‘One Country, Two Systems’ in the 21st Century: A New Policy?

China’s Rise and Its Impact on Asia: Democratization, Development and

Culture, 20 - 22 March 2009

Daniel Garrett
ODNI Research Fellow
Center for Strategic Intelligence Research
National Defense Intelligence College

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States’ Government.
Cleared by DOD/OSR for publication: 09-S-1525.

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ABSTRACT
Thirty-years ago from the ruins of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping and Liao
Chengzhi were forming what would eventually become the ‘One Country, Two System’
(OCTS) policy – aspects of which started ‘New China’ on its ‘new long march’ towards
socialist modernization, thereby enabling China to become the world power it is today. A
vital component of that modernization was the territory of Hong Kong, then a colonial
possession of Great Britain and today, a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the
People’s Republic of China that continues to serve a special role in the middle kingdom’s
rise and reaching out to the West.

It was partly on the basis of Deng’s envisioned role for Hong Kong in China’s
modernization that he entertained the special policies for it that came to be codified in the
Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR. Those policies were supposed to freeze the
community in stasis for fifty-years. However, over the past three decades unforeseen
quarrels over elections became the foremost political issues in the Hong Kong
community, ultimately eclipsing and sidetracking it from fulfilling Beijing’s original goal
of aiding socialist modernization. Concurrent with the transformation of Hong Kong
society from a colony in 1978 to being a SAR in 1997 and subsequently moving towards
being China’s first international city, has been the democratization of Taiwan – a reality
that outstripped OCTS even before Hong Kong returned to China and which has added
additional complications for implementing OCTS in Taiwan at some future point.

Since 1978, China has experienced phenomenal changes and today China is even
advocating democracy. The world situation has also changed dramatically as has China’s
standing in it and, more recently, its relationship with Taiwan too. At a juncture which
some have described as a ‘new situation’ there are indications that China’s ‘new
generation’ of leaders may be considering, or already implementing, changes in the
OCTS policy for Hong Kong and potentially towards Taiwan. This paper proposes to
examine those indicators and attempt to characterize what a new OCTS might look like
and what it portends for Hong Kong and Taiwan.

This paper is a component of a larger work in progress on how China’s implementation

of the “One Country, Two Systems” policy in Hong Kong has affected the prospects for
realizing universal suffrage in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. It will be
published by the Center for Strategic Intelligence (CSIR), National Defense Intelligence
College (NDIC) in early-to-mid 2009. The views expressed in this paper are those of
the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the CSIR, the NDIC, the
Department of Defense or the United States’ Government. Cleared by DOD/OSR for
publication: 09-S-1525

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INTRODUCTION
The socialist system and policies shall not be practiced in Hong Kong. The previous
capitalist system and way life shall remain unchanged for 50 years. This is the core
essence of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ (OCTS) policy for Hong Kong, Macau and
Taiwan as given by Deng Xiaoping and constantly reiterated by successive Chinese
leaders for the last quarter of a century. Chinese leaders from Deng forward have said
that China’s basic policies on Hong Kong would not change. That they would adhere to
the OCTS policy and its subordinate guiding principles – ‘Hong Kong people ruling
Hong Kong’ and ‘a high degree of autonomy.” Those assurances were predicated,
however, on China’s policies being correct and there being no need for changes. This,
however, has not been the case. Since the early 1980s when the return of the colony and
the OCTS policy was announced Hong Kong (and China) has changed tremendously.
Hong Kong has become a quintessentially political city over the issues of democracy,
elections and universal suffrage despite the best efforts of the Central Authorities to
prevent it from becoming anything other than an economic metropolis.

As the Central Authorities and their supporters in Hong Kong see it, the hijacking of
Hong Kong’s role for aiding socialist modernization by the pan-democrats and foreign
and external forces supporting them over the issue of universal suffrage, has evolved to
the point where it places the viability of retaining the ‘Two Systems’ in their current state
at risk because China’s sovereignty is challenged at every corner and the prosperity of
stability of Hong Kong is endangered by the escalating conflicts over universal suffrage.
The continued prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, they argue, is the guarantor of
OCTS – not democratic politics or universal suffrage. The most conservative warn that
the public’s fixation with universal suffrage jeopardizes Beijing’s willingness to maintain
OCTS and the retention of the ‘Two Systems.’ As early as 1991, the director of the Hong
Kong and Macao Affairs Office (HKMAO), Lu Ping, had warned Hongkongers over
fighting with Beijing over universal suffrage saying that, “If the future SAR [turns]
confrontational against the central government, it has absolutely no future.” i Yet, this is
exactly was has occurred in the eighteen years since Director Lu’s warning and the
situation has grown more dire since reunification.

In fact, right before the ten-year anniversary of the HKSAR in mid-2007, National
People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) Hong Kong Basic Law Committee and
former Legislative Council (Legco) member, Maria Tam Wai-chu, found it necessary to
bluntly tell Hongkongers what they had to do if they wanted the HKSAR and OCTS to
survive, “Hong Kong should not hinge on democratic protests against the central
authorities or on the support of foreign countries or international society for our
democratic progression, but instead rely on implementing the national policies of China.
The operation of ‘one country, two systems’ implies that the previous capitalist system
and way of life remain unchanged. First of all, we should safeguard the sovereignty of
the central authorities. Second, we should maintain the economic and social stability of
Hong Kong …” ii

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Today, as the 12-year anniversary of the turn-over of Hong Kong to the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) approaches, Beijing and its proxies in Hong Kong continue to
experience befuddlement, consternation, disbelief, frustration, and enduring gaffes in
attempting to absorb a highly-educated, cosmopolitan, and animated population into the
OCTS model. Ruling Hong Kong with “patriots” has failed to achieve the model level of
political control the PRC had desired over Hong Kong. Instead of being an exemplar of
OCTS that China sought to use to encourage Taiwan’s reconciliation and return, Taipei
has vocally derided OCTS in the past and today remains dubious over it. More
importantly, however, for the future of OCTS, has been that the incessant fights in Hong
Kong over the issue of universal suffrage has distracted the SAR from the primary role
and goals China intended for it – contributing to socialist modernization, maintaining it’s
own prosperity and stability and acting as bridge and window between the Mainland and
the West.

As a result, China has decided that it has to accelerate the process of integrating Hong
Kong into the cultural, economic and social fabric of the Mainland and has begun
intensifying efforts to introduce the a ‘Hong Kong-styled socialist system’ in the SAR.
The goal is to transform Hong Kong society into a patriotic bastion dedicated to
contributing to socialist modernization and national rejuvenation and who will, of their
own accord, accept China’s form of universal suffrage and only elect patriots and
patriotic parties who will in turn ‘cooperate’ with the Chinese Communist Party’s
representative in Hong Kong – the chief executive (CE). To achieve this, the
introduction into Hong Kong of the Party’s socialist core value system (SCVS) – the
basis of today’s socialism with Chinese characteristics – and its socialist moral system is
being pursued because the SAR Government has failed to assuage Western-style
democratic aspirations and demands over the last decade.

This failure, from the Central Authorities perspective, has prevented the HKSAR from
ensuring its prosperity and stability not once but twice; the first time being during the
Asian Financial crisis after the Handover and now once again during the global financial
tsunami. Hong Kong was never supposed to be a ‘problem’ for the Central Authorities
and according to various Chinese academics that is exactly what it has become because it
has been obsessed on fighting for or against universal suffrage instead of pursuing
development and contributing to their country’s modernization. One commentator in
2007 even observed that Hong Kong is no longer the golden goose that lays golden eggs
for China. iii

This paper will address the issue that the implementation of OCTS in Hong Kong has not
progressed as well as the Central Authorities had desired and that they feel the SAR’s
preoccupation and fights with the Central Government over the issue of universal
suffrage has threatened the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and China’s
sovereignty over it. It will discuss how the Central Authorities, their advisors and some
members of the SAR Government believe that the existing generations of Hongkongers
may be so beyond recovery that a fundamental transformation of the society, starting
with the youth, is necessary to ensure a future patriotic and loyal HKSAR where ‘true’
universal suffrage could be allowed.

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It will introduce the suggestion that China has decided that, in spite of the prohibition in
the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Hong Kong Basic Law against the socialist
system being practiced in Hong Kong before 2047, it must introduce a ‘Hong Kong-style
socialist system’ to create the type of society it desires and that this will occur through
the SAR Government’s national education efforts and selective cultivation of
Hongkongers for leadership positions within the SAR. In conjunction, the paper will
briefly consider how Beijing’s decision to accelerate the integration of Hong Kong into
the Mainland may also reflect, in combination with its national education efforts in Hong
Kong and the possible development of nomenklatura system through its patriotic
education efforts, an adjustment to the OCTS policy that some might argue constitutes a
new development or a ‘new’ OCTS. These latter issues will be more substantively
addressed in a forthcoming work to be published by the Center for Strategic Intelligence
Research, National Defense Intelligence College, of which this paper is a component.

Seeking Truth from Facts: Big Trouble in the HKSAR

Despite all the public professions of success in implementing the OCTS principle in
Hong Kong over the last decade, there could probably be no more definitive or telling
bellwether of the Central Authorities’ perception of the success and the state of Hong
Kong’s return to China than President Hu’s clarion call on eve of the tenth anniversary (1
July 2007) of Hong Kong’s return when he called for the transformation of young
Hongkongers into a new generation who would “abide by ‘one country, two systems’ and
the Hong Kong Basic Law (the legal embodiment of OCTS), safeguard Hong Kong’s
prosperity and stability and be responsible for the prosperity of the country and the
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” iv

President Hu’s comments were reiterated several times over the next six months by other
senior Chinese leaders and HKSAR Government officials in addition to being carried in
the China Daily, People’s Daily and Xinhua. In his annual policy address in October of
the same year, CE Donald Tsang Yam-keung proclaimed, “Over the next five years, we
need cultivate a new spirit for these new times. We need to become new Hongkongers,
better equipped to sustain developments in the new era.” v Also significant were the
statements of the chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
(CPPCC), Jia Qinglin, who in a December 2007 speech to 1,000 Hong Kong students,
teachers and HKSAR officials in Beijing for a national education exercise, repeated
President Hu’s transcendental call for Hongkongers to become a new generation, telling
the HKSAR Government that they needed “to make greater efforts and set a higher target
to ensure the smooth operation of the patriotic education campaign” in order to achieve
the goal. vi

Resisting Beijing and Losing Control

The calls for a new generation of Hongkongers reflect a perception among some Chinese
leaders and academics that in spite of all the public pronouncements by the Chinese

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Government of the successful implementation of OCTS in Hong Kong, Beijing’s
resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong has not been satisfactory or complete. For
instance, a December 2007 HKSAR Government think tank report, Hong Kong’s
Relationship with the Mainland, concluded that while Hong Kong and the mainland had
grown closer since reunification, “there is still work to be done” and that, “The
strengthening of trust and affection between the people of the two places remain[ed] a
priority issue…” vii This conclusion mirrored an earlier, separate assessment by respected
Chinese national security analyst, Yan Xuetong, who observed in June 2007 that even
though Hong Kong was again in its mother’s bosom, “The return of Hong Kong to China
is just half achieved. Hong Kong is still regarded as a special place of China, still
regarded as a foreign country. Hong Kong has returned in name, but not in substance.” viii

This view is also held by some influential loyalist officials and academics in Hong Kong
as well. For instance, Professor Lau Siu-kai, the head of the Central Policy Unit (CPU),
the HKSAR Government think tank overseeing public consultations for the HKSAR’s
constitutional development towards universal suffrage, holds that, “The acquisition of
Hong Kong by China in 1997 has not been accompanied by political rapport between the
Chinese government and the Hong Kong people, thus sowing seeds for lingering friction
between them.” ix More poignantly, Dr. Lau has explicitly written that China’s efforts to
create a ‘new political order’ x (NPO) in the SAR has met unexpected and substantial
resistance from ‘anti-new order forces’ xi (ANOF) that were cultivated by the British to
sabotage Hong Kong’s return to China and prevent it from exercising sovereignty over it.

This ‘resistance’ to Beijing described by Professor Lau was most dramatically manifested
on 1 July 2003 when half-a-million Hongkongers marched against a proposed national
security bill and over a bevy of other economic, governance and universal suffrage-
related grievances against related to the administration of then CE Tung Chee-hwa. This
led to the SAR Government withdrawing the legislation from consideration after
continuing public outcry over the legislation led to one the primary pro-Beijing political
parties bailing from supporting the bill and the Administration. Dr. Lau also states it was
this event that forced the Central Authorities to realize their previous policy approach of
implementing the OCTS policy in the SAR was flawed and a more active one was needed
“to prevent the derailment of the OCTS project in Hong Kong.” xii

This included the Central Authorities creating a Coordinating Leading Group on Hong
Kong Affairs xiii and the sending of many ‘agents’ to Hong Kong to ascertain the ‘actual
situation’ in the SAR since their traditional information sources had failed to predict the
level of public displeasure leading up to 1 July. It also marked the beginning of a
substantial role and level of involvement for the United Front Work Department (UFWD)
in Hong Kong in order to improve China’s image and lower the attractiveness of the pan-
democrats. Later in the year, however, the pro-Beijing camp’s largest political party, the
Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong, still lost the 2003 District Council
elections to pan-democratic forces in another unsettling political development for Beijing.

By year’s end, the Central Authorities felt the situation in the SAR had deteriorated to the
point it was necessary to express their dissatisfaction over the state of the implementation

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of OCTS in Hong Kong. This occurred during a duty visit by CE Tung to Beijing where
President Hu Jintao told him that the Central Authorities were ‘highly concerned’ with
constitutional development trends in the HKSAR. Following up President Hu’s censure,
were critical commentaries by four mainland legal scholars xiv who were also former
drafters of Hong Kong’s Basic Law. They strongly singled out the territory’s lack of
understanding of OCTS and the Basic Law. In one analysis of the incident, by Wang
Xiangwei, a former China Daily journalist and current China editor at the South China
Morning Post (SCMP) opined that,

The remarks by Mr. Hu and the legal experts signal a significant shift in the central
government’s policy towards Hong Kong – with far-reaching implications. The
central government appears to have adopted a more proactive approach in handling
issues related to Hong Kong following the mass anti-government protest on July 1
and the embarrassing defeat of the pro-government Democratic Alliance for
Betterment of Hong Kong in last month’s district council elections. Mainland
analysts said … the central government wanted to have a bigger say on Hong Kong’s
political reform, elevating its importance to that attached by defense and foreign
affairs. xv

The following year in Hong Kong, 2004, saw the NPCSC attempting to remove universal
suffrage from the political discourse for the upcoming Legislative Council elections by
issuing a decision saying universal suffrage would not be instituted in 2007-08 – the
earliest point that the Basic Law allowed universal suffrage to be considered. A fierce
patriotic campaign initiated by Beijing also targeted the pan-democrats in the lead up to
the September Legco elections. In that election, the pro-Beijing forces won the largest
number of legislative seats but the pan-democrats still retained most of their strength.
This allowed them to continue to confront the SAR Government while lobbying for
quicker and double universal suffrage (simultaneously electing the chief executive and
the Legco by universal suffrage.) The political situation in Hong Kong remained
unsettling as far as the Central Authorities were concerned and in December 2004, while
in Macau on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the Macau SAR’s return to Chinese
sovereignty, President Hu Jintao gave CE Tung Chee-hwa yet another high profile rebuke
over the state of OCTS in Hong Kong, admonishing him to follow the Macau SAR’s
example. However, more significant episodes of Hongkongers’ resistance were yet to
come.

Rejecting Beijing & the Chief Executive

In 2005 two significant examples of Hongkongers’ resistance that struck at the heart of
the implementation of OCTS in Hong Kong occurred. The Central Government
perceived these are affecting the nature of the relationship between the Central
Authorities and the HKSAR and the operation of the executive-led political system
established by Beijing and headed by the chief executive. According to the Central
Authorities and the HKSAR Government, “the design of the political structure is to
ensure the comprehensive implementation of the basic policies of the Central Authorities
regarding Hong Kong.” xvi

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The first incident occurred in March 2005 when continued public discontent over Chief
Executive Tung Chee-hwa’s poor performance and governance led to the embattled CE
stepping down ostensibly for health reasons. But his resignation was widely believed to
be due to his inability to stem growing calls for universal suffrage in the SAR. He was
replaced by then Chief Secretary for Administration (CS) Donald Tsang who had headed
the SAR Government’s Constitutional Development Task Force (CDTF) created in
January 2004 after the President Hu had warned CE Tung over Hong Kong’s
constitutional development. xvii The CDTF was the first major effort by the Central
Authorities and the SAR Government to define and scope the limits of political reform
and universal suffrage in Hong Kong. Through its public consultation exercise and
constitutional development reports, the CDTF was supposed to set Hong Kong ‘right’
regarding the limitations and boundaries of universal suffrage under OCTS.

After eighteen-plus months of work and five reports by the Task Force, in October 2005
the Government submitted a political reform package to the Legco. That package was
based on the CDTF’s recommendations and findings. This created the setting for the
second most damaging incidence of resistance by Hongkongers to Beijing’s wishes when
the reforms failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority (40 votes) in the Legco for
passage. This occurred because the pan-democrats were united in opposing the reforms.
The pan-democrats had deemed the package to be insufficiently democratic and while
they had lost some seats in the 2004 Legco elections, the pan-democrats still retained
enough legislators to prevent the Administration from securing the necessary number of
votes in the Legco. Next to the 1 July march, this was arguably one of the most visibly
embarrassing developments for the SAR Government and the Central Authorities.

The rejection by the pan-democrats of a constitutional reform package already ostensibly

blessed by the Central Authorities (by virtue of the SAR Government’s prior coordination
with the Mainland) represented a major public relations fiasco for the Central Authorities
and the SAR Government. In the weeks prior to the vote, CE Tsang and his
administration had expended a lot of political capital with the Central Authorities to
fashion a political reform package amenable to Beijing, and according by media accounts,
he had indicated to them that the SAR Government could push it through the Legco.

In announcing the launch of the reform package, CS Rafael Hui boldly declared that the
SAR’s constitutional development had “entered into a defining stage.” xviii CE Tsang
upped the ante by exaggerating what in reality was only an incremental development xix
when he exclaimed, “This is a defining moment for constitutional development in Hong
Kong. I call on all political parties, and all sectors of the community, to focus on the
community’s overall interests and put their own preconceptions and differences on one
side. These proposals will lead us to the ultimate goal of universal suffrage. I hope
everyone will give them their full support.” xx

As the debate over the sufficiency of the reform package became more confrontational
between the Government and the pan-democrats it became apparent that the pan-
democrats were not falling in line with Beijing’s expectations. In November 2005, the

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CE Tsang had warned Hongkongers to “face reality” over opposing the reform plan,
“Hong Kong cannot act unilaterally in this regard, although some people, naively in my
view, believe we can and should. But they seem to have forgotten that Hong Kong is a
part of China. Our political development is as much a national issue as it is an issue for
Hong Kong.” xxi More to the point, China views the SAR Government as “part of the
central government” therefore opposition to the Chief Executive is considered to be
opposition to the Central People’s Government as well – at least in the case of universal
suffrage, Hong Kong’s constitutional development and the impact it has on the
relationship between the Central Authorities and the HKSAR – all of which ultimately
impacts the implementation of OCTS in Hong Kong. xxii

After the constitutional development package died in the Legco, CE Tsang dejectedly
stated that Beijing’s trust with the SAR had been damaged, “This is a major issue. You
cannot say, ‘Oh, it’s game over, let’s do it again.’” A spokesman for the State Council’s
HKMAO, said, “The outcome is not in line with mainstream public opinion in Hong
Kong and is not what the special administrative region government and the members of
public would like to see. It’s also not something the central government would like to
see.” xxiii Harsher comments were carried in the China Daily where the pan-democrats
were blamed for failing to advance Hong Kong’s democratic development by refusing to
approve the CE’s reform plan. xxiv

OCTS, Universal Suffrage & Sovereignty

It is clear from various Chinese officials’ statements that for the Central Authorities, the
issue of universal suffrage is first and foremost an issue of sovereignty. The Central
Authorities indisputably see the power to appoint the chief executive of Hong Kong as a
manifestation of the country’s sovereignty over it. Director of the HKMAO Ji Pengfei
said as much when he spoke to the Third Session of the Seventh People’s National
Congress on March 28, 1990,

The power to be exercised by, or the affairs which are the responsibility of the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress or the Central People’s
Government, as prescribed in the draft law, is indispensible in maintaining the state
sovereignty. For example, the Central People’s Government will be responsible for
the Special Administrative Region’s defense and foreign affairs and the Chief
Executive and other principal officials of the Special Administrative Region will be
appointed by the Central People’s Government… xxv

Likewise, the Center feels that the executive-led political structure of Hong Kong, where
the chief executive has nearly complete fiefdom and an elected legislature is weak and
subservient to the executive, ensures that China maintains its sovereignty and that it has
not be delegated to a ballot box where the Party is relegated to merely rubber stamping
Hongkongers’ electoral whims. According to Director Ji, “The political structure of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region should accord with the principle of ‘One

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Country, Two Systems” and aim to maintain stability and prosperity in Hong Kong in
line with its legal status and actual situation.” xxvi

China, it appears, also views proposals to amend the Basic Law to change Hong Kong’s
political system in a similar vein – a challenge to China’s sovereignty. xxvii Therefore,
calls by pan-democrats to amend the Basic Law in order to make the political system
more like Western-democratic models are antitheses to OCTS. And while it may not be
understood in the West or even in Hong Kong, calls for the overthrow of the Communist
Party and the socialist system are, by the Central Authorities’ definition, also counter to
the principle of OCTS. This refers back to Deng Xiaoping’s comments that neither
system should ‘eat’ the other otherwise there would be no ‘Two Systems.’ Most consider
this in reference to socialism replacing capitalism in Hong Kong, but in reality it also
applies to capitalism, or democracy, replacing the socialist system of the PRC.

OCTS – Not Getting It

Over the decades and throughout the debates over universal suffrage an often heard retort
by senior Chinese officials and the mainland academics providing policy support to them
is that a ‘sound understanding’ of OCTS is required before the Basic Law can be
understood and implemented correctly. As explained by Deputy Secretary-General of the
NPCSC, Qiao Xiaoyang, “Understanding and handling the relationship between ‘one
country’ and ‘two systems’ correctly is the key to understanding and handling the
relationship between the CPG and the HKSAR correctly. It is also the key to
successfully implementing the Basic Law.” xxviii

From China’s perspective, the failures of the Hong Kong people to: appreciate and
embrace OCTS and the Basic Law; to be ‘grateful’ to Beijing and show proper respect
and be subservient to the Central Authorities; and, the public’s continuing support for
pan-democrats whom the Center views as radicals, unpatriotic and under foreign control
and influence, have been significant barriers to political reform. This, the Beijing
loyalists claim, has prevented the Central Authorities from permitting substantive
progress towards universal suffrage for the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council.
The 2005 defeat of Chief Executive Donald Tsang’s political reforms reportedly sparked
renewed bitterness in Beijing towards Hong Kong’s pan-democrats and their cries for
universal suffrage and greater democracy. CE Tsang even reportedly referred to the pan-
democratic cohort’s mass mentality as “horrifying animals without being reasonable.” xxix

Senior Chinese officials, such as Qiao Xiaoyang, have openly questioned whether or not
“Hong Kong people are ready for political changes” because they have ‘disrespected’ the
Basic Law and that, “everyday the constitution [i.e., the Hong Kong Basic Law] is
challenged, questioned, distorted and even condemned.” xxx Three-and-a-half years
earlier, in April 2004, Qiao had also remarked negatively about Hong Kong’s patriotism,
“… many people of Hong Kong still had an inadequate understanding of “one country,
two systems” and the Basic Law. The concepts of “one country”, national identity, the
legal status of Hong Kong and meaning of universal suffrage were not so clear to the

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general public.” xxxi The reference to Hong Kong’s ‘legal status’ alludes to the fact that it
is ‘only’ a local administrative region under the Central People’s Government.

Hong Kong’s lack of understanding of OCTS and the Basic Law was also criticized
during the election for the chief executive in March 2007 when the pan-democratic
candidate proposed diminishing the Central Authorities power to appoint HKSAR
officials by changing the Basic Law. This alarmed the Central Authorities who later
remarked that, “There is still a long way to go before the Basic Law is fully implemented
and understood by all, as demonstrated by the recent challenge to the central
government’s power to appoint officials. That is why promoting the Basic Law remains
as urgent a task as ever.” xxxii Any reference to changing the Basic Law to proscribe the
Central Authorities or Central People’s Government’s authority or powers over Hong
Kong is apparently a red line for Beijing bordering on separatism.

And, as recently as the lead up to the ten-year anniversary celebration of the Hong Kong
SAR, senior Chinese leaders were still emphatically stating that they wanted Hong Kong
to try harder to understand their position in the hierarchy of being a SAR of China – that
of just a local administrative region. In June 2007, NPCSC Chairman Wu Bangguo was
cited by the China Daily stressing “the need for an accurate understanding of the essence
of the Basic Law.” xxxiii He emphasized three underlying principals as the “essence of the
Basic Law”: “safeguarding the country’s sovereignty”, “maintaining a high degree of
autonomy in Hong Kong,” and “securing the SAR’s prosperity and stability.” xxxiv

Triggers for these admonishments of Hongkongers ignorance tend to revolve around

contentious public debates over the limits and nature of Hong Kong’s autonomy,
constitutional development, political structure, its relationship to the central authorities,
and the form, pace and substance of universal suffrage. Chinese officials responsible for
Hong Kong affairs have often lamented Hong Kong’s lack of understanding of OCTS,
the Basic Law, the relationship between the Central Authorities and the HKSAR and
Hong Kong’s unwillingness to submit to Beijing’s primacy. Legion among many of the
criticisms has been that Hong Kongers have misinterpreted China’s purpose in creating
the Basic Law and the impetus behind OCTS and are ascribing greater autonomy and
independence to the SAR than China ever envisioned.

Universal Suffrage = Separation

Some officials have claimed that some in Hong Kong are even attempting to create an
independent Hong Kong or reverse the relationship between Beijing and the SAR in
contravention of the spirit of OCTS and the Basic Law. Basic Law drafters and Chinese
legal scholars have stressed that the overarching principal and pretext guiding the
creation of the Basic Law was that of keeping the country united, i.e., ‘One Country’. xxxv
They emphasize that without ‘One Country’ there is no ‘Two Systems’ and that all of
Hong Kong’s autonomy, rights, privileges and future prosperity are fully contingent on
China’s authority and benevolence. The ‘proper’ relationship between Hong Kong and
the Central Authorities, they argue, is that of “the supervisor and the supervised” or

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“between the leader and the led” xxxvi and the relationship between Beijing and the
HKSAR is “the key issue in the practice of the concept of ‘one country, two
systems.’” xxxvii Attempts to democratize Hong Kong’s legislature are seen by some in
China as an attempt to make Hong Kong independent – thereby attacking and
undermining the country’s sovereignty and national unity (not to mention the
‘legitimacy’ of the Party.)

In fact, the view of some of the Central Authorities leadership is that the British
introduced ‘representative government’ and elections in Hong Kong purely as a tool to
subvert the OCTS policy for their own benefit and to further deny China’s sovereignty
over Hong Kong. This view appears to be shared by some Mainland and Hong Kong
academics who advise the Central and SAR Government on constitutional development,
the Basic Law and the implementation of OCTS and other relevant Hong Kong issues
which also have impact on Hong Kong’s progression towards universal suffrage, such as
helping the Central Authorities to ascertain what the ‘actual situation’ is on the ground in
Hong Kong. Former Vice-Premier and Chairman of the HKSAR Preparatory Committee,
Qian Qichen has described Britain’s efforts and motivations as follows,

In the 1980s, after China and the UK signed the Joint Declaration on the Question of
Hong Kong, China began to draw up a draft for the Basic Law for the future Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region and to design a brand-new political system
embodying the concept of ‘one country, two systems’ At this time, the UK intended
to use the transitional period to carry out the reform for a so-called ‘representative
government,’ so that it would become a fact before the Basic Law was finalized, thus
influencing the Basic Law arrangements for the future political system. The goal of
the ‘representative government’ was actually to change the executive-led setup into a
legislative-led one, to restrain the executive body by enhancing the power and status
of the legislative body, and finally to transform the returned Hong Kong into
an ’independent entity’ separated from the motherland for the benefit of the UK’s
long-term political and economic interests there. xxxviii

Moreover, according to some in the Hong Kong government and their advisors, they feel
that some Hongkongers even use the OCTS as an excuse to deny China’s sovereignty
over Hong Kong and to push China away. This sentiment was, unsurprisingly, included
in one of the conclusions of the Task Group on National Education’s (TGNE) April 2008
report on status of and challenges to promoting national education in the HKSAR,
“Although ‘One Country, Two Systems’ is a cornerstone principle for Hong Kong, it is
also provides an excuse for a few Hong Kong people to resist forging closer links with
the Mainland.” xxxix One headline in the SCMP, the leading English-language daily in the
SAR, in July 2006 aptly depicts the gulf in perceptions between loyalists and pan-
democrats regarding Hong Kong’s return to China with headline, July 1 One Big Party
for Patriots, One Big Protest for Democrats. xl

REMAKING HONG KONG

Page 12 of 59
Implicit in the high-level eviscerating criticisms by China’s leaders directed at Hong
Kong’s pan-democrats and their supporters over Hongkonger’s lack of patriotism, poor
knowledge of the Basic Law and opposition to the central government’s policies vis-à-vis
universal suffrage, is the insinuation that the pre-Handover generations of Hongkongers
that grew up under colonial rule are ‘damaged goods.’ That they are tainted by alien
ideologies and Western influences and instilled with hatred of the Communist Party and
even their own culture – because they mimic and covet Western ideologies such as
democracy. For instance, in his 2007 paper, In Search of a New Political Order, CPU
Head Lau Siu-kai described how colonial actions and influence had polluted Hong Kong
and obstructed the emergence of Beijing’s NPO which he defines as “the post-1997
political order envisaged by Beijing in accordance with China’s policy towards Hong
Kong,”

For one-and-a-half centuries, Hong Kong people, many of whom had fled the
Mainland to avoid political oppression, treasured the protection against the various
Chinese regimes that the colonial rulers provided. Colonial rule was also associated
with Hong Kong’s post-World War II economic miracle and social progress. Many
Hongkongers were resistant to and fearful of Hong Kong’s return to China, even
though they had won the best possible deal from Beijing. In this politico-
psychological context, it was natural that the majority of Hong Kong people would
succumb to the political persuasions of the ANOF [anti-new order forces]. xli

Expounding on what constitutes the ANOF, Professor Lau writes,

The main components of the ANOF are the political parties (notably the Democratic
Party and the Civic Party), a number of politicians and retired senior civil servants
groomed by the colonial regime with suspicion and apprehension, intellectuals
steeped in Western political ideas, anti-communists and public personalities with
liberal proclivities. What unite them are mistrust and hostility towards Chinese
communists and their desire to see China democratizing in the Western fashion.
Their common goal is bring about ‘full democracy’ in Hong Kong as soon as possible
so that Hongkongers can have more power at their disposal to withstand any possible
political interference from Beijing after the handover. They portray themselves as the
guardians of Hong Kong’s interests and the spokesmen of Hong Kong citizens. xlii

Another Hong Kong politico, Professor Anthony B.L. Cheung, a member of the CE
Tsang’s Executive Council and a well known academic in Hong Kong, argued in April
2007 that Hong Kong’s chief executive, despite having inherited much of the legacy
colonial governor’s autocratic powers has, since the Handover, had those powers
neutralized to the point where the SAR government has almost been rendered a ‘disabled
state’ and that a continuing ‘political quagmire’ persisted in Hong Kong despite the
efforts of the second chief executive. xliii According to Cheung,

The new SAR political order was supposed to be a continuation of the previous mode
of executive-led and bureaucracy-based governance. Such continuation, however,
proved to be unsustainable. Even during the final years of British rule, the last

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 governor, Chris Patton, had already quickened the pace of politicization and made the
government more open and responsive to legislative scrutiny and local public opinion.
The introduction of legislative elections in the transitional period saw the emergence
of political parties and elected legislators as new political actors. Apart from the
attempt at democratization as part of the British agenda of decolonization, there was
obviously a real need for the departing administration to accede to some demands
from these rising local politicians. The government had become less strong and civil
society less weak than before. xliv

Given the world view of PNOF in Hong Kong described by Professor Lau, Hongkongers
espousing Western-style democratic views are intrinsically inimical to the NPO that
brought about Hong Kong’s return. Indeed, Lau has concluded that the problem with
Hongkongers’ resistance to the NPO was so endemic that an ‘ideological reorientation’
was required to ensure the correct implementation of OCTS and the Basic Law,

Despite Beijing’s pledge to maintain Hong Kong’s pre-1997 status quo after the end
of colonial rule, the implementation of OCTS still requires an ideological
reorientation towards China, the CCP, the central authorities and compatriots in the
Mainland. Making ideological changes in these respects, however, does not entail the
denigration of colonial rule and rejection of colonial legacies. It certainly calls for the
imaginative crafting of a new Hong Kong identity that creatively combines patriotic
sentiments, a pragmatic understanding of Hong Kong’s situation and the selective
preservation of those aspects of the colonial legacy that represent ‘modernity.’ xlv

Professor Lau continues on to warn that without a viable and successful national
education program Hongkongers would be further turned against Beijing:

… very little has been done since the handover to respond to the imperative of
ideological reorientation. Strong psychological resistance to anything that smacks of
political ‘brainwashing’ has been one reason for the lack of such efforts. The
weakness of the PNOF and the Tung administration has been another. What is worse
is that the ANOF is taking advantage of the situation to reorient Hongkongers
towards a direction marked by nostalgia for colonial rule, Hong Kong localism, and
mistrust of Beijing and indifference to its OCTS policy. xlvi

Current Generations Can’t Be Trusted

As seen in the earlier comments by some senior Chinese leaders and academics involved
in Hong Kong affairs in the previous section, these ‘people’ in Hong Kong who grew up
under the national humiliation of colonialism but who still view colonial rule
nostalgically, they reason, can not be trusted with universal suffrage in China’s SAR to
pick patriots for the position of chief executive or the legislature; that Hongkongers have
yet to reconcile themselves with the NPO in a Hong Kong that is part of China or, more
pointedly, that is part of a China under Chinese communist rule; China has been accepted
but Communist primacy over the SAR has not.

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The concept that Hongkongers don’t know they are part of the motherland of Communist
China has been a constant theme among ‘patriotic camp’ in Hong Kong who have
ceaselessly lobbied for enhancing and increasing national education in the SAR and who
see it as a panacea for all Hong Kong’s ills. While a China-centric national education
program has been practiced in the SAR since the Handover, it has been one conducted
much more in words than deed. The Government’s efforts have often come under
criticism by leftists, some of who have been appointed to Government or advisory
positions, who feel that Hong Kong’s national education and Basic Law promotion
programs were too watered down and that Hong Kong’s inferior position to Beijing had
been minimized.

Other SAR officials have also called for Hongkongers to rectify their thinking. One
example is a speech by former Secretary for Justice Elsie Leung in February 2007
criticized the mentality of Hongkongers raised under colonial times and called for them
to change their mode of thinking. To some degree, this typified the perspective of some
in the administration and presaged President Hu Jintao’s and other Chinese leaders’ call
for a new generation of Hongkongers that would come a few months later. In her speech,
Secretary Leung called upon “Hong Kong people to gain a better understanding of the
Basic Law through which the city derives its power of a high degree of autonomy from
the central government” and urged that “Hong Kong people must appreciate the meaning
of China’s resumption of the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong and adjust their
mindset accordingly.” xlvii

To achieve this, she advocated that a Basic Law promotion campaign was necessary to
“educate the younger generation about the concept of ‘once country, two systems.” xlviii
Not only did the SAR Government need to institute a Basic Law campaign, Secretary
Leung claimed, but Hongkongers themselves had to reevaluate their relationships with
Hong Kong and its ruler. Citing a 2005 Census and Statistics Department survey that
showed that 85 percent of a surveyed 15,000 Hongkongers claimed to “not [to]
understand the Basic Law well,” Secretary Leung said this necessitated Hongkongers to
make a ‘paradigm shift’ so they could “accept China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong.”
Explaining, she said,

Under the British rule, they [Hongkongers] were governed by a sovereign of a nation
to which they did not belong. There was the subconscious repulsion toward the
sovereignty. Since nationalism was not encouraged under colonial rule, Hong Kong
people would have to find their new identity as Chinese citizens after reunification.
Many of them do not understand what sovereignty entails….Once we understand
Hong Kong’s legal position vis-à-vis the whole country, we will accept the new
constitutional order under the Basic Law, and recognize the PRC as our sovereign.
We would support the principle of “one country, two systems” and commit ourselves
to making it a success. xlix

Months later in another speech, Elsie Leung, who is also a deputy director on the
NPCSC’s Hong Kong Basic Law Committee, continued to critique Hongkongers’

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resistance against the Basic Law and China, emphasizing that the relationship between
the Central Authorities and Hong Kong is “one of subservience, with one side leading
and supervising the other. The SAR is not an entity independent from the nation.” l She
also berated the superficiality of Hongkongers understanding of OCTS, retorting that it
was not realized by just “changing to a new national flag and regional flag and changing
a few names” and that, “a long mental journey was needed before one recognized the
country and the nation.” li

Reeducating Hongkongers

From the perspective of some senior Party leaders and their advisors in the HKMAO, the
Research Institute of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs, and the Legislative Affairs
Commission and Hong Kong Basic Law Committees of the NPCSC, as well as leftists
and loyalists in Hong Kong, the problems of Hongkongers’ loyalty, patriotism and weak
national identity are so endemic and pervasive that the only viable remedy is to remake
Hong Kong society and Hongkongers themselves. Hong Kong society and people must
be transformed into patriots and transformed into part of new China. The obvious
question is how can this be achieved?

The answer, these advocates claim, is by enhancing Hong Kong’s national education and
identity formation efforts, by promoting a positive and benign image of China, by
instilling a patriotic fervor and by ‘guiding’ Hongkongers to the proper understanding
and acceptance of their position in OCTS. Intrinsic to this approach, the Central
Authorities believe, is the ‘filtering’ into Hong Kong society of a Mainland-centric view
of the duties and obligations of Hongkongers which mirrors the socialist honor and
disgrace model of President Hu Jintao and the socialist core values system on the
Mainland.

This, the Center hopes, would lead Hongkongers to dedicate themselves to supporting
socialist modernization and national rejuvenation, the building a harmonious society in
Hong Kong (and China), supporting the HKSAR Government and the Center’s policies,
and upholding the best of China’s culture as advanced citizens of the PRC, who just also
happen to be HKSAR residents. Where does the Party hope to find this vanguard of
patriotic Hongkongers to lead this new politically compliant and dedicated generation of
Hongkongers into the future? From Hong Kong’s youth.

Building a New Generation of Hongkongers

As part of China, the Central Authorities expect Hong Kong’s youth to serve the same
role as the Mainland’s younger generations do for China. President Hu Jintao
unambiguously communicated this to Hong Kong in June 2007 when, speaking at the eve
of the ten-year anniversary of the resumption of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong, he
told an audience of SAR government officials and Hong Kong dignitaries that, “The
youth are the future and hope of Hong Kong, as well as the future and hope of the
country.” lii The President then instructed the HKSAR government that the proper

Page 16 of 59
ideological education and preparation of these youth was an important task that had to be
accomplished,

What I want to particularly emphasize is that teenagers constitute Hong Kong’s future
and hope and also the country’s future and hope. We must attach importance to
conducting national education among teenagers and strengthen exchanges between
Hong Kong’s young people and the young people in Mainland China so as to pass on
Hong Kong compatriots’ fine tradition of loving the country and loving Hong Kong
from generation to generation. liii

Shortly after President Hu’s comments in June 2007, the SAR Government formed the
TGNE under the CPU’s Commission on Strategic Development to review Hong Kong’s
policies and practices in promoting national education since the Handover. The TGNE
was created “with a view to proposing necessary improvement to the relevant strategic
direction, policies and measures, enhancing the public awareness of the Basic Law, and
strengthening the sense of national identity among Hong Kong residents, particularly the
younger generation.” liv This emphasis on the youth was carried forward in the CE’s
annual policy address in October, where CE Tsang, as the Central Authorities’ highest
representative in Hong Kong, parroted President Hu Jintao’s directive,

The future lies with our young people. In the interest of our country’s development
and the continued success of “One Country, Two Systems”, the HKSAR Government
will make every effort to promote national education among our young people, so that
they grow to love our motherland and Hong Kong, aspire to win honor and make
contributions for our country, and have a strong sense of pride as nationals of the
People’s Republic of China. lv

In April 2008, the TGNE issued its report on the status of Hong Kong’s national
education efforts and carried similar language as that used by President Hu and Chairman
Jia; declaring that the way forward for Hong Kong’s national education promotion was to
enable “members of the general public to become new Hongkongers who love the
motherland and Hong Kong and take pride in being citizens of the People’s Republic of
China.” lvi (emphasis added) National education for youth (primary to university-level)
was expected to promote the formation of a national identity and enable them to “ponder
over their responsibilities towards the motherland.” The focus on the public, in
comparison, would be to put forward as a program of “general education … formulated
to foster their understanding of Chinese culture, history and current national affairs.” lvii

In identifying the way ahead for national education, the TGNE singled out the youth in
primary, secondary and university levels as the targets of the scheme as opposed to the
general public. The effort to target the latter was significantly less ambitious and would
utilize a more passive approach. Hong Kong’s civil servants would also be targets of
educational indoctrination and some limited Hong Kong-Mainland national education
exchanges, but the primary marks of the SAR Government’s efforts were Hong Kong’s
younger generations.

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Why the Young? The Role of Youth in a Socialist Society

Since the mid-1990s, the Party has increased its emphasis on ‘appealing’ to China’s
youth and have “actively recruited youth members” with significant numbers making up
the CPC. According to the All China Youth Federation (ACYF) at the conclusion of
1994, more than 21 per cent of the CPC’s 55 million members were below the age of 35
and by the end of 2006, party members below the age of 35 represented 23.4 per cent of
Party members. lviii An additional indicator of the extensive role of younger Chinese in
China’s modernization is that as of the end of 2005, over 75 per cent of the permanent
staff of the Chinese Academy of Sciences were under the age of 45 which the ACYF has
characterized as demonstrating “the greater participation of youth in social development
and scientific and technological progress.” lix

The CCP views the youth as “the future builders of the motherland and successors to the
cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics” and considers their ideological education
as a paramount task for ensuring that the Party has future “successors for the Party’s and
nation’s cause.” lx As described in a dated, yet highly relevant analysis for understanding
how the CPC views the role of youth in a socialist society, The Functions of the Chinese
Communist Youth Leagues (1929-1949), Klaus Pringsheim explained that both
Communist and Fascist societies target their youth and use youth organizations for
turning the young into “faithful and reliable tools or willing helpers of the ruling group of
party” and seek to instill the “‘correct’ political outlook.” lxi President Jiang Zemin also
identified at the 16th Party Congress that the selection and training of ‘young cadres’ to
help them ‘cultivate their Party spirit’ was part of the CPC party building efforts. lxii

The Party’s aspirations and plans for shaping Hong Kong’s youth and its national
education promotion program to reflect the proper political attitudes and dedication to
national modernization and rejuvenation in the SAR are no different. As President Hu
Jintao stated in June 2007, “… young people in Hong Kong … represent the future of
Hong Kong, indeed, the future of China. We should foster a strong sense of national
identity among the young people in Hong Kong and promote exchanges between them
and the young people on the mainland so that they will carry forward the Hong Kong
people’s great tradition of ‘loving the motherland and loving Hong Kong’.” lxiii And
while Hong Kong’s national education approaches have been adapted to local realities,
the goals remain the same as in China – the promotion of socialist core values, the ‘Eight
honors and dishonors,’ and the pursuit of common affluence/prosperity, social harmony
and national unity – although expectations of their success and pace are more measured
and pragmatic for Hongkongers than what is expected of Mainland youngsters and young
adults.

Role of Youth Groups

Pringsheim also notes that the ultimate purpose of youth groups created by the State in
these societies is “to mould the thinking of youngsters … and to establish an apparatus
for control …” for assisting the government in pursuing its objectives. lxiv Gregory
Fairbrother has described this political socialization as, “The process by which regimes

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attempt to justify their rule and motivate populations behind national goals is political
socialization, whereby children are taught about, and encouraged to form attitude
supportative of, the political system and the nation.” lxv Youth groups in Hong Kong form
an important part of the SAR Government’s approach in promoting the formation of a
national identity, its national education efforts, and as targets of the promotion of the
Basic Law. In fact, these groups are the main foci of the Central Authorities and SAR
Government’s national education-related Hong Kong-Mainland exchange programs.
Previously, the activities of these groups were not well coordinated. However, starting in
2008 and continuing in 2009, the SAR Government began to create an infrastructure to
better coordinate their exchange efforts.

The primary Hong Kong youth groups supporting the SAR Government’s national
education efforts closely interact and coordinate with Mainland youth organizations and
Chinese Government and Communist Party counterparts such as the Communist Youth
League (CYL) or the ACYF. This includes groups like the Hong Kong Federation of
Youth Groups (HKYFG) and Hong Kong United Youth Association (HKUYA). Some
of the executive management of these Hong Kong youth groups also have overlapping
membership or affiliations with the CYL, the ACYF or Mainland provincial youth bodies
which provides Beijing further control over Hong Kong’s youth groups.

Moreover, these groups often receive financial assistance from the SAR Government in
the form of grants for national education training and Hong Kong-Mainland exchange
programs. The association of the ACYF with Hong Kong’s youth groups is of no small
consequence. The ACYF is led by the CYL. As such, it holds considerable implications
for shaping the SAR’s national education and identity formation programs to better
support the CCP and the pro-Beijing elements of Hong Kong’s political society.
Professor Tam Chi-Kuong of the University of Macau has described the ACYF’s role as
being a “united front organization of Chinese authorities coordinating youth
organizations” on the Mainland. lxvi

The importance of these Hong Kong-Mainland national education exchanges is seen in

that during these exchanges, Hong Kong youth meet with high-level Chinese government
and Party officials and leading Chinese academics on Hong Kong affairs. This includes
Chinese organs such as the HKMAO, the NPC, and the CPPCC. Members from the
UFWD are also often involved. The Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government
in the HKSAR (CGLO) even has a Youth Department that handles youth development in
the Hong Kong and Macao SARs. The Director and Deputy Director of the CGLO along
with principal HKSAR Government officials including the chief executive are common
faces at national education and Basic Law promotion youth-centric events in Hong Kong.
Some youth organizations in Hong Kong, such as the Hong Kong Federation of Youth
Groups (HKFYG), even hold ‘coming of age’ ceremonies reminiscent of Party
ceremonies for youth on the Mainland. These have also been attended by high-ranking
SAR Government and CGLO officials.

Elite youth selected from Hong Kong schools and the community to participate in these
programs. Afterwards, they are expected to offer testimonials on how their awareness

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and national identity was strengthened after the visits. Some of those participating in
Mainland national education exchange visits will become ‘seed students’ for motivating
and encouraging their fellow youth in Hong Kong to be more receptive and accepting of
China and to contribute to its modernization. These exchanges, the Party feels, “promote
a closer and more harmonious relationship of mainland China with Hong Kong …” lxvii

One recent example of youth activities focusing on the development of an elite core of
future Beijing-friendly community and political leaders is the Hong Kong 200 (HK200)
leadership development program. The HK200 program was launched by the leftist
HKFYG and the ACYF in 2006. The ten-year program will provide intensive political
and leadership training for 2,000 youth leaders between 2006 and 2016. According to
HK200 promotional material, one of the goals of the program is “to nurture youth so as to
help in the creation of a pool of future leaders, competent and committed to contributing
to Hong Kong. With ‘One Country, Two Systems’ and ‘Hong Kong People Ruling Hong
Kong,’ there is a great need to encourage and foster leadership knowledge, skills and
training at an early age in order to maximize their potential.” lxviii As part of their 200
hours of training in Hong Kong and on the Mainland, the elite youth receive specialized
training session from the ACYF. The best of the HK200 yearly cohorts are expected to
help with the education of future participants and interact with the community as role
models and advocates for national education.

Eventually, some of these youth are expected to take up leadership positions within the
pro-Beijing organizations, political parties and civil service positions. Professor Tam has
described a similar process in Macau where pro-Beijing organizations serve as “training
ground for their future leadership. Promising candidates in the youth organizations will
eventually be groomed for important positions in the pro-Beijing forces as well as in the
Government.” lxix Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing political parties have taken a similar tact in
grooming young Hongkongers. The SAR’s largest political party, the pro-Beijing
Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) has created a
Young DAB branch for members less than 35 years old. And in December 2007, the
DAB started a Political Leadership Development Programme for DAB Young Talents.
The principal goal of the program is to foster the young to participate in politics and
enhance their capabilities. It may also be that this will be part of a Hong Kong-style
nomenklatura system that will eventually create a cadre of suitable candidates cultivated
from the SAR’s elite by Beijing in ordering to serve in the legislature, civil service and
among the principal officials and the chief executive. No doubt some will also fill the
ranks of Hong Kong’s CPPCC and NPC ranks. Some of these individuals may also be
used to penetrate Hong Kong’s civil society and non-governmental organizations similar
to how the UFWD is on the Mainland.

One of the most recent beneficiaries of the DAB’s political leadership training was Starry
Lee Wai-king who was a DAB Standing Committee member and District Councilor when
she participated in the program and has been referred to as “one of the DAB’s young
political stars.” In September 2008 she won a geographic constituency Legco seat and
became the second youngest member in the Legco. Another example of the DAB’s
investment in young talents is Gary Chan Hak-kan who is the youngest member in the

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2008-2012 Legco. Like Starry Lee, Gary Chan has been described as a “young DAB
star.” Gary Chan was born in 1976 and served as a District Councilor from 1999 to 2003
and then served as a special assistant to CE Tsang from 2006 to 2008. When he was
selected to be a special assistant to CE Tsang, Chan was a member of the HKSAR
Government’s Commission on Youth and the chairman of the Federation of New
Territories Youth. lxx Chan had also participated in the DAB’s “Deputy Spokesman
Scheme” which allowed “young party members” to work for a DAB lawmaker “to
observe the operations of the Legislative Council” and perform as a deputy spokesman
for their issue areas. Chan had served as a deputy spokesman for DAB member Lau
Kong-wah. According to Lau Kong-wah, “Teenagers are the future of our party.” lxxi

Patriotic Education & Patriotism

On the mainland, the CCP’s principle vehicle for developing youth to become “future
builders” is through patriotic education. Patriotic education is considered to be a “long
term strategic task” for the Party and its implementation is “important and urgent” task
according to the CCP’s Central Committee. lxxii Its purpose is to ultimately imbue a form
of patriotism that is equivalent to socialism – a position explicitly stated in the 1994
Action Plan for Patriotic Education (hereafter Action Plan), “In contemporary China,
patriotism is essentially identical to socialism.” lxxiii Indeed, the process of patriotic
education in China itself, according to Professor Gregory Fairbrother, is specifically
designed to engender support for the CCP “and its principles and policies.” lxxiv President
Hu Jintao has said that the “winning over youths is tantamount to winning the future.” lxxv

The CCP’s convergence of patriotism and socialism into a whole is one of the basic
principles of patriotic education mentioned in a September 1994 Xinhua article, A
Program for Education in Patriotism, “In contemporary China, patriotism, in essence, is
identical to socialism, and building socialism with Chinese characteristics is the main
theme of patriotism in the new period.” lxxvi Professor Fairbrother has also noted that in
the process of conducting patriotic education on the mainland, “… patriotism is equated
with love for the socialist system and the Communist Party, and a number of objectives
for students’ knowledge and attitudes include upholding socialism, the leadership of the
CCP, and a continuation of its basic policies.” lxxvii

The 2004 patriotism campaign in Hong Kong instituted by the Central Authorities and
the UFWD after the Center expressed their ‘serious concerns” lxxviii over Hong Kong’s
constitutional development to CE Tung heavily promoted this convergence theme.
Professor Eric Ma of the Chinese University of Hong Kong has characterized the event as,
“Fearing Hong Kong politics might go out of control, the central government’s
ideological apparatus was activated to inject into Hong Kong a strong version of
nationalism, even to an extend of equating loving the Chinese nation with loving the
Communist Party.” lxxix Years later in 2008, the TGNE continued this emphasis stating
that part of creating a national identity in Hongkongers was the need to imbue an
“understanding and support for the institutions of our country, in other words for the
Chinese Government and for the CCP.

Page 21 of 59
HKSAR Government’s Efforts Not Enough

Because Hong Kong’s post-retrocession national education efforts had been very diffused
and not effective in achieving the political buy-in from the community that the Central
Authorities and leftists in Hong Kong have desired or in curbing demands for Western-
style democratic traditions and universal suffrage, the SAR Government has faced a lot of
criticism to increase its involvement and coordination of community’s national education
efforts. An often heard criticism from loyalists has been that national education, identity
formation and Basic Law promotion was not a priority for the various Administrations
(Tung Chee-hwa’s and Donald Tsang’s alike.)

This has reportedly included complaints to China’s senior leaders by loyalist Legco
leaders such as by Rita Fan Hsu Lai-tai. lxxx Rita Fan served as the HKSAR’s first
President of the Legco during the first decade of China’s rule, is a member of the NPC
Standing Committee, and is also a member of the NPCSC Hong Kong Basic Law
Committee. According to the SCMP, in March 2006 Rita Fan blasted CE Tsang’s
national education efforts and questioned his commitment to the effort when she met with
NPCSC deputy secretary-general Qiao Xiaoyang and CGLO Director Gao Siren in a
closed-door session in Beijing,

In his political manifesto for the chief executive election, [Mr. Tsang] mentioned he
would promote national education. He also said he would promote education in
China when he met Election Committee members, yet after he became chief
executive, he did not even devote a word to national education or education in China
in his first policy address. Why is that the case? What is our government doing? lxxxi

Task Group on National Education

However, the situation of the SAR Government’s laissez faire approach for promoting
national education largely remained the same until President Hu’s comments on the eve
of the tenth-anniversary. Afterwards, the Government moved quickly to create the
TGNE. Part of the Task Group’s mandate was to examine how the SAR Government had
promoted national education, the efficacy of those efforts, and how the Government
should address any deficiencies. It met several times in the intervening months and in
April 2008 issued its findings, Promotion of National Education in Hong Kong – Current
Situation, Challenges and Way Forward (hereafter Way Forward.) The key conclusion
was that the SAR Government had to become more deeply involved not only in the
nature of the promotion of national education and the Basic Law, but would also increase
its funding, policy involvement and leadership role,

National education is a task of paramount importance that demands progressive and

continuous efforts. There should be long-term planning and systemic promotion
strategies regarding national education. Relevant measures should be implemented
with more vigor and in a more holistic way. The Government should continue to
assume a coordinating role in the promotion of national education, accord a higher

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 priority to national education among its various policy areas, allocate more resources
to this area and step up its effort in cooperating with the relevant Mainland
authorities. lxxxii

The primary emphasis of Hong Kong’s national education efforts would be on its youth.
This was necessary so that the community could eventually become “new Hongkongers
who love our motherland and Hong Kong, take pride in being a national of the People’s
Republic of China and aspire to win honor and make contributions for our country lxxxiii --
unlike the current generations tainted by colonialism and Western notions of democracy.
By concentrating on Hong Kong’s youth, the SAR Government could achieve President’s
Hu’s hope “that the torch of patriotism would be passed down generation by generation
through educating the young people of Hong Kong.” lxxxiv

During the remainder of 2008, the SAR Government’s Secretary for Home Affairs
(HAB), Tsang Tak-sing, a well-known leftist in Hong Kong, was quoted several times
promoting the new national education effort and stressing their importance, often using
terminology more akin to China’s patriotic education traditions than necessarily Hong
Kong’s civic education legacy or its current international status.

 In July 2008 Hong Kong Secretary for Home Affairs, Tsang Tak-sing, referenced
the importance of Hong Kong’s national education efforts in similar terms as the
CCP has used to describe its patriotic education campaign, “National education is
an important and long-term mission for Hong Kong…” lxxxv This mirrored how
the China’s Central Committee has described patriotic education as a “long term
strategic task” and as “an important and urgent” lxxxvi task.

 In September 2008, Secretary Tsang also commented, “Young people are the
future pillars of our society. The Home Affairs Bureau is committed to
strengthening youth development and training, as well as promoting civic and
national education, with youngsters being the target.” lxxxvii The reference to the
youth being “the future pillars of our society” tracks with previous comments by
then Politburo member Hu Jintao and head of the UFWD and CPPCC vice-
chairperson Liu Yandong in 1999 and 2004 respectively. lxxxviii

In general, the HAB’s policy portfolio covers many areas that, on the Mainland, the Party
would traditionally be responsible for ‘guiding’ through propaganda and united front
levers in order to control the public’s interaction with the Party and the Government
including contact with the youth. In Hong Kong, the HAB is responsible for: Social
Harmony & Civic Education; Culture; District, Community and Public Relations; and
Recreation, Sports and Entertainment Licensing. It is through the HAB that the SAR
Government works with the Commission on Youth and the Committee on the Promotion
of Civic Education to achieve the policy objectives of the Government (e.g., enhancing
youth’s understanding of Chinese culture and heritage, promoting national education and
enhancing “a sense of belonging to the community,” promoting the Basic Law,
encouraging their participation in voluntary and community work, etc.) lxxxix

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Leading & Guiding Hongkongers

The goal of the youth-centric national education strategy being applied to Hong Kong by
the Central Authorities and the SAR Government is to subtly ‘lead’ or ‘guide’ Hong
Kong youth to adopting a Hong Kong-style socialist core value-like system in order to
reduce opposition from Hongkongers to the Communist Party’s rule over Hong Kong, to
engender more support for the CPC, to inspire their contributions to the modernization
and rejuvenation of the motherland, and the fostering of national unity. This includes
helping Hong Kong youth to “understand that ‘we are all China’” and that this ‘we-ness’
should include ‘noting that the understanding of and support for the institutions of our
country is conducive to the development of commonalities among the mass of people.” xc

National education promotion has been identified by the SAR Government as being an
important aim of its Moral and Civic Education curriculum. Hong Kong’s Education
Bureau has indicated that in the course of pursuing a national education agenda that it
must cultivate a ‘sense of national identity and commitment’ for contributing to the
nation and society so that Hongkongers will see their destiny as married to that of the
Mainland’s. As portrayed by one pro-Beijing youth group, the Hok Yau Club, “No
matter what you political affiliation may be, you can’t change the reality that politically
and socially we are integrating more with China. … Our aim is to help youth understand
modern China. We don’t want them to put China aside – that won’t work. China is in
our daily life.” xci In the TGNE’s Way Forward the Government explained that by
improving Hong Kong’s youths’ understanding of the Mainland that the enhanced
understanding they gained of the Mainland would naturally ‘lead’ them, of their own
volition, to wanting to contribute to China’s development,

The national education policy in Hong Kong is to cultivate a sense of national identity,
pride and responsibility in our people. This is achieved mainly through enhancing the
public knowledge of China, including its culture, history, peoples and current
development, that would enable them to develop a better understanding of, and in
turn greater affection and a sense of belonging to the motherland. This affection and
sense of belonging would then influence their behavior, motivating them to take up
more social responsibilities and contribute to the well-being of their country and their
compatriots. xcii (emphasis added)

Elsie Leung communicated the same theme in her Wen Wei Po article, Full Development
of the Basic Law Under the Common Law System, when she described in June 2007 that
the implementation of the Basic Law on 1 June 1997 also represented the beginning of ‘a
new chapter’ in the history of the Chinese Constitution and nation,

Although we practice a system different from the mainland, we are not an

independent entity. We live on the same piece of land with our comrades in the
mainland. We all belong to the Chinese nation, use the same language, and share the
same culture and long history. Hong Kong is part of the country, and the country
means the People's Republic of China. We are obliged to maintain the security, honor,
and interests of the country, alongside other duties. We cannot put into peril the

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 country's safety, honor, and interests (Articles 51 to 56, Constitution of the People's
Republic of China. xciii

The method of ‘leading’ or ‘guiding’ Hong Kong residents to accept an identity as a

subject of Communist China with responsibilities and duties to the country under the
leadership of the CPC is similar to how the Party approaches guiding Mainland Chinese
citizens to embrace the socialist value system of their own accord. As stated at the 17th
Party Congress,

The ideological and moral qualities, scientific and cultural qualities and health status
of the whole nation will be improved markedly and further progress will be made in
fostering a sound moral atmosphere and harmonious interpersonal relationships. To
achieve this, we shall filter socialist core values into the minds of people and help
them reach a wide agreement on moral standards such as patriotism, devotion,
honesty and friendliness. xciv (emphasis added)

Socialist Core Value System & Socialist Honor System

The SCVS, which was announced at the Sixth Plenum of the 16th Party Congress,
consists of “Marxism, socialism with Chinese characteristics, patriotism, the spirit of
reform and innovation and the socialist sense of honor and disgrace.” In his work report
to the 17th Party Congress, President Hu Jintao described the SCVS as representing the
“essence of socialist ideology.” xcv Professor Cheng Enfu, president of the Academy of
Marxism has explained that the SCVS takes Marxism as its soul to guide all kinds of
social trends of thought and social practice.” xcvi

The foundation of the SCVS is President Hu Jintao’s Eight Honors and Eight Disgraces
which is also referred to as the ‘socialist honor-and-shame perspective” or ‘socialist
honor system.’ In tandem, the socialist honor-shame system and the SCVS illustrate the
Party’s “demand for basic socialist moral norms and social practices. It is the integration
of the traditional virtues of the Chinese nation with the spirit of the times.” xcvii This
world view provides the “basic benchmarks for the value orientations and moral
judgment relevant to life in contemporary society.” xcviii The eight honors and eight
disgraces are:

 Love, do not harm the motherland;

 Serve, don't disserve the people;
 Uphold science, don't be ignorant and unenlightened;
 Work hard, don't be lazy and hate work;
 Be united and help each other, don't gain benefits at the expense of others;
 Be honest and trustworthy, not profit-mongering at the expense of your values;
 Be disciplined and law-abiding instead of chaotic and lawless;

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  Know plain living and hard struggle, do not wallow in luxuries and pleasures.

Some Government entities and affiliates in Hong Kong are promoting the SCVS in the
HKSAR both overtly and subtly. For example, Hong Kong’s Educational Bureau has
extolled the CCP values for its students, with senior Hong Kong Government officials
sometimes even using traditional Mainland mechanisms such as patriotic role models to
motivate students to emulate socialist mores. In 2003 then Permanent Secretary for
Education, Fanny Law, wrote a series of letters, 10 Letters to Youth, telling Hong Kong’s
kindergarten, primary and secondary school students that “As members of the People’s
Republic, you young people must assume an active role in fulfilling your obligations as
Chinese nationals. You should get to know your country, love your country, prepare to
dedicated yourselves to the service of your country, and link your career to the
development of the country as a whole.” xcix

Interestingly, because of the SAR Government’s general efforts to avoid presenting its
national education efforts in a style clearly resembling patriotic education on the
Mainland, in the same letter Secretary Law relied on the use of a patriotic role model,
Zhu Kezhen, to motivate the students to accept the values of nationalism, patriotism, and
selflessness (in contributing to the Country.) In her example, Secretary Law wrote,

The growth and development of a country depends upon the dedication and
participation of its people. In the Mainland, many young people who are still in
school already have plans about how they can contribute to the country. The late Zhu
Kezhen, a famous Chinese meteorologist, geographer and educationalist, recalled that
he was once asked by a language teacher to make a sentence with the words “bitter”
and “sweet”. He replied: ‘The bitterest thing is to surrender our country’s sovereign
rights under humiliating terms, and the sweetest thing is when our country is
prosperous and strong.’ To pursue prosperity for the country was the foundation of
Zhu’s aspirations. In summing up the achievements of his lifetime, he said: ‘I regard
it my duty to promote technological development and nurture talents for my country.
I do so out of a sense of patriotism and a desire for a stronger and more prosperous
country.” My young friends, do you have the same sense of patriotism? Are you
ready to dedicated yourself to the service of your country, just like Zhu? c

Patriotic role models are traditionally used on the Mainland by the Party to promote its
ideology and world views and to provide more exemplars for students to follow and
aspire to. According to Mei Zhang, China’s use of patriotic role models for education
purposes “was a common defining characteristic of the Chinese governments in history”
and that since 1978, “In the reform era, while the Party put up new reform role models as
defined by the courage to develop market economy and achieve material prosperity, the
Party continued to present traditional socialist role models as defined by altruism and
self-sacrifice in public interests to promote ‘socialist spiritual civilization’ as a means to
counteract corruption, money fetishism, and excessive interest in personal benefits.” ci

In another situation where socialist values were being promoted in Hong Kong by the
Government or its affiliates, the Estate Agents Authority (EAA) – a statutory body which

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regulates real estate industry in the SAR and whose members are appointed by the Chief
Executive – promoted President Hu’s honor system in one of its official newsletter urging
that, “His message is worth pondering for all of us.” cii Emphasizing the duties that its
estate agents had to the nation and not just their profession, the EAA told its members
that,

Honor and disgrace is not only a concern at the country or national-level, but also in
the daily life of every single citizen. Morality and justice will prevail if everyone has
a sense of disgrace. The saying “Where every intellectual understands disgrace, the
country will never be in disgrace.” Means that a country will stay away from
humiliation if every intellectual has a sense of disgrace Thus, we can see that the
ability to understand honor and disgrace is not only a matter of personal character and
reputation – it also affects the rise and fall of a country or nation. ciii

The Purpose in Introducing SCVS in China (and Hong Kong)

The efforts to introduce and adopt the SCVS and socialist honor system, or a Hong Kong-
style derivative of the two, in to the SAR should be viewed as a significant development
because, as Professor Liu Jianping has observed, the “Construction of the socialist core
value system is interrelated with the construction of the socialist system.” civ The
intended effect of introducing the SCVS or a Hong Kong-style SCVS in the SAR is to
facilitate the creation of a new Hong Kong society filled with patriotic residents, to build
a harmonious society in the SAR and to foster a harmonious relationship between the
Central Authorities and the HKSAR; the latter being a key aspect of the implementation
of the OCTS in Hong Kong.

It can be logically assumed, if one follows the logic of some advocates of strengthening
‘One Country’ at the cost of ‘Two Systems,’ that if President Hu’s call for a new
generation of Hongkongers is to be realized that it will have to be accompanied or
preceded by a change in Hong Kong society itself – a situation necessitated by the
corruption and pollution of the current generations of Hongkongers as discussed earlier
on. For instance, President’s Hu’s socialist morality system has been lauded by a
prominent member of the NPCSC Hong Kong Basic Law Committee member, Lau Nai-
keung, as “an ideological antidote to the lack of morality in China” to unchecked greed
which “has just destroyed the American capitalist system” and threatens to “destroy our
socialist system before we know it.” cv

According to some CPC theorists, the formation of a new society normally occurs when a
new system of values materializes in the society. In Hong Kong’s case, this could be
considered to include the introduction of the SCVS and socialist honor system. As
explained in one Qiushi commentary,

As a society engages in the long-term process of fostering mutual understanding and

activities to achieve this, it will certainly form a system of values. Within this system,
it is the system of core values that constitutes its key importance, serving a dominant

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 and spearheading role. … The birth of a new society is usually preceded by the
formation of a system of core values. Likewise, the stability and developments of a
society are dependent on a system of core values for its establishment and perfection.
A system of core values not only is relevant to various facets of a society including
the economy, politics, culture, and social life, but also affects the global outlook, life
perspective, and values orientation of every member of the society indelibly. cvi

Thus, from the Party’s perspective, if China is to create a new Hong Kong society which
is sympathetic and submissive to the Central Authorities then it must introduce new
values to replace the colonial legacies and Western influences. On the Mainland, the
development of individuals’ moral compasses to align with that of the Party has been a
goal of China’s construction of a spiritual civilization, advanced citizens and the creation
of socialist harmonious society. Since 2001 the SAR Government has listed Moral and
Civic Education (MCE) as one of four key tasks for Hong Kong schools when it
reformed Hong Kong schools’ curriculum. Under the banner of MCE the Education
Bureau classified national education as one of the key learning experiences for students
as part of its curriculum development. In its 2006-07 annual report the Education Bureau
identified that fostering national identity was a ‘priority’ of its MCE curriculum. cvii In
2008, the Secretary for Education describes MCE as emphasizing “the promotion of
positive values and attitudes among students for whole-person development.” cviii

Another aspect of Hongkonger’s identity that the Central Authorities and the SAR
Government are attempting to change is Hongkongers perception of superiority to China
and their image of China as backward and oppressive. These perceptions are viewed as
inhibiting Hongkongers reconciliation with the Mainland and are also a sore point for
Beijing loyalists and nationalistic Hongkongers. One Education Bureau presentation,
Mapping Hong Kong Identity, notes that the perception of China prior to 1997 was that of,
“China as primitive and [the] authoritarian other” set against “Hong Kong as modern and
liberal metropolis.” cix The presentation considered post-1997 challenges and periods that
the community has and is going through such as: “re-nationalization, [a] tarnished
economic miracle, [the] re-inventing [of] local identity, the imagination of Hong Kong as
a city, re-inventing multiple histories, heightened political awareness, unstable cultural
positions, rescaling the local, the regional, the national and the international” and
concluding with the question of if this journey results in a ‘A new Hong Kong
generations?

Defining ‘Good Hongkongers’

Part of the political socialization process under the socialist value and honor system has
been an emphasis on the duties and obligations Chinese citizens have to the country and
to society. As described by Lau Nai-keung, the socialist morality code summarizes
“what a good citizen should regard as honorable or shameful” and represents a CPC
moral code for the country. cx Beyond their applicability to Mainland Chinese, many
Chinese and HKSAR Government officials and loyalist academics have also stated that

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Hongkongers have similar obligations to the PRC as do their Mainland compatriots. In
general, some of these socialist duties include the obligation to,

1) safeguard the unification of the country and the unity of all its nationalities;
2) abide by the Constitution and the law, keep state secretes, protect public property,
observe labor discipline and public order and respect social ethics;
3) safeguard the security, honor and interests of the People’s Republic of China;
4) defend the motherland, resist aggression, perform military service, and join the
military in accordance with the law;
5) pay taxes in accordance with the law, and
6) practice family planning cxi

While some of these duties such as military service and family planning do not apply to
the HKSAR, other duties such as safeguarding national unity and protecting the honor of
the country are clear expectations of Hongkongers – even though they appear no where in
the Hong Kong Basic Law; only the ‘Duty to Obey the Law,” Article 46 of the Basic Law
is listed as a ‘duty’ under Chapter III Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Residents.
The duty to keep ‘state secrets’ falls under the obligation the HKSAR Government has to
enact the Article 23 national security legislation which sparked the massive public
demonstrations against the SAR Government and the governance of CE Tung. However,
despite their absence from the Basic Law, senior Chinese officials and loyalists argue
their application is implicit in the Basic Law and in the concept of OCTS. Their feeling
is that under the premise of ‘One Country’ Hongkongers have the same duties for
upholding and protecting national unity and contributing to China’s rejuvenation and
modernization.

Hong Kong’s youth-centric national education promotion efforts and exchanges are likely
to be the primary vehicle used by the SAR Government to ‘filter’ SCVS into Hong Kong
society and to improve the image of the Party among Hongkongers. Chinese and Hong
Kong media and cinema, however, will also be a major avenue of ‘filtering’ these
socialist values and continuing to polish Beijing’s image among Hongkongers. Given the
Hong Kong Government’s emphasis on promoting national education primarily among
Hong Kong’s primary, secondary and elite university students, it reflects a strategic
approach to creating the type of Hong Kong society the Central Authorities desire. The
SAR Government’s Working Group on National Education, formed by the Committee on
the Promotion of Civic Education (CPCE) and the Commission on Youth (COY), have
adopted the “principles of ‘gradually intensifying the contents’ and ‘having regard to the
general sentiment of the people’” in pursuing raising public awareness of national
awareness, national identity and the sense of being a Chinese citizen. cxii Even the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is used today as part of the national education process
and PRC image enhancement in the HKSAR – something that would have been an
unimaginable thought for millions of Hongkongers who peacefully marched in moral
support of the students in Tiananmen and in mourning and disapproval after the tragedy
of 4 June. cxiii

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Defining ‘Responsible Citizens’

The SAR Government is also attempting to shape the notion of what a responsible citizen
represents in Hong Kong as well under its umbrella of national education. The CPCE’s
Guidelines for the 2009-10 Community Participation Scheme reflected a strong emphasis
on promoting social harmony and emphasized other Mainland themes seen in
constructing a ‘spiritual civilization’ such as collectivism, volunteerism, focus on familial
harmony and the development of patriotism. Notably, under its objective of cultivating
‘responsible nationals’ in Hong Kong the key characteristics of ‘responsible individuals’
was singled out as being possessing a Chinese national self-identity and having “a greater
sense of belonging, responsibility and national pride towards our country by fostering a
greater understanding and interest in the developments in our country …” cxiv

By defining responsible Hongkongers explicitly and exclusively as those who self-

identify as Chinese, who are dedicated to the country, and who are both nationalistic and
proud of China, the HKSAR Government is not only attempting to define the ideal
residents but also stipulating the character traits it hopes to instill in the younger
generations who will be the new generation called for by President Hu in order to protect
and uphold OCTS. Such a definition may also serve as a metric by which the SAR
Government may use to vet future political leaders in the SAR and to exclude pan-
democrats from participating in ‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong’ – a principle
Beijing has said that is exclusively the purview of ‘patriots.’

The Party’s blending of traditional Chinese values, cultural and social norms along with
the CCP’s notions of a merged nationalism and patriotism and the lexicon of sustainable
development, social harmony and a spiritual civilization aided by a polished and
sophisticated modern publicity (i.e., propaganda) machine has made it increasingly
difficult to delineate where Chinese culture stops and the Party begins. The SCVS, the
socialist honor and disgrace system and harmonious society are three such examples. If
the Party hadn’t said that they were the “essence of socialist ideology” cxv (SCVS), the
foundation for the SCVS (socialist honor system), and that China’s socialist democracy
included the “rule of law, social justice, honesty and credibility, balancing human
activities and natural resources” cxvi (to form a harmonious society), they might have
simply been seen as good and responsible governance instead of aspects of socialism
with Chinese characteristics. When these policies are applied to Hong Kong, the issue of
socialism becomes even more muddled as does capitalism and the Hong Kong ‘way of
life.’

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A ‘HONG KONG-STYLE SOCIALIST SYSTEM’?
The socialist system and policies shall not be practiced in Hong Kong. The previous
capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years. This is the core
essence of the OCTS policy for Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan as given by Deng
Xiaoping and constantly reiterated by successive Chinese leaders for the last quarter of a
century. However, answers to key questions such as what the socialist system and
policies meant and what was the capitalist system and way of life to be retained were
never elucidated.

Today, these concepts are much more ambiguous and elusive than they were in the early
1980s when the promises were first given to Hong Kong after the end of the Cultural
Revolution and at the beginning of opening up and reform during the late 1970s and early
1980s. It is also the case that the Party has continued to study and refine what socialism
and socialism with Chinese characteristics constitute. The creation of a socialist market
economy and rapid modernization of parts of China over the last 25 years, especially
those areas adjacent to Hong Kong, have further reduced the gulf between the socialist
and capitalist systems and ways of life. And as Hong Kong integrates more deeply into
China and cross-boundary exchanges and travel for educational, economic, occupational
and social purposes significantly expand, the delineation between socialist and capitalist
systems becomes even more indistinct.

Obviously, having an understanding of what the socialist system and polices referred to
by Deng Xiaoping is an important, if not the critical, part of evaluating if the dictum that
the socialist system would not be introduced in Hong Kong has been abided by or not.
Moreover, the same understanding of Deng’s concept of the capitalist system and the
Hong Kong’s way of life is needed to understand if they have been changed or retained.
Unfortunately, there is a great deal of ambiguity regarding these concepts, terms and
understandings. Deng’s remarks about horse racing obviously should not be seriously
taken as the substance of the ‘capitalist way of life’ and while the Joint Declaration and
Basic Law go through great lengths to codify the economic, legal, political, and trade
systems, they do not define what the socialist or capitalist systems are or Hong Kong’s
way of life.

Comments from some of the Hong Kong Basic Law drafters, such as Professor Xiao
Weiyun, do shed some light regarding what China considered the capitalism system to be,
“The substance of the capitalist system is protection of private ownership, labor
employment system, free trade and a market economy. Article 6 of the Basic Law
provides: ‘The HKSAR shall protect the right of private ownership of property in
accordance with law.” This is the kernel of the capitalist system,” cxvii but they do not
provide a definitive account – or one that is necessarily relevant today given the changes
China has experienced and the development of a socialist market economy. For instance,
the protection of private property is now part of the PRC Constitution and private
entrepreneurs and businessmen have been absorbed into the Party – a situation likely

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never envisioned by most Party members in the late 1970s or early 1980s when Hong
Kong’s OCTS policy was weaved together.

Another consideration is that prior to the Handover Chinese leaders did not have a good
understanding of colonial Hong Kong and Hongkongers and are still attempting to
comprehend the complex society today. The CPU’s Professor Lau has described China’s
policy towards Hong Kong between 1949 and 1997 as being pragmatic and focused on
China’s own national interests but notes that China only had a ‘mechanical understanding
of Hong Kong as a society’ and that it had ‘over estimated the political passivity’ of
Hongkongers and that, more importantly, after the return of Hong Kong to China was
public knowledge “a Pandora’s box was opened and China’s key premises about Hong
Kong were in shambles.” cxviii

When attempting to evaluate if the socialist system or a Hong Kong-equivalent has been
introduced in the SAR one should also consider that from China’s perspective the
socialist system is more than just an economic or political model. It is not purely an issue
of public versus private ownership. cxix “Socialism is a social movement and a social
system. It is also an ideal of values and a pursuit of values,” writes Professor Liu
Jianping of Renmin University. cxx Continuing, Professor Liu explains socialism is “an
ideal of values and a pursuit of values.” cxxi Therefore, we can not simply evaluate
whether China’s socialist system has been introduced in Hong Kong only on the basis of
economic models or practices. Although, since the SAR Government started introducing
its form of China’s socialist harmonious society, it has attempted to solicit more socially
conscious policies from the business sector such as establishing a minimum wage and
anti-monopoly law and has forced businesses to participate in a social security program
for workers.

As the Party sees it, the socialist system is broad; it encompasses all of society. Deng
Xiaoping said in 1983 that, “… we are building a socialist society with high cultural and
ethnical standards, which essentially means that our people should have communist ideas,
moral integrity, a good education, and a strong sense of discipline. Internationalism and
patriotism also belong to this realm.” cxxii János Kornai has observed that the CCP had
“left its mark on all spheres of society, politics, and the economy” cxxiii The SAR
Government’s national education and Hong Kong-Mainland exchange efforts also have a
wide focus across the society even as it emphasizes the youth and the elite in Hong Kong
including business tycoons and their offspring, civil servants, journalists, lawyers,
scientists and teachers.

Socialism in Transition

Another factor in attempting to evaluate the introduction of a socialist system in Hong

Kong is that China’s own understanding of what socialism and socialism with Chinese
characteristics constitute has been an evolving process. Even as the Sino-British
negotiations were approaching their conclusion in mid-1984, it is apparent that China’s
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping was still in the midst of formulating just what was
socialism with Chinese characteristics was. In June 1984, when speaking to a Japanese

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delegation at the Council of Sino-Japanese Non-Government Persons, Deng said that,
“What is socialism and what is Marxism? We were not quite clear about this in the
past.” cxxiv

One researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences articulated that after Deng’s
comments, “Even though some of our research personnel took a serious view of this
proposition at the time, very few of them could develop a profound understanding on it.
It is only after 20-odd years of reform and reflection that we have gradually realized the
original meaning of socialism with Chinese characteristics – it is to carry out socialist
development combined with the reality of China.” cxxv That even the architect of OCTS
was unclear about what constituted socialism so shortly after the OCTS policy was put
forward is provocative given the prohibition against the introduction of the socialist
system in Hong Kong that was written into the Joint Declaration in 1984 and later
codified in the Hong Kong Basic Law in 1990.

That China’s understanding and practice of socialism has changed since the Hong Kong
version of OCTS was announced should not have been a surprise or unexpected –
especially in light of the evolving aspects of China’s OCTS for Taiwan. Change, under
socialism, is expected according to Chinese academics. In fact, according to one of the
‘eight basic tenets of scientific socialism’ that China is pursing is that, “… socialism is
society that is continuously transforming and continuously being perfected; it is not a
society that is unchangeable and ossified.” cxxvi Even China’s understanding of the
sacrament of the Four Cardinal Principles – keeping to the socialist road, upholding the
dictatorship of the proletariat, upholding the leadership of the Communist Party and,
upholding Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought – is subject to advancing with
the times. cxxvii Today, socialism with Chinese characteristics, according to an article in
the Xuexi Shibao, can be summarized as being people-centered, following scientific
development, seeking common affluence and the building of social harmony – all
principals being pursued by the SAR Government. cxxviii

Socialism is dependent on the actual situation

China has also stated that the construction of socialism or a socialist society is dependent
on the actual conditions of the country (realities) and the time (history.) This not only
presents the possibility of different ‘models of socialism’ but also insinuates that the form
of socialism appropriate at one time and one place might be different than the form
instituted at later point. This has already been demonstrated with the OCTS system
which has at least variants: Hong Kong, Macau and (eventually) Taiwan. This also gives
rise to the possibility that a new and different form of socialism might be created for
Hong Kong if the Central Authorities decided that allowing the existing capitalist system
and way of life in Hong Kong to persist was no longer the correct policy to pursue
because it threatened the implementation of OCTS and the prosperity and stability of the
HKSAR. Or, more importantly, it may also decide the policy was not correct if China’s
modernization and ability to seize strategic opportunities in this historic period was
endangered.

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However, it is not readily apparent that such a derivative form of socialism with Chinese
characteristics for Hong Kong would be easily identifiable as such if the approach was
subtle and strategically oriented. This has increasingly become the case as the Party has
become less dogmatic; more sophisticated in communicating its ideology; more active in
promoting Chinese culture; having converged patriotism and nationalism; and, having
internalized new ideas and strategies on economics and governance. Home Affairs
Secretary Tsang Tak-sing, a long time ardent leftist, has said that “We cannot hard sell
national education. It must be delivered in an agreeable and sensible way.” cxxix

Even Secretary Tsang Tak-sing’s selection as a Secretary was allegedly partially based on
his “amiable personality” with The Standard citing one informant, “Tak-sing is a prudent
and cheerful person with social understanding and strong interpersonal skills he has won
the trust and confidence of Beijing, the chief executive and the government as he has
contributed invaluable ideas to economic integration with the mainland and the push to
promote patriotism.” cxxx Use of ‘subtle persuasion and gradual inculcation” was also
identified as part of the TGNE recommendations for the SAR Government’s approach for
national education promotion in the future,

Subtle persuasion and gradual inculcation, taking up the easy items before the
difficult ones – An approach of ‘persuasive influence’ and ‘resolving the simple
issues before the difficult ones’, rather than ‘hard-selling’ should be adopted for
promoting national education. Cooperation with community organizations should be
fostered to avoid arousing resistance among the public. cxxxi

Socialist Harmony

Since November 2002, socialist harmony has been identified by the Party as being an
‘essential attribute of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” cxxxii In 2006, the Sixth
Plenum of the 16th CPC Central Committee explained “that the harmonious socialist
society we are going to build is a harmonious society built and shared by all Chinese
people along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics and under the leadership
of the CPC.” cxxxiii At the 17th Party Congress President Hu has expanded the concept of
socialism with Chinese characteristics to include: economic construction; political
construction; cultural development and social development. cxxxiv Harmony and economic
development have also been identified by NPCSC Chairman Wu Bangguo as being
important for maintaining the SAR’s long-term prosperity and stability under OCTS. cxxxv

President Hu’s harmonious society/world concepts are also based on the SCVS model:
“the socialist core value system is fundamental to build harmonious culture and lay the
moral and ideological foundations to consolidate social harmony.” cxxxvi The socialist
value system has been identified as one of the four areas necessary to develop for
building a harmonious society; President Hu’s socialist honor and disgrace system is
another area. cxxxvii Today, President Hu Jintao’s SCVS and harmonious society/world

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paradigm serve as the yardsticks by which Chinese society and Hong Kong society are to
be measured. cxxxviii

Beijing has promoted the SCVS as “the spiritual pillar for the survival and development
of a party, a state, and a nation” and as “an inherent requirement of building the
harmonious socialist society.” cxxxix Not only is it a requirement for the building of a
harmonious society, it is also the basis upon which Chinese society (under the PRC) is to
be founded upon: “the socialist core value system is fundamental to build harmonious
culture and lay the moral and ideological foundations to consolidate social harmony.” cxl
A reflection of the Center’s interest in promoting harmony in the HKSAR can be seen a
2006 News Guangdong article which describes some of the economic and integration
levers used by the Mainland to assuage dissent in the community over the lack of
progress towards universal suffrage and poor governance issues,

The keyword in Beijing’s Hong Kong policy is ‘harmony’. Over the past two years,
the central authorities have adopted a series of new political and economic measures,
the essence of which is ‘tolerance, mutual assistance and [the] fostering of harmony.’
Measures such as the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) and
individual Travel Scheme (ITS) have been instrumental in brining about Hong
Kong’s economic recovery by reversing the downslide since the Asian Financial
crisis. They have laid the groundwork for redressing grievances and creating
harmony in the community.

It was this harmony policy of the central government and the people that markedly
improved the social atmosphere and boosted confidence in the future of Hong Kong
in 2005. With unnecessary disputes becoming less frequent and the confrontational
sentiment subsiding, the chief executive and his administration were able to retain a
relatively high level of popularity in society. 1

This harmonious environment is supposed to be conducive to the operation of the

executive-led political system China created in Hong Kong under OCTS as well as
enhancing the relationship between the Central Authorities and the HKSAR. For
example, in his 2005 policy address CE Tung referenced the disputes over universal
suffrage and the other conflicts in the community such as the NPCSC’s interpretations of
the Basic Law while discussing the need to bring harmony to the community. He tied the
realization of prosperity and stability in the SAR to creation of a harmonious society in
the community. In addition to pursuing people-centric governance, social justice and
unity, Tung also linked the promotion of national education as an important process for
achieving social harmony by increasing Hongkongers’ understanding and trust of the
Mainland, urging that, “We must endeavor to avoid giving our country worries and
trouble. We will help those who still have doubts about or feel antagonistic towards the
Central Government to change their minds.” cxli

1
News Guangdong, Beijing’s Attentive to HK’s Harmony, 4 January 2006

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As discussed earlier, Hong Kong-Mainland exchanges are seen by the Party as an
important part of building mutual understanding and mutual trust between the Central
Authorities and the HKSAR. By knowing more about the Mainland the Center hopes to
change stereotypes, engender affinity, national identity and a sense of belonging to the
Mainland. Hong Kong’s national education programs were supposed to facilitate the
attainment of these objectives; however, it is also considered a long term endeavor whose
benefits will not be reaped in the near term. Another route the Party is taking in
conjunction with the aforementioned approaches is accelerating the integration of Hong
Kong into the Mainland which will increase the amount of contact and exchanges
Hongkongers have with Mainlanders and thus be conducive to creating mutual
understanding and trust between both sides.

Page 36 of 59
ACCELERATING INTEGRATION
China is in the process of accelerating the integration of Hong Kong into the Mainland on
several fronts but first and foremost is doing so in the economic sphere. While it is
indisputable that there are substantive economic merits for both Beijing and the HKSAR
in quickening Hong Kong’s economic integration with the Pearl River Delta (PRD) and
the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, it is also true that the Central Authorities perceive
that Hong Kong hasn’t fully accepted the territory’s return to China and the Communist
Party’s dominion over it. Greater and faster cultural, economic and social integration
between Hong Kong and the Mainland may be explicitly seen as a method to rectify
some Hongkongers’ negative perceptions about China and to reduce hostility towards the
socialist system by expanding the interaction and understanding between Mainlanders
and Hong Kong residents. This would be conducive to getting OCTS and Hong Kong
back on track for the purposes of aiding socialist modernization, strengthening ‘One
Country’ and lowering demands for universal suffrage.

Greater economic cooperation and integration also leads to a greater reliance on the
Mainland – which is already substantial. According to a 2005 Commission on Strategic
Development (CSD) study, How to Power Ahead Hong Kong’s Economic Cooperation
with the Mainland on All Fonts (hereafter Power Ahead), at least 30 per cent of Hong
Kong’s GDP and 25 per cent of the SAR’s total employment directly came from
“economic cooperation with the Mainland.” cxlii China’s special economic policies for
Hong Kong, the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and its various
subsequent expansions and the Individual Visit Scheme (IVS) have all contributed tens of
billions to Hong Kong’s economy. According to the CSD, in the first year (2004) alone
of the IVS program, Mainland tourists visiting Hong Kong increased the SAR’s tourist
revenues by HK$6.5 billion. cxliii Increasing Hongkongers financial reliance on Mainland
revenue flows is viewed by Beijing as being conducive to dampening demands for
universal suffrage and reducing overt opposition to its rule in the SAR.

Moreover, the imposition on Hong Kong of a culture of economic dependency on the

Mainland market for economic opportunities, such as those provided by CEPA, has been
forming in the SAR. This is typified in the tendency to only look inwards toward China
for economic opportunities rather than going abroad and bringing foreign investment,
expertise and technology back to China – a break from the initial purpose of Hong Kong
as being a window and bridge for the Mainland’s modernization. Exemplary of this
dependency was the CSD Power Ahead report basically states that the only reason Hong
Kong’s economic doldrums turned around after the retrocession and the impact of the
Asian Financial crisis and the SARS epidemic was because of the SAR’s inclusion in the
Mainland’s 11th Five-Year Plan. cxliv This dependency is also useful as a tool of political
control to remind Hongkongers where their ‘bread is buttered.’

This lever was utilized several times in the last few years such as most recently during the
lead up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics when China tightly restricted its issuance of visas
to not only foreigners, but also to Hongkongers. While ostensibly intended to ensure the

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security of the Games in Beijing, it was likely a convenient opportunity for Beijing to
remind Hongkongers before the September 2008 Legco elections of how the Party
controls the economic viability of the territory and the importance of electing of
legislators who have the Central Authorities’ ear.

China’s Rise and the Effect on Hong Kong

China’s unforeseen rapid rise and development has affected Hong Kong dramatically and
its inclusion of Hong Kong in its Five-Year Plans created “a whole new situation’ for the
HKSAR according CE Tsang. cxlv Starting in 2005 the SAR Government has sought a
greater role in the Mainland’s economic development planning to ensure Hong Kong’s
role for China was secured. This included the HKSAR Government inviting
‘representatives of the relevant ministries in Beijing to explain to [HKSAR] Government
officials the work involved in drawing up the [11th Five-Year] Plan.” cxlvi This was also
part of a larger effort by the Administration to foster exchanges and increase Hong
Kong’s civil servants’ “communication with their Mainland counterparts and other
authorities.” cxlvii

Closer and tighter integration and cooperation between Hong Kong and Mainland
bureaucrats can also be seen by Beijing as being a positive step towards implementing
OCTS in Hong Kong but, from Hong Kong’s democrats’ standpoint, possibly less
beneficial toward the retention of the distinctiveness of the ‘Two Systems.’ For instance,
the SAR Government’s national education and Putonghua promotion efforts targeted at
Hong Kong civil servants can be seen as lowering barriers between the two systems and
as providing an inducement for civil servants to accept OCTS more readily as it becomes
more pertinent to their professional and career development. The SAR Government’s
decision in 2008 to pursue more systematic and life-long national education and Basic
Law training for its civil servants is a step towards formalizing and eventually mandating
this knowledge and core value perspective. cxlviii This is also apparent from the
requirement for all new civil service applicants after 1 September 2008 to take an
assessment of their Basic Law knowledge “to assess the suitability of a candidate.” cxlix

Speaking to the Legco in May 2006, CE Tsang said that after the HKSAR Government
had consulted with the Mainland on the formation of the 11th Five-Year Plan, he had
concluded that it would have “a great impact on our prevailing economic development
track and strategies. We should reconsider our follow-up actions to the Plan.” cl Because
the Plan would have “important and far reaching influence on Hong Kong’s long-term
development”, the SAR Government held an economic summit to attempt to form a
consensus in the community to enable the Government to formulate its policies and
development strategies. CE Tsang concluded with the urging, “We must act right now to
harness the strong momentum form the Mainland to drive our development, to improve
the lives and earning capacity of the general public and to make our unique contribution
to the modernization of the country.” cli

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In June 2006, Hong Kong’s expanded integration with the Mainland took another step
forward. Speaking to the Forum on Economic and Trade Cooperation and Development
Between the Mainland, Hong Kong and Macao, CPPCC Chairman Jia promised that
Hong Kong’s inclusion in the 11th Five-Year Plan was a priority and as a result the
Mainland would increase its economic cooperation and trade with Hong Kong and Macao
bringing them to a ‘new height.’ clii This included the intensification of cooperation
between the mainland and the two SARs, regional cooperation within the pan-Pearl River
Delta (PPRD) region, and between the two SARs.

Under the 11th Five-Year Plan, relations would be enhanced, expanded, improved and
upgraded, and cooperation promoted among the PPRD, the MSAR and the Mainland.
The Central Government, its relevant departments and local governments in the PPRD
would “strengthen communication and coordination” with the HKSAR and MSAR
Governments. This integration and cooperation would, in turn, Chairman Jia said, lead to
the creation of common prosperity for all and enhance the two SARs abilities to compete
globally but more importantly contribute to China’s socialist modernization and
rejuvenation,

The blueprint for China's development has been drawn up and revitalization of the
Chinese nation is clearly in view, just like the rising sun above the horizon. Keeping
with the times and reform and development drive of the motherland, Hong Kong and
Macao will embark on equally ambitious journey of development. Our future is
bright and beautiful, but our tasks are heavy and challenging. Let us work together in
a pioneering spirit and keep pace with the times to create greater prosperity and
harmony for Hong Kong and Macao, and write a new chapter in the annals of the
great revitalization of the Chinese nation. cliii

Chairman Jia also specifically urged the Hong Kong and Macau SARs to seize the
current opportunities to achieve greater progress in China’s development and to expand
its ties with the mainland. Both SARs should seize this time of strategic opportunities as
it would “be a golden period for making major development in economic cooperation and
trade” between the three and that the strength gained from this cooperation that would
make it possible for them to compete internationally. cliv

Cross-border Interaction

More than half of the 7 million population of Hong Kong make up its labor force clv and
about 10 per cent of those three million-plus Hongkongers currently work or reside in
some capacity on the Mainland. According to a 2007 Hong Kong’s Census and Statistics
Department household survey, approximately about half-a-million Hongkongers spent a
substantial amount of time on the Mainland for work, family issues or retirement but still
retained residences in Hong Kong. clvi Another 200,000 Hongkongers lived on the
mainland without maintaining a usual place of residence in Hong Kong. More
Hongkongers are marrying Mainlanders today and Mainlanders are responsible for the
majority of Hong Kong’s immigration growth. Some indicators of the level of exchange
and interaction include,

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  In 2006, immigration to Hong Kong from the Mainland between 1983 and 2006
accounted for than 14 per cent of the population. clvii According to the 2007
HKSAR Government Yearbook, “The Mainland is the major contributor to Hong
Kong’s immigrant population. During the year, about 34,000 mainlanders joined
their families in Hong Kong under the One-way Permit Scheme, which imposes a
daily quota of 150.” clviii And, for the year ending 2008, Mainland immigrants to
Hong Kong under the One-way Permit scheme accounted for 74 per cent of the
population increase in the HKSAR. clix

 In January 2009, Mainland tourists accounted for 67 per cent of total visitors to
Hong Kong. clx More than 35 million Mainlanders have visited Hong Kong under
the IVS since 2003. Cross-boundary land traffic increased from 65 million in
1997 to 1176.63 million in 2002. clxi

 As of 2008, between 6,000 and 7,000 Hong Kong school children live in the
Shenzhen but commute to Hong Kong for schooling. clxii

 According to the SAR Government, “The number of marriages registered in Hong

Kong where either the husband or wife is a Mainlander has increased from about
2,600 in 1997 to 21,400 in 2006 (provisional figures).” clxiii

 In 2005, investments (US$163.1 billion) by the Mainland into Hong Kong

reportedly accounted for more than 30 per cent of Hong Kong’s inward
investment. clxiv

 The CSD’s Report of the Task Group on Attracting Talent recommended that
although the SAR Government recognized that it would need to seek new
professionals from around the world, “nevertheless [it] recognized that the
Mainlanders and overseas Chinese would naturally become the major potential
sources of supply of talent for Hong Kong.” clxv As part of its efforts to attract
talented professionals to Hong Kong, the Task Group on Attracting Talent
considered that they “should target specific groups of talent” on the Mainland that
could help achieve the goals for Hong Kong identified in the National 11th Five-
Year Plan.

The trends in cross-boundary/border interaction will have implications for the

implementation of OCTS in Hong Kong. In the long-run, greater interaction with
Mainlanders and growing migration of Mainland Chinese to Hong Kong will eventually
impact the political society in Hong Kong, possibly affecting demands for universal
suffrage and changing the electoral landscape. In the October 2007, Hong Kong’s
Development Bureau and Planning Department released its development plans for the
SAR over the next 23 years. In that report, it identified “Strengthening links with the
Mainland to cope with the rapid growth of cross-boundary interaction’ as one of its seven
planning objectives. However, more importantly, the Hong Kong 2030 Planning Vision

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and Strategy (hereafter HK2030), stated that the HKSAR had to move now to realign its
future with that of the Mainland,

As reflected in the her Eleventh five Year Plans at the national, provincial and city
levels, China will continue to instigate further changes towards modernization. The
role played by Hong Kong is thus experiencing further transformation. On the
economic front, with our established institutions and framework of ‘one country, two
systems,’ we should look beyond our existing roles as ‘gateway’ and ‘springboard’ to
actively participate in Mainland’s development. Socially and environmentally, we
should not just be ‘good neighbors’ who maintain a cordial relationship, but members
of one family who share in the responsibility of making this whole city-region a
livable home. clxvi

Integrating with Shenzhen, the PRD and Greater PRD

The main points of Mainland integration with immediate implications for Hong Kong
include the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, the PRD region and the Greater PRD. In
addition to expanding economic integration, the Central Authorities and the HKSAR
Government are also expanding the integration of regional infrastructure such as air, rail
and roadways to better facilitate economic activity. That same infrastructure also
facilitates greater social traffic and interaction within the region – a goal that some
loyalists in Hong Kong would like to see. One senior research with the ‘One Country,
Two Systems’ Research Institute in Hong Kong, for instance, recommended that the fares
for a high-speed rail link project between Hong Kong and the capital of Guangdong
Province should be kept so low that 50 million residents in the PRD would find “Hong
Kong such a convenient and inexpensive destination that mainland visitors would come
just for a meal or movie.” clxvii

In early January 2009, Beijing moved to seize the opportunities provided by the current
global financial crisis. In a comprehensive plan for the reform and development of the
PRD, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) published a
report, Outline of the Plan for Reform and Development of Pearl River Delta (2008-
2009), that revealed the Central Government was accelerating the reform and
development of the PRD and the HKSAR and MSARs. This would help meeting “the
urgent need of the country to sustain its current economic growth and the strategic need
to achieve scientific development.” clxviii Under various plans, Hong Kong’s universities
and other industries are expected to assist the Mainland in enhancing their own
technological capabilities.

The accelerated integration and development of the PRD would sustain “the long-term
prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and Macau …” clxix This included the PRD
quickening and deepening its “intimate cooperation, integration and common
development with Hong Kong and Macao so as to forge jointly the most dynamic and
internationally competitive city cluster of the Asia-Pacific region.” clxx As part of their
cooperative efforts, the Chinese Government urged the three actors (the PRD, HKSAR
and MSAR) to “cooperate on education, medical services, social insurance, culture,

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emergency management, and protection of intellectual properties, and conveniences will
be provided for people from Hong Kong and Macao to work and live in the
Mainland.” clxxi

Another example of the extent of regional integration that may be seen is the talk of
creating a Hong Kong-Shenzhen metropolis whereby Shenzhen residents could routinely
and easily visit the HKSAR. Reportedly, according to the HK2030 study, a Shenzhen
2030 Study approved by the Shenzhen People’s Congress in July 2006 “clearly stated
that Shenzhen’s future will hinge on joining forces with Hong Kong to develop an
international megalopis. Shenzhen will look upon Hong Kong as the future main driving
force of the PRD and will actively provide means to attract more Hong Kong high-value-
added industries to establish in Shenzhen and explore ways to co-operate with Hong
Kong on high-tech industries, logistics and high valued-added services.” clxxii In his 2008-
09 Policy Address, Embracing New Challenges, CE Tsang declared, “To stand out in the
face of severe competition, we need to broaden our horizons and intensify economic
integration with the Pearl River Delta (PRD) Region. The Government also needs to take
the lead in building a Hong Kong-Shenzhen international metropolis as well as
strengthening co-operation with Guangdong.” clxxiii

Significant levels of cross-border traffic from Hongkongers traveling and/or working in

Shenzhen or elsewhere in the PRD is occurring already. Cross-boundary traffic of people
has approached 160 million in 2006 – up from 75 million on 1997. clxxiv The greater
integration of Hong Kong with Shenzhen, the PRD and Greater PRD region would bring
larger numbers of Mainlanders and the Mainland culture to Hong Kong. One estimate by
the SAR Government is that by 2030, there will be more than 500 million cross-boundary
travelers and that ‘mobile residents’ who live in Hong Kong but work in Shenzhen or
elsewhere in the PRD would account for 5% of Hong Kong’s total population. clxxv This,
some may feel, would contribute to enhancing Hong Kong’s national identity formation.
Others, pointing to the substantial differences in culture between Hong Kong and even
the adjacent areas, warn that such expectations might be overly optimistic – at least in the
short term.

It should also be noted that the greater integration of Hong Kong into the PRD and the
Mainland of China will also affect the nature of the ‘actual situation’ in Hong Kong and
this, as the April 2004 Decision by the NPCSC lays out, directly impacts the realization
and form of universal suffrage. Furthermore, as these immigrants make up a larger
percentage of the population of Hong Kong and become eligible to vote in elections for
the Legco and the chief executive it is not entirely clear if this development will benefit
the pro-Beijing political forces in Hong Kong or not; although, because of the power of
the purse, the SAR Government can direct significant resources through social
organizations and district councilors and is in a much better situation to curry support
among the new arrivers in the SAR. Pro-Beijing parties such as the DAB have already
started catering to these new arrivals. The DAB’s entrenchment among Hong Kong’s
district councils and close relationship with the SAR Government assists the DAB in
tending to these new arrivals with economic and social welfare inducements.

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Currently, the majority of new arrivals tend to settle in the various new towns constructed
in the New Territories of the HKSAR which are closer to Shenzhen and the Mainland.
While part of Hong Kong, these areas are further removed from the international
influences and exposure that is readily apparent on Hong Kong Island and in the lower
parts of the Kowloon peninsula. Many of these new arrivals have found it difficult to
adapt to Hong Kong society and cultural and the SAR Government and various non-
governmental groups have created programs to help integrate them into Hong Kong
society and way of life. By some accounts, even Mainland professionals and young elites
who attend universities in Hong Kong encounter cultural shock. Because of the SAR’s
poor population growth prospective, the SAR Government has made it easier for
Mainland professionals to immigrate and for Mainland students to stay in Hong Kong
after they graduate. This policy is also directed at other ‘foreign students’ as well, but as
indicated earlier, the SAR Government perceives Mainland and overseas Chinese as
being its largest source of influx and growth. clxxvi

Period of ‘Strategic Opportunities’

While greater economic integration would provide the Central Authorities greater control
over Hong Kong and holds the possibility of subtly reducing Hongkongers’ alienation
from Mainland China, it is also the case that China in general is speeding up its
development. clxxvii In a March 2007 speech, Premier Wen Jiabao said, “The first 20 years
of this century will be a period of important strategic opportunities for China. We must
not miss it, and we must make full use of it. To embrace this period of strategic
opportunities and make good use of it is of utmost importance to our goal of building a
society of moderate prosperity in all respects and building socialism with Chinese
characteristics.” clxxviii Premier Wen warned, “Opportunity is rare. When it presents itself,
we must seize it, or it will be lost for good.” clxxix In describing what China had to do to
flourish in the new situation, Premier Wen stated that China had to “accomplish the
central goal of socialist modernization” and that all Chinese “should recognize the larger
interest of the modernization drive, comply with it and work to advance it. clxxx

Along a similar line, President Hu Jintao told the Central Party School in June 2007 that,
“Under the present international and domestic circumstances, our country faces
unprecedented development opportunities and equally unprecedented challenges.” clxxxi
President Hu said,

Our country’s development is at a new historical starting point in the new century and
new period. We must scientifically analyze the new opportunities and challenges in
our country’s all-round participation in economic globalization; profoundly grasp the
new tasks and contradictions facing our country as it pushes forward development in
various areas against the backdrop of deepening industrialization, urbanization,
mareketization, and internationalization, deepen implementation of the scientific
development concept; more conscientiously promote scientific development; and do
all we can to broaden the bright prospect of developing socialism with Chinese
characteristics. clxxxii

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Hong Kong is expected to play a critical role in China’s realization of these opportunities.
In a June 2006 speech given at the Forum on Economic Trade Cooperation and
Development Between the Mainland, Hong Kong and Macao, CPPCC Chairman Jia
Qinglin said the first two decades of the 21st century would be “a golden period for
making major developments in economic cooperation and trade among the Mainland,
Hong Kong and Macao.” clxxxiii However, in order to realize these opportunities it would
be necessary for the two SARs to strengthen trade and cooperation with Mainland and “to
give top priority to economic development, and lift the economic cooperation and trade”
between the three areas “to a new height.” As part of China’s own accelerated
development, reform and opening-up, the PRC would on the basis of the Eleventh Five-
Year Plan pursue deeper ties with the Hong Kong and Macao SARs as “a matter of
priority.”

China’s seizing ‘strategic opportunities’ during this period can also be extrapolated by
Beijing to include expanding and consolidating the implementation of OCTS in Hong
Kong. It can also be seen as an opportunity to accelerate and expand the cultural and
social integration of Hong Kong into the socialist system. This would be consistent with
Beijing’s efforts to convince Hongkongers that their future is intertwined and dependent
on the future of the Mainland. Hong Kong rises or falls with the Mainland is the message.
Opposing the Central Authorities would be tantamount to suicide. Given the current
increasingly dire global financial situation, the Central Authorities may view that it can
easily table discussions on universal suffrage or take controversial steps, such as pushing
forward with Hong Kong’s national security legislation, because Hongkongers are
focused on livelihood issues not political reforms.

This view has already been reflected in some incidents. The SAR Government has
indefinitely postponed scheduled public discussions on the election methods for selecting
the chief executive and forming the Legco in 2012. Delay of the liberalization of the
election methods for 2012 could conceivably also push back the earliest date of selecting
the chief executive by universal suffrage beyond 2017 for the CE and 2020 for the Legco.
This might happen because if there were no progress in the electoral process in 2012, the
principles of proceeding in a ‘gradual and orderly progress’ might necessitate an
intermediary step from the current arrangements to a full universal suffrage model. And
in the case of the Macao SAR, the Central Authorities were able to successfully introduce
and pass the MSAR’s equivalent Article 23 legislation – albeit not without some
opposition and protests, and the banning of some Hong Kong pan-democratic legislators
and academics from visiting Macao to meet with universal suffrage advocates there.

The Second Decade of the HKSAR

The second decade (2007 to 2017) of Hong Kong under PRC rule may be the most
important for the future implementation of OCTS and the realization of universal suffrage.
China is accelerating its integration of Hong Kong and initiating the transformation of
Hong Kong society into a patriotic base by focusing on its youth. Even though OCTS
and the Hong Kong Basic Law provide for no changes for at least 50 years it is clear that

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China is moving ahead in spirit with changes if not in name. Moreover, the SAR
Government has itself concluded that the HKSAR will be subsumed by the emergence of
‘one region’ of the PRC. According to the HK2030 study,

In the context of the evolution of the PRD Region as a multi-centered city-region,

Hong Kong needs to recognize the synergy of co-operation and coordination. The
Greater PRD Study could address some of the common issues between Hong Kong
and the PRD Region with a view to formulating a regional strategy to the overall
benefit of the Greater PRD Region, not only in relation to our economic strength, but
also the environment and social harmony. We must recognize that as our neighboring
cities make further progress in their development, our differences will become
increasing obscure. From the socio-economic angle, it is not unrealistic to assume
that all could become one within the next decade or so. In our planning work, we
need to be more anticipatory of the emergence of ‘one region’ and its likely impacts
on matters such as migration patterns and reorganization of economic functions
across the region, and in turn the repercussions on our planning strategy. clxxxiv
(emphasis added)

A Confluence of 2020?

The prediction of ‘a decade or so’ before Hong Kong would become ‘one with its
neighboring [Mainland] cities’ approximate the same time that the NPCSC has said
would be the earliest point that universal suffrage in Hong Kong could be achieved (2017
for the CE and 2020 for the Legco) and the end of China’s period of strategic
opportunities. This may be a coincidence but there are other statements by Chinese
leaders and academics and leftist Hong Kong politicians and personages in the SAR that
might suggest something more substantive perhaps. While the specified years are not
always exact, they are approximate enough to deduce a possible outline of a plan for
economic and political reform in China:

 In May 2007, seven months before the NPCSC decision on universal suffrage in
2017 and 2020, Ma Lik, the chairman of the DAB said that he expected Hong
Kong might realize universal suffrage in 2022, “In 25 years from 1997 … we
should have embarked on the road to full democracy.” Chairman Ma also said,
“You can call me conservative but I am more liberal-minded than before. We
should thrash out a solution within 25 years of the handover, which is half the
time pledged during which there would be no change in Hong Kong.” clxxxv

 On 29 December 2007, in response to the HKSAR Government’s report to the

National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC), The Report on Public
Consultation on Green Paper on Constitutional Development, the NPCSC issued
a decision, The Resolution on Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the
Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region [HKSAR] and
for Forming the HKSAR Legislative Council in the Year of 2012 and on Issues
Relating to Universal Suffrage. clxxxvi This decision tentatively provided for the
election of the chief executive by universal suffrage in 2017 and the Legislative

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 Council by 2020 – if Hong Kong’s legislature and community could form a
consensus on electoral methods that were also amenable to the Central Authorities.

 In October 2008, Professor Zhou Tianyong of the Central Party School told the
United Kingdom’s Telegraph that “by 2020, China will basically finish its
political and institutional reforms” and the China had a 12-year plan “to establish
a democratic platform” which would include “public democratic involvement at
all government levels” clxxxvii ; an allusion to the deliberative/political consultative
democracy model that China has been advocating for the Mainland and seeking to
transform Hong Kong society to.

 The year 2017 or 2020 would also be the point that Hongkongers residents born
shortly before or during the Handover would be eligible to vote in Hong Kong’s
elections for the CE and the Legco.

Page 46 of 59
CONCLUSION
Despite the best efforts by China, over the last quarter of a century a politically
antagonistic milieu in the Hong Kong SAR has evolved centering on universal suffrage,
Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy and its relationship with the Central Authorities.
This is seen by Beijing not only as a challenge to the implementation of OCTS but also as
counter to China’s overall policy of building social harmony and promoting national
unity; as distracting the SAR from contributing to socialist modernization and national
rejuvenation; and, as being detrimental to the country’s overall national interests and the
reunification of Taiwan. Despite the recognition at the Fourth Plenary session of the 16th
CPC Central Committee in September 2004 that a new approach was needed to deal with
the ‘new social order’ that had emerged in the SAR during the period of ‘new
circumstances,’ it seems now that more extraordinary efforts are needed as indicated by
President Hu’s clarion call for the building of a new generation of Hongkongers who
accept OCTS. This includes the targeted cultivation of patriotic Hongkongers, the
intensified introduction of socialist values in to Hong Kong society – arguably the
formation of a ‘Hong Kong-style socialist system’ – and greater and faster integration of
Hong Kong into the fabric of the Mainland.

When considering the critical comments of some Chinese State leaders regarding
Hongkongers and universal suffrage, it is apparent that from their perspective, while
Hong Kong may be ruled by patriots (the chief executive and his principal officials)
selected, promoted and appointed by the Central Authorities, the SAR is certainly not
filled with them – at least not patriots based on the Party’s criteria. This has been caused
by alienation from the Mainland and spiritual pollution by colonial and Western
influences which have made Hongkongers critical, if not hostile, to the Communist Party
and the socialist system practiced on the Mainland. This presents a dilemma for the
Central Authorities because as Beijing handpicks its political leadership to administer the
HKSAR it finds it only has a limited pool of Hongkongers who are politically suitable to
Beijing, predictable, politically capable and ‘acceptable’ to the Hong Kong community.
Beijing has also found that it needs future recruits for its patriotic parties in the SAR to
ensure that any future chief executive has a loyal legislative base to administer Hong
Kong on behalf of the Central Authorities. This includes ostensibly ‘independent’
legislators who are ‘patriotic.’

To resolve this shortfall, Beijing has decided that the young elite of Hong Kong’s society
have to be co-opted, indoctrinated and groomed to become the core of the Party’s future
leaders in the community and government – if the SAR is to be prevented from becoming
rogue achieving de facto independence through unfettered electoral freedoms –
something that Chinese leaders and Party members have long suspected was the goal of
the British plans to introduce representative government and elections in the former
colony. The cultivation of a patriotic mainstay in Hong Kong is also intended to promote
national unity and prevent the formation of separatist or independence-trending attitudes
and movements in the society, including what Beijing considers ‘excessive localism.’
Promoting national unity is one of the implicit goals of China’s patriotic/national

Page 47 of 59
education efforts both on the mainland and in Hong Kong and in its approach for dealing
with the Taiwan independence movement. A strong Hong Kong identity with a sense of
superiority over the Mainland is seen as inimical to building national unity and tending
towards separatism.

Simultaneously with Beijing’s emphasis on transforming the elite youth of Hong Kong
into future builders, China has been attempting to imbue a degree of patriotism within the
wider community who are expected one day to vote for loyalist candidates and parties in
the SAR once full universal suffrage is implemented. This cohort of ‘red politicians’ can
also act as a counterweight to the pan-democratic core in Hong Kong during elections for
the Legislative Council and the Chief Executive. This is an especially critical
requirement once full universal suffrage is permitted sometime after 2017/2020. As part
of its united front efforts in Hong Kong, Beijing will continue seeking to consolidate its
core support among the loyalists and to draw in those not firmly entrenched among the
pan-democrats but it must also pull in the larger part of the community. This will include
reaching out to and co-opting more moderate democrats (supporters and politicians) that
Beijing feels it can deal with and who are ‘reasonable’ and not radical. Use of patriotic
‘independents’ in the HKSAR who eschew political affiliation in name (but not in values)
is also likely to increase because they provide the Center the option of a politically
correct candidate without the ‘stigma’ of being a pro-Beijing party.

However, a major task for achieving the goal of creating a generation of new
Hongkongers who will steadfastly vote for red candidates is the transformation of Hong
Kong society. Ever since the founding of New China, the Party has sought to reshape
Chinese society into its own image even as its own understanding of what socialism is
and what socialism with Chinese characteristics was evolving. This has conspicuously
been the situation since the mid-1990s with the Party’s emphasis on the building of a
‘socialist spiritual civilization’ and its efforts to imbue patriotism as the ‘soul of the
nation’ – a patriotism that appropriates all of China’s glorious traditions and
achievements into a legacy foremost represented and carried forward by the vanguard of
the Chinese Communist Party. Love of nation is love of the Party, the Party posits. This
is what Beijing hopes Hong Kong will accept and act upon by only voting for loyalist
parties and candidates for the Legco and the Chief Executive.

China’s attempts to change Hong Kong’s society are not new developments. The Central
Authorities have been attempting to transform Hong Kong society since before the Sino-
British Negotiations started in 1982. They enhanced their efforts after the Joint
Declaration was signed in 1984, and continued throughout the transition to the Handover
to ensure a smooth changeover and once achieved they reportedly dialed back their
activities in the SAR until after the 1 July march. During the first-half decade of Hong
Kong’s return China’s efforts were subtle yet still discernable in the policy addresses of
the fist chief executive of Hong Kong, Tung Chee-hwa, who repeatedly extolled
traditional Chinese values sprinkled liberally with Communist Party nuances – faint
reflections of Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s spiritual civilization and later, under CE
Tsang, of President Hu Jintao’s socialist harmonious society, socialist culture and
scientific development rhetoric.

Page 48 of 59
At its most obvious level there is a parallel emphasis on creating a harmonious society in
Hong Kong and the promotion of socialist values without the moniker of the SCVS. This
mirrors, in many ways, the mainland’s own efforts to create a socialist harmonious
society – right down to similar socialist core values being promoted in the Hong Kong
via the SAR Government’s national education efforts – efforts which, just like on the
mainland, are primarily directed towards the youth of the SAR. Arguably, this might be
the fashioning of a ‘Hong Kong-style socialist system.’ If so, then this oblique
introduction of the socialist system through the infiltration of socialist morals and values
represents a major change in the implementation of OCTS in that the socialist system was
not supposed to be introduced in to Hong Kong for at least 50 years.

However, it is a change which China has found necessary because the idea level of
control over the SAR never materialized and the constant battles over universal suffrage
have threatened, in the eyes of the Central Authorities, Hong Kong’s prosperity and
stability – and by extrapolation, the Mainland’s too who now finds itself stuck with a
major new task regarding Hong Kong. That of ensuring and maintaining the prosperity
and stability of the HKSAR clxxxviii – a task that Hongkongers ‘ruling’ Hong Kong were
supposed to be able to achieve themselves just as they had done so during colonial times
but which has not manifested post reunification. This is suggested by the continued
necessity of the Mainland to provide economic concessions and preferential financial
policies to ‘support’ the SAR’s economy. So, now as China enters the second decade of
the period of strategic opportunities, it not only has to concentrate on seizing these
opportunities it must also manage potentially increasingly confrontational demands for
universal suffrage in the HKSAR while maintaining its prosperity and stability. Not only
have the incessant fights over democracy, elections and universal suffrage in the SAR
hijacked Hong Kong’s role for China, but it may also threaten China’s modernization and
rejuvenation.

Aiding socialist modernization, Hong Kong’s role for China, has ultimately been the
raison d’être for China’s special policies for Hong Kong. However, the decades-long
squabbles over universal suffrage and democracy have distracted Hong Kong from what
was supposed to be the business of Hong Kong – making money for China and ensuring
that it was well positioned to continue to do so in the future by maintaining its stability.
The latter has become less certain as the SAR Government has faltered in identifying a
surefooted way ahead for Hong Kong’s economic future as well as building harmony in
the society. Concurrently, the tendency of Hong Kong’s tycoons and business sector to
chase easy money in the China rather than bringing in overseas dollars and technology to
both the Mainland and the SAR, has not aided Hong Kong’s role in socialist
modernization.

Furthermore, the failure of big business in Hong Kong to equitably share their wealth
with the workers has resulted in greater economic inequities and greater social unrest in
the community – which has fed into the demands for greater democratic accountability of
the Administration for the faster realization of universal suffrage. Right or wrong, the
mirage of universal suffrage is seen as a panacea by many pan-democrats in Hong Kong.

Page 49 of 59
Ironically, given the long history of economic co-optation of the business elite by the
Central Authorities and the SAR Government, the CE and his officials have been
impotent in getting big business to making concessions such as agreeing to establish a
minimum wage in Hong Kong.

As a result of this and other pro-business incidents, the Government has been accused of
collusion with business and neglecting the middle class and grassroots. Thus, now, the
Central Authorities are not only faced with having to maintain ‘lasting prosperity and
stability” but also ensuring that the “governance and administration” of Hong Kong is
carried out well. This situation has a major influence on Hong Kong’s ‘high degree of
autonomy’ and “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong’ as those principals were also
predicated, just like the overall OCTS policy, on the policies being correct, i.e., the Hong
Kong patriots being able to ensure the SAR played its role in China’s grand strategy. clxxxix

In spite of the fact that China has repeatedly stated it will support the SAR when it
experiences economic challenges this support is supposed to be the exception, not the
status quo. Hong Kong was supposed to be at a minimum economically self-sufficient
but ideally contributing strongly to national modernization. The continued reliance of the
HKSAR Government on the Central Authorities to financially bail out the SAR through
special economic concessions and incentives has caused dissension among its Mainland
compatriots. Professor Joseph Cheng from City University noted in 2005 that, “the
degree of economic support that Beijing has been pouring into Hong Kong has aroused
serious resentment on the part of China’s provincial governments, which dislike seeing
resource go to the city whose people are almost five times richer than the average
Mainland Chinese.” cxc

If Hong Kong can not maintain its leading or unique role in China’s modernization, the
incentives for tolerating challenges to the OCTS in the form of pan-democrats demands
for Western-style universal suffrage are vulnerable to be reexamined and diminished.
Deng Xiaoping said the policies would not be changed – but only if they were correct. If
they are proven to be not correct, then Beijing would obviously correct them when it was
politically advantageous. Unlike when OCTS was first formed, China is a much stronger
nation economically, militarily and politically, would easily winter any fallout over an
overt incremental institution of the socialist system in Hong Kong and might not suffer
any at all if Hongkongers themselves ‘democratically’ requested it themselves.

The latter is a possible scenario given the Center’s strategy in promoting the SCVS,
socialist morals and national identity formation in Hong Kong which is to ultimately
‘guide’ individuals to the proper political conclusions of their own volition. This,
combined with the Party’s efforts to redefine the publics’ understanding of democracy,
elections and universal suffrage in the SAR provides the CPC ‘a’ pathway for
transforming Hong Kong’s society through the absorption and subversion of aspirations
for Western-style democracy into a community which embraces the ‘one country’ aspect
of the OCTS policy.

Page 50 of 59
Thus, the need for Hong Kong to find its way and role for China under the ‘new
situation’ is the most critical question for the future of the HKSAR and the
implementation of OCTS. The answer will directly affect not only its stability and
prosperity and its chances to realize meaningful universal suffrage but also the viability
of maintaining the distinctness of the ‘two systems.’ Many Chinese and Hong Kong
commentators have noted that since the handover and the ups and downs of the first
decade under sovereignty, the SAR has experienced a crisis of confidence and identity
and is still feeling its way across the river. Unfortunately, this is occurring while China
rushes forward with its own strategic goals of modernization and ascending to
prominence in the international community as it seeks to take advantage of ‘strategic
opportunities’ in the new era.

Hong Kong has already lost valuable time and the decision by the Central Government to
guide Hongkongers to embrace socialist morals and ideas has already started the process
of the socialist system or a Hong Kong variant being introduced into Hong Kong.
Irrespective of whether one classifies the ideology and governance being instituted in the
HKSAR through its national education, Mainland exchange programs and accelerated
integration as being ‘socialist or not’ it is clearly a change to the Hong Kong ‘way of life’
that existed at the signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984 and even on 1 July 1997.
China is actively attempting to change what the ‘actual situation’ is in the HKSAR to one
that favors its worldview and politics. The calls for and the efforts to achieve the
transformation of Hong Kong society and its youngsters into a new generation of patriots
strongly suggest a new OCTS policy from the West’s and pro-democracy Hongkongers’
perspectives. Although, it can be argued that from China’s position the policy has not
changed and it is only clearing ‘landmines’ left behind by the British colonial rule and
Western influences during the century of humiliation.

Page 51 of 59
ENDNOTES

i
John Kohut, Lu Ping Attacks Democracy Calls, SCMP, 9 October 1991
ii
Maria Tam Wai-chu, Decoding the Basic Law: A High Degree of Autonomy Under the Sovereignty of
the Motherland (Key Points), City University of Hong Kong, 22 June 2007 as translated by the Open
Source Center (OSC) in CPP20080122507003
iii
Chow Chung-yan, Losing Our Lustre, SCMP, 1 July 2007
iv
“China’s Hong Kong Policies Proven Completely Correct CPPCC Chairman”. Xinhua. 24 December
2007
v
Donald Tsang, 2007-08 Policy Address - A New Direction for Hong Kong, 10 October 2007
vi
Sino-Thai Youth Development Network, CPPCC Chairman: China’s Hong Kong Policies Proven
Completely Correct, 25 December 2007,
http://www.sinothaiyouth.com/spotlight/200712/t20071225_627371.htm
vii
HKSARG: Commission on Strategic Development, Hong Kong’s Relationship with the Mainland,
CSD/6/2007, 17 December 2007
viii
Zoher Abdoolcarim. “Hong Kong’s Future: Sunshine, with Clouds” Time. 7 June 2007.
http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1630244_1630240,00.html
ix
Lau, Siu-kai. The Hong Kong Policy of the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1997. Journal of
Contemporary China (2000), 9(23), 77-93
x
Lau Siu-kai, “In Search of a New Political Order,” in The First Decade: the Hong Kong SAR in
Retrospective and Introspective Perspectives, ed. Yeung Yue-man (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press,
2007). 139-159.
xi
The comments of the head of the CPU are important because the CPU not only advises the CE and the
HKSAR Government as the SAR’s official think tank but they also interact with the mainland academics
advising the Central Authorities on policy formation and the ‘actual situation’ in Hong Kong. Furthermore,
the CPU’s influence on SAR policy formation is not limited to constitutional development issues related to
universal suffrage or the political system of the HKSAR, but also includes the HKSAR Government’s
strategy for the 21st century, its plans for integrating with the Mainland, research on public opinion and,
since 2007, how the Administration will approach the implementation of national education and the
promotion of the Basic Law in the SAR – two areas of exceptional interest for the Central Authorities.
xii
Lau Siu-kai, “In Search of a New Political Order,” in The First Decade: the Hong Kong SAR in
Retrospective and Introspective Perspectives, ed. Yeung Yue-man (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press,
2007). 146-147.
xiii
Willy Lam, Beijing’s Hand in Hong Kong Politics, China Brief, Vol. 4, Issue 12, 9 June 2004,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=26643
xiv
The four were Professors Xiao Weiyun, Xu Chongde, Wu Jianfan, and Xia Yong.
xv
Wang Xiangwei, Beijing Has Final Say on Hong Kong’s Constitutional Reform, SCMP, 6 December
2003
xvi
Constitutional Affairs Bureau, Task Force on Constitutional Development, Paper submitted to the
Legislative Council Panel on Constitutional Affairs, 14 January 2004
xvii
The CDTF was headed by the Chief Secretary for Administration Donald Tsang and included the Chief
Secretary for Administration and the Secretary for Constitutional Affairs as its members. The CDTF
published for reports on constitutional development in 2004.
xviii
HKSARG, Statement by CS on the Fifth Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force, Press
Release, 19 October 2005, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200510/19/P200510190190.htm
xix
It should be noted while the Government’s proposal only represented an incremental development in real
terms, it did potentially represent a much more politically significant compromise on behalf of the Central
Authorities who were resistant to allowing direct elections for the Legco or the CE in the first place.
xx
HKSARG, CE Speaks on the Fifth Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force, Press Release,
19 October 2005, http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200510/19/P200510190220.htm
xxi
Cannix Yau. “Don’t be Naïve on Reform, Tsang Tells Public”. The Standard. 5 November 2005

Page 52 of 59
xxii
Then Chief Secretary Donald Tsang was quoted in the SCMP as saying, “The Hong Kong government is
part of the central government, and not only the chief executive, but senior officials have to maintain
regular contact [with them].” See Chris Yeung, Under a Cloud of Suspicion, SCMP, 8 August 2005
xxiii
Jimmy Cheung and Gary Cheung, Beijing’s Trust Will Be Hurt, Warns Tsang, SCMP, 23 December
2005
xxiv
Joseph Li, HK Opposition ‘should be held liable’ for Reform Failure, China Daily HK Edition, 22
December 2005
xxv
Ji Pengfei, Explanations on “The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People’s Republic of China (Draft)” And Its Related Documents – Addressing the Third Session of the
Seventh National People’s Congress on March 28, 1990, 28 March 1990,
http://law.hku.hk/clsourcebook/10018.htm
xxvi
Ji Pengfei, Explanations on “The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People’s Republic of China (Draft)” And Its Related Documents – Addressing the Third Session of the
Seventh National People’s Congress on March 28, 1990, 28 March 1990,
http://law.hku.hk/clsourcebook/10018.htm
xxvii
This is an exceptionally complicating factor when debates about amending the Basic Law arise
because it raises the possibility that there are flaws in the Basic Law. Even without the sovereignty
issue, the mainland’s beatification of Basic Law as an exemplar of socialism with Chinese
characteristics and Deng Xiaoping’s brilliance. In addition, Chinese authorities have expressed on a few
occasions resistance to amending the Basic Law because they fear that it might open up a flood gate of
changes, some of which might affect the political structure of Hong Kong and thereby directly affect the
relationship between the Central Authorities and the SAR Government.
xxviii
Qiao Xiaoyang, My Views on the Correct Understanding and Handling of the Relationship between
the Central Authorities and the HKSAR under ‘One Country, Two Systems’, 1 April 2000
xxix
Carrie Chan and Cannix Yau, Tsang in ‘Animals’ Outburst at Critics, The Standard, 20 December 2005
xxx
China Daily HK: HK, Macao Seek Relaxation of Travel Restriction, DNI OSC, CPP20071023968023,
23 October 2007
xxxi
Qiao, Xiaoyang. Striving for the truth in a pragmatic spirit in finding the right path for the
constitutional development of Hong Kong. NPCSC. 26 April 2004
xxxii
China Daily, Promoting Basic Law, An Urgent Task, 7 June 2007
xxxiii
Ibid.
xxxiv
Ibid.
xxxv
Weiyun, Xiao. One Country, Two Systems An account of the drafting of the Hong Kong Basic Law.
Peking University Press (Beijing). 2001. pp.16
xxxvi
Wang, Shuwen (chief editor). Introduction to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (Xianggang tebie Xingzhengqu ji ben fao dao lun. Beijing: China Law Press, 2000. pp. 173
xxxvii
Qiao Xiaoyang, My Views on the Correct Understanding and Handling of the Relationship between
the Central Authorities and the HKSAR under ‘One Country, Two Systems’, 1 April 2000
xxxviii
Qichen, Qian. Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy. HarperCollins (New York). 2005. pp. 261
xxxix
Task Group on National Education, Promotion of National Education in Hong Kong – Current
Situation, Challenges and Way Forward, Commission on Strategic Development, CSD/2/2008, 14 April
2008
xl
Dikky Sinn, Stephenie Hui and Donald Asprey, July 1 One Big Party for Patriots, One Big Protest for
Democrats, SCMP, 2 July 2006
xli
Lau Siu-kai, “In Search of a New Political Order,” in The First Decade: the Hong Kong SAR in
Retrospective and Introspective Perspectives, ed. Yeung Yue-man (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press,
2007). 143.
xlii
Ibid.
xliii
Anthony B.L. Cheung. “Executive-led Governance or Executive Power ‘Hollowed-Out’ –the Political
Quagmire of Hong Kong”, Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 15, No. 1, April 2007, pp.17-38
xliv
Ibid.
xlv
Lau Siu-kai, “In Search of a New Political Order,” in The First Decade: the Hong Kong SAR in
Retrospective and Introspective Perspectives, ed. Yeung Yue-man (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press,
2007). 147.
xlvi
Ibid.

Page 53 of 59
xlvii
Elsie Leung Oi-see. Time for Hongkongers to learn the Basic Law. 5 February 2007,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200702/05/eng20070205_347649.html
xlviii
Ibid.
xlix
Ibid.
l
Elsie Leung Oi-see, Full Development of the Basic Law Under the Common Law System, Wen Wei Po, 7
June 2007 as translated by the OSC in CPP20070611710015
li
Elsie Leung Oi-see, Full Development of the Basic Law Under the Common Law System, Wen Wei Po, 7
June 2007 as translated by the OSC in CPP20070611710015
lii
Xinhua, Full Text of President Hu Jintao’s Speech at Dinner given by the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region on 30 June 2007, 30 June 2007 as translated by the OSC in CPP20070701136001
liii
Xinhua, Full Text of President Hu Jintao’s Speech at Dinner given by the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region on 30 June 2007, 30 June 2007 as translated by the OSC in CPP20070701136001
liv
HKSARG: Secretariat to the Commission on Strategic Development, Promotion of National Education in
Hong Kong – Current Situation, Challenges and Way Forward, CSD/2/2008, 14 April 2008
lv
Donald Tsang, 2007-2008 Policy Address – A New Direction for Hong Kong, 10 October 2007,
paragraph 118.
lvi
Secretariat to the Commission on Strategic Development. Promotion of National Education in Hong
Kong Current Situation, Challenges and Way Forward (Translation). April 2008. CSD/2/2008.
lvii
Task Group on National Education, Promotion of National Education in Hong Kong – Current Situation,
Challenges and Way Forward, Commission on Strategic Development, CSD/2/2008, 14 April 2008
lviii
All-China Youth Federation, Youth Participation in Social Life and Decision-making, October 2007,
http://www.acyf.org.cn/english/zgqn/200710/t20071030_606745.htm
lix
All-China Youth Federation, Youth Participation in Social Life and Decision-making, October 2007,
http://www.acyf.org.cn/english/zgqn/200710/t20071030_606745.htm
lx
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council, “Some Opinions on Further
Strengthening and Improving the Development of Ideology and Morality Among Minors,” (Zhonggong
zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu jin yi bu jiaqiang he gaijin weichengnianren sixiang diode jianshe de
ruogan yijian), 26 February 2004 as translated in Chinese Education & Society, Mar/Apr 2006, Vol. 39,
Issue 2, 75-76.
lxi
Klaus H. Pringsheim, The Functions of the Chinese Communist Youth Leagues (1920-1949), The China
Quarterly, No. 12 (Oct. – Dec. 1962). 75.
lxii
Xinhua, Full Text of Jiang Zemin’s Report at 16th Party Congress, 17 November 2002
lxiii
Albert Wong and Chester Yung, Hu urges national identity for youth, Sunday Morning Post, 1 July
2007
lxiv
Klaus H. Pringsheim, The Functions of the Chinese Communist Youth Leagues (1920-1949), The China
Quarterly, No. 12 (Oct. – Dec. 1962). 75.
lxv
Gregory P. Fairbrother, Toward Critical Patriotism: Student Resistance to Political Education in Hong
Kong and China, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), 21.
lxvi
Derrick Tam Chi-kuong, Political Leadership in Youth Organizations of Macau, University of
Macau,
lxvii
Tang Wen-cheng, Hu Jintao Offers Broad Discourse on the Five Major Relationships in a Harmonious
Society, Ching Pao, No. 350, p.24-28, 1 to 30 September 2006 as translated by the OSC in
CPP20060922715024
lxviii
Hong Kong 200 Leadership Project 2008,
http://www.hkedcity.net/radio/activities/upload_files/16764/460297272.pdf
lxix
Derrick Tam Chi-kuong, Political Leadership in Youth Organizations of Macau, University of
Macau,
lxx
Gary Cheung and Ambrose Leung, Young DAB Star Set to Join Tsang Office, SCMP, 19 January 2006
lxxi
Howard Kwong, Political Parties Look to Young Guns, Varsity Online Edition, May 2006,
http://www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/varsity/0605/socialissues.htm
lxxii
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council, “Some Opinions on Further
Strengthening and Improving the Development of Ideology and Morality Among Minors,” (Zhonggong
zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu jin yi bu jiaqiang he gaijin weichengnianren sixiang diode jianshe de
ruogan yijian), 26 February 2004 as translated in Chinese Education & Society, Mar/Apr 2006, Vol. 39,
Issue 2, 78.

Page 54 of 59
lxxiii
xxxx, Action Plan for Patriotic Education, Chinese Education and Society, vol. 39, no.2, March/April
2006. 7.
lxxiv
Gregory P. Fairbrother, Raising a New Generation of Patriots: Patriotism in the Eyes of Chinese
Educators and Students, Department of Government and International Studies Working Paper No. 14, June
2005. http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~gis/FAIRBROTHER.pdf
lxxv
Hu Jintao, Speech by Hu Jintao at a Forum With Members of the New Leading Body of the CYL
Central Committee and Some of the Delegates to the 16th CYL National Congress on 14 June 2008,
Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, 15 June 2008 as translated by the OSC in CPP20080617710004
lxxvi
Xinhua, A Program for Education in Patriotism, 4 September 1994 as translated by the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service in OW0609144294
lxxvii
Gregory P. Fairbrother, Toward Critical Patriotism: Student Resistance to Political Education in Hong
Kong and China, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), 64.
lxxviii
HKSARG, CE Talks About Constitutional Development, Press Release, 20 February 2004
lxxix
Eric Ma, Top-down Patriotism and Bottom-up Nationalism in Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong
Kong, p.5. http://www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/project/ericsite/academic/top-down.pdf
lxxx
Prior to the Handover, Rita Fan had served as an appointed Legco councilor and was a member of the
colonial Executive Council. She was removed as ExCo by Governor Chris Patton due to her opposition to
his political reform proposals. In 1995, she became a member of the Chinese Government’s Preparatory
Committee and in 1997 became the president of the first legislature of the HKSAR, the provisional Legco.
She continued in that position until she resigned in 2008. She was a local NPC deputy from 1998 until
2008 when she ascended to the NPC Standing Committee.
lxxxi
Dikky Sinn, Education Pledge Not Kept, Says Rita Fan, SCMP, 11 March 2006
lxxxii
Task Group on National Education, Promotion of National Education in Hong Kong – Current
Situation, Challenges and Way Forward, Commission on Strategic Development, CSD/2/2008, 14 April
2008
lxxxiii
Task Group on National Education, Promotion of National Education in Hong Kong – Current
Situation, Challenges and Way Forward, Commission on Strategic Development, CSD/2/2008, 14 April
2008
lxxxiv
Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, Jia: China’s HK Policies Prove Completely Correct, 24
December 2007, http://www.gov.cn/english/2007-12/24/content_842493.htm
lxxxv
HKSARG, National Education a long-term mission: TS Tsang, Press Release, 8 July 2008,
http://www3.news.gov.hk/isd/ebulletin/en/category/healthandcommunity/080708/html/080708en05005.htm
lxxxvi
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council, “Some Opinions on
Further Strengthening and Improving the Development of Ideology and Morality Among Minors,”
(Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu jin yi bu jiaqiang he gaijin weichengnianren sixiang diode
jianshe de ruogan yijian), 26 February 2004 as translated in Chinese Education & Society, Mar/Apr 2006,
Vol. 39, Issue 2, 78.
lxxxvii
Home Affairs Bureau, Government Committed to Promoting Youth Development and National
Education (with photos), Press Release, 22 September 2008,
http://www.hab.gov.hk/file_manager/en/documents/publications_and_press_releases/20080922y
outh_edu_e.pd
lxxxviii
Hu was quoted in July 2002 by the Hong Kong’s Ching Pao as saying, “The children today will be
the pillars of the society tomorrow. The state and the nation have placed hopes on children and teenagers.”
See Hsia Yi-ping, Hu Jintao is Charged with Important Tasks After Beijing Tempered for 10 Years, 1 July
2002 as translated by the OSC in CPP20020705000049; UFWD Head Liu Yandong was quoted by the
China Daily as saying, “Children are the future pillars of the society, and should be given proper guidance
to develop their talents. These children will become the architects of a more prosperous future for Hong
Kong …”, see Alfons Chan, Liu Continues Charm Offensive, Repeats Harmony Call, China Daily Hong
Kong Edition, 29 May 2004
lxxxix
Home Affairs Bureau, Social Harmony and Civic Education, Policy Responsibilities,
http://www.hab.gov.hk/en/policy_responsibilities/policy1.htm
xc
Task Group on National Education, Promotion of National Education in Hong Kong – Current Situation,
Challenges and Way Forward, Commission on Strategic Development, CSD/2/2008, p.8-9, paragraphs
22.a, 23, and 24, 14 April 2008
xci
Colum Murphy, Little Patriots, The Standard, 9-10 October 2004

Page 55 of 59
xcii
Task Group on National Education, Promotion of National Education in Hong Kong – Current Situation,
Challenges and Way Forward, Commission on Strategic Development, CSD/2/2008, p.7, paragraphs 20,
14 April 2008
xciii
Elsie Leung Oi-see, Full Development of the Basic Law Under the Common Law System, Wen Wei Po,
7 June 2007 as translated by the OSC in CPP20070611710015
xciv
17thcongress.org.cn, Scientific Concept of Development & Harmonious Society, 8 October 2007,
http://china.org.cn/english/congress/227029.htm
xcv
Hu Jintao, Hu Jintao’s Report at 17th Party Congress, Xinhua, 25 October 2007
xcvi
Cheng Enfu, Uphold and Develop Socialism With Chinese Characteristics, Wen Hui Bao, 10 July 2007
as translated by the OSC in CPP20070712050004
xcvii
Wu Bangguo, Programmatic Document on the Building of a Harmonious Socialist Society, Renmin
Ribao, 20 October 2006 as translated by the OSC in CPP20061020701001
xcviii
Qiushi, Commentary on the Core Value System of Socialism, No. 26, 16 December 2006 as translated
by the OSC in CPP20061228710003
xcix
Fanny Law, On Patriotism: National Identification, Letters to Youth, 6 October 2003,
http://www.edb.gov.hk/FileManager/EN/Content_2097/2e.pdf
c
Fanny Law, On Patriotism: National Identification, Letters to Youth, 6 October 2003,
http://www.edb.gov.hk/FileManager/EN/Content_2097/2e.pdf; Zhu is listed on China’s Ministry of
Culture’s website, China.Culture.org, as one of 21 modern patriotic role models along the likes of China’s
first nobel prize winner (Yang Zhenning), the founder of China’s atomic and hydrogen (Deng Jiaxian) and
the first Chinese in outer space (Yang Liwei.)
ci
Mei Zhang, Official Role Models and Unofficial Responses: Problems of Model Emulation in Post-Mao
China, in Chinese Perspectives in Rhetoric and Communication (ed.) D. Ray Heisey, .(Ablex Publishing
Corporation:Stamford (2000)). p.68.
cii
Estate Agents Authority, The Enduring Cosmos ‘Understanding Honour and Disgrace and Assuming
One’s Responsibilities is an Important Mission,’ Horizons, October 2006
ciii
Ibid.
civ
Lu Jianping, Building a Socialist Core Values System – A Major Issue in Strengthening the Party’s
Ideological Theory Building, Renmin Ribao, 3 August 2007
cv
Lau Nai-keung, Moral Regeneration is the Need of the Hour, China Daily, 22 October 2008
cvi
Qiushi, Commentary on the Core Value System of Socialism, No. 26, 16 December 2006 as translated
by the OSC in CPP20061228710003
cvii
Education Bureau, Inspection Annual Report 2006/07, .p.25.
cviii
Secretary for Education, Launching of the Revised Moral and Civic Education Curriculum Framework,
Education Bureau Circular Memorandum No. 45/2008, 2 April 2008
cix
Education Bureau, Mapping Hong Kong Identity,
www.edb.gov.hk/FileManager/TC/Content_6323/nation2_301007_free.ppt
cx
Lau Nai-keung, Moral Regeneration is the Need of the Hour, China Daily, 22 October 2008
cxi
Official Website of the Nanjing Municipal Government, FAQ for Chinese Citizens, 25 October 2008,
http://english.nanning.gov.cn/n725531/n751804/n751821/n752676/2546923.html
cxii
Task Group on National Education, Promotion of National Education in Hong Kong – Current Situation,
Challenges and Way Forward, Commission on Strategic Development, CSD/2/2008, para. 48, 14 April
2008
cxiii
The PLA has held annual military summer camps for Hong Kong youth since 2004. The camps have
included hundreds of secondary school students. According to a 9 July 2008 SCMP report, “Organizers of
the fourth annual Military Summer Camp for Hong Kong Youth want parents involved so the values
instilled at the camp – discipline, endurance and national identity – will continue at home.” As with
national exchange programs, participants of the military summer camps are also expected to promote the
message to others, “The sense of camaraderie continues after the camp with previous participants
publishing newsletters and organizing reunions.” See Isabel Tam, Parents Welcome at PLA Boot Camp for
Students, SCMP, 9 July 2008
cxiv
CPCE, Guidelines for Application, Community Participation Scheme 2009-10,
http://www.cpce.gov.hk/common/doc/cps09_guideline_e.pdf
cxv
Hu Jintao, Hu Jintao’s Report at 17th Party Congress, Xinhua, 25 October 2007
cxvi
China Daily, Officials Seek to Quantify Harmonious Society, 29 September 2007

Page 56 of 59
cxvii
Xiao Weiyun. “One Country, Two Systems: An Account of the Drafting of the Hong Kong Basic Law”.
Beijing: Peking University Press. 2001. 109.
cxviii
Lau Siu-kai, Pragmatic Calculations of National Interest: China’s Hong Kong Policy from 1949-1997,
in Chinese Foreign Policy edited by Suisheng Zhao, New York: An East Gate Book (2004)), p.99.
cxix
This is even more the case today as private and public ownership in today’s China coexist as “two
unshakable pillars” of Socialism with Chinese characteristics. See Xiao Liang, Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics Marches Forward Amid Exploration, Lilun Qianyan, 1 September 2007 as translated by the
OSC in CPP20071101332005; Research Center of the Ministry of Education for Deng Xiaoping Theory
and the Important Thinking of the ‘Three Represents, Continuously Improving the Ability to Handle
Internal Contradictions Among the People, Qiushi, 1 August 2005 as translated by the OSC in
CPP20060419501001
cxx
Liu Jianping, Building a Socialist Core Values System – A Major Issue in Strengthening the Party’s
Ideological Theory Building, Renmin Ribao, 3 August 2007 as translated by the OSC in
CPP20070803710002
cxxi
Ibid.
cxxii
Deng Xiaoping, We are Building a Socialist Society with Both High Material Standards and High
Cultural and Ethnical Standards, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3, xxxxxxxxx
cxxiii
János Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1992), p.3.
cxxiv
Deng Xiaoping, Building a Socialism with Specifically Chinese Character, Selected Works of Deng
Xiaoping, Vol. III, 30 June 1984
cxxv
Xiao Liang, Socialism with Chinese Characteristics Marches Forward Amid Exploration, Lilun
Qianyan, 1 September 2007, as translated by the OSC in CPP20071101332005
cxxvi
Li Junru, Great Banner: Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, Jiefangjun Bao, 6 November 2007 as
translated by the OSC in CPP20071109710016
cxxvii
Ren Zhongyi, Further Discussion on Upholding the Four Cardinal Principles, Guangzhou Nanfang
Zhoumo, 5 May 2000 as translated by the OSC in CPP20000506000020
cxxviii
Xuexi Shibao, The People-Centered Concept, Scientific Development, Common Prosperity, Social
Harmony – Deciphering Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, 21 May 2007 as translated by the OSC in
CPP20070529332001
cxxix
Carrie Chan, District Councilors Call for More National Education, The Standard, 20 July 2007
cxxx
Carrie Chan, Home Affairs Candidate Secures Wide Support, The Standard, 18 June 2007
cxxxi
Task Group on National Education, Promotion of National Education in Hong Kong – Current
Situation, Challenges and Way Forward, Commission on Strategic Development, CSD/2/2008, para. 99,
14 April 2008
cxxxii
People’s Daily Online, Socialist Harmony an Essential Attribute of Socialism with Chinese
Characteristic, 17 October 2007
cxxxiii
Xinhua, CPC Session Concludes, Elevating Social Harmony, 11 October 2006
cxxxiv
People’s Daily Online, Socialist Harmony an Essential Attribute of Socialism with Chinese
Characteristic, 17 October 2007
cxxxv
Xinhua, Development, Harmony Key to HK’s Prosperity: Wu, 2 December 2006
cxxxvi
Xinhua, Senior CPC Leader Highlights Socialist Core Value System for Social Harmony, 3 March
2007
cxxxvii
Wu Bangguo, Programmatic Document on the Building of a Harmonious Socialist Society, Renmin
Ribao, 20 October 2006 as translated by the OSC in CPP20061020701001
cxxxviii
Lau Nai-keung, Moral Regeneration is the Need of the Hour, China Daily Online, 22 October 2008
cxxxix
Wang Jianwei and Wen Zhongmin, The Spiritual Pillar for the Whole Nation’s Unity and Progress –
ON the Building of the Core Values System of Socialism, Jiefangjun Bao, 7 December 2006 as translated
by the OSC in CPP20061207710018
cxl
Xinhua, Senior CPC Leader Highlights Socialist Core Value System for Social Harmony, 3 March 2007
cxli
Tung Chee-hwa, 2005 Policy Address: Working Together for Economic Development and Social
Harmony, 2005
cxlii
Secretariat to the Commons on Strategic Development, Committee on Economic Development and
Economic Cooperation with the Mainland: How to Power Ahead Hong Kong’s Economic Cooperation with
the Mainland on All Fronts, CSD/EDC/2/2005, November 2005

Page 57 of 59
cxliii
Ibid.
cxliv
Ibid.
cxlv
HKSARG Information Services Department, Opening Remarks by CE at Question and Answer Session
in Legislative Council, Press Release, 28 May 2006,
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200605/18/P200605180302_print.htm
cxlvi
Panel of Constitutional Affairs, Minutes of Meeting held on Monday, 15 October 2007, at 2:30 pm in
the Chamber of the Legislative Council Building, LC Paper No. CB(2)589/07-08, paragraph 23(b).
cxlvii
Ibid.
cxlviii
After CE Tsang’s 2007-08 Policy Address Hong Kong’s Civil Service Bureau created an action plan
for a comprehensive training plan to enhance the understanding of the Basic Law among civil servants.
This includes the development of three core courses (Introductory, Intermediate and Advanced) for all civil
servants. The course material covered key concepts of the Basic Law, its various provisions and case
studies.
cxlix
Civil Service Bureau, Assessment of Basic Law Knowledge in Civil Service Recruitment,
http://www.csb.gov.hk/english/recruit/basiclaw/1372.html
cl
HKSARG Information Services Department, Opening Remarks by CE at Question and Answer Session
in Legislative Council, Press Release, 28 May 2006,
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200605/18/P200605180302_print.htm
cli
HKSARG Information Services Department, Opening Remarks by CE at Question and Answer Session
in Legislative Council, Press Release, 28 May 2006,
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200605/18/P200605180302_print.htm
clii
Jia Qinglin, Deepen Cooperation and Work Together for a Bright Future, Address at the Forum on
Economic and Trade Cooperation and Development Between the Mainland, Hong Kong and Macao
(Translation), HKSAR Government, 29 June 2006,
http://gia.info.gov.hk/general/200606/29/P200606290109_0109_16025.pdf
cliii
Ibid.
cliv
Ibid.
clv
HKSARG: Development Bureau and Planning Department, Hong Kong 2030 Planning Vision and
Strategy (HK2030 hereafter), Chapter 7: Population Dynamics, p.75, October 2007
clvi
Census and Statistics Department (C&SD), The Second Round of Thematic Household Survey in 2007
– Topic on Characteristics of Hong Kong Residents Having Resided/Having Stayed Substantially in the
Mainland,
clvii
HKSARG: Development Bureau and Planning Department, HK2030, Chapter 7: Population Dynamics,
p.74, October 2007
clviii
HKSARG, Hong Kong 2007, Population and Immigration, p.407.
clix
HKSARG: Census & Statistics Department, Year-end Population for 2008, Press Release, 16 February
2009
clx
DPA, Mainland Chinese Visitors Boost Hong Kong Tourism Figures, 26 February 2009
clxi
Civil Service Bureau, Hand in Glove-Co-operation with the Mainland, Civil Service Newsletter, No.56,
http://www.csb.gov.hk/hkgcsb/csn/csn56/56eng/e_pdf/e6-8.pdf
clxii
Commission on Strategic Development, An Overview of the Opportunities and Challenges of Hong
Kong’s Development (Translation), CSD/6/2008, 6 November 2008
clxiii
HKSARG Government Information Services Department, LCQ1: Marriages between Hong Kong
Residents and Mainlanders, Press Release, 16 May 2007,
clxiv
Vince Chong, The Going’s Been Good for HK – Mostly, The Straits Times, 29 June 2007
clxv
Task Group on Attracting Talent, Report of the Task Group on Attracting Talent, Commission on
Strategic Development, Paragraph 58, April 2008,
http://www.cpu.gov.hk/english/documents/csd/csd_1_2008.pdf
clxvi
HKSARG: Development Bureau and Planning Department, HK2030, Executive Summary, p.9, October
2007
clxvii
Anita Lam, Low Fares Urged for New Rail Link, SCMP, 25 February 2009
clxviii
National Development and Reform Commission, Outline of the Plan for Reform and Development of
Pearl River Delta (2008-2020), 3 January 2009
clxix
National Development and Reform Commission, Outline of the Plan for Reform and Development of
Pearl River Delta (2008-2020), 3 January 2009

Page 58 of 59
clxx
National Development and Reform Commission, Outline of the Plan for Reform and Development of
Pearl River Delta (2008-2020), 3 January 2009
clxxi
National Development and Reform Commission, Outline of the Plan for Reform and Development of
Pearl River Delta (2008-2020), 3 January 2009
clxxii
HKSARG: Development Bureau and Planning Department, HK2030, Executive Summary, p.49-50,
October 2007
clxxiii
Donald Tsang, 2008-09 Policy Address: Embracing New Challenges, 15 October 2008
clxxiv
Ibid.
clxxv
Ibid.
clxxvi
Task Group on Attracting Talent, Report of the Task Group on Attracting Talent, Commission on
Strategic Development, Paragraph 58, April 2008,
http://www.cpu.gov.hk/english/documents/csd/csd_1_2008.pdf
clxxvii
In 2002, at the 16th Party Congress, the CPC announce that “the first two decades of the 21st century
are a period of important strategic opportunities, which must be seized tightly and which offers bright
prospects. The congress agreed with the objectives of building a well-off society in an all-round way put
forward in the report and held that the objectives are of great significance for rallying the forces of the
whole Party and the people of all ethnic groups and speeding up the socialist modernization drive.” See
Xinhuanet, 16th CPC National Congress Closes, 14 November 2002
clxxviii
Wen Jiabao, Our Historical Tasks at the Primary Stage of Socialism and Several Issues Concerning
China’s Foreign Policy, 4 March 2007
clxxix
Ibid.
clxxx
Ibid.
clxxxi
Xinhua, Hu Jintao Gives Important Speech at Central Party School, Stressing Need to Firmly Take the
Great Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive to Win New Victories in Creating a Well-
off Society; Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia QInglin, Wu Guanzheng, Li Changchun, and Luo Gan attend;
Zeng Qinghong Chairs the Meeting, 25 June 2007 as translated by the OSC in CPP20070625045001
clxxxii
Xinhua, Hu Jintao Gives Important Speech at Central Party School, Stressing Need to Firmly Take the
Great Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive to Win New Victories in Creating a Well-
off Society; Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia QInglin, Wu Guanzheng, Li Changchun, and Luo Gan attend;
Zeng Qinghong Chairs the Meeting, 25 June 2007 as translated by the OSC in CPP20070625045001
clxxxiii
Jia Qinglin, Deepen Cooperation and Work Together for a Bright Future, Address at the Forum on
Economic and Trade Cooperation and Development Between the Mainland, Hong Kong and Macao
(translation), Press Release, 29 June 2006,
http://gia.info.gov.hk/general/200606/29/P200606290109_0109_16025.pdf
clxxxiv
HKSARG: Development Bureau and Planning Department, HK2030, Executive Summary, p.35,
October 2007
clxxxv
Carrie Chan, Ma Calls for Realism and Courage in Reform, The Standard, 16 May 2007
clxxxvi
National People’s Congress Standing Committee, “Resolution on Issues Relating to the Methods for
Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative region [HKSAR] and for Forming
the HKSAR Legislative Council in the Year of 2012 and on Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage,” 29
December 2007
clxxxvii
Malcolm Moore, China Will be a Democracy by 2020, Says Senior Party Figure, Telegraph, 15
October 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/3195370/China-will-be-a-
democracy-by-2020-says-senior-party-figure.html
clxxxviii
Wang Zhenmin, One Country, Two Systems, A Success, China Daily, 12 November 2007; Tang
Wen-cheng, Hu Jintao Offers Broad Discourse on the Five Major Relationships in a Harmonious Society,
Ching Pao, No. 350, p.24-28, 1 to 30 September 2006 as translated by the OSC in CPP20060922715024
clxxxix
Xinhua, Communiqué of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th CPC Central Committee, 19
September 2004 as translated by the Open Source Center in CPP20040919000057
cxc
Joseph Y.S. Cheng, Preface, The July 1 Protest Rally: Interpreting a Historic Event, (ed. Joseph Y.S.
Cheng), (Hong Kong, City University Press: Hong Kong, 2005). xii-xiii.

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