CASE TITLE

The Devastating Fire That

Engulfed The ONGC Mumbai
High North Platform
Presentation to Dr. Mandira Aggarwal, Faculty HSE

Muzahid Khan
Integrated BBA + MBA (Oil & Gas Management), 2007-11
muzahidkhan123@gmail.com
HSE Foretalk
(w.r.t the Case)

@
OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION
LIMITED
HSE Management System in
ONGC

ü Is top driven efficient

ü Effective and vibrant management system.

ü Top management is committed for maintaining highest HSE standards

ü HSE Committee Board comprises of members of Board from ONGC including representative from Ministry
of Petroleum and Natural Gas.

ü A dedicated HSE website has been developed for creating awareness among company employees

ü ONGC has Institute of Petroleum Safety Health and Environment Management (IPSHEM) the nodal
institute which deals with all HSE related trainings
 ONGC HSE Policy

Ø
We are committed to maintain highest standards of Occupational health, safety
and environment protection.

Ø
We shall comply with all applicable codes and requirements to promote
occupational health, safety and environment protection.

Ø
We shall be always alert, equipped and ready to respond to emergencies.

Ø
We shall take all actions necessary to protect the integrity of the system in
order to avoid accidental release of hazardous substances.

Ø
We shall enhance awareness and involvement in promotion of occupational health,
safety and environment protection wherever we work and reside.
4 PHASE ANALYSIS OF THE
CASE Introduction: Mumbai High
1.

North

2. The Accident

3. Aftermath (Key Safety Issues)

4. Conclusion
 Click to edit Master text styles
Second level
● Third level
● Fourth level
Fifth level ●
MUMBAI HIGH North
Discovered in 1974
160km west of the
Introduction

Mumbai coast.
•

•
 MHW is a relatively
recent additional
process platform.

MHN is a processing
platform (1981)

MHF is residential (1978)

NA is a small wellhead
platform, circa 1976 (first
Introduction

The complex imported fluids from 11 other satellite wellhead

platforms and exported oil to shore via undersea pipelines, as
well as processing gas for gas lift operations.
The seven-storey high Mumbai High North (MHN) platform had
five gas export risers and ten fluid import risers situated
outside the platform jacket.
In July 2005, a multi-purpose support vessel (MSV) collided
with the MHN platform, severing at least one gas riser and
causing a massive fire which destroyed the MHN platform
within two hours.
Weather=Monsoon
Mumbai High North Platform Fire, India
Overview

Location: Mumbai offshore, India

Fire Event: 27 July 2005
A vessel collided with the offshore Mumbai
High North platform, 160 km west of the
Mumbai coast, causing a major fire, completely
destroying the platform and resulting in 11
deaths and 11 others missing.
Fire duration = 2 hours

Fire Damage: Complete collapse of the platform

Construction Steel
Type:

Fire Resistance: No information available

Oil and natural gas processing platform

Function:
Dimensions: 7 storeys
The Accident
The fire occurred on 27 July
2005 - a multi- purpose
MSV: Samundra
support vessel (MSV), Suraksha
Samundra Suraksha,100m
long, hit one of the MHN
platform risers.
Vessel owned by ONGC but
operated and maintained by
another nationalised company,
the Shipping Company of India
(SCI).
Vessel working elsewhere in
the field, supporting saturation
diving operations. Cook cut off
the tips of two fingers, and
transfer sought to MHN
complex for medical
The Accident
Leeward crane on MHN was not working, so vessel came onto
the windward side (wind 35 knots, swell 5 metres, sea current
3 knots).

Problems with azimuth thrusters – came alongside under

manual (joy stick) control in emergency mode, stern first. The
casualty was transferred off the deck by crane

The vessel experienced a strong heave, and the helideck

struck the risers (export gas lift).

The resulting leak ignited very quickly afterwards. The

resulting fire engulfed virtually all of MHN and MHF, with NA
and the Noble rig severely affected by heat radiation.
Rescue Operations

22 people died. 362 were rescued over next fifteen hours.

The fire significantly affected rescue, with only two out of the
eight complex lifeboats able to be launched, and only one out
of ten life rafts. Similarly, only half of the NCY’s rescue craft
could be launched.

Rescue exacerbated by the monsoon conditions. Mumbai, so

no helicopters could take off from land.

Six divers in saturation chamber on vessel rescued 36 hours

later. Samudra Suraksha sunk four days afterwards.
Aftermath

Key safety management issues:

Robustness of risk assessment

process
Poor Safety Culture
Riser Issues
Vessel Issues
Poor Safety Culture
Serious doubts have been raised on the safety certification of
MHN

Intervention of the higher management seems to be just ad

hoc

Seaworthiness of the MSV has been questioned as during the

rescue mission it was found that the vessel was working on
emergency thrusters as the manual thrusters were not
working

Rescue efforts have also been questioned

Riser Issues
The positioning of risers in relation to the platform
structure and loading zones
The vulnerability to damage (even risers inside the
jacket structure may be at risk)
The appropriateness of fendering/riser guards in
relation to the design of attending vessels
The inventory which is likely to be discharged if the
riser fails below its ESDV
Risk management process
Vessel Issues
Role of Safety Zone and vessels approaching the installation

Collision Risk Management Principles

Installation vulnerability
Vessel suitability
Crew competence
Marine knowledge of Installation
Communication
● Installation data cards, pre-entry checks, UKOOA “Guidelines for Ship/Installation
Collision Avoidance”.
● Quality of discussions, radios etc
Conclusion
Incident reinforces the need for

Thorough risk assessment of the potential causes and

consequences of riser damage

Development, implementation and maintenance of

associated risk management measures

Adoption of collision avoidance and protection measures

which at least meet current good practice as described in
UKOOA

Management arrangements to ensure that the risk

management measures are effective and observed in
practise.