Abstract

The article investigates the managers of the audit firms upon the relationship between
the audit risk and audit fees through survey. Based on the historical and experimental
data and literatures, it is concluded a common point of view that there exists a positive
relationship between audit risk and audit fee. The aim of the article is to find the
possibility of other elements affect the relationship between audit fee and audit risk in
terms of the survey to the audit firms.
Table of content

Abstract ...........................................................................................................................1
1.0 Introduction ..............................................................................................................2
2.0 Literature review.......................................................................................................3
2.1 Audit pricing model and low-balling theory...........................................................3
2.2 Risk model review...................................................................................................6
2.3 Hypothesis review ..................................................................................................7
3.0 Methodology:.............................................................................................................9
3.1 The purpose of survey ............................................................................................9
3.2 Reasons for using a survey in this paper.................................................................9
3.3 Sampling strategies................................................................................................10
3.4 How to design our survey questions......................................................................10
3.5 Data issue...............................................................................................................11
4.0 Analysis.....................................................................................................................11
4.1 Competition among audit firms ............................................................................12
4.2 Low-balling provided by auditing firms................................................................13
4.3 Measurement to reduce the audit risk....................................................................13
5.0 Conclusion and Limitation.....................................................................................15
6.0 reference...................................................................................................................15
7.0 Appendix..................................................................................................................18
7.1 Appendix 1 (Survey questions).............................................................................18
7.1 Appendix 1 (Top 100 accounting firms in Australia)............................................18

1.0 Introduction
According to the previous studies it can be concluded that a well-acceptable theory is
there exists a positive relationship between the audit risk and audit fee. However, we
have doubted that whether the positive relationship might be affected by the auditor
rotation (“Australian Auditor Independence Requirements” issued in 2006). The key
statutory provision about auditor rotation, s.324DA of Corporations Acts raises a
limited term for eligibility to play a significant role in audit of listed companies is 5
consecutive years. This statutory law probably increase the competition in the audit
marketplace. Basis on this situation, we are interested in finding whether there is a
strong competitive pressure to audit firms to reduce audit fee to obtain new clients after
5-year-rotation regulations issued. However, this low-balling price strategy conflicts
with the sufficient quality control procedures and qualified auditor input which comply
with the assurance standards, guidelines.

The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. The next section provides a
review of the prior research and identifies the hypotheses. This section is then followed
by a description of the research method and the analysis of the findings. The final
section is devoted to a summary and limitation of the paper.

2.0 Literature review

2.1 Audit pricing model and low-balling theory
The pricing model is a well-researched topic in literature review. Simunic (1980)
originally develops an audit fee model explaining nexus between the audit risk and audit
fees. The hypothesis is: When market for audit is competitive, the minimum fees for
different level of audit quantity will equal the incremental expected total cost.
The model is well developed in 2000s. At December 15, 2003, SEC (Securities and
Exchange Commission) alter the audit fee disclosure requirements therefore more
classified and integrated audit services are being performed. Based on regulations set by
SEC in 2006 Dunmore and Shao not only propose a nonlinear regression model to
investigate the different fees charged by auditors in various risky scenarios but also
develop a linear relationship between the audit risk and audit fees.
Although Messier in 2008 states that audit pricing model is the essential component to
assist auditors to make audit decisions. It still can be argued that merely obeying
Simunic’s model will transfer the focus from specification of pricing model to
exploration of different determinants for audit fees. A variety of factors like the client
size, complexity of operation and risk, industry of client, the firm type of client should
be considered as determinants for audit fees according to the review. Based on the
previous results on audit pricing model, audit resources are the vital elements
determining the audit fees. By utilizing the specific pricing model auditors are able to
evaluate a specific client. Therefore it is necessary to take a look at the empirical pricing
model. It is again Simunic originally introduces the variable factors in analysis of audit
effort and audit risk.
In spite that Palmrose fails to propose the statistic nexus between audit risks and audit
fees its contribution is still remarkable due to the declaration that there exists a positive
relation between client’s size and audit fees. In 1994 the conclusion is supported by
Anderson who asserts that the size of the auditor firms could exert a significant
influence on the assessment of risk and performance of the auditor’s revenue. However
the limitation for the theory is it merely applies to small clients rather than the sample of
the large clients.
Audit risk has the association with audit fees in a subsequent positive or negative
consequence however the role of risk is a difficult concept to understand. Therefore
O’Keefe (1994) investigates the likelihood of bearing the legal costs of risk by the audit
firm and their clients. The goal is achieved by examining the nexus between the
auditor’s business risk and audit fees. The opinion is agreed by Bell, Landsman, and
Shackelford (2001) and both literatures hold the opinion that there is a positive
coefficient nexus between the audit fees and audit risk.
In 2005 Lyon and Maher also investigate the relation between audit risk and fees paid to
auditors by examining the client’s misconduct. They predict that auditors will charge a
fee premium to compensate a higher risk. Their hypothesis has been supported by the
statement that there is an obvious relationship between the audit fees and the payment
of bribes. The research illustrates that the audit fees are higher to clients disclosing to
have paid bribes.
Audit fee is decided by various determinants with the purpose maximizing the firm’s
profit therefore it becomes common phenomenon that the auditors grant a lower price
(discount fee) to the first-year client. The method involved can be defined as “low-
balling price”
According to the term regulated in AICPA, 1978, “low-balling of audit fee is the fee
that auditors charge for initial engagement below cost in order to obtain business in the
audit market and impair audit independence”.
When it comes to the low-balling behavior it can be attributed to “purchase” by auditors
of information on the client’s true financial statements. In another words initially-
engaged clients who are assessed as low risk customers are eager to pay an increased
renewal fees.
It is the common phenomenon that audit firms are more willing to reduce the audit fees
to certain extent to lure more clients. In order to set tone of the audit industry then in
1981 DeAngelo defines “low-balling” as the practice of setting fees below total current
costs during the initial audit engagement.
Tread way Commission, a subsidiary of AICPA (1987) make the conclusion: “auditing
firms led to the competition between the audit fees, the main pressure exerted on the
cost of bring the appropriate issues.” The action can be taken involve reducing staff and
reducing time in manual process. By focusing on the pricing of the first-year audit fee
we can test for the role of pricing of risky engagements in the context of the practice of
low-balling.
Following prior literature, study relies on a regression framework to determine how risk
is priced in the first year of an audit engagement for a comprehensive sample of U.S.
public firms with audit fee data between 2000 and 2006. As in prior studies of audit-
fees, we include several firm characteristics that proxy for audit effort and audit risk.
Consistent with prior studies, we find that auditors discount audit fees for first year
audits compared to continuing audits, confirming the existence of low-balling in the US
audit market (Turpen 1990; Walker and Casterella 2000; Ghosh and Lustgarten 2006,
Ghosh and Pawlewicz 2008).
However Arrunada and Paz-Ares (1995) hold the different opinion on the effect of the
low-balling of audit fees. Based on their literature review and well-organized pricing
model they propose that the application of “low-balling” will inevitably decrease the
competition between the audit firms. In the light of the statement as the audit costs
increase there could be a definite reduction in the incentive for audit firms to be
efficient.
According to SEC (2000) the SEC has regarded the innovation as a frustration by
criticizing: “create an economic incentive that may inappropriately influence the audit”.
The evidence is in 2000 former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt states that “the audit is
sometimes priced lower to attract clients willing to pay for higher margin consulting
services” it can be inferred although low-balling has demonstrated the willingness of
auditor to keep clients and it may benefit the firm to certain extent, the problems
existing at the discount of audit price have the risk leading to “unhealthy” competition
in the long run.
Levitt supports the assertion in 2000 by stating:” This discounting of audit prices is
problematic as it demonstrates a willingness of auditors to make compromises with
clients in order to attain lucrative contracts for non-audit services. Audits are discounted
to promote the more profitable business of NAS so a high level of NAS is considered to
be a sign of lower audit quality.
By review of the pricing model

2.2 Risk model review

According to terms regulated by U.S.GAAP and U.S.GAAS: “the risk that the auditor
may unknowingly fail to appropriately modify his opinion on financial report that are
materiaibility to do audit under the “general accepted auditing standards” (GAASlly
misstated” [AICPA, 1983,PAR.2] All auditors have the respons).
SEC (association between financial reporting risk and audit fees) has also accepted the
disciplines set by the GAAS to meet the disclosure requirements. Therefore auditors are
required to take a host of circumstances into account and then choose the most suitable
approach to audit. Meanwhile auditors are supposed to gain sufficient knowledge of a
company’s internal control as well as the ability to examine the effectiveness of controls
especially they plan to rely on the substantive procedures.
Based on the method established by Morgan and Stocken (1998), client’s business risk
and risk of litigation costs (AICPA 1992) are main components of auditor’s risk. It
should be beard in mind that even the audit is done accordance with GAAS the
likelihood of existence of litigation risk can be still high. (SAS NO. 107, Footnote 2).
When it comes to the factors contributing to the audit risk Houston et al, (1999)
proposes that the litigation is the main reason leading to business risk and it is
evidenced that minority of the business risk arises from other components. Based on the
previous studies the audit risks can be decomposed into three components: (1) inherent
risk (2) control risk and (3) detection risk. {Definition stated at Statement on Auditing
Standards (SAS)}.
The mathematical relationship between the risks can be expressed in the formula below:
AR = IR x CR x DR
Note: each item is defined conditionally due to various scenarios therefore all
components can be combined multiplicatively. However according to the method raised
by Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky [1982] auditors are more willing to use the
simplifying rules instead of complex rules. Many assumptions have been raised in
1980s. Example is an abstract from “accounting review, April 1985” with three
hypothesis listed below:
H1: when control risk rises it will lead to a greater slump in control reliance in a more
susceptible process than in a less susceptible process.
H2: when control design strength decreases it will lead to a greater reduction in control
reliance in a more susceptible process than a less susceptible process.
H3: when the test strength decreases it will lead to a greater reduction in control reliance
in a more susceptible process than a less susceptible process.
By understanding the definition of Audit risk (AR, the risk which the auditor may
unknowingly fail to appropriately modify his or her opinion on financial statements that
are materially misstated). It can be inferred that the level of understanding of the audit
risk model is decided by profession of auditors in performing an audit.

2.3 Hypothesis review

Nexus between the audit risk and audit fees
Collier and Gregory (1996) investigate the nexus between audit fees paid to auditors
and audit committees in both supply and demand sides. Based on their method, at
demand side the preference of low risk may strength auditors to work extra hours to
maintain the quality of the audit and thus lead to an increase in audit fees. As auditors
have the incentive to ensure a high quality audit then the risk of litigation, deterioration
and ruin of the fame in the event of fraudulent activity will be relatively reduced or
eliminated.
Another finding is that the higher external audit fee is probably the result of application
of internal control. This result indicates that firms that engage in greater internal
monitoring through the application of internal audit also demand higher quality external
auditing and thus the payment to auditors goes up.
Houston 1999 Philips 1999 Beaulieu 2001, suggest that auditor should contemplate the
nexus between the aggressiveness of audit reporting and risk of manipulation process
before action.
Then in 2003 Gul proposes a positive relation between the audit risk and audit fees. In
2004 Bedard and Johnstone demonstrate the theory by performing a set of data analysis.
They utilize the internal information of a proprietary company to do client’s risk
assessment and conclude that management risk and governance risk have the linkage
with an increase in planned audit effort and increasing pricing level.
However the statement declares that “a higher audit fee implies higher audit quality”
(Francis, 2004, p.352) the higher audit fees imply an increased audit testing and as a
consequent a higher quality audit should improve the quality of financial reporting and
thus reduce or eliminate external audit risk. In the light of the statement Shannon L.
Charles, Steven M. Glover, and Nathan Y. Sharp (2010) raise two hypothesis associated
between financial reporting risk and audit fees.
Two hypotheses come out afterward:
H1: Audit fees increase as financial reporting risk increases.
H2: The responsiveness of audit fees to financial reporting risk increases.
Another hypothesis incorporating the committee factors are presented below:
H1: Higher external audit fees are associated with the existence of an audit committee.
H2: Higher external audit fees are associated with audit committees that are more
independent, have greater accounting and finance expertise and meet more frequently.
H3: External audit fees are associated with an interaction between audit committee
independence, accounting and finance expertise and meeting frequency.
All the literature review is the existing research around “low-balling of audit fee”,
pricing model and risk model.
Firstly, by taking a brief look at the “low-balling”, the reasons why most firms adjust
the audit fees are methodically investigated. It will guide us perform the survey
sufficiently and make it relevant to the topic.
Secondly by reviewing various pricing models we bear in mind there are a host of
determinants in pricing model while in the survey the size of client is our focus and will
be further discussed. The discussion is about will the influence exerted by application of
low-balling be different in various size of firm?
Finally it can be inferred after review that audit risk is difficult concept to understand.
Although the nexus between various risks (inherent risk, control risk and diction risk)
can be explained in a formula, it still hard to capture and assess the audit risk.
Therefore the purpose of reviewing various risk models is to choose the most relevant
pricing model in the survey from professional perspective.
3.0 Methodology:
3.1 The purpose of survey
Basis on the literature review above, it is generally believed that there is a positive
relationship between the audit risk and audit fee. Audit firms charge their clients high
audit if they find the level of audit risk is high. However, there is no telling that it is
always positive in every circumstance. Numbers of elements existed to exert impact on
this relationship. Our target of this paper is to find more detail to prove or refute this
opinion. In particular, we are interested on whether the restriction of 5 years rotation
affects the positive relationship between audit fee and audit risk.
Due to the 5 years rotation principle came out, the cooperative time between audit firms
and their clients have been reduced sharply. Hence, more and more new clients show up
in the audit market. This situation could probably result in intensifying competition
among different audit firms. Inevitably, some of the audit firms might provide low-
balling price for attracting new clients. Nevertheless, the audit firm which get new
clients by giving discount of the audit fee does not have enough experience to minimise
the firms risk exposure because this is their fist cooperation. On the other hand, because
of the low audit fee, the timing and extent of audit procedures input to audit are less
than before. Hence, the audit risk will increase.
We want to raise survey questions to find out the possibility of the 5 years auditor
rotation affects the positive relationship between audit fee and audit risk on the basis of
the above analysis and discussion.

3.2 Reasons for using a survey in this paper

For the purpose of exploiting in this topic, we made a survey to investigate respondents:
Australia audit firms. We believe that doing a survey in questionnaire is the best way
for us. Firstly, survey can be administered from remote locations by using email or
telephone. In this case, there are thousands of audit firms. They locate in different area
of the country. It is impossible for us to interview even small part of them. In addition,
almost all the audit firms have emails. It is the most convenient way for us to send them
the survey by email. Further more, as we can get respondents’ email easily, large
samples are feasible. The more sample we choose the more accuracy of the statistical
result.

3.3 Sampling strategies

We expect to collected feedback from managers of audit with their points of view.
Obviously, the population of the investigation is all the audit firms in Australia. We did
not choose the whole world scope because different countries have different audit
standards. The sample of the population is the audit firms which will receive the survey
questions. We choose the judgement sampling to select our sample which is top 100
accounting firms in Australia. The criterion of choosing top 100 accounting firms is
basis on their revenues, service scope, and how many of their employees.

3.4 How to design our survey questions

Firstly, we have to check whether the audit firms have new clients which entered into
contract last year. Secondly, if the audit firm really get new clients last year, the second
step is to calculate how many new clients in every selected audit firms and the
proportion of new clients in its total clients. It is important for the survey as this data
can prove whether 5 years rotation restriction has increased the number of new clients
in audit firms. After getting this data, we can find out that the competition in audit
market affected by increasing or decreasing new audit clients. Generally speaking, the
increased rotation frequency probable result in intensifying competition in audit market.
Hence we assume that there is more competition between audit firms in external audit
market after 5 years rotation restriction issued. Further more, due to the increased
competition, some audit firms may obtain an assurance engagement by charging a lower
audit fee for attracting a new client. This is called “lowballing policy”. We want to
know how many audit firms have taken the lowballing policy to obtain new clients and
their reasons. Next, there is another query coming up, do the small audit firms gain the
same benefit from the lowballing policy as well as the large audit firms? Following this
query, there are several aspects need to ask. We will keep focus on whether audit firms
adjust the time and qualified staffs assigned to the new client’s task. And what quality
control procedures will be taken to comply with all applicable assurance standards and
guidelines under a low level of audit fee. In addition, we want to figue out whether
different sizes of audit firms exert impact on the sufficiency of the audit risk assessment
on the new client’s audit task. At last, we want to know if there is other beneficial
policy taken by audit firms to obtain the initially-engaged clients besides lowballing
policy.

3.5 Data issue

The first stage is sending survey questions to managers of audit firms by email. The
second stage is the collection of their responses.
On one hand, collection surveys have the potential to provide an enormous amount of
information vital to planning the management of your collection. Due to all of our
survey questions are open-ended questions, there are different kinds of answers of the
survey questions. Which means the procedures of collect and analyse the responses is
difficult. In order to reduce the complex, we are going to create a database through
Microsoft Office Access for data analysis. Because the answers of the survey are sent
back by email, it is easy for us to copy audit firms’ answers to the Access database from
email box. And separate their answers into groups which have different points of view.
On the other hand, we have to consider there are a portion of audit firms will not reply
our survey questions. It is concern that the percentage of effective survey questionnaires
must stay at a high level. Otherwise, the survey is not precise as we expect.

4.0 Analysis
Our survey is based on the assumption that there is a positive nexus between audit risk
and audit fee. Our targeted respondents are the managers from top 100 audit firms in
Australia.
Generally the aim of the survey is to gather various opinions from managers of audit
firms upon low-balling strategy. There are 2 limbs decomposed: 1) gather the responses
to influence of low-balling in terms of risk assessment and pricing model 2) analyse the
factors that should considered in order to attain the new clients in terms of audit fees.
As can be concluded from the Arthur Andersen and Enron case, it is the long-term
relationship (approximately 10 years) between clients and auditors that leads to the
corruption. Therefore the Section 203 of the SOX prohibits a audit firm from providing
audit services to a company for certain continuing period.
In Australia it regulates that “the limited term for eligibility to play a significant role in
audit of listed companies is 5 consecutive years.”
Such mandatory auditor rotation will inevitably bring a series of revolution especially in
audit operation and it can be inferred that certain strategy will be rearranged or replaced.

4.1 Competition among audit firms

According to the results that all firms confirm they do contract with new clients last
year regardless the population of clients it can be inferred that the audit market becomes
more active than before during the survey period.
In another words the competition among audit firms turns out to be more fiercely.
The evidence is that approximate % respondents declare the new clients dominated the
revenue. As a result it can be predicted that it must be introduction of certain
measure/measures that stimulate the market.
In order to find out the causes to the phenomenon it is necessary to do the strategy
review which is to compare the previous prevailing strategy with the current common
practice. The quality-oriented strategy dominated the industry previously. However with
the introduction of rotation policy auditors are more willing to reduce the audit fees
(price-oriented) in order to lure clients.
To summarize, the explanation to alteration of strategy is introduction of rotation policy
on one hand, the motivation of audit firms on the other.
But it should be noticed that due to variability of circumstances and complexity of the
risk assessment, the merits or demerits of the strategy should be further discussed.
Furthermore as a host of determinants for risk assessment such as procedure, reputation
and competence of auditors vary in large and small audit firms, whether the competition
brought by new policy will benefit all sized corporation could be questioned and further
discussed.
It becomes a common phenomenon it is the increasing level of competition within the
audit industry pushing audit firms to offer discount fees.
4.2 Low-balling provided by auditing firms

In the survey % of the audit firms confirm that they do offer discount fees to new clients
last year. It is the evidence to the statement that auditors are more willing to provide low
price to the first-year clients rather than those with continuing engagements.
According to the survey results, about % of firms accept that the audit risk has been
increased by the application of low-balling price. Therefore it is crucial to examine the
reasons.
Normally the nature of the client should be considered as a priority. The complexity of
client’s risk should also be considered.
However by the application of the lower audit fees, certain negative effects come up
with the phenomenon that the financial reporting risk increases with the deterioration of
quality for audit services.
In the article we support one of the causes is the insufficient resource allocated to low
charged clients that lead to the poor performance of the audit service. Additionally, the
inferior understanding of audit procedures, lack of knowledge and experience dealing
with clients also contribute to the increase of audit risk. In the scenario created to
respondents in survey it is likely that auditors may carry out irregular practices in order
to attain the client, for instance the timing and extent of audit procedures are lessened,
such behaviour will increase the risk of audit failure.
The opinion then has been supported by the survey results that % of the auditors believe
that the application of low audit fees has exerted negative effect upon audit process and
main reason for unqualified audit is the low price.

4.3 Measurement to reduce the audit risk

Most auditors accept the opinion that the audit risk (detection risk) increases by offering
a discount fee to new clients. The next step is to figure out the alternatives to eliminate
or reduce the audit risk.
Recommendations are as follows:
According to the results it is suggested that audit fees for initially-engaged clients is
approximate % less than those for continuing services.
It is a significant alteration in audit. As payment to auditors decrease, it will inevitably
affect the motivation of managers in the firm. The auditors’ attitude to clients may be
altered from positive to negative. With less charge on clients, managers are more likely
to nominate insufficient auditors responsible for the audit tasks.
Although the payment to employees is saved, the audit risk conversely is raised.
According to the mathematical formula below:
DR = AR / (IR x CR).
When inherent and control risks increase, the detection risk need go down. Therefore
audit procedures will be adjusted by auditors. Normally more procedures are required in
various scenarios, timing, nature and extent.
As a consequence the goal is to limit the risk to the acceptable low level and see an
appropriate balance between the costs of an audit opinion and costs of performing the
additional audit procedures to reduce audit risk.

Another finding from the survey is that reporting problems frequently happen during the
first-year clients.
By enquiring measures that auditors take to limit the potentially increasing risk, we bear
in mind the common practice adopted by most audit firms as well as practices tackling
clients with different size and industry.
For instance the procedures taken to gas, oil exploration industry will be different with
manufacturing industry.
Facing the influence exerted by adoption of low-balling audit firms should judge the
level of risk and work on designing the procedures.
Obtaining an understanding by reviewing the clients’ previous experience, enquiring of
appropriate staff personnel, inspecting relevant documents and records and observing
the financial decisions and operations assist auditors to figure out the risk level and thus
to create relevant assessing procedures.
By analysing the responses from audit firms upon question (!!!!!), we find all firms are
assessing the potentially increased risk and trying to produce an acceptable level of
detection risk by performing substantive procedures.
(Again it can be explained by formula above: inherent and control risk can’t be
controlled by audit firms, detection risk is the only one item can be controlled)

5.0 Conclusion and Limitation

Almost all research studies have limitations and a finite scope. It is the same to this
paper. Firstly, due to all of our survey questionnaires are open-ended questions, it will
take much more time for respondents to answer than close-ended questions. It is
possible that the manager of an audit firm do not even want to waste their precious time
on answering these complex questions. It will make the effective survey questionnaires
not enough for analysis. However, as we discussed above, there are thousands of audit
firms located in different areas. It is impossible for us to interview even small part of
them. Secondly, there is some of the survey questions refer to secrets of corporate
governance. It might be that some managers of audit firms are either reluctant to answer
that or answer it without facility.

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7.0 Appendix
7.1 Appendix 1 (Survey questions)

Survey questions:

1) Do you have any new clients last year? How many new clients
entered the contract with you for audit service last year? What is the
percentage of the new clients among all clients?

2) Do you think the “low-balling price policy” can attain the new
clients? Specify your reasons below
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
_________________________________

3) Do you think the small audit firms can benefit from the low-balling
price strategy as well as the large audit firms?

4) What is your consideration when determining the specific audit price

for new clients? Do you think there is a need to adjust the audit time
and procedures after reducing the audit fees?

5) What measures will you take if suffering an increased audit risk by

offering the discount audit fees to first-year clients?

6) Do you think the impact upon sufficiency of the audit risk

assessment will be varied by different size of the audit firms after
they reduce the audit fees?

7) What is cost or benefit outcome of “low-balling price strategy” in

your firm compared to the previous?

8) What other beneficial policy will you take to attain the initially-
engaged clients besides “low-balling strategy”?

7.1 Appendix 1 (Top 100 accounting firms in Australia)

PricewaterhouseCoopers
KPMG
Ernst & Young
Deloitte
WHK Group
PKF
BDO
Horwath
Pitcher Partners
Grant Thornton
Moore Stephens
RSM Bird Cameron
William Buck
Bentleys MRI
H&R Block
HLB Mann Judd
Acumen Alliance
Ferrier Hodgson
McGrathNicol+Partners
KordaMentha
WalterTurnbull
SimsPartners
MGI Australian Association
Hall Chadwick
UHY Haines Norton
Forsythes
DFK Australia
BKR Walker Wayland
Hayes Knight Group
Nexia Court & Co
INPACT McDonald Carter
Accru Group
MSI Group
Lawler Partners
Johnston Rorke
DKM Group
Perks
Prosperity Advisers
Australian Solutions Group
Boyce Chartered Accountants
Borough Mazars
Avenir Group
Nexia ASR
Worrells Solvency and Forensic Accountants
Crosbie Warren Sinclair
Einfeld Symonds Vince
Gaddie Metz Kahn
McLean Delmo & Partners
BRW
Roberts & Morrow
Cutcher & Neale
Bell Partners Accountants & Business Advisors
Jones Condon
Stanton Partners
Edwards Marshall
Pilot Partners
Duesburys Nexia
Gould Ralph & Company
Hood Sweeney
Webb Group
The Allan Hall Partnership
Ulton
Fennell Allen & Co
Byfields
Forsyths
Alan Morse & Co
Hill Rogers
Williams & Partners SCI
Bedford Titley
Molloy Orr & Ronan
PDY Partners
NelsonWheeler Nexia
Saccasan Bailey Partners
Pritchard Adams
Camerons Accountants & Advisors
Mulqueen Griffin Rogers
WMS Chartered Accountants
Bush and Campbell
Stewart, Brown & Co
Wise Lord Ferguson
MB+M Business Solutions
Poole & Associates
Wearne & Co.
McInnes, Graham & Gibbs
Duncan Dovico
Benson Partners
Marsh Ticknell
Anderson Roscoe
Cassim Calligeros Simos
GHR Accounting Group
Wilson Watt Panadrea
Barnes Dowell James
MJC Partners
Rhodes Docherty
Bentley Brett & Vincent
Berger Piepers
Elliotts Accounting