Theory and Method in the Study of

International Integration

JAMES A. CAPORASO

I N many ways the study of international integration

is in what Thomas Kuhn has called the pre-paradigm stage of the develop-
ment of science.1 This stage is characterized by disagreement on the entities
to be studied and the definitions, concepts, and indicators to be employed.
Controversy is widespread even on the simplest of issues and, what is more
discouraging, this controversy does not take place in a theoretical-methodo-
logical context which facilitates its resolution. There is a general lack of com-
mon standards by which to evaluate knowledge, decision-rules to interpret
evidence, and criteria to measure progress. Thus, what constitutes advance
for one school may mean retreat for another, and efforts to exchange views
and harmonize aims frequently only serve to further define existing cleavages.
Given this disagreement on broad philosophical issues it should not be sur-
prising that research efforts and presentations of "evidence" have had little
compelling impact in altering theoretical convictions. It is also no accident
that the two most promising efforts to date are not presentations of data but
are attempts to fashion a generally acceptable framework within which to
evaluate evidence. Leon Lindberg has urged the adoption of a systems per-
spective which would harmonize a variety of research efforts and would, as
well, make findings roughly comparable.2 Joseph Nye has suggested that we
must "disaggregate" the concept of integration before we can meaningfully
JAMES A. CAPORASO is assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illi-
nois. The author gratefully wishes to acknowledge the support of the Northwestern University Research
Committee for providing funds for research assistance. Special thanks are due to Kathy Schwering for
assistance in the data-collection phase of this effort. Kenneth Janda, Thomas Milbuia, and Alan Pelow-
ski provided helpful criticism of an earlier draft of this article.
1
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1962).
2
Leon N. Lindberg, "The European Community as a Political System: Notes toward the Construction
of a Model," Journal of Common Market Studies, June 1967 (Vol. 5, No. 4), pp. 344-387.

228
 THEORY AND METHOD IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 229

answer the important questions facing us. 3 1 have already indicated how com-
plementary Lindberg's and Nye's suggestions are, and I feel that implementa-
tion of their suggestions would aid in making research findings touch base
with one another and thus impart to evidence its proper multiplying effect.4

I. T H E STATE OF INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

How integrated is the European Economic Community (EEC) today?

How does this compare with the level of integration before the EEC came
into existence? This seems to be a fundamental question and one that needs
to be answered before the more complex theoretical issues are treated. For
example, before one can ask whether the formation of the EEC has had any
effect on the level of integration of the six member states, one must be able to
describe the level of integration at a number of different points in time.
The literature on regional integration in Western Europe offers a rich variety
of arguments concerning trends in the integration or disintegration »f the six
member states. One can divide this literature into at least three classes: i)
studies dealing with transactions between units, 2) studies dealing with atti-
tudes and opinions of the unit members, and 3) those dealing with the
growth of political institutions. This gross classification is surely subject to
elaboration, but classification is useful because it avoids the confusion of using
a single label to cover a host of distinct processes.
By 1967 trade between Common Market countries had doubled and in some
cases nearly tripled since the initiation of the EEC. Even if one expresses
trade figures in terms of percentage of total trade turnover, one will find that
Common Market partners account for the majority of each member's total
trade.5 Carl Friedrich, criticizing the relative acceptance (RA) index used
by Karl Deutsch and his associates to measure transactions, has noted that the
"actual" statistics show that "intercommunity trade has increased much more
rapidly in the past decade than has trade with outsiders."8 This conclusion
is sharply challenged by Karl Deutsch and his associates who argue that a
variety of transaction measures, including trade, indicate that European in-
tegration has slowed down.7 European integration probably reached a peak
during 1957-1958 and perhaps much earlier for trade in particular (1948-
1951). While Deutsch and his associates recognize that absolute increases have
3
Joseph S. Nye, "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement," International Organi-
zation, Autumn 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 4), pp. 855-880.
4
James A. Caporaso and Alan L. Pelowski, "Economic and Political Integration in Europe: A Time-
Series Quasi-Experimental Analysis," American Political Science Review, June 1971, forthcoming.
3
Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Wotdd-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the
European Community (Englewood Cliffs, N J : Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 29.
0
Carl J. Friedrich, Europe: An Emergent Nation? (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 38.
7
Karl W. Deutsch et al., France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on
European Integration and World Politics (New York: Charles Scribncr's Sons, 1967), p. 219.
23O INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

occurred since the EEC came into existence, they argue that these increases
are expected "from mere random probability." They utilize die RA index
developed by Deutsch and I. Richard Savage to take account of these abso-
lute increases and to derive scores which express levels of integration in terms
of departures from a null model.8
Research on mass and elite attitudes toward integration has been less con-
troversial. Jacques-Rene Rabier, director of die Press and Information Service
of die European Communities, has presented evidence from opinion polls
conducted during 1952 and 1962. The figures for 1962 show marked increases
in favorable attitudes toward Europe.9 A more recent study, suggested by
the Press and Information Service, but, significantly, carried out under odier
professional auspices, comes up widi extremely favorable reactions toward die
formation of a "United States of Europe." Results ranged from a low of 60
percent favorable in Belgium and Italy to a high of 75 percent in Luxem-
bourg. These figures become even more astonishing if one discounts the large
number^of people who did not respond.10 Similarly, Ronald Inglehart, pre-
senting survey data on the attitudes of die younger generation in France,
the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), die Netherlands, and die
United Kingdom, has come to die conclusion diat "European integration
may have moved into full gear only since 1958."11
That mass attitudes toward past activities of the EEC and future possibili-
ties for federation are favorable does not seem to be disputed. However, when
one attempts either to assess die influence of odier variables (such as die crea-
tion and operation of die EEC) on attitudes or, conversely, to assess the im-
pact of changing attitudinal patterns on transactions or political institutions,
many difficulties emerge. Donald Puchala has attempted to show diat, al-
diough diere is a generally high level of support for die EEC, this
support is not generalized into support for political union.12 Using survey
data collected for 1957 and 1962, Puchala has observed diat "increasing ap-
proval for the Common Market did not generally coincide widi increasing
support for political federation on die Continent between 1957 and 1962 "13
8
For the details of working out the RA index, in addition to some of its mathematical properties,
see I. Richard Savage and Karl W. Deutsch, "A Statistical Model o£ the Gross Analysis of Transaction
Flows," Econometrica, July i960 (Vol. 28, No. 3), pp. 551-572.
8
Jacques-Rene Rabier, L'Injormation des europeens et I'integration de I'Europe (No. 10) (Brussels:
Instirut d'etudes europeennes, Universite libre de Bruxelles, February 1965), p. 38.
1<!
Les Europeens: "Out" a I'Europe, Resultats commented d'un sondage d'opinion realise en janvier-
fevrier 1970 dans les six pays de la Communaute europeenne et en Grande-Bretagne (Brussels: Direction
g£n£rale de la presse et de Pinformation, Commission des Communautes europiennes, May 1970), pp.
4 and 11.
11
Ronald Inglehart, "An End to European Integration?" American Political Science Review, March
1967 (Vol. 61, No. 1), p. 91.
12
Donald J. Puchala, "The Common Market and Political Federation in Western European Opinion,"
International Studies Quarterly, March 1970 (Vol. 14, No. 1), p. 32. Puchala's data applies only to
France, West Germany, and Italy.
13
Ibid., p. 53.
 THEORY AND METHOD IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 231

This has led him to conclude that, attitudinally at least, economic integration
and political federation were quite distinct processes. Similarly, Roger Cobb
and Charles Elder have noted the general noncongruence of indicators of
integration and call into question the relations between transactions and mass
perceptions."
While most observers concede progress in economic integration, the picture
of political integration is much less optimistic. The defeat of British applica-
tion for entry into the EEC in 1963, the agricultural crisis of 1965-1966 and
the subsequent Luxembourg agreements, Charles de Gaulle's second "no" to
the United Kingdom in 1967, the increased importance of the Committee of
Permanent Representatives in the decisionmaking process,15 and the generally
attenuated role of the Commission of the European Communities all point to
this conclusion.
The optimism which argued that an unobtrusive series of limited steps would
eventually lead to political union has been eclipsed by a new pessimism which
fears that past progress toward integration may have brought the EEC to a
new equilibrium point far removed from both the model of the jealous nation-
state and the authoritative supranational organization. In short, by success-
fully segregating economic rewards from cultural and political preferences
the new community system has now made it possible for Europeans to enjoy
the fruits of a large market and customs union while at the same time sacri-
ficing neither cultural identity nor political autonomy. Discussion of the com-
mission as an embryonic federal executive has all but ceased and scholars in-
creasingly view it in its administrative capacity. In a provocative analysis of
the administrative-political role of the EEC commission David Coombes has
come to the conclusion that the commission's role has evolved toward that
of a classic bureaucracy.16 To state the pessimism more strongly, the fear is
that the EEC will become little more than an intergovernmental secretariat
dedicated to implementing the details of the common agricultural policy.
This picture contrasts sharply with the conclusions reached by William
Fisher and Carl Friedrich. Both scholars, working independently and em-
ploying very different techniques, have come to similar conclusions. Fisher,
defining political integration as the growth of the decisionmaking capacity
14
Roger W. Cobb and Charles Elder, International Community: A Regional and Global Study (New
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), p. 138.
15
Although the Committee of Permanent Representatives is not specifically mentioned in the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community (Rome Treaty), it has come to occupy a central role
in the community decisionmaking machinery. It is a delegate body for the Council of Ministers, im-
parting day-to-day administrative continuity to the irregular council sessions and preparing the work for
its meetings. It also acts as a clearinghouse for commission proposals and is in this sense akin to an
"early warning system," alerting the nationally minded council to any possible supranational maneuvers
on the part of the commission.
16
David Coombes, Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community: A Portrait of the Commis-
sion of the E.E.C. (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications [in cooperation with Political and Economic
Planning], 1970), p. 327.
232 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

of political institutions at the community level, has reached the conclusion

that the EEC went through three distinct stages of growth, 1958-1961, 1961-
1962, and 1962-1964." On the other hand, Friedrich's approach is to examine
in some depth the processes of formal and informal community formation
across a broad spectrum of social life. He has examined the activities of busi-
ness associations, agricultural groups, labor unions, and the academic com-
munity. His conclusion is that in some respects Europe can be viewed as an
emerging nation in the midst of a "federalizing" process.
The above discussion indicates at least four sources of confusion in the argu-
ment over the extent of European integration. These have to do with the
generic nature of the integration process, the types of scoring procedures
utilized, the nonsubstitutability of indicators, and the types of theoretical in-
ferences drawn from available data. The first problem arises when we use
the same term to describe a process that has a set of distinctive components,
as with political, economic, and attitudinal integration. The second arises
when the methods used to operationalize and score variables lead to different
descriptive and theoretical conclusions. The third source of confusion—the
nonsubstitutability of indicators—comes into play when one takes for granted
the relationship between several components of integration and thus substi-
tutes indicators of one component for indicators of another. The fourth area
of disagreement, a result of differences in interpretation of substantive theory,
arises because different observers will never draw precisely the same conclu-
sions from the same set of data. In this sense all theory is "empirically under-
determined."
I suggest these four problem areas with the hope that a recognition of them
may be the first step toward a resolution of some of the problems facing us.
A theory of integration must grapple with these four problems for the sim-
ple reason that any one of them can alter its conclusions. The failure to under-
stand the source of the conclusions of a theory inevitably results in contro-
versy. While this controversy generally assumes the form of substantive theory
(point four), it may in fact be an unrecognized version of point one, two, or
three. In this article I have chosen to focus specifically on some of the theo-
retical and methodological problems involved in the measurement and scor-
ing of international transactions. This is not to suggest that the other three
are less important; rather, it is a recognition that an adequate treatment of
all of them is a task beyond the scope of this article.

II. PROBLEMS OF MEASUREMENT AND SCORING

Clearly, it is not possible to determine whether the EEC is more integrated
today than it was in 1957-1958 on purely descriptive and technical grounds.
17
William E. Fisher, "An Analysis of the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigm o£ Political Integration," Inter-
national Organization, Spring 1969 (Vol. 23, No. 2), p. 273.
 THEORY AND METHOD IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 233

Given the lack of a pure, i.e., theoretically neutral, observation language a

straightforward descriptive approach simply does not provide the necessary
criteria for a disciplined solution of the problem: "What scoring procedure
ought one to use in measuring international integration?" A variety of strate-
gies are possible. Assuming that one has chosen some transactional measure of
integration such as trade, one could utilize any scoring procedure from abso-
lute trade values to some index of relative trade, e.g., the relative acceptance
index. What follows is, therefore, an attempt to answer a descriptive question
as well as an attempt to provide a theoretical and methodological rationale
for making defensible choices from a set of competing procedures for measur-
ing integration.
The problem centers on the appropriate scoring procedure to express trans-
action data between nations. Deutsch's and Savage's relative acceptance index
expresses interdependence between nations in terms of a score which reflects
the extent to which the transactions between them deviate from chance.18
Basically, the model works as follows: Any two countries transact a certain
quantity of trade with one another and with the world. If country A exports
10 percent of the world's total exports and country B imports 10 percent of
the world's imports, it is "expected" that country B will receive 10 percent
of country A's exports. If country B received no more than this, countries
A and B would not be considered integrated according to the model. This
follows from the assumption of origin-destination independence which asserts
that trade is distributed only in terms of the respective shares of each coun-
try's imports and exports. Substantive factors, such as geographic proximity,
cultural affinities, and historical ties, are treated as exogenous variables. The
model is null in the sense that it is based solely on the laws of probability
and in that it is primarily departures from the model that are interesting.
Deutsch and Savage correctly point out that computation of RA scores should
be only a first step in analysis. After departures from the model have been
isolated, substantive variables should be introduced to explain their occur-
rence.19
The RA index is valuable because it provides us with a "contextually de-
fined" measure of interaction and controls for the gross size effects of trade.20
If the total trade of country A increases by 15 percent and its trade with B
increases by 15 percent, Deutsch argues that we do not think of A and B as
more integrated. Their respective shares of each other's markets have re-
mained the same.
18
Savage and Deutsch, Econometrica, Vol. 28, No. 3, p. 551.
19
Ibid., p. 552.
20
Hayward Alker, Jr., and Donald Puchala, "Trends in Economic Partnership: The North Atlantic
Area, 1928-1963," in J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence,
Vol. 6 of International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 290.
234 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The formula for computing the RA index is:

in which
- i < RAij < oo .

Aij refers to the actual trade between two countries and Eu refers to their
expected trade. By allowing expected trade to enter into the computation of
the RA index both absolute trade levels and trends are controlled. (Trends
are viewed as increases or decreases in the mean level of world or regional
trade.) 21
The RA index is interesting to us because its use is tied to a particular sub-
stantive controversy with respect to European integration. On the basis of RA
scores Karl Deutsch and his associates have presented evidence to show that
European integration has come to a halt:
European integration has slowed since the mid-1950's, and it has stopped or
reached a plateau since 1957-58. In the 1957-58 period, Europe reached the
highest level of structural integration that it has ever had.22
The authors add that:
There are, to be sure, absolute increases after 1958 in trade, travel, postal cor-
respondence and the exchange of students, but all this can be accounted for by
the effects of prosperity and the general increase in the level of these activities
in the 1950's and early 1960's. There have been no increases in integration in
regard to all these transactions beyond what one would expect from mere ran-
dom probability and increase in prosperity in the countries concerned.23
These findings concerning the leveling-off of European integration since
1957-1958 have been criticized by Ronald Inglehart as well as others.24 Ingle-
hart has noted that "far from finding a stagnation of integrative processes
since 1958, I would argue that, in some respects, European integration may
have moved into full gear only since 1958."25 Lindberg has noted that he and
Ernst Haas have similarly argued that "it is since 1957 that integration has
made its greatest strides."26
This disagreement is not in itself disturbing. Conflict over theory may
lead to "crucial tests" which may produce change, cognitive reshuffling, and
theoretical refinement. For the most part, however, parties to the controversy
have failed to meet one another on common ground. Inglehart has made a
21
Paul Smoker, "A Time Series Analysis of Sino-Indian Relations" (Paper presented at the Second
International Peace Research Association Conference, Tallberg, Sweden, June 17—19, 1967), p . 3.
22
Deutsch et al., p. 218.
23
Ibid., p. 219.
24
Inglehart, American Political Science Review, Vol. 6 1 , No. 1, p . 9 1 . See also Fisher, International
Organization, Vol. 23, No. 2, p. 273.
26
Inglehart, American Political Science Review, Vol. 6 1 , No. 1, p . 9 1 .
26
Lindberg, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, p . 344.
 THEORY AND METHOD IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 235

serious attempt to deal with the RA index but he has criticized so many of
Deutsch's findings in terms of his own political socialization data that it is
impossible to identify the locus of the disagreement. Do the differences arise
from the respective variations in data (socialization data versus transactional
data), from different scoring procedures (the RA index versus simple per-
centage data), or purely from differences in interpretation ?
This controversy highlights four important problems of general interest for
the social sciences. The first problem is the lack of criteria by which to assess
evidence. In the absence of such criteria it is impossible to evaluate opposing
arguments and, likewise, it becomes difficult to assess progress toward the
solution of the problem. Both Inglehart and Deutsch present persuasive cases:
Deutsch says we must control for size; Inglehart says we must not penalize
nations just because they account for a large proportion of world trade. While
these arguments appeal to our sense of plausibility and reasonableness, they
are not necessarily desirable in terms of theory construction. In addition, we
do not assess the arguments in terms of identical and explicit standards.
The second problem arises because the controversy is carried on outside of
a common mutually accepted theoretical framework. The underlying assump-
tion of Deutsch's model is one of scarcity. There is a certain amount of inte-
gration to be divided among various countries. The RA index is based on a
"share of the pie" model. The total size of the pie does not increase; only the
allocations to individual countries change. Inglehart's notion of integration
seems to be based on an expanding pie model.27 Not only may the respective
portions of the pie change but the total size may also increase or decrease.
Adopting Inglehart's assumptions it is possible to imagine four or five regions
of the world becoming more integrated whereas this is very improbable with
the RA index.28
27
Sec Ronald Inglehart and Robert Schoenbcrgcr, "Communications and Political Mobilization: De-
velopment o£ a European Orientation in Great Britain, France, and Italy" (Paper delivered at the an-
nual American Political Science Association Convention, Washington, 1968), especially pp. 2-6.
28
The assumption here is that the world is composed of only four or five regions. The RA index
technically is not based on perfect zero-sum assumptions in the sense that increases in integration be-
tween any two actors must be canceled out elsewhere in the system. However, it is based on assumptions
that may be described as "highly competitive." For example, imagine a trading system of three actors
(A, B, and C). Imagine that A's RA score with B increases. It is technically possible for A's RA score
with C to increase also. Roughly, the conditions under which this can occur require: 1) an approximate
equality of actor A's raw trade in imports and exports with actors B and C; 2) an approximately equal
increase of A's imports and exports with B and C; and 3) A's increases with B and C must be greater
than the increases between B and C.
A rough idea o£ the empirical competitiveness o£ the RA score is provided by our data. We have a
three-actor system, West Germany, the EEC, and the world. If the RA score has no scarcity biases, we
should expect West Germany's trade (measured in RA scores) with the EEC and the world to be un-
correlated. In fact, West Germany's exports to the EEC and to the world correlate at -.836 and imports
correlate at -.960. Thus, despite the fact that West Germany's total trade increased with both the EEC
and the world, the RA scores for trade with these two systems are negatively related.
I am grateful to Raymond Duvall of Northwestern University for working out the mathematical
properties of the RA index as well as providing simulated data on the behavior of this index in a variety
of international trade systems.
236 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The third problem raised by the controversy over measures of integration

involves the utilization of different data by Deutsch and Inglehart. As men-
tioned previously Deutsch's data is derived primarily from transaction flows,
particularly trade, while Inglehart's data is obtained through survey research
and reflects an attempt to measure loyalty to European symbols and institu-
tions.29 Ideally, substantive findings will be invariant with respect to different
methods of data collection, provided that the data attempts to get at the same
thing. There is as yet little evidence to indicate whether attitudinal integra-
tion (community of loyalties and sentiment) is part of a general construct of
"integration" or whether it is distinct. Our very common notions of cultural
lag suggest that attitudes, loyalties, etc., may follow transactional integration
by quite long periods of time. If this is the case or if shifts in attitudes occur
before transactional integration, it may not be fair to criticize results based
on one kind of data by referring to results based on other kinds of data.30
A final problem results from the fact that, by and large, RA scores have
been treated as empirical findings rather than as scores to be used in tests
of substantive theory. Savage and Deutsch explicitly pointed out this danger
when they formulated the RA index.51 Despite this there has been a general
tendency to replace tests of substantive hypotheses with presentation of tables
of distributions of RA scores. Such tables may give us an indication of the
extent to which trading patterns deviate from a random model but we are
given no clue as to the substantive variables which might account for these
departures. The test of a substantive hypothesis suggested by Steven Brams
is the only one I know of in which RA scores were entered as data.32

III. T H E RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEORY AND MEASUREMENT

The above discussion indicates that resolution of the problems involved in

measuring integration is unlikely unless we simultaneously focus on problems
of theory and measurement. Unfortunately, the inseparability of these two
realms is seldom recognized at all and, even if superficially acknowledged,
is rarely taken seriously in the actual conduct of research operations.33 Opera-
tionalism has left social scientists under the illusion that concepts will be
29
Deutsch actually utilizes five streams of evidence including survey research and content analysis.
However, Deutsch bases his strongest conclusions on trade data and other measures of "structural inte-
gration." See Deutsch et al., pp. 218-220.
30
Joseph S. Nye, in his brilliant article, "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measure-
ment," International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 855-880, persuasively argues that political inte-
gration may not only be different from economic and social integration but political integration itself
may include several distinct components.
31
Savage and Deutsch, Econometrica, Vol. 28, No. 3, p. 552.
32
Steven J. Brams, "Transaction Flows in the International System," American Political Science Re-
view, December 1966 (Vol. 60, No. 4), pp. 880-898.
83
See, for example, Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "The Measurement Problem: A Gap between the Lan-
guages of Theory and Research," in Hubert M. Blalock and Ann B. Blalock, eds., Methodology in Social
Research (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), pp. 5-27.
 THEORY AND METHOD IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 237

theoretically significant if they are precisely defined and measured. But while
operationalism was fairly successful in providing criteria for precise, inter-
subjective concepts, it was not nearly as successful in terms of leading to theo-
retical terms with broad scope. The present controversy concerning the level
of European integration can never be resolved with respect to research and
measurement considerations alone, just as an exclusive focus on theory or de-
scriptive argument is futile. Yet, the argument has been carried out in just
these terms as if some self-evident descriptive answer were waiting there to be
found by the straightforward application of some neutral measurement lan-
guage.
Every research method carries a theoretical bias in its assessment of reality.
If countries are considered more integrated when the value of their trade in-
creases, then integration is viewed in terms of growth characteristics. If the
RA index is used, then integration is viewed in terms of changes in preferen-
tial behavior. Most of the methods used to measure international integration—
from absolute trade figures and percentage scores to measures which control
for national income and the RA index—frequently argue that these control
terms are needed since they neutralize factors that otherwise would lead to
artifactual results. But what is artifactual is far from a settled matter. One will
probably want to control for increases in trade due to inflation, but whether
one wants to control for changes due to higher gross national product (GNP),
increased growth rates, or general increases in the level of world trade is by
no means a closed matter. There is simply no extratheoretical solution to the
problem.
We mentioned that the RA index could be roughly thought of as a zero-
sum measure whereby increases or decreases in integration between any two
actors would probably be offset elsewhere by changes with other actors.
Deutsch's communication perspective leads him to view integration in terms
of the relative density of communication flows, i.e., transactions. There are
thus two areas in which one must attempt to introduce controls, between
members of some integrating system and third parties and between the supra-
national system and its component units, in this case nation-states. Thus, it is
important to note not only that integration has reached a plateau with respect
to diird members but also that there has been a relative decline in interna-
tional life compared with the intensity of domestic activity and transactions.34
In contrast to this view of integration which stresses that the development
of domestic and supranational systems are distinctive, even competitive, con-
cerns other authors choose to view integration as a process of mingling and
blending activity and institutions at different levels. Lindberg and Stuart
Scheingold have discussed in some detail how the institutional system of the
34
Karl W. Dcutsch, "The Propensity to International Transactions," Political Studies, June i960
(Vol. 8, No. 2), pp. 147-155.
238 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

European community involves a symbiotic relationship between national and

supranational elements. The thrust of their analysis is that it is no longer
fruitful to view community and national systems as antagonistic or in terms
of one replacing the other. The involvement and co-optation of national elites,
the utilization of national channels, and the preservation of national political
structures, far from posing a threat to integration at the supranational level,
may actually reinforce it.35
There is nothing necessarily right or wrong with any of these assumptions.
However, assumptions should be made explicit and their consequences must
be taken into account. There are a variety of examples from other fields to
support either of these approaches. Analogues to a theory of integration based
on an "expanding pie" model are provided by the notion of the cooperative
game, by theories of political development which stress total growth of sys-
tem characteristics such as the capacity of the political system to control and
command societal resources, and by notions of power such as provided by
Talcott Parsons.36 Analogues to Deutsch's theory are provided by the zero-sum
game, by the problem of distribution in a scarce economy, and by the phe-
nomenon of relative deprivation.
In brief, the argument here is that procedures have implications for theory
and vice versa. A theoretical bias inheres in each method and each theoretical
perspective suggests certain practical research operations. The dilemma which
we wish to avoid has two facets. One facet is a narrow operationalism in which
each measurement operation defines a separate concept. Such an approach,
in which the domains of indicators and concepts are coextensive, sacrifices
the deductive power of concepts in favor of precision. The other facet is the
assumption that the language of measurement is neutral with respect to theory
and can therefore be applied without attention to its consequences.

IV. CRITERIA FOR JUDGING THE VALIDITY OF SCORING PROCEDURES

My argument has been that the crux of the problem of measuring integra-
tion is the lack of criteria by which to assess the state of integration. I offer
two criteria both of which are based on the belief that what is involved here
is really a question of validity. These two criteria are 1) the convergence be-
tween one particular scoring procedure and others in attempting to measure
the same construct and 2) the differential predictive and explanatory capacity
of a variety of different scoring procedures for the same raw variable. The
35
Lindberg and Scheingold, pp. 32, 37. See also the excellent articles on the preparation of commu-
nity decisions at the national level by Theodor Holtz, Pierre Gerbert, Marco Olivetti, Guy de Muyser,
and Robert De Bruin in La Decision dans Us Communautes europeennes (Brussels: Presses universitaires
de Bruxelles, 1969).
36
Parsons's conception of power is one that is seen as infinitely expandable depending upon the
number of functional contexts in which it operates. See "On the Concept of Political Power," in Talcott
Parsons, Sociological Theory and Modern Society (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 297-355.
 THEORY AND METHOD IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 239

former criterion utilizes the notions of both reliability and validity especially
as formulated by Donald Campbell and Donald Fiske.3' The latter borrows
from a variety of sources but especially from the literature of construct
validity.38

Convergence
The criterion of convergence is satisfied when, in the attempt to measure
a construct, a variety of independent methods arrive at similar results. The
independence of methods is crucial here in distinguishing validity from re-
liability.39 William Scott has correctly argued that "it is prudent to intercorre-
late quite different instrument types, if their correspondence is to be attrib-
uted primarily to common content."40 To the extent that a particular method
produces results which are artifactual these results will tend not to agree with
those derived from highly different measurement techniques. Thus, given a
set of scoring techniques, we will place more confidence in those which show
highest agreement with all others, ceteris paribus. To the extent that none of
the various scoring procedures displays significant (in the nonstatistical sense)
overlap we must conclude either that each technique taps a different con-
struct, that the construct is not unidimensional, or that a substantial portion of
the variance results from variance in the methods and not from variance in
the substantive variables that we are attempting to measure.
The construct of interest here is "economic integration," particularly the
economic integration of West Germany into die European Economic Com-
munity. Two indicators have been selected to measure this construct: West
German imports from and exports to EEC countries. Four different scoring
techniques have been applied to these two indicators.41 Each of the scoring
procedures is treated as a separate method.
The four scoring procedures are as follows: i ) Raw data for imports and
exports is used. This technique does not control for internal economic growth,
total growth of trade in the world or region, or for West Germany's changing
share of EEC and world markets. 2) Preoccupation ratios are used.42 A pre-
occupation ratio (PR) is a measure of relative integration. It assesses the
37
Donald T. Campbell and Donald Fiske, "Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-
Multimethod Matrix," Psychological Bulletin, March 1959 (Vol. 56, No. 2), pp. 81-105.
38
Lee Cronbach and Paul Meehl, "Construct Validity in Psychological Tests," Psychological Bulletin,
May 1955 (Vol. 52, No. 3), pp. 281-302.
39
Campbell and Fiske, Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 56, No. 2, p. 83.
40
William A. Scott, "Attitude Measurement," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., The
Handbook, of Social Psychology, Vol. 2: Research Methods (2nd cd.; Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley
Publishing Co., 1968), p. 254.
41
This results in a "multimethod matrix," a variant on the Campbell-Fiske theme. Technically, there
are four methods and one trait since imports and exports are viewed as indicators of the same construct.
We thus expect high interindicator correlations and are not concerned here with discriminant validity.
42
James V. Toscano, "Transaction Flow Analysis in Metropolitan Areas: Some Preliminary Explora-
tions," in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., The Integration of Political Communities (Phila-
delphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), pp. 102-103.
24O INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

amount of integration between two units by controlling for integration with

some third unit. For example, we can express West Germany's economic in-
tegration into the EEC according to the following simple formula:
I (EEC)
= =
PR T~i TJT 0 imports)
I (world)
in which the strength of West Germany's linkages to the EEC is gauged in
relation to its ties with the rest of the world. This technique controls for gross
size effects such as an increase in the total volume of trade which one country
transacts with the world. 3) The relative acceptance index, previously de-
scribed, is used. This technique controls not only for an exporting country's
share of the world market but also for the importing country's share of the
import market.43 4) Bruce Russett's "chooser-chosen" method is used. Russett
is interested in the relative impact of a country's trade on political processes
in other countries. He assumes that "the political effects of trade are subject
to decreasing marginal returns?" The impact of country j on country i is
measured according to the formula:
III
Y,
in which Tu equals the total exports plus imports between two countries (or
a country and a region) i and j and Y equals the total national income of
country i.45
One way to assess convergence is to evaluate the degree of correlation be-
tween independent methods. The following matrix presents the correlations
obtained between four methods and two indicators (imports and exports) of
the same construct. The import-export data is distributed longitudinally over
35 points in time from 1958 to 1966 using quarter-years as the basic observa-
tion point. (See table 1.)
As we would expect, most of the coefficients are very high. The correlations
of the RA indices, especially the RA index of exports, are generally lower
than the others. One way to express the notion of convergence more accu-
rately is to add all the columns in the matrix and rank each method/indicator
score according to its average intercorrelation (table 2). The method which
produces the highest average intercorrelation may be thought of as possessing
43
Karl Deutsch points out that i£ two countries double their shares o£ world trade "while the average
trade of the rest of the world remains unchanged, and if their mutual trade were proportional to their
respective shares in world trade," then the total flow of trade between these two countries will increase
fourfold. See Deutsch et al., p. 228.
44
Bruce M. Russett, " 'Regional' Trading Patterns, 1938-1963," International Studies Quarterly, De-
cember 1968 (Vol. 12, No. 4), p. 362.
45
This technique is not stricdy comparable to the other three because it introduces a new term (Y)
and because it considers imports and exports in a combined way rather than separately. The assumption
here is that the impact of EEC trade on West Germany can be treated roughly as West German im-
ports from the EEC and West Germany's impact on the EEC treated comparable to West German ex-
ports to Common Market countries.
 THEORY AND METHOD IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 24I

the "greatest convergence" and the least unique method variance. In this sense
we would also have confidence that the method is a most valid one.

TABLE I . WEST GERMAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE EEC: CONVERGENCE

OF FOUR SCORING PROCEDURES

Method 1 Method Q Method 3 Method 4

Procedure Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports

Method 1
Imports 1.000
Exports (-955) 1.000
•
Method 2
Imports •936 .884 1.000
Exports •796 •913 (.798) 1.000

Method 3
Imports •557 421 .740 .308 1.000
Exports -•509 -•329 -•679 -.169 (-.980) 1.000

Method 4
Imports •833 •830 •834 •736 .486 -425 1 -ooo
Exports •777 .78. •765 .688 •4'7 --357 (-964) 'ooo

NOTE: The figures in parentheses are reliability coefficients. Pearson's r is used. N = 3 5 .

TABLE 2. CONVERGENCE TEST OF THE FOUR SCORING PROCEDURES

Method i Method 2 Method 3 Method 4

Scoring
Procedure Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports

Method i
CO CO

Imports I.OOO •796

CO CO
CO O

•955 •936 •557 -•509 •777

Exports •955 1.000 .884 •9'3 421 -329 .781
Method 2
CD CD

Imports .884 1.000 •740

CO O>

•798
O) r-

-•679 •834 •765

Exports •913 •798 1.000 .308 -.169 •736 .688
Method 3
Imports •557 421 .740 .308 1.000 -.980 486 417
Exports -509 -•329 -679 -.169 -.980 1.000 -425 -•357
Method 4
Imports •833 .830 •834 •736 .486 -425 1.000 •964
Exports •777 .78. •765 .688 .417 -357 .964 1.000
CD CO
CO O)

X = .621 •636 .611 .581 .278 -492 •576

O CO

XPr = •859 •873 .841 .786 •795

NOTE: XPr refers to the mean of the purified correlation coefficient. It is equal to the average inter-
corrdation coefficient omitting the two RA scores. Pearson's r is used. N=35.
242 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The average correlation for all methods except the RA method appears to
be quite high especially if we consider that the low RA scores are included
in the composite scores. The XPr ("average purified correlation") indicates
how much higher these correlations are when calculated without the RA co-
efficients. Table 3 ranks these methods in terms of the strength of the inter-
indicator correlation.

TABLE 3. RANKINGS OF METHODS BY AVERAGE INTERINDICATOR CORRELATION

Interindicator Correlation Composite Score*

1. Method 1, indicator 2 .636

2. Method 1, indicator 1 .621
Method
3. ,Method
- . . .2, .indicator
. 1 .611
~ '•
1 Merhnd '1 -629
4. Method 4, indicator 1 .608 2. Method 2 .596
5. Method 2,
a, indicator 2 .581 3. Method 4 .592
6. Method 4, indicator 2 .576 4 Method 3 -.107
7. Method 3, indicator 1 .278
8. Method 3, indicator 2 -492

a
Exports and imports combined.

The highest scores are produced by method i, indicators i and 2 (.621 and
.636). Method 2, indicator 1 ranks second with .611, then method 4, indicator
1 with .608, and method 2, indicator 2 with .581. The RA method has the low-
est average intercorrelation with exports and the second lowest with imports.
It is striking to note that the highest composite score (considering exports and
imports combined) is yielded by the raw data on exports and imports, a value
of .629. Method 2, the preoccupation ratio, is close behind with a combined
score of .596. Russett's method is next (.592), and the RA index is the least
convergent with an index of -.107.40
Perhaps a bivariate correlation matrix cannot give us the information we
need. For example, two bivariate correlations (rAB, rBC) may be high in-
ternally and yet rAC will be low. Any two variables (A and C) may share
variance with a construct by virtue of common variation with a third variable
(B).47 Factor analysis may help us with this problem. Table 4 presents the
results of an orthogonal rotation.
40
I hasten to add that this does not invalidate the RA index although it does decrease our confi-
dence in it. The criterion o£ convergence could be looked upon as a kind o£ "halfway house" for validity.
In principle, though, any construct should be amenable to measurement through a variety of methods.
If, after exhaustive attempts to find other techniques sensitive to the same variance as the RA index,
the RA index still stands alone, we would be tempted to draw the conclusion that the variance is due
to special properties of the method. (In this line of reasoning, in particular with respect to the view of
convergence as a "halfway house," I am indebted to Thomas Milburn, professor of social psychology,
DePaul University.)
47
On this point see Benjamin Fruchter, Introduction to Factor Analysis (Princeton, N.J: D. Van
Nostrand Co., 1954), pp. 5-6.
 THEORY AND METHOD INT INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 243

TABLE 4. FACTOR ANALYSIS OF MULTIPLY SCORED INTEGRATION DATA

Scoring Procedure Factor i Factor 2

Method 1
Imports .881 .371
Exports .954 .181
Method 2
Imports .809 .558
Exports .919 .035
Method 3
Imports .256 .955
Exports --158 --986
Method 4
Imports .881 .285
Exports .855 .222
Percentage variance 61.161 3 • -939

NOTE: The loadings in this table are for the rotated matrix.

All variables have high loadings on factor i except imports and exports
measured by die RA mediod (.256 and -.158). This factor explains over 61
percent of die variance in die correlation matrix. Also, on factor 2 die two
RA scores behave very differendy from the odier variables. Imports load at
.955 and exports at -.986. These two variables define die second factor and
account for most of die variance. Aldiough it is true diat die two RA variables
show strong loadings in the opposite direction, diis is not necessarily incon-
sistent widi die interpretation diat diey are bodi tapping the same dimension.
If die RA index is sensitive to changes in preferential behavior, it would be
sensitive to bodi positive and negative changes.
This supports our interpretation of die correlation matrix diat die RA index
is least convergent widi odier mediods. It also suggests diat die RA mediod
may be sensitive to a dimension of integration different than diat tapped by
odier scoring procedures. Theoretically, we may diink of factor i as measur-
ing economic integration where integration includes growth characteristics
in die individual country, die region, and die world. Factor 2 may be sensi-
tive only to changes in preferential behavior, what Deutsch calls "structural
behavior." It probably is not sensitive to size-effect changes, volume changes,
and growdi variations.
Deutsch's view of integration comes close to Kennedi Boulding's idea of
structural growdi/ 8 Odier views of integration which stress die growdi of
48
Kenneth Boulding has developed a threefold typology of growth: simple growth, population growth,
and structural growth. Simple growth and structural growth are relevant for our purposes. Boulding
thinks of simple growth as "the growth or decline of a single variable or quantity by accretion or de-
244 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

structures and functions at the suprasystem level are more directly concerned
with the "mere effects of size and prosperity," i.e., simple growth. The growth
of political structures, institutions, and functions at one level (e.g., the EEC)
may leave patterns of political activities and capacities at the nation-state level
quite undisturbed. Indeed, it may even encourage further growth of these
individual nation-states.
While the evidence here suggests that raw data, preoccupation ratios, and
the Russett method may all be valid techniques for scoring transaction data,
there are two caveats we should mention. First, convergent validity is ex-
tremely impressive when one has great confidence in one of the measures
beforehand. In the absence of this confidence one must accept commonality
of multiple measurements as the only acceptable evidence. The risk of circu-
larity here is decreased to the extent that the methods are independent. Sec-
ond, as Johan Galtung has stated,
"the proof of the pudding is in the eating," i.e., what can be explained and
predicted from the data collected is the important thing, not how much "con-
sistency" tiiere is between forms of data collection with perhaps no theoretical
reason for consistency at all between them.49

Construct Validity
The question arises as to whether a set of methods can yield consistent re-
sults and still be invalid. One interpretation is that the three methods whose
results converge are contaminated (e.g., by method variance) in the same
direction. The only uncontaminated method in this case would be the RA
index and its unique noncontamination would explain its lonely nonconver-
gence. In order for this argument to be acceptable the nonconvergent method
(the RA index) should have greater predictive ability (according to a theory)
than the convergent methods. This brings us directly to our second criterion,
the predictive and explanatory capacity of various measures. This approach is
pletion" ("Toward a General Theory of Growth," in Joseph John Spengler and Otis Dudley Duncan,
eds., Population Theory and Policy: Selected Readings [Glencoe, 111: Free Press, 1956], p. 109). Struc-
tural growth, on the other hand, consists not of a scale or volume change but of a change in the com-
plexity of a system or in the relationships of the parts of the system to one another. We notice a strik-
ing parallel between this concept and Deutsch's conception of integration as reflected in the RA index:
This index thus measures by how many more or fewer percent these two countries deal with one
another than they could be expected to do according to random probability and the mere size of
their total foreign trade. The RA index separates, therefore, the actual results of preferential be-
havior and structural integration from the mere effects of the size and prosperity of countries.
[Deutsch et al, p. 220.] :
I do not, however, mean to imply that Deutsch's concept of integration and Boulding's idea of struc-
tural growth are identical. Boulding's notion of structural growth also includes changes in system com-
plexity in which the system may gain new components without these additions being offset elsewhere in
the system. This kind of growth is epigenetic in Etzioni's sense. See Amitai Etzioni, "The Epigenesis of
Political Communities at the International Level," American Journal of Sociology, January 1963 (Vol.
68, No. 4), pp. 407-421.
49
Johan Galtung, Theory and Methods of Social Research (New York: Columbia University Press,
IQ
67)> P- i 2 7- This quote should be seen in light of a position on which Galtung was commenting; it
is not necessarily his own position.
 THEORY AND METHOD IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 245

straightforward: "To make clear the meaning of a concept is to set forth the
laws within which it occurs."50 Thus, we can simply embody the alternatively
scored data in the same substantive propositions and ask what the explanatory
import of each is. This approach to validation, unlike the convergence ap-
proach, immediately raises considerations about the structure of science and
the laws in terms of which it is composed. The construct validation approach
simultaneously involves the validation of a construct and a theory. The ra-
tionale of this approach is concisely summarized by Helen Peak:
The essence of the approach to validation through testing predictions from
theory may be stated briefly. The meaning of any measured process is given
not only by a description of operations used in isolating it from other processes
and in assigning some index of quantity but also by knowledge of its influence
on other processes and their influence on it. . . . This involves all the problems
of formulating theory, deducing consequences, and testing the deductions un-
der conditions of controlled observation.51

It will be convenient to apply this test in four steps: i) specifying the con-
cept, 2) embedding the concept in a theory, 3) deducing testable theorems
from it, and 4) presenting and evaluating the evidence. The concept of inter-
est here is economic integration and the theory with which we will be dealing
is that of "spillover." According to this theory the greatest amount of spill-
over is expected from the least technical sectors. It is expected that integration
in technical sectors will remain more or less isolated while integration in non-
technical areas will generate effects in other sectors.52 We deal with the third
step of our test, deducing testable theorems, by selecting two sectors within
the EEC, transport and agriculture, as examples of technical and nontechni-
cal integration. According to the theory more spillover will occur between our
measures of economic integration and political integration in agriculture, a
nontechnical sector of the EEC, than in transport, a technical sector.53
A word should be mentioned concerning the operationalization of the
variable political integration. Political integration is viewed as the emergence
and development of political structures and activities around supranational
units. Thus, the EEC can be said to become more integrated as it acquires
decisionmaking capabilities, the power to make binding decisions, the power
to implement these decisions, and the power to adjudicate disputes between
member states. We can thus utilize decisions, regulations, recommendations,
50
Cronbach and Mcehl, Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 52, No. 3, p. 290.
51
Helen Peak, "Problems of Objective Observation," in Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz, cds., Re-
search Methods in the Behavorial Sciences (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), pp. 288-289.
52
This is almost the opposite relationship from the one suggested by David Mitrany in his A Word-
ing Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization (Chi-
cago: Quadrangle Books, 1966).
63
There is no space to fully defend the selection of these two sectors here. Briefly, I considered the
extent to which different groups were involved in the issue area, the extent to which autonomy is given
to experts, the degree of involvement of key political decisionmakers in the decisions of the sectors, and
the degree of problem-solving versus purely political (e.g., satisfying group interests) activity.
246 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

and other indicators of the political activity of the Commission and the Coun-
cil of Ministers of the European Communities to measure integration. Any
composite indices which are formed on the basis of these indicators can be
thought of as "institutional output scores" as suggested by William Fisher.54
The following procedure was utilized. There are basically four community
institutions empowered to make decisions that have some political and legal
force in the EEC: The Council of Ministers of the European Communities,
the Commission of the European Communities, the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, and the European Parliament. Both the Council of
Ministers and the Commission of the European Communities have the power
to issue regulations, decisions, directives, and recommendations; the European
Parliament can submit questions to the commission and the council although
the Rome Treaty provides no legal basis for submitting questions to the coun-
cil.55 The following list explains the differences between the four types of
action:
1) Court communications—these are letters and other information concern-
ing a case which the court receives and sends out.
2) Court judgments—judgments are true judicial acts resulting from con-
sideration of alleged infractions of community laws. Judgments of the Court
of Justice are directly enforceable in all member states.
3) Court rulings—rulings of the court are, for the most part, procedural in
nature and concern the manner in which a case is litigated.
4) Court decisions—decisions are preliminary in nature and usually concern
interpretation of the Rome Treaty or acts of community institutions.
5) Number of new cases considered by the court—this indicator is intended
to reflect the volume of new legal activity undertaken by the court.
6) Parliamentary questions—the number and kind of written questions
•submitted by the members of the European Parliament to members of the
•Council of Ministers or the Commission of the European Communities.
7) Council regulations—these do not differ in legal status from regulations
•of the Commission of the European Communities. However, in substantive
terms, their content is different; they usually apply to more general, political
•concerns than commission regulations which are usually reserved for "those
technical areas in which the principles and the general policy have been de-
fined in the Treaty."56
8) Council information—this indicator reflects the amount of internal (to
the EEC) communication which takes place between the Council of Ministers
of the European Communities and EEC institutions, especially the Economic
and Social Committee.
54
Fisher, International Organization, Vol. 23, No. 2, p . 273.
55
Murray Forsyth, " T h e Parliament of the European Communities," Political and Economic Planning,
March 1964 (Vol. 30, N o . 478), p . 52.
56
Leon N . Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford, Calif:
.Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 35.
 THEORY AND METHOD IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 247

9) Commission regulations—regulations have general scope, are binding in

all respects, and are directly applicable in all member states. Regulations are
distinct in terms of the generality of their scope and the immediacy of their
application, i.e., they are directly applicable and do not have to pass through
the administrative apparatus of member states.57
10) Commission directives and decisions—directives are obligatory with
respect to the goals they assign but leave to the agencies in question the choice
of the means to carry out these goals.53 Decisions are binding but do not pos-
sess the general scope of regulations. They become individual in the sense
that they designate a destination.59
11. Council and commission recommendations—recommendations are not
legally binding and only reflect the wishes of the issuing institutions.60
12. Delegations and foreign missions received by the EEC—this is a crude
measure of the level of diplomatic involvement of the EEC and its participa-
tion in external affairs.
13. Expenditures of the European Development Fund—this is a measure
of the extent to which the EEC allocates the resources to development projects
in other countries.
The intensity of activity of these institutions was observed over a period of
ten years (1958-1967) at three-month intervals to obtain an index of the politi-
cal development of the community. Thus, we are presented with a time-
series distribution of data over 40 points (10 years x 4 intervals per year).
One way of gauging the development of integration would be to examine
the growth or decline of each of these indicators over the 40 points in time.
After observing the number of regulations, decisions, etc., in each interval
we correlated each of the indicators to see which of them formed homoge-
neous sets, standardized the data by transforming the raw scores into standard
scores, and added the unweighted indicators together to form composite in-
dices of political integration. On the basis of correlation analysis and subse-
quent factor analysis we derived one composite index for political integration
in agriculture and transport and four for political activity in all issue areas
combined. The way in which we arrived at our decisionmaking index may
help to illustrate the general logic of this procedure.
The general measurement model employed here is the "additive-response
model."61 This model assumes that each of a correlated set of indicators "re-
flects" a portion of the concept and that, therefore, one can add these indica-
tors to form a composite measure which is less fallible than any single indica-
tor. The following correlation matrix gives an idea of how homogeneous (and
thus how additive) our indicators of political integration are.
57
Dusan Sidjanski, L'Originalite des Commtinautes europeennes et la repartition de lews pouvoirs
(Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1961), p. 25.
68
Sidjanski, p. 25.
59
Ibid.
e
° Ibid.
61
See Scott in Lindzey and Aronson, p. 254.
248 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

TABLE 5. COMPOSITE MEASURE OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION

Indicator
Indicator 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Parliamentary questions 1.000
2. Council regulations •679* 1.000
3. Council information •509* .466* 1.000
4. Commission regulations •332* .710* .221 1.000
5. Commission directives •528* •553* •723* •369* 1.000
6. Commission recommendations .408* .420* •548* •'73 .690* 1.000

NOTE: Values statistically significant at the .05 level are indicated by an asterisk. N=4O.

The first thing to note is that almost all the indicators are highly correlated,
i.e., there is a great deal of shared variation which is statistically significant.
Yet, there are hints that there may be subgroupings within the total correlated
set, e.g., council regulations have a very high correlation with both parlia-
mentary questions (-\-.6yg) and commission regulations (+.710) while com-
mission recommendations correlate at +.690 with commission directives.
There appear to be complex, multivariate relationships here with which a
bivariate correlation matrix is not equipped to deal. Factor analysis may help
us discover some of these more subtle relationships.62 The following factor
structure offers interpretations of the data that were barely hinted at in the
correlation matrix:
TABLE 6. FACTOR ANALYSIS OF INDICATORS OF ALL POLITICAL INTEGRATION I N THE
EEC
Indicator Factor i Factor 2 Factor 3

1. Court communications •572 •552 -.241

2. Court j udgments .822 -.018 •043
3. Court rulings .064 -.204 -.508
4. Court decisions •35' .025 -.102
5. Court new cases •832 •340 -.225
6. Parliamentary questions .202 .689 -.418
7. Council regulations .163 .908 -.129
8. Council information •765 •294 -337
9. Commission regulations .112 .819 .205
10. Commission directives and decisions .684 .467 -•309
11. Council and commission recommendations .226 •349 -.701
12. Delegations and foreign missions received by EEC .201 .029 -.801
13. Expenditures of European Development Fund .182 •350 -•745
Percentage variance 27-709 21.410 18.175

NOTE: The loadings in this table are for the rotated matrix.
62
Factor analysis is a multivariate technique particularly helpful in determining whether a given set
of data (the data may be correlation coefficients) contains one, two, or "n" sets of organized properties.
In short, it is very useful when one wants to dimensionalize an array of data.
 THEORY AND METHOD IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 249

The factor structure reinforces the suggestion that all indicators of politi-
cal integration do not belong to the same dimension. It seems clear that
factor 1 represents a rule-adjudication dimension. This dimension is defined
by communications of the court, judgments of the court, and new cases
brought before the court. Indicators 8 and 10 (council information and com-
mission directives and decisions), also part of this factor, probably reflect the
beginnings of implementive activity in the EEC. The fact that two "adminis-
trative" indicators are part of the same dimension as the activity of the court
may reflect the relatively low level of structural differentiation existing in the
community today.
The interpretation of the second factor is clearer. Indicators 6, 7, and 9
(parliamentary questions, council regulations, and commission regulations)
define this factor. We remember that council and commission regulations are
legally binding and have the force of real community law. In addition, they
are directly enforceable in all member states. We thus label this factor our
rulemaking dimension. The procedure from here was to standardize these
indicators and add them together to form a composite index of political
decisionmaking.
The above propositions will be tested through a correlation analysis. Before
turning to this evidence, however, it should be made clear just what it is the
theory "expects." First, we expect higher absolute correlations between method
1 (raw data) and our dependent variables. We expect lower correlations with
methods 2, 3, and 4. This is because the theory on which the empirical test is
based is not grounded in assumptions about scarcity or relative share of the
market. We postulate a relationship between economic and political integra-
tion which is not concerned with the "share" of a particular country's trade
with a particular region. If West Germany increases its trade with the EEC
by 15 percent and with the rest of the world by 30 percent, we still expect
the hypothesized spillover processes to occur. Second, the theory suggests that
we are interested in the difference in the respective coefficients of strategic
sets of variables in addition to their absolute values. In other words, we are
interested in which predictor variable is most discerning among our integra-
tion measures for agriculture and transport. Correlations may be high for
both agriculture and transport but this by itself would neither confirm the
theory nor validate any of the scoring procedures. Table 7 presents evidence
for our hypotheses.
The first thing to note is that method 1 does yield very high correlations
as predicted. Method 2 also produces high correlations but methods 3 and 4
both are lower. A useful summarizing measure is the mean intervariable cor-
relation (XVr) which is presented in the right-hand portion of the matrix.
The highest predictive capacity is given by method 1, variables 1 and 2. Again
25O INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

TABLE 7. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF MULTIPLY SCORED IMPORT-EXPORT

DATA AND MEASURES OF POLITICAL AND FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION

Variable

Scoring Procedure 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 XVr

Method 1
Imports .886 •743 •705 .824 .717 .487 .809 •374 •693
Exports .889 .620 •793 .871 .770 •577 .788 •322 •704
Method 2
Imports .834 •653 •707 .783 •695 •532 •775 •453 .680
Exports .821 •442 •873 .862 •777 •679 .708 .284 .681
Method 3
Imports .428 •397 •254 •33O •304 .216 •445 •379 •344
Exports -•358 -.424 -•139 -•239 -.218 -.110 -•390 -.362 -.280
Method 4
Imports .728 •556 .656 •739 .629 •536 .611 •365 •603
Exports .661 •503 •637 .666 .631 •598 .562 •333 •574

NOTE: Variables i through 8 are identified as follows: i ) political integration within the agricultural
sector of the EEC; 2) political integration within the transport sector of the EEC; 3) total political inte-
gration in the EEC. Variables 4-6 are based on the Almond-Coleman output functions of a political
system, adjudication, rulemaking, and external affairs, respectively. Each of these is a measure of the
degree to which the institutions of the EEC perform these functions; 7) functional (trade) integration
in agriculture; 8) functional integration in transport. The political integration measures are based on
political activities of four institutions: the Court of Justice of the European Communities; the Council
of Ministers and the Commission of the European Communities; and the European Parliament. In all
there were fourteen indicators of political integration on which our final measures here are based. Func-
tional integration in agriculture is simply a composite score of trade in food, beverages, and tobacco
between the six. Functional integration in transport was measured by five indicators, two of them based
on railroad activity between the six, two on inland waterway shipping, and one on tourism. Again,
Pearson's r is used and N = 3 5 .

closely behind is method 2 with .680 and .681 for imports and exports, re-
spectively. Russett's technique ranks third with .603 and .574, and the RA
method ranks last with the lowest predictive power, .344 and -.280, for im-
ports and exports. It is interesting to note that the outcomes of this predic-
tive test exactly parallel those of the convergence test. It will be recalled there
that method 1 ranked first, just barely above method 2. Here method 1 ranks
first but again the difference between methods 1 and 2 is negligible. Methods
3 and 4 are ranked in the same order as in the convergence test. This "match-
ing up" of predictive and convergence tests is in itself evidence of a kind of
"convergent" validity.

A Further Test of the Hypothesis

But let us move on to a specific test of the major hypothesis that import-
export measures will correlate higher with measures of political and func-
 THEORY AND METHOD IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 251

tional integration in agriculture than in transport. Table 8 presents the results

of this test.

TABLE 8. CORRELATION OF MULTIPLY SCORED IMPORT-EXPORT DATA WITH

POLITICAL AND FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION IN AGRICULTURE AND TRANSPORT

Political Political
Scoring Integration Integration Significance
Procedure (agriculture) (transport) Difference t-value at .05 level*

Method i
Imports .886 •743 +•'43 2.31 Yes
Exports .889 .620 + .269 3-8i Yes
Method 2
Imports .658 2.23 Yes
CO CO

+.176
CO «

Exports •442 +•379 9-79 Yes

Method 3
Imports .428 •397 +•031 0.02 No
Exports -•358 -.424 -.066 -0.47 No
Method 4
No

ID CO
Imports .728 •556 + .172

CO CO
Exports .661 •5°3 +•158 No

NOTE: Pearson's r is used. N = 3 5 .

0
Significance calculations are for one-tailed tests.

We are now interested in the difference between coefficients. We can see

that methods 1 and 2 produce the greatest spread between the correlations
with agricultural and transport integration. A more rigorous way of assessing
this spread would be to test for the significance of the difference between the
correlations for agriculture and transport. We can do this by utilizing the
standard formula for testing the significance of differences between noninde-
pendent correlations:
. l/ ( N - 3 ) ( i + r»)
t = (rxy - i.r) V , " x
r
f 2(.I w 2 _ r x , 2 - r a y 2 + 2 r w r« rzr) •
Table 8 also presents the t-values and indicates whether or not they are
significant at the .05 level. The first two methods (raw data and preoccupa-
tion ratios) yield t-values which are significant. Exports, measured by method
2, have the highest t-value, 9.79. Method 1 ranks second with t-values of 2.31
and 3.81. Russett's method ranks third and the RA method ranks fourth.
Again, this ranking roughly corresponds with the results of our tests of con-
vergent validity. The only exception is the reversal of methods 1 and 2. The
stability of our results over three tests gives us some confidence in the validity
of the first two scoring procedures.
252 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

V. CONCLUSION

The primary purpose of this article has been to suggest a means by which
we may settle the particular methodological dispute in question. It has not
been my intent to "prove" or "disprove" the worth of a particular scoring pro-
cedure such as the RA index. The two criteria suggested, convergence and
predictive capacity, seem to be two helpful criteria which are generally ac-
cepted as sound methodological tools by the scientific community. They
should help to provide a broad common ground on which to base a fruitful
exchange of ideas and perhaps to lessen the "dialogue of the deaf quality
which is so much a result of different (or implicit) criteria for evaluation.
Convergence is really a specific application of the general scientific mandate
that inquiry be intersubjective and yield findings invariant with respect to the
method employed. We recall that three of the methods (raw score, preoccu-
pation ratios, and Russett's method) are highly convergent. In interpreting the
process of integration the notion of construct validity is very helpful. We have
hypothesized that the process measured by the three convergent methods is
one of "simple growth" in which growth is thought of as a general (i.e., aver-
age) increase in the value of a variable. We think of growth models as largely
concerned with increases in the capacity or frequency of a variable. Non-
growth models may be concerned only with the distribution of an existing
capacity. Perhaps the RA index would be fruitful for such a model. It seems
that for integration, however, it is precisely the growth of the capacity of a
new system (the suprasystem) to build new structures and perform new func-
tions that is important. We are generally interested in monotonic increases
and not in structural changes. The essence of an integrative relationship is
system growth, the creation and development of new behavioral patterns, not
the reallocation of existing ones.
We have hypothesized that if we were measuring "simple growth" our mea-
sures should behave in certain specified ways. The theory is capable of pre-
dicting substantial portions of the variance as well as ranking the different
scoring procedures in terms of predictive capacity. The most convincing case
was made when our methods were set up competitively to test the hypothesis
about differential rates of spillover for agriculture and transport. The results
of this test have reinforced our confidence in the previous two tests and have
provided independent evidence of the validity of our first two scoring proce-
dures. This test has required precise measurement and clarity, demanding not
only high correlations but also the ability to ascertain differential spillover
rates in the two issue contexts. In this regard we should note that method 4
(Russett's technique) has not satisfied the requirements of this test although
it did meet the requirements of the other two tests.
I want to emphasize that no inference has been drawn with respect to the
 THEORY AND METHOD IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 253

RA index in general. The validity of a measure is theoretically situational.

In this particular theory the RA index has proven to be less valid. We should
note that the way in which we measured our political integration variable
may have stacked the case against the RA index. Political integration was
measured in absolute, not in relative, terms. It is possible to measure political
integration in the European Economic Community as a proportion of world
political integration. Perhaps the RA index would fare better with a variable
measured in this fashion.63
Conventional wisdom seems to accept a period of descriptive history as a
necessary forerunner to theory building. However, the thrust of this article
has been that no unequivocal answer is provided by descriptive language to
the question, "Is Europe more integrated?" All descriptive categories were
seen as theory-laden. Turning to theoretical language has had the benefit of
supplying criteria but has not been without its problems.
Perhaps one final plea may be entered. The argument is frequently heard
that gross size effects must be controlled in the study of integration for, if
they are not, results will occur which are strictly artifactual. My position
has been that what is or is not artifactual cannot be answered by the
method (every method is artifactual) but by whether the method makes sense
in terms of the theory. There is no self-fulfilling prophecy here. There
is plenty of room for falsification, and each method allows many possibilities
for its own invalidation.
While convergent validation suffers from the absence of an established
standard by which to evaluate progress, construct validation suffers from the
impoverished state of theory in the social sciences. One needs valid constructs
in order to build theories, but accepted theories are needed to validate con-
structs. Both techniques run the risk of circularity but both, fortunately, have
redeeming qualities. Salvation for convergent validity comes through use of
"maximally different methods." In the case of construct validity the achieve-
ment of high predictive capacity in a theory-deficient world makes the con-
struct and its measurement operations all the more credible.

63
Similarly, I have pointed out how this problem poses a limitation on the conclusions drawn by
William Fisher in his test of Deutsch's theory of integration. See James Caporaso, "Fisher's Test of
Deutsch's Sociocausal Paradigm of Political Integration: A Research Note," International Organization,
Winter 1971 (Vol. 25, No. i ) , pp. 120-131.