Analysis
May 16, 2011
Summary: In shaping its policy
in the Arab Middle East, Turkey
had worked to build a network
of stable relationships with the
existing regimes. Now confronted
with regimes that have come
under popular challenges, it finds
itself in a difficult situation. There
is no established international
mechanism that prevents the
use of force by authoritarian
regimes against their citizens
who demand democratic reforms.
Turkish responses to Tunisian
and Egyptian developments
were in harmony with the United
States and the EU. In the Libyan
and then the Syrian crisis,
Turkey experienced difficulty in
formulating a quick response.
Syria presents a particularly
complex picture. The unity and
stability of Syria is critical for both
Turkish and regional interests
as well as those of the Western
Alliance.
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The Going Gets Tough:
Turkey Tries to Meet the Syrian Challenge
by İlter Turan
Who Is Next?
The countries of the Arab Middle East
have different sized populations, social
structures, religious and, in some
instances, ethnic compositions, and
types of leadership. But they also share
common problems. They are all under
some type of authoritarian rule. No
effective mechanism exists for citizens
to communicate their preferences to
their governments. Almost all have
poorly developed economies, which
have failed to create jobs for rapidly
expanding populations. All, including
those with major oil income, harbor
major income disparities. And the
military constitutes a relatively well-
organized and well-equipped organiza-
tion in each.
Now a wave of change is sweeping the
region. The awakening that started in
Tunisia and Egypt invited speculation
in regard to who would be next. Syria
received less attention in this game of
fortune telling. It is more isolated from
the international system than others,
with limited and somewhat unfriendly
relations with Western countries. The
United States has declared it a rogue
state — a U.S. ambassador returned to
Damascus only recently. It is ruled by a
political elite that has mastered the art
of ruthless application of authoritarian
rule, justified by hostile relations with
Israel and the state of siege that this
has necessitated, which has, in turn,
been used to hinder expressions of
discontent against the government.
At the outset, what happens in Syria
appeared to matter less than other
countries facing popular uprisings.
Syria is not a major oil/gas producer
nor does it have a major transit route.
While its cooperation in helping
Iraq stabilize has been important, its
influence is often seen as possessing
nuisance value, not a major deter-
minant of outcomes. Furthermore, it
has recently been reported that Syria
has been devoting more attention to
monitoring the Iraqi border in order
to prevent shipments of arms to Syrian
anti-government groups and infiltra-
tion of Syrian Islamic radicals.
There is also the complex question of
what could be done in Syria if events
erupted. There is no established inter-
national mechanism that prevents the
use of force by authoritarian regimes
against their citizens who demand
democratic reforms. Concerned coun-
tries act according to their own inter-
ests and judgments. The EU seems less
Analysis
than capable of doing very much unless the United States
takes the lead. Otherwise, each member country pursues its
own interest. Russia and China, both being authoritarian
systems themselves, are generally opposed to humanitarian
interventions. In Syria’s case, no country seems deeply inter-
ested in devoting resources to restrain the government’s
authoritarianism or to intervene actively, let alone militarily,
to stop bloodshed.
In Syria’s case, no country
seems deeply interested in
devoting resources to restrain the
government’s authoritarianism
or to intervene actively, let alone
militarily, to stop bloodshed.
Syria has a young leader who had been expected to bring
about change. Bashar al-Assad, unlike his father, Hafez
al-Assad, was not a military officer. He had spent much of
his time in England, training to be an ophthalmologist. His
ascendance to power owed much to the death of a brother
who had been groomed for the job. It had been felt that as
he gradually took the reins of power in and came to rely less
on the cadres he inherited from his father, he would render
the political system more moderate and less authoritarian.
Turkish-Syrian Relations
Turkey has displayed hesitancy in deciding how to respond
to Syrian developments. Turkey’s relations with Syria had
improved in recent years. It seemed that Syria wanted
to make a gradual comeback to the international system
through establishing closer relations with Turkey. Turkey
hoped that the mood of optimism owing to economic
betterment would dampen pressures for regime change.
During the Cold War Turkey’s relations with Syria were
distant. The Syrians had close relations with the USSR while
2
Turkey was a pillar of NATO. Also, the general direction of
Turkish foreign policy was to avoid getting entangled in the
politics of the Middle East.
Syrian territorial claims on the neighboring Turkish
province of Hatay and Turkey’s building dams/irrigation
schemes on the Euphrates, the main water source for Syria,
constituted the background for hostile relations. In 1999,
after Turkey threatened military action against Syria for
supporting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) ethnic
separatist terrorism and hosting its leader, Abdullah Öcalan,
Turkish-Syrian relations became transformed. Syria sent
Öcalan away; it stopped offering facilities to the PKK in
Bekaa Valley (Lebanon), then under Syrian control; and it
clamped down on PKK’s activities in the country itself.
The turnaround was remarkable. Relations expanded
rapidly in the domains of trade, investments, tourism, and
education. They gained special momentum after Ahmet
Davutoğlu became Turkey’s foreign minister. Turkey served
as host to proximity talks between Syria and Israel that
failed only after Israel staged its attack on Gaza in December
2008. Visa requirements were mutually cancelled. High level
visits became commonplace. Steps for building a “strategic
partnership,” with the two countries holding joint cabinet
meetings, were introduced. Projects were developed to
clean the minefields along the border and return them to
agricultural use. Turkish businesses sought investment
and export opportunities. Only recently, groundbreaking
ceremonies were held for a dam on the Orontes that would
provide flood control and water for both countries. Turkey
was looking forward to a long period of peace, stability, and
prosperity in its “special relationship” with Syria.
Turkey was looking forward to a
long period of peace, stability,
and prosperity in its “special
relationship” with Syria.
Analysis

The Syrian Crisis and Turkey
The contagion of mass uprisings demanding reforms and
democratization in the Arab Middle East caught all parties
with interests in the region, including Turkey, off-guard.
Turkish responses to Tunisian and Egyptian developments
were in harmony with the United States and the EU. But
making a choice in those cases was relatively easy. Turkey
had no major interests in Tunisia, and limited interests
in Egypt. Furthermore, major policy differences existed
between Turkey and Egypt regarding how to address the
Palestinian problem, especially its Gaza/Hamas dimension.
Also, the Turkish Prime Minister had wide appeal among
Egyptian masses who wanted President Hosni Mubarak to
go.
In the Libyan and then the Syrian crisis, Turkey experi-
enced difficulty in formulating a quick response. In Libya,
relations with the government of Col. Muammar Qadhafi
had been good. Turkey had developed substantial business
interests in building contracts totaling US$25 billion. Also,
Turkey was unsure of Western resolve to intervene. These
considerations initially led Turkey to encourage restraint,
appealing to Qadhafi to reform. Qadhafi seemed, however,
to be in no mood to accommodate. It soon became evident
that the best policy was to act together with other NATO
allies, among others, to prevent France from acting alone
to prevail in Libya. Turkey’s position against Qadhafi has
hardened slowly as it has become apparent that his ability
to stay in power is far from assured in view of the resolute
NATO position that his rule should end, and expressions of
anti-Turkish sentiment in Eastern Libya. Turkey has now
asked Qadhafi to leave only to be told, like others, that it
should not intervene in Libyan domestic affairs.
Syria presents a complex picture, unlike Libya where
Turkey’s major interests were mainly economic. Syria and
Turkey have relatively porous contiguous borders with no
visa requirements at the crossings. Already small groups
have crossed into Turkey asking for asylum, claiming (it
seems falsely) that their lives were in danger. If distur-
bances intensify, particularly in the North, Turkey would be
exposed to populations crossing the border, which it would
find difficult to cope with.
There is an additional dimension to Syria’s population in its
north east. This is a Kurdish region bordering the Kurdish
inhabited regions of Turkey and the Kurdish Regional
Government of Northern Iraq. Of late, Syrian Kurds have
displayed challenging attitudes toward the Syrian govern-
ment. Turkey is nervous that as Syria is trying to find a way
of accommodating the aspirations of its Kurdish population
for ethnic recognition within the framework of the nation-
state, the breakdown of the regime might unleash forces
that neither the new Syrian regime nor Turkey would find
easy to contain, while Northern Iraq might not resist the
temptation to support Kurdish separatism.
Turkey is nervous that as
Syria is trying to find a way of
accommodating the aspirations of
its Kurdish population for ethnic
recognition within the framework
of the nation-state, the breakdown
of the regime might unleash forces
that neither the new Syrian regime
nor Turkey would find easy to
contain.
It appears that centrifugal tendencies in Syria abound. The
most easily identifiable fault line is sectarian. The Assad
family and important command posts in the army are held
by the Nusayris, a heterodox religious minority. Questions
have been raised, for example, in regard to whether and for
how long the ordinary soldiers comprised mainly of Sunni
recruits will continue to fire on Sunni crowds demanding
reforms. In parts of Syria, tribal identifications are strong; in
others, regional identity combined with religious sect seems
to play an important political role. Although the secular

3
Analysis
approach of the Baas government has held the country
together, it has always been with the help of the military and
security agencies. It is far from clear if centrifugal tenden-
cies would not become too manifest should strong central
authority break down.
The unity and stability of Syria is critical for both Turkish
and regional interests as well as those of the Western Alli-
ance. Its collapse would open the way to enhanced Iranian
presence in Syria as well as Lebanon, presenting a challenge
to both Western interests and Israel. While Syrian-Israeli
relations are highly adversarial at the rhetorical level of, they
are otherwise predictably stable. A regime change might
well undermine such stability, setting off events that would
drag in other regional countries.
International conditions favor continuation of the Baas
regime under Assad. It must bring about reforms, however,
reduce the omnipotence and omnipresence of al-Muhabarat
(the intelligence and secret police agency), allow for greater
political participation, and demonstrate greater sensitivity
to demands emanating from society. The Turkish govern-
ment has hoped to persuade Assad to take bold steps
toward reforms. It is not clear if he has been persuaded and
whether he can command a reform process without the
concurrence of the military and the security agencies. The
answer to this question is not known but the policies of the
Syrian government have to date been far from encouraging.
Turkey is also reluctantly working on a plan B if the current
regime proves unsustainable.
In shaping its policy in the Arab Middle East, Turkey had
worked to build a network of stable relationships with the
existing regimes. Now confronted with regimes that have
come under popular challenges, it finds itself in a difficult
situation. It has to maintain relations with existing regimes,
promote change, and calculate how its actions affect its
credibility in the region and the world, its aspirations to
regional leadership, and its economic prosperity. The going
has gotten rough. It will not become easier until the process
of change has run its course.
İlter Turan, Professor, Bilgi University
İlter Turan is currently a professor of political science at Istanbul’s
Bilgi University, where he also served as president between 1998-2001.
His previous employment included professorships at Koç University
(1993-1998) and Istanbul University (1964-1993), where he also
served as the chair of the International Relations Department (1987-
1993), and the director of the Center for the Study of the Balkans and
the Middle East (1985-1993). Dr. Turan is the past president of the
Turkish Political Science Association and has been a member of the
Executive Committee and a vice president of the International Political
Science Association (2000-2006). He has served as the program chair
of the 21st World Congress of Political Science in Santiago, Chile, July
12-16, 2009. He is board chair of the Health and Education Founda-
tion and serves on the board of several foundations and corporations.
He is widely published in English and Turkish on comparative politics,
Turkish politics, and foreign policy. His most recent writings have
been on the domestic and international politics of water, the Turkish
parliament and its members, and Turkish political parties. He is a
frequent commentator on Turkish politics on TV and newspapers.
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