PARTICIPANTS:
Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator, NASA Headquarters
Mr. D. Brainerd Holmes, Director, Office of Manned Space Flight,
NASA Headquarters
Mr. Robert R. Gilruth, Director of Project Mercury, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center
Mr. Walter C. Williams, Mercury Operations Director, NASA
Manned Spacecraft Center
Dr. Stanley White, Chief, Life Systems Division, NASA Manned
Spacecraft Center
MaJ. Gen. 0. J. Ritland, Commander, Space Systems Division, AFSC
Maj. Gen. Leighton I. Davis, Commander, AMR, & DOD Representative,
Project Mercury
Rear Admiral John L. Chew, Commander, Mercury Recovery Forces
Astronaut Alan B. Shepard
NARRATOR: Paul P. Haney, Project Mercury Information Manager
We would like to proceed now. Starting at the far end of
the table is Dr. Stanley C. White, Chief of the Life Systems
Division, Manned Spacecraft Center, NASA; Major General 0. J.
Ritland, Commander of the Space Systems Division, United States
Air Force, Los Angeles; Mr. Walter C. Williams, Mercury Opera-
tions Director, Manned Spacecraft Center; Mr. Robert Gilruth,
Director of Project Mercury. To Mr. Gilruth's left is Dr. Hugh
Dryden, Deputy Administrator of NASA. To his left is Mr. D.
Brainerd Holmes; to his left Maj. Gen. Leighton I. Davis, Dept.
of Defense Representative to Project Mercury, and Cmdr. of the
Atlantic Missile Range, and to his left is Rear Adm. John L.
Chew, Cmdr. of the Mercury Recovery Forces. At this end of the
table is Astronaut Alan B. Shepard. Dr. Dryden will open the
remarks.
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I feel this is really a great deal of testimony to the engi-
neering effort of this particular team and to the engineering
problems of the men working in space in the United States.
And now to my left is General Leighton I. Davis.
DAVIS: The DOD support for this project was quite extensive,
of course -- 18,000 people, 15,000 of which were in the
recovery portion, about which Admiral Chew will speak. I
would like to address myself to the other units of the DOD
which helped out. In addition to the ranges -- Pacific Range,
White Sands Missile Range and the Atlantic Missile Range --
of course we had the Sea Air Rescue Forces around the country
and Europe and Africa, the Pacific Air Force deployed, as well
as the many medical officers from the three services who are
assighed to support the project. The operation went very well
from our viewpoint. I think some of the stations performed
quite terrificly, particularly the Mercury Station at Muchea,
which.came out with the maximum amount of information on each
pass. The links of communication were particularly effective.
The voice of the Astronaut from the capsule to the Indian
Ocean ship, for instance, came back by single side band, and
also from the Atlantic ship. Similarly, in the final phases
of the recovery, there was a two shore relay by airplane, then
through sub cable and then up to our Mercury Control Center,
which went very well, and speaks, more I think as tribute to
a lot of practice and a lot of simulation in exercises of
this type. I would like to pass the ball to Admiral Chew.
CHEW: I would simply like to remark that the relative simpli-
city with which the recovery was accomplished in no way showed
the tremendous amount of work that had gone into the DOD
team effort -- the planning, the extensive preparations, the
training of all tlse forces involved. Both Army, Navy, Air
Force and Marines, and the fruition of the successful recovery,
which of course entails location -- and again in this particular
case it was simple -- because the spacecraft was sighted
coming down just about five miles away from a destroyer, The
first element then, of recovery, was simple. The second element
-- retrieval -- was also simple, for in 21 minutes the capsule
with John Glen in it was on board the Noa, and I hope and
presume that the third phase of recovery, which is delivery
of the Astronaut, will be accomplished without further ado.
It has been my privilege to be associated with such a team.
I will now pass it on to someone who probably doesn't need
much introduction, Astronaut Alan Shepard.
(OVER)
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the very important elements of this team, and if I do, I hope
Walt Willliams will fill in for me. Before I relinquish my spot
here, I would like to say a word of tribute for Walt Wtlliams and
his operations team. He has always been terrific in these missions,
and has never given any indication of getting rattled and makes
the right decisions, and Walt himself, I think, deserves a large
amount of credit for pulling this team together, training it, and
training with them, with himself and Chris Craft and the rest of
those wonderful people. And now I would like to ask Walt Williams
to say how it looks from where he sat.
WILLIAMS: After that, I don't know what to say. Thanks a lot,
Bob. Rather than going into any of the real details of the
flight today, I think I would like to talk about a few of the
significant things I feel we did accomplish. We not only put an
American man in space, we showed very definitely how well a man
can work in space. We had numerous problems along the way, which
I'm sure were relayed to you, that had we not had a man aboard,
the flight would not have come out nearly so well. It surely
would not have gone three rounds. There were times when the
pilot did take over, and the automatic controls which control
the capsule quite well through much of the flight. It was re-
assuring when there were instrumentation questions that the pilot
would come back and answer and help, and as Alan pointed out, he
sure did a beautiful Job today. I have watched many a test pilot
at work, and I have never seen a better Job anywhere than John
Glenn did today.
I think one point that might be confirmed was this matter of
why we left the retro pack on during reentry. This is quite
simple. We had the choice of whether to believe we had a faulty
micro switch or a faulty relay. A faulty micro switch had given
us a false indication that the heat shield had separated from the
capsule as it does at landing. I think most of youl are familiar
with the landing bag where the heat shield is dropped down from
the capsule. There was every indication that this had occurred.
Wke also new iThe retro packs and it.$s straps would hold the heat
shield in place until fired and Jettisoned. On the other hand,
as I say, this could have been Just a faulty indication because
of the micro switch. On the other hand we could have had a relay
go bad which had fired the squib which would have disengaged the
heat shield from the capsule. And reentry with the heat shield
detached would have been a catastrophe. So our choice was to
retain the retro pack, after firing, and take advantage of the
straps of the retro peck to hold the heat shield In place until
we had enough aerodynamic force on so there would be no possibility
of the heat shield dropping off.
(OVER)
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I don't know if this is completely clear but this is the
problem we were faced with. We felt we were much better off
cominlg in with the retro pack on, Xnowing sooner or later that
if vie did it would, the straps holding it, would melt away, but
we also knew it would not melt away till thqre was sufficient
force against the heat shield to hold it in place. I think,
I say I think, Al you may want to confirm this from your
discussions that actually we had a false indication, that
actually the heat shield did not release from the capsule
until after the main parachute deployment, as it would be
expected to. However, we did -no know this at ,the time we
got into trouble. At least, at ' time we had\this indication,
and had tu perform our reentry, a d that was the reason for that.
Now this did mean that this interrupted the cap ule sequence
and John had to take over and do some controlling during re-.
entry. And he did a good job of this.
I don't know. I guess maybe at times I get a lit le emotional
about these things. Right now I feel like the day chool let out.
RITLAND: After following through the mission today, t seems like
the launch phase happened a long time ago -- so many hings have
happened. It was certainly a perfectly beautiful shot as all of i
you will attest to who were here today at the Cape. t more
importantly, from a scientific and technical point of view, it
was still more beautiful and wonderful.
To those of us that monitored the launch phase from Ce tral
Control and watched the plot of the missile as it rose in o the
atmosphere and then out of the atmosphere, it followed a rect
and positive line on a preplot. We did have one concern, t
about 150 seconds the pen bobbled a little bit and had no b aring
on what wias happening in space. It was the pen that tracks tho
plot.
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Q. Was that at 150 seconds?
WHITE- I would like to turn from the mechanics and say hey to some-
tning that Al shepard said. I think as I started putting my notes
together, I said it was the day and it was all John's because of
two things as far as our point of view. First of all, he flew, as
far as we can see from the data obtained, completely normal, as
normal as can be and even more normal than roost expected flights. In
addition to this we had a real bonanza by getting good data from all
the sensors that were hooked to John aid also to the environmental
system that would give us a good correlation of how the spacecraft
and its environments were workring. Thirdly, we were
able to, in the early look data and reports
(O()
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coming in from the station, follow along with the proposed flight
pLan and the tests we had put on to th'y to get at some of the.
questions of the Titov problems and at least in the early, very .
early looks, it looked as if John had no diffioulty with these
and the reports coming from these stations and also the voice
checks coming from John. We asked him and queried him about it
and he was very complimentary to the fact that the tests didn't
phase him a bit. I must admit the accelerations were very
nominal during launch and we werequite pleased to hear John
talking right through both BECO and SECO. He was completely
in command throughout the entire thing so far as libtening~-t, him
report, and I also say that he kept his sense of humor. I thought
it was very well and it was very refreshing around the network.
HANEY: Thank you. If you have questions, please address them to
specific panelists.
Q: Dr. Dryden, obviously this has shortened the gap in our race
with the Russians and I wonder If-you can-go into that a little
more in detail as to how much it has shortened the gap and when
that gap may not exist?
DR'YDF: This is very difficult to answer because our Russian
friends have been silent for several months now and have still
not produced the steps forward in their capabilities that may lie
ahead. I think *itis in the hands of Brainerd, Bob Gilruth and
Wernher von Braun--when we obtain the Saturn vehicle, C-1 and t!
advanced Saturns to determine whether in their hands and in the
hands of what the Russians do to decide whether we, in fact, have
closed the gap. We have orbited a man three times around the earth4
in three years from the time it was an idea.
Q: I wonder if Dr. White could tell us a little bit more in detail
what the pilotea tasks were--how they were carried on--the eating,
the drinking, the exercise and the picture taking and so on.
WHITE: First of all, I would like to say the one big task that
he carried out was the one he did so well--that of control. Now
superimposed upon this, during the flight plan, there were a
series of tests which got at the eating and drinking that was
mentioned. These were phased so that they would be repeated
with elapsing segments--each orbit. It would allow him to try
both.. solid malt-type 'pills and also some of thb tube seeds--
liquids, semiliquids and paste--as a way of finding out if the
upset of the stomach would be the problem that was associated
with Titov. We also programmed, with the sarme periodicity,
the scheduling of head motions, which would normally get; t'; the
inner ear as a trigger mechanism of setting off the nausea that
Cosmonaut Titov described. During t;he first two orbits he was
able to follow this program very, very closely. During the
third orbit he had to defer some of these to stay with i e work
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that was accumulating for him to do on the automatic control
system. We felt ,his is not a real loss because he obviously
was demonstrating a performance which compensated for the small
experiments which were scheduled.
Q: I guess this should be directed to Walt Williams. I don't
mean to beat this bobbling pen to death, but did it cause any
momentary consideration of possibly having to destroy the booster?
WILLIAMS: Oh no, as Genera' Ritland pointed out, this had nothing
to do with the booster. This is purely a display board which
wiggles.
Q: I never should have mentioned it.
WILLIAMS: I can say that the plot board in Mercury Control today
showed the smoothest tracking data that I think we have seen on
any of our missions. There was very little noise in the data-;
it was very beautiful.
Q: Will the Admiral give us some more time details on recovery--
the 21 minutes to the time on board the destroyer is from what
point?
CHEW: The 21 minutes were taken from the time the capsule landed
in the water until it was on board.
HANEY: I believe the times were 47 and 04.
CHEW: That is correct. 47 and 04.
Q: I would like to find out two things. One is to Walt Williams-
what was the difficulty what turned the fuel light red sometime
during the second orbit and was this a consideration at one point
of perhaps terminating the flight at that point? Secondly, why
did the Astronaut spend so much time trying to get out the top
on board the destroyer rather than blowing the hatch right away?
WILLIAMS: I can answer only part of that. I think I indicated we
were having difficulty with the automatic system. We were using
excessive fuel on automatic system. Again, one of the small
thrusters malfunctioned. We had this trouble before. At this
time, rather than ioiding the mission or not going on, we had a
pilot aboard. I think I pointed this out at the time of the
Enos shot, and this was the very same thing. This time we hard
a man aboard and we did not have to worry about depleting the
automatic system because he could use the manual system and had
sufficient fuel to carry out the, sion. And we lid it on this
basis.
Now as to why he did not come. out the top hatch--came out the
side instead, I will have to refer to Al. He talked to John, I
have not. Do you have any comment, Al? (OVER)
SHEPARD: Yes, and before I comment on that--to amplify the answer
to the first question a little bit--the warning light which we use
on the fuel system is actually set to come out at a fairly high
value. In this particular case, it comes on with only 35 per cent
of the fuel used or 65 per cent remaining. It is just a warning
signal to indicate that the fuel is being used out of that system.
For example, on that tank we consider 35 per cent as being the
absolute minimum. So you see we have given ourselves a great
deal of margin there. And secondly, with respect to coming out of
the capsule, the most desirable way to keep the capsule intact is
not to blow the hitch because there is some deformation of the
hatch itself du7-ing explosion. Therefore, we had decided ahead of
time that if it was at all possible that he would come out through
the top. He wac having a little difficulty in getting out fairly
soon to go ahead And blow the hatch. That is the reason the
decision was made'.
Q: This I believe is to either Mr. Williams or to Mr. Gilruth.
You recall at the time of the MA-5 Enos flight that there was
trouble with the steering mechanism in the capsule and there was
overheating in the cabin. At that time it was said that if either
of the eventualities had occurred with a man on board he could
have corrected them. Now they both did, and man did correct them.
My question is this, whether this does not indicate to you some
sort of necessity for a rather drastic revision of your steering
mechanism in this capsule?
WILLIAMS: No, I don't think so. I would say refinements, yes,
but not drastic revision. I wish I had one of them here to show
you. This small, one-pound thruster is a delicate piece of
Jewelry which is also used with a liquid, and this is a problem.
The orifices are very small that could be easily blocked.
Q: I would like to ask Brainerd Holmes if tnray's achievement
will allow i7s to accelerate Mercury and our follow-on programs
such as Gemini or Apollo?
HOLMES; I think the answer is no. We are planning very carefully
to schedule ahead more extended Mercury flights, for additional
Mercury flights like this--three orbits, to the extent of one and
then follow hard on the heels of that with Gemini and Apollo.
But we planned for success today, and we are plannirg and laying
out our organization for our entire program for maximum accelera-
tion and speed. I think it would not be candid or frazac or honest
to say this will speed it up. If we hadn't done this today it
would have 'been a setback for us.
Q: You will stick then to the three other three-orbit Mercury
flights planned for this year in preference to the two 18 orbit
f lgh ts?
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HOLMES: We will have further three orbit flights, and toward the
end of the year and the first part of next year go into 18 orbit
flights. And hard on the heels of that Gemini and Apollo flights.
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CE:Ws Nor. When I left the control row there was not an
indication of precisely what time he would leave the.oarrier.
WILLXAMSs Admiral Chew, I believe I just got some had Signal
here that he was going to go aboard the Randolph in five ftnutes.
Q. We have been told around here that Vice President 7ohnton
is going down to the island to escort Glenn here and that the
President is coming up here Friday. Is there any confirmation
to that?
Man: There was an announcement at the White House at
approximately 15 minutes before this meeting began that thE
President does plan to come down here Friday morning. We will
have firmer times, sites and agenda on this probably tomorrow
morning.
Q: I have a few other questions on vital statistics. Can you
tell us the time that Col. Glenn was w~ightless? Can you tell
us the number of miles that he flow today? Also the maximum
o force?
HANEY: The number of miles he flew and max 0. Alan, do you have
any figures on that?
SHEPARMD The computers are at work. The ftogee and perigee,
Walt?.
47ILLAIS I have those--141.2 nautical miles was the aogee.
Perigce was 86.84 nautical miles. Period of orbit w.3 B8
minutes 29 seconds. The Inclination of the orbit wal 32.54
degrees. The velocity of insertion was 25,728 feet per second,
which was very close to what we planned it to be.
QILRUTH: In response to the other question about how far did
he fly, I believe the figure was 81,000 miles--give or take a
few miles. Quite a bit to put on your coar In one afternoon.
WILLIAMS: The weightlessness would be roughly three times the
orbital,
SHEPARD: About four and three quarter hours for the period of
weightlessness. And the acceleration went up to a peak of about
8 0 twioe during launch and a little over 8 0 during reentry,
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Q: Was there any damage so far as you know from your conversation--
any damage to the capsule which caused it to land, getting out
of it?
SHEPARD: No, there was no damage to the capsule. We were re-
ceiving continual reports through the relay which General Davis
mentioned from the recovery ship here at the Cape, and so we were
getting immediate information. And they continued to indicate
that there was no external damage visible in the capsule, in-
cluding the landing system. The impact bag system was also intact.
Q: Mr. Williams, I would like to ask about the pictures that Col.
Glenn was to take in orbit. Did he take pictures in orbit?
WILLIAMS: Yes, he did.
.Q: What kind of film did he use, sir? Did he use color film,
black and white?
WILLIAMS: He used color. He used black and white.
SHEPARD: Yes, he used both color and black and white.
WILLIAMS: I recall at one time during the flight he was putting
the fourth roll of film in the camera, but I don't :remember now
just when it was.
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Q: When do you expect John Glenn back here, and when will we have
a press conference with him? When will we know if the President
is coming?
GILRUTH: Do you mean BTUs per square foot per second max? I have
forgotten them.
Q: Temperature?
GILRUTH: Temperature of what?
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and he reported this consistently around the flight, all the
way through the flight, until after reentry, and the only
time he said it was kind of hot in there, so he was well in-
sulated, even though the temperature of the cabin was running
maybe 20 to 30 degrees higher than his suit.
Q: Will Deke Slayton be the next astronaut and can you give
us some idea of the picture?
Q: I would like to know if the pilot did use the little flash-
flights on the tips of his gloves, since he has asked for them?