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To: Mi.Jk.L..:[Qnx
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Shireman. Bob
lli:rgeron...David
Madzelan. Dan
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From: Miller, Tony </O-USDOED/OU~USDOED/CN-RECIPIENTS/CN-TQNY.MILLER>
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From: Miller, Tony </O~USDOED/OU=USDOED/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=TONY.MILLER>
To: Mil~r, Tony
Shireman, Bob
(b)( 5)
From: Miller, Tony </O~USDOED/OU-USDOED/CN-RECIPIENTS/CN~TONY.MILLER>
To: Milter, Tony
Shireman, Bob
(b)( 5)
Subject: GE Meeting
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-----Original Message-----
From: Yuan, Georgia
[(b)(5) [
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To: Miller, Tony; Kanter, Martha; Shireman, Bob; Kvaal, James; Ferguson, Keith
Subject: Re: Info Request
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ivrartna
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From: Miller, Tony <IO=USDOED/OU=USDOED/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=TONY.MILLER>
To: Miller, Tony
Shireman, Bob
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Subject: GE & Talent Search
(b)( 5)
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From: Miller, Tony </O=USDOED/OU=USDOED/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=TONY.MILLER>
To: S£hmjdt, Greg
RQbinson-Kimble. Stephanie
l(b )(5 ) I
(b)( 5)
-----Original Appointment-----
From: Fine, Stephanie
l(b)(5 ) I
To: Miller, Tony; Shireman, Bob; Bergeron, David; Madzelan, Dan; Finley, Steve; Dannenberg, Michael; Yuan,
Georgia; Weko, Tom; Miller, Elise; Graham, William; Fine, Stephanie
. Subject: GE Data Working Group
(b)( 5)
Pollack,Joshua
From: Miller, Tony
[(b itS) . [
To: Kanter, Martha; Shireman, Bob; Kvaai, James; Yuan, Georgia; Ferguson, Keith
SUbject: Re: Info Request
(b)( S)
(b)( S)
1
Pollack,Joshua
(b)( 5)
-----Original Message-----
I
From: Yuan, Georgia
l(b)(5 ) I
To: Miller, Tony; Kanter, Martha; Shireman, Bob; Kvaal, James; Ferguson, Keith
Subject: Re: Info Request
(b)( 5)
1
----- Original Message -----
From: Kanter, Martha
To: Miller, Tony; Shireman, Bob; Kvaal, James; Yuan, Georgia; Ferguson, Keith
l(b)(5 ) I
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Pollack,Joshua
From: Miller, Tony
l(b)(5)
To: Rogers, Margot
Subject: Re: ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION-PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL-
(b)(5 )
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From: Bergeron, David
176)(5\ n T' • - w • < • • •• I
J > J ,
To: Gomez, Gabriella; Yuau, Georgia; Jenkins, Harold; Siegel, Briau; Madzelau, Dau
Cc: Shiremau, Bob; Rogers, Margot
Subject: RE: ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION-PRNILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL-
(b)( 5)
(b)( 5)
I
1
----- Original Message -----
From: Yuan, Georgia
To: Jenkins, Harold; Siegel, Brian; Madzelan, Dan; Bergeron, David
Cc: Shireman, Bob; Rogers, Margot; Gomez, Gabriella
Sent: Wed May 2620:58:162010
Subject: Fw: ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION-PRNILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL-
(b )(5 )
-----Original Mcssagc-v->-
From: Rogers, Margot
Sent: Wednesday, May 26,20109:26 PM
To: Gomez, Gabriella; Martin, Carmel; Miller, Tony; Kanter, Martha; Rose, Charlie; Cunningham, Peter; Shireman, Bob;
Yuan, Georgia
Subject: ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATION-PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL-
2
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IS
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(b )(5)
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Pollack,Joshua
From: Miller, Tony
Sent: Wednesday, May 12,20109:31 AM
To: Kanter, Martha; Shireman, Bob; Shelton, Jim; Melendez, Thelma; Martin, Carmel; Posny,
Alexa
Cc: Snyder, Jason
Subject: RE: ED- List- of- Documents- for- OMB Review 05-07-10
(b )(5 )
1
Pollack, Joshua
-----Origina1 Message-----
From: Kanter, Martha •
Sent: Friday, May 07, 2010 12:08 AM
To: Snyder, Jason
Cc: Shireman, Bob; Darm-Messier, Brenda; Madze1an, Dan; Ferguson, Keith; Ceja, Alejandra
Subject: FW: New Draft Spending Plan Priority
(b)( 5)
(b)( 5)
2
Draft 5-7-10
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Pollack,Joshua
From:
Sent:
re.
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(b)( 5)
(b)( 5)
(b)( 5)
Pollack, Joshua
-----Original Message-----
From: Sellers, Fred
Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2010 2:38 PM
To: Miller, Tony; Shireman, Bob
Cc: Bergeron, David; Fine, Stephanie; Arsenault, Leigh; Manheimer, Ann; Kolotos, John;
Madzelan, Dan
Subject: FW: Tony and Bobs comments on GE
(b)( 5)
Thanks.
-----Original Message-----
From: Kolotos, John
Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2010 12:57 PM
To: Sellers, Fred; McCullough, Carney; Guthrie, Marty; Bergeron, David
Subject: Tony and Bobs comments on GE
To move the discussion along, here are Bob's and Tony's comments and some responses.
(b)( 5)
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(b )(5)
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Pollack,Joshua
From: Sellers, Fred
Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 2010 2:38 PM
To: Miller, Tony; Shireman, Bob
Cc: Bergeron, David; Fine, Stephanie; Arsenault, Leigh; Manheimer, Ann; Kolotos, John;
Madzelan, Dan
Subject: FW: Tony and Bobs comments on GE
(b)(5 )
Thanks.
-----Original Message-----
From: Kolotos, John
Sent: Tuesday, May 18, 201012:57 PM
To: Sellers, Fred; McCullough, Carney; Guthrie, Marty; Bergeron, David
Subject: Tony and Bobs conunents on GE
To move the discussion along, here are Bob's and Tony's conunents and some responses.
Bobs conunents:
(b)( 5)
Tony's conunents:
1
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i.
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Pollack, Joshua
From: Rogers, Margot
Sent: Monday, May 24, 2010 8:43 AM
To: Miller, Tony
Subject: RE: Guaranty Agency FINAL Letter
Done.
-----Original Message-----
From: Miller, Tony
Sent: Sunday, May 23, 2010 11:11 PM
To: Rogers, Margot
Subject: Fw: Guaranty Agency FINAL Letter
(b)( 5)
Martha
-Bob
Robert Shireman
Deputy Undersecretary
U.S. Department of Education
1
(202) 260-0101
-----Original Message-----
From: David, Fanta
Sent: Friday, May 21,2010 5:01 PM
To: Taggart, Bill; Runcie, James; Yuan, Georgia; Duporte, Franklyn; Jenkins, Harold; Marinucci, Fred; Bergeron, David;
Madzelan, Dan; Baker, Jeff; Szabo, Susan; Shireman, Bob; Martin, Phil; Skelly, Thomas; Ferrier, Evan; Siegel, Brian
Cc: Turner, Katrina; Moran, Pamela; David, Fanta
Subject: Guaranty Agency FINAL Letter
All,
(b)( 5)
Fanta David
(202) 377-4668
-----Original Message-----
From: David, Fanta
Sent: Friday, May 21,2010 10:11 AM
To: Taggart, Bill; Runcie, James; Yuan, Georgia; Duporte, Franklyn; Jenkins, Harold; Marinucci, Fred; Bergeron, David;
Madzelan, Dan; Baker, Jeff; Szabo, Susan; Shireman, Bob; Martin, Phil; Skelly, Thomas; Ferrier, Evan
Cc: Turner, Katrina
Subject: FW: PGA Letter 2
Importance: High
All,
(b)( 5)
Thank you.
2
Fanta on behalf of Katrina Turner
Fanta David
(202) 377-4668
-----Original Message-----
From: Turner, Katrina
Sent: Thursday, May 20,2010 4:27 PM
To: David, Fanta
Subject: FW: PGA Letter 2
Importance: High
(b)( 5)
Thanks
-----Original Message-----
From: Bergeron, David
°
Sent: Thursday, May 20, 20 I II :59 AM
To: Siegel, Brian; Duporte, Franklyn; Graham, William; Turner, Katrina
Cc: Taggart, Bill; Runcie, James; Yuan, Georgia; Jenkins, Harold; Marinucci, Fred; Madzelan, Dan; Baker, Jeff; Szabo,
Susan; Shireman, Bob; Martin, Phil; Skelly, Thomas; Ferrier, Evan
Subject: RE: PGA Letter 2
Importance: High
(b)(5 )
David
-----Original Message-----
From: Siegel, Brian
Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2010 II :46 AM
To: Bergeron, David; Duporte, Franklyn; Graham, William; Turner, Katrina
Cc: Taggart, Bill; Runcie, James; Yuan, Georgia; Jenkins, Harold; Marinucci, Fred; Madzelan, Dan; Baker, Jeff; Szabo,
Susan; Shireman, Bob; Martin, Phil; Skelly, Thomas; Ferrier, Evan
Subject: RE: PGA Letter 2
3
(b)( 5)
Brian
-----Original Message-----
From: Bergeron, David
Sent: Thursday, May 20,2010 II :23 AM iI
To: Duporte, Franklyn; Graham, William; Siegel, Brian; Turner, Katrina
Cc: Taggart, Bill; Runcie, James; Yuan, Georgia; Jenkins, Harold; Marinucci, Fred; Madzelan, Dan; Baker, Jeff; Szabo,
Susan; Shireman, Bob; Martin, Phil; Skelly, Thomas; Ferrier, Evan
Subject: RE: PGA Letter 2
Importance: High
(b)( 5)
David
-----Original Message-----
From: Duporte, Franklyn
Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2010 II :00 AM
To: Bergeron, David; Graham, William; Siegel, Brian; Turner, Katrina
Cc: Taggart, Bill; Runcie, James; Yuan, Georgia; Jenkins, Harold; Marinucci, Fred; Madzelan, Dan; Baker, Jeff; Szabo,
Susan; Shireman, Bob; Martin, Phil; Skelly, Thomas; Ferrier, Evan
Subject: Re: PGA Letter 2
(b)( 5)
-----Original Message-----
From: Siegel, Brian
Sent: Wednesday, May 19, 2010 7:11 PM
To: Turner, Katrina
Cc: Taggart, Bill; Runcie, James; Yuan, Georgia; Duporte, Franklyn; Jenkins, Harold; Marinucci, Fred; Bergeron, David;
Madzelan, Dan; Baker, Jeff; Szabo, Susan; Graham, William; Shireman, Bob; Martin, Phil
Subject: RE: PGA Letter 2
(b)( 5)
All,
(b )(5 )
5
Pollack, Joshua
I
----- Original Message -----
From: Miller, Tony
To: Rogers, Margot
Sent: Sun May 2322:10:472010
Subject: Fw: Guaranty Agency FINAL Letter
(b)( 5)
iI -
From: Shireman, Bob
I
Sent: Sunday, May 23,2010 8:33 PM i
To: Kanter, Martha
Cc: Gomez, Gabriella
Subject: FW: Guaranty Agency FINAL Letter
Martha:
(b)( 5)
Robert Shireman
Deputy Undersecretary
U.S. Department of Education
1
(202) 260-01 01
-----Original Message-----
From: David, Fanta
Ub i'S ) ." ., , I
To: Taggart, Bill; Runcie, James; Yuan, Georgia; Duporte, Franklyn; Jenkins, Harold; Marinucci, Fred; Bergeron, David;
Madzelan, Dan; Baker, Jeff; Szabo, Susan; Shireman, Bob; Martin, Phil; Skelly, Thomas; Ferrier, Evan; Siegel, Brian
Cc: Turner, Katrina; Moran, Pamela; David, Fanta
Subj ect: Guaranty Agency FINAL Letter
All,
(b)( S)
Fanta David
(202) 377-4668
-----Original Message-----
From: David, Fanta
Sent: Friday, May 21,2010 10:1l AM
To: Taggart, Bill; Runcie, James; Yuan, Georgia; Duporte, Franklyn; Jenkins, Harold; Marinucci, Fred; Bergeron, David;
Madzelan, Dan; Baker, Jeff; Szabo, Susan; Shireman, Bob; Martin, Phil; Skelly, Thomas; Ferrier, Evan
Cc: Turner, Katrina
Subject: FW: PGA Letter 2
Importance: High
All,
(b)( S)
Thank you.
2
Fanta on behalf of Katrina Turner
Fanta David
(202) 377-4668
-----Original Message-----
From: Turner, Katrina
Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2010 4:27 PM
To: David, Fanta
Subject: FW: PGA Letter 2
Importance: High
(b)( 5)
Thanks
-----Original Message-----
From: Bergeron, David
l(b )(5 ) I
David
-----Original Message-----
From: Siegel, Brian
Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2010 11:46 AM
To: Bergeron, David; Duporte, Franklyn; Graham, William; Turner, Katrina
Cc: Taggart, Bill; Runcie, James; Yuan, Georgia; Jenkins, Harold; Marinucci, Fred; Madzelan, Dan; Baker, Jeff; Szabo,
Susan; Shireman, Bob; Martin, Phil; Skelly, Thomas; Ferrier, Evan
Subject: RE: PGA Letter 2
(b)( 5)
3
(b)( 5)
Brian
-----Original Message-----
From: Bergeron, David
Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2010 II :23 AM
To: Duporte, Franklyn; Graham, William; Siegel, Brian; Turner, Katrina
Cc: Taggart, Bill; Runcie, James; Yuan, Georgia; Jenkins, Harold; Marinucci, Fred; Madzelan, Dan; Baker, Jeff; Szabo,
Susan; Shireman, Bob; Martin, Phil; Skelly, Thomas; Ferrier, Evan
Subject: RE: PGA Letter 2
Importance: High
(b)( 5)
-----Original Message-----
From: Duporte, Franklyn
Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2010 11 :00 AM
To: Bergeron, David; Graham, William; Siegel, Brian; Turner, Katrina
Cc: Taggart, Bill; Runcie, James; Yuan, Georgia; Jenkins, Harold; Marinucci, Fred; Madzelan, Dan; Baker, Jeff; Szabo,
Susan; Shireman, Bob; Martin, Phil; Skelly, Thomas; Ferrier, Evan
Subject: Re: PGA Letter 2
l(b )(5 )
4
-----Original Message-----
From: Graham, William
Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2010 9:40 AM
To: Siegel, Brian; Turner, Katrina
Cc: Taggart, Bill; Runde, James; Yuan, Georgia; Duporte, Franklyn; Jenkins, Harold; Marinucci, Fred; Bergeron, David;
Madzelan, Dan; Baker, Jeff; Szabo, Susan; Shireman, Bob; Martin, Phil; Skelly, Thomas; Ferrier, Evan
Subject: RE: PGA Letter 2
(b )(5 )
-----Original Message-----
From: Siegel, Brian
Sent: Wednesday, May 19, 2010 7:11 PM
To: Turner, Katrina
Cc: Taggart, Bill; Runcie, James; Yuan, Georgia; Duporte, Franklyn; Jenkins, Harold; Marinucci, Fred; Bergeron, David;
Madzelan, Dan; Baker, Jeff; Szabo, Susan; Graham, William; Shireman, Bob; Martin, Phil
Subject: RE: PGA Letter 2
(b)(5 )
Brian Siegel
All,
(b)(5 )
5
Pollack, Joshua
Mary,
(b)( 5)
Thanks,
Tony
Tony,
(b)( 5)
I
(b)( 5)
2
This message, including any attachment, is for the use of the intended recipient; it may contain information that is
privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law. Intended recipients should take appropriate
steps to protect the confidential nature ofthis communication. If you are not an intended recipient, please notify the sender
and delete/destroy this message.
!
!
!,
3
Pollack, Joshua
From: Miller, Tony
Sent: Friday, May 21,20103:35 PM
To: Fine, Stephanie
SUbject: FW: Important Correspondence Summary for May 21, 2010
May 21,2010
Klein.pdf
1
Asher.pdf
Final Report.pdf
Attached is an image file should you wish to see the whole document. To do so, click 011 the icon for the document, and it should open in your PC's image viewer.
2
Mayes. Ed9.:::ar:.... _
From: Mayes, Edgar on behalf of Duncan, Arne
Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2010 1:46 PM
To: 'lau ren Asher'
Subject: RE: letter from broad coalition seeking strong regulation of career education programs
1bank you for your e-mail to Secretary of Education Arne Duncan. We appreciate hearing from you.
Your message has been forwarded to the appropriate staff member for review.
Sincerely,
Edgar Mayes •
Director of Correspondence and
Communications Control Unit
Office of the Secretary
U,S. Department of Education
Washington, DC 20202
Please find attached a letter from a diverse coalition of more than 30 student, college, consumer and civil rights
organizations seeking strong and effective regulation of career education programs. Those signing the letter
represent many public institutions that are subject to the gainful employment and incentive compensation rules,
as well as advocates for college access for African-American, Hispanic and low-income students.
Thank you for your initiative in reviewing the Department's current program integrity regulations to ensure
their consistency with federal law and to protect both students and taxpayers. We support your efforts and stand
ready to assist you in improving the Department's regulations. Please feel free to contact me or any of the staff
listed below should you or your staff have any questions about this letter or the issues it addresses.
- Institute for College Access & Success: Pauline Abernathy (pabemathy@ticas.org) or Debbie Cochrane
(dcochrane@ticas.org),510-318-7900
- Florida State College at Jacksonville: Susan Lehr (slehr@fscj.edu)or Jim Simpson (jsimpson@fscj.edu),
904-632-3391
- National Association fur College Admission Counseling: David Hawkins (dhawkins@nacacnet.org) or
Amanda Modar (amodar@nacacnet.org), 703/836·2222
- National Consumer Law Center: Deanne Loonin (dloonin@nclc.org), (617) 542-8010
I
- Public Advocates: Jamienne Studley Gstudley@publicadvocates.org), (415) 431-7430
- United States Students Association: Angela Peoples (leg@usstudents.org1.J202) 640-6570
- U.S. PIRG: Chris Lindstrom (chris.lindstrom@pirg.org),617)747-4330
Sincerely,
Lauren Asher
President, Institute for College Access & Success
-------- ---
www.licas.org
www.~tonstudentdebt.org
www.colle!)e-insight.org
2
.'
To protect both students and taxpayers. federal law prohibits "any commission, bonus, or
other incentive payment based directly or indirectly on success in securing enrollments or
financial aid," and requires vocational programs and nearly all programs at for-profit
institutions to "prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation." Yet,
examples of overly aggressive recruiting are plentiful. Some for-profit institutions recently
made headlines by targeting homeless shelters in their recruitment efforts. i Another for-
profit institution paid $78.5 million to settle a whistleblower False Claim Act lawsuit" and
another $9.8 million to the Department of Education to resolve claims that it was paying
improper incentive compensation to its recruiters. m Yet another large for-profit institution
paid $6.5 million to settle a lawsuit brought by the California Attorney General charging "a
persistent pattern of unlawful conduct." including the inflation ofjob placement and
starting salary information in order to recruit students to enroll in costly vocational
programs, and falsification of records provided to the government,"
While most schools may not engage in such practices, federal data suggest these are not
isolated incidents. Students at for-profit schools are the most likely to borrow and borrow
the most. According to the most recent federal data, one in five for-profit school students
defaults on their federal loans. A full 44% of all defaulters attended for-profit institutions,
even though just 7% of all students attend for-profit schools. v Low-income, first-
generation and minority students attend for-profit institutions at disproportionate rates,
making them particularly vulnerable to illegal or unscrupulous acts by these schools."
Gainful Employment Each year, students borrow and taxpayers spend billions of dollars
to subsidize attendance at programs required to "prepare students for gainful employment
in a recognized occupation." Yet, the Department's current regulations include no official
definition of "gainful employment." We urge you to develop regulations that define
gainful employment in a way that is measurable, enforceable, not overly burdensome to
schools, and is aligned with the following principles:
• Include all debt incurred at any affiliated school. All debt incurred at a school
under the same control structure must be included in any measure of gainful
employment that considers debt. Otherwise, schools controlled by the same
company could simply move students from one school or program to
another. Excluding debt from unaffiliated schools also has the benefit of allowing
low-cost schools to enroll and graduate students with high debt from unaffiliated
schools without fear of penalty.
• Include all private loans known to the school and its affiliates. Debt-related
measures of gainful employment must include all private loans that should be
known to the school. Excluding private loans would create a perverse incentive for
schools to promote risky private loans before students have exhausted their safer
federal loan options. Private loans that should be known to the school must include
all credit provided by any school under the same control structure as well as any
loans provided by lenders with which the school has a preferred lender
arrangement.
• Avoid loopholes for programs with hoth high student horrowing and low
completion rates. A low completion rate is one of the ways schools can fail to
prepare students for gainful employment. Students who borrow but do not
complete are often left carrying substantial debt without the increased earning
power that should come from a completed degree or certificate. The definition of
gainful employment should not create a loophole for schools to discourage
completion by students they consider likely to have trouble repaying their loans.
• Use only data that are accurate and consistent across colleges and programs.
Existing requirements for the calculation and reporting of completion and
placement rates are not sufficient for use in any success-based measure of gainful
employment. Accrediting agency requirements vary widely and allow for
substantial variation in the calculation of rates, and some schools have been found
to have falsified and manipulated their placement data. It is therefore essential that
the data and reporting standards are clear, consistent and independently verified.
Again, we applaud your initiative in reviewing the Department's current program integrity
regulations to ensure their consistency with federal law and to protect both students and
2
taxpayers. We support your efforts and stand ready to assist you in improving the
Department's regulations.
Sincerely,
i Golden, Daniel, "Homeless Dropouts From High School Lured by For-Profit Colleges," Bloomberg.com,
April 30, 2010. Available at http://www,w..oombere·COml312pstnews?I)Ld=newsarchjye&sjd-aA2 EI.YUaS..k
ii O'Reilly, Cary and Daniel Golden, "Apollo Settles University of Phoenix Recruiting Suit," Bloomberg.com,
December 14, 2009. Available at hnP'/lwwwhloowbm <jom!apps/pews?pid=2060l{!8Z&sid-aQ ~&pos-;5
'" Gilbertson, Dawn, "Student-recruitment tactics at University ofPhoenix blasted by feds," The Arizona
Republic, September 14,2004. Available at hup'f/www fm;entral !XlllV&pecialstsneciat9:UartitJe$/09~?&wired.
i, California Attorney General's office July 31,2007 press release on settlement with Corinthian Schools at
hthrUag Cft goylDewsaJerts!release.p~
TICAS press release available at !)ltp:l/1lrojectonS1uden«lebt.on:/rmb yiew.php?idx=537
v.
~ Based On calculations by the Project on Student Debt on data from the 2008 National Postsecondary
Student Aid Study (NPSAS).
3
taxpayers. We support your efforts and stand ready to assist you in improving the
Department's regulations.
•
Sincerely,
1 Golden, Daniel, "Homeless Dropouts From High School Lured by For-Profit Colleges," Bloomberg.com,
April 30. 2010. Available at htu)'J(www bloomberg cQmIa~slnews?pid=n~ws6rchjve&sid=aA2]lVDs2S~
u O'Reilly, Cary and Daniel Golden, "Apollo Settles University of Phoenix Recruiting Sun," Bloomoerg.com,
December 14, 2009. Available at bttp'Uwww,bloombeTg comlapps/news'i'pid=20601087Jtsid""atLTscSKjRBr&pos=5
til Gilbertson, Dawn, "Student-recruitment tactics at University of Phoenix blasted by feds," The Arizona
3
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I would like to thank you for taking the time to meet with me and other members of Congress this past
Tuesday to discuss the Department's proposal for defining "gainful employment in a recognized
occupation." As we discussed after the meeting, I have several spedfic proposals that I think may help
the Department weed out the "bad actors" in our higher education system (those schools with abysmal
graduation, job placement and default rates), while allOWing the good quality educational institutions to
continue to thrive.
I strongly believe that a robust disclosure policy, with real penalties for schools that fail to disclose
information or misrepresent themselves in any way, will help students make informed decisions on both ,
the quality of the program and the amount of debt they stand to incur. These are the components that I
believe should be a part of that disclosure policy.
Schools would be required to disclose the estimated debt-to-income ratio each student stands to
incur based on data from either the 8ureau of Labor Statistic's 25th and 75'h percentile of wages for
careers the program prepares students to enter, or based on the actual wages of graduates of the
program when sufficient data Is available. These ratios would be calculated on 10, 15 and 20 year
repayment plans so that students understand their repayment options and what each plan will cost
them in the long run.
Schools would be required to disclose whether or not a program has programmatic accreditation if
the program is supposed to prepare students for a career that requires professional licensure. This
piece Is critical because, as I'm sure you know, certain professions, such as psychologists, nurses,
engineers and more require graduation from an accredited program before that student can begin
practicing as a licensed professional.
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299 r:.. BItO'NARD Bovl&VoIIUl.P s"",no S~ITE 280 WMrHlNGTON. DC 205 15
SlJITI 127 W~8r PAlM Be.tDi. R. 3340. Soe..t, FtA,lON. FL 33431 lzo.tJ 22fi-30.2B
FOkf~.FL 3:1301 1560651-7594 15611 M4-GS10 F"x IZ021 225-8396
1954).5220-4579 1666) 713-1303 (9661113-1303
1&6&) 713-73IJ:J FI,)C.I5Gll So$4-2El64
Standardlzed disclosure forms:
Schools are already required to disclose graduation and job placement rates, as well as types of
employment typically obtained by graduates. We would also require schools, as part of their
obligation to disclose debt-to-income ratios and programmatic accreditation to potential students,_
to include ali this information in one standardized disclosure form to be given to students prior to
enrollment. The school would have an obligation to interact with the student and convey the
importance of this information.
Schools regulated under this proposal that fail to disclose this information prior to enrollment, or
misrepresent this information in anyway would be subject to fines and/or risk temporarily or
indefiniteiy
,
losing their Title IV eligibility.
Ifthe goal of defining "gainful employment" is to prevent students from being taken advantage of by
institutions that strap them with enormous levels of debt, while failing to prepare them for Jobs within
their fields of study, then increased disclosure could realistically meet that goal by encouraging students
and investors (in the case of for-profit institutions) to take their money to schools that offer more
quality products. Like any business, these institutions are only as good as the services they provide, so if
we make It abundantly clear that an institution fails to deliver to students within a particular program,
students will take their business elsewhere, and the school will have new incentives to improve.
Igreatly appreciate the time you have devoted to this issue and your consideration of my ideas. Irealize
this is a difficult clause to define, but an important one none the less to ensure students are protected
from the unfair practices of a few "bad actors" In our higher education system. Ilook forward to
working with you toward a successful resolution of this matter and encourage you to contact me with
any questions you may have.
regards,
•
Ron Klein
Member of Congress
Mayes, Ed9:.;;;,ar;... _
From: Toye, Theresa
Sent: Friday, May 21, 2010 11 :02 AM
To: Mayes, Edgar
SUbJect: FW: letter on gainful employment
Attachments : Klein letter to Secretary Duncan on Gainful Employment PDF. pdf; Klein letter to secretary
Duncan on GainfUl Employment.doc
·····Original Message-----
From: Gomez, Gabriella
Sent: May 21,2010 11:01 AM
To: Toye, Theresa
Subject: FW: letter on gainful employment
PIs log in
Thanks again for your help with our independent living council- I spoke with Andy Peppin (sorry if I'm spelling
his name wrong) and we're going to set up a meeting to work everything out.
On another note- here is a letter from Congressman Klein with a more specific alternative proposal for the
gainful employment proposed rule, as we talked about earlier, I've attached the pdfand the word document.
Thank you so much for your consideration of our ideas. Please let me know if you have any questions.
Virginia
1
Virginia Neale
Legislative Assistant
202.225.3026
2
United States Government Accountability Office
May 2010
HOMELESSNESS
Information on
Administrative Costs
for HUD's Emergency
Shelter Grants
Program
,
"
'"
"" ":::
****
~ Accountability * Integrity * Reliability
GAO-IO-491
May 2010
HOMELESSNESS
Information on Administrative Costs for HUD's
Emergency Shelter Grants Program
A number of ESG grantees and subgrantees we visited told us they expect the
new ESG activities authorized by the HEARTH Act will result in different
kinds of administrative activities that in many cases will be more costly. They
cited client screening and eligibility verification, technical assistance to
subgrantees, number of grant applicants, and facility management and
collaboration with third parties as among areas where administrative costs
may increase. Although the HEARTH Act makes significant changes, including
increasing the administrative cost allowance to 7.5 percent, it remains unclear
when new program activities might be implemented. Uncertainty over how
and when the new ESG program might be implemented, plus variation in
administrative activities under the current program, complicate any attempt to
determine the appropriate size of the ESG administrative allowance.
Letter 1
Background 3
Grantees and Subgrantees We Visited Reported a Range of
Administrative Activities Whose Costs Generally Were Not Fully
Covered by the ESG Allowance 9
Funding and Treatment of Administrative Costs Varied Across
Selected Federal Grant Programs 23
Some ESG Recipients Expect the Nature of Administrative Costs to
Change and the Amount to Increase under New Activities
Authorized by the HEARTH Act 27
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 29
Tables
Table 1: Retention of ESG Administrative Allowance by Selected
Grantees 11
Table 2: Grantee Administrative Allowance for Selected HUD
Formula Grant Programs 27
Table 3: ESG Grantee Summary for States Visited, Fiscal Year 2009 32
Figures
Figure 1: The Distribution of ESG Grants by State, Fiscal Year 2009 5
Figure 2: How ESG Grants Fund Homeless Services 7
Figure 3: ESG Grantee Administrative Activities by Major
Categories 10
Figure 4: ESG Subgrantee Administrative Activities by Major
Categories 12
Figure 5: Estimated Unfunded ESG Administrative Costs for
Grantees and Subgrantees in Selected States 14
Figure 6: ESG Administrative Cost Provisions Compared to
Selected Other Federal Homeless Programs 24
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the
United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety
without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain
copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be
necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Congressional Committees
ISee The 2008 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress, U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, Office of Community Planning and Development, July
2009.
2Grantees that make subgrants are responsible for ensuring that subgrantees comply with
ESG program requirements.
The HEARTH Act is contained in Division B of Public Law 111-22. Pub. L. No. 111~22 §
3
Page 2
administrative costs for federal grants. Further, we reviewed the
administrative cost allowances for homeless grant programs administered
by the Departments of Labor, Education, and Health and Human Services,
and we interviewed officials from these departments knowledgeable about
the programs. Finally, we reviewed the HEARTH Act changes to the ESG
program and obtained the perspectives of HUD officials, 34 grantees and
subgrantees we visited, various nonprofit organizations that advocate for
people experiencing homelessness, and others regarding how these
changes might affect the nature or amount of administrative costs for the
ESG program. Appendix I provides a more detailed description of our
scope and methodology.
According to HUD, the ESG program was designed to be the first step in a
Background continuum of assistance to prevent homelessness and to enable
individuals and families experiencing homelessness to move toward
independent living.' More specifically, the program objectives were to
increase the number and quality of emergency shelters for individuals and i
i
families experiencing homelessness, to operate these facilities and provide i
essential social services, and to help prevent homelessness. The ESG
program is targeted at persons experiencing homelessness." It was
originally established by the Homeless Housing Act of 1986, in response to
the growing issue of homelessness among men, women, and children in
4In this report, we use "ESG" primarily to refer to the current version of the program,
because the new Emergency Solutions Grants Program, as authorized by the HEARTH Act,
has not yet been implemented. Where appropIiate, we distinguish between the current
program and the new program.
'Targeted homeless programs such as ESG are designed to specifically assist people
experiencing homelessness; homeless persons may also obtain assistance from mainstream
programs, which are not specifically designed to assist them. Examples of such
mainstream programs include Medicaid, HUD's Section 8 Rental Voucher Program, and
employment and training activities provided under the Workforce Investment Act. See, for
example, GAO, Homelessness: Barriers to Using Mainstream Programs,
GAOIRCED-OO-l84 (Washington, D.C.: July 6,2000).
For fiscal year 2009, RUD awarded $160 million in ESG funding to
grantees. Figure 1 shows the total amount of ESG funds received by
grantees, by state, for fiscal year 2009.
"The Homeless Housing Act of 1986 was enacted at Pub. L. No. 99-500 § 101(g), 100 Stat.
1783 (Oct. 18, 1986) and Pub. L. No. 99-691 § 101(g), 100 Stat. 3341 (Oct 30, 1986). In 1987,
the ESG program was incorporated into Subtitle B of Title IV of the Stewart B. McKinney
Homeless Assistance Act. Pub. L. No. 100-371 (July 22, 1987).
7For purposes of the CDBG formula, a metropolitan city is a city within a metropolitan area
that is the central city of the area, as deflned by the Office of Management and Budget
COMB), or any other city within a metropolitan area that has a population of 50,000 or
more. An urban county is, generally, one meeting specified population or density
requirements. 24 C.F.R. § 576.3; see Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 5302(a). Prior to the CDBG-based allocation, HUD first sets aside 0.2
percent of the annual appropriation for allocation among U.S. territories.
8Accordingto HUD, the grantees were: the 50 states, the District of Colwnbia, Puerto Rico,
202 metropolitan cities, 102 urban counties, and the U.S. territories of Guam, Virgin Islands,
American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands.
I,
Page 4 GAO-IO-491 Homelessness
Figure 1: The Distribution of ESG Grants by State, Fiscal Year 2009
-
Puerto Rico
0$500,000 or less
Notes: Amounts shown are for federal ESG grants only. The U.S. territories of Guam, Virgin Islands,
American Samoa, and Northern Mariana Islands received $320,000 combined.
ESG funds may reach eligible projects through different routes, as shown
in figure 2. First, HUD allocates ESG funds to grantees. Metropolitan
cities, urban counties, and territories may carry out the program directly
or subgrant all or part of their ESG
,
funds to nonprofit organizations. States
cannot carry out program activities directly, and must subgrant ESG funds
(but may retain up to 5 percent for administration, as discussed below) to
local governments or nonprofit organizations. Local governments
receiving ESG funds as a subgrant from the state may carry out the
program themselves or further subgrant funds to nonprofit organizations.
HUD allows ESG grantees flexibility to determine how to award funds to
subgrantees. For example, many grantees conduct a competitive process
for awarding funds to subgrantees. Other grantees offer repeat funding to
organizations that have demonstrated success with ESG-funded homeless
assistance programs in the past, or they alternate funding each year among
multiple agencies with ongoing homeless assistance programs. Grantees
also might make relatively few, but relatively larger, subgrants, or award
relatively smaller grants to a greater number of subgrantees.
9Grantees that are local governments may comply with the matching requirement by
providing matching foods themselves, or through matching funds or voluntary efforts
provided by any subgrantee. For state grantees, ESG subgrantees can also contribute the
matching funds, but each state grantee must distribute the benefit of a $100,000 credit
toward the state's required match amount to those subgrantees that are least capable of
contributing matching funds. Matching funds can be cash or other fOITIlS including donated
materials, rental value of a building, or value of time and services contributed. Territories
are not subject to the matching requirement.
HUD
Funding
(generally based on formula for Community
Development Block Grant program)
____-----'t-~
Nonprofit Nonprofit local
organizations \organizations \ governments
Nonprofit
organizations
"Hequtations require HUD to set aside 0.2 percent of the total ESG allocation for U.S. territories.
Subgrantees and grantees that are not states may use ESG funding to
conduct a range of eligible activities which, as previously noted, include
the rehabilitation or remodeling of buildings to be used as shelters,
operation of the facilities, essential supportive services, and homeless
prevention.
The HEARTH Act made major changes to the ESG program, while
renaming it the Emergency Solutions Grants Program. As noted earlier, the
HEARTH Act changed the amount of ESG funds that grantees may use to
cover adIninistrative costs, increasing it from 5 percent to a maximum of
7.5 percent of the total grant amount. Programmatically, the HEARTH Act
also made the following changes:
IOAs noted previously, the 5 percent limitation, set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 11378, will increase
to 7.5 percent when the pertinent provisions of Pub. L. No. 111~22 take effect. The effective
date is the earlier of 18 months from the date of enactment (May 20, 2009) or 3 months
after the publication of HUD's [mal regulations implementing the amendments, which are
to be promulgated not later than 12 months after the date of enactment. Pub. L. No. 111-22
§ 1503.
Grantees' Administrative Grantees in the states we visited told us they conducted various activities
Activities Focus on to administer their ESG allocations. As figure 3 shows, these activities
Awarding and Monitoring generally fell into live categories: application/approval, financial,
reporting, monitoring/oversight, and other. Our review found these
Subgrants, while grantees' ESG administrative activities generally focused on awarding
Subgrantee Administrative subgrants and monitoring subgrantee performance. For example, City of
Activity Centers on Philadelphia officials told us they awarded a total of $2.2 million through
Operating Programs and live ESG grants for fiscal year 2009 and their administrative activities
Reporting Outcomes included, among other things, approval and tracking of subgrantee budgets
and program monitoring.
Financial • Process grant disbursements, including related financial and accounting functions
• Planning, budgeting
• Audits, including auditor review of subqrantee reports
• Review, adjust subgrantee budgets
• Monitor subgrantee budgets, programs to ensure HUD compliance
• Report information to HUD grant management system
• Reconcile data discrepancies between HUD system and local accounting system
• Secure matching funds
"Before 2009, Detroit retained 5 percent, but officials reduced the amount to zero, in part due to
declining grant amounts.
bFor compliance purposes.fhe state uses local governments to distribute ESG funds to local service
providers. In such cases, sharing of the administrative allowance, from state to local government, is
mandatory, although the amount is not specified.
13As noted earlier, ESG funding may reach eligible projects through different routes. In our
state visits, we spoke with homeless service providers that were nonprofit organizations.
We did not visit any local governments that use ESG funds to provide homeless services
themselves. We refer collectively to the nonprofit organizations we visited as
"subgrantees."
Reporting • Various reports to primary grantees or others, including financial matters, number of
clients served, services provided, number of clients housed, referrals made
"i~
• Data collection, reporting for Homeless Management Information System
I
I
I
Page 12 GAO-I0-491 Homelessness
Neither Grantees Nor Grantees and subgrantees in the states we visited told us the ESG
Subgrantees Fully Cover administrative allowance generally did not fully cover their actual costs to
Administrative Costs with administer the grant award, and that as a result, they relied on other
sources to cover any unfunded costs. We found that grantees' and
Amounts Designated for subgrantees' actual ESG administrative costs depended on a number of
Administration and Rely factors, such as the number of grant awards made, level of oversight
on Other Sources to Cover provided, number of staff involved in administrative tasks, and types of
Unfunded Costs ESG program activities funded. Figure 5 provides details on the estimated
unfunded ESG administrative costs and sources used to cover these costs
for grantees and subgrantees we visited. Overall, the unfunded
administrative costs reported to us across the eight grantees and 22
subgrantees we visited for which information was available averaged an
estimated 13.2 percent of the ESG allocation, with a range of 2.5 percent to
56 percent. However, HOD officials cautioned that some subgrantees we
visited appear to be confusing program activities with administrative
activities, which might have affected their estimates of actual
administrative costs.
California Grantees
ESG grant Est. unfunded ESG administrative
funds received expenses as percentage of grant Source(s) used to fill the gap
State of California $6.8M
------------------
" _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,, 40°'
'2
\!: . /0 General fund
~ - - -- -- - - - - - --,
Oakland $371,000 iE4lm1.mL --,25.0 General fund, redevelopment funds
Emergency shelter, transitional housing Case manager salary 11_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ -J 13.5 Federal, county funding;
rfvate fund raisin
Range of housing options from emergency shelter to
ermanent su ortive housin Ius homeless services
Facilities, food, and direct operating costs
for a e 18-24 shelter
;-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-J 9.0 City funding, private fundraising
Shelter for abused and homeless women, children General operations 1ft.
-~----------------
J 9.0 County funding, private fundraising
Grantees
ESG grant Est. unfunded ESG administrative
funds received expenses as percentage of grant Source(s) used to fill the gap
!lelJ'" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
State of Michigan $2.8M ~ --,13.0% State housing development
authori b
Detroit
~?;;;;:- - - - - - - - - - - - - --,
United Wa rivate fundraisin ---1
Shelter, apartments for homeless women General operations Private fund raising,
is''''''iX
;~- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -,18.0 endowment funds
Figura continues on next page.
Notes: "Use of ESG funds" refers to program services funded by ESG grants. "Est. unfunded ESG
administrative expenses" refers only to administrative costs. Funding is as reported for fiscal year
2009. When range provided by source, mid-point is reported here. Figures for unfunded
administrative costs are for actual or minimum amount, as reported by source. Some local homeless
service providers may receive ESG funds from state as well as local government sources. Omitted is
one additional homeless service provider in Detroit, for which information was unavailable.
"Community Development Block Grant
"Specifically, proceeds from operations of the Michigan State Housing Development Authority, a !
quasi-governmental authority that oversees the state's ESG program.
!
"City combines ESG funding with other sources to make lump sum grants to homeless service
providers, of which 12 percent may be used for administration. ESG funds do not go towards the 12
I
percent allowance.
"Also, some charges not billed, and some costs absorbed through growth.
Grantees
Georgia
ESG grant Est. unfunded ESG administrative
funds received expenses as percentage of grant Source(s) used to fill the gap
"""': - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, State trust fund for homeless,
State of Georgia $2.2M \§t?0i
ll'=--_______________ ,12.5% t t hOUSIn
state . f mance au th on.
$369,000
Homeless prevention Prevention services; in most cases, County funding, United Way
to a client rent
Emergency shelter, transitional housing for women, ~f- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, Donations from congregations,
families with children; homeless prevention
General operations lrr ~ 5.0 other rivate donations
Emergency shelter, residential recovery,
Utilities
rusc
\::1U
.~-
-- -- - -- - -- - -- - -'10
_, .
5
Generally from other sources
transitional housing
r --------,- ------, Generally from other sources,
Sheller, financial assistance, employment education Short-term housing AfiS€ ,13.0
s -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-J
I,,"%~"_ - __ - - - __ - - --I
United Wa
Comprehensive homeless service center, including shelter, 7.0 Generally from other sources,
Food, security
da center medical clinic em J rnent and lrainin services United Wa
Legal services Foreclosure prevention
------------------
Not avejatse Generally from other sources
Source: GAO interviews with respective government officials, homeless service providers.
Several subgrantees in the states we visited told us there has been a trend
toward more private donations being restricted-that is, made for specific
programs or purposes, rather than generally available for a subgrantee's
operations, including administrative costs. Thus, reliance on private
donations to cover unfunded ESG administrative costs may become more
challenging. For example, one subgrantee told us that donors feel it is
more attractive to fund specific programs that have more tangible
outcomes compared withfunding administrative costs. Another
subgrantee told us that business donors tend to target contributions to
address specific issues and achieve particular results. Finally, one
subgrantee told us that nonprofits themselves have contributed to this
trend by telling potential donors they will use donations to undertake
specific nonadministrative tasks."
Some grantees and subgrantees in the states we visited told us the need to
cover unfunded ESG administrative costs using other funding sources has
diminished their ability to fund other program activities. For example, one
grantee told us that amounts spent to cover unfunded ESG administrative
costs could otherwise be directed toward community and economic
development activities. Another grantee cited housing counseling and
home purchase down-payment assistance as areas that could receive
According to HUD officials, the ESG program was established with a lower
administrative cost allowance based on the expectation that grantees
could obtain funds from other sources to cover unfunded ESG
administrative costs. The officials also told us that although they do not
have comprehensive information on the extent to which the ESG
administrative cost allowance is sufficient to cover grantees' actual
150ur review focused on current ESG grantees and subgrantees. We did not seek to identity
any instances of grantees or subgrantees dropping out of the ESG program, or declining to
participate, because of unfunded administrative costs.
16For one subgrantee, the mitigating factor was the ability to realize economies by using
data produced for other purposes to satisfy ESG requirements. For the other, officials told
us that cost notwithstanding, they believed it is important to be an active participant in the
local community.
Available Sources for As GAO has noted previously, there is no government-wide definition of
Evaluating the what constitutes an administrative cost. ta For the ESG program in
Appropriateness of ESG particular, there are a number of sources that provide standards for
administrative costs, but we found they generally offer little detail for
Program Administrative evaluating the appropriateness of these costs.
Costs Offer Little Detail,
and Monitoring of These For grantees, there are regulations and agency guidance that address
Costs Varies administrative costs.
general, federal grant programs can treat administrative expenses, and expected
17In
contributions by grant recipients, a number of different ways. See, for example, GAO,
Human Service Programs: Demonstmtion Projects Could Identify Ways to Simplify
Policies and Facilitate Technology Enhancements to Reduce Administrative Costs,
GAO-D6-942 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19,2006). This report describes, among other things,
how deflnitlons of administrative costs vary across programs, and how federal and state
participation in funding administrative costs can be governed by matching rates, block
grants, spending caps, or other rules.
"See. for example, GAO, Title I: Although Definitions ofAdministrative Expenditures
Vary, Almost All School Districts Studied Spent Less Than 10 Percent on
Administration, GAO-03-386 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2003). Additionally, a relevant
OMB circular-OMB Circular A-87, Cost Principlesfor State, Local, and Indian Tribal
Governments-does not define administrative costs. Similarly, OMB Circular A-122, Cost
Principlesfor Non-Profit Organizations, which establishes cost principles for
determining costs of grants, contracts and other agreements with nonprofit organizations,
states that "[b]ecause of the diverse characteristics and accounting practices of non-profit
organizations, it is not possible to specify the types of cost which may be classified as
indirect cost in all situations," where "indirect cost" includes "administration" expenses.
"'.rd.
In addition to the regulations and the desk guide, HUD also publishes the
Guide for Review ofESG Cost Allowability and the Guide for Review of
ESG Financial Management as resources for grantees." These guides,
however, do not provide any additional details on the appropriateness of
administrative expenses. The guides refer to compliance with reguiations
and circulars published by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
In particular, OMB Circular A-87, Cost Principlesfor State, Local, and
Indian Tribal Governments, details principles for determining allowable
costs incurred by state, local, and federally recognized Indian tribal
governments under grants and other agreements with the federal
government. These principles are not specific to the ESG program, and the
circular is not necessarily the final authority on such matters, as it requires
agencies administering programs to issue reguiations implementing the
circular. HUD officials told us the agency's ESG regulations incorporate
the provisions of OMB Circular A-87. 23
21bese are contained within HUD's CPD Monitoring Handbook, which contains HUD
monitoring criteria for programs administered by HUD's Office of Community Planning and
Development.
2~e circular identifies administrative costs as a form of "indirect costsv-, those incurred
for common or joint objectives-and specifically defines "administration" as "general
administration and general expenses" such as a director's office, accounting, personnel, ,i,
library expenses, and other nonfacility expenses. OMB Circular A-122, Attachment A
(Revised June 9, 2004). See 2 C.F.R. Part 230.
As with grantees, the level of detail in the various cost standards for
subgrantees' administrative costs can make it difficult to assess the
appropriateness of spending. For example, as noted, California rules cite
expenses necessary to administer the ESG grant itself, not to administer or
operate a shelter. However, one California subgrantee reported to us that
its ESG administrative activities include those associated with client
intake, handling client case management forms, and technical support.
Similarly, as noted, the City of Atlanta relies on OMB Circular A-122, which
identifies administrative costs as a form of "indirect costs"-those
incurred for common or joint objectives-and defines "administration" as
"general administration and general expenses." However, a subgrantee
also reported to us that its ESG administrative activities include those
associated with a range of client-focused dealings spanning intake to post-
program follow-up. HUD officials told us that both client intake and case
management (including handling case management forms) activities are
not eligible administrative costs under the ESG program; rather, these
activities are eligible program costs under the shelter operations and
essential services categories. Moreover, as with grantees, a complicating
factor is subgrantees' self-funding of ESG administrative costs.
21n addition to HUD's own monitoring of grantees, there can also be monitoring by entities
other than HUD. For example, officials of the Michigan State Housing Development
Authority, which runs the state's ESG program, described to us how credit rating agencies
playa role in overseeing their agency's performance. As an issuer afbonds, the authority is
subject to evaluations by credit rating agencies. According to authority officials, the ratings
agencies look at such things as the authority's fmances, legal situation, and program and
service delivery. The officials told us that despite the scrutiny, rating agency attention is
more constructive than a liability and has contributed to the agency's financial stability and
ability to expand.
2wn officials said the last major evaluation of the ESG program was in 1994; see HUD
Office of Policy Research and Development, Evaluation of the Emergency Shelter Grants
Program, Washington, D.C., prepared by Abt Associates: September 1994. The report
contains limited discussion of administrative costs. Since then, the agency has not
undertaken a separate analysis of ESG administrative costs, officials told us.
JJJJ
housing, related services for independent
living funds deemed to have met sharing
requirement
Education
veterans
J
Youth - Grants for State and Local
Activities: Public education for homeless rul
children
Homeless Education Disaster Assistance One-lime program ending in 20t 0;
under the grant, states not
J
Program: Assistance to local education
agencies where homeless student enrollment responsible for monitoring local
increased due to 2008 natural disasterst educational agency aclivilles
HHS
J
Individuals: Treatment lor homeless
Grantees must have indirect
persons wlth mental illness or substance NA NA cost agreement if claiming
use disorders (funds (funds indirect costs, which include
distributed distributed administration. Otherwise,
Services in Supportive Housing Program: gran! specialists review
J
Housing assistance and support services for directly) directly) administrative items.
homeless persons with mental illness and
substance use disorders
o Not applicable
l!i~slit; Provision/allowance
_ No provision/allowance
Note: This comparison does not include HUD's Shelter Plus Care Program, which provides rental
assistance for permanent housing. According to HUD, the program provides an allowance for
administering rental assistance, such as providing housing information or inspecting housing units,
but does not provide funds for grant administration. On that basis, although Shelter Plus Care is a
targeted homeless program, we excluded it from our comparison.
27Under the program, when a state or local government receives a grant to fund projects
operated by nonprofit organizations, the administrative funds provided as part of the grant
must be passed on to the nonprofit in proportion to the administrative burden borne. HUD
considers sharing of at least 50 percent of the administrative allowance as meeting this
requirement.
29 HOD officials said they have adopted OMB's reasonabie and necessary standard into the
agency's own rules.
While a number of grantees and subgrantees told us they expect the nature
of administrative activities to change, and their costs to increase, not all
the recipients we visited agreed that higher administrative costs are likely.
For example, a Pennsylvania subgrantee told us it anticipates that the
administrative costs associated with a prevention program would probably
be equal to the costs of a shelter program, and it would not expect costs to
be higher unless program requirements become more onerous. California
state officials told us they do not expect the nature or amount of
administrative costs will change with new program activities, because
activities already change frequently today. Similarly, a Michigan
subgrantee told us that barring any increase in regulatory requirements, it
does not expect any added burden in areas such as reporting of program
activity, audit duties, or office space required for administration. Overall,
expectations about higher administrative costs are plainly prospective in
nature, because the new activities have not yet been implemented.
Uncertainty over how and when the new ESG program might be
implemented, as well as variation in the nature of administrative activities
seen in the current ESG program, complicate any attempt to determine the
appropriate size of the program's administrative allowance. Providing such
an allowance helps ensure funds are spent properly and directed to their
appropriate purpose. But if the allowance is insufficient to allow adequate
administration and oversight, program efficiency and effectiveness could
be at risk. Grantees and subgrantees we spoke with reported that the
current ESG administrative allowance does not fully cover their
administrative costs. Moreover, our work indicates that even with the new
administrative allowance of 7.5 percent, the ESG program would still have
one of the lower allowances among similarly structured homeless grant
programs. If the new ESG program increases in complexity or scope of
services, its administrative cost allowance will take on even more
significance in the future.
3w.m officials told us they are drafting regulations to implement the new Emergency
Solutions Grant Program, but did not specify a schedule for publishing proposed
regulations for public comment. HUD expects to implement the new ESG program in the
fiscal year 2011 allocation process. In its fiscal year 2011 budget proposal, HUD requested
$200 million for the new ESG program, a 25 percent increase above the $160 million
allocated for ESG in fiscal year 2010.
The Secretaries of Education, Health aud Hurnau Services, aud Labor did
not provide comments.
Table 3: ESG Grantee Summary for States Visited, Fiscal Year 2009
!
Note: Figures for state governments, total awards to local governments rounded to nearest $100,000;
local award figures rounded to nearest $100.
The states we visited collectively received 24.5 percent of the total ESG
funds HUD awarded to grantees in fiscal year 2009, Because we used a
IWe obtained cost information expressed as a percentage of the ESG grant amount. The
amounts reported to us generally were estimates and not the product of formal accounting
systems, because ESG grant recipients generally did not track ESG administrative costs
specifically. We compared the cost figure to any administrative allowance received from
ESG grant proceeds, also expressed as a percentage of the grant amount. We netted the
two amounts to calculate any unfunded ESG administrative expenses.
(250487)
Page 35 GAO-1O-491 Homelessness
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•
I
Pollack,Joshua
From: Rogers, Margot
Sent: Thursday, April 29, 20107:49 AM
To: Miller, Tony
Subject: FW: Here's the story: "Comparing Higher Ed to Wall Street"
(b )(5)
·•
- i
· i,
·,
· !
, !
•
_ i
•,
Robert Shireman •
•
Deputy Undersecretary
U .S. Department of Education •
, :
(202) 260-0 I0 1
While Shireman's comments were aimed most directly at the for-profit colleges themselves, they may be most noteworthy \•
for his indictment of accreditation, higher education's system o f institutional peer review. In Shireman's narrative before
the annual meeting <http://www.nasasps.org/conference/registration-m aterials> of the National Association o f State
I
1
I
•
; ,
Pollack,Joshua
From: Rogers , Margot
Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2010 7:49 AM
To: Miller, Tony
Subject: FW: Here's the story: "Comparing Highe r Ed to Wall Street"
The words have provided little reassurance to the co lleges, since they haven't always seemed to square with the aggressive
approach <http ://www.insidehighered.comlnews/20 I 0/04/21 /gainful> the Obama administration is taking in rewriting
federal rules governing vocational and other programs.
On Wednesday, in a speech to state regulators who overs ee for-profit colleges, the chief architect of the Education
Department's strategy, R obert Shireman, offered a much more critical assessment of the private sector institutions than he
has in his public comments to date, according to accounts given by several people who were in the room. He compared
the institutions repeatedly to the Wall Street firms whose behavior led to the financial meltdown and called them out
individually, one by one, for the vast and quickly increasing sums of federal student aid money they are drawing down.
While Shireman's comments were aimed most directly at the for-profit colleges themselves, they may be most noteworthy
for his indictment of accreditation, higher education's system of institutional peer review . In Shireman's narrative before
the annual meeting <http://www .nasasps.org/conference/registration-materials> of the National Association of State
t
Administrators and Supervisors of Private Schools, the accrediting agencies are to the for-profit colleges what the Wall
Street ratings agencies were to the misbehaving financial firms: entities charged with regulating an industry that has
grown too quickly and too complex for them to control, and that have an "inherent conflict of interest" because their
existence depends on financial contributions from those they regulate.
Accreditors lack the "firepower" to regulate the for-profit sector, and the states and the federal government don't
necessarily have all the tools they need to do it either, Shireman said, according to the notes of several in the audience.
That, he suggested, is why the Education Department must toughen its rules in the way it is now proposing.
I Shireman could not be reached for comment, and an Education Department spokesman said its officials did not wish to
comment on this article.
To several people in the audience, Shireman's comments represented a much more candid (and critical) appraisal ofthe
for-profit sector than he has offered publicly since he became deputy under secretary of education almost exactly a year
ago <http://www.insidehighered.comlnews/2009/04/21/shireman> . Many supporters of the education companies feared
his appointment because they believed his track record as an advocate for low-income students and a foe of student debt
would result in a crackdown on the institutions, whose students are disproportionately needy and disproportionately go
into heavy debt <http://www.insidehighered.comlnews/201 0/04/27/debt> to finance their educations.
But with Wall Street analysts hanging on his every word <http://www.insidehighered.comlnews/2009/06/01/qt#200115>
looking for snippets that might threaten the publicly traded companies' stock prices, Shireman has often seemed to go out
of his way to avoid singling the institutions out for criticism.
A typical quotation, from last sunnner: <http://www.insidehighered.comlnews/2009/06/16/cca> "Our overall goal at the
Department of Education in postsecondary education is to make sure that students ... have the information they need to
make good choices, and that they have good quality postsecondary education that serves both them as students and
taxpayers as well," Shireman said. "...If there is not quality, we want to know about it and if we can, we want to do
something about it. Whether that involves a public institution, a nonprofit, a for-profit, a two-year, a four-year, a trade
program, whatever type or sector of institution, we want to do all we can to make sure that we have good quality."
Different Tone
In his comments Wednesday, Shireman laid out the context underlying the Obama administration's elevation of higher
education as a central focus of its domestic policies. The economic slide. created in part by the collapse of the credit
markets has sent Americans streaming back to college in record numbers, and has made it more imperative than ever that
more Americans get a higher education to strengthen the country's economic base for the future, Shireman said.
The administration has poured tens of billions of dollars into Pell Grants and restructured the federal student loan
programs to try to ensure that Americans have access to higher education, Shireman said Wednesday. Many public
institutions, facing cuts in their state funding, have had to limit or even cut their enrollments, reducing their ability to meet
the increasing demand from students.
The for-profit colleges, by contrast, have stepped up, seeing their enrollments explode -- and with them, the amount of
Pell Grant money that follows the students to the institutions, Shireman said. Anyone in the audience from Corinthian
Colleges? Shireman asked the assembled audience Wednesday.
A hand went up. The California-based for-profit higher ed company has seen its revenue from Pell Grants grow by 38
percent in the first three quarters of this fiscal year compared to the last one, he said. Anyone from DeVry? Forty-two
percent, Shireman said. Strayer? ITT? One by one, he ticked through a list of publicly traded companies, pointing out the
increasing amounts of federal money the institutions were collecting ("It was like fourth grade, with a teacher scolding
students over their grades," said one person who was in the room).
What are taxpayers and students getting in return for that investment? Shireman asked. It has historically been up to the
"triad" -- the three-headed regulatory scheme involving the federal government, state governments and accrediting
agencies -- to ensure access, quality and integrity in higher education, he said.
2
But is that regulatory system up to the job? To draw a parallel, Shireman noted that as this meeting was unfolding in St.
Paul, politicians back in Washington were debating possible reforms of Wall Street, to try to fix the "flawed" regulatory
process that allowed Goldman Sachs and other purveyors of subprime mortgages to engage in misbehavior that helped
devastate the economy.
.,
One major reason the process was flawed, Shireman said, was because the bond rating agencies that were supposed to be
judging the riskiness of the financial instruments were supported in large part by fees from the companies that were asking
the agencies to rate the financial instruments -- "a clear, inherent conflict of interest," Shireman said, according to the
accounts of several in the room.
.! On top of that inherent conflict, the ratings agencies have been struggling to keep tabs on industries that grew quickly and
adopted increasingly complex practices, Shireman said, suggesting that the ratings agencies lacked the "firepower" to
regulate the financial markets.
In case anyone missed it, Shireman drove his point home, pointing out that higher education accrediting agencies are
made up of (and financially supported by) their member colleges, and see it as their mission both to help the institutions
"improve" and also to ensure, in what is essentially a subcontract from the federal govermnent, that they are of sufficient
quality.
The peer review nature of higher education accreditation has an inherent conflict of interest similar to the ratings agencies,
Shireman said. Given that, he suggested, it is crucial for state and federal agencies, as the other two parts of the triad, to
step up their role in regulating higher education. But do state regulators think they have the "firepower" to keep tabs on
the big, growing and complex private market college sector? Shireman asked the state officials in the room. The response
was underwhelming.
The federal govermnent's own powers may be insufficient to do the job, too, Shireman suggested, according to members
of the audience. That is why the department needs new approaches to ensuring integrity in the financial aid programs, he
said, such as requiring most for-profit colleges and non-degree vocational programs at nonprofit colleges to show that
they are preparing students for gainful employment.
Several people who heard the speech said they viewed it as a much more strident critique of for-profit colleges, and of
higher education accreditation, than Shireman has delivered before. But David Dies, who heads the Wisconsin
Educational Approval Board and just finished a term as president of the national group of state regulators, didn't hear it
quite that way.
"I think Bob was explaining why we need state regulation and [Education] Department oversight to be part ofthis three-
legged stool, not just accreditation, and why we all need to work together," said Dies. "He was pointing out some
limitations of accreditation, but I didn't really see it" as highly critical of accreditors or for-profit colleges.