminated, by increasing the number

  Assuming diversification costs nothing (in terms of transactions costs),