The risk is typically greater for the party who must pay in the other country’s cu
rrency (Salscuse, 1998). The less stable the currency, the greater the risk for
both party. In addition, any change in the value of a currency (upper or downwa
rd) can significantly affect the value of the agreement for both parties, changi
ng a mutually valuable deal into a windfall profit for one and a large loss for
the other. Many countries also control the currency flowing across their border.
Frequently, purchases within these countries may be made only with hard currenc
ies that are brought into the country by foreign parties, and domestic organizat
ions are unable to purchase foreign products or negotiate outcomes that require
payment in foreign currencies.
Foreign Government and Bureaucracies
Countries differ in the extent to which the government regulates industries and
organizations. United States are relatively free from government intervention, a
lthough some industries are more heavily regulated than other (e.g. power genera
tion, defense), and some states have tougher environmental regulations than othe
rs. Generally, business negotiations in the United States occur without governme
nt approval, however, and the parties to a negotiation decide whether or not to
engage in an agreement based on business reasons alone. In contrast, the governm
ents of many developing and (former) communist countries closely supervise impor
t and joint ventures. Frequently an agency of the government has a monopoly in d
ealing with foreign organizations (Salacuse, 1988). In addition, political consi
derations, such as the effect of the negotiation on the government treasury and
the general economy of the country, may influence the negotiations more heavily
than what Western businesses would consider legitimate business reasons.
Instability
Businesses negotiating within North America are accustomed to a degree of stabil
ity that is not present in many areas of the world. Instability may take many fo
rm, including a lack of resources that American commonly except during business
negotiations (paper, electricity, computers): shortages of other goods and servi
ces (food, reliable transportation, portable water); and political instability (
coups, sudden shifts in government policy, major currency revaluations). The cha
llenge for international negotiators is to anticipate changes accurately and wit
h enough lead time to adjust for their consequences clauses in their contracts t
hat allow easy cancellation or neutral arbitration, and consider purchasing insu
rance policies to guarantee contract provisions. The advice presumes that contra
ct will be honored and that specific contract clauses will be culturally accepta
ble to the other party.
Ideology
Negotiators within the United States generally share a common ideology about the
benefits of individualism and capitalism. American believe strongly in individu
al right, the superiority of private investment, and the importance of making a
profit in business (Salacuse, 1988). Negotiators from other countries do not alw
ays share this ideology. For example, negotiators from some countries (e.g. Chin
a, France) may instead stress group right as more important than individual righ
ts and public investment as a better allocation of resources than private invest
ment; they may also have different prescriptions for earning and sharing profit.
Ideological clashes increase the communication challenges in international nego
tiation in the broadest sense because the parties may disagree at the most funda
mental level about what is being negotiated.
Culture
One does not have to leave the United States to see the influence of culture on
negotiations. Clearly it is challenging when the fundamental beliefs about what
negotiation is and how it occurs are different.
Introduction
Every step in international business involves negotiations, be that between the
governments of various countries and multinationals to allow operating in their
territories, or suppliers and customers from different cultures or between union
s and employees working in subsidiaries or factories located in different countr
ies. No skill is more required in international managers than negotiating skills
.
Governments often impose restrictions on repatriation of profits and owners
hip of raw material sources, and require employment of local people and use of i
ndigenous inputs. On the other hand, MNCs have resources, technology and managem
ent skills and they want tax concessions and protection of their patents and tec
hnology. Hence, the two must interact and negotiate with each other to settle te
rms. In this equation, the local partner and the government of MNCs home-country
also participates to influence business outcomes. All this requires intense neg
otiations and diplomacy between different players. Hence, negotiation and diplom
atic skills are essential qualities of international managers.
Negotiation skills are also required when seeking to enter a market via an
agent or distributor, setting up sales network, establishing a joint venture or
a production facility as well as licensing a technology or seeking technology t
ransfer. Negotiation plays a key role in mergers and acquisitions. In internatio
nal diplomacy, major breakthroughs, such as the signing of Euro tunnel agreement
or the Sino-Soviet border agreement, which took several years and many rounds a
t different levels, are made only through negotiations. Failure to appreciate ho
w deals are made through negotiations and diplomacy may seriously jeopardize the
interest of a firm. It is also important to know how different societies and cu
ltures influence this process.
Negotiation and Diplomacy
Negotiation is a dialogue between two or more parties, who are trying to work ou
t a solution to their problem. This interpersonal or inter-group process can occ
ur at a personal level, as well as at a corporate or international (diplomatic)
level. Negotiations typically take place because the parties wish to create some
thing new that neither could do on his or her own, or to resolve a problem or to
make a deal with each other.
The parties acknowledge that there is a conflict of interest between them and th
ink that they can use some form of influence to get a better deal, particularly
when they have interlinked goals that they cannot attain independently. The natu
re of interdependence will have a major impact on the nature of their relationsh
ip, the way negotiations are conducted, and the outcome of these negotiations. M
utual adjustment is one of the key causes of the changes that occur during negot
iation. Both parties know that they can each influence the other’s outcomes. The e
ffective negotiator attempts to understand how people will adjust and readjust t
heir positions during negotiations, based on what the other party does and is ex
pected to do.
The parties have to exchange information and make an effort to influence each ot
her. As negotiations evolve, each side proposes changes to the other party’s posit
ion and makes changes to its own proposals. This process of give and take is nec
essary if a settlement is to be reached. If one party makes several proposals th
at are rejected, and the other party makes no alternate proposals, the first par
ty may break off negotiations. Parties typically will not concede much if they s
ense that other party is not willing to compromise. The parties must work toward
s a solution that takes into account each person’s requirements and optimizes the
outcomes for both.
The Anatomy of Negotiation Process
It is necessary to look at negotiation process and techniques before moving to c
ross-cultural considerations in the negotiation process. Negotiations involve tw
o levels-one is the rational decision-making level, the other is at the psycholo
gical and social levels. Psychological and social elements are affected by cultu
re; therefore, negotiations are as much to do with the psychological as with the
rational.
Failure to optimally resolve the psychological factors that affect negoti
ation will include such elements as attitudes, persuasion styles, goals and expe
ctations, perceptions and misperceptions, the need to avoid the conflict, the ne
ed to win, and so on. The ripe moment for a solution is when a deadlock seems li
kely and the costs of not reaching the agreement are rising for both parties. Th
en, an alternative is irresistible.
Parameters of Negotiation
It is important to carefully decide:
1. Where to negotiate?
2. When to negotiate?
3. Who negotiates?
4. Who has authority to decide?
5. Why negotiate?
6. How to negotiate?
7. How much time is needed for negotiations?
In theory, negotiating is one’s homeland gives territorial advantage, includ
ing consultation with others in one’s company and availability of information. How
ever, meeting at the negotiating party’s premises gives you insights into how they
manage their operations and their capacities. It also enables one to hide from
other company members should one prefer to be anonymous. Meeting on neutral terr
itory or alternately at each other’s place makes a compromise.
The timing of holding the negotiation is also critical. The parties sho
uld meet when the problem is ripe and both parties need a solution. One should a
void holidays and religious festivals, such as month of Ramadhan in Arabia, Chin
ese lunar New Year or Christmas in the West. Timing of the negotiation also invo
lves planning the schedule, how often should the parties meet, and at what inter
val.
It is important to estimate how much time is required for conducting ne
gotiations. Decision-making in collectivist cultures takes longer because consen
sus has to be built among interested parties within the firm. Sometimes, after a
consensus has been built, negotiators may be unwilling to make radical concessi
ons, which means creating a new consensus. Negotiators from China often demand a
large amount of technical information and progress may be delayed due to this.
Ghauri (1988) concludes from his study of deals between Swedish, Indian and Nige
rian firms that negotiations with unfamiliar parties takes more than double the
time taken with familiar parties. Time usually spent by U.S. and Japanese negoti
ators on various activities during negotiations is given below:
3-D Negotiations
Three important barriers exist between success and failure in most serious negot
iations. The first is tactics; the second is deal design and the third is set up
. Each dimension is crucial, but much of the negotiation literature is devoted t
o the first two only. For instance, negotiation skills focus on how executives c
an focus on tactics-interaction at the bargaining table. The common barriers in
this dimension include lack of trust, poor communications and negotiator’s hard-ba
ll attitudes. For this, one should learn how to read body language, adapting the
style according to bargaining situation, listening carefully, framing your case
persuasively, and making offers and counter offers, managing deadlines, managin
g cross-cultural gaffers and others.
The second dimension (2-D) that of deal design or negotiator’s ability to d
raw up a deal at the table creates lasting value is also important. When a deal
does not offer enough value to all sides- the negotiators work to diagnose under
lying sources of economic and non-economic value and then craft agreements that
can unlock that value for the parties. Does some sort of trade between sides mak
e some sense and, if so, on what terms? Should it be a staged agreement, perhaps
with contingencies and risk-sharing provisions? This deal is a more creative in
concept and structure and one that meets the ego-needs as well as the economic
ones.
Beyond the interpersonal and deal design challenges that executives f
ace in 1-D and 2-D negotiations, lay the 3-D obstacles-flaws in the negotiating
setup itself. Common problems in this often-neglected third dimension include n
egotiating with the wrong parties or about the wrong set of issues, involving pa
rties in the wrong sequence or at the wrong time, as well as incompatible or una
ttractive no-deal options. 3-D negotiators, however reshape the scope and sequen
ce of the game itself to achieve the desired outcome. Acting entrepreneurially,
away from the table, they ensure that the right parties are approached in the ri
ght order to deal with the right issues, by the right means, at the right time,
under the right set of expectations, and facing the right no-deal options.
Former U.S. trade representative Charlene Barshefsky, who has negotia
ted with hundreds of companies, governments, and non-governmental organizations
to spearhead deals on goods, services, land, intellectual property, characterize
s successful 3-D negotiations this way: ‘Tactics at the table are only the clean-u
p work. Many people mistake tactics for the underlying substance and the relentl
ess efforts away from the table that are needed to set up the most promising pos
sible situation once you face your counterpart. When you know what you need and
you have put a broader strategy in place, then negotiating tactics will flow.’
3-D Negotiation in practice
Even managers who possess superior interpersonal skills in negotiations can fail
when the barriers to agreement fall in the 3-D realm. During the 1960s, Kenneco
tt Copper’s long term, low royalty contract governing its huge EI Teniente mine in
Chile was at high risk of renegotiation; the political situation in Chile had c
hanged drastically since the contract was originally drawn up, rendering the ter
ms of the deal unstable. Chile had what appeared to be a very attractive walk aw
ay option-or in negotiation lingo, a BATNA (best alternative to negotiated agree
ment). By unilateral action, the Chilean government could radically change the f
inancial terms of the deal or even expropriate the mine. Kennecott’s BATNA appeare
d poor: Submit to new terms or be expropriated.
Imagine that Kennecott had adopted a 1-D strategy focusing primarily
on interpersonal actions at the bargaining table. Using that approach, Kennecott’s
management team would assess the personalities of the ministers with whom it wo
uld be negotiating. It would try to be culturally sensitive and it might choose
elegant restaurants in which to meet. Indeed, Kennecott’s team did take such sensi
ble actions. But, that approach wasn’t promising enough given the threatening real
ities of the situation. Chile’s officials seemed to hold all the cards. They didn’t
need Kennecott to run the mine; the country had its own experienced managers and
engineers. And Kennecott’s hands seemed tied. It couldn’t move the copper mine, nor
did it have a lick on downstream processing or marketing of the valuable metal,
nor any realistic prospect, as in a previous era, of calling in the U.S. fleet.
Fortunately for Kennecott, its negotiators adopted a 3-D strategy and
setup the impending talks most favorably. The team took six steps and changed t
he playing field altogether. First, somewhat to the government’s surprise, Kenneco
tt offered to sell a majority equity interest in the mine to Chile. Second, to s
weeten that offer, the company proposed using the proceeds from the sale of equi
ty, along with money from an Export-Import bank loan, to finance a large expansi
on of the mine. Third, it induced the Chilean government to guarantee this loan
and make the guarantee subject to New York state law. Fourth, Kennecott insured
as much as possible of its assets under a U.S. guarantee against expropriation.
Fifth, it arranged for the expanded mine’s output to be sold under long-term contr
acts with North-American and European customers. And sixth, the collection right
s to these contracts were sold to a consortium of European, U.S., and Japanese f
inancial institutions.
These actions fundamentally changed the negotiations. A larger mine,
with Chile as the majority owner, meant a larger and more valuable pie for the h
ost country. The proposal would result in more revenue for Chile and would addre
ss the country’s interest in maintaining at least nominal sovereignty over its own
natural resources.
Moreover, a broad array of customers, government, and creditors now s
hared Kennecott’s concerns about future political changes in Chile and were highly
skeptical of Chile’s capacity to run the mine efficiently overtime. Instead of fa
cing the original negotiation with Kennecott alone, Chile now effectively faced
a multiparty negotiation with players who would have future dealings with that c
ountry-not only in the mining sector but also in the financial, industrial, lega
l, and public sectors. Chile’s original BATNA to unceremoniously eject Kennecott w
as now far less attractive than it had been at the outset, since hurting Kenneco
tt put a wider set of Chile’s present and future interests at risk.
Relationship
Authority
Initial position
Deadlines Factual: appeals made to logic.
Objective facts.
Small concessions made early to establish a relationship.
Usually reciprocate opponent’s concessions
Short term
Short term
Moderate
Very important Affective: appeals made to emotions.
Subjective feelings.
Long term
Broad
Extreme
Casual Axiomatic: appeals made to ideals.
Asserted ideals.
Face-saving crucial; Decisions often made on basis of saving someone from embarr
assment.
Decision-makers openly influenced by special interests.
Cultivate a good emotional social setting for decision making; to know decision
makers. Emotional sensitivity is not highly valued. Straightforward or impersona
l dealings.
Litigation; not as much as conciliation.
Lack of commitment to employer; breaking of ties by either if necessary.
Teamwork provides input to decision-maker.
Decisions made on cost-benefit basis; face saving does not always matter.
Decision makers influenced by special interests but often not considered ethical
.
Argumentative when right or wrong, but impersonal.
Great importance given to documentation as proof.
Methodically organized decision-making.
Profit motive or good of individual ultimate aim.
Decision-making impersonal; avoid involvements, conflict of interest. Emotiona
l sensitivity valued; passionate.