The development of EU Crisis Management: RRM to IfS

CHENG, Yu-Chin

Lecturer
Institute of Political Studies, Charles University, Prague

Chief Consultant

GHNI Criminal Law Policy Centre, Geneva

Email: cheng@fsv.cuni.cz

According to Council Regulation No. 381/2001, the rapid reaction mechanism

(hereafter RRM) needs triggering in order to stabilize society when crisis or disaster
occurs in the beneficiary countries. This mechanism is designed not only for EU member
states but also for the third country, and EU becomes influential actor in international
politics. RRM expired at the end of 2007, and the Instrument for Stability (hereafter, IfS)
follows up in 2007. Regard of the advantage and disadvantage of RRM, IfS has been
more effective and well functioned.

Unlike RRM, IfS creates “The Peace-building Partnership” to promote pre-

emptive crisis management to face various crisis and disaster around the world. This
paper consists of the key parts to overview the development of EU crisis management—
the function, effectiveness, and the development of RRM and IfS, To fit for purpose, this
research is designed to apply Organisational Decision-Making theory for theory base, and
is employed Open-Source Intelligence Study to manage data, and historical review is
used for research approach.

This paper assumes that crisis management need cooperative collaboration among
nations; in particular, some current disaster cannot be solved by single individual country.
EU coordinated and collaborative crisis management provides an example for the world
to manage crisis globally, and it could inspire a common community of crisis
management — shoulder consequence, not avoid responsibility, capacity and ability
contribution. This paper is designed to test the possibility of establishing Crisis
Management World Community to rethink trend of crisis management via EU crisis
management strategy.

Keywords: Instrument for Stability of EU, Rapid Reaction Mechanism, Crisis

Management World Community, Open-Source Intelligence, Organisational
Decision-Making

1
Introduction

Since the Treaty of European Union (TEU) was approved, the European Union
has been in charge of both European and worldwide affairs; as we know the EU
framework has become the most crucial centre for European foreign policy debates,
where national policies meet and part (Zielonka, 2008). The EU Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) is responsible for coordination of EU member state’s foreign
policy as well as the interest of national security. According to the CFSP, the EU
provides the Crisis Management to help the member states as well as other countries; by
the reason of crisis wide spreading under the influence of globalisation and geography,
the EU could be affected when other countries suffer crisis that destabilise entire society;
therefore, the EU provide the aid of crisis management for the third countries in order to
ensure Europe safety.

Among the measures of the EU crisis management, the Rapid Reaction

Mechanism (RRM) and the Instrument for Stability (IfS) are worthy to analyse in this
research, because they mention the concept, theory and practice of rapid crisis
management to avoid the crisis worsening; no doubt, the pattern of EU rapid crisis
management is capable of providing the model to establish the Crisis Management World
Community (CMWC). The EU rapid crisis management contents the military and civilian
parts, and the task team includes both EU officials and NGO staffs; particularly, any
crisis takes place anywhere outside Europe, the diplomatic coordination and international
cooperation are the key elements for implementing the EU rapid crisis management.

Fast reviewing the history of EU crisis management, European crisis management

practices have distinguished themselves from previous ones in three aspects since 1990s.
First there is difference in opportunities for intervention, and secondly, there has been the
development of more complex forms of intervention in conflict-torn societies, reflected in
new practices of “peace-building”, “post-conflict reconstruction” and “peace support
operations”, and thirdly, there is an transatlantic debate about the principles and practices
that Europe and the United States should pursue to shape an emerging new world order.
(Bono, 2004)

Apparently, the EU tries to get rid of US influence to launch the crisis

management to fit the purpose of EU interest seeking in the world. Additionally, the
European Security Strategy (ESS), published in 2003, gave a push to more active
international role for the EU: “the EU is inevitably a global player…it should be ready to
share in the responsibility for global security.” (Hazelet, 2006) The ESS reminds the
member states’ responsibility for the rest of the world, and emphasises the reality of US
withdrawal from the world responsibility. For EU, the RRM and IfS guards Europe as
well as the world.

1. Key Issues

Before studying EU crisis management, researching crisis is necessary; crises

provide one of the most fascinating and frightening subjects in all diplomatic history and

2
international relations. They occur suddenly, demand quick decisions by leaders under
intense pressure, threaten vital interest, and raise enormous uncertainties about war and
peace. (Gilbert& Lauren, 1980) The Successful crisis management eliminates chaos and
reconstructs stability and achieves peace; however, unsuccessful one provokes national
loss, and even it escalates into war; therefore, the crisis management is very important for
national security as well as international security.

The EU crisis management solves natural disaster and human misconduct, and it
supports region or country reconstruction as well as achieves peace-building; EU will
provides the crisis management to where the authority is less able to solve, and no doubt,
any kinds of crisis are tackled by the EU. According to the RRM and IfS regulations, the
EU is responsible to provide any solutions for the crisis that can destroy a region or
country inside and outside Europe; stability promotion in Europe and the rest of the world
matches the EU interest.

2. Theory Base

To consider the characteristics of the EU crisis management, the theory base of

this paper employs Organizational Decision-Making Theory to analyse the development
of EU crisis management; in fact, EU is not only a coordinative executive body but also
an organisational decision-making institution. This pro Europe international organisation
is designed to collect the effective resources from the member states to provide common
and unambiguous contribution in any field whether they are happy or unhappy to do by
the TEU. (Cheng, 2010b)

It may happen that member state A is more influential than others, and they have
no more opinions or keep silent, but the final decision made is still interpreted that whole
members have decided. Since EU member states adopted Göteborg programme in 2001,
making decision in organisation together become the principle and regulation for EU
crisis management; therefore, applying Organizational Decision-Making Theory is ideal
to study theory and practices of EU crisis management (Cheng, 2010b) The decision
process and procedure of the RRM and IfS both belong to organizational decision-
making, and it is perfect match for theory base in this paper. As we know, theory base is
the base of theory that provides a formal statement of the rules on which is based of ideas
which are suggested to explain a fact or event or, more generally an opinion or
explanation.

In the context of COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 381/2001 and No

1717/2006, the RRM and IfS disagree to make decision out of organisation, and the
operations tasked by the RRM and IfS are joint and coordinative; the joint and
coordinative operations means no ambiguity, and it cannot exist in the process and
procedure of organisational decision-making. As a matter of fact, ambiguity may be in
the preference in organisation, but the outcome of the decision-making in organisation
matches consistency as well as the characteristics of the RRM and the IfS.

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 The ODMT cannot be explained that every decision maker makes decision while
ongoing process of decision-making is starting; the organisational decision-making does
not exclude any decision maker in organisation, but sometimes not every makes decision
in organisation; decision makers, who do not make any decision in organisation,
participate the process and procedure of decision-making, and it also can be named
organisational decision-making.

Unlike individual decision-making, organisational decision-making emphasises

incentives and penalty; the incentives of organisational decision-making encourage
decision makers to make decision, which is better for an organisation; the penalty of
organisational decision-making publish decision makers, who make worse decision to
damage the operation or survival of organisation. Organisational decision-making may
appear repeated decisions on the same or similar issues or problems, such like the RRM
and the IfS; the repeated decisions in organisation usually happen to the same situation,
but not to the same decision makers.

Organisational decision-making ensures that different groups of decision makers

make similar decisions, which support organisation. Organisational decision-making is
usually hierarchical system in which low or middle-range managers or staffs report to the
superiors as well as the RRM and the IfS; EU delegates of the RRM and the IfS are on
the equal position and superior, and make decision, and the Commission has to report any
situation of operation of the RRM.

Organisational decision-making is both choice-based and rule-based as well as the

RRM and the IfS; members of an organisation choose preference, select situation, and
make the decision which is advantageous for organisation; however, the preference and
situation chosen by organisation cannot break and violate rules, because penalty is in
organisation; penalty protects organisation from damage, and continues its survival;
obviously, choice and rule of organisation are consistent.

Uncertainty is unacceptable in organisational decision-making, and ambiguity is

avoidable as well; decision-making in organisation is expected to reduce inconsistency
and to clear fog of information, and mass thinking is rational and mature, unlike
individual. Choice of the members in organisation is common preference and interest as
well as a faith, and it is clear and consistent as well as decision.

Organisational decision-making accepts any future outcome to any situation, and

receive burden on disadvantageous consequence; it is difficult to expect or predict the
result of decision-making in organisation, even though every decision maker processes
information well, overcomes limitation of rationality, and mobilises expertise; while
organisational decision-making is made, every decision maker share advantage or
disadvantage of consequence.

Not to mention, organisational decision-making is stable and unchangeable. In the

first and second phases of decision making in organisation (no decision is made),
different preference, choice, risk taking or data processing among decision makers are

4
allowable, but the last phase (decision is made) insists consistent and changeless
decision-making.

Every decision maker’s experience is different in organisation; some are

experienced, but some are not; as a result, successful decision makers tend to
underestimate the risk they have experienced and the risk they currently face (Shapira,
2002); nonetheless, both successful and unexperienced decision maker tend to make less
risky decision to support survival of organisation, of which is rule-based. Organisational
decision-making is not only on the basis of consequence and preference but also on the
basis of procedures, routines, rules and regulations. Rules evolve over time, and current
rules store information generated by previous experience and analysis in a form not easily
retrieved for systematic current evaluation; rules can be seen as chosen consciously and
accepted rationally by actors who calculate the expected consequences of their actions.
(Shapira, 2002).

Rule assists a decision maker, who is not very experienced, revolve the same or
similar issue and problem, and it limits a successful decision maker to execute power or
to violate the other decision maker’s right in accordance with the terms of organisational
decision-making. In addition, rules lead imitation of decision-making among decision
makers to fit the purpose of organisation in principle. Implementation of rules can be
treated as simply for of rational action in which choices are made among alternative
interpretations in terms of expectations of consequences for the actor’s interests. (Shapira,
2002) Unlike individual, organisational decision-organisation has to satisfy decision
makers and rules of organisation; moreover, the outcome or consequence of
organisational decision-making cannot reach every decision maker’ expectation or
preference, but fulfill the rules of organisation instead.

It usually leads to competition of decision-making among decision makers in

organisation as well as cooperation; it is obvious that competition comes up before
decision-making, but cooperation results in after making a decision in organisation.
Besides, decision-making is usually shaped in organisation by reason of collaboration,
contest and imitation, and organisational decision-making emphasises interaction among
decision makers; additionally, decision-making is organised by time rather than causality,
and every decision maker is under stress of limited time. (Shapira, 2002)

Discussion is a necessary process and procedure in organisational decision-making, and it

is also a rule as well. Unlike individual decision-making, decision-making in organisation
needs discussion by the reason of coordination of decision-making; however, discussions
leading to decisions seem to be filled with apparently irrelevant matters, and the
postdecision elaboration of justification often seems to be considerably more extensive
than the exploration of reasons before a decision. (Shapira, 2002)

Before organisational decision-making, data collection and processing can help

every decision maker understand the current and past similar situation; unlike individual
decision-making, organisational decision-making has two types of data management—
secretariat and decision maker. In general, an organisation founds a secretariat to manage

5
general affairs, including data collection and process; in addition, not only a secretariat
but decision maker in organisation collects and processes data as well; not to mention,
data management in organisation usually coexists secretariat and decision maker. Data
management is a very significant phase of the cycle of organisational decision-making,
and it impacts on preference, choice, discussion and decision-making. Therefore, Double
Data Processing is often starting off in organisational decision-making.

Organisations arrange priorities through hierarchies that both buffer rules from the
consciousness of others and create orders of precedence and subordination among rules
and identities. (Shapira, 2002) This statement could stand, but not for the RRM and the
IfS; the RRM and the IfS are the systems and rules that establishes a temporary
organisation to make decision, and coordinate EU institutions to launch rapid reaction
when sudden and unpredictable crisis or conflict happens.

The decision-making from the RRM and the IfS are not hierarchy, and every
decision maker is equal and no discrimination in these two systems. Having said that,
every decision maker in the RRM has the same right and obligation to make decision, and
even the chairmen of the RRM and the IfS just conduct the programme of meeting, but
has no right or power to order or enforce every decision maker of the RRM. Nonetheless,
some of decision maker are influential, and could impact on other decision makers; on
the other words, the uninfluential decision makers are in the majority, but other powerful
decision makers are in minority; in accordance with the rule of organisation, decision-
making in organisation wins by the majority.

On the other words, there is no powerful decision maker in organisation, but

imitation and influence exists as well. Because of rule of organisation, every independent
decision maker is expected to make decision that satisfies organisation; no surprise, every
decision maker imitate and influence each other to achieve the purpose of organisation.
Figure 1 explains interaction of decision maker in organisation. Obviously, the types of
organisation consist of hierarchy and non-discrimination; hierarchy indicates distribution
of power in organisation, but non-discrimination relates to distribution of imitation or
influence.

The interaction among decision makers in organisation has three types—hierarchy

(top to down), hierarchy (down to top), and non-discrimination; in hierarchy (A), the
superior is powerful and influential in decision-making, and the organisational decision-
making is high relevance with the superior; in hierarchy (B), this is the typical principle
“majority wins”, and the organisational decision-making reflects the major opinion; in
non-discrimination, there is no hierarchy, but every decision maker imitates, consults,
advises and impacts on each other; as a matter of fact, the organisational decision-making
is usually unanimous in non-discrimination.

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 Hierarchy (A) Hierarchy (B)

Top
Down

Down Top

Non-discrimination

Figure 1 Interaction of decision maker in organisation

Source: Cheng, Y. C. (2010a). Accelerated decision-making procedure: Case study of EU rapid

reaction mechanism. (Unpublished PhD). Political Science, Praha.

Decision makers in non-discrimination organisation have high common

perspectives and expectation, and their common decision is always strong and
unbreakable. Organisational decision-making is based on rationality and calculation, and
discussion and data processing and collection are essential for decision makers in
organisation. Nevertheless, organisational decision-making still has its limitation—for
example, it is under clouds of ambiguity.

Organisational decision-making would be a relatively simple matter if

probabilities could always be estimated and objectives were clear and consistent. Under
those conditions, a decision maker could systematically compare and evaluate alternative
courses of action with ease; most important organisational decisions today are made
under clouds of ambiguity. (Shapira, 2002) As a matter of fact, there is still an ambiguity
after precise data collection and processing, excellent decision analysis techniques, and
effective discussion and consultation; what can decision makers do is reduce possibility
of ambiguity having. If organisational decision-making can remove all clouds of
ambiguity, it will waste time and energy; in fact, it is doubt whether decision makers in
organisation is capable of dealing with or not.

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 It is mention that discussion is elementary for organisational decision-making,
and what to discuss is strategic in organisation. According to figure 1, agenda building
belongs to the superior, the staff, every decision maker or the secretariat; every agenda
reflects the preference and choice of decision maker in organisation, but it is sure that
every organisational decision-making cannot damage the interest of organisation. Figure
5 describes the ecology of organisational decision-making.

Clouds of ambiguity

Situation Data Agenda Choice and

Identification collection build and alternatives
and discussion
processing
Decision
If necessary Fit Making
and fit Processing 1.Priority organisation
organisation necessary 2.Preference
data 1. Common choice
2. Common or different preference
If unnecessary Unnecessary Unnecessary Not match 3. Share responsibility
turn down data priority organisation 4. No heroism
and
preference

Garbage can Garbage can Garbage can Garbage can

Figure 2 Ecology of organisational decision-making

Source: Cheng, Y. C. (2010a). Accelerated decision-making procedure: Case study of EU rapid
reaction mechanism. (Unpublished PhD). Political Science, Praha.

Situation identification is the beginning phase of organisational decision-making,

decision maker or the secretariat analyse whether the situation fits organisation or not; if
the situation is compatible with organisation, decision maker or the secretariat carries out
data collection and processing; if no compatibility, decision maker or the secretariat drop
the situation into garbage can. When data collection and processing undertake, analysis
technique filters data flow, and receives necessary data, but removes unnecessary one;
necessary data helps agenda building and inspires discussion. Agenda building consists of
priority and preference, but unnecessary priority and preference will be thrown away;
priority and preference need discussion, and choice and alternatives comes up when
discussion is finished.

Not all choice and alternatives are chosen and considered, but they relate to
organisation instead; Choice and alternatives frame decision-making, and clear ambiguity;
as a matter of fact, ambiguity cannot be removed at all, but it can be decreased.

8
 Ambiguity exists all phase of organisational decision-making, but its possibility and
quantity is decreasing phase by phase. When choice and alternatives fit organisation,
decision makers make organisational decision, which represents common choice,
common or different preference, and shares responsibility and consequence, and heroism
is unacceptable in organisation.

3. Methodology
Unique
or
Crucial
Question Theorisation after
finding analysis and prove
Input Case Unique
Crucial
Answer Failed
seeking

successful
Drop case or another
selection Usual
or
less important

Produce theory
Analysis only

Figure 3 develop the Single-Case Research Design

Source: Cheng, Y. C. (2010a). Accelerated decision-making procedure: Case

study of EU rapid reaction mechanism. (Unpublished PhD). Political Science, Praha.

Moreover, this paper applies OSINT (open source intelligence) to collect and
process research materials, and this method matches of information gathering of EU
crisis management1; in accordance with OSINT definition, the research materials come
from public and unclassified, and include text, video, and audio, but those material
collected by author cannot be interpreted as OSINT; instead, they are called Open Source
Data (OSD) and Open Source Information (OSIF).

OSD is primary source, and usually comes from raw print, broadcast, oral
debriefing or other form of information from primary source, such like a photograph, a
tape recording, a commercial satellite image, or a personal letter from an individual.
OSIF has an editorial process that filters and validates data, such as newspapers, general
daily report, books and periodicals. And OSINT is unclassified information that has
been deliberately discovered, discriminated, distilled and disseminated to a select

1
OSINT is set to play a great role for EU crisis management while working in the field in crisis prevention,
in conflict evaluation or in event monitoring.

9
audience in order to address specific question, and Validated OSINT (OSINT-V) is the
last process to test the credibility of intelligence.

Planning and directing

OSINT
Open source Collection, gathering and processing

Analysis and synthesis OSINT-V

Figure 4 the process of OSINT

Source: Cheng, Y. C. (2009). Shaping military intelligence management with e-

interaction. Defence Information Management, Taipei.

Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4

Idea coming Concept development Collection and process data Analysis and Synthesis

Researchers’ perspective
Individual Team Definition Data Collection
Proposal

Research
Importance OSD OSINF
evaluation
OSINT-V

OSINT-V
OSINT

Target setting

&

Resetting Process
Advice and
suggestion

Continuous update and reshaping Revision and evaluation

Figure 3 OSINT process

Source: Cheng, Y. C. (2008 a). The application of OSINT in IR studies. 政治大學外交學系第六

屆「研究生論文發表會」(Zhèng Zhì dà Xué Wài Jiāo Xué xì dì Liù Jiè "Yán Jiū Shēng
Lùn Wén fā Biǎo Huì "), Taipei. P.16.

10
EU Rapid Reaction Mechanism

The Helsinki European Council called on the Commission on December 10 and

11 1999 to stress in particular that rapid financing mechanisms such as the creation by the
Commission of a Rapid Reaction Fund (RRF) should be set up to allow the acceleration
of the provision of finance to support EU activities, to contribute to operations run by
other international organisations and to fund non-governmental organisations (NGO)
activities, as appropriate. (No. 381/2001)

In accordance with complexity of sudden crises, the European Community (EC)

had decided to adopt one practical mechanism to respond critical crises. Having regard to
the Treaty establishing the European Community, and to proposal of the Commission,
and to opinion and consultation of European Parliament, EU decided to establish own
rapid crisis management to mobilise resources quickly to reciprocate the emergence of
situations of crisis or conflict. In February 2001, the RRM was created, and launched in
May in the same year. RRM was designed expectedly to be a civilian crisis management
tool, and to start off short-term intervention.

Videlicet, in the beginning, the RRM only conducted 19 cases, but increased upon
to 65 contracts in 2003, particularly boosted up to hundreds of cases in 2006; obviously,
RRM broadens contribution and cooperate intensively with local conductors. RRM is
viewed as civilian crisis management, and it usually employs mediation, negotiation and
other non-military tool to manage crises. Notwithstanding it cannot interpret that RRM
uses no military force, but instead RRM makes decision on military operation with the
Council’s permission, particularly when EU thinks military respond is necessary. (Cheng,
2008, 53)

The RRM is designed to enhance the EU's civilian capacity to intervene fast and
effectively in crisis situations in third countries. It will provide the flexibility to mobilise
Community instruments to be deployed quickly, whenever necessary. Commissioner for
External Relations Chris Patten said: “Conflict prevention and crisis management are at
the heart of the EU's Foreign and Security Policy agenda.” This mechanism will act as a
catalyser, allowing us to mobilise resources within hours or days rather than weeks or
months. (European Commission, 2001)

1. Accelerated Decision-Making Pattern

According to No. 381/2001, EU ministers must gather within 72 hours to respond

sudden crises. In this timeframe, QMV (Qualified Majority Voting) is applied for the
procedure of decision-making made by the Council, but the Commission employs the
procedure of accelerated decision-making (ADM) to allocate all necessary resource and
manpower to deal with crises. QMV helps the EU ministers to find common position on
the rapid crisis management issue, but accelerated decision-making of RRM speeds up
the procedure of decision-making. (Cheng, 2008, 54)

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 Figure 1 The procedure of Rapid Reaction Mechanism

Source: Cheng, Y. C. (2008). Regional aid to global disaster:

Review EU Rapid Reaction mechanism. Journal of US-China Public Administration, 5(6), 54.

It is to prove conclusively that RRM is created to break the limitation of crisis

management time, and to become a practical stabilizer to freeze the current heat of
sudden crises and to melt the future coldness of permanent reconstruction after crisis. At
last but not least, the Commission can promote international and regional organizations to
cooperate, and can enhance effectiveness of EU member states’ cooperation through the
launch of RRM. Obviously, the ADM is based on QMV and supports the RRM to take
quick respond to face any sudden or unpredicted crisis, and it removes bureaucracy whilst
decision making

2. Special Process for Crisis Management

The difference between the RRM and other EU’s crisis management instruments
is its speed and flexibility, and it can enable short term interventions, and moreover it has
world-wide coverage and can mix a number of measures under one intervention
according to the needs of the crisis. Besides, its purpose is to transport any useful
instrument as rapid stabilisers, and it provides the base for later longer-term
reconstruction and rehabilitation. Furthermore, the RRM has independent budget
reinforced by the authority of the Commission to decide fast on rapid interventions.

The characteristics of the RRM are twofold— immediate actions and reasonable
time-limit. As mentioned before, RRM manipulates all kinds of instruments necessary to
solve crises or conflicts, but its particularity is to mobilize quickly within limited time.
Having said that, immediate actions consist of deciding, financing and exercising actions.

12
All these actions need consistent, and carry out immediately. There is one indication
written in Council regulation (EC) no 381/2001 that any kind programme of RRM
validates within six months, except EC’s decision on expansion of RRM’s programmes.

The RRM is a reserve instrument, and therefore performance cannot be judged on

the ability to fully commit funds year on year; nevertheless, becoming a more complete
tool has allowed the RRM to take on a more structured approach, integrating a range of
actions at regional, national and local levels, covering the main stages of instability: i)
conflict prevention in countries and regions showing significant signs of instabiligy, ii)
assessment of possible Community responses to a crisis, iii) acute crisis management, iv)
post-conflict reconciliation; v) post-crisis reconstruction. Directorate CFSP. (2004).

All these instruments related with RRM pursue the alleviation of crises, through
human rights work, election monitoring, institution building, media support, border
management, humanitarian missions, police training and the provision of police
equipment, civil emergency assistance, rehabilitation, reconstruction, pacification,
resettlement and mediation; (European Commission, 2001) they are ready to start off
before the Council’s decision. Only the Council decides whether to launch RRM or not,
but the Commission conducts all activities.

EU Instrument for Stability

As well as other foreign country’s aid, EU is immediate to carry out crisis

management operation; in regard to EU crisis management theory and practices—“quick
fix in short time”, and the most appropriate and used method is the Instrument for
Stability (IfS), of which predecessor is Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM). The Council
Regulation No. 381/2001(the No.381.2001) created and enforced RRM in March 2, 2001.
In accordance with the No.381.2001, the RRM conducts disaster inside Europe and
outside the world, and besides it is mainly civilian-oriented and EU-supervising crisis
management tool and procedure. Of course, RRM also involves military action, but this
kind mission still be conducted by EU member states, instead of EU institutions. (Cheng,
2009) The RRM expired in 2006, and EU adopted IfS in 2007 to succeed EU crisis
management operation, and to broaden its budget line to collect more resource to start off
crisis recovery.

The IfS reflects EU concept—“Complex issues need a complex set of reactions”,

and it means that EU realises crisis brings more damage than the danger of war in today’s
world. The IfS adopts the major functions of the RRM, but accepts new instruments to
resolve new crisis; in order to match declaration on combating terrorism, the European
Council plans to integrate counter terrorist objectives into external assistance
programmes.

Besides, the IfS is granted more budget to deal with emerging crisis, and the it
adopts a new programme—the Interim Response Programmes to view the necessity for
establishing or re-establishing the essential conditions necessary for the effective
implementation of the Community’s external cooperation policies. (Council Regulation,

13
2006) This is also designed for better international cooperation for EU rapid crisis
management. In addition, the IfS cares violent conflicts more than the RRM, and it also
covers international and national criminal tribunals, and it enhances the flexibility in
decision-making and budget allocation.

Complex Set of Reactions Toward Crisis

Fundamentally, the IfS offers both technical and financial aids to where suffer
crisis that can ruin the stability of the region or country; therefore, the aids provided by
the IfS covers from economy, political, juridical, fundamental freedoms of human-being,
food supply, counter terrorism and organised crime, and so on. According to Council
regulation (EC) no 1717/2006, the IfS has a complex set of reactions against various
crises:

• Provide support to improve political development, and better the role of women in
politics; at the same time, offer the methods to help transparentise governance and
to maintain law and order.

• Support for international and national criminal tribunals, establish truth and
reconciliation commissions, and create ad hoc mechanism for human rights in
accordance with international human rights and rule of law standards.

• Provide anything necessary to settle displaced people, and ensure basic

employment for them.

• Help former combatants reintegrate into civil society, particularly child and
female soldiers or prevent them from gender-based violence.

• Curb illicit arms trade and unjust or violent military activities.

• Counter any threats that come from natural or man-made and damage public
health.

Not to mention, the IfS adopts or revises the methods for the other traditional
crises that have been resolved by the RRM; nonetheless, the IfS emphasises pre-and post-
crisis capacity building. According to Council regulation (EC) no 1717/2006, the IfS
aims at long-term measures and capacity of crisis management, and tries to strengthen the
capacity of international, regional and sub-regional organisation, state and non-state
actors to face crisis, such like promoting early warning, confidence-building, mediation
and reconciliation, and addressing emerging inter-community tensions, and improving
post-conflict and post-disaster recovery. (Council regulation, 2006)

Toward Crisis Management World Community (CMWC)

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 Crisis occurs from natural or man-made reasons, and it costs loss and threaten
survival of human-being; therefore the right way of crisis management is very important,
and it is also decisive to construct a worldwide crisis management community to
intensify international cooperation in this field. Apparently, more and more crisis needs
dealing with under international collaboration, because the cooperation strengthens
capacity to tackle the crisis and save time of discovering the solutions.

As a crisis manager, it would do well to anticipate by reaching out key agents

within member governments, the communities, and the mass media well before crisis
occurs, in order to exchange information, to coordinate planning, and to build the kind of
trust and partnership that are key to effective crisis management (Hart, Stern &Sundelius,
1998). To achieve Crisis Management World Community (CMWC), it is very necessary
to create the common decision-making and agenda setting mechanism, and adopts
multiples and various measures in different areas, particularly some methods or supports
have to respect culture or tradition; most importantly, the common concepts and
regulations of crisis management, and reaching out common definitions and response of
crises are also unforgettable factors when coming toward the CMWC.

Lessons and Experience contributed by the RRM and the IfS

The CMWC can apply lessons and experience from the RRM and the IfS, because
these two systems of crisis management cover the entire patterns of decision-making,
early warning systems, intelligence exchange, pre-and post-conflict reconstruction and
reconciliation. In accordance with the RRM and IfS patterns, the CMWC is provided for
the good model of international cooperation in crisis management; at the same time, the
CMWC can provide more budgets to achieve crisis management than EU can, because
more member states participate to international crisis management. No doubt, the task
team from the CMWC will become skillful by reason of more participation in
international crisis management.

Most importantly, the CMWC has no problem of expiration unlike the RRM and
the IfS, but it is a permanent international organisation, and the CMWC will grant the
membership for all authority; for example, some authority or governments have
sovereignty issues, but the CMWC considers the necessity of crisis management to grant
membership for them; the CMWC argues that international crisis management exempts
from political arguments.

Conclusion

Since EU took the international responsibility, the RRM and the IfS have been the
main systems to save Europe and the rest of the world from crisis; it is believed that both
crisis managements have become mature, and can provide valuable lessons and
experience for founding the CMWC. To appreciate the EU to be responsible for the
world, but all nations cannot request the EU to take whole burden of crisis management;
to share responsibility, to broaden participation, to pattern international crisis

15
management and to reach institutionalization are the major purposes to voice the CMWC
establishment.

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